Today in 1965, 40 years ago Options

[brendan]

Here are some things that happened 40 years ago. I thought it would be good to take a look at where we have been. If you like this concept and want to help. Simply log in in the morning and post whatever news catches your eye from 1965.



New York Knickerbockers beat the Boston Celtics 123 to 113 but the Celtics maintained their lead in the standings.

Jerry Burke, pianist (Lawrence Welk Show), dies

February 13, 1965
President Johnson authorizes Operation Rolling Thunder, a limited but long lasting bombing offensive. Its aim is to force North Vietnam to stop supporting Vietcong guerrillas in the South.
http://www.vietnam-war.info/timeline/timeline2.php

February 13th, 1965: the album "The Rolling Stones, Now!" is released in the US
http://www.stones.at/stones/calendar/0213.htm

[kindergarten tea...]

I moved to Guam in October, 1965 and lived on Andersen A.F.B. for two years.
"Rolling Thunder" describes how they sounded! Frigging Amazing how all 18-20 sounded reving their engines and taking turns for take off! I remember this 24-7 for the entire two years. They took off around 11:00 P.M. and came back in the early morning around 5 to 6 if I remember right. The vibration shook our house.

http://www.war-stories.com/b52-poss-arclig...to-svn-1965.htm

KT

[brendan]

I moved to Guam in October, 1965 and lived on Andersen A.F.B. for two years. 
"Rolling Thunder" describes how they sounded!  Frigging Amazing how all 18-20 sounded reving their engines and taking turns for take off!  I remember this 24-7 for the entire two years.  They took off around 11:00 P.M. and came back in the early morning around 5 to 6 if I remember right.  The vibration shook our house. 

http://www.war-stories.com/b52-poss-arclig...to-svn-1965.htm

KT

Why were so many people sent to Guam. A lot of people I talked to said they went there.

[Marigat]

I was in fifth grade, the same age my daughter is now. What a different world she lives in!

[kindergarten tea...]

Why were so many people sent to Guam.  A lot of people I talked to said they went there.

Because Johnson stepped up the bombing! There is an A.F.B. there and a naval base. Guam is strategically located also. I was a senior in highschool there in '65 and graduated in '66. The commanding General then at Anderson A.F.B., Major General William J. Crumm died July 7, 1967 flying his last mission (which he did not have to do). It was so sad. His daughter was a friend of mine. General Crumm and his family were to leave the following week where he was going to work at the Pentagon. We were totally stunned. He was a wonderful person. I played tennis doubles with him once.

http://39th.org/39th/bio/crumm.htm

Major General William Joseph Crumm is commander, 3rd Air Division, Strategic Air Command. He is responsible for the management, operational control and employment of all Strategic Air Command forces in the Western Pacific, including the B-52 bombing missions and all Air Force aerial refueling operations in support of U.S. operations in Southeast Asia. 

General Crumm was born in New York City in 1919 and attended Scarsdale High School and the University of Virginia. He entered military service in 1941, receiving his wings and commission in 1942 through the flying cadet program. 

His first assignment was with the 91st Bomb Group in the European Theatre of Operations as a B-17 pilot. He returned to the United States as a member of the "Most Deserving Bomber Crew of the 8th Air Force" and lectured at 30 combat crew training schools and all of the major aircraft factories.

In May 1943, the general was assigned to the 796th Bomb Squadron, Alexandria, La., as operations officer, and later the same year he was assigned to Second Air Force in Colorado Springs, Colo. In October 1944 General Crumm assumed command of the 61st Bomb Squadron, Smoky Hill Army Air Base, Kan., and shortly after he moved the unit to Guam. 

In 1946 he was assigned to the Flying Training Division, Strategic Air Command, as assistant training officer. In rapid succession he became chief of the Bomb Section, deputy of the Training Section and acting chief of the Training Section. 

General Crumm attended Air Command and Staff School at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., in August 1947. He took command of the 344th Bomb Squadron, Spokane Air Force Base, Wash., in July 1948. In January of the following year he became director of operations for the 98th Bomb Group at Spokane Air Force Base. 

