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[Marine]

Publius Quinctilius Varus


Publius Quinctilius Varus (46 BC - 9 AD): Roman senator, friend of the emperor Augustus, killed in the battle in the Teutoburg Forest.

The son of Sextus Quinctilius Varus was probably born in 46BC. His family belonged to the patriciate, the ancient Roman aristocracy, but during the past centuries, none of the Quinctilii had been a really important senator. Father Sextus was quaestor in 49 and defended Corfinium when Julius Caesar besieged the city during the civil war against Pompey. He was forced to surrender the town, was pardoned, but immediately went to Africa, where Caesar's deputy Curio was fighting against Pompey's allies. Sextus Quinctilius did his best to win over Curio's soldiers. Although Curio was defeated, Caesar won the civil war. From 48 to 44, he was sole ruler of the Roman empire. Sextus probably remained away from Rome, because it was not Caesar's policy to show his clemency twice to the same man.


On 15 March 44, he was assassinated by conservative senators like Brutus and Cassius. We do not know whether Sextus was involved, but it is certain that he was at the battlefield of Philippi, where the new leaders of the Caesarian party, Marc Antony and Octavian, defeated the last republicans. Sextus asked one of his freedman to kill him.
What happened to his son Publius Quinctilius Varus is not known, but one thing is certain: he accepted the end of the Roman republic, and became a personal friend of Octavian. It was not uncommon that fathers and sons had different opinions about the rise of the Roman monarchy. Perhaps, Varus was present at Actium, where Octavian defeated Marc Antony in 31. However this may be, it is certain that Varus was quaestor in 23 or 21, and accompanied Augustus (Octavian's name after becoming Rome's first emperor) on his tour through the eastern provinces.


The two men became political friends and Varus must easily have passed through the stages of the cursus honorum. He was aedile, praetor, and after commanding a legion or governing a minor province, he was made consul in 13, together with Tiberius, the stepson of Augustus. Both consuls were married to daughters of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, another close friend of the emperor. Tiberius and Varus introduced legislation that gave additional powers to their father-in-law, who was now officially recognized as Augustus' equal in power. However, in the next year, Agrippa died, and Varus had to deliver the funerary oration.
Not much is known about Varus' marriage to Vipsania. It is possible that one of the consuls of 8 AD, Sextus Nonius Quinctilianus, was Varus' and Vipsania's child, adopted by Varus' brother-in-law Lucius Nonius Asprenas (the husband of Varus' sister Quinctilia). If this reconstruction of Quinctilianus' ancestry is correct, we are left with the question why he was not educated by his own father. Perhaps Varus' governorships in Africa and Syria offer an explanation?


By now, Varus had befriended Tiberius, and the latter may have seen to Varus' appointment as governor of Africa (modern Tunisia). After the death of Agrippa, Tiberius was regarded as Augustus' successor, and he seems to have been behind many appointments in these years.
The governorship of Africa was a very prestigious position: it was one of the provinces ruled by the Senate, and the only one with a legion, III Augusta. (All other garrisoned provinces were ruled by the emperor.) Varus ruled this part of the Roman world in 8-7 BC. Although we do not know about any military interventions, he must have shown that he was a capable general, because he was reappointed as governor of Syria, where he had to command one sixth of the Roman army. It is possible that Augustus and Tiberius had always wanted to make their relative and friend commander of the Syrian army; in that case, the governorship of Africa was a mere traineeship.


In 7 BC, Varus arrived in Syria, one of the most important provinces of the empire: its four legions -III Gallica, VI Ferrata, X Fretensis, and XII Fulminata- guarded the eastern frontier against the Parthians. The governor of Syria was also responsible for the peace in the vassal kingdoms.
One of these was Judaea, where Herod had been Rome's most loyal ally. The old king had always been suspicious of his relatives, but at the end of his reign, he became paranoid and accused his son (and intended successor) Antipater of high treason. Varus, who had just arrived in Syria, supported the accusation, and Antipater was executed. The incident made Augustus remark that it was preferable to be Herod's pig (hus) than his son (huios) - a very insulting remark to any Jew.


Three years later, Herod died. In his will, he divided his kingdom among his three sons Herod Archelaus (Judaea and Samaria), Herod Antipas (Galilee and Perea), and Philip (Gaulanitis). Immediately, there were riots in the areas ruled by Archelaus, riots that may have been (partly) messianic in nature. The leaders were a robber named Judas, a royal slave called Simon, and a shepherd named Athronges. Archelaus' troops were unable to cope with these men, and Varus had to intervene. It was a major operation, which involved three legions. Sepphoris and Emmaus were destroyed, two thousand people crucified, and although not all leaders were caught immediately, Herod Archelaus' territories were pacified and his reign could begin.
After this crisis, Varus returned to Rome. Later, one of his enemies, the author Velleius Paterculus, was to state in his Roman History that Varus had arrived as a poor man in rich Syria, and had left an impoverished province as a rich man. This is unlikely; Varus belonged to the highest elite of the empire and can not have been poor.

In the old days of the republic, the Senate would have granted the successful general the right to enter the city in a triumphal procession. Augustus, however, had monopolized this right; Varus may instead have received triumphal ornaments. Or perhaps not even that, because the political situation had changed considerably, and he may have been out of favor. Augustus had changed his mind about his succession: no longer did he believe Tiberius was the right man - instead, he preferred his grandsons Caius and Lucius, the sons of his daughter Julia and Agrippa. Tiberius had left Rome and lived as an exile on Rhodes.
We do not know how Augustus judged Varus: they had been political allies, but perhaps the former governor of Africa and Syria had been too close to Tiberius to be fully trusted. We do not know of any offices occupied by Varus in these years. It must be stressed that he was vulnerable. Although he was a patrician, he was also one of the new men who owed their career entirely to Augustus.


However, Augustus' new scheme was unsuccessful. In August 2 AD, when Lucius was 19 years old, the emperor sent him to Hispania to get acquainted with the armies. However, the young man died in Marseilles. Less than a year-and-a-half later, his older brother Caius, who had been sent to Syria with Augustus' friend Marcus Lollius, succumbed to wounds received at the siege of an Armenian town.

The result of this family tragedy was that Tiberius, the stepson of Augustus and one of Rome's most experienced generals, was recalled from Rhodes. During the next ten years, he was regarded as Augustus' successor, and in 14, he did in fact become the second emperor of Rome.
After the recall of Tiberius, Varus was appointed as governor of Germania, probably in the autumn of 6 AD. It was celebrated with a donativum, a gift of money to the soldiers; the coins were marked with the sign VAR. (There are other interpretations of these coins, however.) It is possible that it was about this time that Varus married to Claudia Pulchra, the daughter of a niece of Augustus; they had a son Quinctilius Varus.


The office of governor of Germania had been created in the years 16-13 BC, when the Romans had organized the strip of land along the Rhine and Danube as a military zone. (The legions guarding the Rhine had, until then, served as occupation force in Gaul; the fact that they were now transferred to the river proves that Gaul had become a thoroughly romanized area.) The fortresses along the Rhine had served as base for the conquest of the east bank of the river. Tiberius' brother Drusus, who had commanded the Rhine armies in those years, had even reached the river Elbe. Although Drusus had died in 9 BC, several camps were built along the river Lippe (Haltern, Oberaden, Anreppen) and it is not exaggerated to state that Germania had become part of the Roman empire. Like Gaul, it was expected to adopt the Roman way of life.

Together with the legions of the army of the Lower Rhine (XVII, XVIII and XIX), Tiberius toured through Germania in the autumn of 4 and summer of 5 AD. It was meant as a show of strength, and the Germanic tribes understood that they were by now really part of the empire - and would have to pay tribute. Tiberius was now preparing one of the largest campaigns in Roman history. In 6, he wanted to lead at least eight legions (VIII Augusta from Pannonia, XV Apollinaris and XX Valeria Victrix from Illyricum, XXI Rapax from Raetia, XIII Gemina, XIV Gemina and XVI Gallica from the Middle Rhine and an unknown unit) against king Marbod of the Marcomanni in Czechia. They were to be gathered at Bratislava.
At the same time the three legions from the Lower Rhine were to move against Czechia as well, attacking it along the Elbe. Their commander was Caius Sentius Saturninus. A third army group (I Germanica and V Alaudae) was to march along the Main. A giant base was built at Marktbreit (on the river Main), where the army of the Middle Rhine would gather. This was to be the most grandiose operation that was ever conducted by a Roman army.


However, nothing happened, because a rebellion in Pannonia obstructed the execution of Tiberius' plan. It took three years to suppress the revolt. Caius Sentius Saturninus was replaced by Varus, and the legions of the Rhine army were with him in Germania: sometimes in their winter quarters on the Rhine (Xanten and Cologne), sometimes on the eastern bank, for example at Haltern, where the presence of the Nineteenth legion is attested. The Germanic tribes were quiet: Tiberius' campaigns had been successful. It seems that Varus was actively organizing the conquered territories between Rhine and Elbe. He collected taxes, founded new settlements (Waldgirmes) and administered justice.
In the summer of 9, Tiberius had defeated the Pannonians, and it was obvious that the Romans would resume the offensive towards Bohemia and the Elbe in 10. To those Germanic leaders who wanted to get rid of the Romans, it was time to act: every German now knew what the Roman occupation meant, and several tribes preferred freedom to taxes. The Cheruscans, Marsi, Bructerians, and Chatti (or Chauci?) united under a man named Arminius, son of Sigimer. Although his father-in-law Segestes betrayed the conspiracy, Varus was not convinced of the accusations.


Varus and the three legions XVII, XVIII, and XIX were somewhere near the river Weser (perhaps near modern Minden) when he learned of an insurrection in the west. He decided to return to the Rhine and make a detour through the rebellious area. The only road led through a small strip of accessible land; to the south, there were the inaccessible hills of the Teutoburg forest, and to the north, marshes made progress difficult. It was the perfect place to trap the heavy legionaries.
And so it happened. The three marching legions were a long line, easily exposed to attacks from the hills. North of modern Osnabrück, archaeologists have excavated a part of the battlefield (called Kalkriese), and many military objects were found. Other objects attest to the presence of civilians. All in all, some 20,000 people were massacred. Like his father, Varus killed himself.


The first reports of the disaster, which became known as the Clades Variana, reached Rome five days after the news of Tiberius' Pannonian victory. It is said that the emperor Augustus, on hearing the story, was unable to sleep and paced up and down through his house, exclaiming "Quinctilius Varus, give me back my legions!" He had every reason to be restless, because this was the greatest military disaster since Crassus had lost an army at Carrhae in 53 BC, and Augustus must have known that he was responsible - his Germanic strategy had been too ambitious.
Meanwhile, Varus' nephew and deputy Lucius Nonius Asprenas, kept his head cool. His uncle had left him behind with the two legions of the Middle Rhine, and he immediately sent these units, I Germanica and V Alaudae, to the north. This prevented the Germanic tribes from invading the country west of the Rhine. During the winter, Arminius created a tribal coalition, and Tiberius prepared for renewed war. In 9, 10 and 11, he restored order in the Rhineland.

However, he also decided to give up the territories between the Elbe and Rhine. As it turned out, the Clades Variana had been one of the most decisive battles in world history.

Varus' dead body was identified by the Germans, who cut off the Roman's head and sent it to Marbod, hoping that he would join the general insurrection. However, he refused, and sent Varus' remains to Rome. Augustus buried the head in the mausoleum of his own family.

This post has been edited by Marine: Aug 21 2005, 07:13 AM

[The_Bammo]

Publius Quinctilius Varus 
 

Publius Quinctilius Varus (46 BC - 9 AD): Roman senator, friend of the emperor Augustus, killed in the battle in the Teutoburg Forest.

The son of Sextus Quinctilius Varus was probably born in 46BC. His family belonged to the patriciate, the ancient Roman aristocracy, but during the past centuries, none of the Quinctilii had been a really important senator. Father Sextus was quaestor in 49 and defended Corfinium when Julius Caesar besieged the city during the civil war against Pompey. He was forced to surrender the town, was pardoned, but immediately went to Africa, where Caesar's deputy Curio was fighting against Pompey's allies. Sextus Quinctilius did his best to win over Curio's soldiers. Although Curio was defeated, Caesar won the civil war. From 48 to 44, he was sole ruler of the Roman empire. Sextus probably remained away from Rome, because it was not Caesar's policy to show his clemency twice to the same man.
 

On 15 March 44, he was assassinated by conservative senators like Brutus and Cassius. We do not know whether Sextus was involved, but it is certain that he was at the battlefield of Philippi, where the new leaders of the Caesarian party, Marc Antony and Octavian, defeated the last republicans. Sextus asked one of his freedman to kill him.
What happened to his son Publius Quinctilius Varus is not known, but one thing is certain: he accepted the end of the Roman republic, and became a personal friend of Octavian. It was not uncommon that fathers and sons had different opinions about the rise of the Roman monarchy. Perhaps, Varus was present at Actium, where Octavian defeated Marc Antony in 31. However this may be, it is certain that Varus was quaestor in 23 or 21, and accompanied Augustus (Octavian's name after becoming Rome's first emperor) on his tour through the eastern provinces.
 

The two men became political friends and Varus must easily have passed through the stages of the cursus honorum. He was aedile, praetor, and after commanding a legion or governing a minor province, he was made consul in 13, together with Tiberius, the stepson of Augustus. Both consuls were married to daughters of Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, another close friend of the emperor. Tiberius and Varus introduced legislation that gave additional powers to their father-in-law, who was now officially recognized as Augustus' equal in power. However, in the next year, Agrippa died, and Varus had to deliver the funerary oration.
Not much is known about Varus' marriage to Vipsania. It is possible that one of the consuls of 8 AD, Sextus Nonius Quinctilianus, was Varus' and Vipsania's child, adopted by Varus' brother-in-law Lucius Nonius Asprenas (the husband of Varus' sister Quinctilia). If this reconstruction of Quinctilianus' ancestry is correct, we are left with the question why he was not educated by his own father. Perhaps Varus' governorships in Africa and Syria offer an explanation?
 

By now, Varus had befriended Tiberius, and the latter may have seen to Varus' appointment as governor of Africa (modern Tunisia). After the death of Agrippa, Tiberius was regarded as Augustus' successor, and he seems to have been behind many appointments in these years.
The governorship of Africa was a very prestigious position: it was one of the provinces ruled by the Senate, and the only one with a legion, III Augusta. (All other garrisoned provinces were ruled by the emperor.) Varus ruled this part of the Roman world in 8-7 BC. Although we do not know about any military interventions, he must have shown that he was a capable general, because he was reappointed as governor of Syria, where he had to command one sixth of the Roman army. It is possible that Augustus and Tiberius had always wanted to make their relative and friend commander of the Syrian army; in that case, the governorship of Africa was a mere traineeship.
 

In 7 BC, Varus arrived in Syria, one of the most important provinces of the empire: its four legions -III Gallica, VI Ferrata, X Fretensis, and XII Fulminata- guarded the eastern frontier against the Parthians. The governor of Syria was also responsible for the peace in the vassal kingdoms.
One of these was Judaea, where Herod had been Rome's most loyal ally. The old king had always been suspicious of his relatives, but at the end of his reign, he became paranoid and accused his son (and intended successor) Antipater of high treason. Varus, who had just arrived in Syria, supported the accusation, and Antipater was executed. The incident made Augustus remark that it was preferable to be Herod's pig (hus) than his son (huios) - a very insulting remark to any Jew.
 

Three years later, Herod died. In his will, he divided his kingdom among his three sons Herod Archelaus (Judaea and Samaria), Herod Antipas (Galilee and Perea), and Philip (Gaulanitis). Immediately, there were riots in the areas ruled by Archelaus, riots that may have been (partly) messianic in nature. The leaders were a robber named Judas, a royal slave called Simon, and a shepherd named Athronges. Archelaus' troops were unable to cope with these men, and Varus had to intervene. It was a major operation, which involved three legions. Sepphoris and Emmaus were destroyed, two thousand people crucified, and although not all leaders were caught immediately, Herod Archelaus' territories were pacified and his reign could begin.
After this crisis, Varus returned to Rome. Later, one of his enemies, the author Velleius Paterculus, was to state in his Roman History that Varus had arrived as a poor man in rich Syria, and had left an impoverished province as a rich man. This is unlikely; Varus belonged to the highest elite of the empire and can not have been poor.
 
In the old days of the republic, the Senate would have granted the successful general the right to enter the city in a triumphal procession. Augustus, however, had monopolized this right; Varus may instead have received triumphal ornaments. Or perhaps not even that, because the political situation had changed considerably, and he may have been out of favor. Augustus had changed his mind about his succession: no longer did he believe Tiberius was the right man - instead, he preferred his grandsons Caius and Lucius, the sons of his daughter Julia and Agrippa. Tiberius had left Rome and lived as an exile on Rhodes.
We do not know how Augustus judged Varus: they had been political allies, but perhaps the former governor of Africa and Syria had been too close to Tiberius to be fully trusted. We do not know of any offices occupied by Varus in these years. It must be stressed that he was vulnerable. Although he was a patrician, he was also one of the new men who owed their career entirely to Augustus.
 

However, Augustus' new scheme was unsuccessful. In August 2 AD, when Lucius was 19 years old, the emperor sent him to Hispania to get acquainted with the armies. However, the young man died in Marseilles. Less than a year-and-a-half later, his older brother Caius, who had been sent to Syria with Augustus' friend Marcus Lollius, succumbed to wounds received at the siege of an Armenian town. 

The result of this family tragedy was that Tiberius, the stepson of Augustus and one of Rome's most experienced generals, was recalled from Rhodes. During the next ten years, he was regarded as Augustus' successor, and in 14, he did in fact become the second emperor of Rome.
After the recall of Tiberius, Varus was appointed as governor of Germania, probably in the autumn of 6 AD. It was celebrated with a donativum, a gift of money to the soldiers; the coins were marked with the sign VAR. (There are other interpretations of these coins, however.) It is possible that it was about this time that Varus married to Claudia Pulchra, the daughter of a niece of Augustus; they had a son Quinctilius Varus.
 

The office of governor of Germania had been created in the years 16-13 BC, when the Romans had organized the strip of land along the Rhine and Danube as a military zone. (The legions guarding the Rhine had, until then, served as occupation force in Gaul; the fact that they were now transferred to the river proves that Gaul had become a thoroughly romanized area.) The fortresses along the Rhine had served as base for the conquest of the east bank of the river. Tiberius' brother Drusus, who had commanded the Rhine armies in those years, had even reached the river Elbe. Although Drusus had died in 9 BC, several camps were built along the river Lippe (Haltern, Oberaden, Anreppen) and it is not exaggerated to state that Germania had become part of the Roman empire. Like Gaul, it was expected to adopt the Roman way of life. 

Together with the legions of the army of the Lower Rhine (XVII, XVIII and XIX), Tiberius toured through Germania in the autumn of 4 and summer of 5 AD. It was meant as a show of strength, and the Germanic tribes understood that they were by now really part of the empire - and would have to pay tribute. Tiberius was now preparing one of the largest campaigns in Roman history. In 6, he wanted to lead at least eight legions (VIII Augusta  from Pannonia, XV Apollinaris and XX Valeria Victrix from Illyricum, XXI Rapax from Raetia, XIII Gemina, XIV Gemina and XVI Gallica from the Middle Rhine and an unknown unit) against king Marbod of the Marcomanni in Czechia. They were to be gathered at Bratislava.
At the same time the three legions from the Lower Rhine were to move against Czechia as well, attacking it along the Elbe. Their commander was Caius Sentius Saturninus. A third army group (I Germanica and V Alaudae) was to march along the Main. A giant base was built at Marktbreit (on the river Main), where the army of the Middle Rhine would gather. This was to be the most grandiose operation that was ever conducted by a Roman army.
 
