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[Marine]

Purple Heart recipient describes attack
Submitted by: 2nd Force Service Support Group
Story Identification #: 200510494240
Story by Lance Cpl. Matthew K. Hacker



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. (Oct. 4, 2005) -- It was June 23, 2005, when 20 Marines boarded a seven-ton truck and began their treacherous journey back to Camp Fallujah, Iraq. What happened a short distance down the road is something that has, and will, continue to change their lives forever.

Sitting in the second to last seat in the back, on the right side of the truck, was Lance Cpl. Erin Liberty of Niceville, Fla., an ammunition technician with Ammunition Company, 2nd Supply Battalion, 2nd Force Service Support Group. She remembers talking with the female Seabee next to her, when a series of combined explosions violently lifted the truck from both sides.

“When it blew up, we all flew back and then forward again in our seats,” said Liberty. “I looked at the girl next to me and saw her bounce up and down in the flames. I just closed my eyes and waited for it to end. I felt myself being thrown in the air, but my eyes remained shut. When I impacted the ground, I realized nothing hurt. I felt everything that was happening, but it was like there was a bubble around me, because when I hit the ground and woke up, I felt no pain. I looked at my hands and saw the skin hanging off my left pinky finger, but it still didn’t hurt. Not then. ”

Lying on the ground and covered in dust, she knew it was an improvised explosive device, but it was later she learned it was constructed of five, 155-millimeter incendiary rounds and a few propane tanks, according to Liberty. They had gone off about six feet from each side of the truck.

Trying to recover from the concussion and the ringing in her ears, she looked over and saw the Seabee she had spoken too just seconds before the blast.

“She was lying next to me, unconscious,” Liberty added. “I tried to pull her away from ground zero, but there was a firefight happening at the same time, so a few guys pulled me off and threw me against the wall. I wanted to go back for her, but the way the truck was positioned, it rolled over on top of her before I could.”

After the firefight had died down and the injured Marines and sailors were recovered, they loaded onto another vehicle and headed straight for the Battalion Aid Station at Camp Fallujah, according to Liberty.

“We then just jumped on another seven-ton and drove away,” Liberty said. “We all just sat there in silence, except for the sounds of discomfort and pain. I can still see the people with their skin hanging off of them. I remember seeing this girl with blood all over her flak jacket and the skin on her fingers falling off. Then, suddenly the silence broke, when a girl in the back of the truck started singing, Amazing Grace. I remember praying to God, and thanking Him that I was alive.”

When they returned to the camp, they were rushed into the surgical unit, but all the serious and critical injuries were rushed in first. Liberty walked in after everyone else, following the blood trails, she said.

They fixed both of her badly burned hands before she went back to her room. When she got there, she saw she got some packages from home that day.

“One was from my mom. She got me the most gorgeous rosary,” said Liberty. “That night, I just remember lying in bed, praying to let me forget about it. I tried to sleep that night, but obviously I couldn’t sleep much. All I wanted was to just wake up in the morning and feel like it didn’t just happen. The whole thing just kept playing in my mind.”

The next morning, she remembers waking up and thanking God, because her thoughts of the present, rather than the tragic events of the day before. She was glad to feel that, but with the morning sun came a new pain. Her neck began to hurt, so she went back to the BAS.

The doctors told Liberty she had broken a cervical vertebrae in her neck and she was going to have to return to the United States.

She returned to Camp Lejeune shortly after the incident and has been on convalescent leave since July 3. Not long after she went on leave, she received her Purple Heart Medal.

“It was extremely hard to accept, knowing all the people that had died,” said Liberty. “It’s nothing you can train or practice for, and you always receive it under the worst circumstances.”

Now, she wears a neck brace to assist in stabilizing the break and help with the pain. She is currently recuperating from first, second and third degree burns on her hands and two black eyes in addition to her broken neck.

Liberty will undergo surgery in Florida next month, where they will put a metal plate between her C4 and C5 vertebraes in an attempt to stabilize the break.

In light of the life-altering events she’s been through, she’s still moving forward in her life. Liberty married on Sept. 19, after getting engaged right before she left for Iraq in February.

“It’s been a rough engagement,” Liberty states, with a light, but respectful chuckle.

Liberty confesses, that even though it has been almost four months since the incident, she still has thoughts of that day.

“I wonder what would have happened if those guys wouldn’t have pulled me away from the truck,” Liberty added. “I imagine what would have happened if I had the strength to pull her away. I’m sure that will always stay with me. Honestly, my mind and my heart hurt way more than my body ever will.”


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[Marine]

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PART III. CONTEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT OF FORCE

X. Strategies and Policies of Terrorism

A. General: The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon of September 11, 2001 have made it more important than ever to comprehend the military significance and political implications of terrorism. While America's current war on terror will be addressed in the last week of the course, this case examines the phenomenon of terrorism in the twentieth century from the standpoint of terrorists themselves, and looks specifically at the relationship among terrorist policies and strategies.

In the twentieth century terrorism has been employed with many different political purposes in view. Some terrorists have aimed at forcing governments to renounce specific policies they found objectionable. Others have desired to topple governments and build alternative structures of political power. Still others have tried to put an end to colonialism or to expel foreign occupiers. Terrorism has sometimes been used as the sole strategy, and sometimes in conjunction with (or in subordination to) other means of struggle such as industrial strikes, rural arson, guerrilla warfare and even conventional military operations. Terrorist methods have included sabotage, hostage-taking, carefully targeted assassinations of officials and the wholesale murder of civilians. More often than not, terrorism has been instrumental, undertaken in the pursuit of discrete political objectives. In short, terrorism has been, in Martha Crenshaw’s phrase, a “strategic choice.”

The first group of assigned readings this week discusses the problem of defining terrorism. It also examines the historical evolution of terrorist strategies and terrorist theories of victory. The second group of readings deals with four cases of terrorism in practice: the Socialist-Revolutionary Party's campaign of terror in Imperial Russia (1902-1907); the IVA/IRA war to end British rule in Ireland (1918-1921); the FLN's struggle to drive the French from Algeria (1954-1961); and the Shining Path's battle to make a revolution in Peru (1980-1992). All four of these terrorist movements inflicted considerable damage on their chosen targets. Two of them were successful, or at least partially successful, politically.

Founded in 1902, the Socialist-Revolutionary (or SR) party dedicated itself to violent overthrow of the tsarist autocracy. Although influenced by Marxism, the SRs sought to make a revolution in the name of and in the interest of the peasants who constituted the overwhelming majority of the Russian Empire's subjects. The SRs believed that the best means of igniting a revolutionary conflagration in Russia would be through a campaign of political murder directed against the highest officials in the government. These terrorist acts were supposed simultaneously to petrify the imperial bureaucracy, undermine the authority of the government, and touch off a general insurrection by the rural masses. In the first two and a half years of its existence, the SRs' "Combat Organization" was able to carry out a series of sensational assassinations that numbered among their victims two ministers of the interior, a governor-general, a minister of education and one of the tsar's uncles. There can be little doubt that SR terrorism helped create the environment that made the Russian revolution of 1905-07 possible. Although that revolution did transform Russia from an autocracy into a quasi-constitutional state, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party was in the end unable to destroy the tsarist system. It was crippled both by internal dissention and severe government repression. Then, too, the tsarist police managed to insinuate its spies and agents into the party's inner circles: Evno Azef, a prominent member of the party's "Combat Organization", and at one point in 1907 its head, was secretly a police employee. But the party was also defeated in part by the contradictions between the logic of mass politics and the logic of conspiracy. By 1905 the party had built up a network of local organizations scattered throughout Russia. During the revolution hundreds of provincial SRs (or people who identified themselves as SRs) undertook political murders, robberies and acts of arson on their own, often without the permission or knowledge of the party's central committee. It did not help matters much that the party's maximalist faction preached the doctrine of "economic terror", and called for indiscriminate attacks on the lives and property of factory owners and landlords. There were thousands of incidents of "revolutionary" violence in the years 1905-07, by no means all of them perpetrated by SRs. It has been estimated that these resulted in at least nine thousand casualties, of whom one half were private citizens. The scale of the bloodbath alienated moderate public opinion in Russia and assisted in discrediting terrorism as an instrument of political struggle.

By contrast, the Irish Republicans enjoyed much greater political success with the strategy of terrorism and guerrilla war they employed against the British from 1918-1921. Michael Collins, who became the de facto leader of the paramilitary Irish Volunteers in the spring of 1918, devised much of that strategy. Unlike those of his colleagues in Sinn Féin who thought that they could negotiate a British withdrawal from Ireland, Collins was firmly convinced that only violence could secure Ireland's complete independence. Collins organized his Volunteers, who soon became known as the Irish Republican Army, into terrorist cells, and led them in a campaign of intimidation and, ultimately, murder directed against Irish "collaborators", the Irish police (RIC) and British officials. British efforts to track down and crush the IRA were frustrated by Collins' superb intelligence department, which frequently supplied him with exact advance information about British intentions and plans. The non-cooperation of a substantial proportion of the Irish public also stymied British counter-terrorism. Britain therefore decided to escalate the repression. In 1920 London recruited and dispatched to Ireland special paramilitary formations, of which the most notorious was the Black and Tans. Charged to "make Ireland hell for the rebels", these units carried out a policy of "reprisals" that degenerated into looting, torture, and homicide. The various forces of the British Crown gunned down over two hundred unarmed civilians in 1920. Such atrocities validated IRA terrorism in the eyes of the Irish population and intensified support for the Republican cause, particularly in the south of the country. Although Britain did have the raw military power to suppress the rebellion in Ireland, the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, hesitated to apply it. One reason for this was his concern for Britain's international standing, particularly in the United States where millions of Irish-Americans openly sympathized with the Irish independence movement. Another was his appreciation of what the cost would likely be, for he was informed that the complete pacification of Ireland would require the deployment of at least an additional hundred thousand troops and the expenditure of an extra hundred million pounds a year. In the summer of 1921 Lloyd George opened negotiations with Eamon de Valera, who as the Prime Minister of Ireland's shadow Dáil government was the political head of Sinn Féin. The ensuing talks resulted in the December 1921 treaty that created the Irish Free State. The Irish nationalists received some but not all of what they had wanted, for six counties in the north remained under British rule. The more extreme Irish republicans rejected the treaty outright and started a civil war.

Strategies that incorporated terrorism also achieved some success in the Algerian case. France had conquered Algeria in the 1830s and had proclaimed it to be an integral part of France in 1847. Yet the Muslim inhabitants of Algeria, who numbered eight and a half million by 1954, were treated as subjects rather than citizens by the French state. Political and economic power in Algeria was concentrated in the hands of the European settlers (pieds noirs), a community of approximately one million people. In 1951 a small group of Algerian nationalists, including several French army veterans, established an organization to fight for Algeria's independence. The Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front or FLN) launched its anti-colonial offensive in November 1954. The FLN's initial acts of sabotage and terrorism did not, however, produce the spontaneous, massive popular uprising on which it had been banking. Realizing that a rapid victory was beyond its grasp, and inspired by the example of the Viet Minh in Indo-China, the FLN then attempted to implement a strategy that borrowed many elements from Mao's teachings about people's war. But that strategy also deviated from Mao's in important respects, since it placed emphasis on urban guerrilla warfare and the premeditated murder of civilians, French and Algerian alike. The French responded with martial law, draconian repression and a military build-up that eventually committed about half of the regular army to the Algerian counter-insurgency. France managed to smash the FLN's urban infrastructure in 1957, and succeeded in isolating the rural battlefield by erecting extensive fortified barriers that cut the Algerian insurgents off from their bases and sanctuaries in Morocco and Tunisia. After 1959 FLN fighters, as one historian writes, "did not appear in the countryside in units larger than company size." From the military point of view, the FLN had been beaten. Yet military defeat did not preclude political victory. De Gaulle, who owed his political comeback in 1958 to the Algerian crisis, had arrived at the conclusion that it was in France's best interest to grant Algeria her independence. De Gaulle won a national referendum on the question of Algerian self-determination, and negotiated France's withdrawal from Algeria in 1962, despite an abortive military coup against him and numerous attempts on his life by right-wing French terrorists.

Our final case of terrorism in practice is that of Peru's Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path guerrilla movement. Sendero was the creation of a group of fanatic Peruvian intellectuals who embraced an extreme form of Maoist ideology. Several of its members, including its leader, former philosophy professor Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, had studied or trained in China during the era of the Cultural Revolution. It was their objective to overthrow the Peruvian government, seize power and use that power to unleash a cultural revolution of their own that would not only banish capitalism, but even mechanized agriculture from Peru. Sendero's plan was to implement a classical Maoist three-phase strategy of guerrilla war, lavishly supplemented by terror. Terrorist activities were designed to publicize the revolutionary movement, demoralize the government, and wreck the Peruvian economy all at the same time. In addition to bombing power lines, rural medical clinics, government offices and bridges, Sendero guerrillas engaged in wholesale murder. From 1980, when the first armed bands became active in the mountains of Ayacucho, until 1992, when the Peruvian authorities apprehended Guzmán, Sendero Luminoso was responsible for killing over twenty seven thousand people. Among the dead were government functionaries, foreign tourists, businessmen and aid workers, and Indian peasants who either resisted the revolution or evinced insufficient enthusiasm for it. Although Sendero initially established a limited social base among the rural poor, over the long term its vicious tactics, economic warfare and doctrinaire ideology alienated the majority of Peru's peasants. As Marks' account makes clear, the case of the Shining Path raises important questions about the capacity and limits of terrorist strategies to win popular support.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions

1. In light of the mini-cases we have examined this week, under what circumstances do strategies that incorporate terrorism have the greatest chances of success?

2. In light of the mini-cases we have examined this week, under what circumstances are strategies that utilize terrorism most prone to failure?

