Afghan chaos growing Options

[Marine]

Afghanistan Four Years On:
An Assessment



SEAN M. MALONEY

“The transformation of a traditional society could only be achieved extremely
slowly, and certainly not by wrecking its existing structure and relationships.
Even in the Soviet Union there had been the ‘great mistakes’ of the 1920s and
1930s. As a Soviet official in Moscow was also reported as saying [in 1981],
‘If there is one country in the world where we would not like to try scientific
socialism at this point in time, it is Afghanistan.’”
— Martin Ewans, Afghanistan (2001)


In Spring 2004, Parameters published “Afghanistan: From Here to Eternity?” which explored the situation in Afghanistan in early 2003, or a little over one year after the Taliban regime was removed from power. The tone of the piece was guardedly pessimistic and in effect reminded readers that though there had been progress, the possibility remained that overenthusiastic and emotional responses by the international community in the follow-on phase of the campaign could scuttle that success. That article also laid out a number of challenges that would have to be addressed to avoid what the critics increasingly referred to as “another Vietnam.”

In 2005, the situation in Afghanistan has progressed to the point where guarded optimism is justified. Unfortunately, the perception of the situation on the ground has become distorted through the prism of American partisan politics, particularly during the run-up to the 2004 election. The focus of this rhetoric was and remains issues related to narcotics production and a number of spin-off arguments related to it. Afghanistan is apparently no longer looked at as “another Vietnam”; now it is perhaps “another Colombia.”1

Though the narcotics issue is critical to the future of Afghanistan, public discussion of it in American fora has overridden acknowledgment of

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other areas of success, areas which are in fact more important than any single issue and which will, in the long run, have a positive effect on counternarcotics operations in the region anyway. This article examines how the situation in Afghanistan has dramatically changed since 2003, and why. It will also suggest that there are new areas for concern which policymakers may wish to focus on beyond the currently salient narcotics problem.

Where Did We Stand in 2003?

Combined Forces Command Afghanistan or “CFC Alpha” (CFC-A) is the American-led Coalition headquarters for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Established in late 2003 to rationalize a convoluted command structure, CFC-A is now the focal point of the Coalition military effort. The situation in-country in July 2003, according to CFC-A, was characterized by these elements: a Coalition force with a counterterrorist focus; an enemy which had sanctuary in Afghanistan conducting operations against Coalition forces; a neutral population; an Afghan National Army that was in training; only four Provincial Reconstruction Teams; and minimal support from Pakistan. There was no constitution, no political process, and minimal sovereignty was exercised by Afghanistan.2

With the exception of the overly simplified portrayal of the enemy forces, these points were generally accurate,3 but they require some elaboration. In 2003, the primary problem was the embryonic nature of the interim and transitional Afghan governments and the possibility that fragile structure could be destabilized and toppled before it could get to work. Connected to this was the questionable legitimacy of the government’s leader, President Hamid Karzai. On the ground, Karzai was variously portrayed as a pawn of the United States or in the pocket of southern anti-Taliban fighters of Pashtun ethnicity, or implicitly controlled by the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance exerted explicit control over Kabul and the associated political processes by dint of its 27,000-man military contingent based in the city and its environs. There was no countervailing federal governmental coercive power in Kabul, let alone throughout the rest of the country. This power was in the hands of local leaders, anti-Taliban chieftains which the media pejoratively labeled “warlords.” Remnants of the Taliban, supported by the remnants of al Qaeda’s military forces,

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were by this time in the process of transitioning from a conventional guerilla war to a low-level terrorist campaign, and the possibility of a return to the destructive post-Soviet era infighting between the chieftains existed in numerous locations, including Kabul. The Afghan population outside of the Pashtun areas was, in the main, not openly hostile toward the international forces, but it generally was not overtly supportive either except in certain cases.4

International forces in Afghanistan at that time included the 18,000 members of the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the 4,500-strong European-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). OEF was evolving into a mature counterinsurgency force, operating mostly in the southeast and eastern parts of Afghanistan, while ISAF was confined to Kabul. ISAF had a muddled mandate and, without the resources to carry it out, functioned as a nearly symbolic European presence in Kabul, a green-uniformed island in a tan-uniformed sea. A pilot program intended to coordinate OEF efforts with those of the provincial chieftains and the embryonic Afghan National Army, called the Joint Regional Teams, was established in Gardez by mid 2003 (in time, the Joint Regional Teams were renamed Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs).

The Afghan National Army program was, at the time, convoluted, and little progress had been made because of the inability of ISAF to support the task effectively and the reticence of OEF to take it over completely pending clarification of the responsibilities of both forces vis-à-vis the emerging transitional government. Infrastructure damage after 25 years of war was another impediment to extending federal government control over the provinces. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were intimidated in insurgency areas, which had a spill-over effect in secured areas: the insurgents targeted NGOs in the southeast knowing that the organizations would pull out of the whole country if enough casualties were taken by aid workers. OEF operations against the insurgents were complicated by the sensitive matter of Pakistani territorial sovereignty and the volatile political scene in that country.5

In sum, the Afghan transitional government had questionable legitimacy among the people (though not necessarily on the international scene), it was subject to coercion by better-armed entities, and it was dependent on international forces in every way. Without security, there can be no reconstruction, and with no reconstruction there would be no nation-building, thus leaving Afghanistan susceptible to continued instability and penetration by international terrorism. On the plus side, the insurgency was forced by OEF operations to alter its methodology, which in turn made insurgent operations less effective. There were clear indicators that the Afghan population did not and would not support the continuation of Taliban influence (and consequently al Qaeda) in the country.

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The Situation in 2004-05

There are, essentially, three enemy forces operating against the Afghan government and its Coalition partners. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) organization, still seeking to influence the brokerage of power in Kabul, operates from areas east of the city and still mounts usually ineffective attacks on ISAF, OEF, and Afghan National Army forces in the capital. Taliban military formations have been completely reduced by OEF operating methods and appear to have shifted from guerilla warfare to pinprick terrorist attacks, usually in ethnically Pashtun areas in the southeast. Al Qaeda provides training and equipment to both HIG and the Taliban. Additionally, al Qaeda mounts its own limited raids on Coalition forces located on the border with Pakistan. These raids appear to employ the well-equipped remnants of al Qaeda’s “conventional” formations which worked with the Taliban prior to 2001. Unlike HIG and al Qaeda, the Taliban are still trying to create a parallel government to garner popular support in Pashtun areas with the aim of retaking the country. At this point, the synergy of HIG, the Taliban, and al Qaeda has been unable to significantly influence the direction that the Afghan people are taking under the Karzai government.6

The importance of Karzai’s election in this milieu cannot be underestimated. It is a truism that government legitimacy and the support of the population are absolutely critical in the fight against guerilla and terrorist organizations. By most indications, this has been achieved for the time being in Afghanistan. The elections were fair and carefully monitored: the voter turnout, more than 80 percent, should put the citizens of the United States and Canada to shame with regard to their respective voter turnouts during elections in 2004. Attempts by enemy forces to use terrorism to interfere with the Afghan election process were crushed before they could bear fruit, particularly in Kabul, where ISAF and OEF forces operated together with Afghan police and military forces in a coordinated fashion.7

The success in containing the insurgency and suppressing other elements posing challenges to the Afghan reconstruction effort is attributable to several “moving parts,” all of which are interdependent. First, the American-led Coalition, OEF, is the repository of mobile striking power in Afghanistan. In the past, OEF special operations forces used direct action against high-value targets and worked closely with various chieftains’ militia forces, while airmobile light infantry was brought in to hit concentrations of enemy fighters and sweep support areas. Most OEF operations were conducted in the eastern part of the country. This approach has, in some ways, changed. A prototype regional team concept, established in 2003, deployed a small coordination cell to Gardez to assist with information collection, limited civic action, and NGO coordination in

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conjunction with the local militia force commanders. These regional teams were originally in support of the sweep and raid operations conducted by the airmobile and special operations forces, and were renamed Joint Regional Teams. Each was expanded in numbers and capability to encompass broader reconstruction coordination and security tasks, and they were then again renamed as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). By late 2004, the emphasis on mobile sweep and raid operations in the east shifted to supporting the 18 PRTs, which were located in every significant populated area in the country. In addition, each concentration of PRTs required a Forward Support Base with helicopters, medical resources, and reaction forces. The effects of establishing a PRT and Forward Support Base network throughout Afghanistan, however rudimentary in the early days, provided a firm basis to extend Afghan government influence once the nature of that influence could be determined.8

The main cog here was the development and expansion of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the second “moving part.” By late 2003, the ANA support process from the international community had become much more rational. ISAF (pre-2003) had dropped the ball in the training scheme and it was picked up by OEF, but the direction taken in the design of the Afghan National Army was initially haphazard and impeded by the chieftains in Kabul and their militia forces. In time, high-quality instruction provided by American, Canadian, and British Embedded Training Teams established a significant confidence level in the fledgling Afghan Ministry of Defence and, most important, in its fighting units. The Afghan National Army expanded from three experimental “kandaks” (battalion-equivalents) toward a goal of 26. With an expanded ANA, the Afghan government has forged a power-projection tool to take advantage of the expanded Coalition presence throughout the country. ANA garrisons now exist in most urban areas. The development of the ANA, however, is still very much a work in progress.9

The third “moving part” was the ISAF in Kabul. ISAF in its pre-NATO configuration had a vague but potentially competing mandate with OEF and possessed virtually no resources or firepower to provide significant influence in the city of Kabul, its designated area of operations.10 The NATO summit in Istanbul in 2003 and the acceptance by NATO of ISAF command dramatically altered this state of affairs.11 Under Canadian influence, the vague ISAF mandate evolved to a statement specifically supporting the interim government and establishing security in Kabul. This depended on an improved ANA capability to offset the military capabilities of at least two heavily armed chieftains who controlled the city and its security forces, which in turn had a countervailing influence on the Afghan political process. ISAF’s area of operations was expanded to encompass the entire province of Kabul, not just the city, and coordination between ISAF and OEF was improved, particularly in the special

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operations realm. ISAF was able to keep an eye on potential problem factions, assist in the hunt for HIG and al Qaeda-trained infiltrations, and facilitate a wide variety of local projects which synergistically assisted the security efforts by building trust with the population.12

Yet another “moving part” is the institution-building and coordination efforts between OEF, ISAF, the Afghan Ministry of Defence, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), and police forces in Kabul. Proceeding simultaneously with the OEF effort in the field, ISAF in Kabul, and the ANA training activities, experienced Afghan military and security leaders were asked to provide their leadership to the central government. This was no easy task, as some had fought each other in previous years. Consensus-building, however, has had some success, and the mentoring programs provided by private military corporations like MPRI have professionalized in some respects the bureaucratic mechanisms needed to handle national army and security forces and have assisted in their coordination with OEF and ISAF. All of this had to be done without generating the perception that the result was being imposed from the outside by foreign entities.