Moving to Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., in 1950, General Crumm was assigned as chief of the Special Projects Division, Director of Operations, Strategic Air Command. He became chief of Operational Plans Division, Director of Operations, Strategic Air Command, in June 1953. He attended B-47 Advanced Flying School at McConnell Air Force Base, Wichita, Kan., and in October 1954, he was assigned as deputy commander of the 22d Bomb Wing, March Air Force Base, Calif., and then as the director of operations for Fifteenth Air Force also at March.

In September 1956, General Crumm served as task force commander at Thule Air Force Base, Greenland. He returned to March Air Force Base in April 1957 as commander of the 320th Bomb Wing. In October 1958 he was transferred to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., as chief of the Strategic Division. 

He became chief of the Atomic Operations Division, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1960. In August of the same year he was reassigned to Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb., as senior Air Force member on the newly organized staff of the director of strategic target planning. In June 1962 he became chief of operations for the director of strategic target planning. 

General Crumm received his present assignment as commander, 3rd Air Division, Strategic Air Command, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, in July 1965. 

On July 7, 1967, two B52 aircraft were enroute to a combat mission when they collided in mid-air over the South China Sea. The aircraft were approximately 20 miles offshore at the point of Vinh Binh Province when the accident occurred. Seven crewmembers from the aircraft were rescued, but Avolese, Crumm, Bittenbender, Blankenship, Jones, and McLaughlin were not. 

All the missing crewmen onboard the two B52 downed that day were believed to be dead. It is unfortunate, but a cold reality of war that their remains were not recoverable. They are listed with honor among the missing because their remains cannot be buried with honor at home.

The General wears the wings of command pilot. His decorations include the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal with three oak leaf clusters, Air Force Commendation Medal, and the Army Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster.

[mommadona]

Feb. 15th:

1965 - A new red and white maple leaf design is adopted as the flag of Canada replacing the old Canadian Red Ensign banner.

[mommadona]

Nobel Prizes

* Physics - Sin-Itiro Tomonaga, Julian Schwinger, Richard P. Feynman
* Chemistry - Robert Burns Woodward
* Medicine - François Jacob, André Lwoff, Jacques Monod
* Literature - Michail Aleksandrovich Sholokhov
* Peace - United Nation's Children's Fund (UNICEF)

World Leaders on this day:

Africa

* Algeria -
1. Ahmed Ben Bella, President of Algeria (1962-1965)
2. Houari Boumédiènne, President of Algeria (1965-1978)
* Burundi
o Monarch - Mwambutsa IV Bangiriceng, King of Burundi (1915-1966)
o Prime Minister -
1. Albin Nyamoya, Prime Minister of Burundi (1964-1965)
2. Pierre Ngendandumwe, Prime Minister of Burundi (1965)
3. Pié Masumbuko, Prime Minister of Burundi (1965)
4. Joseph Bamina, Prime Minister of Burundi (1965)
5. Léopold Biha, Prime Minister of Burundi (1965-1966)
* Guinea - Ahmed Sékou Touré, President of Guinea (1958-1984)
* Kenya - Jomo Kenyatta, President of Kenya (1964-1978)
* Liberia - William V.S. Tubman, President of Liberia (1944-1971)
* Rhodesia -
o Monarch - Elizabeth II, Queen of Rhodesia (unrecognized by her) (1965-1970)
o Officer Administering the Government - Clifford Walter Dupont, Officer Administering the Government (1965-1970)
o Prime Minister - Ian Smith, Prime Minister of Rhodesia (1965-1979)
* Rwanda - Grégoire Kayibanda, President of Rwanda (1961-1973)
* Uganda
o President - Sir Edward Mutesa, President of Uganda (1962-1966)
o Prime Minister - Milton Obote, Prime Minister of Uganda (1962-1971)
* Zambia - Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia (1964-1991)