3. How can a terrorist movement best exploit a government's political or military reaction against it?

4. How can terrorists best shape their campaigns to attract formal or informal support from abroad?

5. What are the strengths and weaknesses of terrorism as an instrument of mass political mobilization?

6. How are the terrorist strategies we have studied this week similar to and dissimilar from the classical Maoist strategy of people's war?

7. Thomas Perry Thornton has argued that a strategy of terrorism is likely to be "appropriate" only if the terrorists "enjoy a low level of actual political support but have a high potential for such support." Do you agree?

8. How useful is Clausewitzian "triangular" analysis for understanding the outcomes of the terrorist campaigns we have studied this week?

9. How useful is Sun Tzu's theory of war for understanding the outcomes of the terrorist campaigns we have studied this week?

10. What strategies are most effective in defeating terrorists?

C. Required Readings

1. Crenshaw, Martha. "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed., The Origins of Terrorism. Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998. pp. 7-24. (Selected Readings)

[Crenshaw offers a spirited defense of the proposition that terrorism can often be understood as politically and militarily rational.]

2. Thornton, Thomas Perry. "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Harry Eckstein, ed., Internal War. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. pp. 71-99. (Selected Readings)

[Thornton is interested in the political objectives that terrorists pursue. Although he is writing about the use of terrorism in insurgencies, his insights may be applicable to other sorts of terrorist movements as well.]

3. Geifman, Anna. “The Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries and Terror” in Anna Geifman, ed. Thou Shalt Kill. Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. pp. 45-83. (Selected Readings)

[The chapter from Geifman's book deals with the use of terror by the Russian Socialists-Revolutionaries in the early twentieth century. She shows how terror escaped from the control of the party leadership and took on a life of its own.]

4. Kee, Robert. The Green Flag. The Turbulent History of the Irish National Movement. New York: Delacorte Press, 1972. pp. 548-603; 628-732.

[Kee's highly readable narrative history of the Anglo-Irish War lays special stress on the political and tactical disagreements among the Irish nationalists themselves.]

5. Townshend, Charles. “The Irish Republican Army and the Development of Guerrilla Warfare.” The English Historical Review, vol 94, no. 371 (April 1979). Pages 318-345 (Selected Readings)

[This article offers an insightful assessment of the strategy and organization of the IRA during the Anglo-Irish War. Townshend highlights the weaknesses of the IRA as a fighting force and evaluates the strategic and political assumptions of its members. In addition, this article compares the actions of the IRA to other insurgencies that occurred during the twentieth century.]

6. Clayton, Anthony. The Wars of French Decolonization. London and New York:Longman, 1994. pp. 108-187. (NWC Reprint)

[Clayton gives a succinct account of the Algerian war of independence.]

7. Crenshaw, Martha. "The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. pp. 473-513. (Selected Readings)

[Crenshaw examines the terrorism perpetrated by the FLN, the MNA, the pieds noirs, and the OAS during the Algerian war. While arguing that the Algerian experience shows that terrorism "is more likely to be effective than successful", she nonetheless suggests that terrorism may have made an enormous contribution to the French decision to abandon Algeria. She also describes the way in which the FLN exploited terror to marginalize, silence, or eliminate its political rivals within the Arab population.]

8. Marks, Thomas. “Making Revolution Sendero Luminoso in Peru as Maoist Conclusion, 1980” in Thomas Marks, ed. Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam. London: Frank Cass, 1996. pp. 253-284. (Selected Readings)

[Marks shows how the Sendero Luminoso grew from a small cabal of radical intellectuals into a force cable of paralyzing the government and economy of Peru. He also explains how and why the Sendero Luminoso ultimately failed.]

9. Bolivar, Alberto, "Peru", in Yonah Alexander, ed. Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002. pp. 84-115. (Selected Readings)

[Bolivar gives an insightful overview of Peru's successful counter-terrorism strategy against Sendero Luminoso.]

10. Nelson Manrique, "The War for the Central Sierra," in Steve J. Stern, ed. Shining and Other Paths. War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998. pp. 193-223. (Selected Readings)

[This article analyzes the interaction of Sendero Luminoso and Peru's rural population.]

11. Laqueur, Walter. "Left, Right and Beyond: The Changing Face of Terrorism," in James F. Hoge, Jr. and Gideon Rose, eds. How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War. New York: Public Affairs, 2001, pp. 71-82. (Selected Readings)

[Laqueur sets the attacks of September 11 in historical context, reflects on the use of terrorism by religious fanatics, and explains why contemporary terrorists "have become more dangerous than ever before."]

D. Additional Subject Bibliography:

General Works on Terrorism and the History of Terrorism:

1. Bell, J. Bowyer. Terror Out of Zion. The Fight for Israeli Independence. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996.

2. Gurr, Nadine and Cole, Benjamin. The New Face of Terrorism. Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001. (HV6431.G87 2000)

3. Harmon, Christopher. "Five Strategies of Terrorism", Small Wars and Insurgencies, Autumn 2001, Pages 39-66.

4. Harmon, Christopher C. Terrorism Today. London: Frank Cass, 2000. (HV6431.H365 2000)

5. Dedijer, Vladimir. The Road to Sarajevo. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966.

6. Laqueur, Walter. A History of Terrorism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002.

7. Laqueur, Walter. The New Terrorism. Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. (HV6431.L35 1999)

8. Laqueur, Walter and Alexander, Yonah, eds. The Terrorism Reader: A Historical Anthology. Rev. ed. New York: NAL Penguin, 1987. (HV6431.T49)

9. Marighella, Carlos. The Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla. San Francisco: Patrick Arguello Press, 1978. (U240.M347 1978)

10. Parry, Albert. Terrorism from Robespierre to Arafat. New York: Vanguard Press, 1976.(HV6431.P37 1976)

11. Rubin, Barry, ed. The Politics of Terrorism. Terror as a State and Revolutionary Strategy. Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute, 1989. (HV6431.P65 1989)

12. Sorel, Georges. Reflections on Violence. Jeremy Jennings, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999 (HD6477.S523)

13. Trautmann, Frederic. The Voice of Terror: A Biography of Johann Most. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987. (HX898.M67.T7)

14. Wilkinson, Paul. Political Terrorism. New York: Wiley, 1975. (HC491.W55)

Terrorism in Tsarist Russia:

1. Carr, E.H. Michael Bakunin. New Ed. New York: Octagon Books, 1975. (HX915.B3C3 1975)

2. Hildermeier, Manfred,"The Terrorist Strategies of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in Russia, 1900-1914", in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld, eds., Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth- and Twentieth Century Europe. London: Berg Publishers, 1982. Pages 80-87. (HN380.Z9V57 1982)

3. Perrie, Maureen. The Agrarian Policy of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party from its Origins through the Revolution of 1905-1907. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976. (HD1993 1901.P47 1976)

4. Perrie, Maureen. "Political and Economic Terror in the Tactics of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary Party before 1914, in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld, eds., Social Protest, Violence and Terror in Nineteenth- and Twentieth Century Europe. London: Berg Publishers, 1982. Pages 63-79. (HN380.Z9V57 1982)

5. Pomper, Philip. Sergei Nechaev. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1979. (DK219.6.N4P65)

6. Savinkov, B. V. Memoirs of a Terrorist. Joseph Shaplen, trans. New York: A & C Boni, 1931.

7. Venturi, Franco. Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia. Francis Haskell, trans. New ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. (HX312.V44.513 1983)

Ireland, 1916-1921:

1. Augusteijn, Joost. From Public Defiance to Guerilla Warfare. The Radicalisation of the Irish Republican Army: A Comparative Analysis. Amsterdam: Centrale Drukkerij Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1994. (DA962.A94 1994)

2. Barry, Tom. Guerilla Days in Ireland. Boulder, CO: Robert Rinehard Publishers, 1995 (DA916.8.B37)

3. Bell, J. Bowyer. The Secret Army. The IRA. Rev. 3rd ed. Dublin: Poolbeg Press, 1997 (DA959.B43 1998)

4. Carroll, F. M. American Opinion and the Irish Question 1910-1923. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1978. (DA959.C37 1978)

5. Coogan, Tim Pat. Eamon de Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland. New York: Harper Collins, 1993.

6. Coogan, Tim Pat. Michael Collins: A Biography. London: Hutchinson, 1990. (DA965.C6C66 1990)

7. Collins, Michael. The Path to Freedom. Dublin: The Talbot Press Limited, 1922.

8. Figgis, Darrell. Recollections of the Irish War. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 192?. (DA962.F47)

9. Holt, Edgar. Protest in Arms. The Irish Troubles 1916-1923. London: Putnam, 1960.

10. Mackay, James. Michael Collins: A Life. Edinburgh, 1996.

11. O'Brien, Brendan. A Pocket History of the IRA. Dublin: O'Brien Press, 1997. (DA963.027 1997)

12. Townshend, Charles. The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: The Development of Political and Military Policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. (DA962.T68)

The Algerian War, 1954-1962:

1. Aussaresses, Paul. The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Algeria, 1955-57. Enigma Books, 2002.

2. Connelly, Matthew James. A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for

Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era. Oxford University Press, 2002.

3. Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. Constance Farrington, trans. New York: Grove Press, 1963. (DT33. F313)

4. Horne, Alistair. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. Rev. ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1987. (DT295.H64 1987)

5. Lacouture, Jean. De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970. Alan Sheridan, trans. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. (DC420.L313)

6. Macey, David. Frantz Fanon: A Biography. New York: Picador, 2001. (CT2628.F35M34 2001)

7. Talbot, John. The War Without a Name: France in Algeria 1954-1962. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980.(DT295.T25)

8. Pontecorvo, Gillo, director. The Battle of Algiers. Casbah Films. 1966/ The Criterion Collection, 2004 [includes newly released re-mastered original in 3-DVD set with interviews/documentary footage].

The "Shining Path" in Peru:

1. Clutterbuck, Richard, "Peru: Cocaine, Terrorism and Corruption," International Relations, (August 1995). Pages 77-91.

2. Gorriti Ellenbogen, Gustavo. The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru. Robin Kirk, trans. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999. (F3448.2.G6713 1999)

3. Kent, Robert B. "The Geographical Dimension of the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru," The Geographical Review. Volume 83. Number 4 (October, 1993). Pages 441-454.

4. Palmer, David Scott. "The Revolutionary Terrorism of Peru's Shining Path," in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context. University Park, PA.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. Pages 249-310. (HV6431.T4665 1995)

5. Palmer, David Scott. The Shining Path of Peru. 2d ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994. (F3448.2S54 1994)

6. Poole, Deborah and Renique, Gerardo. Peru: Time of Fear. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992. (HV6433. P4P66 1992)

7. Starn, Orin. "Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of History," Journal of Latin American Studies, Volume 27, Number 2 (May 1993). Pages 399-421.

8. Stern, Steve J., ed. Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 1980-1995. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998. (F3448.2.S53)

9. Strong, Simon. Shining Path: A Case Study in Ideological Terrorism. London: RISCT, 1993. (D839.3 C6)

[Marine]

PART III. CONTEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT OF FORCE

XI. THE GULF WARS 1990-2005

A. General: Taken together, the conflict with Iraq from 1990 to 2005 encapsulates almost all of the types of war examined in the Strategy and Policy syllabus. This module begins with a regional coalition war (1990-91), which results in containment (1991-2003), the breakdown of which leads to another regional coalition war (2003), the aftermath of which is an irregular war (2003-???). The depth and breadth of this case makes it particularly rewarding for dwelling on course themes such as Policy-Strategy Match, War Termination, and Intelligence, Assessment and Plans.

Iraq in 1990-1991, like Germany in 1917, Japan in 1941, North Korea and its Soviet patrons in 1950, and North Vietnam in 1964, misjudged how the United States would react to aggression. On the other side of the conflict, the American political leadership deftly handled most of the political problems of fighting a limited war. American military planners had to hastily improvise operational plans for waging joint/combined air and ground campaigns against the Iraqis. The interplay between civilian and military leaders –detailed by Trainor and Gordon - was critical in the reassessment of the initial plans. The reworked strategy proved stunningly successful in execution, routing Iraq’s army and quickly liberating Kuwait, but questions remain whether the performance left room for improvement in execution or if the Coalition should have pursued more ambitious objectives.

In considering the key war-termination issues of how far to go militarily and what to demand politically in 1991, one should again give special attention to the interaction between American civilian and military leaders as well as between the United States and multinational coalition members. One should also consider whether or not the calculations of American policymakers and strategists – including President George H.W. Bush and his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft – gave too much weight to the short-term costs of going farther militarily and demanding more politically at the end of the war, and too little weight to possible longer-term costs of a cautious war-termination strategy.

Whatever one’s judgment of the first Gulf War, Saddam Hussein proved to be an adaptive and determined opponent. His continued political survival and halting compliance with the cease-fire agreement rendered the ultimate political result of the First Gulf War more ambiguous than many expected. Since U.S. and Coalition objectives in Desert Storm were explicitly limited, the United States countered with a post-war policy of “containment” using a combination of sanctions, international inspections, and limited but increasingly frequent use of air power (Operations Southern and Northern Watch), as discussed in the Byman and Waxman and Pollack selections.

However, across the course of the 1990s, the containment of Iraq gradually eroded, and international efforts to monitor and destroy Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs broke down. At the same time, a postwar policy of containment required a continued American military presence in Saudi Arabia - a presence that became the heart of Osama Bin Laden's "declaration of Jihad" in 1998 (detailed in Lewis). As a result, the alternative to containment - overthrow of the regime - became more appealing politically, and U.S. objectives became unlimited by the late 1990s. This evolution is discussed in detail by Kenneth Pollack’s excellent pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom analysis of policy options. After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, U.S. policy makers committed themselves to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein through the use of conventional military force, if necessary – a decision that led to Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003.