 
However, nothing happened, because a rebellion in Pannonia obstructed the execution of Tiberius' plan. It took three years to suppress the revolt. Caius Sentius Saturninus was replaced by Varus, and the legions of the Rhine army were with him in Germania: sometimes in their winter quarters on the Rhine (Xanten and Cologne), sometimes on the eastern bank, for example at Haltern, where the presence of the Nineteenth legion is attested. The Germanic tribes were quiet: Tiberius' campaigns had been successful. It seems that Varus was actively organizing the conquered territories between Rhine and Elbe. He collected taxes, founded new settlements (Waldgirmes) and administered justice.
In the summer of 9, Tiberius had defeated the Pannonians, and it was obvious that the Romans would resume the offensive towards Bohemia and the Elbe in 10. To those Germanic leaders who wanted to get rid of the Romans, it was time to act: every German now knew what the Roman occupation meant, and several tribes preferred freedom to taxes. The Cheruscans, Marsi, Bructerians, and Chatti (or Chauci?) united under a man named Arminius, son of Sigimer. Although his father-in-law Segestes betrayed the conspiracy, Varus was not convinced of the accusations.
 

Varus and the three legions XVII, XVIII, and XIX were somewhere near the river Weser (perhaps near modern Minden) when he learned of an insurrection in the west. He decided to return to the Rhine and make a detour through the rebellious area. The only road led through a small strip of accessible land; to the south, there were the inaccessible hills of the Teutoburg forest, and to the north, marshes made progress difficult. It was the perfect place to trap the heavy legionaries.
And so it happened. The three marching legions were a long line, easily exposed to attacks from the hills. North of modern Osnabrück, archaeologists have excavated a part of the battlefield (called Kalkriese), and many military objects were found. Other objects attest to the presence of civilians. All in all, some 20,000 people were massacred. Like his father, Varus killed himself.
 

The first reports of the disaster, which became known as the Clades Variana, reached Rome five days after the news of Tiberius' Pannonian victory. It is said that the emperor Augustus, on hearing the story, was unable to sleep and paced up and down through his house, exclaiming "Quinctilius Varus, give me back my legions!" He had every reason to be restless, because this was the greatest military disaster since Crassus had lost an army at Carrhae in 53 BC, and Augustus must have known that he was responsible - his Germanic strategy had been too ambitious.
Meanwhile, Varus' nephew and deputy Lucius Nonius Asprenas, kept his head cool. His uncle had left him behind with the two legions of the Middle Rhine, and he immediately sent these units, I Germanica and V Alaudae, to the north. This prevented the Germanic tribes from invading the country west of the Rhine. During the winter, Arminius created a tribal coalition, and Tiberius prepared for renewed war. In 9, 10 and 11, he restored order in the Rhineland.

However, he also decided to give up the territories between the Elbe and Rhine. As it turned out, the Clades Variana had been one of the most decisive battles in world history.

Varus' dead body was identified by the Germans, who cut off the Roman's head and sent it to Marbod, hoping that he would join the general insurrection. However, he refused, and sent Varus' remains to Rome. Augustus buried the head in the mausoleum of his own family.

Thanks Marine for the history lesson! LOL

Let us all know when Esop's Fables will be posted again --okay!!

Didn't know you were such a Texass yarn spinner Bro'!

Hang Tough~

[ghostgovt]

  Thanks Marine for the history lesson!  LOL

Let us all know when Esop's Fables will be posted again --okay!! 

Didn't know you were such  a Texass yarn spinner Bro'!

Hang Tough~

Good point Bammo.... being that this is "US Military Issues' section the protected one has drifted off topic again and lost its course....of course. I guess when in Texas, one must feel that they are in Rome. I must admit, it ties in with the mentality for which the protected ones brings us here. We have a goober in the oval office right now that displays the same. Off topic nonsense. Now Goober too is in Texas playing games with his close brown nosed associates, and I am sure chubbo Rove is there too. They all have become the chosen few now haven't they?

[Marine]

Good point Bammo....  being that this is "US Military Issues'  section the protected one has drifted off topic again and lost its course....of course. I guess when in Texas, one must feel that they are in Rome. I must admit, it ties in with the mentality for which the protected ones brings us here. We have a goober in the oval office right now that displays the same. Off topic nonsense. Now Goober too is in Texas playing games with his close brown nosed associates, and I am sure chubbo Rove is there too. They all have become the chosen few now haven't they?

One of you boys named the thread, you aren't trying to claim ownership of a public thread are you? Nothing I've posted is off topic considering the name of the thread.

The Sources
Few military disasters of modern times are as sparsely documented or inadequately recorded in the official records as the defeat of America's forces in the Philippines in the first six months of World War II. Cut off from the United States almost immediately and encircled by a tightening blockade, the Philippine garrison soon became the only island of resistance in the rising tide of Japanese victory. Its sole remaining means of communication with the outside world was by radio. Occasionally an airplane or submarine reached Manila Bay with vitally needed supplies, carrying back on the outward voyage to Australia and Hawaii small and selected cargoes. Space was at a premium and there was room only for the nurses, correspondents, officials and their families, selected officers and enlisted men, and precious commodities such as the gold of the Philippine Commonwealth. Under the circumstances, records did not enjoy a high priority, and only a small number of official documents survived the campaign. Unofficial records and Japanese documents are far more numerous, and, with published works, constitute the main sources on which this volume is based/
Official Records
Among senior commanders in the Philippines there was a strong desire to justify their conduct of the campaign to their countrymen. This, they realized, could be done only if the record was preserved, and on at least three occasions during the course of the battle precious air and submarine space was set aside so that the most important records might be sent back to the United States. The first of these occasions was in February 1942 when General MacArthur sent out by submarine, in the custody of Francis B. Sayre, the High Commissioner, a footlocker filled with personal and official papers. This footlocker reached the United States safely and was stored in a bank in Washington for the duration of the war. It was then returned, by officer courier, to General MacArthur and has remained in his possession since. Though its contents are not know, there is reason to believe that the footlocker contains material of value on the early part of the campaign.
The second shipment of records came in April 1942 when General Wainwright took advantage of the presence of two small aircraft on Corregidor to send to General Sharp on Mindanao fifteen packages of records, of undetermined bulk, to be delivered "in person to General Sutherland for forwarding to the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C."[1] Included in this shipment were General Wainwright's diaries and the general staff journals, with supporting documents. Only the five packages of G-3 records were inventoried and these consisted of ten journal files covering the period from 28 November to 10 April and twenty supporting documents including G-3 periodic reports, general and field orders, training memoranda, and the journals or reports of all the major commands in the Philippines.

--585--

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The evidence that these records were received in Melbourne and placed in a vault in General Sutherland's office is indisputable. Their disposition thereafter is not known. The seven packages of G-4 records may heave reached Washington, for there exist in the files of The Adjutant General, eight feet (one file cabinet) of records sent from Corregidor. These records, which deal largely with supply matters, have been used extensively in the preparation of this volume and were especially valuable in the study of shortages in food and medicine. When used, they were physically located in the Departmental Records Branch, AGO (Accession No. A51-75), and designated USAFFE-USFIP Records.[2] They have been cited throughout this volume by title and AG number, followed by the abbreviation Phil Rcds.
Assuming that the USAFFE-USFIP Records are a part of those sent from Corregidor in April 1942, the disposition of the remainder of the fifteen packages--the G-2 and G-3 journals, General Wainwright's diaries, and supporting papers (altogether eight packages)--remains a mystery. A careful search of the files of The Adjutant General in Washington and of GHQ, Far East Command (FEC) in Tokyo, successor to the 1942 headquarters in Australia, has failed to produce them, and the principals, Generals Wainwright and Sutherland, assert they have no knowledge of their whereabouts.

The third shipment of records from Corregidor was by submarine on 3 May, just before the fall of the harbor defenses. There is no description of these records other than the statement that they included "records and orders," but many, if not most of them, were probably finance and personnel records. Their final disposition is unknown, but it is entirely possible that the eight feet of USAFFE-USFIP records described above came from this shipment rather than the earlier one which went to General Sutherland in Australia. If that is so, then all fifteen packages of the second shipment have been lost.

Though there was little prospect that their records would survive, most of the units in the Philippines did their best nevertheless to maintain proper records in accordance with existing army practice. The quality of these records apparently varied considerably, depending on the unit's proximity to the enemy and on the interest and ability of commanders and clerks. Higher headquarters, which usually had the necessary personnel and equipment, kept the most complete records. Those of combat units, however, were sketchy. These units, composed largely of Filipinos, hastily mobilized and inadequately trained, had little opportunity to keep records. Some, even if they had wished to do so, could not have complied with regulations. They lacked clerical personnel and, in some instances, had first sergeants who could neither read nor write. To these difficulties was soon added another, the shortage of paper. The men had not been on Bataan long when paper became so scarce that orders had to be issued on the reverse side of prewar mimeographed regulations and administrative memoranda.

On Corregidor and the adjoining islands of the harbor defenses more careful records were kept. The units there were composed

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of regulars--Americans and Philippine Scouts--trained and disciplined and accustomed to maintain records. Though subjected to air and artillery bombardment, they were in fixed positions and had ample opportunity to continue to keep accurate administrative and operational records. These, like the records on Bataan, were destroyed when the order was given to surrender.
With the capitulation of Corregidor and of the islands to the south, all communication with the Philippines came to an end. The entire garrison, and army of 140,000 men, passed into captivity and, except for the handful who escaped, no word of their fate reached the United States. Though most of the Filipinos were ultimately released from prison camp, there was no way by which they could communicate with the Allies except through the clandestine intelligence organization kept alive by funds and equipment from Australia. Nominally free, the former Filipino troops of MacArthur's and Wainwright's army were as effectively prisoners of the Japanese as if they had remained in prison camp.

It was only at the end of the war, with the return of the thin, emaciated American prisoners from Japanese camps in the Philippines, Japan, and Manchuria, that the War Department received an official report of the campaign. During their years in prison camp, higher commanders and their staff officers, on orders from General Wainwright and under the eyes of the Japanese, had begun the preparation of an operations report in anticipation of the day when they could present their own account of the disaster that had befallen American arms. These preliminary reports, written from memory, were ultimately collated into a single report by General Wainwright and a group of his former staff officers at Fort Sam Houston in 1946.

Entitled Report of Operations of USAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine Islands, 1941-1942, Wainwright's report covers the period of prewar preparations as well as the entire period of the campaign. It includes, therefore, the activities not only of his own command, USFIP, from 231 March to 6 May, but also those of MacArthur's earlier command, USAFFE, which was transferred with the general to Australia in March 1942. Since neither General MacArthur nor any members of his staff had assisted Wainwright in the preparation of his report, that report cannot be considered an authoritative statement of decisions made by USAFFE or of the operations conducted by that headquarters. But in the absence of a report from General MacArthur, it is the only account by a senior American commander, and the author has been obliged to rely upon its, despite its shortcomings on the level of command and decision. One copy is located in the Departmental Records Branch, AGO, and another is on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History. All references in this volume are to the latter.

The report is an ambitious and large work, with little form. Actually, it is a collection of separate reports, each organized and prepared differently, and attached to the basic report as an annex. There are eighteen such annexes, eight of which deal with the operations of major tactical commands, four with the activities of certain special staff sections, and six with miscellaneous matters, such as citations, lists of

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units, and the organization of various headquarters.[3] Unfortunately, it contains the report of only one of the divisions, the Philippine Division, which fought on Luzon, and none of any unit smaller than a division. Missing also are the reports of the ordnance and artillery officers, and of many of the service and administrative headquarters.
Despite its deficiencies and its uneven nature Wainwright's report contains much of value. Some of the annexes are ambitious reports in their own right with numerous appendixes of their own. Annex XI, Maj. Gen. Gen. William F. Sharp's report on the Visayan-Mindanao Force, for example, contains thirty-seven appendixes and fills more than seven hundred pages. Comparable reports are those by Maj. Gen. George F. Moore, commander of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, Brig. Gen. Charles C. Drake, the quartermaster; and Col. Wibb E. Cooper, medical officer on MacArthur's and later Wainwright's staff. Unfortunately, not all the annexes are as adequate, the most deficient being those of the tactical commands. The report of the Luzon Force, for example, which covers the critical period of the fighting on Bataan between 12 March and 9 April, is only eight pages long, and the supporting reports of the general staff fill only ten more pages.

Official records on the prewar period, and on the place of the Philippines in the strategy of the war are far more plentiful than those dealing with the campaign itself. Most of these are in the custody of The Adjutant General, filed at this writing in the Departmental Records Branch. The most useful for this volume were those numbered: 320.2 (7-28-41), which deals with the organization and reinforcement of USAFFE; 381 (11-27-41) Far East, which consists of seven separate bulky folders and contains most of the messages sent to the Philippines; and 400 (9-12-41), which contains material on the supplies sent to the Islands.

The organizational records of GHQ, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), MacArthur's headquarters during the war, also contain some material of value, especially those files numbered 370.05, 384.1, and

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384.3, Philippine Islands. When used they were physically located in the Kansas City Records Center, AGO. Wherever cited in the text, these files have been indicated by the symbol GHQ SWPA.
Most of the strategy and policy papers relating to the Philippines were filed originally in the War Plans Division (WPD), or its wartime successor, the Operations Division (OPD, now G-3) of the General Staff. These files when used were located in the Operations Division, but, with certain exceptions, have now been transferred to the Departmental Records Brach, AGO. Their integrity has been maintained, however, and they still bear the original WPD and OPD file numbers, which have been used throughout this volume. Included in this collection is the WPD Message File, the WPD Ready Reference File (Philippines), and the OPD 381 Philippine Island File, all of which were particularly useful. The Chief of Staff files were handled in the same manner and are now also located in the Departmental Records Branch, AGO. Those files prepared before March 1942 are identified by the symbol OCS preceding the number; thereafter, by the symbol WDCSA. Most valuable for this volume are those designated OCS 18136, WDCSA 370.05 (3-17-42) Philippines, and WDCSA 381 (3-17-42) Philippines.

Though most of the WPD and OPD records of the 1941-1942 period have been turned over to The Adjutant General, G-3 still retains possession of certain files dealing with strategy and policy. Those used in the preparation of this volume are the former executive office files and the highly confidential strategy papers of the Registered Documents Collection of the Operations Division. The former contains about a half-dozen folders relating to the Philippine campaign, the most useful of which are the messages between General Marshall and Generals MacArthur and Wainwright. Materials from these files are identified in the notes by the abbreviations OPD Exec O and OPD Reg Docs.

Many relevant documents are included in the forty volumes produced as a result of the hearing of the Joint Committee (79th Congress) which investigated the attack on Pearl Harbor. Eleven of the volumes consist of hearing, eighteen of exhibits presented during the course of the hearings, and one of the majority and minority reports of the committee.

For air operations the author has relied largely on secondary accounts, but where necessary has extended his research into the files. In the case of the attack on Clark Field, the author has gone beyond the official Air Forces account, and has used all available files as well as interview material. Particularly valuable were the author's interviews with Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, the notes on which are filed in the Office of the Chief of Military History.

The Office of Naval Records also contains some material of value for this campaign. The reports of Admiral Thomas H. Hart and Rear Adm. Francis W. Rockwell, the former as commander of the Asiatic Fleet and the latter as 16th Naval District commander, were especially useful. Rockwell's report, which covers the period from 1 December 1941 to 19 march 1942, contains a number of supplementary reports as well as a portion of the War Diary of the 16th Naval District.

The operations of the 4th Marines are covered briefly in the postwar report of its commander, Col. Samuel L. Howard, filed in the Historical Division, USMC. Its regimental records, like those of Army units,

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were destroyed when Corregidor surrendered, and the story of the 4th Marines must be reconstructed from memoirs and interviews. Fortunately, this task had been accomplished in part for the author by Hanson W. Baldwin in a four-part article entitled "The Fourth Marines at Corregidor," published in the Marine Corps Gazette (November 1946-February 1947).
Unofficial Records
The inadequacy of the records dealing with operations, and the absence of journals, message files, map overlays, and after action reports from units lower than corps, would have made it impossible to write a detailed account of the Philippine campaign had it not been possible to supplement the official files with a wide variety of unofficial records. During the period in which this volume was in preparation, a total of approximately six feet of records of this type has been accumulated. These are filed in the Officer of the Chief of Military History, and are so located when first cited in the footnotes.
Perhaps the least satisfying aspect of the USAFFE-USFIP Report of Operations was the absence of supporting reports by division and regimental commanders. Except for the report of the Philippine Division and the elements of the Visayan-Mindanao Force, Wainwright's reports and accompanying annexes describe the campaign from the viewpoint of corps headquarters or higher. To have relied on it for combat operations, therefore, would have been most unsatisfactory and every effort was made to secure material on the operations of units smaller than corps. Fortunately, many American officers who commanded such units felt as strongly as their superiors the compulsion to leave a record of their experiences. During their years in prison these men had discussed and compared their operations endlessly with their fellow prisoners and jotted down in cheap Japanese notebooks or on scraps of paper all they could remember and had learned. So scarce was writing material that the men covered every inch of space in the notebooks and wrote in characters so small as to be scarcely legible. These notebooks, hidden most ingeniously from the Japanese guards and brought back after the war, form the bases for the most important single collection of records dealing with combat operations of American and Filipino units in the Philippine campaign.

To secure this material the author embarked on an ambitious letter-writing program, made trips to various parts of the country, and induced many officers to support his requests by letters of their own. It was obviously impossible to reach every officer who had served as a unit commander or staff officer during the campaign, and no effort was made to do so. But letters were written to every division and regimental commander, the senior American instructors in Philippine Army units, and the most important staff officers. Only in exceptional cases were letters sent to battalion and company commanders.

The response to this campaign for material entirely justified the time and effort spent. Only in rare cases did officers refuse categorically to make their notebooks, diaries, and personal papers available. Some who had no records in their possession even volunteered to prepare reports for the author, offers which were gratefully accepted. As this material reached the author it was reproduced, usually by photostat and with the permission of the donor, a copy retained

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in the files of the Office of the Chief of Military History, and the original returned to the owner. Where the owner had carbon copies there was no necessity for reproduction. In rare instances, the originals were presented to the author as representative of the Officer of the Chief of Military History. One such gift came from the widow of General harp who turned her husband's papers over to the author on that officer's death from a heart attack in 1947.[4]
The nature of this collection almost defies description. Included in it are letters written over a three-year period in prison camp but never sent, diaries, notes, poems, unit histories, reports, memoranda, accounts of single incidents or battles, memoirs, and preliminary narratives intended as the basis for a later, larger work which the write hoped would be published. They vary widely in size and quality. Some are only one page long and others are ambitious works numbering several hundred pages. Some are written in the dullest prose imaginable; others have real literary merit. Some are accurate and detailed; others replete with loose generalizations. Common to all is the note of bitterness at what they believed to be their abandonment by their government and the desire to justify themselves to the future.