Asia

* Afghanistan
o Monarch - Mohammed Zahir Shah, King of Afghanistan (1933-1973)
o Prime Minister -
1. Mohammad Yusuf, Prime Minister of Afghanistan (1963-1965)
2. Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal, Prime Minister of Afghanistan (1965-1967)
* Brunei - Omar Ali Saifuddin III, Sultan of Brunei (1950–1967)
* People's Republic of China
o Head of State - Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China (1959-1968)
o Premier - Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council (1949-1976)
o Head of Communist Party - Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Communist Party of China (1935-1976)
* India -
o President - Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, President of India (1962-1967)
o Prime Minister - Lal Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of India (1964-1966)
* Japan
o Monarch - Showa Emperor, Emperor of Japan (1926-1989)
o Prime Minister - Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan (1964-1972)
* South Korea -
o President - Park Chunghee, President of the Republic of Korea (1963-1979)
o Prime Minister - Chung Il-kwon, Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea (1964-1970)
* Malaysia
o Tuanku Syed Putra ibni Almarhum Syed Hassan Jamalullail, Yang di-Pertuan Agong (1960-September 20, 1965)
o Sultan Ismail Nasiruddin Shah Sultan Ismail Nasiruddin Shah ibni Almarhum Sultan Zainal Abidin III, Yang di-Pertuan Agong (September 21, 1965-1970)
o Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Alhaj, Prime Minister of Malaysia (1957-1970)
* Pakistan - Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan (1958-1969)
* Singapore -
o Singapore secedes from Malaysia on August 9, declares independence.
o President - Yusuf Ishak, President of Singapore (1965-1971)
o Prime Minister - Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore (1959-1990)
* Taiwan (Republic of China)
o President - Chiang Kai-Shek, President of the Republic of China (1947-1975)
o Premier - Yen Chia-kan, President of the Executive Yuan (1963-1972)

[edit]

Australia and Oceania

* Australia
o Monarch - Elizabeth II, Queen, Head of the Commonwealth (1952-present)
o Governor-General -
1. William Sidney, Governor-General of Australia (1961-1965)
2. Richard Casey, Governor-General of Australia (1965-1969)
o Prime Minister - Sir Robert Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia (1939-1941, 1949-1966)

[edit]

Europe

* Denmark
o Monarch - Frederick IX, King of Denmark (1947-1972)
o Prime Minister - Jens Otto Krag, Prime Minister of Denmark (1962-1968)
* Finland
o President - Urho Kekkonen (1956-1981)
o Prime Minister - Johannes Virolainen (1964-1966)
* France -
o President - Charles de Gaulle, President of France (1959-1969)
o Prime Minister - Georges Pompidou, Prime Minister of France (1962-1968)
* Federal Republic of Germany -
o President - Heinrich Lübke, President of the Federal Republic of Germany (1959-1969)
o Chancellor - Ludwig Erhard, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (1963-1966)
* German Democratic Republic -
o Communist Party Leader - Walter Ulbricht, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (1950-1971)
o Head of State - Walter Ulbricht, Chairman of the Council of State (1960-1973)
o Premier - Willi Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers (1964-1973)
* Ireland -
o President - Éamon de Valera, President of Ireland (1959-1973)
o Prime Minister - Seán Lemass, Taoiseach (1957-1966)
* Italy
o President - Giuseppe Saragat, President of Italy (1964-1971)
o Prime Minister - Aldo Moro, Prime Minister of Italy (1963-1968)
* Sweden
o Monarch - Gustav VI Adolf of Sweden, King of Sweden (1950-1973)
o Prime Minister - Tage Erlander, Prime Minister of Sweden (1946-1969)
* United Kingdom -
o Monarch - Elizabeth II, Queen of the United Kingdom (1952-present)
o Prime Minister - Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1964-1970)
* Vatican City
o Pope - Paul VI, Bishop of Rome (1963-1978)
o Secretary of State - Amleto Giovanni Cardinal Cicognani, Cardinal Secretary of State (1961-1969)

[edit]

Middle East

* Israel -
o President - Zalman Shazar, President of Israel (1963-1973)
o Prime Minister - Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel (1963-1969)
* Oman - Said Bin Taimur, Sultan of Oman (1932-1970)
* United Arab Republic
o President - Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of the United Arab Republic (1958-1970)
o Prime Minister -
1. Ali Sabri, Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic (1962-1965)
2. Zakaria Mohieddin, Prime Minister of the United Arab Republic (1965-1966)
* Yemen Arab Republic
o President - Abdullah as-Sallal, President of the Yemen Arab Republic (1962-1967)
o Prime Minister -
1. Mahmoud al-Gayifi, Prime Minister of the Yemen Arab Republic (1964-1965)
2. Hassan al-Amri, Prime Minister of the Yemen Arab Republic (1965)
3. Ahmad Muhammad Numan, Prime Minister of the Yemen Arab Republic (1965)
4. Abdullah as-Sallal, Prime Minister of the Yemen Arab Republic (1965)
5. Hassan al-Amri, Prime Minister of the Yemen Arab Republic (1965-1966)

