Marines Sound Off About The Iraq War Options

[big sky brad]

THE COMPANY | SIX MONTHS IN RAMADI
Bloodied Marines Sound Off About Want of Armor and Men
By MICHAEL MOSS

Published: April 25, 2005


On May 29, 2004, a station wagon that Iraqi insurgents had packed with C-4 explosives blew up on a highway in Ramadi, killing four American marines who died for lack of a few inches of steel.

The four were returning to camp in an unarmored Humvee that their unit had rigged with scrap metal, but the makeshift shields rose only as high as their shoulders, photographs of the Humvee show, and the shrapnel from the bomb shot over the top.


Capt. Kelly D. Royer took photos of Humvees in which his men died. He was removed from command, accused of being "dictatorial."


"The steel was not high enough," said Staff Sgt. Jose S. Valerio, their motor transport chief, who along with the unit's commanding officers said the men would have lived had their vehicle been properly armored. "Most of the shrapnel wounds were to their heads."

Among those killed were Rafael Reynosa, a 28-year-old lance corporal from Santa Ana, Calif., whose wife was expecting twins, and Cody S. Calavan, a 19-year-old private first class from Lake Stevens, Wash., who had the Marine Corps motto, Semper Fidelis, tattooed across his back.

They were not the only losses for Company E during its six-month stint last year in Ramadi. In all, more than one-third of the unit's 185 troops were killed or wounded, the highest casualty rate of any company in the war, Marine Corps officials say.

In returning home, the leaders and Marine infantrymen have chosen to break an institutional code of silence and tell their story, one they say was punctuated not only by a lack of armor, but also by a shortage of men and planning that further hampered their efforts in battle, destroyed morale and ruined the careers of some of their fiercest warriors.

The saga of Company E, part of a lionized battalion nicknamed the Magnificent Bastards, is also one of fortitude and ingenuity. The marines, based at Camp Pendleton in southern California, had been asked to rid the provincial capital of one of the most persistent insurgencies, and in enduring 26 firefights, 90 mortar attacks and more than 90 homemade bombs, they shipped their dead home and powered on. Their tour has become legendary among other Marine units now serving in Iraq and facing some of the same problems.

"As marines, we are always taught that we do more with less," said Sgt. James S. King, a platoon sergeant who lost his left leg when he was blown out of the Humvee that Saturday afternoon last May. "And get the job done no matter what it takes."

The experiences of Company E's marines, pieced together through interviews at Camp Pendleton and by phone, company records and dozens of photographs taken by the marines, show they often did just that. The unit had less than half the troops who are now doing its job in Ramadi, and resorted to making dummy marines from cardboard cutouts and camouflage shirts to place in observation posts on the highway when it ran out of men. During one of its deadliest firefights, it came up short on both vehicles and troops. Marines who were stranded at their camp tried in vain to hot-wire a dump truck to help rescue their falling brothers. That day, 10 men in the unit died.

Sergeant Valerio and others had to scrounge for metal scraps to strengthen the Humvees they inherited from the National Guard, which occupied Ramadi before the marines arrived. Among other problems, the armor the marines slapped together included heavier doors that could not be latched, so they "chicken winged it" by holding them shut with their arms as they traveled.

"We were sitting out in the open, an easy target for everybody," Cpl. Toby G. Winn of Centerville, Tex., said of the shortages. "We complained about it every day, to anybody we could. They told us they were listening, but we didn't see it."

The company leaders say it is impossible to know how many lives may have been saved through better protection, since the insurgents became adept at overcoming improved defenses with more powerful weapons. Likewise, Pentagon officials say they do not know how many of the more than 1,500 American troops who have died in the war had insufficient protective gear.

Page 2

But while most of Company E's work in fighting insurgents was on foot, the biggest danger the men faced came in traveling to and from camp: 13 of the 21 men who were killed had been riding in Humvees that failed to deflect bullets or bombs.

Toward the end of their tour when half of their fleet had become factory-armored, the armor's worth became starkly clear. A car bomb that the unit's commander, Capt. Kelly D. Royer, said was at least as powerful as the one on May 29 showered a fully armored Humvee with shrapnel, photographs show. The marines inside were left nearly unscathed.

Captain Royer, from Orangevale, Calif., would not accompany his troops home. He was removed from his post six days before they began leaving Ramadi, accused by his superiors of being dictatorial, records show. His defenders counter that his commanding style was a necessary response to the extreme circumstances of his unit's deployment.

Company E's experiences still resonate today both in Iraq, where two more marines were killed last week in Ramadi by the continuing insurgency, and in Washington, where Congress is still struggling to solve the Humvee problem. Just on Thursday, the Senate voted to spend an extra $213 million to buy more fully armored Humvees. The Army's procurement system, which also supplies the Marines, has come under fierce criticism for underperforming in the war, and to this day it has only one small contractor in Ohio armoring new Humvees.

Marine Corps officials disclosed last month in Congressional hearings that they were now going their own way and had undertaken a crash program to equip all of their more than 2,800 Humvees in Iraq with stronger armor. The effort went into production in November and is to be completed at the end of this year.

Defense Department officials acknowledged that Company E lacked enough equipment and men, but said that those were problems experienced by many troops when the insurgency intensified last year, and that vigorous efforts had been made to improve their circumstances.

Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis of Richland, Wash., who commanded the First Marine Division to which Company E belongs, said he had taken every possible step to support Company E. He added that they had received more factory-armored Humvees than any other unit in Iraq.

"We could not encase men in sufficiently strong armor to deny any enemy success," General Mattis said. "The tragic loss of our men does not necessarily indicate failure - it is war."

Trouble From the Start

Company E's troubles began at Camp Pendleton when, just seven days before the unit left for Iraq, it lost its first commander. The captain who led them through training was relieved for reasons his supervisor declined to discuss.

"That was like losing your quarterback on game day," said First Sgt. Curtis E. Winfree.

In Kuwait, where the unit stopped over, an 18-year-old private committed suicide in a chapel. Then en route to Ramadi, they lost the few armored plates they had earmarked for their vehicles when the steel was borrowed by another unit that failed to return it. Company E tracked the steel down and took it back.

Even at that, the armor was mostly just scrap and thin, and they needed more for the unarmored Humvees they inherited from the Florida National Guard.

"It was pitiful," said Capt. Chae J. Han, a member of a Pentagon team that surveyed the Marine camps in Iraq last year to document their condition. "Everything was just slapped on armor, just homemade, not armor that was given to us through the normal logistical system."

The report they produced was classified, but Captain Royer, who took over command of the unit, and other Company E marines say they had to build barriers at the camp - a former junkyard - to block suicide drivers, improve the fencing and move the toilets under a thick roof to avoid the insurgent shelling.

Even some maps they were given to plan raids were several years old, showing farmland where in fact there were homes, said a company intelligence expert, Cpl. Charles V. Lauersdorf, who later went to work for the Defense Intelligence Agency. There, he discovered up-to-date imagery that had not found its way to the front lines.

Page 3

Ramadi had been quiet under the National Guard, but the Marines had orders to root out an insurgency that was using the provincial capital as a way station to Falluja and Baghdad, said Lt. Col. Paul J. Kennedy, who oversaw Company E as the commander of its Second Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment.

Before the company's first month was up, Lance Cpl. William J. Wiscowiche of Victorville, Calif., lay dead on the main highway as its first casualty. The Marine Corps issued a statement saying only that he had died in action. But for Company E, it was the first reality check on the constraints that would mark their tour.

Sweeping for Bombs

A British officer had taught them to sweep the roads for bombs by boxing off sections and fanning out troops into adjoining neighborhoods in hopes of scaring away insurgents poised to set off the bombs. "We didn't have the time to do that," said Sgt. Charles R. Sheldon of Solana Beach, Calif. "We had to clear this long section of highway, and it usually took us all day."