OEF takes on the organized insurgents, while ISAF assists with security of the capital. PRT expansion provides bases for the extension of central government power into the outlying areas. These ambitious programs did not proceed without challenges. Clearly, the primary antagonists, all supported by al Qaeda, continued in their efforts to disrupt and derail in a broad sense the direction being taken by the Karzai government. The real nub, however, are the chieftains and their militia forces. How, exactly, can a central government be established and its power expanded without a return to the bad old days of 1993-1996? Can a civil war be prevented?

A simplistic analysis would have us believe that the main encumbrances to stability and peace in Afghanistan are “the drug-fueled warlords” and that there aren’t enough American troops on the ground in Afghanistan to confront them because of operations in Iraq.13 Such politically motivated critiques ignore the historical realities of Afghanistan, however, specifically that a large infusion of outside forces would place us in the same position that the Soviets found themselves in during the 1980s. They also are a slap in the face to those Afghan commanders and soldiers loyal to the Afghan government who have engaged in combat against those seeking to topple it. A large infusion of Western soldiery is not necessary; indeed, less is more, when handled adeptly. Having limited resources demands that subtlety and thought be employed rather than brute force. Brute-force solutions will not work in Afghanistan.14

The necessary subtlety is currently employed through the “chess game,” a coordinated effort using a variety of tools to incrementally lessen the power that regional chieftains have and supplant it with central government in-

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fluence while at the same time avoiding fighting.15 Essentially, these are influence tools of differing coerciveness. The “chess game” would be impossible without the high-end coercive resources that OEF and ISAF bring to bear, but that factor is in the background and builds on the psychology of OEF’s four-year firepower demonstration against the Taliban, plus the overall goodwill engendered by the special operations forces, civil affairs teams in the provinces, and ISAF operations in Kabul. Other mechanisms wielded in the “chess game” include the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program; the Heavy Weapons Cantonment (HWC) program; “soft entry” deployments of the Afghan National Army; the proliferation of a variety of police forces to a region; and the “lateral promotion” of recalcitrant militia leaders.

Broadly speaking, the DDR program is used to demobilize personnel, while HWC cantons heavy weapons from machine guns to tanks and artillery. They are separately funded programs with different lines of control.16 DDR is now used as a verb: to “DDR” a militia formation is to incrementally demobilize it and canton the weapons. DDR may be employed bluntly as a threat, while at the same time DDR is an ongoing process throughout the country.

On the police front, militia forces under chieftain command previously provided security of all types in an unsystematic fashion. Now, border police, highway patrol police, and municipal police, all trained in Kabul, are incrementally introduced to professionalize and systematize the application of law at the local level. To a certain extent, law and order remains relative, but the concept behind an incremental transfer of power applies. The method of establishing a small Afghan National Army garrison, building it up slowly, and having its personnel develop relationships with militia forces provides yet another mechanism for progress.17

Militia forces are leadership-dependent. The main issue in this regard is one of “face.” The outright removal of an uncooperative chieftain is too abrupt and, in any event, if he no longer has a stake in the reconstruction process because he is out of power, than why should he and his remaining followers not take to the hills? Instead, chieftains have been brought into the central government in all manner of portfolios and assigned staffs to mentor them in governance. Second-tier militia leaders are promoted to become police commanders—but in another province, with other forces funded by

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Kabul. Rather than taking a moralistic Western stance and labeling them all drug-dealers and war criminals and then demanding Nuremberg-like trials, it has proven to be far better to assume everybody is “dirty” after 25 years of war and to start anew. Yes, some militia leaders will remain dirty, and mechanisms will have to be found to deal with that. However, the avoidance of civil war and a resurgence of Taliban influence is the objective, not show trials using Western laws or our version of international law.

It is critical to emphasize that this “chess game” is not something imposed from the outside: it is a coordinated effort between the Karzai government and the international entities operating in Afghanistan. Indeed, the United Nations, NATO, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the prolific number of American agencies working there are cooperating in various degrees in this direction and with varying levels of effectiveness. It would be easy to label this a “CIA plot” if it were not so transparent and multifaceted. It is clear to objective observers that President Karzai is not a pawn in the game.18

It would be foolish to argue that this “chess game” works perfectly. Indeed, the modeling of third- and fourth-order effects is not up to speed, and there can be unintended consequences when the relationships between certain key personalities are not taken into account.

The situation in Herat in the summer and fall of 2004 was a test case for the “chess game.” Ismail Kahn was a popular but recalcitrant chieftain who had in fact employed substantial revenues generated by cross-border trade with Iran to beautify Herat and its environs, but his militia commanders were not really interested in going along with the central government’s plans for power-sharing. Over time, the militia forces were incrementally “DDR’d” to the point that they were unable to offer serious resistance when Kabul ordered two Afghan National Army battalions into the area. Despite a small firefight, the national army forces were able to convince local militia forces to back off. Factions in Ismail Khan’s forces then attacked each other. Khan was “laterally promoted” to a post in Kabul. The confidence level built up after the Herat affair permitted the Karzai government to conduct a similar action with Fahim Khan’s militia forces in Kabul, which in turn neutralized a significant coercive force in the capital. As a consequence of such effective actions, the fall elections of 2004 were conducted in an atmosphere nearly devoid of Taliban, HIG, or militia coercion.19

New Challenges

The main supporting effort of the “chess game” mechanism will be police and judicial reform. In time, the incremental deployments of central government people to the outer reaches of Afghanistan will have to be backed up with a functioning legal system. Italy is in charge of assisting the Afghan

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government in this area. Though Italy brings to bear substantial experience in combating organized crime, the reform process has been slow and cultural differences are significant. The same can be said of police training. Germany is the lead nation in this regard, and for reasons most likely related to the Afghan budget, progress is slower than anticipated. At some point, it will no longer be desirable for the Afghan government and Coalition entities to continue to use military force to police the country.

This takes us to the narcotics problem. The assumption among some international entities operating in support of the Afghan government in 2004 suggests that the removal of chieftains engaged in narcotics cultivation and trafficking via the “chess game” may have two effects. It may result, in the worst case, in better networking under the guise of legitimate government activity. Second, the removal of the prominent leadership will devolve power to second-, third-, and even fourth-tier local personnel engaged in narcotics production, trafficking, and protection. By no means are all of these personnel former militia force personnel, which complicates attempts to identify and deal with them. Though this works to the advantage of the Afghan government in that the traffickers’ ability to organize a “narco-insurgency” is severely reduced, the lack of police and judicial capacity means that Kabul cannot yet target these dispersed, low-level groups. Similarly, an anti-corruption force will have to be formed to police the chieftains and others in the government to ensure that they remain uninvolved in narcotics production and distribution. In effect, Afghanistan will become like every other nation trying to take on organized crime (and not a Colombia-like narco-insurgency), but only if the right tools are forged and brought to bear.

Two other extremely important aspects of extending government influence to the provinces are sometimes overlooked in military assessments. These are the lack of roads and other infrastructure, coupled with the extremely high illiteracy rate. How does one provide anti-narcotics information to a nearly illiterate population? How does one deploy police and a legal system when the roads do not facilitate vehicular traffic? The deployment of PRTs, be they NATO or OEF, will assist in collecting information as much as they will assist in the local and provincial coordination effort, but how will Afghanistan “balance its books” in the reconstruction effort? And what priorities will be assigned? Politically motivated criticism in the Western media can interfere with the assessment and establishment of priorities. Demands by Western politicians and their mouthpieces for a huge and expensive counternarcotics force could divert the Afghan leadership’s attention from what they rightly view as their own established reconstruction priorities.

The seemingly constant demand by critics that more and more international troops need to be deployed to Afghanistan was addressed earlier.

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However, the PRT expansion program, whereby NATO members have in principle agreed to accept lead-nation status for several former American OEF-run PRTs, has stalled out because of a lack of contributors.20 The PRTs and their associated Forward Support Bases are supposed to be manned by approximately 5,000 personnel (100 per PRT, and 400 to 500 per FSB), yet NATO member nations can’t seem to come up with the additional personnel to meet this requirement. The reason is principally attributable to the stultifying euro-bureaucracy, but there also are serious problems in how ISAF is commanded as it expands to the provinces.

In 2004, the Eurocorps took command of ISAF, while the Franco-German Brigade was placed in command of ISAF’s Kabul Multinational Brigade. The relationship between the two French-led or dominated NATO headquarters with Combined Forces Command Afghanistan and certain American, British, and Canadian nations contributing forces to ISAF can be described in polite terms only as dysfunctional. The infighting, kept to a minimum under Canadian command last year but now detrimental to ISAF’s effectiveness, has reached the point where a new command concept should be considered. Steps were taken to conceptualize a NATO “Afghanistan Force” that would command both CFC-A and ISAF, but the lasting problem over the international command of American forces will prevent significant and effective movement in this direction for the time being.21 As usual, the demand by the French to command the planned NATO force grates on the sensitivities of other NATO members. The only entities to benefit from these fractures are France and al Qaeda.

An Afghanistan Force option was rejected by NATO in spring 2005. As it stands, the phased replacement of OEF PRTs with NATO PRTs will result in the transfer of some American-led PRTs to NATO command. Special operations forces engaged in the hunt for high-value targets will continue to operate in the region. The command relationship between those forces and the new, expanded ISAF is currently under discussion. In effect, ISAF will absorb elements of OEF, not replace them. SHAPE planners are, as of summer 2005, developing a campaign plan for the entire country. The problem of who will conduct the “robust” portions of that plan and what national restrictions will be placed on those forces will remain the main issues.