[edit]

North America and the Caribbean

* Canada
o Monarch - Elizabeth II, Queen of Canada (1962-present)
o Governor General - Georges Vanier, Governor General (1959-1967)
o Prime Minister - Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister (1963-1968)
* United States - Lyndon Johnson, President of the United States (1963-1969)

[edit]

South America

* Brazil - Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco, President of Brazil (1964-1967)
* Paraguay - Alfredo Stroessner, President of Paraguay (1954-1989)
* Peru - Fernando Belaunde Terry, President of Peru (1963-1968)

[kindergarten tea...]

This explains better why so many Americans were stationed in Guam in 1965 Brendan.

Operation Arc Light

June 18, 1965 - August 15, 1973


10 years after becoming operational, the B-52 bomber saw action when 27 B-52F's from Andersen AFB, Guam, hit Vietcong strongholds in South Vietnam on June 18, 1965. This campaign known as Operation Arc Light had by year's end involved flying more than 1,500 sorties in South Vietnam, raining tons of bombs on enemy troop concentrations, bases and supply dumps. Laotian raids followed in December 1965, with raids to North Vietnam added in April 1966.

While some military leaders thought highly of Arc Light, many Air Force commanders thought using B-52s for tactical purposes diverted them from their principal mission of strategic deterrence. Others believed they were being used ineffectively, and simply blowing holes in the jungle.

The B-52F was the first Stratofortress model to participate in combat. B-52F aircraft taken from the 7th and 320th Bomb Wings were sent to bomb suspected Viet Cong enclaves in South Vietnam in June of 1965 under a program known as Arc Light. The B-52Fs were stationed at Andersen AB on Guam, the operation being supported by KC-135As stationed at Kadena AB on Okinawa. The first raid was carried out from Guam by 27 B-52Fs on June 18, 1965 against an unseen Viet Cong target at Ben Cat, 40 miles north of Saigon. This raid was not an outstanding success, and it is not at all certain that anything of military value was actually inside the target area that was bombed. The accuracy of the bombing was less than spectacular, and only about half the bombs actually landed in the target area. In addition, a general pall was cast over the entire operation since it had cost the loss of two B-52Fs which had been destroyed in a mid-air collision on their way to the target, killing 8 crew members.

There were no B-52F losses in actual combat, although two B-52Fs were destroyed when they collided in mid-air on their way to the first Arc Light mission.

*(This is a mistake. This was NOT the first Arc Light mission! The two B-52Fs collided in mid-air
July 7, 1967!) KT *

In spite of the poor results of the first strikes, the raids continued. There was initially some skepticism about the usefulness of a high-altitude radar bomb drop against guerrilla forces. Nevertheless, within a few months there was universal acceptance of the power of the B-52 raids as a new type of artillery.

B-52Ds of the 28th and 484th Bomb Wings deployed to Guam in March and April of 1966, replacing the B-52Fs. Over the next few years, 11 more B-52D wings were rotated to combat duty in Southeast Asia. These included the 7th BW, 22nd BW, 70th BW, 91st BW, 92nd SAW, 96th SAW, 99th BW, 306th BW, 454th BW, 461st BW and 509th BW. SAC crews who ordinarily would have been assigned to the B-52G or H models were sent through an intensive two-week course on the B-52D, making them eligible for duty in Southeast Asia. The program was known as Arc Light. While on duty at Andersen AFB, the B-52Ds were assigned to the 4133rd Bomb Wing (Provisional), which had been established on February 1, 1966. Some wings actually completed three tours of duty in support of the Vietnam war.