Now and then a Humvee would speed through equipped with an electronic device intended to block detonation of makeshift bombs. The battalion, which had five companies in its fold, had only a handful of the devices, Colonel Kennedy said.

Company E had none, even though sweeping roads for bombs was one of its main duties. So many of the marines, like Corporal Wiscowiche, had to rely on their eyes. On duty on March 30, 2004, the 20-year-old lance corporal did not spot the telltale three-inch wires sticking out of the dust until he was a few feet away, the company's leaders say. He died when the bomb was set off.

"We had just left the base," Corporal Winn said. "He was walking in the middle of the road, and all I remember is hearing a big explosion and seeing a big cloud of smoke."

The endless task of walking the highways for newly hidden I.E.D.'s, or improvised explosive devices, "was nerve wracking," Corporal Winn said, and the company began using binoculars and the scopes on their rifles to spot the bombs after Corporal Wiscowiche was killed.

"Halfway through the deployment marines began getting good at spotting little things," Sergeant Sheldon added. "We had marines riding down the road at 60 miles an hour, and they would spot a copper filament sticking out of a block of cement."

General Mattis said troops in the area now have hundreds of the electronic devices to foil the I.E.D.'s.

In parceling out Ramadi, the Marine Corps leadership gave Company E more than 10 square miles to control, far more than the battalion's other companies. Captain Royer said he had informally asked for an extra platoon, or 44 marines, and had been told the battalion was seeking an extra company. The battalion's operations officer, Maj. John D. Harrill, said the battalion had received sporadic assistance from the Army and had given Company E extra help. General Mattis says he could not pull marines from another part of Iraq because "there were tough fights going on everywhere."

Colonel Kennedy said Company E's area was less dense, but the pressure it put on the marines came to a boil on April 6, 2004, when the company had to empty its camp - leaving the cooks to guard the gates - to deal with three firefights.

Ten of its troops were killed that day, including eight who died when the Humvee they were riding in was ambushed en route to assist other marines under fire. That Humvee lacked even the improvised steel on the back where most of the marines sat, Company E leaders say.

"All I saw was sandbags, blood and dead bodies," Sergeant Valerio said. "There was no protection in the back."

Captain Royer said more armor would not have even helped. The insurgents had a .50-caliber machine gun that punched huge holes through its windshield. Only a heavier combat vehicle could have withstood the barrage, he said, but the unit had none. Defense Department officials have said they favored Humvees over tanks in Iraq because they were less imposing to civilians.

The Humvee that trailed behind that day, which did have improvised armor, was hit with less powerful munitions, and the marines riding in it survived by hunkering down. "The rounds were pinging," Sergeant Sheldon said. "Then in a lull they returned fire and got out."

Captain Royer said that he photographed the Humvees in which his men died to show to any official who asked about the condition of their armor, but that no one ever did.

Page 4

Sergeant Valerio redoubled his effort to fortify the Humvees by begging other branches of the military for scraps. "How am I going to leave those kids out there in those Humvees," he recalled asking himself.

The company of 185 marines had only two Humvees and three trucks when it arrived, so just getting them into his shop was a logistical chore, Sergeant Valerio said. He also worried that the steel could come loose in a blast and become deadly shrapnel.

For the gunners who rode atop, Sergeant Valerio stitched together bulletproof shoulder pads into chaps to protect their legs.

"That guy was amazing," First Sgt. Bernard Coleman said. "He was under a vehicle when a mortar landed, and he caught some in the leg. When the mortar fire stopped, he went right back to work."

A Captain's Fate

Lt. Sean J. Schickel remembers Captain Royer asking a high-ranking Marine Corps visitor whether the company would be getting more factory-armored Humvees. The official said they had not been requested and that there were production constraints, Lieutenant Schickel said.

Recalls Captain Royer: "I'm thinking we have our most precious resource engaged in combat, and certainly the wealth of our nation can provide young, selfless men with what they need to accomplish their mission. That's an erudite way of putting it. I have a much more guttural response that I won't give you."

Captain Royer was later relieved of command. General Mattis and Colonel Kennedy declined to discuss the matter. His first fitness report, issued on May 31, 2004, after the company's deadliest firefights, concluded, "He has single-handedly reshaped a company in sore need of a leader; succeeded in forming a cohesive fighting force that is battle-tested and worthy."

The second, on Sept. 1, 2004, gave him opposite marks for leadership. "He has been described on numerous occasions as 'dictatorial,' " it said. "There is no morale or motivation in his marines." His defenders say he drove his troops as hard as he drove himself, but was wrongly blamed for problems like armor. "Captain Royer was a decent man that was used for a dirty job and thrown away by his chain of command," Sergeant Sheldon said.

Today, Captain Royer is at Camp Pendleton contesting his fitness report, which could force him to retire. Company E is awaiting deployment to Okinawa, Japan. Some members have moved to other units, or are leaving the Marines altogether.

"I'm checking out," Corporal Winn said. "When I started, I wanted to make it my career. I've had enough."

Link -
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/25/internat...ted=1&th&emc=th

[anderson_perry]

THE COMPANY | SIX MONTHS IN RAMADI
Bloodied Marines Sound Off About Want of Armor and Men
By MICHAEL MOSS

Published: April 25, 2005
On May 29, 2004, a station wagon that Iraqi insurgents had packed with C-4 explosives blew up on a highway in Ramadi, killing four American marines who died for lack of a few inches of steel.

The four were returning to camp in an unarmored Humvee that their unit had rigged with scrap metal, but the makeshift shields rose only as high as their shoulders, photographs of the Humvee show, and the shrapnel from the bomb shot over the top.


Capt. Kelly D. Royer took photos of Humvees in which his men died. He was removed from command, accused of being "dictatorial."
"The steel was not high enough," said Staff Sgt. Jose S. Valerio, their motor transport chief, who along with the unit's commanding officers said the men would have lived had their vehicle been properly armored. "Most of the shrapnel wounds were to their heads."

Among those killed were Rafael Reynosa, a 28-year-old lance corporal from Santa Ana, Calif., whose wife was expecting twins, and Cody S. Calavan, a 19-year-old private first class from Lake Stevens, Wash., who had the Marine Corps motto, Semper Fidelis, tattooed across his back.

They were not the only losses for Company E during its six-month stint last year in Ramadi. In all, more than one-third of the unit's 185 troops were killed or wounded, the highest casualty rate of any company in the war, Marine Corps officials say.

In returning home, the leaders and Marine infantrymen have chosen to break an institutional code of silence and tell their story, one they say was punctuated not only by a lack of armor, but also by a shortage of men and planning that further hampered their efforts in battle, destroyed morale and ruined the careers of some of their fiercest warriors.

The saga of Company E, part of a lionized battalion nicknamed the Magnificent Bastards, is also one of fortitude and ingenuity. The marines, based at Camp Pendleton in southern California, had been asked to rid the provincial capital of one of the most persistent insurgencies, and in enduring 26 firefights, 90 mortar attacks and more than 90 homemade bombs, they shipped their dead home and powered on. Their tour has become legendary among other Marine units now serving in Iraq and facing some of the same problems.

"As marines, we are always taught that we do more with less," said Sgt. James S. King, a platoon sergeant who lost his left leg when he was blown out of the Humvee that Saturday afternoon last May. "And get the job done no matter what it takes."

The experiences of Company E's marines, pieced together through interviews at Camp Pendleton and by phone, company records and dozens of photographs taken by the marines, show they often did just that. The unit had less than half the troops who are now doing its job in Ramadi, and resorted to making dummy marines from cardboard cutouts and camouflage shirts to place in observation posts on the highway when it ran out of men. During one of its deadliest firefights, it came up short on both vehicles and troops. Marines who were stranded at their camp tried in vain to hot-wire a dump truck to help rescue their falling brothers. That day, 10 men in the unit died.