Another emerging challenge is the demands by international legal personalities for Balkans-style war crimes trials in Afghanistan.22 These demands appear to be rooted in simplistic notions that one size fits all when it comes to international law (other motives, like personal ambition and job security, cannot be ruled out). Afghanistan is not Bosnia, nor is it Kosovo. The Balkan wars were comparatively short in duration and had identifiable protagonists who could be singled out as instigators of mass crimes against humanity. Afghanistan, on the other hand, has had 25 years of war. The existing

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polity includes people who fought on both sides during the Soviet era but against the Taliban in more recent years. Milosevic-style indictments will not work in Afghanistan, where almost everybody may be guilty of violating some Western-based law. Indeed, if we are to have war crimes trials for Afghanistan, one should first call to the dock Soviet military and political leaders for acts of genocide, followed by every Soviet soldier who fought there, before moving on to any current Afghan leader or American soldier. A South African-style Truth and Reconciliation Commission would be the better tool. Afghanistan needs reconciliation, not a reprise of Nuremberg.

A disturbing trend is the belief among some in OEF that the Coalition is barely breaking even in the information war. Recent events in Jalalabad, where 15 people were killed during rioting over the alleged mistreatment of the Koran at Camp Delta in Cuba, coupled with the persistent ongoing hunt for another Abu Ghraib by media outlets, will require deft handling. We can assume the Jalalabad riots were externally stimulated, but if it can happen in Jalalabad, it could happen elsewhere. The best response is an effective and integrated Afghan response, not the imposition of OEF or ISAF troops to put down these information-warfare events. The Coalition, working closely with Afghan authorities, must become better at countering the more salacious allegations by media sources rather than remaining mute in an effort to ride them out.

Similarly, concerns within the intelligence community of the “migration” of tactics used in Iraq to Afghanistan are very real: in May 2005, a mosque in Kandahar was attacked with a significant death toll. In July, captured Afghan police were beheaded by insurgents, while a car bomb was used against the PRT in Kandahar. This new emphasis on mass civilian targets and gruesome terrorism against police indicate that while there has been success in countering the insurgency, there are still those who seek political change through violence. The best response, however, is an Afghan response.

Conclusion

There are grounds for optimism vis-à-vis the future of Afghanistan. As with any complex mechanism, however, the finer components may be damaged with wear and tear, not all the gears will mesh when we want them to, and the casing will be dropped from a great height time and again. There is an argument to made in the age of information operations that the simplistic metrics applied by the media and those seeking to make political fodder out of Afghanistan will always leave us with a perception that the country is on the brink of failure. The lack of historical context to these arguments, the ignorance of the effects of the high level of damage caused by 25 years of war, an underestimation of what the Afghan people are capable of, and the ruthless

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hunt for apparent failure will obscure the realities and complexities of reconstruction in this vast and diverse country.

Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force continue to be critical instruments in buying the Afghan government time for security sector reform. NATO members, however, must live up to the high expectations they established in Istanbul.

Thus far, the path to reconstruction, though rocky, has been navigable, but not every hairpin turn can be anticipated, and there are still bandits on the road. The country we are dealing with is not Vietnam, not Colombia, nor is it Bosnia. It is Afghanistan, and it needs to be seen in its own light.


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NOTES

1. See, for example, T. Christian Miller, “Post-Invasion Chaos Blamed for Drug Surge,” Los Angeles Times, 4 October 2004; Robert Novak, “Lost in Afghanistan,” 31 May 2004, http://www.townhall.com/columnists/robertn...20040531.shtml; Seymour Hersh, “The Other War,” The New Yorker, 12 April 2004, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040412fa_fact; JohnKerry.com, “Afghanistan,” http://www.johnkerry.com/issues/national_security/asia.html; Barnett R. Rubin, “Road to Ruin: Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” Center for American Progress, 7 October 2004.

2. Combined Forces Command Afghanistan briefing to the author, Kabul, Afghanistan, 1 December 2004. Hereinafter “CFC-A briefing.”

3. The OEF operations conducted in 2003 were not strictly counterterrorist in nature. The enemy employed a variety of structures and methods which included terrorism, and OEF forces responded with a full range of synchronized activities to go after al Qaeda international terrorist remnants, al Qaeda light infantry formation remnants, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s organization, and Taliban insurgents who used terrorism, ambushes, and rocket attacks. From 2003 to 2005, enemy forces have operated from both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

4. These were the author’s observations on a research visit to Afghanistan in 2003.

5. OEF briefing to the author, 5 March 2003, Bagram, Afghanistan.

6. CFC-A briefing.

7. Confidential interviews.

8. CFC-A briefing.

9. Interview with General Zahir Azemi, Kabul, Afghanistan, 9 December 2004; Embedded Training Team briefing to the author, Kabul, Afghanistan, 12 December 2004.

10. “The International Security Assistance Force: The Origins,” Canadian Military Journal, 4 (Summer 2003).

11. NATO, “Istanbul Summit Communiqué, 28 June 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm; NATO, “NATO Update: NATO Expands Presence in Afghanistan,” 29 June 2004, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/06-June/e0629a.htm.

12. ISAF Headquarters briefing to the author, Kabul, Afghanistan, 28 November 2004. Hereinafter “ISAF HQ briefing.”

13. One example among many is Hersh, “The Other War,” and the sort of “Monday morning quarterbacking” that Richard Clarke engages in.

14. Which was, of course, one of the lessons of Vietnam. It is truly bizarre to see those critical of today’s American effort in Afghanistan demand that more troops and more force be used in Afghanistan when some are the same ones who criticized the high levels of American force used in Vietnam.

15. My assessment of the “chess game” is based on personal observations and a wide variety of interviews conducted while on a research visit to Afghanistan in 2004.

16. ISAF HQ briefing.

17. I observed this process in Konduz province courtesy of the German ISAF contingent during November-December 2004.

18. Confidential interviews with personnel with access to the ambassadorial level of activity in Kabul.

19. Azemi interview; confidential interviews.

20. ISAF HQ briefing.

21. CFC-A briefing; confidential interviews.

22. BBC News, “Afghan Report Demands War Justice.” 29 January 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4218775.stm.


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Dr. Sean M. Maloney served in Germany as the historian for 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade, the Canadian Army’s Cold War contribution to NATO. The author of several works, including the forthcoming Enduring the Freedom: A Rogue Historian Visits Afghanistan (Potomac Books), Dr. Maloney has extensive field research experience in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. He currently teaches in the Royal Military College War Studies Programme.


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http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200510/s1472427.htm

Saturday, October 1, 2005. 0:00am (AEST)
Roadside bomb injures US troops in Afghanistan

Four US troops were wounded when their armoured vehicle was hit by a roadside bomb blast in the eastern Afghan province of Kunar.

The US military says the wounded soldiers, from a unit that had returned from defusing a similar bomb in the area, are in a stable condition.

Insurgent violence has picked up in Afghanistan since the Taliban guerrillas and their Islamic militant allies failed to derail legislative elections held on September 18.

A US soldier and a US Marine were killed in militant attacks on Monday, a day after a US helicopter crashed on an anti-militant operation killing all five crewmen.

Monday's deaths brought US combat fatalities in Afghanistan this year to more than 50, making it the bloodiest so far for US forces in the country.

[Marine]

Rebuilding Afghanistan’s
National Army



ALI A. JALALI


In May 2002, American Green Berets began training the first group of Afghan soldiers for the new Afghan National Army (ANA). This complex mission will take years to accomplish, yet it is expected to contribute greatly to the return of peace and normalcy to Afghanistan. The United States, the main sponsor of the effort, sees the project as an effective alternative to the expansion of international security forces to police the war-devastated country. Further, the United States expects that the ANA will aid in the multilateral struggle against terrorist activity in the region.

This is the fourth time in 150 years of Afghanistan’s turbulent history that the country is recreating the state military following its total disintegration caused by foreign invasions or civil wars.1 The process of rebuilding has always been influenced by the prevailing political and social conditions in the country. The current attempt is not going to be an exception. The profound social transformation of Afghanistan during more than two decades of a devastating war has drastically changed the traditional political and social landscape of Afghanistan. The rebuilding of a national army will have to be intertwined with the creation of a legitimate broad-based government, economic reconstruction, and the demobilization process.

This article looks at the challenges facing the creation of a new national army in Afghanistan as well as the opportunities for responding to these challenges. It reviews the experience of the past as well as the recent war-instigated social and political transformation to identify conceptual frameworks for building a national military establishment in Afghanistan.

Tribal Fighters and Government Soldiers

Few of Afghanistan’s armies have successfully monopolized the legitimate use of force. The Afghan army generally has not been the only military institution within a social system imbued with military pluralism. The country

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traditionally has relied on popular uprisings to fight foreign invasions and enlisted the aid of tribal levies to beef up the regular army to crush domestic rebellions. The situation reflects the evolving nature of state-society relations since the emergence of Afghanistan as a modern state at the end of the 19th century. It was then a loose conglomerate of tribes and ethnic communities over which the central government had varying degrees of control at different times.

Until the middle of the 20th century, the central government in Afghanistan was not strong enough to integrate the nation through a wide network of political and economic institutions. Society remained segmented and unmobilized. The lack of integration made the communities, particularly in tribal areas, semi-independent, mostly relying on their own resources and their own traditional institutions. This included local military forces that were mobilized during inter-tribal conflicts or foreign threats. The tribal militias also could be mustered in support of or against the central government during domestic disturbances. This nation-in-arms helped the country survive when the central government collapsed or the state army disintegrated in the face of foreign invasion.

These unique sociopolitical conditions favored the development of a national culture of guerrilla warfare.2 This was an indigenous form of guerrilla warfare, which in strategic terms was different from the one conceptualized by Mao Zedong. The latter aims at seizing state power through organizing “liberated zones,”3 while the Afghan model is defensive in nature and tactical in scope. Khushal Khan Khattak, the renowned 17th-century Pashtun national leader and thinker clearly detailed the guerrilla tactics of the Afghan highlanders:

When you fight a smaller enemy detachment you should decisively attack with surprise. But, if the enemy receives reinforcement [or] when you encounter a stronger enemy force, avoid decisive engagement and swiftly withdraw only to hit back where the enemy is vulnerable. By this you gain sustainability and the ability to fight a long war of attrition. . . . A war of attrition eventually frustrates the enemy, no matter how strong he may be . . . and that gives a chance of victory to a small force fighting against an invading army.4

It was in such a setting that the tribal warrior felt at home. It was quite a challenge to transform such a fighter into a soldier in a disciplined army ruled by a professional ethos and regulated by conventional military norms.