Much of the debate over the appropriateness of abandoning a policy of containment and over the case for war in 2003 continues to hinge upon the vital issue of intelligence. The selections from the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD offer a rare glimpse into the complex raw material upon which policy decisions had to be based. Similarly, Woodward’s article captures how an evolving intelligence picture interacted with other policy concerns at the highest levels to alter the strategy and character of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

As in Desert Storm, planning for conventional military operations was creative, if contentious, and Coalition forces achieved remarkable success. Operation Iraqi Freedom, launched in March 2003, decisively defeated Iraq’s conventional military forces and overthrew the Ba’athist regime – but the restoration of political order and the creation of a new democratic regime were complicated by an emerging Iraqi insurgency now coupled with the efforts of Al Qaeda elements. The Bush administration, which had made the need to eliminate Iraqi WMD the central political issue in its justification for war, paid a heavy political price both domestically and internationally after inspectors failed to find evidence of active weapons of mass destruction programs, detailed in Pollack’s unusual confession of misjudgment.

Many have argued that the planning for war termination, post-conflict stabilization missions, occupation and the rebuilding of Iraq demonstrated significant flaws - issues discussed by Schadlow, O’Hanlon, and Diamond. Similarly, the institutional dimension of strategy (inter-agency cooperation and civil-military relations) and the international dimension of strategy (coalition building and operations) were handled quite differently in Operation Iraqi Freedom, despite the presence of so many veterans of the first Gulf War in both the military and civilian leadership. The evolution and consequences of the administration’s new approach to Iraq are discussed in Mann, O’Hanlon, and Diamond.

Finally, in addition to highlighting key issues of war planning and war termination, this case study illuminates the influence of the Gulf Wars on the United States’ vision of how to use hi-tech weaponry to fight wars in the future. Indeed, for some visionaries, Desert Storm marked a transition from the traditional American way of war - in which the United States overwhelmed enemies with massive material superiority in what usually turned out to be wars of attrition - to a new way of war in which the United States would try to win more quickly and at a lower cost in casualties by taking advantage of hi-tech advances in sensors, C4 architecture, and long-range precision-strike weaponry. These capabilities were demonstrated even more decisively in Operation Iraqi Freedom, but have not been easy to apply to the Iraqi insurgency that followed Saddam’s fall.

B. Essay and Discussion Questions:

1. What strategic alternatives were available to Saddam Hussein in 1990 that might have achieved his political objectives?

2. Comparing how the Gulf War of 1990-1991 (Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm) resembled other limited, regional wars that we have studied in this course, what factors seem to be the most important determinants of strategic success in such wars?

3. How effectively did American political and military leaders work together from August 1990 to March 1991 to formulate a strategy that not only matched the stated political objectives but also was sensitive to other political considerations that remained on the minds of policymakers?

4. Was air power strategically effective in the United States’ struggle against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990-2003?

5. Was containment a viable strategy for dealing with Saddam Hussein’s regime in 1990-2003? Why or why not?

6. How well did American military and political planners handle the major war termination issues that they needed to face in the conflicts with Iraq?

7. Were coalitions an asset or a hindrance to strategic success in the Persian Gulf wars? Why?

8. Did the US military successes in 1991 and 2003 produce a favorable political result? Why or why not?

9. Sun Tzu says that a strategist should frustrate the enemy’s strategy. How well, and in what ways, did Saddam Hussein frustrate American policy and strategy from 1990 to 2003?

10. What impact did intelligence have on American policy and strategy vis-à-vis Iraq from 1990 to 2003?

C. Required Readings:

1. Gordon, Michael R., and General Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (ret). The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995. pp. 31-101, 123-202, 227-248, 267-288, 413-432, 443-461, 476-477.

[This reading provides an opportunity to assess civil-military relations, interservice cooperation and rivalry in war planning, the various strategic alternatives open to decision makers, the strengths and limitations of the high-tech RMA pioneered by the American armed forces, the limits of intelligence in piercing the fog of war, and war termination in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.]

2. Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York: Knopf, 1998. pp. 380-382, 388-402, 416-492.

[President George Bush and his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft wrote an illuminating account of foreign policy decision-making during their time in office. Portions of their account rely on a revealing diary kept by President Bush. The sections of this book dealing with the Gulf War provide insights into high-level decision-making during wartime and are especially good for understanding American policy aims in the war, the politics of coalition building, the press of domestic political considerations on the making of strategy, and the president’s role as commander-in-chief.]

3. NSD-54 (January 15, 1991) and “Dod New Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers” (March 21, 2003). (Selected Readings)

[These short readings provide the US war aims in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom, respectively. The latter reading is not an official document, but does reflect the policy perspective of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.]

4. Murray, Williamson. "Air War in the Gulf: The Limits of Air Power." Strategic Review (Winter 1998). pp. 28-38. (Selected Readings)

[While it may not have been the ideal application of air power that some analysts claim, the 1991 air operations did achieve extraordinary results in spite of considerable problems in planning and execution cited by critics. Murray provides an analysis of what worked and what did not in this strategic application of air power, drawing on the Gulf War Air Power Survey and other sources.]

5. Byman, Daniel, Kenneth Pollack, and Matthew Waxman. "Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the Past," Survival (Autumn 1998). pp. 127-148. (Selected Readings)

[The authors draw upon historical events from 1975 to 1998 to illustrate how Saddam Hussein's behavior was influenced by applying pressure to key elements of his relationship with his power base. This reading provides insights into the inner workings of Saddam's regime.]

6. Pollack, Kenneth M. The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq. Washington, DC: Brookings 2002. pp. xxiv-xxx, 27-35, 46-54, 58-94, 168-180, 387-424.

[Kenneth Pollack, an official in the first Bush and Clinton administrations, lays out a careful case for overthrowing Saddam Hussein in a book published after 9/11 but before Operation Iraqi Freedom. Pollack’s case for invasion is based on the failure of the containment policy of the 1990s and on Iraq’s potential acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. This reading discusses internal risings in Iraq before and after Desert Storm; the establishment of containment – including the “no-fly zones” - and the international inspections regime from 1991-1998; and the gradual erosion of that regime in the late 1990s.]

7. Pollack, Kenneth M. “Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong?” The Atlantic Monthly (January-February 2004). (Selected Readings)

[The U.S. used the threat of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction programs as its primary public argument for launching Operation Iraqi Freedom. Pollack attempts to explain what happened to Iraq’s weapons and why the large stockpiles that were expected – based on United Nations inspections as well as various national intelligence assessments – have not yet been found.]

8. Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 332-358. (Selected Readings)

[Focusing on the international and institutional dimensions of strategy, the author examines the decision to go to war with Iraq in 2002, internal debates about the role of allies and international institutions, pre-war diplomacy, and the expansion of political objectives in the run-up to the conflict.]

9. Woodward, Bob. "U.S. Aimed for Hussein as War Began." Washington Post, 22 April 2004, p. A1 (Selected Readings)

[This article is a modified excerpt from Bob Woodward's book Plan of Attack. Throughout the period in question, Woodward was given unique access to the highest levels of the Bush administration and hence is able to capture a slice of the policy-strategy interaction not available elsewhere.]

10. “Interview: Lt. Gen. Raad Al-Hamdani” PBS: Frontline – the invasion of Iraq at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sh...views/raad.html (Selected Readings)

[The subject of this interview was the commander of Iraqi Republican Guard Forces south of Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Gen. Al-Hamdani discusses the tactical and strategic errors made by Iraqi military and political leadership, the impact of air power and joint operations on combat in early April 2003, and his personal experiences in battle against Coalition forces.]

11. O’Hanlon, Michael E. “Iraq Without a Plan,” Policy Review 128 at http://www.policyreview.org/dec04/ohanlon_print.html (Selected Readings)

[The author critiques the post-invasion phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom as both a failure in judgment on the part of civilian planners and also as a failure of military leadership to provide an adequate balance to optimistic civilian assumptions.]

12. Diamond, Larry. “What Went Wrong in Iraq,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2004) at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040901faes...ng-in-iraq.html (Selected Readings)

[The author, who served as Senior Advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad from January – April 2004, argues that the US did not commit adequate resources to secure Iraq in the post-conflict phase, and did not make the best use of the resources it did have on hand. The article also points out that despite over a dozen years of focus on Iraq, the US did not adequately understand the nature of the Iraqi state and political system. As a result, he argues that Iraq’s transition to democracy – already a daunting task – will be much more difficult.]

13. Shadlow, Nadia. "War and the Art of Governance." Parameters (Autumn 2003). pp. 85-94. (Selected Readings)

[The author discusses America’s experience in post-conflict stabilization and occupation during the twentieth century, and suggests lessons for American strategy today.]

14. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (excerpts are Key Findings (Regime Strategic Intent, Regime Finance and Procurement, Delivery Systems, Nuclear, Chemical, Biological) from the original Fall 2004 report; and Prewar Movement of WMD out of Iraq, Iraqi Detainees: Value to Investigation of Iraq WMD and Current Status, and Residual Proliferation Risks: People from the 2005 Addenda) at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/ (Selected Readings)

[This selection is drawn from the final report on the status of Iraq’s WMD programs. The key findings include the fact that Saddam wanted to end sanctions while retaining some capacity to reconstitute his WMD program; indications that Iraq’s efforts to maintain some WMD capacity focused on chemical weapons and ballistic missiles; evidence that Iraq’s nuclear weapons capability was essentially destroyed in 1991; and the conclusion that no meaningful WMD capability was deployed or available in 2003.]

15. Lewis, Bernard. "License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin's Declaration of Jihad," Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec 1998). pp 14-19. (Selected Readings)

[Lewis, the leading Western historian of the Middle East, shows how Bin Ladin's declaration of February 1998 justified its call for war against the United States by pointing to the American military presence in Saudi Arabia and American policy toward Iraq.]

D. Additional Subject Bibliography:

1. Al-Jabbar, Faleh Abd. “Why the Uprisings Failed.” Middle East Report, No. 176, Iraq in the Aftermath (May – Jun., 1992), 2-14.

2. Arkin, William M., “Baghdad: The Urban Sanctuary in Desert Storm?” Air Power Journal, Winter 1997.

3. Baram, Amatzia, and Barry Rubin. Iraq’s Road to War. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993. (DS79.7.I73)

4. Biddle, Stephen. “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us About the Future of Conflict,” International Security (Fall 1996). pp. 139-179.

5. Byman, Daniel, and Matt Waxman. Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000. (AS36.R288 no. 1146)

6. Cohen, Eliot A. Gulf War Air Power Survey, 6 vols. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993. (DS79.724.U6 G85)

7. Cordesman, Anthony H. The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003.

8. Cordesman, Anthony H., and Abraham R Wagner. The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 4: The Gulf War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. (U42.C59 1990 v.4)

9. Cordesman, Anthony H. The War After the War: Strategic Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.

10. De la Billière, Sir Peter. Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War. London: Motivate, 1992. (DS79.74.D45)

11. Ederington, L. Benjamin, and Michael J. Mazarr, eds. Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994. (UA23.T85)

12. Franks, Tommy, with Malcolm McConnell. American Soldier. New York: HarperCollins, 2004.

13. Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Karsh. The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. (DS79.72.F74)

14. Friedman, Norman. Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991. (DS79.72.F75)

15. Garrity, Patrick J. Why the Gulf War Still Matters: Foreign Perspectives on the War and the Future of International Security. Los Alamos: Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1993. (IP Coll. 500053)

16. Keaney, Thomas A., and Eliot A. Cohen. Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf War. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995. (DS79.724.U6 K43)

17. Khalid bin Sultan, with Patrick Seale. Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander. New York: Harper Collins, 1995. (DS79.74.B56)

18. Mahnken, Thomas G. “A Squandered Opportunity? The Decision to End the Gulf War” in Andrew J. Bacevich and Efraim Inbar, editors, The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered (London: Frank Cass, 2003)

19. Mueller, John E. Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. (DS79.724.U6 M84)

20. Murray, Williamson. “The Gulf War as History,” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History (Autumn 1997). pp. 6-19.

21. Murray, Williamson and Major General Robert H. Scalres, Jr. The Iraq War: A Military History. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2003.

22. Mylroie, Laurie. “How We Helped Saddam Survive,” Commentary (July 1991). pp. 15-18.

23. Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercian in War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996. (UG700.P365)

24. Piscatori, James, ed. Islamic Fundamentalisms and the Gulf Crisis. Chicago: The Fundamentalism Project, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991. (BP60.I8254)

25. Powell, General Colin L., with Joseph E. Persico. My American Journey. New York: Random House, 1995. (E840.5.P68)

26. Press, Daryl. “Lessons from Ground Combat in the Gulf,” Keaney, Thomas A., “The Linkage of Air and Ground Power in the Future of Conflict,” Mahnken, Thomas G., and Watts, Barry D., “What the Gulf War Can (and Cannot) Tell Us about the Future of Warfare,” and Biddle, Stephen, “The Gulf War Debate Redux: Why Skill and Technology Are the Right Answer,” International Security (Fall 1997). pp. 137-174.

27. Record, Jeffrey. “Defeating Desert Storm (and Why Saddam Didn’t),” Comparative Strategy (April-June 1993). pp. 125-140.

28. Reynolds, Colonel Richard T., USAF. Heart of the Storm: The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1995. (DS79.724.U6 R49)

29. Scales, Robert H. Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994. (DS79.72.S292)

30. Schwarzkopf, General H. Norman. It Doesn't Take a Hero: General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Autobiography. New York: Bantam Books, 1992. (E840.5.S39)

31. Swain, Richard M. Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1997. (DS79.724.U6)

32. Warden, Colonel John A., III. "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century," in Shultz, Richard H., Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds. The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War. Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1992, pp. 57-82 (UG633.F86)

33. Woodward, Bob. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.

34. Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. (E881.W66)


http://www.nwc.navy.mil/cncscasestudies/cases/case11.htm

[ghostgovt]

Makes one wonder how many fakes there are out there.... learned of several in forums.

http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-1019387.php

August 08, 2005

2-star charade
Legion member’s buddies thought he was major general

By John Hoellwarth
Times staff writer

SHREVEPORT, La. — William J. Lawson’s hands shook as he held the reproduction of a 60-year-old military service record.