Sergeant Valerio and others had to scrounge for metal scraps to strengthen the Humvees they inherited from the National Guard, which occupied Ramadi before the marines arrived. Among other problems, the armor the marines slapped together included heavier doors that could not be latched, so they "chicken winged it" by holding them shut with their arms as they traveled.

"We were sitting out in the open, an easy target for everybody," Cpl. Toby G. Winn of Centerville, Tex., said of the shortages. "We complained about it every day, to anybody we could. They told us they were listening, but we didn't see it."

The company leaders say it is impossible to know how many lives may have been saved through better protection, since the insurgents became adept at overcoming improved defenses with more powerful weapons. Likewise, Pentagon officials say they do not know how many of the more than 1,500 American troops who have died in the war had insufficient protective gear.

Page 2

But while most of Company E's work in fighting insurgents was on foot, the biggest danger the men faced came in traveling to and from camp: 13 of the 21 men who were killed had been riding in Humvees that failed to deflect bullets or bombs.

Toward the end of their tour when half of their fleet had become factory-armored, the armor's worth became starkly clear. A car bomb that the unit's commander, Capt. Kelly D. Royer, said was at least as powerful as the one on May 29 showered a fully armored Humvee with shrapnel, photographs show. The marines inside were left nearly unscathed.

Captain Royer, from Orangevale, Calif., would not accompany his troops home. He was removed from his post six days before they began leaving Ramadi, accused by his superiors of being dictatorial, records show. His defenders counter that his commanding style was a necessary response to the extreme circumstances of his unit's deployment.

Company E's experiences still resonate today both in Iraq, where two more marines were killed last week in Ramadi by the continuing insurgency, and in Washington, where Congress is still struggling to solve the Humvee problem. Just on Thursday, the Senate voted to spend an extra $213 million to buy more fully armored Humvees. The Army's procurement system, which also supplies the Marines, has come under fierce criticism for underperforming in the war, and to this day it has only one small contractor in Ohio armoring new Humvees.

Marine Corps officials disclosed last month in Congressional hearings that they were now going their own way and had undertaken a crash program to equip all of their more than 2,800 Humvees in Iraq with stronger armor. The effort went into production in November and is to be completed at the end of this year.

Defense Department officials acknowledged that Company E lacked enough equipment and men, but said that those were problems experienced by many troops when the insurgency intensified last year, and that vigorous efforts had been made to improve their circumstances.

Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis of Richland, Wash., who commanded the First Marine Division to which Company E belongs, said he had taken every possible step to support Company E. He added that they had received more factory-armored Humvees than any other unit in Iraq.

"We could not encase men in sufficiently strong armor to deny any enemy success," General Mattis said. "The tragic loss of our men does not necessarily indicate failure - it is war."

Trouble From the Start

Company E's troubles began at Camp Pendleton when, just seven days before the unit left for Iraq, it lost its first commander. The captain who led them through training was relieved for reasons his supervisor declined to discuss.

"That was like losing your quarterback on game day," said First Sgt. Curtis E. Winfree.

In Kuwait, where the unit stopped over, an 18-year-old private committed suicide in a chapel. Then en route to Ramadi, they lost the few armored plates they had earmarked for their vehicles when the steel was borrowed by another unit that failed to return it. Company E tracked the steel down and took it back.

Even at that, the armor was mostly just scrap and thin, and they needed more for the unarmored Humvees they inherited from the Florida National Guard.

"It was pitiful," said Capt. Chae J. Han, a member of a Pentagon team that surveyed the Marine camps in Iraq last year to document their condition. "Everything was just slapped on armor, just homemade, not armor that was given to us through the normal logistical system."

The report they produced was classified, but Captain Royer, who took over command of the unit, and other Company E marines say they had to build barriers at the camp - a former junkyard - to block suicide drivers, improve the fencing and move the toilets under a thick roof to avoid the insurgent shelling.

Even some maps they were given to plan raids were several years old, showing farmland where in fact there were homes, said a company intelligence expert, Cpl. Charles V. Lauersdorf, who later went to work for the Defense Intelligence Agency. There, he discovered up-to-date imagery that had not found its way to the front lines.

Page 3

Ramadi had been quiet under the National Guard, but the Marines had orders to root out an insurgency that was using the provincial capital as a way station to Falluja and Baghdad, said Lt. Col. Paul J. Kennedy, who oversaw Company E as the commander of its Second Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment.

Before the company's first month was up, Lance Cpl. William J. Wiscowiche of Victorville, Calif., lay dead on the main highway as its first casualty. The Marine Corps issued a statement saying only that he had died in action. But for Company E, it was the first reality check on the constraints that would mark their tour.

Sweeping for Bombs

A British officer had taught them to sweep the roads for bombs by boxing off sections and fanning out troops into adjoining neighborhoods in hopes of scaring away insurgents poised to set off the bombs. "We didn't have the time to do that," said Sgt. Charles R. Sheldon of Solana Beach, Calif. "We had to clear this long section of highway, and it usually took us all day."

Now and then a Humvee would speed through equipped with an electronic device intended to block detonation of makeshift bombs. The battalion, which had five companies in its fold, had only a handful of the devices, Colonel Kennedy said.

Company E had none, even though sweeping roads for bombs was one of its main duties. So many of the marines, like Corporal Wiscowiche, had to rely on their eyes. On duty on March 30, 2004, the 20-year-old lance corporal did not spot the telltale three-inch wires sticking out of the dust until he was a few feet away, the company's leaders say. He died when the bomb was set off.

"We had just left the base," Corporal Winn said. "He was walking in the middle of the road, and all I remember is hearing a big explosion and seeing a big cloud of smoke."

The endless task of walking the highways for newly hidden I.E.D.'s, or improvised explosive devices, "was nerve wracking," Corporal Winn said, and the company began using binoculars and the scopes on their rifles to spot the bombs after Corporal Wiscowiche was killed.

"Halfway through the deployment marines began getting good at spotting little things," Sergeant Sheldon added. "We had marines riding down the road at 60 miles an hour, and they would spot a copper filament sticking out of a block of cement."

General Mattis said troops in the area now have hundreds of the electronic devices to foil the I.E.D.'s.

In parceling out Ramadi, the Marine Corps leadership gave Company E more than 10 square miles to control, far more than the battalion's other companies. Captain Royer said he had informally asked for an extra platoon, or 44 marines, and had been told the battalion was seeking an extra company. The battalion's operations officer, Maj. John D. Harrill, said the battalion had received sporadic assistance from the Army and had given Company E extra help. General Mattis says he could not pull marines from another part of Iraq because "there were tough fights going on everywhere."

Colonel Kennedy said Company E's area was less dense, but the pressure it put on the marines came to a boil on April 6, 2004, when the company had to empty its camp - leaving the cooks to guard the gates - to deal with three firefights.

Ten of its troops were killed that day, including eight who died when the Humvee they were riding in was ambushed en route to assist other marines under fire. That Humvee lacked even the improvised steel on the back where most of the marines sat, Company E leaders say.

"All I saw was sandbags, blood and dead bodies," Sergeant Valerio said. "There was no protection in the back."

Captain Royer said more armor would not have even helped. The insurgents had a .50-caliber machine gun that punched huge holes through its windshield. Only a heavier combat vehicle could have withstood the barrage, he said, but the unit had none. Defense Department officials have said they favored Humvees over tanks in Iraq because they were less imposing to civilians.