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The primacy of tribal and local loyalty among the soldiers impaired the army’s commitment to the government cause. The army was often crudely organized and led, inadequately armed, poorly trained, meagerly paid, and badly fed. Such an army was hardly capable of standing firm in the face of a determined foe. However, the same soldiers would fight with utmost determination with their kinsmen in their own space under the leadership of their local chiefs. A British observer of the Afghan society, Edward Hensman, wrote in 1881: “The Afghan does not lack native courage, and in hill warfare he is unrivaled, so long as it takes the shape of guerrilla fighting. But once he is asked to sink his identity and to become merely a unit in a battalion, he loses all self-confidence and is apt to think more of getting away than of stubbornly holding his ground as he would have done with his own friends led by his own chief.”5

The government’s legitimacy stemmed from dynastic rights or was based on military power. Both could be challenged by other contenders. This situation was detrimental to the army’s loyalty. Governments often invoked Islam and potential threats by “infidel” foreign powers to motivate soldiers to serve the Islamic ruler (padshah-e Islam) and his government.6 Although Islam united the society in common cause and jihad against alien powers and ideology, it did not politically weld the communities to create a religion-based ideal Islamic nation or umma. As T. A. Heathcote notes, the system, “which ordered the life of most people outside the city areas, was certainly as potent in political terms as the national state system of Europe in 1914. Men felt a fierce loyalty to their own tribe, such that, if called upon they would without hesitation assemble in arms under their own tribal chiefs and local clan leaders.”7

Recruitment for the regular army has always been difficult. Weak government control of the country and lack of resources hindered both compulsory and voluntary enlistment. In 1895, the government introduced a partial draft system called hasht nafari, whereby one man in eight was called to serve in the army. The recruitment quota was imposed on the population of a district or a tribal area. Under this system, the recruits, selected by drawing names (peshk), had the option of paying for exemption or they could choose to pay for a substitute (ewaz). The hasht nafari underwent several modifications after the turn of the 20th cen-

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tury, until it was replaced by a universal draft system in 1941. The draft was an extremely unpopular system and was never fully implemented. Many people even migrated to neighboring countries to escape the harsh enforcement of hasht nafari.8 Public discontent intensified in the 1920s when King Amanullah tried to firmly enforce the system. This move caused tribal unrest.9

In such a socio-political environment, the state armies were faced with two major challenges: creating a national loyalty among the soldiers that would surpass their tribal allegiance, and providing the military units with the skills to fight effectively in both counterinsurgencies and conventional wars. The response to both challenges was slow and unsteady. The pace of progress was linked to social and political development, expansion of government influence through economic modernization, and the availability of resources to increase the army’s professional effectiveness.

Evolution of National Armed Forces

In the mid-1860s, a deserting Afghan soldier justified his defection from the army by telling the beleaguered Amir Sher Ali: “Your kingship is unstable, the service incentives are unattractive, and I am longing for home.”10 The statement encapsulates the problems that Afghan governments have faced in raising and maintaining a regular army in a tribal society.

Traditionally the Afghan governments relied on three military institutions: the regular army, tribal levies, and community militias. The regular army was sustained by the state and commanded by government leaders. The tribal or regional levies (irregular forces) had part-time soldiers provided by tribal or regional chieftains under pre-negotiated contracts. The chiefs received tax breaks, land ownership, cash payment, or other privileges in return. The community militia included all available able-bodied members of the community, mobilized to fight for common causes under community leaders. Each of these institutions had certain strengths and weaknesses.

The combination of these military institutions created a formidable force whose components supplemented each other’s strengths and minimized their weaknesses. The regular army’s conventional military capacity was supplemented by the tribal levies’ skills in guerrilla warfare. The community militias were able to secure the army’s lines of communication in their areas and provide logistical support. On the other hand, disharmony or lack of cooperation among these institutions caused the regular army enormous difficulties.

The evolution of Afghanistan as a unified nation has been influenced by the interplay of the country’s different military institutions. Overreliance on irregular forces cost the government control of the tribes, while maintaining a strong military depleted the government’s limited resources, hindering the nation-building process.

During the turbulent years of the early 19th century, the government army in Afghanistan consisted of the followers of various tribal chiefs whose al-

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legiance to the Amir was unpredictable. Their shifting alliances with power-seekers kept the state politically unstable. Amir Sher Ali Khan (1863-78), is credited with founding the modern national army in Afghanistan. He tried to curb the influence of the tribal chiefs and their irregular forces by creating a modern army.11 He introduced a modern system of recruitment based on voluntary military service, as well as an ethnic balance of military units and the integration of some irregular troops into the state army.12

At the outbreak of the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80), the regular army was about 50,000 strong and consisted of 62 infantry and 16 cavalry regiments, with 324 guns mostly organized in horse and mountain artillery batteries.13 However, much of the organization existed only on paper. Poor training, lack of unit discipline, lack of unit cohesiveness, and inadequate officer education made the army a paper tiger. The army lost cohesiveness after initial clashes with invading British forces in 1878 and ceased to exist as an organized force after its defeat in Charasia, near Kabul. Yet elements of the fragmented army joined the tribesmen and civilian militia to put up a firm resistance against the British forces, forcing them out in 1880.

Amir Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901), who succeeded to the throne after the second Anglo-Afghan War, had to recreate the army from scratch. He faced the enormous challenges of reunifying the country, strengthening internal security, and subduing semi-independent chieftains. His main instrument in responding to these challenges was a powerful army subsidized by the British. Instead of the leader’s traditional reliance on military contingents provided by tribal chiefs or the feudal levy system, the Amir tried to create an army totally linked to the state.14 However, the enormity of the task far outstripped the government’s military capacity. The Amir was forced to rely on tribal militia that numbered up to 40,000 during the pacification of Hazarajat (1891-93).15 The Amir’s heavy-handed policy took its toll in later years when the simmering political discontent expressed itself violently on several occasions during the politically-relaxed reign (1901-19) of Amir Habibullah.

King Amanullah (1919-29) established the legitimacy of his reign by waging a successful anti-British war to regain full independence. However, he lost support among the tribes due to his drastic modernization reforms. Amanullah’s push for rapid modernization was not matched by efforts to build an effective military force to back his reforms. Counting on the nation’s martial

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qualities to deter foreign threats, the reformist monarch did not see a compelling need for a large army.16 His neglect had a disastrous impact. Most of the modernization plans were not implemented, the size of the military was ruthlessly cut, and troops were poorly trained and ineffectively led. The army soon shrank to 23,000 and eventually to 11,000 because of recruitment problems. His last-minute effort in 1928 failed to reverse the decline, and consequently the Afghan army failed to quell the 1928-29 rebellion that cost Amanullah his throne and plunged the country into civil war.

The modernization of the Afghan army that began in the first quarter of the 20th century was a slow and incremental process. The national army became more attached to the government and acquired a solid institutional identity as the country underwent a process of integration through a nationwide education system, economic progress, and political development.

Nadir Shah (1929-33) oversaw the reconstruction and improvement of the army as a key element in responding to security challenges and supporting a measured modernization process. By 1933, the army numbered some 70,000. The Afghan military college was reopened in 1930, and training was modeled on the old Turkish army. The development of a national recruitment system and the professional education of officers and NCOs were among the major achievements of the Afghan military in the first half of the 20th century. The introduction of modern weapons into the army—particularly combat aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, and automatic weapons—brought a landmark shift in the correlation of forces between the center and the tribal areas. The superior firepower of the state army served to prevent domestic security challenges.17

In the mid-20th century, foreign policy exigencies and domestic needs to back rapid modernization of the society spurred a major reorganization of the armed forces. The partitioning of India in 1947 touched off an irredentist Afghan campaign demanding the creation of an independent Afghan-linked “Pashtunistan” in Pakistan’s Pashtun areas. These areas were part of Afghanistan before they were annexed by the British in the 19th century. The country also needed a modern army to support economic development and social reforms, including education and women’s issues. As the United States turned down Afghan demands for military assistance, Kabul turned to the Soviet Union for military and economic aid.

Soviet assistance enabled Afghanistan to improve the structure, armament, training, and command and control system of its armed forces. The strength of the military in the 1960s reached 98,000, with 90,000 in the army and 8,000 in the air force.18

Politicization and Disintegration of the Army

Despite the steady progress in modernizing and training the army and the development of the air force under King Zaher Shah (1933-73), the Afghan military establishment failed to reach the level of professional maturity necessary to

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resist politicization. Political naivete of the peasant-based officer corps allowed a handful of politically motivated mid- and low-level officers to stage two military coups in the 1970s that eventually brought the communists to power in 1978. Armed resistance to the “Saur Revolution” plunged the country into a devastating civil war leading to the Soviet military intervention (1979-89) and increased Western support of the Islamic-led anti-regime resistance forces, the mujahideen.

Simultaneous, rapid, and large-scale arming of opposing forces brought a major portion of the population under arms in the 1980s.19 The trend continued during the post-communist civil war (1992-2001), as neighboring countries and other international actors armed rival Afghan factions. The process gradually de-professionalized the armed forces and gave power to a variety of ethnic and regional factions, self-serving warlords, and criminal freebooters.20

The fall of the Moscow-backed communist regime in Kabul in 1992 disintegrated the state as well as the army. Bits and pieces of the fragmented military either disappeared or joined the warring factions that were locked in a drawn-out power struggle. The warring factions were composed of odd assortments of armed groups with varying levels of loyalties, political commitment, professional skills, and organizational integrity. Many of them felt free to switch sides, shift loyalties, and join or leave the larger group spontaneously. They possessed neither the strength of the anti-Soviet jihad warriors nor the discipline of regular forces. They were haunted by the weaknesses of both.

In 2001-02, exploiting the sudden fall of the Taliban to the US-led coalition air strikes, the Northern Alliance, the only organized anti-Taliban military faction in Afghanistan, moved swiftly to fill the vacuum. The absence of a credible political alternative to the Taliban blocked the emergence of an ethnically balanced post-Taliban government. The anti-Taliban Pashtun forces that took over in most of the southern provinces were too scattered to offer a counterbalancing bloc vis-à-vis the Northern Alliance.