He had just been handed the record of a Marine who served from Jan. 10, 1945, to Aug. 6, 1946.

He read the file, noting that the young leatherneck was discharged as a private first class whose decorations included only marksmanship badges. Turning to the last page, the 78-year-old man was confronted with a picture of the teenager, who he would later describe as looking sad.

He was asked: “Do you recognize this Marine?”

He closed the file and put it on the table in front of him at the American Legion Post in Shreveport that had become the center of his social life since moving to Louisiana 13 years ago.

He looked up with his good eye and said, “I believe I do,” his voice shaky, almost broken.

And just like that, his six-year portrayal of a highly decorated Marine major general was over. He asked to be called “Bill.”

A ruse unravels

Lawson’s wife, Syble, had warned him for years to give up the ruse, reminding him over and over that it would catch up to him one day. The beginning of his undoing came June 22. Lawson attracted national media attention when he showed up in uniform to deliver a rousing speech to Shreveport citizens gathered in protest after groundskeepers at Forest Park Cemetery threw away items left at grave sites there, including several American flags.

One person who was there described the event as bearing a striking resemblance to the last scene of “Frankenstein,” with a riotous mob of citizens ready to crucify Robert Lomison, president of Forest Park Cemeteries and Funeral Home. A combat-wounded, Silver Star-sporting retired major general was “leading the charge.”

It didn’t take long for a photo of Lawson to hit the news wires. A subsequent investigation by Marine Corps Times uncovered Lawson’s true military record and offered a glimpse of a young man who celebrated only one Marine Corps birthday as an active-duty leatherneck.

Although he claimed to rate a Silver Star for actions on Iwo Jima during World War II, he was in New York awaiting his first day in boot camp when the flag was raised on Mount Suribachi in February 1945.

He was a recruit at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, S.C., a few months later when the Marines conducted their last amphibious landing of the Pacific island-hopping campaign, hitting the beach on Okinawa, Japan.

He was assigned to a training battalion at Camp Lejeune, N.C., when the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and the Japanese later capitulated.

The eager young man who attended high school at Xavier Military Academy and sought his parents’ permission to enlist in the Marines before his 18th birthday never got to fight.

“I wanted to fight,” he said. “I was trained for it. I was prepared to fight Japan on the home front.”

Instead, Lawson’s military career was cut short while he served at Camp Pendleton, Calif. A wayward military tractor pinned him against a wall, blew out both of his knees and broke his ankle.

His record shows he was transferred to a military hospital detachment for injured Marines on May 8, 1946. He spent more than three months in recovery before his final transfer to Camp Pendleton’s Separation Company. Eleven days later, he was discharged from the Corps.

“I felt cheated when I got hurt and they discharged me,” he said. “’Cause I wanted to make the Corps my life.”

To this day, Lawson wears braces on his lower legs and motors around the legion post on a motorized scooter that is also a fixture on the back of his car. He wears a patch because he lost his eye to a retinal condition that afflicts some seniors.

Lawson said that after he got out of the Corps, he spent his working years with an insurance agency and in the plastics industry before retiring.

But word around the legion post is that Lawson was left a large sum of money after his father died, which allowed him to buy a large house in one of Shreveport’s more affluent neighborhoods and effectively portray the very model of a modern major general.

A hero in Shreveport

When Marine Corps Times interviewed Lawson in Shreveport on Aug. 4, he was on his way to a meeting of the “Forty and Eight,” which members of the American Legion describe as the invitation-only inner circle of the organization. As one legionnaire put it, the Forty and Eight is to the American Legion what the Shriners are to the Masons.

Lawson agreed to meet at the legion post and arrived wearing a Marine Corps ball cap adorned with both his signature two stars and studded with pins representing his top-shelf awards.

There was a long pause as he reviewed his service record.

“I believe ...,” he paused and restarted.

“For the good of the legion ...,” he paused to restart again.

Then, he just began at the beginning.

Lawson said his deception started when he moved to Louisiana from Cudjoe, Fla., and someone at the legion post got the idea he was a retired general. He described it as a case of mistaken identity, and he eventually acquiesced in 1999, thinking he could use the legion’s willingness to accept him as a general to positively influence his community.

“I said, ‘Do not start this general stuff here, please,’” Lawson said, noting that people were “fairly good for about six months, then it started to get out.”

Though over the years he has declined every offer to take on a formal leadership role at the legion, word of Lawson’s status as a general quickly spread from the post to the Shreveport community at large, which embraced him as a sort of local veterans’ spokes-man and activist.

“Things got beyond where they should have gotten,” Lawson explained. “I wish it would have stayed low-key, but [the legion post] kept throwing stuff at me.”

Lawson appeared at numerous city- and veteran-sponsored community events at the Veteran’s Memorial on Shreveport’s Clyde Fant Parkway. On Memorial Day 2004, Lawson showed up wearing his award-laden cap.

“The first time I did anything in this is when they asked me to come to the dedication for the Purple Heart monument,” he said, referring to an event four years ago organized by the local chapter of The Military Order of the Purple Heart. “My assumption was that they’d ask me to go around with them and see Marines at the [local Department of Veterans Affairs hospitals].

“Next thing is that I’d give a talk in reference to the flag,” he said, referring to his appearance at Forest Park Cemetery. “Lomison got himself into a pickle. I was trying to do some good. I was trying to do what I thought a major general would do.”

Maintaining the illusion

When asked to put his lie in perspective, knowing so many Marines are earning legitimate awards for combat valor even now, Lawson said, “I feel I … I have felt all along not too happy with that. It’s something that has snowballed.”

Even so, Lawson had to take some deliberate steps in maintaining appearances. When asked about the cost of impersonating a major general, he said he spent more than $1,000 getting everything just right.

When asked about how he chose the medals he would wear or ensure he placed them in the correct order, Lawson said he took a very specific approach to the awards.

“The awards were picked from a picture of … I don’t remember who it was,” he said. “I’m trying to remember. It was in one of the Marine Corps books.”

Lawson said that over the years his wife has asked him, “Why don’t you stop this before it gets out of hand?”

His reply: “It’s already out of hand.”

Lawson’s chief concern now is the damage this will do to his relationship with his wife, but he was also mindful of the damage it will do to his relationship with the community that has thus far embraced its resident major general.

What happens next

Lawson could face up to six months in jail and have to pay a fine, said Thomas A. Cottone Jr., a special agent with the FBI based in West Paterson, N.J., who investigates medals frauds — primarily false Medal of Honor claims — and phony service members. Cottone was not familiar with Lawson’s case but discussed such situations in general terms.

If prosecuted, Lawson would be charged under with wearing medals or other decorations he did not rate and for wearing a military uniform, which includes wearing false rank insignia. Whether charges are brought ultimately rests with the local district attorney who would prosecute the case, he said. Since Lawson is a civilian and therefore not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, he would not be charged with impersonating an officer, Cottone said.

But the worst penalty a person in a situation like Lawson’s could face is the inevitable public humiliation he would receive in his community, Cottone said.

“I still say the worst penalty for these imposters is being publicly identified,” he said.

Cottone added that someone like Lawson also could be guilty of public theft — but that’s more figurative. While masquerading as a two-star general, he has likely been given services and other gifts for free or at a discounted rate simply because of who people thought he was.

“He’s got a bunch of unearned things, solely because they think he’s a two-star general,” he said. “In some sense, he’s been committing thefts for years.”

Cottone recalled another man who was impersonating a brigadier general in New Jersey. The man paraded about with three Navy Crosses he didn’t rate and was giving speeches at the local military base.

“He went to the country club, and everyone referred to him as ‘general,’” Cottone said.

As Cottone’s investigation drew to a close, officials learned that the man would be the featured speaker at an event on Memorial Day. Sometime after the FBI busted the man, he committed suicide, Cottone said.

Cottone, who has been investigating these sorts of crimes for 10 years, said it’s important to maintain the significance of rank insignia, medals and the military uniform.

“If none of these things means anything, then why not make everyone a four-star general,” he said.

A spokesman at Marine Corps headquarters said the Corps’ office of the inspector general will investigate.

“As a matter of course, the inspector general’s office would be the one to initially investigate any claims of someone who is improperly wearing the uniform or medals,” said Maj. Douglas Powell.

If they determine there is “credible evidence” against such a person, the matter could be turned over to the staff judge advocate general or to the FBI, he said.

Powell said it’s important for Marines to understand how seriously the Corps takes these matters. Lawson’s alleged crime is an insult to every other service member on active duty, he said.

“This guy wearing a uniform smacks every other service member in the face while they’re putting their life on the line,” he said.

A community reacts

Contacted for comment on Lawson’s ruse, Lomison, the cemetery president, said he was “overwhelmed and saddened” for him.

“I took great umbrage to Mr. Lawson’s attacks on my patriotism and support of veterans. Errors were made during the Forest Park spring cleaning, but we admitted our mistakes and took responsibility for our actions,” Lomison said. “I sincerely hope that Mr. Lawson will do the same. My thoughts and prayers are with Mr. Lawson.”

Reactions among American Legion members seemed to be a shared sense of shock and disbelief. Those legionnaires who had the opportunity to view Lawson’s records invariably shook and scratched their heads for a few moments before declining to go on the record with a comment.

One legionnaire pointed out that the post commander went to high school with Lawson’s wife and that even though he obviously wasn’t a major general, his enlisted service still makes him eligible for membership in the legion.

Lawson, whose drinks are served in a uniquely spotted glass he asks for specifically every time he drinks at the post’s bar, isn’t so sure he’ll be able to overcome his shame enough to continue his membership.

“It’s probably going to be bad enough that I’ll lose a lot of friends I hold dear,” he said. “Perhaps I’ll move back to Florida.”

[Marine]

Makes one wonder how many fakes there are out there.... learned of several in forums.

http://www.armytimes.com/story.php?f=1-292925-1019387.php

August 08, 2005

2-star charade
Legion member’s buddies thought he was major general

By John Hoellwarth
Times staff writer

SHREVEPORT, La. — William J. Lawson’s hands shook as he held the reproduction of a 60-year-old military service record.

He had just been handed the record of a Marine who served from Jan. 10, 1945, to Aug. 6, 1946.

He read the file, noting that the young leatherneck was discharged as a private first class whose decorations included only marksmanship badges. Turning to the last page, the 78-year-old man was confronted with a picture of the teenager, who he would later describe as looking sad.

He was asked: “Do you recognize this Marine?”

He closed the file and put it on the table in front of him at the American Legion Post in Shreveport that had become the center of his social life since moving to Louisiana 13 years ago.

He looked up with his good eye and said, “I believe I do,” his voice shaky, almost broken.

And just like that, his six-year portrayal of a highly decorated Marine major general was over. He asked to be called “Bill.”

A ruse unravels

Lawson’s wife, Syble, had warned him for years to give up the ruse, reminding him over and over that it would catch up to him one day. The beginning of his undoing came June 22. Lawson attracted national media attention when he showed up in uniform to deliver a rousing speech to Shreveport citizens gathered in protest after groundskeepers at Forest Park Cemetery threw away items left at grave sites there, including several American flags.

One person who was there described the event as bearing a striking resemblance to the last scene of “Frankenstein,” with a riotous mob of citizens ready to crucify Robert Lomison, president of Forest Park Cemeteries and Funeral Home. A combat-wounded, Silver Star-sporting retired major general was “leading the charge.”

It didn’t take long for a photo of Lawson to hit the news wires. A subsequent investigation by Marine Corps Times uncovered Lawson’s true military record and offered a glimpse of a young man who celebrated only one Marine Corps birthday as an active-duty leatherneck.

Although he claimed to rate a Silver Star for actions on Iwo Jima during World War II, he was in New York awaiting his first day in boot camp when the flag was raised on Mount Suribachi in February 1945.

He was a recruit at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, S.C., a few months later when the Marines conducted their last amphibious landing of the Pacific island-hopping campaign, hitting the beach on Okinawa, Japan.

He was assigned to a training battalion at Camp Lejeune, N.C., when the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and the Japanese later capitulated.

The eager young man who attended high school at Xavier Military Academy and sought his parents’ permission to enlist in the Marines before his 18th birthday never got to fight.

“I wanted to fight,” he said. “I was trained for it. I was prepared to fight Japan on the home front.”

Instead, Lawson’s military career was cut short while he served at Camp Pendleton, Calif. A wayward military tractor pinned him against a wall, blew out both of his knees and broke his ankle.

His record shows he was transferred to a military hospital detachment for injured Marines on May 8, 1946. He spent more than three months in recovery before his final transfer to Camp Pendleton’s Separation Company. Eleven days later, he was discharged from the Corps.

“I felt cheated when I got hurt and they discharged me,” he said. “’Cause I wanted to make the Corps my life.”

To this day, Lawson wears braces on his lower legs and motors around the legion post on a motorized scooter that is also a fixture on the back of his car. He wears a patch because he lost his eye to a retinal condition that afflicts some seniors.

Lawson said that after he got out of the Corps, he spent his working years with an insurance agency and in the plastics industry before retiring.

But word around the legion post is that Lawson was left a large sum of money after his father died, which allowed him to buy a large house in one of Shreveport’s more affluent neighborhoods and effectively portray the very model of a modern major general.

A hero in Shreveport

When Marine Corps Times interviewed Lawson in Shreveport on Aug. 4, he was on his way to a meeting of the “Forty and Eight,” which members of the American Legion describe as the invitation-only inner circle of the organization. As one legionnaire put it, the Forty and Eight is to the American Legion what the Shriners are to the Masons.

Lawson agreed to meet at the legion post and arrived wearing a Marine Corps ball cap adorned with both his signature two stars and studded with pins representing his top-shelf awards.

There was a long pause as he reviewed his service record.