Among the records thus secured were accounts, written in prison camp, of the operations of most of the divisions and a large number of the regiments that fought on Luzon. Brig. Gen. Kearie L. Berry lent the author his account of the operations of 3d Infantry, 1st Regular Division (PA), which is actually a history of that division. From Col. Ray M. O'Day, senior instructor of the 21st Division (PA), came a history of that division in two thin typescript volumes. Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel's report on the operations of the 31st Division (PA), with its supporting documents, proved extremely useful, as did Col. Malcolm V. Fortier's notebook and notes on the 41st Division (PA). Maj. Gen. Albert M. Jones, who commanded in turn the 51st Division (PA), the South Luzon Force, and I Corps, has perhaps left a more complete record of his experience than any other commander, and his accounts supported by those of his chief of staff, Col. Stuart C. MacDonald, form one of the basic sources for a history of the campaign. Completing the roster of division histories for operations on Luzon is Col. Clyde A. Selleck's Notes on the 71st Division (PA) which covers the activities of that division as long as it remained under his command. The operations of the divisions south of Luzon are described in the Visayan-Mindanao Force Report, which includes among its appendixes accounts be each of the division and sector commanders. Brig. Gen. Bradford G. Chynoweth prepared a separate account of the 61st Division (PA), at this author's request, and it has been used in preference to other reports.

It has not been possible to obtain accounts from three of the division commanders. Missing from the records, therefore, are the histories of the 2d Division (PC), composed of Constabulary troops, and two Philippine Army divisions, the 11th and 91st. Of these, the absence of a report from Brig. Gen. Luther Stevens on the 91st Division is the most serious, for it was that division which failed to hold at Cabanatuan, thereby permitting the Japanese to break through and imperil the withdrawal to Bataan. The lack of reports from the other two commanders is not as serious, and is compensated

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for, in the case of Brig. Gen. William E. Brougher's 11th Division, by regimental reports as well as excellent accounts of the division's most important engagement on Bataan, the Pocket Fights.
Supporting these unofficial division histories, as well as the official history of the Philippine Division, are unofficial accounts of the operations of many of the regiments and battalions. Perhaps the best are those of the 31st (US), 45th (PS), and 57th Infantry (PS), Philippine Division. In the case of the 45th--which figured largely in the Abucay fight, the Battle of the Points, the Pocket Fights, and the counterattack of 6 April--there is an account for each of the battalions. The operations of the 11th Infantry, 11th Division, are well covered in three separate reports, two of which were written by Col. Glen R. Townsend, the regiments of other divisions are similar to those already noted, the weakest usually being just those where the division report itself is inadequate. There are accounts also of the operations of nondivisional units, such as the 26th Cavalry (PS), including a separate report by the commander of the 2d Squadron; the 192d and 194th Tank Battalions (US); and the 86th, 88th, and 301st Field Artillery. Unfortunately, the commander of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment, which for more than two months held a sector for the second line on Bataan, never prepared a report but the operations of other Air Corps units serving as infantry--the 17th, 21st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons, which fought in the Battle of the Points--are briefly covered in separate accounts.

The most valuable single collection of small unit histories--including some of those already mentioned--are those which were gathered in prison camp by Capt. Calvin E. Chunn, 45th Infantry (PS). Resolved to write a history of the campaign if he survived the ordeal, Chunn began to collect material shortly after he reached Cabanatuan. He spoke with officers from almost every unit and secured from them information for an account of their operations. This information, together with other material, such as maps, diaries, statistics, orders, affidavits, he transcribed into his notebooks. Before he was transferred by the Japanese from Cabanatuan to a camp in Japan, he buried his voluminous notes in the prison compound at Cabanatuan where they were found after the war. Copies of the material in the notebooks were made and the originals returned to Captain Chunn, who by this time had reached the United States. One set of the copies was obtained by the author of this volume and is on file in the Office of the Chief of Military History. When used in this volume it is identified as Chunn Notebooks; the individual accounts are credited to the officer who supplied Captain Chunn with the information contained in the notebooks. Chunn, since separated from the service, is, at this writing, still at work on his history of the Philippine campaign.

The diaries, memoirs, and notebooks prepared in prison camp were often as useful in the preparation of this volume as the unofficial unit histories. Col. James V. Collier's four notebooks which were written as a letter to his sons and cover the entire period of the campaign, were of particular value, since the writer was successively Assistant G-3 of USAFFE and G-3 of Luzon Force. The Bataan Diary (two volumes) of Col. Richard C. Mallonée, senior instructor of the 21st Field Artillery (PA), is a

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thoughtful and accurate account which deals with many more matters than one would expect from an officer who saw the war from a regimental headquarters. Though called a diary, it is actually a sustained narrative. Col. Paul D. Bunker's 190-page diary, closely written on sheets measuring 12 by 16 inches, is a true diary and consists of daily entries. Colonel Bunker was commander of the Seaward Defenses of Corregidor and his diary was especially valuable for those chapters dealing with operations there. Unfortunately, it contains no entries for the critical period between 29 April and 7 May 1942, when the Japanese landed and took the island.
The diary of Maj. William J. Priestley is unlike either Mallonée's or Bunker's. It is a compilation of the activities of various units, written by Priestley in prison camp on the basis of information supplied by other officers. Organized in a haphazard manner, it contains all sorts of miscellaneous information difficult to obtain elsewhere. Other diaries useful for a study of the campaign are those of Col. Alexander Quintard, commander of the 301st Field Artillery; Lt. Col. Arthur L. Shreve, artillery officer of the South Luzon Force; Maj. Achille C. Tisdelle, General King's aide; Maj. John McM. Gulick, commander of Battery C, 91st Coast Artillery (PS)--a work of genuine literary merit; and Capt. Roland G. Ames, commander of Battery Chicago, 60th Coast Artillery (AA).

After the reconquest of the Philippines and the release of the prisoners of war, a section was formed in MacArthur's headquarters for the processing of the survivors. This section, called the Recovered Personnel Section, G-1, soon began to receive finance, personnel, hospital, and prison records, as well as diaries and notebooks, prepared in the same way as those mentioned above, all of which had been carefully wrapped and buried on Bataan, Corregidor, and the prison grounds to keep them out of Japanese hands. Before these records were sent to Washington or, in those cases where the papers were of no official value, returned to their owners or heirs, they were carefully screened for any information of value they might contain about the enemy. The entire collection was then microfilmed and deposited in the Records Administration Center, AGO. The author, however, has avoided references to the microfilm file and has used the originals, or photostat and typed copies, which, together with an 80-page index to the entire collection, is available in the Officer of the Chief of Military History.

Despite the large amount of material thus collected, there was still little information on the operations of small units, of company and battalion size. In some cases the action of these units had been decisive and an accurate account was essential. This gap was filled largely with no effort on the author's part. On their return from prison camp, many of the survivors had been assigned as students at various schools of the Army--at The Infantry School, The Armored Force School, and at the Command and General Staff College. Required to write a term paper before completion of the course, most of these officers had naturally found a subject in the only campaign of World War II they had knowledge of. Since most of them had served as company and battalion commanders, it was natural also that they should write about the operations of small units.

To date about twenty such papers have been prepared. More than half of this number deal with elements of the Philippine Division,

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which was officered by Americans. The rest cover operations of elements of the 1st, 11th, 41st, and 91st Divisions, and miscellaneous units. Among this group is the only report of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment, prepared by Lt. Sheldon H. Mendelson while he was a student at The Infantry School, as well as an account entitled The First U.S. Tank Action in World War II, prepared by Lt. Col. Thomas Dooley, General Wainwright's aide, during his assignment to The Armored Force School. All of these papers were borrowed from those schools where they were prepared and returned there after they were used. Their location is indicated in the footnotes.
Though the unofficial unit histories, diaries, notebooks, and term paper made possible for the first time a reasonable reconstruction of the Philippine campaign, there were still many gaps which needed to be filled before a complete and authentic account could be written. only the officers who had participated in the actions for which the accounts were incomplete or nonexistent, or who had been present when an important decision was made, could provide the missing information. This information the author secured in two ways, by letter and by interview. The letter-writing method was used when information of an operational nature was required, or when the distance was too great to permit personal conversation. Interviews were conducted with those officers who were readily available, or where the information needed could not easily be put in writing. The response to both methods was very gratifying and yielded an important body of records dealing with the campaign.

The correspondence file is of especial value, and the author has relied on it more heavily than on the interview. Those asked to supply information in writing usually produced more complete and accurate answers than those who gave their information orally. Often they drew sketches to illustrate their answers and drew upon personal papers of whose existence the author had been unaware. Many officers asked to answer one or two questions wrote lengthy accounts of actions which had been imperfectly described in existing reports, thus creating an additional important source. Moreover, the signed letters constituted an important addition to the written record of the campaign.

Altogether the author has collected three thick folders of such material representing the replies of over one hundred officers, which are on file in the Officer of the Chief of Military History. To these must be added the comments of those officers who read this volume, in whole or in part, while it was still in manuscript. These comments and additional information were carefully considered and are cited in the notes where applicable.

Unlike the correspondence carried on by the author, the interviews did not add greatly to the written record, although they were of great value during the preparation of the volume. To have made them a part of the record would have required the author to take copious notes during the interview, write up a report of the meeting, and then submit it to the officer interviewed for comment and signature. Without this last step, the notes would represent only the author's recollection and interpretation of the conversation. Such a procedure was not considered practical, although the author in many cases made his own notes of the interview to remind him of the more important points. It was felt that the presence of a secretary or the taking of notes would inhibit

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the conversation and destroy the chief value of the interview--the free expression of opinion. They were conducted therefore on a most informal basis, in home and office, in hotel lobby and restaurant, and, when the officers could be reached, by telephone or by waking along the lengthy passages of the Pentagon--almost daily during the preparation of the volume. The information thus secured was incorporated directly into the text and credited in the footnotes.
Japanese Records
The enemy records for the Philippine campaign fall into three major categories. The first and most important of these is composed of a group of histories or reports, part of a collection written by Japanese Army and Navy officers at the direction of G-2, Far East Command (FEC). These officers, working as civilians in the 1st and 2d Demobilization Bureaus, the former Army and Navy Sections of Imperial General Headquarters, prepared a large number of reports collectively titled Japanese Studies in World War II. The total number already completed and translated is well over one hundred and more are in preparation. Though the series contains large gaps and the individual studies vary widely in quality, it constitutes the most important single Japanese source on Japanese operations in the Pacific and in Asia during World War II.
Of this large collection, the author used three reports extensively. On the whole, these are more accurate and complete than those for later operations. The Japanese won this campaign and their records therefore were more complete. They did not have to rely, as they did for histories of later operations, on memory. Indeed, there is reason to believe that one of the six studies used was written during the war by 14th Army officers in the Philippines.

For this volume the most valuable Japanese source was the two-volume history entitled 14th Army Operations. In a sense, all other Japanese documents are supplementary to it. It is detailed, reasonably accurate, and as complete as the after action reports of most units of comparable size. The first volume consists of the basic report, in narrative form, of 14th Army's operations on a day to day basis and includes the text or paraphrase of many important orders. In the second volume are the supporting documents: maps, intelligence reports, terrain studies, plans, as well as some brief but informative notes written by General Homma shortly before the opening of the final offensive on Bataan.

Neither the air nor naval accounts of Japanese operations in the Philippines are on the same scale as the 14th Army history. The air force report, entitled 5th Air Group Operations, contains a brief history of that headquarters as well as the history of its successor commands. It is extremely detailed in operational matters, providing in many instances the number and weight of bombs dropped on a single target, but somewhat vague in matters of decision and command. The naval history, Naval Operations in the Invasion of the Philippines, is the briefest and least satisfying of the reports on the Philippines, and contains hardly more than a brief account of naval surface and air activities in the opening days of the war.

Two other histories in the Japanese Studies in World War II, those of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters and of Southern Army, contain material of value on the Philippine campaign. Translated copies of these, as well as of the other histories, are on file in the Office of the

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Chief of Military History, together with copies of the Japanese originals which were checked in every important case.
The second major category of Japanese source material for the campaign is the collection of the Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) of General MacArthur's headquarters. During the war this section screened all enemy documents taken on the field of battle, translating and publishing those of immediate value. At the conclusion of hostilities, ATIS turned its attention to records of a historical nature and interrogated a large number of Japanese officers about their part in the war. These, like the wartime translations, were published in the ATIS series and distributed to interested agencies and commands. A complete set of these publications is on file in the Officer of the Chief of Military History, as well as in the Military Intelligence Library, Department of the Army.

Those ATIS documents most useful in the preparation of this volume were the after actions reports of the 65th Brigade and 16th Division. For the brigade there are two reports, one for the period 9-27 January 1942, when it fought in the Mt. Natib area, and another for the period 26 January-29 February 1942, covering operations in the vicinity of Mt. Samat (ATIS Enemy Publications 151 and 289). Together they provide a complete account of the brigade's operations during the first part of the siege of Bataan, as well as casualty figures, operations orders, maps, and similar material.

The report of the 16th Division (ATIS Enemy Publication 355) covers the period 24 December 1941 to 3 January 1942 and was issued two days after the conclusion of the operations it describes--the Japanese landings at Lamon Bay and the advance through south Luzon to Manila. Unfortunately, it lacks supporting documents and maps and is therefore of limited value.

Other ATIS documents of value are the postwar interrogations statements of Japanese officers, and the answers to questionnaires sent to key officers by the author. Many of the interrogations were made specifically for historical purposes, either at the request of the G-2 Historical Section of MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo or of the Office of the Chief of Military History. These, together with the statements secured from Japanese officers in response to specific queries, are available in the Officer of the Chief of Military History and form an important supplement to the Japanese accounts already described.

Except for General Homma, who was executed in Manila in April 1946, almost every Japanese officer who had held an important post during the Philippine campaign has contributed to this volume. The Army headquarters was represented by Lt. Gen. Masami Maeda, Homma's first chief of staff; Col. Motoo Nakayama, senior operations officer; Lt. Col. Yoshio Nakajima, intelligence, then later, operations officer; Lt. Col. Monjiro Akiyama, air officer; and other lesser figures.

On the division level, information about the 48th Division was secured from Col. Moriji Kawagoe, division chief of staff, and Maj. Makoto Nakahara, operations officer. Lt. Gen. Susumu Morioka was questioned about the activities of his 16th Division, while Lt. Gen. Kenzo Kitano supplied information about his own division, the 4th. Both interrogations were supplemented by statements from staff officers of the two divisions. Among these the most useful, perhaps, were those of Col. Motohiko Yoshida, 4th Division chief of staff, and Lt. Col. Hiromi Oishi, operations officer. Interrogation

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of 65th Brigade officers was inadequate, but this deficiency was no handicap to the historian who had the two excellent after action reports of that brigade.
The third major Japanese source consists of the transcript and exhibits of the trial of General Homma by an American military tribunal held at Manila in January and February 1946. The thirty volumes of testimony and more than four hundred exhibits constitute a storehouse of information on the campaign--on plans, operations, the condition of Japanese troops, the "death march," the occupation of Manila, and the American surrender. Its chief value, however, lies in the fact that Homma's testimony constitutes a statement by the enemy commander of his conduct of the campaign, together with an explanation of the factors which influenced his most important decisions. In this respect, the enemy sources are more rewarding than the American. The records of the trial when used were in the custody of The Judge Advocate General but have recently been transferred to the Departmental Records Branch, AGO. Citations of the testimony at the trial and to interviews and statements retain the rank of the officers at the time of the action described in the text. In almost all cases, however, these officers had been demobilized and had no military status.

In addition to these three categories of Japanese material, the author has used a number of other enemy sources in the preparation of this volume. These include the numerous postwar interrogations and reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), which conducted a detailed study of many facets of the Japanese war effort. The published work of the survey consists of a summary report, two volumes of naval interrogations, and a large number of volumes on the Japanese war effort. There are also many unpublished interrogations in the USSBS files, copies of which are available in the Officer of the Chief of Military History.

In The National Archives of the United States is a large collection of untranslated Japanese military and naval documents obtained at the end of the war and returned to this country. These consist mainly of war diaries, usually of small units, and in some cases of collections of orders. The systematic use of these records would have required the services of a staff of translators for several years, a project which was neither practical nor profitable. Little use was made of this collection, therefore, except to scan it for the most relevant and useful documents.

Maps
To the difficulties of securing material on the tactical level must be added the lack of the type of maps and overlays required by the military historian. At the start of the war there were only four militarily significant maps of the Philippines in existence. Two f these were U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey maps: one for the entire archipelago at the scale of 1:600,000; and the other, a topographic map consisting of seventeen sheets and covering the major islands, scaled at 1:200,000. The other two maps had been prepared by the Army engineers. The first of these was a topographic map and was based on a military survey made between 1911 and 1914. It covered only a portion of Luzon and was scaled at 1:63,360. The other, also a topographic map, was based on a more recent survey made in 1934 and 1935. Scaled at 1:31,680, it covered an even more restricted area than the 1:63,360, being limited to certain sectors of Luzon considered
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most critical for defense. There were enough copies of the first three of these maps for ordinary needs, but the last was available only in blueprint and in limited quantities.
The disadvantages of so inadequate a map coverage were perhaps not as serious as might be supposed. Many of the troops were fighting on their home islands in country they knew well. The Americans and Scouts had been over the ground many times before and had maneuvered on Bataan as late as January 1941. Those Filipinos who came from islands other than Luzon found the terrain little different from their own. Maps in the quantities needed by American forces in the Pacific later in the war were therefore not required in this campaign.

Facilities for map reproduction in the Philippines were excellent. The plants of the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey and of the Commonwealth Bureau of Public Works were both available to the military and operated until the evacuation of Manila, though the first was bombed on 23 December. Part of the equipment was then moved, with much difficulty, to Corregidor where the printing of maps on a limited basis was continued several months longer.

Facilities for the making of maps were not nearly as satisfactory. There was no headquarters base map plant, such as existed later in the war, in the Philippines at that time, no aerial photography, and only a few small mapping detachments in the field. Men trained to make maps were scarce, and in those days the making of maps was a long and arduous task. Little had been done during the years of peace to remedy these deficiencies. Like other military activities, map making had been severely curtailed for reasons of economy. It was fortunate indeed that the few areas mapped were those where most of the action took place and where most Americans had maneuvered time and again.

During the first part of the campaign, the withdrawal to Bataan, the two maps most in demand were the 1:200,000 U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, and a road map of the island. The engineers had little difficulty meeting this demand, but when the troops moved back into the Bataan peninsula, having lost most of the maps distributed earlier, there were few up-to-date, large-scale maps available for distribution. By utilizing every field expedient the engineers were able to reproduce enough copies of the 1:63,360 and 1:31,680 maps, both of which, fortunately, included the peninsula, for general distribution to the troops. But both maps were hopelessly out of date and had to be supplemented by schematic sketches and overlays which were not based on any actual survey. As new road and trail information became available the sketches were revised and corrected prints in limited editions circulated to the units most directly concerned.

Like the records, the maps in the hands of the troops were destroyed just before the surrender. Those that were not, were appropriated by the Japanese as souvenirs and have since been lost without a trace. A few reached Australia, probably among the possessions taken out by Brig. Gen. High J. Casey, the engineer officer of USAFFE, when he left with General MacArthur. But so scarce are these maps that General Wainwright could find only one--the 1:63,360 trail map of Bataan corrected in prison camp by an engineer officer--to include in his report. The rest of the maps in the report are of a later period.