The Humvee that trailed behind that day, which did have improvised armor, was hit with less powerful munitions, and the marines riding in it survived by hunkering down. "The rounds were pinging," Sergeant Sheldon said. "Then in a lull they returned fire and got out."

Captain Royer said that he photographed the Humvees in which his men died to show to any official who asked about the condition of their armor, but that no one ever did.

Page 4

Sergeant Valerio redoubled his effort to fortify the Humvees by begging other branches of the military for scraps. "How am I going to leave those kids out there in those Humvees," he recalled asking himself.

The company of 185 marines had only two Humvees and three trucks when it arrived, so just getting them into his shop was a logistical chore, Sergeant Valerio said. He also worried that the steel could come loose in a blast and become deadly shrapnel.

For the gunners who rode atop, Sergeant Valerio stitched together bulletproof shoulder pads into chaps to protect their legs.

"That guy was amazing," First Sgt. Bernard Coleman said. "He was under a vehicle when a mortar landed, and he caught some in the leg. When the mortar fire stopped, he went right back to work."

A Captain's Fate

Lt. Sean J. Schickel remembers Captain Royer asking a high-ranking Marine Corps visitor whether the company would be getting more factory-armored Humvees. The official said they had not been requested and that there were production constraints, Lieutenant Schickel said.

Recalls Captain Royer: "I'm thinking we have our most precious resource engaged in combat, and certainly the wealth of our nation can provide young, selfless men with what they need to accomplish their mission. That's an erudite way of putting it. I have a much more guttural response that I won't give you."

Captain Royer was later relieved of command. General Mattis and Colonel Kennedy declined to discuss the matter. His first fitness report, issued on May 31, 2004, after the company's deadliest firefights, concluded, "He has single-handedly reshaped a company in sore need of a leader; succeeded in forming a cohesive fighting force that is battle-tested and worthy."

The second, on Sept. 1, 2004, gave him opposite marks for leadership. "He has been described on numerous occasions as 'dictatorial,' " it said. "There is no morale or motivation in his marines." His defenders say he drove his troops as hard as he drove himself, but was wrongly blamed for problems like armor. "Captain Royer was a decent man that was used for a dirty job and thrown away by his chain of command," Sergeant Sheldon said.

Today, Captain Royer is at Camp Pendleton contesting his fitness report, which could force him to retire. Company E is awaiting deployment to Okinawa, Japan. Some members have moved to other units, or are leaving the Marines altogether.

"I'm checking out," Corporal Winn said. "When I started, I wanted to make it my career. I've had enough."

Link -
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/25/internat...ted=1&th&emc=th

a world gone mad

- perry

[Marine]

15th MEU (SOC) returns to ESG after tour in Baghdad
by marinegrunt0311 on Monday 18 April 2005
http://www.thesquadbay.com/content.php?article.953
THE SQUADBAY, Run By Marines And FMF Corpsmen

ABOARD USS BONHOMME RICHARD (April 17, 2005) -- The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) returned to Expeditionary Strike Group 5 ships after conducting a month of aggressive security and stabilization operations in southern Baghdad, Iraq, to disrupt insurgent operations.

The journey to Baghdad began after the MEU completed a month of sustainment training at Kuwait’s Udairi Range.

“Udairi allowed us to bring our air, artillery, mortars, direct fire weapons all together to get that synergy of combined arms,” according to Maj. Robert Salasko, 37, assistant operations officer and native of Princeton, N.J.


Salasko said that while in Kuwait, the MEU reinforced specific training needed to conduct combat operations in Iraq. “(The training at Udairi Range) afforded us a good opportunity to focus on the small unit level. The ACE was able to get a lot of guys up on their qualifications. The BLT was able to get their squad leaders and team leaders up to a level of expertise, proficiency and confidence before going north.”

Once the training was complete, the MEU spent about a week planning the movement to Forward Operating Base Falcon. It took only six days to move more than 2,000 Marines using a combination of tractor trailers, convoys and strategic airlift.

“Usually units have months to plan this (type of movement) because it’s a big deal. We’re talking receiving, staging, onward movement and integration of a whole force. We had seven days and by MEU (SOC) standards that’s a lot but most of these units that come up here are planning a year out,” Salasko said.

The MEU’s Aviation Combat Element, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 165 (REIN), conducted missions from Al Taqaddum Airbase and Al Asad Airfield, both located west of Baghdad. Being just a short flight from the FOB allowed the squadron to support many of the MEU’s Close Air Support or CAS missions.

The task given to 15th MEU was to “reinforce or enhance the security and stability operations that are being conducted by Multi-National Division Baghdad,” Salasko said. They conducted these operations in an area that had been left unmonitored for approximately six weeks, so there was an increase in insurgent activity prior to the MEU’s arrival.

The MEU’s area of operations, 350 square kilometers of mostly rural farmland, was just a few kilometers from FOB Falcon which allowed for quick resupply missions and a variety fire support from both helicopter assets and artillery capable of engaging enemy forces within minutes of a request.

While conducting their mission, the MEU fell under the Army’s 256th Brigade Combat Team which is part of 3rd Infantry Division. 256th BCT provided guidance and direction for the MEU while they occupied their assigned AO.

Before jumping into the fight, key leaders were shown the AO in armored humvees by Army soldiers from 256th BCT to learn the terrain and identify locations with the majority of insurgent activity.

One of the insurgent’s most popular weapons remains improvised explosive devices, which continue to threaten the safety of service members conducting SASO missions. Marines and soldiers were also continually threatened by small-arms, rocket and mortar fire.

“We analyzed the enemy and what we saw was that their center of gravity was their IED capability. That’s where they were honing all their success,” Salasko said. However, their vulnerability was that they needed to be present to detonate the device.

To combat the IED threats, Marines from Battalion Landing Team 1/1’s A, B and C companies went to the field for approximately ten days each to conduct foot patrols through rural farming areas and specifically near major roads. On patrols, they conducted vehicle check points and house searches to look for explosives, unexploded military munitions and anything that can be used to make an IED.

Each of the three companies found different amounts of explosives and reported their finds to explosive ordnance disposal technicians who destroyed the items. The companies also detained numerous suspected insurgents for follow on questioning.

In addition to the line companies, BLT 1/1’s weapons company formed a Mobile Assault Platoon that teamed up with the Force Reconnaissance Platoon to conduct multiple direct-action raids on specific targets to disrupt insurgent activities and detain individuals for questioning.

The 15th MEU’s actions in the AO “totally reduced their effectiveness and greatly diminished their efforts to emplace them and totally disrupt their operations,” he added.

Salasko said that while the MEU wasn’t in Baghdad as long as other units, they definitely made an impact. Insurgents who had migrated to the area that wasn’t being patrolled were quickly removed by the aggressive actions of the 15th MEU.

“The area was definitely presenting itself as a ‘hardened place’ for the enemy,” said Salasko. “With us coming in and having this dynamic concept of ops … we presented this area that was dominated by Marines.”

In mid-April, the MEU withdrew their forces from Baghdad and turned the area over to the Army’s 3rd Armored Calvary Regiment that will assume all of the MEUs battle space.

This was the second combat tour in Iraq for the 15th MEU, which came just two years after their first visit to the country. In March 2003, the 15th MEU participated in the initial assault into Iraq securing the port facility at Umm Qasr and later pushing into the city of An Nasiriyah to secure it for follow-on forces.

[Marine]

26th MEU enters Red Sea through Suez by marinegrunt0311 on Wednesday 27 April 2005
http://www.thesquadbay.com/content.php?article.953
THE SQUADBAY, Run By Marines And FMF Corpsmen


The Camp Lejeune, N.C.-based 26th Marine Expeditionary unit passed through the Suez Canal April 22 aboard the ships of the Kearsarge Expeditionary Strike Group, entering U.S. Central Command’s area of operations.