“I believe ...,” he paused and restarted.

“For the good of the legion ...,” he paused to restart again.

Then, he just began at the beginning.

Lawson said his deception started when he moved to Louisiana from Cudjoe, Fla., and someone at the legion post got the idea he was a retired general. He described it as a case of mistaken identity, and he eventually acquiesced in 1999, thinking he could use the legion’s willingness to accept him as a general to positively influence his community.

“I said, ‘Do not start this general stuff here, please,’” Lawson said, noting that people were “fairly good for about six months, then it started to get out.”

Though over the years he has declined every offer to take on a formal leadership role at the legion, word of Lawson’s status as a general quickly spread from the post to the Shreveport community at large, which embraced him as a sort of local veterans’ spokes-man and activist.

“Things got beyond where they should have gotten,” Lawson explained. “I wish it would have stayed low-key, but [the legion post] kept throwing stuff at me.”

Lawson appeared at numerous city- and veteran-sponsored community events at the Veteran’s Memorial on Shreveport’s Clyde Fant Parkway. On Memorial Day 2004, Lawson showed up wearing his award-laden cap.

“The first time I did anything in this is when they asked me to come to the dedication for the Purple Heart monument,” he said, referring to an event four years ago organized by the local chapter of The Military Order of the Purple Heart. “My assumption was that they’d ask me to go around with them and see Marines at the [local Department of Veterans Affairs hospitals].

“Next thing is that I’d give a talk in reference to the flag,” he said, referring to his appearance at Forest Park Cemetery. “Lomison got himself into a pickle. I was trying to do some good. I was trying to do what I thought a major general would do.”

Maintaining the illusion

When asked to put his lie in perspective, knowing so many Marines are earning legitimate awards for combat valor even now, Lawson said, “I feel I … I have felt all along not too happy with that. It’s something that has snowballed.”

Even so, Lawson had to take some deliberate steps in maintaining appearances. When asked about the cost of impersonating a major general, he said he spent more than $1,000 getting everything just right.

When asked about how he chose the medals he would wear or ensure he placed them in the correct order, Lawson said he took a very specific approach to the awards.

“The awards were picked from a picture of … I don’t remember who it was,” he said. “I’m trying to remember. It was in one of the Marine Corps books.”

Lawson said that over the years his wife has asked him, “Why don’t you stop this before it gets out of hand?”

His reply: “It’s already out of hand.”

Lawson’s chief concern now is the damage this will do to his relationship with his wife, but he was also mindful of the damage it will do to his relationship with the community that has thus far embraced its resident major general.

What happens next

Lawson could face up to six months in jail and have to pay a fine, said Thomas A. Cottone Jr., a special agent with the FBI based in West Paterson, N.J., who investigates medals frauds — primarily false Medal of Honor claims — and phony service members. Cottone was not familiar with Lawson’s case but discussed such situations in general terms.

If prosecuted, Lawson would be charged under with wearing medals or other decorations he did not rate and for wearing a military uniform, which includes wearing false rank insignia. Whether charges are brought ultimately rests with the local district attorney who would prosecute the case, he said. Since Lawson is a civilian and therefore not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, he would not be charged with impersonating an officer, Cottone said.

But the worst penalty a person in a situation like Lawson’s could face is the inevitable public humiliation he would receive in his community, Cottone said.

“I still say the worst penalty for these imposters is being publicly identified,” he said.

Cottone added that someone like Lawson also could be guilty of public theft — but that’s more figurative. While masquerading as a two-star general, he has likely been given services and other gifts for free or at a discounted rate simply because of who people thought he was.

“He’s got a bunch of unearned things, solely because they think he’s a two-star general,” he said. “In some sense, he’s been committing thefts for years.”

Cottone recalled another man who was impersonating a brigadier general in New Jersey. The man paraded about with three Navy Crosses he didn’t rate and was giving speeches at the local military base.

“He went to the country club, and everyone referred to him as ‘general,’” Cottone said.

As Cottone’s investigation drew to a close, officials learned that the man would be the featured speaker at an event on Memorial Day. Sometime after the FBI busted the man, he committed suicide, Cottone said.

Cottone, who has been investigating these sorts of crimes for 10 years, said it’s important to maintain the significance of rank insignia, medals and the military uniform.

“If none of these things means anything, then why not make everyone a four-star general,” he said.

A spokesman at Marine Corps headquarters said the Corps’ office of the inspector general will investigate.

“As a matter of course, the inspector general’s office would be the one to initially investigate any claims of someone who is improperly wearing the uniform or medals,” said Maj. Douglas Powell.

If they determine there is “credible evidence” against such a person, the matter could be turned over to the staff judge advocate general or to the FBI, he said.

Powell said it’s important for Marines to understand how seriously the Corps takes these matters. Lawson’s alleged crime is an insult to every other service member on active duty, he said.

“This guy wearing a uniform smacks every other service member in the face while they’re putting their life on the line,” he said.

A community reacts

Contacted for comment on Lawson’s ruse, Lomison, the cemetery president, said he was “overwhelmed and saddened” for him.

“I took great umbrage to Mr. Lawson’s attacks on my patriotism and support of veterans. Errors were made during the Forest Park spring cleaning, but we admitted our mistakes and took responsibility for our actions,” Lomison said. “I sincerely hope that Mr. Lawson will do the same. My thoughts and prayers are with Mr. Lawson.”

Reactions among American Legion members seemed to be a shared sense of shock and disbelief. Those legionnaires who had the opportunity to view Lawson’s records invariably shook and scratched their heads for a few moments before declining to go on the record with a comment.

One legionnaire pointed out that the post commander went to high school with Lawson’s wife and that even though he obviously wasn’t a major general, his enlisted service still makes him eligible for membership in the legion.

Lawson, whose drinks are served in a uniquely spotted glass he asks for specifically every time he drinks at the post’s bar, isn’t so sure he’ll be able to overcome his shame enough to continue his membership.

“It’s probably going to be bad enough that I’ll lose a lot of friends I hold dear,” he said. “Perhaps I’ll move back to Florida.”

[Marine]

Foreign Naval attache observe recruit training
Submitted by: MCRD Parris Island
Story Identification #: 200351510535
Story by Lance Cpl. Jennifer Brofer



MCRD/ERR PARRIS ISLAND, S.C. (May 9, 2003) -- Thirty-eight members of the Corps of Foreign Naval Attache and their wives visited Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, S.C., May 6, to observe training and tour the Depot.

The Corps of Foreign Naval Attache is comprised of officers from foreign countries, representing their governments at their countries' embassies in Washington D.C., who travel around the country to observe how military training is conducted in the U.S.

"It's an educational opportunity for them to try and get a good idea of what we do here," said Col. Jeffrey Bearor, commanding officer, Recruit Training Regiment. "They travel around the country to all the services to gain an appreciation of how the U.S. armed forces are trained and equipped. It helps them better understand us, so they can do their jobs more efficiently."

As part of their biennial visit, they toured various areas of recruit training, starting at the infamous yellow footprints, where they received a recruit's welcome.

"We have all been looking forward to this," said Col. Herman Dukers, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. "The tour gives us an idea of what basic training is like and what recruits have to go through."

After the question and answer brief at Receiving, they toured the rifle range at WFTBn. to observe recruits using the new automated unknown distance targets at Khe Sahn range during Event Six of the Crucible.

"I think [the training] is very difficult and very tough for the youngsters, but it's necessary to build a soldier, a Marine." said Army Col. Andrzej Turek, Embassy of the Republic of Poland.

Turek was very impressed by the tour because no special preparations were made to the training curriculum to make it look more difficult for recruits in order to "show off" for the visitors.

For the last part of the tour, the group went to Page Field to witness recruits completing the day movement course and other obstacles during the Crucible.

The visits conducted by the attache give them an opportunity to witness and compare training conducted by U.S. forces to their own. This allows them to integrate aspects of U.S. training that will benefit their own armed services.


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,foreign

[Marine]

Foreign weapons training prepares Marines for Georgia deployment
Submitted by: MCAS Cherry Point
Story Identification #: 200386135354
Story by 1st Lt. Justin M. Colvin



Fort Bragg, N.C. (July 31, 2003)-- (July 31, 2003) -- A team of 25 U.S. Marines completed a foreign weapons training package taught by U.S. Army Special Forces at Ft. Bragg, N.C. July 30.


The team, comprised mostly of infantry Marines, is preparing to deploy to the Republic of Georgia to train a light infantry battalion of selected Georgian troops in U.S. small unit tactics as part of the Georgia Train and Equip Program. They make up the fourth rotation of the tactical training portion of the program and will relieve the current team of Marines already in place in that country.


The GTEP began as a coordinated effort between the government of Georgia and the U.S. government to enhance the capability of selected Georgian military units to provide security and stability to the citizens of Georgia and the region. The program initially began in April, 2002 with the deployment of U.S. Army Special Forces to the region; the job has since been handed over to the Marines.


The purpose of the Special Forces training at Ft. Bragg was to equip the Marines with the knowledge they'll need to identify, maintain, and employ the various foreign weapons systems they will encounter while in Georgia. As a former Soviet state, the Georgian military is equipped with mostly Soviet weapons. The Marines will need to be familiar with their operation before they can begin training the foreign troops on how to employ them more efficiently.


Traditionally the job of training foreign nationals has been the mission of the Special Forces, but with the broad scope of the War on Terrorism, innovative changes have been made to effectively utilize other U.S. forces. "This is not a typical Marine Corps mission, but the Marines here are all volunteers and have risen to this new challenge," said Maj. Charles A. Western, commanding officer, Phase III-D, GTEP. "These Marines will accomplish this mission. Adapting to and overcoming any obstacle is our job."


As rocket propelled grenades (RPG-7s) exploded and AK-47 assault rifles cracked off bursts of ammunition behind them, the team leaders were already planning for their experience with the Georgians. "My end goal is to get them to think like us," said 1st Lt. Daniel R. Nolan, team leader, Phase IIID, GTEP. "Basically I think the Marines have cornered the market when it comes to small unit tactics, leadership down to the lowest level, and doing what it takes to accomplish the mission."


Almost half of the Marines that will deploy to Georgia in the coming weeks have returned from Operation Iraqi Freedom. As they trained on the weapons that only a few months ago were being fired at them by the enemy, most were surprisingly eager to be heading out the door once again.


"I just want to do a good job over there to give these guys the training they need to become a professional, cohesive fighting force, and leave them with a lasting impression of the United States Marine Corps," said Nolan, who returned from Iraq in June with Task Force Tarawa. When the commanding officer was approached about any reservations he might have about taking these Marines back overseas so soon, Western simply responded, "We're Marines. It's what we do."


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,foreign

[Marine]

Silver Star account 'chilling'

Submitted by: MCB Camp Pendleton
Story Identification #: 20056914563
Story by Sgt. Monroe F. Seigle



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (June 9, 2005) -- Leondro F. Baptista says any of the 25 men in his platoon would have done what he did last spring in Iraq.

Nonetheless, his exploits were anything but ordinary -- even to a man who's heard plenty of firsthand accounts about what heroes have done.

"What this Marine did brings chills down my spine," said Maj. Gen. Richard F. Natonski, commanding general for 1st Marine Division, who on June 3 handed Baptista a Silver Star -- the nation's third-highest award for bravery in combat.

"Actions like this truly made a difference in Iraq," Natonski added.

A resident of Miami and a former team leader with Company B, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion here, Baptista recalls in vivid detail the sounds of the enemy's machine-gun fire directed at his platoon that day in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq more than a year ago.

He also remembers the six Marines who were wounded in the firefight.

It happened April 7, 2004. Sixty enemy combatants in fortified positions assaulted the platoon. Baptista, a sergeant at the time, immediately dismounted his vehicle and led a "hit team" to flank the enemy positions, according to the award citation.

After sprinting across a shallow canal and climbing a 10-foot berm, he charged toward the enemy fighters. While drawing fire from enemy machine guns, he silenced one gunner, then continued to press the enemy by hastily forming a three-man assault team, the citation stated.

He then scaled another berm under heavy enemy fire. He disarmed an improvised explosive device and charged forward, surprising 11 enemy combatants. He eliminated four of them, then directed the fire team of three Marines against the remaining seven insurgents, the citation stated.

As he came under fire from different enemy positions, Baptista then provided cover for his team for a withdrawal to safety.

After the award ceremony, Baptista spent the afternoon with several of his Operation Iraqi Freedom comrades. He talked briefly about the firefight and detailed what he remembered.

"Everything happened so quickly out there that it seemed to have only lasted a few minutes, but in actuality, the entire ambush lasted 30 minutes. Time gets distorted when things are happening so fast," Baptista said.

"I am thankful for the recognition, but I also feel somewhat unworthy of it, because all of us that were out there that day made sacrifices. I think all of these Marines here today deserve recognition. I was just put into a position that put me in charge, and I had to make some split-second decisions."

Baptista, who was born in Rio De Janiero, Brazil, and became a naturalized American citizen, has studied criminal justice since he was honorably discharged from the Marine Corps in September 2004. He plans to move back to California to become a police officer locally.

"He was a fearless and natural leader," said Gunnery Sgt. Daniel Griego, operations chief for Company B. "He was one of those Marines you always had to hold back, and if you let him go at the right time, he would win the race. He never questioned what he was told to do."

"It was good to see some familiar faces again," Baptista said. "I am just glad to still be here today and that all my brothers came home safely."

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,enemy

[Marine]

Scout Sniper honored with Silver Star

Submitted by: MCB Camp Pendleton
Story Identification #: 200563011057
Story by Lance Cpl. Ray Lewis



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (June 30, 2005) -- Under enemy fire for 12 hours at a time with rounds landing inches from his head, sniper Sgt. John E. Place volleyed with such a lethal response, insurgents wouldn't poke their head out their windows.

"He neutralized so many insurgents that Iraqi broadcasters in Iraq pleaded the public to watch for snipers," said Maj. Gen. Richard F. Natonski commanding general of the 1st Marine Division.