Taking advantage of an unexpected opportunity, the noncommitted warlords were attracted by Western cash outlays and joined the fray for easy victories. Their militias expanded overnight. On paper the country now (in early summer 2002) has over 40 divisions and dozens of separate brigades. Many of the divisions

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are led by Panjshiri commanders.21 Many others are commanded by leaders closely connected with the Panjshiri faction. Out of the current eight “army corps,” the Northern Alliance controls six.22 Further, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Deputy Minister of Defense, maintains his own seven-division army in the north.23 Several divisions are under central command.24 Most of these units are composed of armed groups affiliated with warlords and their allies who jumped onto the anti-Taliban bandwagon as the radical militia crumbled under the weight of the coalition bombing campaign. The armed groups that occupied the military posts and localities deserted by the Taliban and their foreign supporters gained the status of military units from the Northern Alliance leaders who simply wanted to expand their allies. Now the Afghan Ministry of Defense provides funds to finance this extraordinary military inflation.25

Back to the Future

As Afghanistan begins to emerge from a long period of devastating conflict, the country sifts through the rubble of social and political destruction to try to piece together a peaceful future. Security is the essential prerequisite for the effort. It involves reconstruction of a national army and disbanding the factional militias and private armies. Rebuilding the Afghan armed forces cannot be done in a vacuum. Unless the issues that divided the country are addressed through the emergence of a legitimate, broad-based, effective, and internationally backed government, it will be hard to build a nationally oriented and professionally skilled army. The major challenge is to create a military loyal to the state.

Currently the country is politically and militarily fragmented. Ethnic warlords with questionable track records claim to represent different ethnic groups and geographic regions in the country. Despite their nominal support of the interim administration in Kabul, provincial strongmen and warlords maintain their private armies, sources of income, foreign linkages, and autonomous administrations. Even the Northern Alliance militia that controls Kabul is a partisan army with factional loyalties. Any solution that perpetuates the leadership of these warlords will be detrimental to long-term peace and stability. This will also hinder the development of national harmony that has suffered heavy blows during the long civil war in Afghanistan.

The first step toward building a national army in Afghanistan is broadening the base of the government, which will promote political stability, public trust, and security in the country. Such a government will be able to direct the re-creation of a nationally oriented, ethnically balanced, morally disciplined, professionally skilled, and operationally coherent Afghan army and force the local militias to disarm and disband. An army perceived as a means of furthering the ambitions of a single political or ethnic group, on the other hand, would not lead to an effective demobilization effort. Another condition needed for the emergence of a reliable military establishment is reconstruction of the Afghan economy, offering alternative employment for former combatants not integrated into the new army.

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Ethnic Balance

Given the ethnic politicization and polarization of the country, the new Afghan army has to be multi-ethnic at all levels. The pre-war Afghan army was an ethnically balanced force. Indeed, Afghanistan has a long history of providing for ethnic balance in the military establishment. The alternative—creating ethnically homogeneous military units—has proved in the past to be problematic. While soldiers of homogeneous units understood each other and easily worked together, their loyalty could not be trusted when the military moved against their home turf. In such cases the government usually disarmed units affiliated with the revolting area or tribe.26

The draft system in place after 1941 ensured ethnic diversity in army formations. Recruits from different ethnic and geographic communities were integrated into professional military outfits. The army was both a security force and a national educational institute where Afghan youth also received literacy and civic education. In fact, the army was the most significant integrating institution in the multi-ethnic Afghan society. The officer corps before 1963 was not all-inclusive, however, and was dominated by Pashtuns and Tajiks. But with the beginning of the democratic period in 1963, cadets for officer and NCO training schools were selected from all provinces and all ethnic communities under a quota system proportional to the population. The officer corps thus was ethnically diverse beginning in the late 1960s.

The draft system is not likely to work under current conditions, however, for political, professional, and economic reasons. First, the nascent postwar central government is not powerful enough to enforce a draft system. Second, an army of conscripts who serve for only a short time can hardly acquire the skills, experience, and cohesiveness needed to respond to the enormous security challenges of the current situation. Third, the economic hardship faced by the nation dissuades people from acquiescing to induction into a poorly paid draft army. Most of the young people are supporting their families and have to earn money.

While the Afghan government envisages an ethnically balanced army, there is a lot of suspicion that the Tajiks who now control the military are influencing the ethnic mix of the newly formed ANA battalions. There are reports that in newly formed units the Tajiks outnumber other ethnicities, including the Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.27 Persistence of such suspicions can undermine the demobilization of factional militias and will need to be addressed.

The greatest challenge facing the new army, however, is to integrate the multi-ethnic military units into unified professional outfits. This professional cohesion can be achieved through a “chemical” integration of the soldiers rather than their “physical” combination—“the bonding together of members of an organization/unit in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission.”28 Only with such cohesiveness will the soldiers’ professional loyalty surpass their ethnic, political, and regional allegiance. This can oc-

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cur only after a long period of joint training and experience when members of a unit deal with common challenges, fight together, suffer together, work together, and live together. The longer the association, the tighter the bonding. But it takes a healthy political and service environment, systematic training, and effective leadership to achieve such unit cohesion. A 1995 attempt to integrate factional fighters into professional military units failed because of political instability.29

Structure of the Military Establishment

The size, structure, and professional training of the army will depend on the nature of potential threats, the mission, the area of operations, and available resources. The immediate threats are expected to be domestic and concern internal security. Security threats may stem from anti-government armed challenges by political and religious militants, foreign-inspired rebellions, and infighting between local warlords. Further, Afghanistan is located in an important strategic area and has to face potential threats emerging from a volatile and dangerous neighborhood. Interstate conflicts coupled with religious militancy, organized crime, and smuggling constitute potential threats to the whole region.

Given the geopolitical situation and available defensive capacity, it is unrealistic to expect the ANA to respond to potential foreign threats. In the foreseeable future, Afghanistan will have to depend on international security arrangements and backing to deal with such external threats. The country has long suffered from outside interference and is still vulnerable to foreign instigation and support of renegade factions and militant forces. Afghanistan will need international protection against such foreign intervention. Afghanistan as a nation has a great potential for mobilizing its people to fight foreign invasions, but experience also suggests that the nationwide defensive capacity needs to be harnessed to support the continuity of the unified state in the current postwar period. With international support, Afghanistan has the potential to build a mobile, professionally effective regular military force that can then serve as a deterrent against direct foreign military threats.

The mission of the new Afghan army should be clearly defined in the context of the country’s new military doctrine.30 In the past, the lack of clarity in

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defining the army’s role caused a great deal of organizational and operational confusion. This ambiguity hampered the unit structure, equipment, and training of the army. As a result the army was neither an effective internal security force nor a reliable body for large-scale conventional warfare. Given the prevailing geopolitical setting and political environment in and around Afghanistan, the ANA is expected to provide military backing for the central government, which will entail offsetting the factional militias, disarming illegal armed groups, and backing up law enforcement agencies and other security forces in the country.

Given the nature of the threat, the army’s mission, and the extent of the possible area of operations across the country, Afghanistan needs a military force capable of rapid deployment to any part of the country. This requires an army with high maneuverability and effectiveness. Such an army needs to be composed of three elements: garrison troops, mobile contingents, and a central rapid deployment force. The garrison troops manning the regional bases of operation will facilitate local stability, maintain the lines of communication, and provide logistical support. The mobile troops—with airlift capability—will respond to security threats in their zone of deployment. The central rapid deployment force will serve as the central reserve, responding to crises in any military zone.

The size of the new Afghan army also depends on available resources. The international community has made generous commitments to fund the reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, few countries have pledged funds for building and training the national Afghan army and security forces. Since security is essential for restoring political stability and the reconstruction of the Afghan economy, the creation of the national army should be a top priority in allocating available funds. Afghanistan intends to build a 60,000-strong army, an 8,000-man air force, a 12,000-man border guard, and a 70,000-member police force.31 The cost of organizing, training, arming, and maintaining such a large force is phenomenal by Afghan standards. Insufficient funding will be devastating to the plan.

The cost effectiveness of the army is closely linked to the level of professional training of the military units. US Special Forces are conducting training courses for several 600-strong battalions over an 18-month period that began in May 2002. Each course lasts for ten weeks. The Green Berets are expected to train 9,600 soldiers for the regular army and 3,000 for the border forces before the Afghan instructors take over the training. Obviously this basic training is the first step. It will have to be followed up by long periods of subsequent instruction, specialized combat and combat support training, small and large unit maneuvers, and command and staff exercises.

To develop effective military cohesion, leadership—particularly at the small unit level—is of vital importance. This further signifies the need for a highly trained and professionally effective officer and NCO corps, which is currently conspicuously absent in Afghanistan. The former trained officers are getting old, and the young officers lack adequate professional training. Many are former guerrilla fighters with no education. Many are illiterate. It will take at

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least ten years for Afghanistan to build a qualified officer corps, one which can help restore the military culture and replicate the units trained by the international community.

Command and Control

As an instrument of politics, the Afghan armed forces should be subordinated to popular civilian control. This is going to be a major challenge in Afghanistan, where armed groups and militias have long been involved in politics. Also, the new Afghan army will be engaged mostly in conducting internal security missions. While external threats normally produce stable civil-military relations, involvement of the army in dealing with internal threats is conducive to unstable civil-military relations. The latter can be avoided by achieving and securing the participation of the people in politics, and blocking the dominance of special interest groups. Creating a national security council at the highest level of government and a civil-military council at the ministry of defense level might prove beneficial.

The operational command and control of the army should be assigned to a joint armed forces chief of staff (JAFCS), who will control not only the army and the air force but also the border guards. Six military zone (corps) commands need to be created to command and control the regional forces.32 These forces will include garrison troops, line of communication units, road construction units, and army aviation formations (transport aircraft and combat helicopters). Other elements will include heavy artillery units, logistics formations, and military education institutions. Depending on the level of threat, a number of mobile brigades could be attached to the zone commands. The newly formed battalions are to be grouped in combined-arms brigades, the main operational formation in the army under regional corps. The central rapid deployment force, with both army and air force components, will have to be placed under a separate command under the JAFCS.33

Traditionally a large portion of the Afghan army was deployed along the “Durand line.” This area, covering the Pashtun belt straddling the Afghan-Pakistan border, faced potential British military action in the 19th and early 20th centuries and was considered the front line during the “Pashtunistan” dispute with Pakistan in the second half of the 20th century. It is still the most unstable area in the region. The current distribution of military forces is not in conformity with strategic exigencies but is the outcome of the factional war. The bulk of the forces

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are now concentrated in the north and the west and less in the east and the south.34 A redeployment and reorganization of the corps will be needed.