“This is an AOR that is wrought with uncertainty and a full range of challenges and missions that this Marine Expeditionary Unit is prepared for,” said Col. Thomas F. Qualls, the MEU’s commanding officer.

According to a Marine Corps press release, the MEU is currently in “theater reserve” status and may be called upon to support of operations throughout CentCom.

In the meantime, the MEU continues to train with allies and is expected to stay under CentCom’s tactical control until returning to Lejeune in about four months.

The MEU, which deployed on March 27, is sailing aboard the amphibious assault ship Kearsarge, dock landing ship Ashland and amphibious transport dock Ponce. The MEU includes Battalion Landing Team 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment.

[The_Bammo]

Would like to post this web page in honor of my fallen Bro' who was a Combat Marine.

Mr. Marine he had the same Combat Action Badge that you have on your avator.

I know you feel THIS WAY about Vietnam Veterans. Mr. Marine some do not have the stamina and strength that you possess. You have to excuse some Veterans Mr. Marine they are not as strong and in control of their mind like you are.

This is the web page I would like to dedicate to my fallen Bro', a Combat Marine.

"Dirty John"

[The_Bammo]

Published on Monday, April 25, 2005 by the New York Times
Marines From Iraq Sound Off About Want of Armor and Men
by Michael Moss

On May 29, 2004, a station wagon that Iraqi insurgents had packed with C-4 explosives blew up on a highway in Ramadi, killing four American marines who died for lack of a few inches of steel.

The four were returning to camp in an unarmored Humvee that their unit had rigged with scrap metal, but the makeshift shields rose only as high as their shoulders, photographs of the Humvee show, and the shrapnel from the bomb shot over the top.

"The steel was not high enough," said Staff Sgt. Jose S. Valerio, their motor transport chief, who along with the unit's commanding officers said the men would have lived had their vehicle been properly armored. "Most of the shrapnel wounds were to their heads."

Among those killed were Rafael Reynosa, a 28-year-old lance corporal from Santa Ana, Calif., whose wife was expecting twins, and Cody S. Calavan, a 19-year-old private first class from Lake Stevens, Wash., who had the Marine Corps motto, Semper Fidelis, tattooed across his back.

They were not the only losses for Company E during its six-month stint last year in Ramadi. In all, more than one-third of the unit's 185 troops were killed or wounded, the highest casualty rate of any company in the war, Marine Corps officials say.

In returning home, the leaders and Marine infantrymen have chosen to break an institutional code of silence and tell their story, one they say was punctuated not only by a lack of armor, but also by a shortage of men and planning that further hampered their efforts in battle, destroyed morale and ruined the careers of some of their fiercest warriors.

The saga of Company E, part of a lionized battalion nicknamed the Magnificent Bastards, is also one of fortitude and ingenuity. The marines, based at Camp Pendleton in southern California, had been asked to rid the provincial capital of one of the most persistent insurgencies, and in enduring 26 firefights, 90 mortar attacks and more than 90 homemade bombs, they shipped their dead home and powered on. Their tour has become legendary among other Marine units now serving in Iraq and facing some of the same problems.

"As marines, we are always taught that we do more with less," said Sgt. James S. King, a platoon sergeant who lost his left leg when he was blown out of the Humvee that Saturday afternoon last May. "And get the job done no matter what it takes."

The experiences of Company E's marines, pieced together through interviews at Camp Pendleton and by phone, company records and dozens of photographs taken by the marines, show they often did just that. The unit had less than half the troops who are now doing its job in Ramadi, and resorted to making dummy marines from cardboard cutouts and camouflage shirts to place in observation posts on the highway when it ran out of men. During one of its deadliest firefights, it came up short on both vehicles and troops. Marines who were stranded at their camp tried in vain to hot-wire a dump truck to help rescue their falling brothers. That day, 10 men in the unit died.

Sergeant Valerio and others had to scrounge for metal scraps to strengthen the Humvees they inherited from the National Guard, which occupied Ramadi before the marines arrived. Among other problems, the armor the marines slapped together included heavier doors that could not be latched, so they "chicken winged it" by holding them shut with their arms as they traveled.

"We were sitting out in the open, an easy target for everybody," Cpl. Toby G. Winn of Centerville, Tex., said of the shortages. "We complained about it every day, to anybody we could. They told us they were listening, but we didn't see it."

The company leaders say it is impossible to know how many lives may have been saved through better protection, since the insurgents became adept at overcoming improved defenses with more powerful weapons. Likewise, Pentagon officials say they do not know how many of the more than 1,500 American troops who have died in the war had insufficient protective gear.

But while most of Company E's work in fighting insurgents was on foot, the biggest danger the men faced came in traveling to and from camp: 13 of the 21 men who were killed had been riding in Humvees that failed to deflect bullets or bombs.

Toward the end of their tour when half of their fleet had become factory-armored, the armor's worth became starkly clear. A car bomb that the unit's commander, Capt. Kelly D. Royer, said was at least as powerful as the one on May 29 showered a fully armored Humvee with shrapnel, photographs show. The marines inside were left nearly unscathed.

Captain Royer, from Orangevale, Calif., would not accompany his troops home. He was removed from his post six days before they began leaving Ramadi, accused by his superiors of being dictatorial, records show. His defenders counter that his commanding style was a necessary response to the extreme circumstances of his unit's deployment.

Company E's experiences still resonate today both in Iraq, where two more marines were killed last week in Ramadi by the continuing insurgency, and in Washington, where Congress is still struggling to solve the Humvee problem. Just on Thursday, the Senate voted to spend an extra $213 million to buy more fully armored Humvees. The Army's procurement system, which also supplies the Marines, has come under fierce criticism for underperforming in the war, and to this day it has only one small contractor in Ohio armoring new Humvees.

Marine Corps officials disclosed last month in Congressional hearings that they were now going their own way and had undertaken a crash program to equip all of their more than 2,800 Humvees in Iraq with stronger armor. The effort went into production in November and is to be completed at the end of this year.

Defense Department officials acknowledged that Company E lacked enough equipment and men, but said that those were problems experienced by many troops when the insurgency intensified last year, and that vigorous efforts had been made to improve their circumstances.

Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis of Richland, Wash., who commanded the First Marine Division to which Company E belongs, said he had taken every possible step to support Company E. He added that they had received more factory-armored Humvees than any other unit in Iraq.

"We could not encase men in sufficiently strong armor to deny any enemy success," General Mattis said. "The tragic loss of our men does not necessarily indicate failure - it is war."

Trouble From the Start

Company E's troubles began at Camp Pendleton when, just seven days before the unit left for Iraq, it lost its first commander. The captain who led them through training was relieved for reasons his supervisor declined to discuss.

"That was like losing your quarterback on game day," said First Sgt. Curtis E. Winfree.

In Kuwait, where the unit stopped over, an 18-year-old private committed suicide in a chapel. Then en route to Ramadi, they lost the few armored plates they had earmarked for their vehicles when the steel was borrowed by another unit that failed to return it. Company E tracked the steel down and took it back.

Even at that, the armor was mostly just scrap and thin, and they needed more for the unarmored Humvees they inherited from the Florida National Guard.

"It was pitiful," said Capt. Chae J. Han, a member of a Pentagon team that surveyed the Marine camps in Iraq last year to document their condition. "Everything was just slapped on armor, just homemade, not armor that was given to us through the normal logistical system."

The report they produced was classified, but Captain Royer, who took over command of the unit, and other Company E marines say they had to build barriers at the camp - a former junkyard - to block suicide drivers, improve the fencing and move the toilets under a thick roof to avoid the insurgent shelling.