The author has sought in vain for copies of the maps used by the troops in the Philippines, and for accompanying overlays, to secure exact information on troop dispositions,

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the location of gun emplacements, fields of fire, wire entanglements, demolitions, and the like. If the maps have survived, their owners treasure them too highly to allow their use by others. The author has found copies of the 1:63,360 and 1:31,680 engineer maps, but these lacked the information needed. Moreover, the latest maps of Bataan found are dated February 1942 and do not show the trails built between that time and the end of the campaign. Two of the engineer sketches showing the location of gun emplacements, demolitions, and similar installations, have been found, but these lack exact terrain information and troop dispositions.
To secure the information required in a tactical account the author has utilized every source open to him. Officers interviewed were asked to place their units on a map and to make whatever corrections or additions they could. With the numerous letters requesting material went maps and an added request to supplement and correct the information shown. Sketches drawn by others and data from later maps were also used. All this information was collated, but the result was not entirely satisfactory. Terrain descriptions varied; trails were differently numbered or named; the same name or number was applied to different trails; rivers were named and located differently on various maps and by different officers; boundaries between units could not be exactly fixed; and even the front lines described in the various accounts could not be reconciled. No final resolution of these and other discrepancies is possible since the original map and overlays have been lost.

The Japanese had difficulties of their own with maps, and for the invasion probably used a road map of the Philippines and hydrographic charts of their own. This lack was filled soon after the occupation of Manila when they captured a detailed U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey photostat map of Bataan. This they lithographed and printed, then distributed to their own troops. A copy of this map, with Japanese troop dispositions and place names marked on it, was introduced as evidence in the trial of General Homma. It proved invaluable for fixing enemy positions and following enemy movements; without it the account of Japanese operations would have been less exact in many places.

Published Works
The number of books and articles dealing with the Philippine campaign and its aftermath is especially large, but of limited use. The dramatic defense by the Philippine garrison captured the imagination of the American public immediately, and articles began to appear early in 1942 as officers, public officials, and correspondents made their way by submarine and aircraft through the Japanese blockade. Throughout the year articles on the Philippines continued to appear in service journals and elsewhere, but in steadily diminishing numbers as American forces embarked on new ventures in North Africa, in the Solomons, and in New Guinea. Thereafter until the end of war, a period when those who could have written authoritatively about the Philippine campaign were in prison camp, there were few published works on the Philippines. To this early period belong such works as Lt. Col. William E. Dyess, The Dyess Story (New York, 1944); John Hersey, Men on Bataan (New York, 1942); Lt. Col. Allison Ind, Bataan, The Judgment Seat (New York, 1944); and Carlos P. Romulo, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines (New York, 1942).
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The release of the prisoners, first those in the Philippines and then, after the surrender of Japan, those in Formosa, Japan, and Manchuria, was the prelude to a second large outpouring of books and articles about the campaign and about life in a Japanese prison camp. Like the first group, few of these are of real value for the student of military operations. The most significant is General Wainwright's Story, written with the aid of Robert Considine and published in 1946. Though it left much to be desired as a definitive account, General Wainwright's Story very possibly forestalled the publication by other commanders and staff officers of their own version of the campaign. Reluctant to engage in public controversy or disagree with their chief, they remained silent. Only Col. Ernest B. Miller, a National Guard officer and formerly commander of a tank battalion, has chosen to express his opposition to General Wainwright's views publicly in a volume entitled Bataan Uncensored (long Prairie, Minn., 1949).
Other postwar volumes and articles by survivors deal mostly with prison camp, or with the isolated actions and operations of specific units. In the latter category are Lt. Col. William E. Chandler's three-part history of the 26th Cavalry (PS) in the Armored Cavalry Journal (April 1946); Lt. Col. Harold K. Johnson's "Defense Along the Abucay Line" in the February 1949 issue of Military Review; Col. William C. Braly, "Corregidor--A Name, A Symbol, A Tradition," Coast Artillery Journal LXXX, No. 4 (July-August 1947), pp. 209, 36-44, which is based on the official report of the commander of Harbor Defenses of Manila, and Subic Bays; the story of the naval battalion in the Battle of the Points, written by William F. Prickett and published in the Marine Corps Gazette (July 1950); and Lt. Col. Bruce Palmer, Jr., "Covering the Withdrawal into Bataan," in the July 1950 issue of the Infantry School Quarterly.

At about the time these books and articles were published, the memoirs and histories of the war began to appear. Many of the former, written by men who had occupied high political and military posts during the war, touched briefly on the Philippines and cast additional ight on obscure pointse. The most useful of these are: Manuel L. Quezon, The Good Fight (New York; 1946); Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York, 1946); Dwight D. Eisenhower Crusade in Europe (New York, 1948); and Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948).

Histories of the period first appeared in print in 1948, and, like the memoirs, were still coming out at the time this volume was completed. Most of these were and still are being prepared under the sponsorship of the armed forces, each of which maintains its own historical program. The Army's program, under which this volume was prepared, contains several volumes which deal with this period. Three of these, Mark Skinner Watson's Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ray S. Cline's Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, and Maurice Matloff's and Edwin M. Snell's Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, have already been published in this series. Others which were used in manuscript and which are scheduled for early publication are Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley,

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The Logistics of Global Warfare, 1941-1943, and Rudolph A. Winnacker, The Secretaries.
In the Air Forces series, nominally part of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II but prepared separately and published by the University of Chicago Press, the first volume, Plans and Early Operations: January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago, 1948), edited by Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, was especially useful. Though not a part of the official history, Walter D. Edmonds' They Fought With What They Had (Boston, 1951) belongs, in a sense, to this category since the author, a well-known novelist, secured much of his material during the war on a special mission for the Air Forces. The 15-volume history of naval operations, written by Samuel Eliot Morison and published by Little, Brown & Company, includes eight volumes on the Pacific. The first of these (Volume III of the series), The Rising Sun in the Pacific, covers the first four months of the war and includes naval operations in the Philippines campaign.

In addition to these service histories, each of which presents a segment of the same war from a different point of view, there are other histories which provide valuable material and fresh points of view. These include J.F.C. Fuller, The Second World War, 1939-45 (London, 1948); Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1948); Hanson W. Baldwin, The Great Mistakes of the War (New York, 1950); and Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, 1950).

It is impossible to write about the Philippine campaign without dealing with the controversial figure of General MacArthur. Even before his relief from the Far East command in April 1951 he had already become the subject for numerous books and articles, few of which were objective in tone. His relief was the signal for a fresh flurry of books and articles dealing with his career, and some of these reviewed his conduct of the Philippine campaign. like the earlier works, almost all of these were by stanch champions or violent critics. None contained any significant new material on the campaign. At the time this volume was completed at least two more books about MacArthur were scheduled for early publication and there was every indication that others would appear in the near future.

In this connection, one final note must be added. The manuscript and published sources here described represent the best material available at the time of writing. Undoubtedly additional material will appear. Some of the missing record may turn up in private collections or be found in some obscure corner of The Adjutant General's files. Still to be heard from are General MacArthur and his principal staff officers, most of whom are now retired; General King; and the men who commanded corps and some of the divisions on Bataan. Only then when the full story of these men is known, will it be possible to fill in the gaps and round out the tactical detail of this volume.


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[The_Bammo]

Another Marice Report!

LOL

Very interesting Marine! Amusing as he_l!

Not the post Bro'--boring ---You Bro'! LOL

How many years in the circus Marine?

Hang Tough ~

[ghostgovt]

[quote=Marine,Aug 21 2005, 08:23 AM]
One of you boys named the thread, you aren't trying to claim ownership of a public thread are you? Nothing I've posted is off topic considering the name of the thread.[quote]

Wondering what they have in Texas brew right at this moment. Drink lots of water o chosen one. ..ya might shake this off in a few days.

So I suppose Italy's Varus is considered as US military then. May as well... chosen ones here get to do as they wish. From now on I'll consider the Italian's military same same as the US military per your definition. Thanks for the privilage.

This post has been edited by ghostgovt: Aug 21 2005, 08:49 AM

[Marine]

  Another Marice Report!

LOL

Very interesting Marine!  Amusing as he_l!

Not the post Bro'--boring ---You Bro'!  LOL

How many years in the circus Marine? 

Hang Tough ~

Glad you liked it Tom, It's part of a 27 part series, too big to put in one post, I'll let you read it in installments. A great deal can be learned from military disasters, glad you appreciate that fact.

PART ONE
PREWAR PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

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Chapter I: The Philippine Islands
Since the third century, the Philippine Islands had been under foreign influence, first from Hindu-Malayan empires in Sumatra, Indochina, and Borneo, and then from the Chinese beginning with the early Ming dynasty. Shortly after 1400 Mohammedanism was introduced, and for more than one hundred years all of the islands south of Luzon, and the southern portion of that island, were subject to the Mohammedans of Borneo. During this period, the Japanese established a loose control over northern Luzon and maintained a trading post at Aparri, on the north tip of the island.


European interest in the Philippine Archipelago began with the visit of a Spanish expedition under Ferdinand Magellan in 1521. But it was not until 1565 that the Spaniards established a permanent settlement in the Islands, on Cebu. Five years later they conquered Manila and then gradually extended their control over many of the Islands. late in the sixteenth century the military ruler of japan, Hideyoshi, claimed suzerainty, over the Islands. This claim was apparently neither intended nor taken seriously, but the Spanish did pay "tribute" for a short time to avoid trouble, secure trading rights in Japan, and protect the Jesuit missionaries there. Until 1898, despite unsuccessful efforts by the Portuguese and Dutch and one successful effort by the British (1762-1764) to wrest the Islands from her, Spain ruled the Philippines.

The impress of these centuries of foreign influence and control gave to the Philippines a strange mixture of Oriental and Occidental institutions. The original inhabitants were pushed back into the mountains and the Malayans became the dominant racial type. From later invasions came the Mohammedan religion and the Moslem customs prevalent in the south; from China came the impetus to trade and commerce, still largely controlled by the Chinese; and from Spain came the dominant religion, Christianity, the Roman law, and other features of Western civilization.

The United States seized the Philippine Islands from Spain in May 1898 after Admiral Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, during the Spanish-American War. Formal title to the Islands was granted the United States by the Treaty of Paris in December of that year. By the acquisition of the Philippines the United States at one step advanced its frontiers nearly 7,000 miles across the Pacific Ocean and "gave hostages to fortune in a sense which the American people have never fully realized."[1] Possession of the Islands made the United States an Asiatic power, with full responsibility for maintaining the peace and status quo in that area.

The government of the Islands was placed in the hands first of a Philippine commission and later of a governor general, both appointed by the President of the United


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States. The Filipinos, once their opposition ended, were allowed an increasingly large measure of self-rule and elected the members of the lower house of the legislature, the Philippine Assembly. In 1913, they were granted free trade with the United States, and three years later, in the Jones Act, were permitted a limited autonomy.
A succession of able American governors established a happy relationship between the two countries, and a steadily increasing sentiment for Philippine independence found ready support in the American Congress. A bill for Philippine independence was passed by Congress, over President Hoover's veto, in January 1933, but vetoed by the Philippine legislature. It was passed again, with some changes, as the Tydings-McDuffie Act, on 24 March 1934, and this time approved by the Philippine legislature.

The Tydings-McDuffie Act provided for the recognition of Philippine independence after a ten-year transitional period. During these ten years the United States would be allowed to "maintain military and other reservations and armed forces" in the Islands, and the President of the United States would have the power "to call into the service of such armed forces all military forces organized by the Philippine Government."[2] When the transitional period was over, the United States would abandon all military installations in the Islands.

The Tydings-McDuffie Act left open the question of naval reservations, but authorized the President to negotiate with the Philippine Government for American naval bases in the Islands. The closing date for such negotiations was set at two years after the recognition of independence. Until then "the matter of naval reservations and fueling stations," the Act provided, "shall remain in its present status."[3]

A year after the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the Filipinos adopted a liberal constitution based on the American model and established an interim government known as the Commonwealth. Elections in which Manual Quezon was chosen as president followed soon after, and before the end of 1935 the Philippine National Assembly met to draft plans for local defense.

The Islands
Comprising almost 7,100 known islands and islets, the Philippine Archipelago lies approximately 500 miles off the Asiatic mainland and extends 1,150 miles almost due north and south from Formosa to Borneo. Strategically situation in the geographic heart of the Far East, the Islands are centrally located in relation to Japan, China, Burma, French Indochina, Thailand, Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies. They lie athwart the trade routes leading from Japan and China through the South China Sea to southeast Asia and the rich supplies of oil and minerals in the Indies. Vital areas in Japan and along the Chinese coast are within quick striking distance by sea and air of the Philippines. Over 5,000 miles from Honolulu and 7,000 miles from San Francisco, Manila, the chief city and capital of the Islands, is only 1,800 miles from Tokyo. Formosa and Hong Kong are less than 700 miles distant, Singapore 1,500 miles, and Truk in the Caroline Islands 2,100 miles.[4] The Caroline, Marianas, and the Marshall Islands, stretching across the Central Pacific, lie along the

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United States lines of communication with the Philippines.


SIGNING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH, 23 MARCH 1935. Seated, left to right: George H. Dern, Secretary of War; President Franklin D. Roosevelt, signing the Constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth; Manuel L. Quezon, President, Philippine Senate; standing, left to right: Brig. Gen. Creed F. Cox, Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department; Frank Murphy, Governor General of the Philippine Islands; Cordell Hull, Secretary of State; Key Pittman, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate; Pedro Guevara, Philippine Resident Commissioner; Miguel Cuaderno, Vice President, Philippine National Bank, Manila, P.I.; Manuel Roxas, Representative, Philippine Legislature, Delegate, Constitutional Assembly; Francisco A. Delgado, Philippine Resident Commissioner.
The land area of the archipelago totals about 115,000 square miles. Only 460 of the Islands have an area greater than one square mile, and only eleven boast an area greater than 1,000 square miles. These eleven islands account for 94 percent of the total land area in the archipelago. The largest and most important is Luzon (40,420 square miles) in the north, where Manila is located. Next in size to Luzon is Mindanao (36,527 square miles) in the south, followed by the islands in the central group, the Visayas: Samar, Negros, Panay, Leyte, Cebu, and others.[5]

The climate of the Islands is tropical, with an average yearly temperature


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between 78° and 80° F. The year may be divided generally into dry and wet seasons, which come at different times on the east and west coast because of shift in the seasonal winds or monsoons. From June to September, when the monsoon blows from the southwest, the weather offers little difficulty to the landing of a hostile military force on the favorable beaches along the east coasts. The period of the northeast monsoons, October through April, is the best time for landings along the western China Sea coasts. most of Mindanao, a portion of the Visayas, and southern Luzon have no dry season and no pronounced maximum rainy season.
The people of the Philippines are mostly of Malayan stock, and in 1941 numbered 17,000,000. In that year, Cebu and central Luzon were the most heavily populated areas, and Manila, with 684,000 inhabitants, was the largest city. There were nearly 30,000 Japanese nationals in the Islands, more than two-thirds of whom were concentrated in Davao, the chief port of Mindanao. The 117,000 Chinese constituted the largest foreign group in the Islands; on Luzon there were almost 9,000 American civilians.

Over sixty-five dialects are spoken in the Islands. When the United States acquired the Islands, a small percentage of the people spoke Spanish; after forty years of American occupation about 27 percent spoke English and 3 percent Spanish. Of the many native dialects, Tagalog, the language of the wealthy and influential resident of central Luzon, was chosen as the basis for a national language in 1937, although twice as many people spoke the Visayan dialect. While the many dialects have certain similarities, it is not possible for the natives in different parts of the Islands to understand each other readily. This fact made the recruitment of Filipinos for military service on a national scale difficult, since troops recruited from one island often could not understand their American or Tagalog officers, or troops from other islands.

The Philippines are predominantly agricultural, the principal crops being rice (the chief element in the Filipino diet), copra, sugar, hemp, tobacco, and corn. The far-ranging mountain areas are a source of gold and silver, and of the more important base metals, such as iron, chrome, manganese, copper, and lead. Sixty percent of the Philippines is covered by forest, much of it hardwoods. The fishing banks off Manila Bay and the Sulu Archipelago supplement the Filipino diet and are the basis of one of the more important industries in the Islands. Even after many years of American occupation there was little manufacturing in the Philippines, most of the inhabitants being engaged in home industries or in the processing of agricultural products such as sugar, hemp, and coconuts.

With interisland and coastal shipping carrying the bulk of Philippine products, there was no great need for roads and railroads. Only on Luzon was there a road and rail net adequate to support large-scale military operations. of the 14,270 miles of highway in the archipelago in 1940, more than half were in central and southern Luzon. There were only 50,000 motor vehicles in the Islands; the Filipinos relied on the powerful carabao, or water buffalo, for transportation as well as labor. The two railway systems in the Islands, the government-owned Manila Railway Company on Luzon and the American-owned Philippine Railway Company on Panay and Cebu, had a total of 840 miles of narrow gauge track.


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Most of the principal towns and cities were linked by telephone, telegraph, or radio, and all parts of the archipelago by the government postal system. The American-owned Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company connected manila with most important towns on Luzon, as well as the principal population centers on Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Mindanao. in addition, forty provincial governments operated their own telephone systems so that many small towns and villages had at least one telephone joining them with Manila. Cable connected Manila with Guam, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, and four transoceanic radio stations provided communication with the outside world.
The Philippine Islands are largely mountainous, with elevations as high as 10,000 feet. Narrow coastal plains can be found on most of the islands, and there are numerous short, swift-running streams. large plain areas and navigable rivers are few. on every island are sand beaches, some of them extensive, but few open on lowlands where there is space for military maneuver.

Luzon, with one tenth of its total area a large plain, and another 5,000 square miles forming a magnificent river valley, is the one island in the Philippines whose terrain permits military operations on a large scale. in the north, closed in by mountains on the east and west, is a valley extending southward for over 120 miles and with an average width of 40 miles. Flowing north through the valley is the Cagayan River. Along the west coast is a narrow plain offering only limited opportunities for military operations. A road runs along this coast from the tip of Luzon towards Manila. Southern Luzon is a volcanic region, part plain and part mountain, with numerous deep indentations forming bays and gulfs, and with many beaches suitable for the landing of a military force.

The central portion of Luzon is composed of a plain extending north about 120 miles from Manila Bay to the Lingayen Gulf. With mountains to the east and west, the plain is well protected from invasion except at its two extremities. it is the most highly developed economic area in the Philippines and the one most suitable for mobile warfare.[6]

The three most important military highways on Luzon are Routes 1, 3 and 5--two-lane, all weather roads with concrete or asphalt surface. Each enters the capital and each has numerous access roads linking Manila with all parts of the island. of the 704 miles of railroad on Luzon in 1941, about half were in the central plain, which, in addition, contained 250 miles of private railway lines. All of the road, with the exception of a short stretch above Manila, was single track.

From the South China Sea the southern entrance to the central plain is through Manila Bay, one of the finest natural harbors in the Far East. Opening out from a 12-mile-wide entrance between high headlands, the bay expands toward the low-lying plain to a width of thirty miles. Thirty miles from the entrance lies Manila, and to its north and south are other harbors large enough to shelter seagoing vessels. Mariveles, just inside the northern entrance, is an excellent and easily reached anchorage, and the headland of Sangley point, where the Cavite naval base was located, has always been recognized as one of the finest ports in the bay.