Demobilization and Reintegration

The demobilization of the civil war combatants and their reintegration into the society is one of the greatest challenges facing postwar Afghanistan. According to Afghan government sources, there are over 200,000 irregular militia combatants and war veterans dispersed throughout the country. They include three types of armed groups: the “formal” factional militias that were involved in the civil war, the “bandwagoners” who seized the opportunity to join the winning side in the anti-Taliban war, and the freebooters who filled the vacuum created by the sudden demise of the Taliban. The first group of armed men is closely attached to the warring factions and loyal to the regional leaders. They are expected to survive longer than the others. The last two groups of fighters are mostly incorporated by local warlords.

Some local commanders have shown interest in downsizing their militias because they cannot pay them. But other local warlords, who have access to drug money and other resources, continue to expand their forces or draw freebooters to their ranks.35 In recent months limited disarmament attempts have been made in Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, and Smangan. Most of the disarmament has affected the freebooters who are not affiliated with local warlords. There are also reports that powerful local commanders are disarming their adversaries as a means to increase their influence.36

Random disarmament efforts, however, are not an effective approach. Unless a systematic demobilization program is put in place, the unemployed combatants will return to violence and banditry or join the holdouts of militant groups and terrorists. Creating opportunities for peaceful employment would encourage militia members to leave the warlords and thus help the national demobilization process. The United Nations favors an inverse model of the traditional sequence of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, suggesting instead a program of reintegration and demobilization that would provide alternative employment for the former combatants before they are actually disarmed. This requires funds for launching quick-impact and labor-intensive projects to absorb former combatants. With the restoration of the public work force (Qowaye Kar), agricultural assistance force (Qowaye Sabz) and creation of a demining army and a drug control force, tens of thousands of former militia members could be reintegrated and demobilized. The pace of demobilization also will depend on the process of building the new army and police force, the scope and speed of economic reconstruction, and the restoration of the education system and government bureaucracy.

The demobilization process will need to be supervised by a national commission of demobilization and reintegration. Until the national army becomes operationally effective, parts of the regional militias will have to be maintained as local security forces under strict control of the central government.

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They should be registered, trained, and reeducated in a professional ethos. Qualified combatants could be recruited for the national army and the police force. The militias’ heavy weapons are to be collected by the national commission and stored in secure depots.

The implementation of such an ambitious plan requires significant international support and cooperation from neighboring countries. This is an extremely challenging project. But there are no easy, inexpensive solutions to the process of demobilizing hundreds of thousands of combatants and armed men who know little more than fighting.

Conclusion

Rebuilding Afghanistan’s national army is not only an essential element in stabilizing the war-torn country but also a contribution to the effectiveness of the US-led international war on terrorism in South and Central Asia. It is a highly cost-effective project, but also an expensive and lengthy endeavor. Its success is linked to three major variables: the emergence of a legitimate broad-based government, the availability of resources, and time. A legitimate government will encourage the regional forces to dissolve their militias in the interest of creating a national army. Resources for the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan will provide favorable conditions for demobilization and reintegration of the combatants, and for building an effective military establishment. And, finally, the process will take time to reach fruition. Serious and continued US engagement, perseverance, and support is essential to build an effective national army in Afghanistan, one that will hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in support of empowering the central government and stabilizing the country.


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NOTES

1. In the 1870s Amir Sher Ali Khan recreated the Afghan army that disintegrated during the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-80). In the 1880s Amir Abdur Rahman had to reestablish the army to unify the fragmented country. The army was remodeled under King Amanullah following the third Anglo-Afghan War (1919), but it met a fatal blow during the civil war of 1929. A new military establishment was created by Nadeshah after his accession in 1929. The Soviet-sponsored reorganization and modernization of the Afghan army began in the 1960s and continued through the Moscow-backed communist rule. It was totally disintegrated during the civil war of 1992-2001.

2. The British forces faced major challenges in responding to this mode of warfare in the tribal areas of the northwest frontier. See General Sir Andrew Skeen, Passing it On, Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the Northwest Frontier of India (Aldershot and London: Gale and Polden, 1932), pp. 2-12.

3. See Peter Paret et al., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), p. 841.

4. Khoshal Khan Khattak, Dastarnama, a classic treatise on norms and practice of leadership (in Pashto) (Kabul: 1967), p. 56.

5. See Edward Hensman, The Second Afghan War (London: 1881), p. 329.

6. Each soldier of the regular army under Sher Ali was issued a copy of the Koran. The soldiers were required to study the Holy Scripture with the company’s mullah, who led them in religious rituals during off-duty hours. L. N. Sobolev, Stranitsa iz Istorii Vostochnovo Voprosa (“A Page from the History of the Eastern Question”), cited in Istoriya Vorozhoniekh Sil Afganistana 1747-1977 (“The History of Armed Forces of Afghanistan 1747-1977”), ed. U. V. Gankovsky (Moscow: 1985), p. 45.

7. T. A. Heathcote, The Afghan Wars (London: 1980), p. 9.

8. Gankovsky, p. 65.

9. Rhea Talley Stewart, Fire in Afghanistan 1914-1929 (New York: Doubleday, 1973), p. 210.

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10. My conversation in Kabul in 1962 with an Afghan veteran who was quoting an eyewitness of the event in the 1860s in Kabul when Amir Sher Ali was supervising the payment of government soldiers before moving against his rivals.

11. It was probably the first time the Afghan army was being regularly trained, with the help of field manuals translated from English into Pashto and Dari. See Gankovsky, pp. 44-45.

12. Turkistanskii Vedomostii (“Turkistan Official Bulletin”) 1877, No. 25, in Gankovsky, p. 37.

13. The army had received 29,000 muzzle-loading and 5,000 breach-loading (Snider) rifles from the British government. The army also had 30,000 other firearms, mostly muzzle-loading muskets, smooth-bore and rifled. See The Second Afghan War 1878-80, Official Account, pp. 14-15, and Appendix 1, pp. 633-35.

14. At the death of the Amir the regular army consisted of 80 infantry battalions, 40 cavalry regiments, 100 artillery batteries, and 4,000 household troops. The overall strength of the army was 90,000.

15. Hasan Kakar, Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Development 1880-1896 (Kabul: 1971), pp. 165-66.

16. In July 1923 Amanullah told the people, “These are the days of the pen, not of the sword . . . therefore send your sons to school. Our martial qualities are sufficient, it is education that we lack.” Stewart, p. 209.

17. This, coupled with a state-funded education system and economic development programs, helped national integration and expansion of central government control. The situation enabled the army to successfully respond to simultaneous internal disturbances, including the Katawz rebellion in 1937-39, the Shinwari revolt of 1938, Alizai-Durani unrest in 1939, and the 1944-45 rebellion of the Safi tribe in eastern Kunar province.

18. The armed forces also included a 21,000-strong gendarmerie organized in battalions and regiments and a 25,000-strong Public Works Force organized in companies, battalions, and construction units.

19. The United States sent $5 billion worth of weapons to the mujahideen during 1986-90, while the Soviet Union provided an estimated $5.7 billion (US) worth of weapons to Kabul during the same period. See Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1995), p. 179.

20. In 1990-91 the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan increasingly relied on militia units or paramilitary forces. The regime was finally overthrown by the defection of the major militia formation to the mujahideen. See M. N. Azimi, Ordu wa Siasat dar Seh Daha-ye Akhir (“Army and Politics in the Last Three Decades”), (Peshawar: 1998), pp. 400, 417-23, 491, 512-32.

21. Ahmad Rashid, “Security Concerns Mount in Afghanistan As country Enters Critical Reconstruction Phase,” Foreign Policy in Focus, 19 March 2002.

22. The Central Corps (four divisions, all in Kabul), 1st Corps in Nangrahar (two divisions), 2d Corps in Kandahar (three divisions), 3d Corps in Paktia (three divisions), 4th Corps in Herat (three divisions and several new units made up of former mujahideen), 5th Corps in Charikar (three divisions), 6th Corps in Baghlan-Takhar (three divisions), 7th Corps in Mazar-e Sharif (four divisions). The total strength on paper is estimated at 700,000, while the actual strength is around 200,000. My interviews with several Afghan military officers in Kabul, March 2002.

23. The divisions are deployed in Mazar-e Sharif, Jawzjan, Sar-e Pul, Hairatan, and Mamaymaneh.

24. These divisions are 1st and 31st in Kabul, 34th in Bamian, 36th in Logar, 41st in Ghor, 42d in Wardak, 71st in Farah, 100th in Laghman, and 27th in Qalat. Twenty-seven Border Guard brigades are being formed.

25. Author’s conversation with several Afghan officials, including Defense Minister Qasim Fahim, Kabul, June 2002.

26. For example, in 1912 during a rebellion in Paktia, the Amir ordered the Mangal and Zadran regiments in Kabul and Jalalabad to be disarmed. Similarly, in 1938 the disturbances in the eastern district of Shinwar prompted the government to disarm Shinwari troops based in Jalalabad.

27. David Rohde, “Training an Afghan Army that Can Shoot Straight,” The New York Times, 6 June 2002.

28. Darryl Henderson, Cohesion, The Human Element in Combat (Washington: NDU Press, 1985), p. 4.

29. Recruits from five main political parties could stay together for only seven months before they deserted the government “army” in response to the instructions from the leaders of their quarreling parties.

30. Afghanistan has never had an official military doctrine defining the country’s defense policy and directing the creation of a strategic-technological infrastructure to support its implementation.

31. Michael Christie, “Afghanistan’s New National Army Slowly Takes Shape,” Reuters, Kabul, 2 June 2002.

32. These zones could be the central, eastern and southeastern, southwestern, western, northern, and northeastern zones.

33. The combined-arms brigade will consist of three light infantry battalions, a tank battalion, an artillery regiment, a reconnaissance company, a technical unit, an engineer company, a signal company, an air defense battery, and a logistical support unit.