Even some maps they were given to plan raids were several years old, showing farmland where in fact there were homes, said a company intelligence expert, Cpl. Charles V. Lauersdorf, who later went to work for the Defense Intelligence Agency. There, he discovered up-to-date imagery that had not found its way to the front lines.

Ramadi had been quiet under the National Guard, but the Marines had orders to root out an insurgency that was using the provincial capital as a way station to Falluja and Baghdad, said Lt. Col. Paul J. Kennedy, who oversaw Company E as the commander of its Second Battalion, Fourth Marine Regiment.

Before the company's first month was up, Lance Cpl. William J. Wiscowiche of Victorville, Calif., lay dead on the main highway as its first casualty. The Marine Corps issued a statement saying only that he had died in action. But for Company E, it was the first reality check on the constraints that would mark their tour.

Sweeping for Bombs

A British officer had taught them to sweep the roads for bombs by boxing off sections and fanning out troops into adjoining neighborhoods in hopes of scaring away insurgents poised to set off the bombs. "We didn't have the time to do that," said Sgt. Charles R. Sheldon of Solana Beach, Calif. "We had to clear this long section of highway, and it usually took us all day."

Now and then a Humvee would speed through equipped with an electronic device intended to block detonation of makeshift bombs. The battalion, which had five companies in its fold, had only a handful of the devices, Colonel Kennedy said.

Company E had none, even though sweeping roads for bombs was one of its main duties. So many of the marines, like Corporal Wiscowiche, had to rely on their eyes. On duty on March 30, 2004, the 20-year-old lance corporal did not spot the telltale three-inch wires sticking out of the dust until he was a few feet away, the company's leaders say. He died when the bomb was set off.

"We had just left the base," Corporal Winn said. "He was walking in the middle of the road, and all I remember is hearing a big explosion and seeing a big cloud of smoke."

The endless task of walking the highways for newly hidden I.E.D.'s, or improvised explosive devices, "was nerve wracking," Corporal Winn said, and the company began using binoculars and the scopes on their rifles to spot the bombs after Corporal Wiscowiche was killed.

"Halfway through the deployment marines began getting good at spotting little things," Sergeant Sheldon added. "We had marines riding down the road at 60 miles an hour, and they would spot a copper filament sticking out of a block of cement."

General Mattis said troops in the area now have hundreds of the electronic devices to foil the I.E.D.'s.

In parceling out Ramadi, the Marine Corps leadership gave Company E more than 10 square miles to control, far more than the battalion's other companies. Captain Royer said he had informally asked for an extra platoon, or 44 marines, and had been told the battalion was seeking an extra company. The battalion's operations officer, Maj. John D. Harrill, said the battalion had received sporadic assistance from the Army and had given Company E extra help. General Mattis says he could not pull marines from another part of Iraq because "there were tough fights going on everywhere."

Colonel Kennedy said Company E's area was less dense, but the pressure it put on the marines came to a boil on April 6, 2004, when the company had to empty its camp - leaving the cooks to guard the gates - to deal with three firefights.

Ten of its troops were killed that day, including eight who died when the Humvee they were riding in was ambushed en route to assist other marines under fire. That Humvee lacked even the improvised steel on the back where most of the marines sat, Company E leaders say.

"All I saw was sandbags, blood and dead bodies," Sergeant Valerio said. "There was no protection in the back."

Captain Royer said more armor would not have even helped. The insurgents had a .50-caliber machine gun that punched huge holes through its windshield. Only a heavier combat vehicle could have withstood the barrage, he said, but the unit had none. Defense Department officials have said they favored Humvees over tanks in Iraq because they were less imposing to civilians.

The Humvee that trailed behind that day, which did have improvised armor, was hit with less powerful munitions, and the marines riding in it survived by hunkering down. "The rounds were pinging," Sergeant Sheldon said. "Then in a lull they returned fire and got out."

Captain Royer said that he photographed the Humvees in which his men died to show to any official who asked about the condition of their armor, but that no one ever did.

Sergeant Valerio redoubled his effort to fortify the Humvees by begging other branches of the military for scraps. "How am I going to leave those kids out there in those Humvees," he recalled asking himself.

The company of 185 marines had only two Humvees and three trucks when it arrived, so just getting them into his shop was a logistical chore, Sergeant Valerio said. He also worried that the steel could come loose in a blast and become deadly shrapnel.

For the gunners who rode atop, Sergeant Valerio stitched together bulletproof shoulder pads into chaps to protect their legs.

"That guy was amazing," First Sgt. Bernard Coleman said. "He was under a vehicle when a mortar landed, and he caught some in the leg. When the mortar fire stopped, he went right back to work."

A Captain's Fate

Lt. Sean J. Schickel remembers Captain Royer asking a high-ranking Marine Corps visitor whether the company would be getting more factory-armored Humvees. The official said they had not been requested and that there were production constraints, Lieutenant Schickel said.

Recalls Captain Royer: "I'm thinking we have our most precious resource engaged in combat, and certainly the wealth of our nation can provide young, selfless men with what they need to accomplish their mission. That's an erudite way of putting it. I have a much more guttural response that I won't give you."

Captain Royer was later relieved of command. General Mattis and Colonel Kennedy declined to discuss the matter. His first fitness report, issued on May 31, 2004, after the company's deadliest firefights, concluded, "He has single-handedly reshaped a company in sore need of a leader; succeeded in forming a cohesive fighting force that is battle-tested and worthy."

The second, on Sept. 1, 2004, gave him opposite marks for leadership. "He has been described on numerous occasions as 'dictatorial,' " it said. "There is no morale or motivation in his marines." His defenders say he drove his troops as hard as he drove himself, but was wrongly blamed for problems like armor. "Captain Royer was a decent man that was used for a dirty job and thrown away by his chain of command," Sergeant Sheldon said.

Today, Captain Royer is at Camp Pendleton contesting his fitness report, which could force him to retire. Company E is awaiting deployment to Okinawa, Japan. Some members have moved to other units, or are leaving the Marines altogether.

"I'm checking out," Corporal Winn said. "When I started, I wanted to make it my career. I've had enough."

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0425-07.htm

(thanks Big Sky for letting me post in this Marine Thread - appreciate it)

[big sky brad]

Big Sky, I was not a Marine.  I do not claim to have the knowledge that Mr. Marine has about combat related subjects. 

I was just an Army Airborne Infantryman, Big Sky.  Question for you Bro', can I post in this thread or is just for people like Mr. Marine with his prime knowledge about military situations such as combat and military life in general.

He spent thirty years in the Corp, my steel pot is off to him.  We are da_n lucky to have such "MEN" like Mr. Marine to share such deep knowledge from his un-tarnished career.

Let me know if I can post Big Sky, like I said not the caliper of Mr. Marine but have a CIB - think the Marines get Combat Action Badges.  Might be wrong but I am sure Mr. Marine will straighten that out. 

Look and read those posts of his above, amazing knowledge - for sure. Tough to compete with professionals like Mr. Marine.  Big Sky, your lucky to have such a dedicated Marine like Mr. Marine posting in your thread.  Hang Tough ~

Sure, Bammo, you can post in any of these threads. You're a bona fide veteran, after all. You've earned that right. You know my name, I know yours. I respect you, you respect me.

And I've got a question for you, as well.

This guy on the right in the picture below has a shoulder patch on his left shoulder.
Do you recoginize it? I'll bet you do, seeing as how you fought with these men in Vietnam.



I blanked out the faces of these 2 men because I told the man on the left, a friend of mine, that I would not put a picture of his on-line and cause him any trouble in real life. I think you already know how I feel about people who post pictures of other people that ain't their right to put on-line.


Semper Fi, Bammo.

Hang tough.