The first B-52 Arc Light missions flown out of Kadena AB on Okinawa began on February 16,1968 inaugurating a 30-month period in which three bases were involved in the B-52 effort in Southeast Asia.

In the spring of 1967, B-52Ds were sent to U Tapao Airfield in Thailand, from which they were able to complete their missions without inflight refuelling. U Tapao was initially more of a forward field than it was a main operating base, with responsibility for scheduling missions still remaining on Guam. Small numbers of aircraft were drawn from each SAC B-52D unit to support the effort in Thailand, which was vested in the 4258th Strategic Wing. By 1970, U Tapao had assumed sole responsibility for the Arc Light campaign and was home for over 40 B-52s, and it became a main operating base with a much greater degree of self-sufficiency. In 1970, the 4258th SW was eliminated and replaced by the 207th SW.

After Linebacker II, the B-52s returned to Arc Light missions. The last such mission took place on August 15, 1973. All the B-52s were withdrawn from Southeast Asia shortly thereafter.



------------------------------------------------------------------------

Operation Menu: Secret Bombing of Cambodia
This extensive campaign of bombing suspected Viet Cong sanctuaries in Cambodia was authorized on May 15, 1969 by president Nixon. Three days later 60 B-52s took off from Guam on what seemed to be yet another Arc Light mission. At the last possible minute 48 of the bombers crossed over into Cambodia and dropped twenty-four tons of bombs on what intelligence had determined was the operating area of the COSVN (Central office for South Vietnam) headquarters.



Cambodia was increasingly bombed by B-52s from March 1969 onward. These Cambodian bombing raids, one of the first acts of the new Nixon administration, were initially kept secret, and both SAC and Defense Department records were falsified to report that the targets were actually in South Vietnam. The Cambodian raids were actually carried out at night under the direction of ground units using the MSQ-77 radar, which guided the bombers to the release point and told them the precise moment to release their bombs.This made the deception easier, since even the crew members aboard the bombers did not have to know what country they were bombing.
The bombing of Cambodia was ordered by President Richard Nixon on March 16, 1970. Vietnam enclaves in Cambodia. Conducted under extraordinary secrecy these missions, collectively known as Operation Menu, continued for fourteen months. In 3,875 sorties 108,823 tons of bombs were dropped on targets in Cambodia, a neutral country that admittedly helped the Viet Cong greatly by turning a blind eye.

[graham4anything]

The one thing one cannot compare to today is, Vietnam was a bi-partisan war, supported heavily by both sides

It was started by Eisenhower, escalated first by Kennedy, further by LBJ, finally by Nixon, who ended up ending the war

It started as positive by all sides and opposition only became mainstream later on, by 1968 costing LBJ a reelection run, but continuing another 4 years after thrrough Nixon's first term.

It is not though something the entire war can be blamed on our side or there side. That did not happen. When blame started, it was on the president, whichever one was in office.

In 2003 the Iraq war was one with immediate rumbling of it being for the wrong cause.

[mommadona]

The one thing one cannot compare to today is, Vietnam was a bi-partisan war, supported heavily by both sides

It was started by Eisenhower, escalated first by Kennedy, further by LBJ, finally by Nixon, who ended up ending the war

It started as positive by all sides and opposition only became mainstream later on, by 1968 costing LBJ a reelection run, but continuing another 4 years after thrrough Nixon's first term.

It is not though something the entire war can be blamed on our side or there side. That did not happen. When blame started, it was on the president, whichever one was in office.

In 2003 the Iraq war was one with immediate rumbling of it being for the wrong cause.

Do you remember the frustration because none of the leaders of either party would just step forward and say "OK - this is it. Let's do it as gracefully as possible, but set a date, damn it." That's all that was needed, and I've always wondered who made the final decision.

I would suggest it just might have been the night custodian who happened to pass by on his rounds while a bogged down discussion had meandered into silence......

That's how some big decisions were/and are still decided in this day and age.

[brendan]

Thank you KT. I appreciate you filling in the blank spots.

[brendan]

134 - Memorandum From Vice President Humphrey to President Johnson1
February 17, 1965

Washington, February 17, 1965.