34. Five corps are in the north and the west, and three corps are in the south and east.

35. International Crisis Group Report, “Afghanistan Briefing, Securing Afghanistan: The Need for More International Action,” Kabul/Brussels, 15 March 2002, p. 8.

36. UN General Secretary’s Report to General Assembly (No. A/56/875-S/22002/22278), The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace and Security, 18 March 2002.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ali Ahmad Jalali is Director of the Afghan Radio Network Project and Chief of the Pashto Service of the Voice of America, in Washington, D.C. He is a former colonel in the Afghan army and served as a top military planner with the Afghan resistance following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He attended higher command and staff colleges in Afghanistan, the United States, Britain, and Russia, and has lectured widely. Mr. Jalali is the author of several books, including a three-volume military history of Afghanistan. His most recent book, The Other Side of the Mountain (1998), coauthored with Lester Grau, is an analytical review of the mujahideen war with the Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Paramet...tumn/jalali.htm

[Kmarx]

To get the original right from the horse's mouth, click Bush - The Sad Face of Depression

Bush's Depression: Been There, Reported That
By DOUG THOMPSON
Sep 28, 2005, 06:38

Depressed and demoralized White House staffers say working at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue is “life in a hellhole” as they try to deal with a sullen, moody President whose temper tantrums drive staffers crying from the room and bring the business of running the country to a halt.

“It’s like working in an insane asylum,” says one White House aide. “People walk around like they’re in a trance. We’re the dance band on the Titanic, playing out our last songs to people who know the ship is sinking and none of us are going to make it.”

Increasing reports from the usually tight-lipped staff of the Bush Administration talk of a West Wing dominated by gallows humor, long faces and a depression that has all but paralyzed daily routines.

“If POTUS (President of the United States) is on the road you can breathe a little easier for the day, knowing that those with him are catching hell and the mood will be a little easier in the Wing (West Wing) until he returns,” says another aide.

Capitol Hill Blue began reporting on Bush’s mood swings and erratic behavior in June 2004 but the stories of an erratic, moody President circulating within the White House were ignored by the “mainstream media” until recently. Now more and more outlets have begun to report on what many administration staffers say is a President out of control.

“A president who normally thrives on tough talk and self-assurance finds himself at what aides privately describe as a low point in office, one that is changing the psychic and political aura of the White House, as well as its distinctive political approach,” Jim VandeHei and Peter Baker wrote in The Washington Post over the weekend. “Aides who never betrayed self-doubt now talk in private of failures selling the American people on the Iraq war, the president's Social Security plan and his response to Hurricane Katrina.”

That sentiment is echoed by former Republican Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich.

“I think the Administration realizes the larger system has failed,” Gingrich says. “They are not where they want to be on Iraq. Katrina was an absolute failure."

“It's a standing joke among the president's top aides: who gets to deliver the bad news? Warm and hearty in public, Bush can be cold and snappish in private, and aides sometimes cringe before the displeasure of the president of the United States, or, as he is known in West Wing jargon, POTUS,” Evan Thomas wrote in Newsweek on September 19. Thomas talked to “several aides who did not wish to be quoted because it might displease the president.”

Thomas went on to report “Bush can be petulant about dissent; he equates disagreement with disloyalty. After five years in office, he is surrounded largely by people who agree with him…Late last week, Bush was, by some accounts, down and angry. But another Bush aide described the atmosphere inside the White House as "strangely surreal and almost detached." At one meeting described by this insider, officials were oddly self-congratulatory, perhaps in an effort to buck each other up. Life inside a bunker can be strange, especially in defeat.”

To regular readers of this web site, this should sound all too familiar. Here is what we reported on June 4, 2004:

“Worried White House aides paint a portrait of a man on the edge, increasingly wary of those who disagree with him and paranoid of a public that no longer trusts his policies in Iraq or at home. ‘It reminds me of the Nixon days,’ says a longtime GOP political consultant with contacts in the White House. ‘Everybody is an enemy; everybody is out to get him. That’s the mood over there.’”

Last year, the naysayers said we got it wrong.

But they got it wrong.

Again.

And we got it right and ahead of everyone else.

Again.

Yes, we're gloating. We all too often read reports in the big boys and have a feeling of deja vu because we're already been there and reported that.

[Marine]

High-powered NATO team due for expansion talks


KABUL, October 3 (Pajhwok Afghan News): A high-level delegation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) - leading the peacekeeping mission in the strife-torn country - is due to arrive here this week for talks on ISAF's expansion to the troubled southern zone of Afghanistan.

Major Andrew Elmes, spokesman for the International Security Assistance Force, told reporters here on Monday the delegation would discuss with Afghan officials NATO's policy and operational issues concerning its mission in Afghanistan.

The delegation will meet senior officials of the Afghan government, the United Nations, the group of eight nations involved in reforming Afghanistan's security, the European Union, the US-led coalition and the ISAF to assess the alliance's future involvement in the country.

Andrew Elmes added the team would also discuss upgrading capabilities of the Afghan National Army and police so as to enable them to adequately meet the security challenge in the future.

The North Atlantic Council is NATO's most important decision-making body, whose visit comes at an important stage of Afghanistan's transition to democracy and soon after the legislative vote that marked culmination of the Bonn process.

It will be instructive to point out there are about 11,000 ISAF troops deployed to the Afghan capital and some northern provinces for security and reconstruction assignments.



Ahmad Khalid Mowahid

nd/by/mud


http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=1751

[ghostgovt]

Aside from a lot of Bush propaganda.... the real deal is explained in this article. It's about the truth and what Americans and their confused leaders must face in the now growing Afghan debacle.

http://www.heraldextra.com/modules.php?op=...ticle&sid=65486

Sunday, October 02, 2005 - 12:00 AM Printer friendly page | Send this story to a friend

Taliban has new guns, new drive

Scott Baldauf, Ashraf Khan and Rich Clabaugh CHRISTIAN SCIENCE M

KHOST, AFGHANISTAN; AND CHAMAN, PAKISTAN -- An internal debate within the Taliban -- whether to launch increasingly aggressive attacks against the US-led coalition or to allow the insurgency to bleed the Afghan government over time -- has been settled this year, according to a rebel commander and Afghan security officials.

In the most violent year of their insurgency to date, the Taliban have gone on the offensive, launching more pitched battles in an effort to persuade the international community and Afghans that this remains very much a nation at war, says Mullah Gul Mohammad, a front-line commander for Jaish-e Muslimeen, a recently reconciled Taliban splinter group.

"For the past many days we [the Taliban and the Jaish] have been fighting together against our common enemies," says Mullah Mohammad, who says he traveled from Afghanistan to Chaman, Pakistan, for an interview. The insurgents are flush with new weapons -- including surface-to-air missiles -- and cash, he says, and are pausing only to see if the US military decides to draw down forces following the Sept. 18 parliamentary elections. "If they stay, we would launch our attacks anew."

In the four years since the fall of the Taliban government, there have been many moments when it appeared that the Taliban insurgency had breathed its last breath. But this year was different. The Taliban have launched a series of attacks that has raised this year's death toll -- 1,200 civilians and military personnel so far -- to a wartime high. Their attacks show increasing sophistication, US and Afghan officials say, and a UN report now warns that the Taliban may be receiving tactical training from jihadists returning from Iraq.

With an apparently revitalized Taliban insurgency, the American military and its NATO allies must now decide whether their strategy needs retooling, and American diplomats could have increasing difficulty convincing NATO allies to take over leadership of the Afghan counterinsurgency campaign.

It could be a hard sell, indeed. Even US military commanders say it is too soon to count the Taliban out.

[Marine]

Vote count ends in Helmand & Kandahar provinces


Pajhwok Report

KANDAHAR CITY, October 3 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Vote count has ended in the southern Kandahar and Helmand provinces, electoral officials announced on Monday.

Qahir Wasefi, head of the regional office of the joint Afghan-UN electoral body, said physical tallying of votes had ended in the two provinces, where 300 ballot boxes - needing to be reviewed - remained 'quarantined.'

He told Pajhwok Afghan News 276 'quarantined' boxes from Kandahar would be checked by a delegation and then recounted. And on the 125 sealed ballot boxes in Helmand, a decision would be made by JEMB authorities in Kabul.

In Kandahar, former minister for tribal and frontier affairs Arif Noorzai, Noorul Haq Uloomi, Qayyum Karzai, Khalid Pashtun and Haji Amir Lalai are leading the race for Wolesi Jirga while Fariba Ahmadi Kakar, Shakiba and Rana Tarin are the top women candidates.




http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=1757

[ghostgovt]

http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/000310.html


October 03, 2005
Afghanistan: Opium Farmers Sell Daughters To Pay Off Traffickers

In a report from today's Independent, opium farmers in Afghanistan, prevented from growing their produce have been forced to resort to extreme measures to pay off the drug traffickers - they have been made to hand over their daughters to the opium exporters.

Opium accounts for 60% of Afghanistan's economy, and the trade continues despite measures by NATO peacekeepers to curtail its production. The news of daughters being given away comes from Nangahar province, where the British who protect the region have claimed the largest success in banning the opium trade. While the nation's opium production fell by 21%, in Nangahar it dropped by 96%. Drug dealers had loaned farmers here money to buy opium seeds, but with no harvest, they seek compensation. Apparently, even though the opium trade has been virtually eradicated here, the authorities have given no assistance to farmers to produce other, legal, crops.

[Marine]

Suicide bomber identified as Yemeni national


Safia Milad

KABUL, October 6 (Pajhwok Afghan News): A week after a suicide bomber killed at least nine Afghan army recruits here, an intelligence official Thursday claimed the assailant was a Yemeni national.

On 28 September, the bomber crashed his explosive-laden bike into a bus that was carrying army trainees from the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) at 4:30pm in Pul-i-Charkhi, east of the central capital.

The intelligence official, who asked to be named, confided to Pajhwok Afghan News the attack had been plotted in abroad. He added more details of the bombing would come to light after the investigation was wrapped up.

A day after the blast, Defence Ministry informed the attacker was wearing a military uniform, and that his head had been found. The source would not conjecture about who provided the Yemen national with the motorbike and explosives.