This post has been edited by big sky brad: Apr 28 2005, 02:05 PM

[Marine]

Would like to post this web page in honor of my fallen Bro' who was a Combat Marine.

Mr. Marine he had the same Combat Action Badge that you have on your avator.

I know you feel THIS WAY about Vietnam Veterans.  Mr. Marine some do not have the stamina and strength that you possess.  You have to excuse some Veterans Mr. Marine they are not as strong and in control of their mind like you are.

This is the web page I would like to dedicate to my fallen Bro', a Combat Marine.

"Dirty John"

It's a shame John didn't get help Tom.

Don't know the full story so no comment on what screwed John up. I knew people who went off to the Navy hospital and came back OK and some who went and we never seen them again. If I knew what screwed up peoples heads I wouldn't be living for the next pension check to come in.

[The_Bammo]

Sure, Bammo, you can post in any of these threads. You're a bona fide veteran, after all. You've earned that right. You know my name, I know yours. I respect you, you respect me.

And I've got a question for you, as well.

This guy on the right in the picture below has a shoulder patch on his left shoulder.
Do you recoginize it? I'll bet you do, seeing as how you fought with these men in Vietnam.



I blanked out the faces of these 2 men because I told the man on the left, a friend of mine, that I would not put a picture of his on-line and cause him any trouble in real life. I think you already know how I feel about people who post pictures of other people that ain't their right to put on-line.
Semper Fi, Bammo.

Hang tough.

Big Sky, Ist Cav Division, D Troop 2nd of the 8th Cav - that pic was taken in or near An Khe Bro' - thanks for letting this doggie post in the Marine section. LOL now the 2nd of the 7th - La Drang Valley - most noted for-- We were Soldiers Once - was Custers ol' outfit!

Will do my best to keep all posts Semper Fidelis like Bro' - Like I said Marines got a ribbon - Combat Action Badge - Mr. Marine displays one in his Avator, proudly as all can see.

The Infantry in the Army got a CIB (Combat Infantry Badge)

And if we were Airborne qualified in the Army we got to wear these Bro' -

Enough with the Army crap--this is a Marine Thread! Hang Tough and Thanks Big Sky

[The_Bammo]

It's a shame John didn't get help Tom.

Don't know the full story so no comment on what screwed John up.  I knew people who went off to the Navy hospital and came back OK and some who went and we never seen them again.  If I knew what screwed up peoples heads I wouldn't be living for the next pension check to come in.

Thanks for the words on ol' Dirty John Mr. Marine. Dirty John did 1 3/4 tours ( Marines did 13 month tours) as a Forward Observer.

Dirty John was wounded three times, the last one was the knee and calf, he went back to the states after hospitalization - Japan - Some Marine Hospital in California, then Walter Reed.

Dirty John was a Marine first, a biker second, and a active member of the VVAW (Vietnam Veterans Against the War)

He marched on DC, plus many more places with the VVAW and was there For JK and Winter Soldier.

Dirty John was a Southey from Boston, John Coughlin - Irish as Guiness Stout!

Thanks again Mr. Marine for the fine words about a true Marine- Dirty John - by the way he was buried in his uniform - not his Blues--never owned any - the Greens. To my surprise Dirty John was a Sarge!

As far as help Mr. Marine, Dirty John was in more VAMC'S in-patient for more than 5 years off and on when I met him in the mid 80's. He did get help Mr. Marine, but they did not help him enough.

Another write off for Uncle Sammy!

[Marine]

Yeah Tom, Here's the one with class

I thought you said you was a leg Tom.

[The_Bammo]

Sure, Bammo, you can post in any of these threads. You're a bona fide veteran, after all. You've earned that right. You know my name, I know yours. I respect you, you respect me.

And I've got a question for you, as well.

This guy on the right in the picture below has a shoulder patch on his left shoulder.
Do you recoginize it? I'll bet you do, seeing as how you fought with these men in Vietnam.



I blanked out the faces of these 2 men because I told the man on the left, a friend of mine, that I would not put a picture of his on-line and cause him any trouble in real life. I think you already know how I feel about people who post pictures of other people that ain't their right to put on-line.
Semper Fi, Bammo.

Hang tough.

Big Sky, is the dude on the right a Captain? The one on the left Bro' looks awful familiar - da_n!l

Bro' is he a teacher now of some kind? If so he always wanted to be a history teachor of some kind, teach about war maybe.

Was he active in the VVAW? Got me wondering now Bro'! If this is the same dude he teaches World War II and Vietnam now out west somewhere - maybe Cal. -- not sure. If this is the dude I am thinkin' of - he was pro Kerry - Vietnam Vet for Kerry, very anti "SHRUB" and his fiasco. Not sure Bro, but could be!

Did one of those dudes have a Special Forces patch on his right shoulder? That was the last unit that that he was in before going to the 1st Cav. You wear your active Div. patch on the left the other div. patch on the right - this dude was a green Beenie - Captain --da_n--Martin - Manny - da_n - Mike was it Mike - Capt. Mike or Captain Mick --go with Mike - Special Forces - got to be Captain Mike!


Those wings on his right chest are Vietnamese Jump Wings Big Sky. Wonder if this is the same dude. Did this Dude serve as an advisor with a ARVN (S. Vietnamese) Ranger outfit?

This is just a hunch Big Sky-- Seen a lot of Dudes in the Nam. Wish I could see the faces. LOL Hey let me know if I am close!

Those two had beans of steel, Bro' - if they are the ones I am rappin' about!

Got me wondering now Big Sky! Hang Tough~ (That will be with me all night long Big Sky)

[The_Bammo]

Yeah Tom, Here's the one with class

I thought you said you was a leg Tom.

Seen a lot of Force Recons (Marine) with those Jump Wings Mr. Marine. Worked with them from time to time .

Might as well say I was a leg , all I did was hump the ruck! MOS - 11B20P Airborne Infantry --same same as a leg over there--LOL We all did the same sweat, dig and hump!

Glad we didn't jump --that would of been a disaster in the Ashau.

Only ones that did a jump in Nam --besides the ARVN Rangers was the Herd - 173rd Airborne -- think that was it for combat jumps in Nam.

[Marine]

Seen a lot of Force Recons (Marine) with those Jump Wings Mr. Marine. Worked with them from time to time .

Might as well say I was a leg , all I did was hump the ruck!  MOS - 11B20P Airborne Infantry  --same same as a leg over there--LOL  We all did the same sweat, dig and hump! 

Glad we didn't jump --that would of been a disaster in the Ashau.

Only ones that did a jump in Nam --besides the ARVN Rangers was the Herd - 173rd Airborne --  think that was it for combat jumps in Nam.

Recon is a different from what hollywood potrays it, I mean they are good at what they do but they don't go out looking for a fight the way they show it in the movies.

That Marine Recon movie Heartbreak Ridge was bs, if Recon got in a firefight it meant someone screwed up. Same way in ANGLICO, if we got in a firefight someone had screwed up.

The closest I was ever being deep in a firefight was when we jumped in Grenada. We jump from so low the AAA the Cubans set up on the hills around the airfield couldn't depress enough to shoot at us, elsewise there would have been beaucoup dead paratroopers. We still got small arms fire from the airfield but that don't pucker the poot chute like AAA does.

Take care Tom.

[The_Bammo]

Recon is a different from what hollywood potrays it, I mean they are good at what they do but they don't go out looking for a fight the way they show it in the movies. 

That Marine Recon movie Heartbreak Ridge was bs, if Recon got in a firefight it meant someone screwed up.  Same way in ANGLICO, if we got in a firefight someone had screwed up. 

The closest I was ever being deep in a firefight was when we jumped in Grenada.  We jump from so low the AAA the Cubans set up on the hills around the airfield couldn't depress enough to shoot at us, elsewise there would have been beaucoup dead paratroopers.  We still got small arms fire from the airfield but that don't pucker the poot chute like AAA does.