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MANILA HARBOR. The Bataan peninsula, partly shrouded in fog and clouds, is visible twenty-five miles across Manila Bay.
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On either side of the entrance to manila Bay are high volcanic peaks covered with luxuriant tropical foliage. North of the entrance is the Bataan peninsula; to the south is Cavite Province. From a military point of view, the more important and more easily defended of the headlands is the Bataan peninsula, a rocky extension of the Zambales Mountain range which separates the central plain of Luzon from the China Sea.
Across the entrance to Manila Bay are several small islands. The largest and most important, Corregidor, lies two miles off Bataan and, with Caballo, separates the entrance into the North and South Channels. Shaped like a tadpole with its tail to the east, Corregidor measures three and one half miles in length and one and one half miles at its widest point. One mile south of the tip of the tail is Caballo, less than one third the size of Corregidor. In the South Channel, about a mile from the southern headland, lies El Fraile, a rock about 200 by 100 yards jutting up into the entrance of Manila Bay. Just outside and to the south of the entrance is Carabao, the fourth of the small islands whose location in Manila Bay gave them a strategic importance out of all proportion to their size. In the history of American plans for the defense of the Philippines, these islands loom large.

The Philippine Army
Before the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, no effort was made to prepare the Philippines for their

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own defense. The United States had assumed all obligations for national defense and maintained a garrison in the Islands for that purpose. This garrison numbered about 10,000 men, half of whom were Philippine Scouts, a U.S. Army unit in which the enlisted men, with some exceptions, were native Filipinos and most of the officers American. After 1913 the Philippine garrison was called the Philippine Department, a regular U.S. Army establishment commanded by an American general officer. The Philippine Constabulary, first organized in 1901, was the national police force, but by training and organization had a military character. Thus, except for their experience with the Constabulary, the Filipinos had had no military tradition upon which to build a national army.[7]
One of the first problems of the newly established Commonwealth Government was to make provision for the defense of the archipelago. Such a task required a man with proven military and executive ability, and, since there was no likely candidate in the Philippines, the President-elect Manuel L. Quezon turned to the United States for help. In the summer of 1935, he induced his friend, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, then Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, to become the military adviser to the new government in its effort to organize a national army.[8] President Roosevelt's consent was readily obtained and arrangements quickly concluded.

MacArthur's title in his new assignment was Military Advisor to the Commonwealth Government; his mission to aid in the "establishment and development of a system of national Defense." The authority given him was unusually broad. He was authorized to deal directly with the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff and, "in all cases not specifically covered," to use his own judgment. "Your mission must be accomplished---," he was told," ways and means are largely left to you."[9] Although there was no official connection between the Philippine Department, the U.S. Army command in the Islands, and the Officer of the Military Advisor, the department commander, Maj. Gen. Lucius R. Holbrook, was informed that assistance to General MacArthur was "the most important peacetime mission of your command."[10]

General MacArthur selected Majs. Dwight D. Eisenhower and James B. Ord as his principal assistants. With the aid of a special committee from the Army War College, they prepared a plan to provide the Philippine Commonwealth with a system of national security by 1946, the date the Islands would become independent. This plan called for a small regular army, a conscription system, a ten-year training program of two classes a year to build up a reserve force, a small air force, and a fleet of small motor torpedo boats to repel an enemy landing. The tactical organization of this army was to be based on divisions of approximately 7,500 men. Armament and


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equipment for the new army was to be of a type suitable to the economy and terrain in the Philippines.[11]
The staff of the Military Advisor was always small. In addition to the officers he took with him, General MacArthur secured the services of four other officers from the Philippine Department when he reached Manila. He also employed as a civilian assistant a retired naval officer, Sidney L. Huff, to advise in naval matters. On the death of Colonel Ord in an airplane accident in 1938, Lt. Col. Richard J. Marshall was chosen to replace him. In October 1937, Capt. Hugh J. Casey joined MacArthur's staff to advise in engineer matters, and later Maj. William F. Marquat was designated antiaircraft officer. All of these men remained with General MacArthur through the war years.[12]

The first legislative measure of the Philippine National Assembly was the passage, on 21 December 1935, of the National Defense Act, which embodied the plan proposed by General MacArthur. In explaining the bill to the Assembly, President Quezon emphasized that the defense program must be carried out economically and should be "passively defensive." It would be impossible to reasons of economy, he declared, to develop an adequate fleet in the short time allotted and with the money available.[13]

The National Defense Act provided for a regular force of 10,000 men and a reserve force which was expected to reach 400,000 by the middle of 1946. The regular establishment was also to include the Philippine Constabulary, then consisting of about 6,000 men, so that more than half of the regular army from the start consisted of partially trained men. All Filipinos between the ages of twenty-one and fifty were liable for military service. After a 5 1/2-month training period Filipinos would become a part of the reserve force. There were to be two classes a year, each to consist of 20m000 men with the regulars serving as training cadres. For the training of junior officers a military academy patterned after West Point was to be established at Baguio on Luzon. It was expected to graduate about 100 officers each year.[14]

For military purposes the Commonwealth was divided into ten military districts with functions comparable to those of the prewar corps areas in the United States. Each district had an approximately equal population, and each was to provide initially one reserve division and ultimately three. Luzon, together with several outlying islands (Mindora, Palawan, Masbate), had five military districts; Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago together constituted another; and the Visayas four more. In each district the military commander was responsible during peacetime for training and for


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the preparation of defense plans; in time of war for the defense of his district. The provincial governor was responsible for the enforcement of the recruitment and mobilization laws.[15]
Although the district commanders were responsible for defense plans, the Office of the Military Advisor drew up the plans for all the major islands--Luzon, Cebu, Negros, Panay, Leyte, Mindanao, Bohol, Mindoro--as well as many of the small ones. Since these plans were to be employed by the Philippine Government after that nation had received its independence, they were based on the assumption that there would be no U.S. Army forces in the Islands and that all forces would come from the Philippine Army. The plans of the Military Advisor also called for the establishment of seacoast defenses along the seven straits which give access to the inland waters of the Philippine Islands.[16]

The defense of the coast line--longer than that of the United States--posed an extremely difficult problem. The National Defense Act made no provision for a navy but established in the army an Off Shore Patrol This organization was to consist of fast motor torpedo boats of a British design. Contracts for thirty-six of the vessels, to be completed by 1946, were placed with British shipbuilders under specifications that called for a boat 65 feet long, with a 13-foot beam, three 12-cylinder engines, and a speed of 41 knots. Armament would consist of two torpedo tubes, depth charges, and light antiaircraft guns.[17] "A relatively small fleet of such vessels," said General MacArthur, "... will have distinct effect in compelling any hostile force to approach cautiously and by small detachments."[18]

The National Defense Act also made provision for an air force, to be utilized primarily for coast defense. By 1946 the Commonwealth expected to have a fleet of approximately 100 fast bombers, supported by other tactical types. They would be used with the Off Shore Patrol to keep hostile craft away from the Philippine coast.

The basic concepts which determined the nature and organization of the Commonwealth military establishment are perhaps best explained by MacArthur himself. The underlying principle, he said in a speech in 1936, was to create a defensive force of such strength as to make an invasion so costly in lives and money that "no Chancellory in the World, if it accepts the opinions of the military and naval staffs, will ever willingly make an attempt to willfully attack the Philippines ..." The Islands. MacArthur pointed out, had "enormous defensive advantages" in their geographical separation from possible enemies, mountainous character, heavy forests and jungles, narrow beaches and limited communications. Luzon, the probably objective of an enemy, he reminded his listeners, had only two areas in which "a hostile army of any size could land." "Each of these," he added, "is broken by strong defensive positions, which if properly


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manned and prepared would present to any attacking force a practically impossible problem of penetration."
When the development of the Philippine Army was completed, MacArthur believed it would be strong enough to oppose successfully "any conceivable expeditionary force." It would have a great advantage also in being assigned only one mission: defense of the homeland. Each unit of the army would operate over ground it knew well and which had been "deliberately selected and organized for defense."

The absence of a battle fleet in the plan of defense, MacArthur explained, was due to the defensive mission of the military establishment. The major duty of a large navy, he pointed out, was to protect overseas possessions. For the Philippines, which had no colonies, the only naval task was that of inshore defense. This defense would be provided by "flotillas of fast torpedo boats, supported by an air force," whose task would be to deny the enemy an opportunity to bring its forces close enough to Philippine shores to debark his troops and supplies. All these preparations, he believed, would, by 1946, place the Islands "in a favorable posture of defensive security."[19]

The development of the Philippine Army was slow. The year 1936 was devoted to the building of camps, organization of cadres, and the special training of instructors, drawn largely from the Constabulary. The commander of the Philippine Department provided Philippine Scouts as instructors and detailed U.S. Army officers to assist in the inspection, instruction, and administration of the program. By the end of the year instructors had been trained and camps established.

The first group of 20,000 men was called up on 1 January 1937 and by the end of 1939 there were 4,800 officers and 104,000 men in the reserves. Infantry training was given at camps scattered throughout the Philippines; field artillery training was concentrated in the vicinity of the U.S. Army's Fort Stotsenburg near Angeles, about fifty miles north of Manila, and specialized training was given at Fort William McKinley just south of Manila. Coast artillery instruction was carried on at Fort Stotsenburg and at Grande Island in Subic Bay by personnel supplied largely by the American commander at Corregidor.[20]

One of the greatest difficulties encountered in the organization of the Philippine Army was the creation of a satisfactory officer corps. in the Constabulary were Filipino officers with excellent training and experience, but their interests lay in law enforcement rather than military training. Some of the best officers came from the Philippine Scouts; these men rapidly became senior officers in the Philippine Army. The great problem was to train junior officers to command the training camps and reserve units once these were formed. Since no graduates could be expected from the projected military academy at Baguio for four years the most promising men in each semiannual class of reservists were selected for an additional six months' training as noncommissioned officers. The best of these were chosen for officer training and


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became 3d lieutenants upon graduation from Officer Candidate School. Senior ROTC units in colleges and universities were established to provide additional junior reserve officers.
The air program of the Philippine Army, though its development was slow, met with few serious obstacles. The first Philippine Army airfield was built just outside of Manila, and by the time the first runway was completed three trainers were available for pilot training. This course was supplemented by courses in military flying and technical training given in the United States to selected air force students. By 1940 the Philippine Army Air Corps had about forty planes and one hundred trained pilots. Practice in light bombing and gunnery had been given, and the entire instructional system, General Eisenhower observed later, was "on a very sound basis."[21]

The program for the building of a fleet of motor torpedo boats did not progress well. Only two had been delivered by the end of 1939 when the war in Europe destroyed any hope of securing additional boats from England. An effort was made to produce the torpedo boats locally by purchasing the engines and the right to build from the British design, but by October 1941 only one boat had been completed. Meanwhile, with the assistance of the U.S. Navy, the training of boatmen and mechanics continued.[22]

No military plan for the defense of an archipelago such as the Philippine Islands could have had serious prospects of success against a determined enemy with a powerful fleet without great reliance on more effective naval support than that provided by patrol boats. The Philippine Government had neither the industrial capacity nor the wealth to build and support a navy which could compete with that of a first class naval power. President Quezon had frankly admitted this in November 1935. Such naval support could come only from the United States. No provision, it is true, had been made in the Tydings-McDuffie Act for the use by the U.S. Navy of naval bases in the Islands after 1946. But such a possibility had not been specifically denied and it was undoubtedly believed that arrangements for their use would be made at a later date. Certainly, the Philippine Government did not anticipate that the United States would stand idly by if the security of the Philippines was threatened.


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[The_Bammo]

People’s Petition on Iraq Urges Bush to Shift Strategies
A Progressive Partnership of Activists, Congressional Staffers and Journalists Has Developed A Roadmap to Peace in Iraq

WASHINGTON - August 16 -
As the death toll in Iraq escalates and support for the Iraq war plummets, a national consensus has taken root that current U.S. strategies there have failed and cannot bring about peace and stability in that country. While President Bush and his chief advisors seem in deep denial, it is overwhelmingly apparent to the rest of the nation that we are faced with only one question: How to exit Iraq.

Peace Action and the Progressive Democrats of America are offering ordinary Americans and other interested groups the opportunity to provide leadership for the politicians in Washington. This leadership will take the form of a petition to Congress. The plan calls for the administration to shift from a military to a conflict resolution model and offers five initial policies, which if enacted, will markedly move the U.S. towards peace in Iraq.

The petition lists five principles essential to ending the quagmire in Iraq:



The US government must declare it has no interest in permanent military bases or controlling Iraqi oil or other resources.
The US government must set goals for ending the occupation and bringing all our troops home, in months, not years, beginning with an initial withdrawal of troops by the end of this year.

The US government must request that the United Nations monitor the process of military disengagement and de-escalation, and organize a peaceful reconstruction effort.

The US government should appoint a peace envoy independent of the occupation authorities to underscore its commitment to an entirely different mission—that of a peace process ending the occupation and returning our soldiers home.

The peace envoy should encourage and cooperate in talks with Iraqi groups opposed to the occupation, including insurgents, to explore a political settlement. The settlement must include representation of opposition forces and parties, and power-sharing and the protection of women's rights as core principles of governance and economic and energy development.


“America cannot afford to continue down this disastrous road in Iraq,” said Tim Carpenter, executive director of Progressive Democrats of America. “The cost is simply too high in human lives, squandered international relations and the tax burden now being foisted on future American generations."

To sign the petition and join hundreds of thousands of our fellow Americans in calling for an end to the war in Iraq, click here.

PETITION TEXT:


We have waited too long. Peace talks now. Bring them home safely and soon.

A PEOPLE’S PETITION FOR AN IRAQ PEACE PROCESS

"For Mr. Bush, questions about an exit strategy in Iraq have become especially delicate as a crowd of anti-war protestors has expanded at the edge of his ranch, rallying around Cindy Sheehan, the California woman whose son Casey was killed in Iraq in 2004." - New York Times, Aug. 12, 2005.

Like our friend Cindy Sheehan, we are tired of waiting for our troops to come home. Tired of the bloodshed, tired of tax dollar waste, tired of torture cover-ups, tired of contractor scandals, tired of deceit and fabrication. We are tired of elected officials with profiles in compromise rather than courage.

It is dishonest to admit there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, only to invent new reasons for inflicting mass destruction on that country.

It is dishonorable to fix the facts around the policy.

It is unacceptable to admit that going to war was a mistake, only to claim that the mistake must be perpetuated.

Because we cannot wait for our government to lead, we shall become leaders in ending the war ourselves. We shall propose an exit strategy from Iraq and demand that our government listen and follow. Because we cannot wait for our government to plan for peace, we call on civil society to make our government pay attention.

There are simply no military solutions to this bloodshed. The American military presence, threatening to Iraqi nationalism, religion and culture, are the main cause of the violent response from Iraqis. US policies are pushing Iraq toward civil war, with our government funding and arming Shiites and Kurds against Sunnis. Nearly half of the Iraqi national assembly has called for the “departure of the occupation”. The State Department’s own internal surveys show that a majority of Iraqis feel less safe in the presence of the American occupying forces. Since the invasion and occupation the status and safety of women in Iraq have declined precipitously.

Iraqis themselves are calling for the end of occupation. One million recently signed a petition demanding the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq. Initial peace talks among Iraqis already are underway. Our government is deaf to these Iraqi voices for peace.

It is time to shift from a military model to a conflict-resolution model aimed at a peace process and negotiated political settlement.

We propose the following principles as essential to ending the war in Iraq:

First, as a confidence-building measure, the US government must declare that it has no interest in permanent military bases or the control of Iraqi oil or other resources.

Second, as a further confidence-building measure, the US government must set goals for ending the occupation and bringing all our troops home - in months, not years, beginning with an initial withdrawal of troops by the end of this year.

Third, the US government must request that the United Nations monitor the process of military disengagement and de-escalation, and organize a peaceful reconstruction effort. The US must accept its obligation to fairly compensate Iraqis for damages and assist Iraqi reconstruction while ceasing the imposition of privatization schemes and ending the dominance of US contractors in the bidding process.

Fourth, the US government should appoint a peace envoy independent of the occupation authorities to underscore its commitment to an entirely different mission, that of a peace process ending the occupation and returning our soldiers home.

Fifth, the peace envoy should encourage and cooperate in talks with Iraqi groups opposed to the occupation, including insurgents, to explore a political settlement. The settlement must include representation of opposition forces and parties, and power-sharing and the protection of women's rights as core principles of governance and economic and energy development. We believe such an initiative will reduce though not eliminate violence, by lessening any rationale for Jihadist or sectarian conflict.

We send this message to all Americans in civil society, to our elected officials, and to the global peace movement. We demand that Congressional hearings begin to define an exit strategy now. We demand that members of Congress, reflecting the will of the people, adopt policy and budget initiatives that call for an exit strategy based on the above principles. We demand a peace envoy, peace talks with the opposition, reconstruction, the closure of US bases, and the safe return home of all U.S. Troops.

http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/0816-05.htm

[ghostgovt]

  Another Marice Report!

How many years in the circus Marine? 

Hang Tough ~

Bammo,

Now I am understanding why there's so much failed command ... consider the source that we have been gifted with per it's presence. If they can't follow simply instructions, how can they command anything with any success at all??

[The_Bammo]

Bammo,

Now I am understanding why there's so much failed command ... consider the source that we have been gifted with per it's presence. If they can't follow simply instructions, how can they command anything with any success at all??

I hear you Bro', on this issue in Marice's hand!

LOL

You know how this kind of mentality got all those stripes in the Corp Bro' -- according to him anyway!

It wasn't from intelligence or military knowledge, this has been proven time and time again!

Got to be the pucker up and smack the butt theory---for sure!

Hang Tough Bro' ~

[ghostgovt]

Concerning Iraq: Various Military Commanders and Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski


http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?p...3¬Found=true

U.S. Sent Specialists To Train Prison Units

By Bradley Graham and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, May 4, 2004; Page A01

Presented with reports of abusive behavior by U.S. military guards at Baghdad's main prison, the Army two months ago quietly dispatched to Iraq a team of about 25 military police experienced in running detention facilities to shore up training and supervision, Army officials said yesterday.

It was the first group of such specialists sent to Iraq since the invasion last year, the officials said. The move followed an internal Army investigation that found military police at the Abu Ghraib prison largely unprepared for their role as guards and accused them of grossly mistreating Iraqi detainees, the officials said.

Iraqi women wait outside Abu Ghraib prison, where U.S. guards reportedly abused detainees. A special U.S. team is now helping with training there. (Faleh Kheiber -- Reuters)

The decision to send the special team reflected an acknowledgement by U.S. military commanders that the abuse of detainees and laxness in oversight evident at the prison may extend beyond the small group of enlisted soldiers and officers charged or reprimanded so far and require broader remedial action.

Although military police are frequently used to take control of prisoners in the field and escort them to detention centers, most are not trained to operate prisons, the officials said. That responsibility falls to a tiny share of the Army's military police force -- about 970 out of 38,000 troops -- who receive specific training to run correctional facilities. The Army maintains several such permanent prisons in the United States and abroad.