The powerful blast had left the bus ruined while partially damaging three others vehicles parked in the vicinity. The site of the explosion is close to a vote-count centre in Kabul.

nd/amm/mud

http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=7171

[ghostgovt]

http://www.borderlandnews.com/apps/pbcs.dl.../510060331/1001

Another charged with Afghan prison assaults

Chris Roberts
El Paso Times

Another soldier has been charged in connection with the beating of inmates at a temporary prison in Afghanistan in 2002 and 2003, but this time the charges include indecent exposure and the use of drugs and alcohol.

Pfc. Damien M. Corsetti is accused of violating a lawful order, dereliction of duty, maltreatment of a prisoner, assault, wrongful use of hashish, indecent act with another, indecent exposure and indecent language. Corsetti is the 15th soldier charged in the incidents.

[Marine]

Arab escapee vows jihad against US


KANDAHAR CITY, October 5 (Pajhwok Afghan News): An al-Qaeda escapee from the US detention centre in Bagram, has vowed to continue fighting the United States.

The Lebanese national Abu Naser, along with three others, had managed to escape from the heavily guarded Bagram airbase on July 11.

In a 30-minute video-tape released here, Abu Naser vowed to continue jihad against the 'infidels'. He hoped their struggle would bring emancipation to Palestinians.

Clad in military fatigue and holding a missile, Abu Naser praised Osama bin Ladin, saying his followers would continue the 'holy war' in Afghanistan and Iraq.

He also recited an Arabic poem to incite youths against the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. "Let us refresh our memories of the courageous strikes of September 11 and defeat the crusaders."

He also referred to his 'jihad' in Paktia, Paktika and Khost provinces and recalled some of his old companions, who fought alongside him.

Janullah Hashemzada

jh/amm/dk



http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=7158

[ghostgovt]

Looks like chaos is growing in Afghanistan... and more troops are needed. Got to keep that PNAC march alive for those BushCons.


http://www.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,3010...2,00.html?f=rss

AFGHAN FORCE INCREASED
Thursday October 06, 2005

NATO is to send thousands more troops to Afghanistan, increasing the total there now by up to 50 percent.

It follows a decision to expand the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) into the volatile southern region.

The decision was made after talks with Afghan president Hamid Karzai.

NATO says the number of ISAF troops in Afghanistan could eventually rise to 15,000.

The ISAF force has been in the country since late 2001.

It came under NATO control in 2003 and currently and numbers about 10,000 troops.

At the moment the force ensures security in the capital Kabul and across parts of the north and west.

It will move into the southern part of Afghanistan, where there are already 20,000 US-led troops, next year.

They are combatting a rising insurgency by the Taliban and hunting al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

This has been the bloodiest year in Afghanistan since 2001 with a growing number of attacks on both civilian and military targets.

[Marine]

Ah, another rat in the trap.

Islamabad to ponder extraditing Hakimi to Kabul


Pajhwok Report

ISLAMABAD, October 6 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Islamabad, if formally approached, is ready to ponder the handover of detained Taliban spokesman Latifullah Hakimi to Afghan authorities.

Speaking to Pajhwok Afghan News on Thursday, Foreign Office spokesperson Tasnim Aslam said: "The Afghan government has not yet contacted us for the extradition of Hakimi."

Islamabad's willingness to consider handing the Taiban voice over to Kabul came a day after President Hamid Karzai sought Hakimi's extradition.

Following the man's capture in Balochistan, Pakistan's Information Minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmad had said they would grill the Taliban spokesman before making a decision on his extradition.


http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=7200

[Marine]

NATO delegation arrives in Kabul


KABUL, October 5 (Pajhwok Afghan News): A high-level delegation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) arrived here on Tuesday to discuss the alliance's priority mission in Afghanistan.

During the three-day visit, the 26-member delegation led by Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer will meet President Hamid Karzai and other ministers of his cabinet.

A statement released here on Wednesday said the delegation would also hold talks with officials of G-8, the United Nations, the European Union and the US-led coalition force to discuss the NATO's future role in Afghanistan.

The high-level visit comes at a crucial time as the country has just held its landmark parliamentary election that officially concludes the Bonn Process. NATO is contributing 11,000 troops for peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. Most of them are stationed in Kabul and the northern provinces.

Pajhwok Report

by/dk

http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=7143

[ghostgovt]

http://www.dailytelegraph.news.com.au/stor...5001028,00.html

Children killed in Afghan quake

From correspondents in Jalalabad

October 08, 2005

TWO children were killed and nearly a dozen mud-brick houses were destroyed when an earthquake hit parts of Afghanistan today, an official said.

"We've reports that two children were killed, one in Charbag and one in Chapliyar districts," Haikal Shah Falah, a government employee in Jalalabad, said.

Thousands of citizens fled on to the streets in the Afghan capital Kabul and several cities in eastern and northeastern Afghanistan, according to witnesses.

"Lots of people rushed onto the streets - it was so strong," a shopkeeper in the northern city of Kunduz said.

[Marine]

Suppose the Taliban would approve ghost?

[Indianhead]

Suppose the Taliban would approve ghost?

Don't know if they would...but I do.

As much as I disagree with the invasion of Iraq,
I support the Op in Afghanistan.

The action was neccessary (a biggie to go to war),
was engaged by a true coalition and appears to
be run by a cadre with brains. Yup, it's tough
terrain and an alien culture, including a drug
economy, but we had to go IMO.

I do wish we'd have moved in through Pakistan
as well and made our best effort to capture Osama.
Such a capture would have wounded al-Quida perhaps
mortally within a year IMO.

But war ain't perfect, and at least they get this:

Militia forces are leadership-dependent. The main issue in this regard is one of “face.” The outright removal of an uncooperative chieftain is too abrupt and, in any event, if he no longer has a stake in the reconstruction process because he is out of power, than why should he and his remaining followers not take to the hills? Instead, chieftains have been brought into the central government in all manner of portfolios and assigned staffs to mentor them in governance. Second-tier militia leaders are promoted to become police commanders—but in another province, with other forces funded by

27/28

Kabul. Rather than taking a moralistic Western stance and labeling them all drug-dealers and war criminals and then demanding Nuremberg-like trials, it has proven to be far better to assume everybody is “dirty” after 25 years of war and to start anew. Yes, some militia leaders will remain dirty, and mechanisms will have to be found to deal with that. However, the avoidance of civil war and a resurgence of Taliban influence is the objective, not show trials using Western laws or our version of international law.

It is critical to emphasize that this “chess game” is not something imposed from the outside: it is a coordinated effort between the Karzai government and the international entities operating in Afghanistan. Indeed, the United Nations, NATO, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the prolific number of American agencies working there are cooperating in various degrees in this direction and with varying levels of effectiveness. It would be easy to label this a “CIA plot” if it were not so transparent and multifaceted.

Nothing wrong with a CIA plot in such a case, as long as it supports true local
power and friendly government. Afghanistan is the backwoods of the world and
thus must be monitored from now on - I say buy all the opium - make stocks of
legal morphine and destroy the rest - as long as the chieftans keep their word
to our military leadership. That leadership must be professional, honest and
tough as nails to get the respect from these guys. Macho respect is required to maintain the level of control needed to be sure a "Taliban" never rules again.

One of my main reasons for my wanting to find a way to put Kurds and Shiites
in control in Iraq immediately is to let them begin working out their national
formula - and free the strength and assests of the US for stand down, and
long-term support in Afghanistan. I hate war - but that's because I know it -
and it's sometimes neccessary. That's part of what makes me a "blue" dog, rather than a "yellow" dog Democrat. It's sad these days the neo-cons have polarized everyone's vision to "conservative" (which ain't anything close) and "liberal".
If the political tactics that work in Afghanistan were used here - maybe we
could form a reasonable coalition too.

[Marine]

Huge quantity of narcotics seized in Zabul


Pajhwok Report

KABUL, October 9 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Afghan police Sunday seized 152 kilograms of opium and 692 kilograms of hashish in Qalat, capital of the restive Zabul province.

A press release issued here said police stopped a Kandahar-bound truck near Qalat. On search, the contraband was recovered hidden in its fuel tank. Driver of the vehicle managed to escape, said the release.

Spokesman for the interior ministry Mohammad Yousaf Stanizai said the truck had been taken into custody. Police was searching the surroundings to arrest the driver.

Lt General Mohammad Daud, deputy interior minister for counter-narcotics said: Afghan forces are well trained and have the capability to conduct raids against narcotics and drug dealers any time in any part of the country."

dk


http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=7294

[Marine]

More than 1,000 children to get vocational training, says minister


Pajhwok Report

KABUL, October 9 (Pajhwok Afghan News): Over thousand poor children hailing from central capital, and provinces of Nangarhar, Badkhshan, Kundoz would be imparted vocational trainings, Minister Ikramudin Masumi said.

In a brief chat with Pajhwok Afghan News, Ikramudin Masumi, Minister for Public Works and Social Affairs, said the children would be trained in different professions to help them in earning livelihood.

Save the Children NGOs of Sweden and Norway would provide $3.5 million to the ministry for carrying out these trainings. In this connection, Afghan Minister Syed Ikramudin Masomi signed an accord with Lein lees head of the NGO here.

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) report shows the number of working children in Kabul is 60,000.



http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=7317

[ghostgovt]

http://www.afgha.com/?af=article&sid=50394

Afghan 'Friendly Fire' Kills Four

BBC
07.10.2005

US-led coalition troops have killed four Afghan policemen and wounded one other after mistaking them for militants in southern Afghanistan.

The incident happened on Thursday in Helmand province's Girishk district, a US military statement said.

Insurgents have been active in Helmand since the toppling of the Taleban regime by US-led forces in 2001.

More than 1,000 people have died in violence linked to militants in Afghanistan this year.

'Not in uniform'

The incident in Helmand happened when US troops spotted a vehicle carrying five armed men in an area where the soldiers were fighting militants.

"Coalition soldiers shot at the vehicle, killing four of the individuals and wounding the other," the US military statement said.

US military spokesman, Lt Col Jerry O' Hara, told journalists that the police officers were not in uniform and that the vehicle had tried to drive away quickly from the area.

"We are conducting an investigation. Of course, we regret this incident," Col O'Hara said.

A senior police official in Helmand, Haji Mohammed Rahim, said the friendly fire incident took place after Taleban militants attacked a convoy of US and Afghan troops, killing two soldiers.

Afghanistan has recently held parliamentary elections which passed off without major violence, despite Taleban attempts to disrupt them.
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