Take care Tom.

I hear you Marine, Forced Recon in the Corp was similar to Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) in the Army.

Usually 6 man teams, go out for positions and info--# of enemy, hardware they are humping, etc. - report back on the Pri_K 25 and get back to the LZ.

Did not work out that way all the time as you know, that there could get hairy, but most of the time 75%-80% you made it to the LZ and on the chopper and out.

Now in the Corp was Force Recon the elite? Have no clue on that. In the Army everbody thought the Green Beanies were the elite - they were good from what I seen, but the Special Operations Group (SOG) and Military Advisors that lived with the Vietnamese in the Vills - had big ol' beans! They were not all Green Beanies like everyone thought.

Marines that lived in the vills with the Vietnamese - alone as well - what were they called - Kack --something like that. Not my bag Marine, sorry! LOL

This Marine was ANGLICO, CMH recipient Major Stephen W. Pless who lived through nearly 800 Helicopter Combat missions in Vietnam - da_n. Get this - Pless was killed, 7/20/69, when his motorcycle flew off an open drawbridge into Santa Rosa Sound which divides Pensacola from Pensacola Beach, Florida.

A Biker as well - What a way to go-- !

Hang Tough ~

[Marine]

I hear you Marine, Forced Recon in the Corp was similar to Long Range Recon Patrol (LRRP) in the Army.

Usually 6 man teams, go out for positions and info--# of enemy, hardware they are humping, etc. - report back on the Pri_K 25 and get back to the LZ. 

Did not work out that way all the time as you know, that there could get hairy, but most of the time 75%-80% you made it to the LZ and on the chopper and out.

Now in the Corp was Force Recon the elite?  Have no clue on that.  In the Army everbody thought the Green Beanies were the elite -  they were good from what I seen, but the Special Operations Group (SOG) and Military Advisors that lived with the Vietnamese in the Vills - had big ol' beans!  They were not all Green Beanies like everyone thought.

Marines that lived in the vills with the Vietnamese - alone as well - what were they called - Kack --something like that.  Not my bag Marine, sorry!  LOL

This Marine was ANGLICO, CMH recipient Major Stephen W. Pless who lived through nearly 800 Helicopter Combat missions in Vietnam - da_n.   Get this - Pless was killed, 7/20/69, when his motorcycle flew off an open drawbridge into Santa Rosa Sound which divides Pensacola from Pensacola Beach, Florida.

A Biker as well - What a way to go--  !

Hang Tough ~ 

ANGLICO did the same work and got the same training as Force Recon, the difference is ANGLICO humps, as well as a regular load, about 120 pounds of comm equipment per man every where we went so ANGLICO was always too tired out from dragging all that chit around to brag about it.

There is another Marine on the board who in all likelyhood is going to end up an ANGLICAN, SSGT Noonana usually posts in the 2nd amendment thread, he's in AO school at Fort Sill, not to many opportunities for an AO outside of ANGLICO.

Major Pless was an AO but I think he got the CMH while working in aviation, flying a dust off I think.

This post has been edited by Marine: Apr 28 2005, 08:30 PM

[big sky brad]

  Big Sky, Ist Cav Division, D Troop 2nd of the 8th Cav - that pic was taken in or near An Khe Bro'  - thanks for letting this doggie post in the Marine section.  LOL  now the 2nd of the 7th - La Drang Valley - most noted for--  We were Soldiers Once -  was Custers ol' outfit! 

Will do my best to keep all posts Semper Fidelis like Bro' -  Like I said Marines got a ribbon - Combat Action Badge - Mr. Marine displays one in his Avator, proudly as all can see.

The Infantry in the Army got a CIB (Combat Infantry Badge)

And if we were Airborne qualified in the Army we got to wear these Bro' -

Enough with the Army crap--this is a Marine Thread!  Hang Tough and Thanks Big Sky

Sir, you're right as rain.

This photograph was taken right outside of 2/8's HQ hootch in An Khe.

[Sandra]

Sure, Bammo, you can post in any of these threads. You're a bona fide veteran, after all. You've earned that right. You know my name, I know yours. I respect you, you respect me.

Thanks to all of you for your service to our country.

I wanted to make certain that everyone understands: we don't put restrictions on posting in this forum. Meaning, you don't have to be a veteran to post here; veterans' issues affect us all (many of us have military members or veterans in our families, after all).

That's my ... carry on!

[big sky brad]

Big Sky, is the dude on the right a Captain? The one on the left Bro' looks awful familiar - da_n!l

Bro' is he a  teacher now of some kind? If so he always wanted to be a history teachor of some kind, teach about war maybe.

Was he active in the VVAW?  Got me wondering now Bro'!  If this is the same dude he teaches World War II and Vietnam now out west somewhere - maybe Cal. --  not sure.  If this is the dude I am thinkin' of - he was pro Kerry - Vietnam Vet for Kerry, very anti "SHRUB" and his fiasco. Not sure Bro, but could be! 

Did one of those dudes have a Special Forces patch on his right shoulder? That was the last unit that  that he was in before going to the 1st Cav.  You wear your active Div. patch on the left the other div. patch on the right - this dude was a green Beenie - Captain --da_n--Martin - Manny - da_n -  Mike was it Mike - Capt. Mike or Captain Mick --go with Mike - Special Forces - got to be Captain Mike!
Those wings on his right chest are Vietnamese Jump Wings Big Sky. Wonder if this is the same dude.  Did this Dude serve as an advisor with a ARVN (S. Vietnamese) Ranger outfit?

This is just a hunch Big Sky--  Seen a lot of Dudes in the Nam.  Wish I could see the faces.  LOL  Hey let me know if I am close! 

Those two had beans of steel, Bro' - if they are the ones I am rappin' about! 

Got me wondering now Big Sky!  Hang Tough~ (That will be with me all night long Big Sky) 

Damn! You're right on the money! They're both Captains! I'll send you the name of my friend, the Captain on the left, in a PM so the freepers that lurk here won't find out who he is and send him hate mail.

Sir, I am very impressed. Your knowledge of the Vietnam War is very extensive. It blows my mind.

And you're totally correct, you may even know this guy, or at least walked the same paths in Nam. The man on the left became a professor of history at a California college teaching both WWII and Vietnam history. And you're right that he was an avid Kerry supporter like you, ghostgovt, and I. He was totally against the Iraq War, from the get-go. He knew it was a big mistake because he had already learned the "Vietnam lesson" because he had been there, done that. Now, he's at college teaching students why Bush never learned that lesson.


And you're right again about him serving as an advisor with the ARVN in a SF outfit. I had never seen Silver Wings displayed above the right pocket like that, so I had to ask him what that badge was. I had never even seen one like it before.

Here's what he told me about that badge -
The silver wings on my right chest in the last photo are Vietnamese parachute wings, which I was awarded while serving with a Vietnamese Airborne Ranger unit. You can wear one foreign badge on the right chest, and you always wear your host country's badge if you have one.

[The_Bammo]

Thanks to all of you for your service to our country. 

I wanted to make certain that everyone understands:  we don't put restrictions on posting in this forum.  Meaning, you don't have to be a veteran to post here; veterans' issues affect us all (many of us have military members or veterans in our families, after all).

That's my  ... carry on!

Thanks for the update Sandra. Your always on top of things!

Got a question Sandra for you. Do you know a dude (Irish Fella) named O'Sullivan first name M. said he had something to do with CGCS.

Just got an E Mail from him asking some questions about CGCS, hey never know - maybe this fella will drop in for a visit. to see whats going down. You take care Sandra.

Always a pleasure!!