The 25 specialists dispatched to Iraq will operate as a "mobile training team," the officials said, working with military police units that have rotated into the country in recent weeks to replace other forces.

U.S. military authorities have made no attempt to excuse the reported behavior of the guards at Abu Ghraib. Widely published photographs of their alleged actions showed naked Iraqi prisoners stacked in a pyramid or positioned to simulate sex acts with one another. In one case, a prisoner, pictured standing on a box with wires attached to his hands and feet, was reportedly told he would be electrocuted if he stepped down.

The Army's internal investigation, completed in March by Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba, found "clear friction and lack of effective communication" between Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, who was in charge of the accused soldiers, and military intelligence officials operating in the prison. Although Taguba recommended that Karpinski be relieved of command and reprimanded for command failures related to the abuse, she has said responsibility for the abuses should be shared by her superiors, including Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq.

[Marine]

Chapter II: U.S. Army Forces, Far East
By the middle of 1941 international developments had heightened the tension between the United States and Japan and made the defense of the Philippines an urgent problem. The Nazi-Soviet pact, followed by the German Army's march into Poland in September 1939, had destroyed completely any hope for a peaceful settlement in Europe. The events of the following year made it evident that the United States might soon be involved in war with the Axis in Asia as well as Europe. Denmark and Norway had been invaded by Hitler's armies in April, Holland and Belgium were conquered in May, and on 21 June France surrendered. Not long after, Japanese troops, with the acquiescence of the Vichy Government, moved into French Indochina. In September, Germany, Italy, and Japan concluded the Tripartite pact, and the following April, Russia and Japan reached agreement and signed a neutrality pact, thus freeing the latter for extension of her empire southward.
American efforts to halt Japanese aggression in Asia had met with little success. On 26 July 1940 Japan was notified that the commercial treaty of 1911 would be abrogated. On the same day Congress granted the President authority to control export to Japan. Immediately he put the export of oil and scrap iron under government license and banned the shipment of aviation gasoline to that country. By the early part of 1941 shipments of scrap iron, steel, gasoline, and other important war material from the United States to Japan had practically ceased.

While the United States market was being closed to Japan, American economic support to China was increased. In November 1940 Chiang Kai-shek's government was lent $50,000,000 through the Export-Import Bank; by the end of that year loans to China had reached a total of $170,000,000. Despite these moves, perhaps because of them, Japan continued to exert pressure on the French and Dutch colonies in Southeast Asia to "co-operate" in economic matters.

The possibility of war in the Far East was too real to be ignored and a reluctant Congress began to loosen the purse strings. But the years of neglect could not be remedied quickly. The demand for planes and weapons was great and the supply was limited. The Philippines was only one of many bases that had to be protected. Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama--which formed a strategic triangle whose defense was considered essential to the safety of the continental United States--had also been neglected and their needs had to be filled first. "Adequate reinforcements for the Philippines at this time," wrote Gen. George C. Marshall, "would have left the United States in a position of great peril should there be a break in the defense of Great Britain."[1]


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What the United States needed more than anything else was time. But Japan's occupation of naval and air bases in southern Indochina on 22 July 1941 gave warning that time was short. The Philippine Islands, already almost entirely surrounded, were now further threatened and America's position in the Far East rendered precarious. Measures to strengthen the defense of the Philippines could be put off no longer.
The Recall of General MacArthur
The establishment of a new American command in the Far East and the recall of General MacArthur to active duty in the U.S. Army were already under consideration when Japan moved southward in July 1941. A month earlier Joseph Stevenot, a prominent American businessman in Manila and president of the Philippine Long Distance telephone Company, in an interview with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson in Washington, had urged a closer relationship between the Military Advisor and the commander of the Philippine Department. Stimson had relayed this suggestion to General Marshall at a meeting during which both men discussed MacArthur's status and agreed he was the logical man to command in the Far East in the event of an emergency.[2]
By a coincidence, on the same day that Stimson talked with Stevenot, Maj. Gen. George Grunert, the Philippine Department commander, asked permission from the War Department to include representatives of the Commonwealth Government in conferences then being held in Manila. The purpose of these meetings was to formulate plans, based on the expected use of $52,000,000 in sugar excise funds, for improving the defenses of the Islands. The reason for Grunert's request was to permit him to work more closely and directly with General MacArthur without going through official government channels. Close contact between the department commander and the Military Advisor, he pointed out, was an obvious necessity in making defense plans. General Marshall approved Grunert's request without question, adding that "MacArthur's support will be invaluable to you in the accomplishment of the difficult task with which you are confronted."[3]

The first direct bid for the recall of General MacArthur came from the former Chief of Staff himself and was contained in a letter to General Marshall.[4] In this letter


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MacArthur stated that since the Philippine Army was to be absorbed by the U.S. Army in the near future--a step not yet contemplated by the War Department--he intended to close out the office of Military Advisor. A new American military command embracing all U.S. Army activities in the Far East, comparable to the British command in that area, should be established, he told the Chief of Staff, and he, MacArthur, be named commander.
The idea of creating a high command in the Far East had been broached before, but never by so influential a source. in January 1941 the intelligence officer of the Philippine Department had recommended to his superior in Washington that such a command be established. This proposal differed from MacArthur's in that the department commander was to be designated commander in chief of such a command, while MacArthur put forward his own nomination.[5] The Philippine Department G-2 continued to urge this move during the first six months of 1941, but there is no evidence that it was ever considered by the General Staff in Washington until June of that year, after General MacArthur's letter to the Chief of Staff.[6]

MacArthur's proposal was sent to the War Plans Division of the General Staff for study. on 6 June Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, acting chief of the division, sent his recommendations to the Chief of Staff. he agreed that the British had created such a command, but pointed out that their situation was quite different from that faced by the Americans. The British had accepted strategic direction of naval forces in the Far East, and their troops were scattered throughout the area. U.S. Army forces were concentrated in the Philippines and had responsibility only for the defense of the Islands. Gerow therefore recommended against the establishment of a new command in the Far East. If MacArthur was called to active service, he wrote, it should be as commander of the Philippine Department.[7]

Despite the recommendations of the chief of War Plans, the official reply to MacArthur's letter expressed a sentiment entirely favorable to the proposal. This reply was contained in a letter dated 20 June from the Chief of Staff to General MacArthur. In it Marshall told the Military Advisor that the War Department's plans for the Philippine Army were not as broad as MacArthur believed, but that the decision to close out his office rested with him. All that the U.S. Army planned to do at the present time, he said, was to train about 75,000 Filipinos for a period of from three to nine months, contingent upon the appropriation by Congress of the sugar excise and currency devaluation fund.


Both the Secretary of War and I [Marshall continued] are much concerned about the situation in the Far East. During one of our discussions about three months ago it was decided that your outstanding qualifications and vast experience in the Philippines make you the logical selection for the Army Commander in the Far East should the situation approach a crisis. The Secretary has delayed recommending your appointment as he does not feel the time has arrived for such action. however, he has authorized me to tell you that, at the proper time, he will recommend to the

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President that you be so appointed. It is my impression that the President will approve his recommendation.[8]
The appointment of General MacArthur as commander of all Army forces in the Far East was part of the larger problem of mobilization and training of the Philippine Army. By July 1941 it was clear that some decision on the use of the Philippine Army would soon have to be made. On 7 July MacArthur presented his views on the mobilization and training of the Philippine Army in a personal letter to the Chief of Staff, adding that the creation of a high command for the Far East "would results in favorable psychological amd morale reactions."[9] A week later General Gerow summarized for the Chief of Staff the steps being taken for improving the defenses of the Philippine Islands, and on 17 July made the following specific recommendations:


That the President, by executive order, call into the service of the U.S. for the period of the emergency all organized military forces of the Commonwealth.
That General MacArthur be called to active duty in the grade of Major General and assigned as commander of Army Forces in the Far East.
That $10,000,000 of the President's Emergency Fund be allotted to cover the costs of mobilization and training of the Philippine Army for a period of three months.
That the training program of the Philippine Army for an additional six to nine months be financed from the sugar excise fund, or from other funds appropriated for this purpose.
That 425 Reserve officers be sent to the Philippines to assist in the mobilization and training of the Philippine Army.[10]
Within a week these recommendations had been approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. The Secretary immediately requested President Franklin D. Roosevelt to issue the necessary executive order, already drafted and approved, for calling the military forces of the Commonwealth into active service of the United States. "Due to the situation in the Far East," Stimson wrote, "all practical steps should be taken to increase the defensive strength of the Philippines Islands." One of the most effective measures to accomplish this would be to call the Philippine Army into active service for a year's training. Such a program, Stimson estimated, would involve about 75,000 men and would cost about $32,000,000, which would be met by the sugar excise fund. Pending appropriation by Congress, the funds to initiate the program could be met from the President's emergency fund.[11]

Stimson's recommendations reached the President at a time when he was thoroughly aroused by japan's occupation of air and naval bases in Indochina on 22 July. Already he had broken off negotiations with Japan for a settlement of Far Eastern problems and was considering economic reprisals in the form of a freeze on Japanese assets in the United States. On 27 July, the day after Stimson made his recommendations, the President put the freeze into effect and issued the military order which would


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bring into the service of the United States the armed forces of the Philippines.[12]
The President's military order did not mention General MacArthur by name; it was carefully worded so as to place the forces in the Philippines under a general officer of the United States Army, "to be designated by the Secretary of War from time to time." The actual induction of Philippine Army units was to be accomplished by orders issued by that general officer.

The War Department immediately followed up the President's action by establishing, that same day, a new command in the Philippines, with headquarters in Manila. This command, to be called U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), would consist of the Philippine Department, those military forces of the Commonwealth ordered into active service for the period of the emergency, and such other forces as might be assigned. At the same time, MacArthur was recalled to active duty, effective on 26 July, with the rank of major general, designated as the general officer referred to in the military order, and put in command of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.[13] With the establishment of USAFFE and the simultaneous induction of the military forces of the Commonwealth Government, the two separate military establishments which had existed in the Philippine Islands since 1935 were placed for the first time under one command.

The recall of Douglas MacArthur to active duty at the age of 61 brought back into the U.S. Army one of its most able and experienced senior officers. Son of General Arthur MacArthur of Philippine fame, he had graduated from the military Academy in 1903 as a second lieutenant of engineers. Since then his record had been one of rapid advancement and brilliant achievement. His first assignment had been in the Philippines as a construction officer and he had been aide to his father when the senior MacArthur was chief military observer with the Japanese Army in the war against Russia. In 1907 he served as aide-de-camp to President Theodore Roosevelt. After various assignments in the United States he was ordered to Washington in 1913 for duty with the Chief of Engineers. The following year he accompanied the Mexican expedition to Vera Cruz as assistant engineer officer.

In World War I Douglas MacArthur's record was outstanding. Transferring to the infantry, he served as chief of staff of the 42d Division, the Rainbow Division, and as commander of the 84th Brigade of that division. He was wounded twice, served briefly in the occupation and returned to the United States in 1919 as a brigadier general of the National Army. That year, at the age of 39, he was appointed Superintendent of the Military Academy at West Point over a number of senior generals. From West Point he went to the Philippines where he commanded in turn the District of Manila and the 23d Brigade. In January 1925 he was appointed a major general and returned to the United States the following month.

For the next three years General MacArthur commanded a corps area in the United States. In 1928 he returned to Manila as commander of the Philippine Department. Upon completion of this assignment he was brought back to the United


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States where he commanded the Ninth Corps Area on the west coast for a month and on 1 November 1930 was appointed Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. He held this post five years before going to the Philippine Commonwealth. On 31 December 1937, after thirty-eight years' service [sic: 1937-1903=34], eighteen of them as a general officer, MacArthur retired from the Army with the rank of general to become field marshal in the Philippine Army a short time alter. His return to active duty on 26 July 1941 was as a major general, his permanent rank before retirement. The next day action to promote him to the rank of temporary lieutenant general was initiated and approved two days later, effective 27 July.
The Organization of USAFFE
The immediate tasks facing General MacArthur were, first, to establish his headquarters and organize his command on an efficient basis; second, to induct and train the Philippine Army; and third, to secure the necessary supplies and reinforcements to put his forces on a war footing.
The first task was quickly accomplished. From the small group of Army officers who had been detailed to the Office of the Military Advisor and from U.S. Army organizations in the Philippines, MacArthur secured enough officers to form a nucleus for his headquarters. By mid-August he had a small and highly efficient staff in Headquarters, USAFFE, located at No. 1, Calle Victoria in the walled city in Manila. His principal staff officers were men who had been with him for some time. For the most part they were men in the prime of their lives. The chief of staff and deputy chief of staff were 47 and 46 years old respectively at the time USAFFE was organized and had already served under MacArthur for several years. All the officers on the general staff were under 50 years of age, and of the three special staff officers who had been requested specifically by name, the youngest was 43 and the oldest 52.

For his chief of staff, General MacArthur selected the senior officer of the military mission, Lt. Col. Richard K. Sutherland. Entering the army as a private after his graduation from Yale in 1916, Sutherland rose to the rank of captain before the end of World War I. During the peace years, he attended the Infantry School, Command and Staff School, Ecole Supériure de Guerre, and the Army War College. Conceded by most to be a brilliant, hard-wording officer, he was selected for MacArthur's staff in 1938 after a tour of duty in Shanghai. Gen. George C. Kenney, who served with him for four years, remarked, "He knew so many of the answers that I could understand why General MacArthur had picked him for chief of staff." But he also noted that among Sutherland's traits were egotism and "an unfortunate bit of arrogance."[14] Promoted directly to brigadier general in August 1941, Sutherland remained MacArthur's chief of staff until 1946, rising finally to the rank of lieutenant general.

For the next important post in USAFFE, the deputy chief of staff, MacArthur chose Lt. Col. Richard J. Marshall who had occupied a similar position in the Military Advisor's office. Promoted rapidly, first to colonel and in December 1941 to brigadier general, Marshall had, in MacArthur's opinion, "no superior as a supply officer in the Army."[15]


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PHILIPPINE SCOUTS at Fort McKinley firing a 37-mm. antitank gun in training, above; below, engineers preparing sections for a pontoon bridge.


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U.S. Army in the Philippines
When General MacArthur assumed command of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, the Philippine Department consisted of 22,532 men, 11,972 of whom were Philippine Scouts.[16] Of the 1,340 officers, 775 were reservists on active duty. The largest group of men--7,293--was assigned to the infantry, and the Coast Artillery Corps was next with 4,967. Almost the entire strength of the command was stationed on Luzon.
The largest single U.S. Army unit in the Philippines was the Philippine Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright. Theoretically, it was a square division, but was not equipped as such, and lacked a brigade organization and some of its organic elements. All of the enlisted men in the division, except those in the 31st Infantry and a few military police and headquarters troops, were Philippine Scouts; the 31st was the only American infantry unit in the Islands composed entirely of Americans. in addition to this regiment, the Philippine Division contained the 45th and 57th Infantry (PS).[17] Authorized strength for these Scout regiments was 2,435 officers and men, and for the 31st, 1,729. In July 1941 the former were slightly below strength and the latter was 402 overstrength in officers and enlisted men.[18]

Field artillery components of the Philippine Division consisted of the two-battalion 24th Regiment (truck-drawn British 75-mm. guns) with 843 officers and enlisted men, and one battalion of the 23d, with 401 men and armed with 2.95-inch mountain guns (pack). Plans existed for the organization at a later date of the 25th Field Artillery and a separate battalion of 155-mm. guns for use with the division. The division also included the standard engineer, ordnance, signal, military police, medical, and quartermaster units. The total strength of the Philippine Division on 31 July was 10m473 men, distributed as shown in Table 1.

The Philippine Division rarely functioned as a division, for its elements were scattered. headquarters and the bulk of the division were at Fort William McKinley, just south of the city. The 31st Infantry was stationed at the Post of manila, in the city itself, and a battalion of the 12th Quartermaster Regiment was located in the Manila port area. The 1st Battalion, less one company, of the 45th Infantry was stationed at the Post of Limay on the southeast coast of the Bataan peninsula. The rest of the division, including the artillery components, the 12th Ordnance Company, and a platoon of the quartermaster regiment, was at Fort Stotsenburg, about fifty miles north of Manila, close to Clark Field.

The major nondivisional U.S. Army ground elements in the Philippines in July


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Table 1--Strength of Philippine Division, 31 July 1941



Enlisted
Unit Total Officer Total American Philippine
Scouts
All Units
10,473 *516 9,957 2,036 7,921
Hq and Hq Co 181 30 151 4 147
Special Troops 5 5 0 0 0
31st Infantry 2,100 114 1,986 1,986 0
45th Infantry 2,265 117 2,148
2,147
57th Infantry 2,279 118 2,161 0 2,161
23d FA Regt 401 10 391 0 391
24th FA Regt 843 39 804 0 804
12th MP Co 136 5 131 45 86
12th QM Regt 592 18 574 0 574
12th Med Regt 421 22 399 0 399
12th Ord Co 142 3 139 0 139
12 Sig Regt 227 10 217 0 217
14th Engr Regt 870 24 846 0 846
4th Vet Co 11 1 10 0 10
* Includes 15 Philippine Scout Officers: 2 Hq, 2 Sp Trs, 3 45th Inf, 1 57th Inf, 5 24th FA Regt, 1 12th QM Regt, and 1 14th Engr.
Source: Phil Dept, Machine Rcds Unit Station Strength and Misc., Officer and Enlisted Men, Jul 41.

1941 included the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, a cavalry regiment, two field artillery regiments, and quartermaster, signal, and military police units. The Harbor Defenses were commanded by Maj. Gen. George F. Moore, who had his headquarters at Fort Mills on Corregidor. They included not only the defenses of Corregidor, but also those on Caballo Island (Forth Hughes), El Fraile (Fort Drum), and Carabo (Fort Frank)--all at the entrance to Manila Bay--and Fort Wint on Grande Island at the entrance to Subic Bay.

The 26th Cavalry was a Philippine Scout organization with two squadrons of three troops each. It was considerably smaller than a similar regiment in the United States and had a strength of 784 enlisted men and 54 officers. The home station of the regiment, except for one troop, was at Fort Stotsenburg; Troop F was stationed at Nichols Field, south of Manila.[19] Also at Fort Stotsenburg were two Philippine Scout field artillery regiments, the 86th and 88th the first with a strength of 388 and the second with 518 men.

Service and supply elements in the Philippine Department at the end of July 1941 totaled approximately 2,500 officers and men, exclusive of those service with the Air Forces. The largest part of these troops were assigned to quartermaster and medical units, stationed at the various posts on Luzon, and at Pettit Barracks in Zamboanga


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(Mindanao). A military police company, the 808th, was stationed in Manila, as were the headquarters of the Philippine Department and of USAFFE. (See Table 2.)
On 4 August, the air forces in the Philippines were brought under the control of MacArthur's headquarters, "except for routine administration and supply," and redesignated the USAFFE Air Force. It was only a token force. Of the 210 aircraft in the Islands, only the thirty-one P-40Bs could be considered modern aircraft; the others, consisting of P-26s, P-35s, B-10s, B-18s, A-29s, C-39s and observation planes, were largely obsolescent. One field alone, Clark Field near Fort Stotsenburg, could accommodate heavy bombers.[20]

Air Forces headquarters was located at Nielson Field on the outskirts of Manila; the majority of the planes were based at either Nichols, also near Manila, or Clark Field. The 4th Composite Group at Clark Field had under it a headquarters squadron, three pursuit squadrons, one bombardment squadron, and an observation squadron. The 20th Air Base Group at Nichols Field contained miscellaneous supporting units, including the 27th and 28th Materiel Squadrons, and the 19th Air Base Squadron. Total strength of the air forces was 254 officers and 2,049 men.[21]

With the establishment of USAFFE, the Philippine Department became a subordinate command. The headquarters staff was left largely intact, although General MacArthur designated some of its members to serve on his staff in addition to their regular duties, but the mission of the Department was narrowed until its principal task became the training and supply of the Philippine Army. In effect, it became a service command, "and administrative echelon," MacArthur explained, "analogous to a Corps Area."[22] Planning and the tactical control of field troops. organized into task forces, were now centered in USAFFE.