For his exploits in operation Iraqi Freedom II, Maj. Gen. Natonski pinned Place's left breast pocket with a Silver Star June 23 -- the third highest military award given for combat heroism.

"It's hard to believe an individual would have such an impact on a country," Natonski said.

Place, 22, said he was just trying to be the best Marine that he could be.

He also said being a sniper isn't about the numbers you get, it's about the dedication - this job isn't fun.

"The events from Iraq frequently play in my head - but I try to focus on the positive," said Place, who looks up to snipers like Carlos Hathcock as inspiration.

"It takes desire to do this difficult job. Long hours go into being a sniper - some of the hours run into your personal life," said Place.

Place, from St. Louis, and former team leader with Company E, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, used a corpsman to fill in for a downed Marine.

"As a sniper you need a spotter to do your job correctly. My first spotter got shot in his hand, then one of the corpsman stepped up and took position as spotter - he did great things," said Place.

Place also did great things, according to his Silver Star award citation.

On various occasions, Place carried out his Marine Corps missions.

While conducting a key-leader ride-along March 18, two insurgents attacked his convoy. He immediately located and destroyed their position, which enabled the convoy to proceed unharmed.

During a security patrol March 26, Place encountered two more insurgents and neutralized their position.

Just two weeks later, with another company, he engaged and eliminated enemy forces while under intense enemy fire.

From April 11 through 24, Place's keen observation ensured his supported rifle company maintained a lethal, long-range response to enemy attacks.

During an ambush April 26, enemy forces attacked a company patrol 400 meters away from friendly lines. Disregarding his own safety, Place left the cover of his defensive position to close with and destroy the enemy.

"We are blessed to have him in our Corps today. He was 2/1 Echo Company's guardian angel," Natonski reiterated.

Place said it was challenging during his deployment but his parents Lynn and Richard Place, his brother Richard H. Place, and the St. Louis community kept him going by sending him care packages.

"Now that he's a Marine, the bigger brother role isn't there anymore, he's (a) professional," Richard H. Place said.

After the ceremony, Place freely answered all of the media's questions."It's great to be recognized but there are guys still out there doing heroics - even the good men that just died," said Place, referring to the Marines that made the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq.

Place is currently assigned to 1st Marine Division Schools as a Marksmanship Training Unit instructor and has until Oct. 9 to determine if he will re-enlist.

"I haven't decided yet, but if I do stay - for sure I'm going back to Iraq," Place said.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...hlight=2,silver

[Marine]

The enemy’s silent, invisible weapon
Submitted by: MCB Camp Butler
Story Identification #: 200442023599
Story by Lance Cpl. Thomas A. Sloan



CAMP KINSER, Okinawa, Japan (April 16, 2004) -- Exposure to poisonous gases and other chemical agents during a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical attack is a threat to service members deployed to various places around the globe in support of the war on terrorism.

For this reason, Marines are required to conduct annual NBC training, according to Cpl. Michael L. Frantz, NBC specialist and noncommissioned officer-in-charge of NBC Defense section, Headquarters and Service Battalion, 3rd Force Service Support Group.

“The training covers what to do in the event of an attack in order to live through it and still carry out the mission,” said the 22-year-old Ephrata, Pa., native. “We go over how to wear the gear and check it for serviceability, how to use detection equipment and the M291 skin decontamination kit. The training takes about a half a day and ends with a trip to the gas chamber.”

Dressed in Mission Oriented Protective Posture-4 gear, trainees normally send in small groups to spend a short time inside the chamber where they receive a brief and perform side-straddle-hops to get a feel for how MOPP gear limits mobility. They also exposed their faces to chlorobenzalmalononitrile, better known as CS gas, by breaking the seal on their masks.

MOPP Gear is uncomfortable to wear but could prove necessary for survival in warfare, according to Cpl. Rico O. Brown, motor transportation operator for H & S BN, 3rd FSSG, and Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran.

“We wore the suits at MOPP level two (boots, trousers and jacket) for a solid month; the high desert temperatures and numerous layers of clothing made the heat almost unbearable,” the 23-year-old Detroit, Mich., native said. “There’s no telling how much I sweated. As bad as it was though, I felt safe and confident knowing it would protect me if an NBC attack were to occur.”

An attack never did occur, but there were instances where the threat was imminent, said Brown.

“There were times when we got a level four alert and had to put on our masks,” he said. “I’m a vehicle operator, and wearing a mask while trying to drive is hard. I didn’t complain too much though; I’d gladly give up some comfort to stay alive. Dying by gas is a terrible way to go.”

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ight=2,veterans

[Marine]

Cheers, crowds greet returning Marines

By Thomas Sheeran
The Associated Press

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BROOK PARK, Ohio - People with relatives in a Marine Corps battalion that lost 48 members in Iraq cheered loudly Thursday as the unit finished its trip home.

Thousands of people lined a one-mile parade route from Cleveland Hopkins International Airport to welcome back the 160 Marines of Headquarters and Service Company of the 3rd Battalion, 25th Marines.

The parade route led to a recreation center where the Marines could have private reunions with friends and family.

"You don't really realize what we have until it's gone," said Melissa Schlabach, 25, of Canton, who brought her 2½-year old son, Josh, to welcome home her brother, Cpl. Brent Monastra, 23, of Canton. "I'm really excited to see him. Growing up with him, you don't realize what you have until he's not around."

The Marines' fallen comrades were on their minds as they returned.

"It's really sad, I lost a lot of good friends," said Lance Cpl. Jason Woodliff, 23, of Massillon, who served in Iraq with his brother Johel Woodliff, 20.

"There's nothing else you can do but come back and lead a normal life and think of them as you go along," Jason Woodliff said.

Lance Cpl. Nick Kehl, 23, of Berea, said the deaths made the homecoming difficult. "It's really hard losing guys," he said.

The battalion commander, Col. Lionel B. Urquhart, told family members their support was important to the Marines while they served overseas.

"We couldn't have done it without you," he said. "You lifted our spirits when our spirits needed to be lifted."

Brook Park police estimated the parade crowd at more than 5,000.

The caravan of Marines was escorted by a more than 70 civilian motorcycles plus police cars, fire trucks and an ambulance with sirens sounding and lights flashing.

The Marines saluted the flags held by a color guard at the recreation center. Some carried their bags. One walked with crutch.

Lance Cpl. Eric Montgomery, whose brother Lance Cpl. Brian Montgomery, 26, of Willoughby, was killed while the two served in Iraq, worked at the homecoming directing relatives and Marines into the center's parking lot.

"Right now, it's just bittersweet," Montgomery said. "I can't wait to see these guys get home so bad. I love these guys."

Montgomery escorted his brother's body home in August.

"There's a part of me wishes my brother was coming home with them and that I was coming home with them, because I was looking forward to that," he said. "But I'm home now and I just can't wait to give these guys the welcome they deserve because they're all heroes."

The battalion's deaths included 14 Marines killed in back-to-back attacks within a week during the summer. Five of those Marines were from Greater Cincinnati. Another 150 unit members were wounded. The battalion has about 900 members.

The reunion scene was the Brook Park recreation center, which was decorated with a red carpet and banners reading "Thank You," "We Love You" and "Let Freedom Ring."

A separate arrival ceremony was held in early afternoon for Beans, a puppy adopted by Cpl. Jeff Boskovitch, 25, of nearby North Royalton, and fellow Marines. Iraqi villagers sold the puppy for a quarter and three jelly beans and she became the unit's mascot.

Boskovitch was killed in Iraq on Aug. 1 and his mother, Kathy Wright, asked the Marine Corps to fly the dog here to live with her. It had been her son's wish to bring the dog home.

Homecomings are planned today for battalion units based in Akron and Columbus. The battalion also has units in Buffalo, N.Y., and Moundsville, W.Va.

http://news.enquirer.com/apps/pbcs.dll/art.../510070389/1056

[Marine]

U.S. forces continue training Iraq’s future
Submitted by: 2nd Marine Division
Story Identification #: 200551633613
Story by Cpl. Mike Escobar



FALLUJAH, Iraq (May 10, 2005) -- Fathal Jabbar and his 19 comrades sit together atop stone bleachers, proudly clutching red folders tightly in their hands as they swap stories about their experiences over the past few days.

Beside them their officers speak with American commanders occasionally looking back at the jundi (privates) and smile in satisfaction as they recognize the pride their troops are feeling.

Today marks a special day in the lives of Jabbar and his comrades. He and fellow soldiers from the Iraqi Security Forces’1st and 2nd Battalions, 2nd Brigade, have graduated from the first squad-level infantry skills training course conducted by 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment personnel here.

“The training was very, very good,” stated Jabbar, a Baghdad native and class honor graduate. “All the information the Marines have taught me I will teach my troops now. God willing, we will do our job of protecting the future of Iraq.”

Five days ago, these soldiers had stood before a group of U.S. Marines prepared to learn tactics that will save theirs and their troops’ lives on the country’s urban battlefields.

According to Chief Warrant Officer “Gunner” Kenneth R. Silvers, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment’s gunner, battalion medical and infantry personnel spent five days teaching the Iraqi soldiers topics such as patrolling tactics, first aid in combat, and urban war fighting skills.

“This course is geared toward the fire team leader concept,” explained the 37-year-old Rome, Ga. native and the course curriculum’s developer. “They have squad leaders in their units already, but didn’t really understand the concept of a team leader. We’ve given them the skills so when they go back to their units, they can be made team leaders within their squads.”

According to Silvers, the Marine instructors, who were chosen from the battalion’s four infantry companies, had their students conduct a live-fire range with their AK-47 automatic rifle on the first day of training. The range was similar to the one Marines with the battalion completed prior to deploying here.

“This was kind of similar to the Marine Corps’ EMP shooting package,” he explained.

Silvers referred to the Enhanced Marksmanship Program, a training package that teaches Marines how to quickly shoot targets at close range and rapidly reload their weapons.

“After that, (the Iraqi students) do a ‘shooting house’ (maze-like structure made up of barriers) here, where they learn how to move through a structure and clear rooms,” Silvers continued.

On the second training day, the soldiers learned how to conduct cordon and search operations.

Jabbar and his fellow students establish a perimeter, or cordon, around the target area to ensure no one entered or left while the operation took place. The students then enter the building and question those inside while others search the premises.

This training was followed by lessons in basic troop movement and formations.

“We also teach them some basic patrolling tactics that day,” Silvers said. The Iraqi soldiers learned how use hand signals and move as a squad while simulating patrolling through Fallujah’s streets.

“These classes are similar to those Marines receive in boot camp and Marine Combat Training ( MCT),” Slivers added.

Training day three brought more patrolling for the soldiers as well as instruction in conducting Vehicle and Personnel Entry Control Point operations. Here, the troops practice setting up and manning stations where they check personnel for concealed weapons, explosive devices and anti-Coalition and Iraqi government propaganda. Currently, Iraqi soldiers and U.S. troops man numbers of these stations throughout Fallujah.

“On day four, we taught them to give and receive an operation order,” Slivers explained. “The orders process for them is nothing like we have in the Marine Corps. So we taught them how we do it.”

Marine leaders issue these written orders before every operation. The reports state the mission’s objectives along with the details on how the operation will be conducted.

The final day of training consisted of a final exercise that put all their newly learned knowledge to the test.

“The exercise lasted about five hours,” Slivers stated. “It’s a culmination of everything they’ve learned. Basically, an operation order is issued and the two squads go out to conduct a patrol. They move over to (a nearby) building, cordon it off, enter it and then clear the bad guys out of it.”

The Iraqis simulate taking casualties as they clear rooms, putting their medical training to the test.

The troops run through this evaluation twice so that each squad can conduct a different aspect of the operation. “After that, it’s on to the graduation ceremony,” Silvers added.

All 20 Iraqi soldiers successfully completed this first squad-level training course, and the instructors said they were impressed by the soldiers’ quick understanding of the training material.

“At first, there was a little bit of difficulty with the translation, but the students really wanted to learn, so we made it work,” stated Cpl. Randolf S. Ramirez, one of the chief instructors. “There was a lot of initiative coming from this crowd. At first, they were kind of laid back, but by day five they were all into it and wanted to do all the training. I’d say they’re fully developed grunts (infantrymen) now.”

Despite the soldiers’ general motivation level, the instructors recognized a few extraordinarily motivated soldiers.

Silvers said Jabbar finished as the class honor graduate because of his leadership skills and all-around motivation. Additionally, the instructors recognized four other soldiers for being outstanding squad leaders. “Every day, we’d rotate the squad leaders out,” Silvers continued. “Through that rotation, we found those who stood out above all the others.”

At the troops’ graduation, Jabbar received a tool kit, including a mini shovel, flashlight and Gerber multi-purpose tool. The four other “honorable mention” soldiers received a multi-purpose tool, as well.

The ceremony also featured appearances from Iraqi Brig. Gen. Juad Khudun, the 2nd Brigade’s commander, and Lt. Col. William M. Jurney, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine’s commander. They congratulated the soldiers and presented each of them a diploma and class photo.

“During this time, we have benefited from the experience of the Marines,” Khudun stated after the ceremony. “My soldiers and the Marines are working as one family in the streets of Fallujah. We are grateful for the Coalition forces helping us create a new Iraqi army.”

These soldiers, though, are only the first to benefit from the knowledge and experience of the Marines here supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.

“Operations permitting, we’re going to keep on doing this type of squad training once every other week,” Silvers stated. “There’s also leadership training planned out over the next several months at the platoon, company, and battalion-sized unit level.”

For now, the local soldiers and their leadership remain grateful for the Marines’ help, and look forward to serving their country.

“A big concern for the soldiers is helping to rebuild Iraq,” Khudun stated. “The Marines’ training has helped them to protect Iraq and protect themselves. We will help bring about security to this free and democratic new Iraq.”