1Source: Minnesota Historical Society, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Vietnam, 1965-1968. No classification marking. An earlier version, drafted by Hughes of INR and dated February 15, is printed in Humphrey's Education of a Public Man, pp. 320-324. The source text, which incorporates numerous revisions of the earlier version, including the addition of section "B," is unsigned but appears on formal Vice Presidential stationery and is captioned "Memo to the President From the Vice President.

"Humphrey later told Hughes that President Johnson saw the memorandum, but there is no record of it in the White House files at the Johnson Library. Moyers has stated that Humphrey gave him a copy that he passed on to Johnson. (Gittinger, ed., The Johnson Years, pp. 51-52; William C. Gibbons, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War, Part III, pp. 92-95; Charles L. Garrettson III, Hubert H. Humphrey: The Politics of Joy, p. 181)

SUBJECT

Vietnam

I would like to share with you my views on the political consequences of certain courses of action that have been proposed in regard to U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. I refer both to the domestic political consequences here in the United States and to the international political consequences.

A. Domestic Political Consequences.

1. 1964 Campaign.

Although the question of U.S. involvement in Vietnam is and should be a non-partisan question, there have always been significant differences in approach to the Asian question between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party. These came out in the 1964 campaign. The Republicans represented both by Goldwater, and the top Republican leaders in Congress, favored a quick, total military solution in Vietnam, to be achieved through military escalation of the war.

The Democratic position emphasized the complexity of a Vietnam situation involving both political, social and military factors; the necessity of staying in Vietnam as long as necessary; recognition that the war will be won or lost chiefly in South Vietnam.

In Vietnam, as in Korea, the Republicans have attacked the Democrats either for failure to use our military power to "win" a total victory, or alternatively for losing the country to the Communists. The Democratic position has always been one of firmness in the face of Communist pressure but restraint in the use of military force; it has sought to obtain the best possible settlement without provoking a nuclear World War III; it has sought to leave open face-saving options to an opponent when necessary to avoid a nuclear show-down. When grave risks have been necessary, as in the case of Cuba, they have been taken. But here again a face-saving option was permitted the opponent. In all instances the Democratic position has included a balancing of both political and military factors.

Today the Administration is being charged by some of its critics with adopting the Goldwater position on Vietnam. While this is not true of the Administration's position as defined by the President, it is true that many key advisors in the Government are advocating a policy markedly similar to the Republican policy as defined by Goldwater.

2. Consequences for other policies advocated by a Democratic Administration.

The Johnson Administration is associated both at home and abroad with a policy of progress toward detente with the Soviet bloc, a policy of limited arms control, and a policy of new initiatives for peace. A full-scale military attack on North Vietnam--with the attendant risk of an open military clash with Communist China--would risk gravely undermining other U.S. policies. It would eliminate for the time being any possible exchange between the President and Soviet leaders; it would postpone any progress on arms control; it would encourage the Soviet Union and China to end their rift; it would seriously hamper our efforts to strengthen relations with our European allies; it would weaken our position in the United Nations; it might require a call-up of reservists if we were to get involved in a large-scale land war--and a consequent increase in defense expenditures; it would tend to shift the Administration's emphasis from its Great Society oriented programs to further military outlays; finally and most important it would damage the image of the President of the United States--and that of the United States itself.

3. Involvement in a full scale war with North Vietnam would not make sense to the majority of the American people.

American wars have to be politically understandable by the American public. There has to be a cogent, convincing case if we are to have sustained public support. In World Wars I and II we had this. In Korea we were moving under UN auspices to defend South Korea against dramatic, across-the-border conventional aggression. Yet even with those advantages, we could not sustain American political support for fighting the Chinese in Korea in 1952.

Today in Vietnam we lack the very advantages we had in Korea. The public is worried and confused. Our rationale for action has shifted away now even from the notion that we are there as advisors on request of a free government--to the simple argument of our "national interest." We have not succeeded in making this "national interest" interesting enough at home or abroad to generate support.

4. From a political viewpoint, the American people find it hard to understand why we risk World War III by enlarging a war under terms we found unacceptable 12 years ago in Korea, particularly since the chances of success are slimmer.