Under the circumstances, there seemed little need for the services of so senior an officer as General Grunert, and MacArthur recommended that he be relieved and another officer, "who had not enjoyed such high command" be appointed to the position. Point out that Grunert would complete his tour of duty in less than four months, MacArthur declared, "It would be advantageous to relieve him, as I am loath, as long as he is here, to contract the functions of the Department Commander. ..."[23] The War Department accepted this suggestion and on 23 October names MacArthur commander of the Philippine Department, relieved Grunert, and ordered him back to he United States.[24] Thus, the Philippine Department, which had been for so long the highest Army command in the Far East, became, in fact first and later in name, a service command. The headquarters


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Table 2--Strength and Composition of U.S. Army Troops in Philippine Islands, 31 July 1941



Enlisted
Unit Total Officers Total American Philippine Scouts
All Units 22,532 a1,434 21,098 9,161 11,937

Hq USAFFE 5 5 0 0 0
Hq and Hq Det Phil Dept 289 125 164 163 1
Philippine Division 10,473 516 9,957 2,036 7,921
26th Cavalry 838 54 784 0 784
43 Infantry 329 16 313 0 313
86th FA 388 12 376 0 376
88th FA 518 17 501 0 501
808th MP Co 69 4 65 65 0

Harbor Defenses (Ft Mills) 5,360 204 5,156 3,698 1,458
Hq and Hq Btry 418 32 386 316 70
59th CA 1,415 34 1,381 1,381 0
60th CA 1,896 41 1,855 1,855 0
91st CA 783 26 757 0 757
92d CA 653 26 627 0 627
USAMPb Harrison 47 7 40 36 4
Station Hospital 144 35 109 109 0
Chemical Warfare Det 4 3 1 1 0

Air Corps 2,407 275 2,132 2,132 0
Headquarters 109 18 91 91 0
4th Composite Group 1,393 232 1,161 1,161 0
20th Air Base Group 842 19 823 823 0
Tow Target Det 42 1 41 41 0
Weather Det 21 5 16 16 0

Service Detachments 1,836 188 1,648 1,065 583
Quartermaster Corps 505 31 474 182 292
Medical Dept 526 132 394 233 161
Ordnance Dept 173 9 164 164 0
Corps of Engineers 196 7 189 189 0
Signal Corps 348 6 342 224 118
Chemical Warfare Service 68 2 66 54 12
Finance Dept 20 1 19 19 0

Otherc 20 18 2 2 0
a Includes 26 Philippines Scout Officers.
b U.S. Army Mine Planter.
c Includes officers and enlisted men for which no specific unit was indicated.
Source: Phil Dept, Machine Rcds Unit Station Strength and Misc., Officers and Enlisted Men, Jul 41.


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which had made the plans and preparations for war had no tactical control when war came.


CEREMONY AT CAMP MURPHY, RIZAL, 15 August 1941, marking the induction of the Philippine Army Air Corps. Behind Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, from left to right, are Lt. Col. Richard K. Sutherland, Col. Harold H. George, Lt. Col. William F. Marquat, and Maj. LeGrande A. Diller.
Philippine Army: Mobilization and Training
The major task of the hurriedly assembled staff of Headquarters, USAFFE, was to work out a plan for the mobilization, training, and supply of the Philippine Army. Within a few days of his appointment, General MacArthur had selected 1 September as the day when mobilization of the Philippine Army would start. This left thirty days in which to select camp sites, enlarge and improve existing camps for the first reservists, and build new camps.
The integration of the armed forces of the Philippine Commonwealth into the service of the United States was to be gradual. Elements of the ten reserve divisions were to be called into service at regular intervals until 15 December 1941, when the mobilization would be complete. The Philippine Army Air Corps would be inducted separately. Reserve units engaged in their normal yearly training were not to be inducted unless war came. it was hoped in this way to continue the development of the Commonwealth's defense program and at the same time mobilize and train the Philippine Army. Commonwealth forces coming under United States control would retain their national integrity; they would have their own uniforms, rations, military law, scale


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of pay, and promotion list; would requisition through their own supply channel until 1 December; but would be paid by the U.S. Army. The Regular Army of the Philippine Commonwealth and the Constabulary were not to be inducted immediately.
A construction program was to be started immediately since there was only enough housing for about one third of the 75,000 men scheduled for induction. Camp sites would have to be selected and facilities for training built. The first units called would use existing or temporary quarters and, as camps were completed, additional units would be inducted. By 15 December, when the last units would be mobilized, the entire construction program would be completed.[25]

On 15 August, less than three weeks after he had assumed command of USAFFE, General MacArthur incorporated into the American forces the Philippine Army Air Corps of six squadrons and approximately 500 men. A few days later he issued orders calling into the service by 1 September ten infantry regiments--one from each of the reserve divisions--and the cadres of most of the other divisional units.[26]

As housing facilities became available, USAFFE brought other elements of the Philippine Army into service. Early in November the second infantry regiment of each of the divisions was called up, to be joined before the end of the month by the division headquarters and the service elements. But time was running out. When war came not a single division had been completely mobilized and not one of the units was a full strength. None of the antitank battalions was ever organized because of the lack of equipment, and the shortage of organic artillery forced many of the divisions to go into battle without full artillery components.[27]

To each division were assigned about forty U.S. Army officers and twenty American or Philippine Scout noncommissioned officers who served as instructors. The officers were usually attached to division and regimental staffs; the enlisted men served in battalions and companies. The position of the instructor was an anomalous one. When one instructor asked for a clarification of his status he was told: "You have no command status. you have no authority. But you are directly responsible for the success or failure of the regiment."[28]

While it is not possible to state definitely the strength of the Philippine Army by mid-December 1941, an estimate of the number of Filipinos available for combat can be


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made. On the basis of the authorized strength of a Philippine Division (7,500 men), the total divisional strength of the Philippine Army reserve would be 75,000 men. To this figure must be added the strength of the 1st Regular Division, a part of the regular establishment, and the Constabulary, plus nondivisional and provisional units formed after the start of war. A rough estimate of the number of men in the Philippine Army, therefore, would be approximately 120,000, a figure which is confirmed by later reports on the number of men surrendered and by postwar claims for back pay and pensions.[29]
Upon mobilization of the first elements of the ten reserve divisions, schools were established to provide special training for officers and selected enlisted men of the Philippine Army who in turn would train other Filipinos as the mobilization progressed. At Baguio a command and staff school was established to train a few American colonels and senior Philippine officers who were to command Philippine Army divisions, as well as certain key officers slated for the staffs of these divisions. Schools for the training of infantry cadres were established in each division mobilization district. Americans and Philippine Scouts served as instructors, and the students consisted of the cadres of the infantry elements of the divisions, regimental and battalion staffs, company commanders, platoon leaders, first sergeants, cooks, and company clerks. In addition to specialized training, each student took the basic infantry course.[30]

Coast artillery schools were established at Fort Mills (Corregidor) and Fort Wint (Grande Island), and field artillery cadres were trained at the Philippine Army training center at Camp Dau, near Fort Stotsenburg, Two engineer schools were established, with instructors from the 14th Engineer Regiment (PS), the engineer component of the Philippine Division. A signal and a medical school were organized at Fort William McKinley; a second medical school was established for the training of nondivisional cadres; and in the port area of Manila was a quartermaster motor transport school.[31]

The training of the Philippine Army was beset with numerous difficulties. In many units there was a serious language barrier, not only between the American instructors and the Filipinos but also among the Filipinos. The enlisted men of one division spoke the Bicolanian dialect, their Philippine officers usually spoke Tagalog, and the Americans spoke neither.[32] In the Visayas the problem was even more complicated since ost of the officers were Tagalogs from central Luzon and the men spoke one or more of the many Visayan tongues. Transfers were made to alleviate the situation, but no real solution to the problem was ever found.[33]


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Discipline in Philippine Army units left much to be desired, according to U.S. Army officers. Until war was declared there were no courts-martial. Since the Philippine Army retained its national integrity after induction, Philippine Army headquarters was responsible for discipline and punishment. Many of the officers and noncommissioned officers were untrained and unqualified for their assignments. There were some first sergeants and company clerks who could neither read nor write.
Training facilities and equipment were almost nonexistent. Target ranges had been hurriedly improvised but many units went into battle without ever having fired their weapons. There was a serious shortage in almost all types of equipment. The clothing was old and much of it not fit for use; shoes were rubber soled and quickly wore out. The uniform usually consisted of the blue fatigue suit, and when that wore out, anything that could be found. There were serious shortages in personal equipment, blankets, mosquito bars, and shelter halves. The supply of Enfield and Springfield '03 rifles was adequate but that of many other weapons, entrenching tools, gas masks, and steel helmets was not. After the outbreak of war, units secured supplies wherever and whenever they could, and the amount was usually dependent upon the initiative and energy of the individual supply officers.[34]

The difficulties of mobilizing and training the Philippine Army can best be shown by following the experiences of a single division. The 31st Division (PA) was organized on 18 November at a camp near San Marcelino in Zambales Province, Luzon.[35] An American Army officer, Col. Clifford Bluemel, who had commanded the 45th Infantry (PS) and later the staff and command school at Baguio, was assigned as division commander with a staff consisting of Philippine Army and Scout officers.

When the division was organized, in camp was still under construction. The buildings were about 80 percent complete, and in the absence of a water system a few shallow wells were used. Work on sanitary installations had just begun.

One of the division's regiments, the 31st Infantry (PA), had been mobilized on 1 September and was already in camp when Colonel Bluemel arrived. The 32d Infantry had been inducted on 1 November but did not join the division until 6 December. Starting on 25 November the third infantry element of the division, the 33d Infantry, began arriving in camp. Between 18 and 30 November, the medical battalion, motor transport, service, and division headquarters companies were mobilized. The signal company was organized on 1 December when a cadre which had been in training at Fort McKinley for three months arrived at camp. The 31st Field Artillery Regiment began mobilizing on 12 December, after the outbreak of war, and was finally organized with two battalions on 26 December, after the division had already moved to Bataan.

The 31st Division, like the other Philippine Army divisions, suffered from shortages in personal and organizational equipment.


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Every man was equipped with a rifle, the .30-caliber Enfield rifle used by American troops in World War I. The stock was too long for the small Philippine soldier and the weak extractor often broke and could not be replaced. of the other infantry weapons, there was one Browning automatic rifle for each infantry company and eight .30-caliber Browning water-cooled machine guns for each machine gun company. Each infantry regiment had two .50-caliber machine guns and six 3-inch trench mortars, 70 percent of the ammunition for which proved to be duds. Artillery equipment for the division consisted of eight World War I model 75-mm. guns which were delivered to the division on the evening of 7 December, without sights or fire control equipment. The 31st Field Artillery, therefore, could only organize two of the six firing batteries it was authorized.
Organic transportation was virtually nonexistent. Division headquarters and the motor transport company could muster only one sedan, one command car, one bantam car, one 1 1/2-ton truck and one 1/2-ton truck. The 31st Infantry had only one command car and eight 1 1/2-ton trucks, which was more than the other regiments had. The division was deficient also in communications and engineer supplies, office equipment, spare parts, and tools.

The personal equipment of the Philippine soldier in the 31st Division left much to be desired. His uniform consisted of shorts, short-sleeved shirt, and cheap canvas shoes with a rubber sole that wore out in about two weeks. Some of the men were fortunate enough to draw leather shoes. For warmth and protection against mosquitoes, the Filipino wore his blue fatigue uniform. There were no surplus stocks for issue or replacement. The division received no steel helmets, but did have gas masks.

Rations were purchased by the individual organizations with funds furnished the unit commanders by the Philippine Army. Zambales Province, where the 31st Division was located, did not produce enough food for its own needs, and as additional units joined the division the procurement of food became a difficult problem. The division railhead scheduled to open on 1 December did not begin operations until a week later, after the war had started, because of the inexperience of Filipino supply officers.

The training program of the division began theoretically on 1 September, when the 31st Infantry was mobilized, but it was not until 24 November that the men first fired their rifles on the target range at the Olongapo Naval Station. One battalion fired fifty rounds per man, and another twenty-five rounds. The third battalion never fired at all, for permission to use the range was withdrawn by the Navy when the 4th Marine Regiment arriving from China, was stationed at Olongapo. No other range was available for the division, and the one under construction was not completed when war came.

The men in the 31st Infantry were more fortunate than those in the other regiments, many of whom never even fired a rifle before entering combat. Nor had their previous five and a half months' training under Philippine Army supervision been of much value, according to Colonel Bluemel. Practically none of the men, he observed, had fired as many as five rounds with the rifle or the .30-caliber machine gun. None had fired the .50-caliber machine gun or the mortar. Bluemel's judgment of the value of the early training program was borne out


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by the experience of other Philippine Army division commanders.[36]
The field artillery units received even less training than the infantry. As soon as the two batteries were organized, they fired two rounds per gun. Most of the men had never fired a 75-mm. gun and many had never even seen one fired. The engineer battalion had been constructing a road since its arrival in camp and received no other training. The cadre of the signal company was commanded by a Filipino who had received inadequate training at Fort McKinley. This man, who was to be division signal officer, was unable to establish radio communication with units a mile away in the same camp.

All officers in the division, with few exceptions, were Filipinos with little or no knowledge of tactics or of the method of training troops for combat. in some cases, their understanding of English was inadequate. As the war progressed, it became necessary to replace many of the Filipino battalion commanders with American officers. The enlisted men seemed to the division commander to be proficient in only two things; "one, when an officer appeared, to hell attention in a loud voice, jump up and salute; the other, to demand 3 meals per day."[37]


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[The_Bammo]

Aug. 21, 2005, 9:48AM

Army planners looking at Iraq in '09
One scenario has troops' numbers equal with today's
By ROBERT BURNS
Associated Press

WASHINGTON - It's no secret that the Pentagon is eyeing a possible cut in U.S. troop levels in Iraq next year.

Less well-known is that Army planners are preparing for quite a different scenario: that they will have to sustain, through multiple rotations, the current number of troops for another four years.

"We are now into '07-'09 in our planning," Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff, said in an Associated Press interview Saturday. By that he meant his planners are sketching out which combat and support units can be called upon to sustain the current force levels through 2009.


Thinking 'worst case'
Because decisions about future troop levels are not his to make, Schoomaker is planning for the "worst case" in terms of what will be required in the years ahead. He said the number could be adjusted lower, if called for, by slowing the force rotation or by shortening tours for soldiers.

Schoomaker said commanders in Iraq and others who are in the chain of command will decide how many troops will be needed next year and beyond. His responsibility is to provide them, trained and equipped.

About 138,000 U.S. troops, including about 25,000 Marines, are now in Iraq.

Schoomaker's comments come amid indications from Bush administration officials and commanders in Iraq that the size of the U.S. force may be scaled back next year if certain conditions are achieved.

Among those conditions: an Iraqi constitution must be drafted in coming days; it must be approved in a national referendum; and elections must be held for a new government under that charter.


Troop rotations
Schoomaker, who spoke aboard an Army jet en route to Washington from Kansas City, Mo., made no predictions about the pace of political progress in Iraq. But he said he is confident the Army could provide the current number of forces to fight the insurgency for many more years. The 2007-09 rotation he is planning would go beyond President Bush's term in office, which ends in January 2009.

Schoomaker was in Kansas City for a dinner Friday hosted by the Military Order of the World Wars, a veterans' organization.

"We're staying 18 months to two years ahead of ourselves" in planning which active-duty and National Guard and Reserve units will be provided to meet the commanders' needs, Schoomaker said in the interview.

The main active-duty combat units that are scheduled to go to Iraq in the coming year are the 101st Airborne Division, based at Fort Campbell, Ky., and the 4th Infantry Division from Fort Hood. Both did one-year tours earlier in the war.

The Army has changed the way it arranges troop rotations.

Instead of sending a full complement of replacement forces each 12-month cycle, it is stretching out the rotation over two years.

The current rotation, for 2005-07, will overlap with the 2006-08 replacements. Beyond that, the Army is putting together the plan for the 2007-09 switch, Schoomaker said.

With the recent deployments of National Guard brigades from Georgia and Pennsylvania, the National Guard has seven combat brigades in Iraq ? the most of the entire war ? plus thousands of support troops.

Along with the Army Reserve and Marine Reserve, they account for about 40 percent of the total U.S. forces in Iraq. Schoomaker said that will be scaled back next year to about 25 percent as newly expanded active-duty divisions such as the 101st Airborne enter the rotation.


Deadly month
August has been the deadliest month of the war for the National Guard and Reserve, with at least 42 fatalities thus far. Schoomaker disputed the suggestion by some that the Guard and Reserve units are not fully prepared for the hostile environment of Iraq.

"I'm very confident that there is no difference in the preparation" of active-duty soldiers and the reservists, who normally train one weekend a month and two weeks each summer, unless they are mobilized. Once called to active duty, they go through the same training as active-duty units.

In internal surveys, some in the reserve forces have indicated to Army leaders that they think they are spending too much time in predeployment training, not too little, Schoomaker said.

"Consistently, what we've been (hearing) is, 'We're better than you think we are, and we could do this faster,' " he said. "I can promise you that we're not taking any risk in terms of what we're doing to prepare people."

http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/nation/3319037

[Marine]

Chapter III: The Reinforcement of the Philippines
When General MacArthur assumed command of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, there was no program in the War Department for any immediate large-scale reinforcement of the Islands. As a matter of fact, the War Department specifically told MacArthur that he could have "no additional forces, except approximately 400 reserve officers to assist in training the Philippine Army. . ."[1] Within a few days, there was a complete reversal of policy in the War Department. The first sign of this change came on 31 July when General Marshall approved a proposal by the War Plans Division to reinforce the Islands' defense "in view of the possibility of an attack."[2] The next day MacArthur was informed that he would receive substantial reinforcements and Marshall told his immediate staff, "It was the policy of the United States to defend the Philippines." This statement so impressed the Chief of the War Plans Division that he entered it in his office diary.[3]
The reasons for this change of policy are nowhere explicitly stated. Undoubtedly many factors both political and military contributed to the American Government's firm stand in July and August 1941. One of these was recognition of the potentialities of air power and especially of the Army's new heavy bomber, the B-17, called the Flying Fortress. in Stimson's opinion, the success of B-17 operations in Europe was responsible for creating an optimistic view in the War Department that the Philippines could be successfully held.[4] A striking force of such heavy bombers, it was argued, would act as a deterrent to Japanese advances southward and would strengthen the United States position in the Far East.