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...hlight=2,silver

[Marine]

Hero receives Silver Star for bravery
Submitted by: MCB Camp Lejeune
Story Identification #: 2004819103545
Story by Pfc. Lucian Friel



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. (August 6, 2004) -- The scars on his arms were reminders of the sacrifice he made to save his fellow Marines lives amiss combat in Iraq, earning him the Marine Corps' third highest award.

Gunnery Sgt. Timothy P. Haney, 39, a native of Clearfield, Pa., received the Silver Star Medal in a ceremony at the base theater August 6.

The medal, designated solely for heroism in combat, was awarded to Haney for his distinct bravery and fearlessness in action against enemy forces as platoon sergeant of the Combined Anti-Armor Platoon, Weapons Company, 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, Task Force Tarawa, I Marine Expeditionary Force in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from March 20 to April 3, 2003. During this period his leadership, personal sacrifice and calming influence enabled his platoon to repeatedly engage and defeat enemy forces in close combat.

From March 23 to 26, while conducting missions to destroy enemy tanks and other heavy armored vehicles, Haney's platoon participated in firefights with Iraqi Military and Paramilitary forces in An Nasariyah, Iraq, during which his personal example, while under fire, set the tone for the platoon's tactical success.

During one direct fire engagement against a heavy machine gun, he dismounted his vehicle to gain awareness of the enemy's positions, exposing himself to enemy fire and providing higher headquarters with vital situational awareness.

On March 26, 2003, as the battalion's Main Command Operations Center came under attack from two directions, Haney raced through intense fire placing Marines in defensive positions and directing their fire. An explosion riddled Haney's body with 60 pieces of shrapnel as he began preparing wounded Marines for evacuation. Ignoring his wounds he continued transporting injured Marines to the Battalion Aid Station, refusing medical attention until everyone else had been treated.

"You just act sometimes. You simply remember the drills and muscle memory takes over your body," he said. "I did what every Marine in 2/8 would have done if they were in my position. They're all just as deserving of this medal as I am."

Haney's wife Jackie and son Robert, 12, were on hand to watch their Marine receive the medal, which was originally established in 1918 as the Citation Star. In 1932, the Silver Star was redesigned as a medal with a retroactive provision allowing servicemembers as far back as the Spanish-American War (1898) to receive it for gallant actions.

"I'm very proud of my dad today, he's an American hero and he's my hero," said Robert.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...hlight=2,silver

[Marine]

A true Marine to the depths of his soul
Submitted by: MCB Hawaii
Story Identification #: 20039916127
Story by Lance Cpl. Monroe F. Seigle



MCB HAWAII, KANEOHE BAY, Hawaii (September 5, 2003) -- In June of 1957, many Marines in our beloved Marine Corps had not been born yet.

It this same year, a young man who had always dreamed of becoming a Marine, left his home in Radford, Va., at the age of 17, and took his first steps on a journey to Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, S.C.

Retired Col. John Ripley's mother cried when he left home to join the Marines. His father beamed with pride he knew his son would succeed in becoming a member of the world's fighting force.

"When I went to boot camp, it was a tough experience," recalled the salty, blue-eyed colonel with a chuckle. "I was physically fit, and I was a tough kid, but no one could be prepared for what lied ahead of us. Twenty-five percent of the platoon did not make it through recruit training."

Ripley can still recall how the Marine Corps was everything he thought it would be and how he felt the day he pinned on the Eagle, Globe and Anchor.

It was only a year after Ripley had earned the title Marine that he was nominated to be a fleet appointee and earn a commission in the Marine Corps or Navy. In June of 1958, the private first class reported to the U.S. Naval Institute.

Although the determined, young warrior was usually first in all the inspections and set records on the obstacle course that to this day have yet been broken, academics were a tough challenge for him.

"I struggled for four years in most of my classes," recalled the colonel. "I had to work and study like crazy to stay abreast of the other students as far as academics were concerned.

"I remember in 1962 I was commissioned as a 2nd Lt. in the Corps, and let me tell you - I was ready to get back into the fleet," said Ripley. "The Marine Corps was already part of me, and I knew I wanted to be a Marine for the rest of my life."

After graduating from the Naval Academy, Ripley was granted one month of leave; however, the gung-ho warrior had no interest in going home and wasting time. He was ready to go back to the fleet as an infantry officer.

As a commanding officer, Ripley enjoyed leading his troops. He was the commanding officer of three companies and a reconnaissance platoon. He was the type of Marine that other Marines in his charge looked up to and respected as a leader. This proved to be an advantage when he led Lima Co., 3rd Bn., 3rd Marine Regiment into combat in the gruesome battles of Vietnam.

During the spring of 1972, in the mist of the Vietnam conflict, Ripley found himself in a desperate situation. More than 30,000 North Vietnamese troops were pushing through defensive points during a major assault when Ripley put himself in personal danger to set high explosives and destroy a key bridge in Dong Ha. This single act of bravery thwarted the North Vietnamese troops assault and destroyed 200 of their tanks in the process. Ripley later received the Navy Cross, the nation's second highest award for heroism, for his personal sacrifices in the line of duty.

Ripley returned to the Amphibious Warfare School after his tour in Vietnam to serve as an instructor, only to once again find himself longing for the action of front lines. He returned to Vietnam to serve as an advisor to the Vietnamese Marines.

"I was given a chance to serve with some magnificent warriors during my tours in Vietnam," he recalled with a touch of emotion. "There were Marines out there that would have put their lives on the line without thinking twice."

Ripley continued to serve in the Marine Corps after his second fight in Vietnam. He eventually attained the rank of colonel and retired from the Corps in 1992. Today, he continues to keep the Marine Corps close to his heart as he serves as the director of the Marine Corps History and Museums.

"If I can say anything to the Marines today, I would explain to them that being a Marine is a great privilege, never a right. It is something that you earn and if you prove to be good enough, then you can serve," said the colonel sternly. "If you ever think for a moment you can just take off your pack and call it quits, you are wrong.

"We have a tremendous legacy to uphold and everything we do must burnish that reputation," he continued. "There is no easy way to be a Marine and there never will be. You are a Marine every day and it is your responsibility to uphold the legacy that Marines in the past have so dearly established.


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...f5?OpenDocument

[Marine]

Legion of Merit awarded for outstanding service
Submitted by: MCB Camp Lejeune
Story Identification #: 2000124131037
Story by Sgt. Bobbie J. Bryant



CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. (Nov. 07, 2000) -- The director of instruction for Marine Corps Combat Service Support Schools was awarded the Legion of Merit recently in a ceremony aboard Camp Johnson recently.
Lt. Col. John R. Miles of Staten Island, N.Y., was presented the award by Col. J.C. Hardee, the assistant chief of staff for Training, Education and Operations, Marine Corps Base.

Miles reported to G-5, II Marine Expeditionary Force in 1994 to serve as a regional plans officer after graduating from the School of Advanced Warfighting at Quantico, Va. He stayed there for the next six years and served as a planner, deputy assistant chief of staff and finally, as the assistant chief of staff, G-5.

"He was initially the regional plans officer for the Southern Command," said Hardee, the former chief of staff for II MEF from Clayton, N.C. "He spent six months on Joint Task Force 160 as the plans officer in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, supporting migrant operations."

The JTF was responsible for security, feeding, health and having a destructive weather plan for 40,000 migrants, according to Miles. All of these functions required long-term planning.

"Planners coordinate the activities during the development of a plan. Everything a planner does is a team effort," he said.

"The most exciting part of working in the G-5 as a planner was that on a regular basis I was involved in plans that would have elements of II MEF going off to combat or some other crisis," Miles said.

Miles later served as the regional planner for the European Theater.

"He served in this billet during a time when there was a tremendous amount of activity in the U.S. European Command and within NATO," said Hardee. "He is very well known to both U.S. and allied planners. He attained instant credibility through his diligence and professional performance of duty. He has a great work ethic. He's very intelligent and has been blessed with a great deal of common sense. He worked very hard to take care of the Marines in his section."

Miles traveled extensively in an official capacity throughout Northern Europe, specifically Norway and to the southern flank of Europe. While there, he was developing deliberate war plans in support of NATO and contingency planning in support of Bosnia and Kosovo.

"He spent a lot of time in the Balkans forming plans that might potentially involve U.S. Marines," Hardee said.
"I think that what Lt. Col. Miles brought back to II MEF was important. I think that what's much more important is what he took to Europe as a direct representative of II MEF," he said. "In the eyes of many U.S. and allied officers that he met and worked with in Europe, he represented not just II MEF but also the United States Marine Corps."

Miles took 27 trips to Europe between 1995 and 2000. Ten of those trips were to Bosnia in support of II MEF's role there as part of the strategic reserve.

"We have sent him TAD innumerable times to that theatre," Hardee said. Often times these trips were known and planned on some he had no notice. Some were for a short period of time others kept him away from his family for weeks on end.

"For a Marine to serve for six years in the same general type of billet and to maintain such a high level of performance is a significant accomplishment. On an easy day his duties were hard," he said.

"It has been a difficult six years for my family," Miles said. "It would have been very difficult to keep my focus without my family's support. It was absolutely critical and it meant the world to me."


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...e7?OpenDocument

[Marine]

Marine Air supports NATO exercise Clean Hunter
Submitted by: Marine Forces Europe
Story Identification #: 2004628112722
Story by Master Sgt. Phil Mehringer



KARUP, Denmark (June 28, 2004) -- The skies of NATO's northern region were recently filled with sounds from Marine Corps aircraft in support of Clean Hunter 2004, an aviation exercise designed to test command and control of NATO's air assets. The exercise involved 200 aircraft, 10 nations and more than 300 U.S. Marines.

Twenty Marine Corps F/A 18 Hornets, 10 each from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 "Crusaders" and Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 321 "Hells Angels" were on hand to provide the fast movers for the exercise. The Crusaders of VMFA-122 are based out of Beaufort, S.C., while Hells Angels are from Washington, D.C. Keeping the Hornets in the fight were two KC-130s belonging to the "Rangers" from Marine Aerial Refueling Squadron 234 from Ft. Worth, Texas.

The scenario of the exercise established four coalition zones in which aircraft had to alternate attacks on each other. It was necessary for pilots to adjust their missions quickly, moving from a defensive role to an offensive role. Aircraft alternated timeframes, placing them either on the attack or on the defense.

"The scenario is similar to the Kosovo Air Task Order," said Maj. Carsten Rasmussen, assistant director of operations for Air Base Karup and exercise planner. The backbone of the exercise is "trying out plans, communications, air task orders and checking to see if our skills are correct," added Rasmussen.

Targets during the exercise consisted of radar sites, airfields and other ground targets. Electronic warfare assets and Combat Search and Rescue projects were also incorporated in the scenario buildup.

Airspace for the exercise spanned through 10 countries in northern Europe, ranging from Scotland to the west and the Czech Republic to the east. Other countries involved in the exercise were the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Denmark, Luxemburg and Belgium.

All of the U.S. Marines participating in Clean Hunter were located at Air Base Karup. The area offered a great history lesson for the visiting Marines.

The base was originally named "Einsatzhafen Grove" by German forces that built the base shortly after their occupation of Denmark in the Spring of 1940. A loose translation for the Deutsch description is "forward combat air base." The Germans continued to improve the installation up until the very end of WW II, including the construction of a longer, concrete runway that left Allied forces questioning the intent of such a runway. The answer to the question became apparent at the end of the war when 165 German aircraft were captured, including six Arado jet aircraft.

The base has transitioned through several periods since the German occupation ended in May 1945, and it was home to many types of Danish and NATO fighter/bomber aircraft during the Cold War years.

One of the most famous stories told by Danish forces stationed at the base today is that of a special reconnaissance mission flown from the base in the early 1960's. Photos taken from reconnaissance aircraft were the first to reveal missiles aboard Soviet ships bound for Cuba.

After the Cold War ended, like many U.S. military installations, Air Base Karup went under a realignment that moved fixed wing assets to other locations, leaving the base in 1993 with no permanent fixed wing "jet" aircraft. The base is currently home to a pilot training school and several helicopter squadrons.

With the majority of the local citizenry retired from working at the base, having an increase of activity in the area is a welcomed sign. "It's nice to have fighter noise around here again," said Maj. Rasmussen, recently assigned as the commanding officer of the Royal Danish Air Force Search and Rescue Squadron.

"Denmark has been a great experience," said Sgt. John Isaksen, flight equipment technician/plane captain for the Hell's Angels of VMFA-321. A native of Hampstead, N.C., Isaksen said this was his first visit to Denmark, and the deployment was full of new scenery and new culture.

Keeping the aircraft in the air was a challenge for all the Marines in the squadron. This deployment has been a "very big accomplishment for all of the shops," said Sgt. Tim Adkins, power line crew chief for the Crusaders. "We worked like a well oiled machine."

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...c6?OpenDocument

[ghostgovt]

Letters
Write Review

The Review welcomes letters from readers and will print them as space permits. Letters may be edited for brevity and clarity. Unsigned letters cannot be used, but names of the writers may be withheld on request. Send letters to Rochester Review, 147 Wallis Hall, P.O. Box 270033, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627-0033; rochrev@rochester.edu.
Saluting Midshipmen . . .

Your profile of Ensign [Anne Marie] Regan ’03 [“Squared Away,” Fall 2003] was very well done. I recommended it to my 14-year-old daughter, who actually set down a J. R. R. Tolkien book to read it.

Naval ROTC friendships are strong. Our class of 1977—16 Navy and one Marine—is at work on a reunion, thanks to the efforts of one of our career officers.

We are including all who shared our college experience, not just those who graduated and received commissions, and call our directory “Freshman (NROTC) Class of 1973.”