Politically, people think of North Vietnam and North Korea. They recall all the "lessons" of 1950-53:

a. The limitations of air power.

b. The Chinese intervention.

c. The "never again club"--never again GI's fighting a land war against Asians in Asia.

d. The Eisenhower Administration's compromise which represented a frank recognition of all these factors.

If a war with China was ruled out by the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations alike in 1952-3, at a time when we alone had nuclear weapons, people find it hard to contemplate such a war with China now. No one really believes the Soviet Union would allow us to destroy Communist China with nuclear weapons, as Russia's status as a world power would be undermined if she did.

5. Absence of confidence in the Government of South Vietnam.

Politically, people can't understand why we would run grave risks to support a country which is totally unable to put its own house in order. The chronic instability in Saigon directly undermines American political support for our policy.

6. Politically, it is hard to justify over a long period of time sustained, large-scale U.S. air bombardments across a border as a response to camouflaged, often non-sensational, elusive, small-scale terror which has been going on for 10 years in what looks like a civil war in the South.

7. Politically, in Washington and across the country, the opposition is more Democratic than Republican.

8. Politically, it is always hard to cut losses. But the Johnson Administration is in a stronger position to do so than any Administration in this century. 1965 is the year of minimum political risk for the Johnson Administration. Indeed it is the first year when we can face the Vietnam problem without being preoccupied with the political repercussions from the Republican right. As indicated earlier, the political problems are likely to come from new and different sources if we pursue an enlarged military policy very long (Democratic liberals, Independents, Labor, Church groups).

9. Politically, we now risk creating the impression that we are the prisoner of events in Vietnam. This blurs the Administration's leadership role and has spill-over effects across the board. It also helps erode confidence and credibility in our policies.


10. The President is personally identified with, and admired for, political ingenuity. He will be expected to put all his great political sense to work now for international political solutions. People will be counting upon him to use on the world scene his unrivalled talents as a political leader.

They will be watching to see how he makes this transition. The best possible outcome a year from now would be a Vietnam settlement which turns out to be better than was in the cards because the President's political talents for the first time came to grips with a fateful world crisis and so successfully. It goes without saying that the subsequent domestic political benefits of such an outcome, and such a new dimension for the President, would be enormous.

11. If on the other hand, we find ourselves leading from frustration to escalation, and end up short of a war with China but embroiled deeper in fighting with Vietnam over the next few months, political opposition will steadily mount. It will underwrite all the negativism and disillusionment which we already have about foreign involvement generally--with direct spill-over effects politically for all the Democratic internationalist programs to which we are committed--AID, UN, disarmament, and activist world policies generally.

B. International Political Implications of Vietnam.

1. What is our goal, our ultimate objective in Vietnam? Is our goal to restore a military balance between North and South Vietnam so as to go to the conference table later to negotiate a settlement? I believe it is the latter. If so, what is the optimum time for achieving the most favorable combination of factors to achieve this goal?

If ultimately a negotiated settlement is our aim, when do we start developing a political track, in addition to the military one, that might lead us to the conference table? I believe we should develop the political track earlier rather than later. We should take the initiative on the political side and not end up being dragged to a conference as an unwilling participant. This does not mean we should cease all programs of military pressure. But we should distinguish carefully between those military actions necessary to reach our political goal of a negotiated settlement, and those likely to provoke open Chinese military intervention.

We should not underestimate the likelihood of Chinese intervention and repeat the mistake of the Korean War. If we begin to bomb further north in Vietnam, the likelihood is great of an encounter with the Chinese Air Force operating from sanctuary bases across the border. Once the Chinese Air Force is involved, Peking's full prestige will be involved as she cannot afford to permit her Air Force to be destroyed. To do so would undermine, if not end, her role as a great power in Asia.

Confrontation with the Chinese Air Force can easily lead to massive retaliation by the Chinese in South Vietnam. What is our response to this? Do we bomb Chinese air bases and nuclear installations? If so, will not the Soviet Union honor its treaty of friendship and come to China's assistance? I believe there is a good chance that it would--thereby involving us in a war with both China and the Soviet Union. Here again, we must remember the consequences for the Soviet Union of not intervening if China's military power is destroyed by the U.S.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/vietnam/showdoc.php?docid=64