We’ll send you a picture.
Mark Sturnick ’77
Hollandale, Wisconsin

Thank you for your profile of the Naval ROTC unit at the University. Rochester has a proud history and part of that history is entwined with the men and women who choose to use the great education that Rochester provides in service to our great country. I am very proud to be both a graduate of the University and a commissioned officer serving aboard one of the 12 greatest warships in the world, the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy.

Victor Davis Hanson, a columnist with National Review Online, perhaps describes an aircraft carrier best when he stated in his December 13, 2002, column that “Our aircraft carriers are this nation’s phalanxes, at once frightening weapons and symbols of American Freedom. . . . [I]n the far less comfortable but much more real world of the Kennedy, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and whites are indistinguishable in the manner in which they eat, sleep, and work, united as they are as Americans in a common cause, not separated by race, class, and tribe. African-American officers supervise whites, and vice versa. . . . Women fly planes that men service or the other way around or both. And recently graduated Naval Academy ensigns learn from tough men with tattoos and calluses who inhabit primordial places of fire and oil in the ship’s bowels or who work on the flight deck where a momentary lapse in concentration can get one disemboweled or vaporized in seconds. Our universities might do better to mothball Ethnic Studies and send the entire freshman class to the Kennedy for a semester.”

The University’s staff, students, and alumni can rest assured that through the efforts of the NROTC unit, Rochester graduates are making an immeasurable contribution to the freedom we all enjoy.
David Kemp ’91
Lt. Commander, U.S. Navy
USS John F. Kennedy
Naval Station Mayport, Florida

I was interested to read your article “Squared Away” and wanted to share my own personal link to the University’s NROTC program.

My father, Hanford Cohen, was a sonar operator in the Navy during WWII. After the war, he was asked to go to Rochester to teach in the newly formed NROTC program.

He greatly enjoyed his years at Rochester, and I grew up hearing stories of his time there. He had installed all the telephones and their wiring in the NROTC building and he remembers that before he left in 1949, he had to crawl through the building to document the wiring schematic, as it only existed in his head. He also had fond memories of the Rochester winters.

I chose Rochester, in part, because of my father’s stories of the place. He enjoyed returning to the campus when I was an undergraduate to see the many ways in which it remained the same and the many ways in which it had changed.
Lisa Janice Cohen ’84
Newton, Massachusetts
. . . Remembering Marines

I read the most recent issue of Rochester Review first with surprise and pleasure and then with a bit of incredulity.

The pleasure was over the report that the NROTC unit is now apparently an accepted part of the University—a big, big change from the early ’60s.

Then, I noticed the report that Guy Wyser-Pratte ’62 “was the only Marine-option cadet . . . in the early 1960s.” There are no and never were any “Marine-option cadets.” Members of the NROTC, Navy or Marine-option, are midshipmen. Your statement about “the only Marine” is only correct if the “early 1960s” ended in August 1962.

The Class of 1966, which arrived on campus in September 1962, graduated four Marines from the NROTC program. In addition to me, Bob Rivers, Andy Vaart, and Tom King were commissioned in June 1966. The Class of 1965, which came on campus in 1961, graduated at least two Marines out of the NROTC program, if my memory is correct.

You may hear from Bob and Andy in this regard, but Tom King was killed at Con Thien, Vietnam, in July 1967. I know exactly because I was on the radio talking to him trying to bring my battery’s fires to protect his unit and him at the time he was killed.

You might also have mentioned that Major Vic Ohanesian was the Marine option instructor in those days. You won’t hear from him either as Lt. Col. Ohanesian was also killed in Vietnam after his tour at the University.

The Wyser-Prattes, Kings, and Ohanesians of the University served their country well. It is a shame that the organ of their alma mater cannot even get the terminology straight nor the story complete.
Richard Hulslander ’66
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps (inactive)
Ransom Canyon, Texas
‘Midshipmen’ Mix-Up

As I picked up my mail, I glanced at the fall edition of Rochester Review and an oxymoron leaped off the cover: “NROTC Cadet.”

What?

Turning inside I found an article about Midshipman Anne Marie Regan ’03, the battalion commander of the NROTC unit during the 2002–03 school year.

The term “cadet” was used no fewer than 39 more times, including quotes attributed to (now) Ensign Regan.

Will journalists ever learn that the Navy is not the Army? That sailors are not soldiers and midshipmen will never be cadets?

I suspect that Rochester Review would not call a “professor” a “dean” just because the word is shorter. Also, it would have been nice to learn the title of Captain Gavin Lowder, who is quoted, but not identified as the commanding officer of the NROTC unit and professor of naval science.

Finally, technology must have really caught on at the NROTC unit, allowing responsibilities to enlarge greatly. Unlike my dinosaur days there in the ’50s, the battalion commander must now know the “whereabouts (of all other NROTC students) at all times.” GPS transponder on every student?

Oh no, now I get it. Ms. Regan had to know the whereabouts of all NROTC cadets at all times. Clever joke!
Robert Mumford Jr. ’57
Captain, U.S. Navy (retired)
Darnestown, Maryland

http://www.rochester.edu/pr/Review/V66N2/letters.html

[Marine]

Texan honored as hero, friend to the end

Submitted by: MCB Camp Pendleton
Story Identification #: 200584104338
Story by Sgt. Monroe F. Seigle



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (Aug. 4, 2005) -- When Lance Cpl. Aaron Austin was growing up in the heart of Texas, he would put up a fight when anyone messed with the people he considered his friends or family.

Similarly, when insurgents on a rooftop threatened the security of his fellow Marines in Iraq, the warm-hearted Texan threw caution to the wind and entered the line of fire — ultimately fighting to his death and distinction as a certifiable Marine Corps hero.

The hard-charging machine gunner from 2nd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, was posthumously award- ed the Silver Star July 22 in Amarillo, Texas. The award was presented to the Marine’s father, Doug Austin, by Sgt. Justin Rettenberger, 53 Area guard chief for the 1st Marine Divis-ion. Rettenberger was present on April 26, 2004, during the firefight in which Austin gave his life. He helped carry him out of the firefight after he sustained his fatal wounds.

“I will always remember Austin as a hero,” Rettenberger said. “He is the poster boy of Marine hero. The sacrifice he made enabled the other Marines to go home.

“Even as he died, he told me not to worry about him and to keep shooting at the enemy.”

The day after Austin passed away, his hometown of Sun Ray, Texas, put all flags at half-mast in honor of the fallen Marine.

When his father was presented with the Silver Star — the military’s third-highest award for battlefield valor — 14 months later, the Veterans of Foreign Wars set up a color guard ceremony. Sgt. Maj. William Skiles initially planned to present the medal, but decided to pass the honor to Rettenberger.

“I was Lance Cpl. Austin’s first sergeant for eight months,” said Skiles, now the top enlistedman at Medium Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267. “That Marine was a real motivator and he enjoyed life. I felt that it was appropriate for (Rettenberger) to be the one to hand that Marine’s father the Silver Star.”

Skiles said one of the best parts of the ceremony was seeing the mother and father get some closure after losing their son.

According to his award citation, based on battlefield accounts, Austin’s platoon secured and occupied two buildings in enemy-occupied territory. Austin positioned his machine-gun team on the rooftop of the northernmost building. The platoon bolstered its defense and searched for enemy personnel.

At around 11 a.m., a “numerically superior” enemy force attacked Austin’s position from three directions.

Approximately 4,000 rounds of enemy machine-gun and small-arms fire — plus no less than 30 rocket-propelled grenades — rained down on the platoon for 15 minutes, the citation said.

The enemy fighters assaulted to within 20 meters of Austin’s platoon, threw hand grenades and sprayed AK-47 fire, according to the account.

During the hailstorm, Austin discovered many of his comrades had been injured. He whisked them into the building to ensure their medical treatment, the citation said.

Next, he rallied able-bodied comrades: “We’ve got to get back upon the roof and get on that gun (240G machine gun),” he said, according to the award ciation.

Austin, along with other Marines in his company, rushed to the rooftop defensive position, braving small-arms and rocket- propelled grenade fire the whole way. Austin led the way. When he reached the rooftop, he withdrew a hand grenade from his fighting vest and prepared to throw it, according to the account.

He changed positions to get a better look, exposing himself to intense enemy machine-gun fire. Several enemy bullets struck Austin in the chest, the citation said.

Despite his wounds, Austin threw his hand grenade. The resulting explosion disjointed the enemy and allowed the platoon to regain the upper hand, the citation said.

Petty Officer 2nd Class Jason Duty, who now instructs corpsmen in Great Lakes, Ill., was the first to administer medical attention to the mortally wounded Marine.

“All I could do was bandage him up and get him to the hospital as fast as I could,” Duty said. “He died in the back of the vehicle we were in. It was hard as hell for me to watch him die, and I do not care what anyone says, he is a hero and one of the best Marines I have ever met.”

Although painful for Austin’s mother to have lost her son, she said she understands the sacrifice he made and why he made it.

“I will always remember his loyalty and zest for life,” De’on Miller said. “I am so proud of him. I can say, ‘Why can’t it have been someone else instead of my son,’ but I know that what my son did saved some lives; and he gave me the best 21 years of my life, so I will thank God every day for the ones that he gave me.”

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,enemy

[Marine]

Houston Marine receives Navy Cross
Submitted by: MCB Camp Pendleton
Story Identification #: 200456172127
Story by -



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (May 6, 2004) -- Marine Pfc. Joseph B. Perez received the Navy Cross Medal from the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, Gen. Michael W. Hagee, during an awards ceremony Thursday at Marine Corps Air-Ground Training Center, Twentynine Palms, Calif.

Perez, 23, a Houston, Texas, native, received the naval service's second highest award for extraordinary heroism while serving as a rifleman with Company I, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom April 4, 2003. The Medal of Honor is the highest military award.

Three other Marines received medals for valor at the same ceremony.

"They are the reflection of the Marine Corps type who's service to the Marine Corps and country is held above their own safety and lives," said Gen. Hagee, commenting on the four Marines who received medals during the ceremony. "I'm proud to be here awarding the second highest and third highest awards for bravery to these great Marines."

"These four Marines are a reflection of every Marine and sailor in this great battalion," said Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, Sgt. Maj. John L. Estrada.

1st Platoon came under intense enemy fire while clearing near Route 6 during the advance into Baghdad. Perez, the point man for the lead squad, and therefore the most exposed member of the platoon, came under the majority of these fires.

Without hesitation, he continuously fired his M16A4 rifle to destroy the enemy while calmly directing accurate fires for his squad. He led the charge down a trench destroying the enemy and while closing and under tremendous enemy fire, threw a grenade into a trench that the enemy was occupying.
While under a heavy volume of fire, Perez fired an AT-4 rocket into a machine gun bunker, completely destroying it and killing four enemy personnel. His actions enabled the squad to maneuver safely to the enemy position and seize it.

In an effort to link up with 3rd Platoon on his platoon's left flank, Perez continued to destroy enemy combatants with precision rifle fire. As he worked his way to the left, he was hit by enemy fire, sustaining gunshot wounds to his torso and shoulder.
Despite being seriously injured, Perez directed the squad to take cover and gave the squad accurate fire direction to the enemy that enabled the squad to reorganize and destroy the enemy.

"It is unreal, it is not what I expected, it is unbelievable," Perez said. "This is real weird for me, because, I am not big on special events," said Perez.

In effect since April 1917, and established by an Act of Congress on Feb. 4, 1919, the Navy Cross may be awarded to any person who, while serving with the Navy or Marine Corps, distinguishes himself/herself in action by extraordinary heroism not justifying an award of the Medal of Honor.

The action must take place under one of three circumstances: while engaged in action against an enemy of the United States; while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force; or, while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict in which the United States is not a belligerent party. To earn a Navy Cross the act to be commended must be performed in the presence of great danger or at great personal risk and must be performed in such a manner as to render the individual highly conspicuous among others of equal grade, rate, experience, or position of responsibility.

More than 6,000 Navy Crosses have been awarded since World War I.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,enemy

[Marine]

CETO hosts child-soldier seminar
Submitted by: Warfighting Lab
Story Identification #: 2002521141511




(May 21, 2002) -- The phenomenon of child soldiers affects every theater where U.S. forces may deploy. As many as seventy-five percent of conflicts worldwide may involve children engaged in the roles of soldiers. In January 2002, U.S. Army Special Forces Sergeant Nathan Chapman, the first American serviceman killed by hostile fire in Afghanistan, reportedly was killed by a 14-year old boy. Child soldiers are fighting and dying every day in Colombia, Chechnya, the Middle East, Africa and Sri Lanka, and in other conflicts throughout the world.

The Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities is sponsoring a seminar on June 11 to examine the exploitation of children as soldiers. Panelists will discuss ways that U.S. forces can better plan and deal with the child soldier phenomenon and limit unnecessary casualties. The seminar also will address the optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.

When: Tuesday, June 11, 2002, from 9:00am to 3:00pm

Where: Liversedge Hall, 15 Liversedge Dr., Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Va.

Panelists:
Panelists include representatives from the Brookings Institution, the United Nations, the Embassy of the United Kingdom and the Office of the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Representatives from Human Rights Watch, the International Rescue Committee and UNICEF, and a former child soldier have been invited to participate.

Who Should Attend:
· Personnel from the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Army and other military Services
· Representatives from other U.S. government departments and agencies
· Policymakers
· Members of the media

RSVP:
Please RSVP by June 1, 2002 to Leigh Uithoven at 703 784-0450, uithovenl@mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil or to Debi McCormick at 703 784-3452, mccormickdx@mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil. Seating is limited.

For information about lodging, directions, and a detailed schedule, see CETO?s website at www.ceto.quantico.usmc.mil or contact CETO at the numbers listed above.

Seminar Fee:
A seminar fee of $15.00 will be charged to cover seminar materials, lunch and refreshments. Please bring cash only to be collected at the registration desk. CETO also will entertain requests for funding support for USMC personnel.

Dress:
Dress is Summer Service ?C? or equivalent for military personnel and business attire for civilians.


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,soldier