Another cause for optimism was the recall of General MacArthur to active duty. No one knew as much as he about the Philippines and no one believed more completely that it could be held if the Japanese allowed sufficient time for reinforcement.

The possibility of establishing an effective defense against Japan in the Philippines and thereby preventing Japanese domination of the Western Pacific without altering the major lines of strategy already agreed upon "had the effect," Stimson said, "of making the War Department a strong proponent of maximum delay in bringing the


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Japanese crisis to a climax. . . In their [Stimson's and Marshall's] eyes the Philippines suddenly acquired a wholly new importance and were given the highest priority on all kinds of military equipment."[5]
Ground Forces
The first official War Department program for a large-scale reinforcement of the Philippines during this period was proposed by War Plans on 14 August. In a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, General Gerow argued that those reasons which had limited the size of the Philippine garrison--lack of funds, personnel, and equipment, plus the inability of the Navy to support a large force--were no longer entirely valid. With its present strength, he pointed out, there was a real doubt in the Philippine garrison could resist a Japanese attack, a contingency which he considered probably in view of Japan's attitude. To strengthen the garrison and increase its chances of holding Luzon and especially Manila Bay, General Gerow recommended that the Philippines be reinforced by antiaircraft artillery, modern combat planes, and tanks. The amount that could be sent, Gerow admitted, would be limited by the number of ships available for transport duty to he Far East. "The best that can be done at the moment," therefore, would be "to adopt a definite plan of reinforcement and carry it forward as availability of shipping permits."[6]
Gerow's recommendations were approved and two days later, on 16 August, General MacArthur was notified that the following units would sail from San Francisco between 27 August and 5 September: the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) consisting of 76 officers and 1,681 enlisted men; the 194th Tank Battalion (less Company , with 54 tanks, 34 officers, and 390 enlisted men; and one company (155 men) of the 17th Ordnance Battalion.[7]

There had been some mention earlier of the possibility of sending a division to the Philippines, and on 5 September the Chief of Staff asked MacArthur if he wanted a National Guard division (probably the 41st). MacArthur replied that he did not need this division since he already had one U.S. Army division (the Philippine Division) and was mobilizing ten Philippine Army divisions. He asked instead for authority to reorganize the theoretically square Philippine Division into a triangular division, adding, "Equipment and supply of existing forces are the prime essential." "I am confident if these steps are taken with sufficient speed," he said, "that no further major reinforcement will be necessary for accomplishment of defense mission."[8]

The reinforcement of the Philippines now enjoyed the highest priority in the War Department. MacArthur's request for permission to reorganize the Philippine Division was approved immediately. He was promised additional aircraft as well as the funds needed for airfield construction and the antiaircraft guns and equipment to protect the fields once they were built. "I have directed," wrote General Marshall, "that United States Army Forces in the


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Philippines be placed in highest priority for equipment including authorized defense reserves for fifty thousand men."[9]
As a result, General MacArthur's requests for men and supplies during the next few months received almost instant approval by the War Department. "I wish to express my personal appreciation for the splendid support that you and the entire War Department have given me along every line since the formation of this command," he told the Chief of Staff in a personal letter. "With such backing the development of a completely adequate defense force will be rapid."[10]

Through no fault of the War Department or a lack of desire on the part of the Chief of Staff, General MacArthur's confidence in the rapid development of an adequate defense for the Philippines was not entirely justified. The task was a heavy one and limited by many factors beyond the control of the military. The industrial capacity of the United States was only just beginning to turn to the production of war material; the needs of a rapidly expanding citizen army had to be met; Great Britain and Russia were in critical need of supplies; and shipping space was extremely limited.

The reinforcements promised MacArthur on 16 August were dispatched with the greatest speed and by 12 September General Marshall was able to report considerable progress. The antiaircraft artillery regiment, the tank battalion of 54 tanks, and reserve supplies had already been shipped from San Francisco. During the month, 50 more tanks, and 50 self-propelled mounts for 75-mm. guns were to be sent.[11]

These reinforcements reached MacArthur before the end of September. The arrival of the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment (AA) gave him 12 additional 30-inch guns, 24 37-mm. guns, and a similar number of machine guns. Armored reinforcement consisted of the 192d and 194th Tank Battalions each with 54 tanks. And he could count on 25 more 75-mm. guns on self-propelled mounts (SPM) already en route and due to arrive in Manila on 15 October.[12]

The arrival of the two tank battalions with their 108 light tanks, M-3, were a welcome addition to the Philippine garrison. On 21 November a Provisional Tank Group consisting of the 192d and 194th Tank Battalions and the 17th Ordnance Company (Armored) was established, with Col. James R.N. Weaver in command.

As Military Advisor, MacArthur had proposed a plan to protect the inland seas by emplacing heavy coastal guns at the entrance to the key straits leading into these waters. The War Department had approved this plan and sent 24 155-mm. guns (without fire control equipment) to the Philippine Commonwealth to carry out this program, scheduled for completion in April 1942. MacArthur now proposed to extend this plan to include northern Luzon and asked the War Department for 4 12-inch and 4 8-inch railway guns, 22 more 155-mm. guns, and 30 searchlights. When


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emplaced, he argued, these guns would present an enemy advancing on Manila with "fixed position gunfire, the lightest of which will be of sufficient proportions to interfere with troop landings and the operations of lightly armored vessels."[13] The letter was received in Washington at the beginning of December, too late to result in action.[14]
General MacArthur's request for authority to reorganize the Philippine Division as a triangular division had been readily granted. To accomplish this reorganization, MacArthur said he needed an infantry regiment, a field artillery headquarters and headquarters battery, two field artillery battalions, a reconnaissance troop, and a military police platoon for the division.[15] The War Department agreed to provide these units and the staff began the detailed work necessary to select and ship them.

MacArthur's plans for the Philippine Division were explained in a letter he wrote to the Chief of Staff on 28 October. He wished, he said, to have the division at war strength and trained intensively for combat. "It would be impolitic," he thought, "to increase the number of Philippine Scouts above the authorized 12,000, for all recruits would be taken from Philippine Army reservists to serve at higher rates of pay than the Philippine Army can pay." The only way, then, to increase the strength of the division was to secure an additional infantry regiment and two battalions of artillery from the United States. With these units and the American 31st Infantry, he could form two American combat teams in the Philippine Division. The Scouts thus released could be used to bring the 91st and 92d Coast Artillery Regiments of the Harbor Defenses up to strength, retain several small units already in existence, and provide station complements for Forts McKinley and Stotsenburg. The Philippine Division would then be free to train for combat and would be available "for instant use." "The entire plan,": he told General Marshall, "will be placed in effect upon the arrival of the new regiment."[16]

MacArthur's plans included also the establishment of four major tactical commands, directly subordinate to USAFFE. On 2 October he requested authority, which was readily granted, to activate a headquarters and headquarters company for each "with average strength approximately those of Army Corps."[17] He also asked for army and corps troops to establish a balanced force, and for a field artillery brigade, a chemical company, three signal battalions, a medical supply depot, and a military police company, all at full strength and with complete organization and individual equipment. By the end of October he had requested almost 12,000 men: for the Philippine Division, 209 officers and 4,991 enlisted men; for army and corps troops, 340 officers and 6,392 enlisted men.

During the next month MacArthur continued to ask for additional units and individual specialists, and by the middle of November the War Department had approved for transfer to Manila 1,312 officers, 25 nurses, and 18,047 enlisted men belonging to units. Individual specialists totaled 200 officers and 2,968 enlisted men. The units


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selected for this overseas movement, including the 34th Infantry for the Philippine Division, were scheduled for shipment, forst for January 1942, but later, ironically, on 8 December 1941.[18]
These reinforcements and supplies were all intended for the regular U.S. Army establishment; requisitions for the Philippine Army were made and considered separately. His plan of induction had hardly been completed when MacArthur began to request from the War Department large amounts of supplies for his Philippine troops. During August alone he called for 84,500 Garand rifles (M1), 330 .30-caliber machine guns, 326 .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, 450 37-mm. guns, 217 81-mm. mortars, 288 75-mm. guns with high-speed adapters, and over 8,000 vehicles of all types for the ten Philippine Army divisions he planned to mobilize.[19] On 18 September he was told that because of lend-lease commitments and production schedules it would not be possible to send most of these items. Especially unwelcome was the news that Garand rifles were not available and that the Philippine Army divisions would have to continue to use the Enfield and '03s with which they were equipped.[20]

MacArthur nevertheless continued to request equipment for the Philippine Army, asking, on 10 September, for 125,000 steel helmets, as well as chemical, engineer, and signal equipment. A month later, the request for the helmets was approved. They would be shipped immediately and the other equipment would be shipped at a later date.[21]

Since the Philippine Army was not limited in size by law as was the U.S. Army, MacArthur was in the unique position of being able to raise as many troops as the War Department could equip. On 20 September he asked for "complete organizational equipment" for a number of army and corps units to be formed principally of Philippine Army personnel. Included were 2 155-mm. and 3 105-mm. howitzer regiments, a motorized battalion of 155-mm. guns, 3 antitank gun battalions, and service, signal, and medical units.[22] These requests were approved and a shipping schedule established.

Most disturbing was the shortage of light artillery and machine guns in the Philippine Army divisions. By the end of September the Philippine Army had only 48 75-m. guns. At least 240 were required to equip the artillery regiments of the ten reserve divisions and another 36 for filed artillery training centers. Also needed were 37-mm. guns for the antitank battalions and .40-caliber machine guns. Realizing that the supply of these guns was limited, MacArthur expressed a willingness to accept as substitutes obsolete models or smaller weapons. "Strongly recommend," he appealed to the Chief of Staff, "improvisation to the extent of providing substitute


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arrangement in spite of lowered efficiency for any types available in the United States."[23] By mid-November, the War Department had taken action to ship 40 105-mm. howitzers to the Philippines. These weapons were to be given to U.S. Army units and would release to Philippine Army units a like number of 75s. In addition, 10 75-mm. pack howitzers were to be taken from the vital Canal Zone and 48 British 75-mm. guns and 123 .30-caliber machine guns from the equally important Hawaiian garrison for the Philippine Islands, an indication of the importance which the defense of the archipelago had acquired in the eyes of the War Department. From the United States itself would come 130 75-mm. guns, 35 37-mm. guns (M1916) and 14 .30-caliber machine guns.[24]
No action was taken until October to supply the thousands of vehicles MacArthur had requested. During that month a large number of jeeps, ambulances, trucks, and sedans became available and on the 15th the War Department released these vehicles for the Philippine Army, "subject to the availability of shipping."[25] A request for clothing for the Philippine Army was also approved, as was the equipment for ten 250-bed station hospitals and 180 sets of regimental infirmary equipment.[26] An early requisition for 500,000 C rations and enough 55-gallon drums to hold 1,000,000 gallons of gasoline was filled during the summer. Strangely enough, the drums arrived filled although the gasoline had not been requested. This unexpected windfall proved extremely fortunate. A large portion of the gasoline was stored on Bataan and was most welcome during the campaign.[27]

The approval of requisitions and orders for shipment did not result in any immediate increase in the supplies of the Philippine Army. Time was required to order the stocks from depots and factories, pack and ship them to the port of embarkation, find the vessels to transport them, and finally get them to the Islands. In September, the Navy began sending cruiser escorts with Army transports and merchant ships on their voyages between Hawaii and Manila. This procedure frequently meant that the transports had to stop at Honolulu, sometimes reload, and then sail west at a speed equal to that of the slowest vessel in the convoy.

The shipment of supplies was dependent upon the number of cargo vessels available to the Army. This number was never large and the Navy, for a time, threatened even this limited supply. In September the Navy announced its intention to convert three transports to escort carriers. General Marshall protested this decision vigorously,


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pointing out to the Chief of Naval Operations that it would delay the delivery of much-needed reinforcements to MacArthur by over two months.[28] Despite the favorable outcome of this protest, a large backlog of troops and approximately 1,100,000 tons of equipment destined for the Philippines had piled up in U.S. ports or depots by November. A group of shipping experts, including representatives from the War Department General Staff, Office of the Quartermaster General, the Navy, and Maritime Commission, met on 10 November to discuss ways of breaking the shipping block. As a result of this meeting a shipping schedule was established which recognized the priority of the Philippines over Hawaiian defenses and advanced the troop movements scheduled for mid-January to 17 and 20 December. Altogether, nine vessels were assigned to the Manila route, to sail in November and December. They would bring to MacArthur one light and one heavy bombardment group, a pursuit group, one reconnaissance squadron, a regiment of infantry, a brigade of field artillery, two battalions of light artillery, together with ground and air service units.[29] Had these vessels, the last of which was to leave the United States on 20 December, reached the Philippines the Japanese would have faced a far stronger force when they landed on Luzon.
Air Forces
In July 1941 the air force in the Philippines was still a token force, unable to withstand "even a mildly determined and ill-equipped foe."[30] Air Corps headquarters in Washington had been urging for some time that additional planes be sent to the Philippines and the Joint Board, early in 1940, had proposed an increase in air strength for the island garrison.[31] The following July 1941 Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, chief of the newly created Army Air Forces, came forward with the strongest proposal yet made for the reinforcement of the Philippines. This proposal called for the transfer to the Philippines of four heavy bombardment groups, consisting of 272 aircraft with 68 in reserve, and two pursuit groups of 130 planes each.[32] These planes, wrote Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, chief of the Air Staff, would not be used for an offensive mission, but to maintain "a strategical defensive in Asia."[33]
General Arnold's recommendations, approved in August, were not easily carried out.[34] To have raised that number of planes in the summer of 1941 would have meant stripping the fields in the United States as well as all other overseas bases. Moreover, many of the heavy bombers were still on the production lines. What could be scraped together was shipped immediately and by mid-August General Gerow


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reported to he Chief of Staff that thirty-one modern fighters of the P-40 type were on their way. Meanwhile General Arnold made arrangements to send fifty more directly from the factory. These, too, were soon on their way and by 2 October had arrived in the Philippines.[35] Some weeks earlier a historic flight of nine Flying Fortresses had reached Manila by air. These planes were part of the 19th Bombardment Group (H), which had been selected for transfer to he Far East. After a flight from Hamilton Field near San Francisco, the Group's 14th Squadron, under Maj. Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., left Hickam Field in Hawaii on 5 September for Clark Field via Midway, Wake, Port Moresby, and Darwin. This pioneering 10,000-mile flight, almost all of it over water, was successfully concluded a week later, establishing the fact that the Philippines could be reinforced by air.[36] But the Midway-Wake route could not be considered safe in the event of war with Japan since it passed over the mandated islands and work was begun after October to develop a South Pacific ferry route.[37]
Once the pioneering flight had been successfully concluded, all heavy bombers sent to the Philippines went by air via the Central Pacific route. On 9 September, General Marshall told MacArthur that two additional squadrons of the 19th Group--the 30th and 93d--would leave the next month. At that time the ground echelon of the two squadrons and the headquarters sailed from San Francisco. The air echelon of twenty-six B-17s followed soon after. By 22 October these planes had arrived at Hickam Field in Hawaii. After a short stopover they flew on to Clark Field where all but two reported on 4 November; the other two followed soon after.

The flight of the 30th and 93d Squadrons was one in a scheduled series which called for the shipment of 33 heavy bombers in December, 51 in January 1942, and 46 more in February. By March 1942 the War Department planned to have 165 heavy bombers in the Philippines.[38]

Scheduled for shipment after the 19th Bombardment Group was the 7th. The ground echelon reached Hawaii late in November and was held there until naval escort could be secured. The air echelon, scheduled to fly to the Philippines via the Midway route during late November and early December, had completed only the first leg of the journey before war came.[39]

In addition to heavy bombers, MacArthur was also promised a light bombardment group of three combat squadrons. Selected for shipment was the 27th


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Bombardment Group (l). The Air Corps experienced some difficulty in securing the 52 A-24s for this group but by early November the planes had been collected. The pilots and ground personnel reached the Philippines during November but the A-24s, loaded on a separate transport, were held at Hawaii with the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group and failed to reach their destination.[40]
At the end of November General Marshall summarized for the Secretary of War the air reinforcements already shipped or scheduled for shipment to the Philippines. At that time, he noted, there were 35 B-17s already in the Islands and 52 A-24s were due there--they never arrived--on the 30th. Fifty P-40s had reached MacArthur in September, Marshall explained to Stimson, thus giving him a total of 81 modern fighters. In addition, 24 P-40s had left San Francisco on 19 October, and 40 more on 9 November. By 31 December, General Marshall estimated, the Philippines should have a total of 240 fighters of the latest type.[41]

By now the War Department was fully committed to an all-out effort to strengthen the air defense of the Philippines. General Arnold, in a letter to the commander of the Hawaiian Air Force on 1 December, expressed this view when he wrote: "We must get every B-17 available to he Philippines as soon as possible."[42] His statement was not an exaggeration. On the outbreak of war there were 913 U.S. Army aircraft scattered among the numerous overseas bases. This number of aircraft included 61 heavy, 157 medium, and 59 light bombers and 636 fighters. more than half of the total of heavy bombers and one sixth of the fighters were already in the Philippines.[43] (See Table 3) Within a few months this number would have been raised considerably.

The arrival of the bombers and additional pursuit planes, with the promise of more to come, led to a reorganization of the air forces in the Philippines. Early in the fall of 1941 General MacArthur had asked for Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, a senior air officer, as his air commander. This request was approved and early in October Brereton was relieved of command of the Third Air Force and called to Washington. There, in a series of conferences at Army Air Force headquarters, the form of the new air organization, to be called the Far East Air Force, was drawn up.[44]

General Brereton arrived in the Philippines on 3 November. He saw MacArthur that same day, and gave him the latest views about reinforcements and developments within the War Department. By the middle of the month the reorganization of the air forces had been accomplished and a short time later MacArthur told Marshall,


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[ghostgovt]

Concerning Iraq: Army command officers



http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/11781484.htm

May. 31, 2005

U.S. Army officers cite lack of troops in key region

By Tom Lasseter

Knight Ridder Newspapers

TAL AFAR, Iraq - U.S. Army officers in the badland deserts of northwest Iraq, near the Syrian border, say they don't have enough troops to hold the ground they take from insurgents in this transit point for weapons, money and foreign fighters.

From last October to the end of April, there were about 400 soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division patrolling the northwest region, which covers about 10,000 square miles.

"Resources are everything in combat . . . there's no way 400 people can cover that much ground," said Maj. John Wilwerding, of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, which is responsible for the northwest tract that includes Tal Afar.

"Because there weren't enough troops on the ground to do what you needed to do, the (insurgency) was able to get a toehold." said Wilwerding, 37, of Chaska, Minn.

During the past two months, Army commanders, trying to pacify the area, have had to move in some 4,000 Iraqi soldiers; about 2,000 more are on the way. About 3,500 troops from the 3rd ACR took control of the area this month, but officers said they were still understaffed for the mission.

"There's simply not enough forces here," said a high-ranking U.S. Army officer with knowledge of the 3rd ACR. "There are not enough to do anything right; everybody's got their finger in a dike."

The officer spoke on the condition of anonymity because of concern that he'd be reprimanded for questioning American military policy in Iraq.

The Army has no difficulty in launching large-scale operations to catch fighters in "an insurgent Easter egg hunt," the officer said. "But when we're done, what comes next?"

Control of the area is seen as key to stemming the insurgency in the rest of Iraq. More than 650 Iraqis have been killed since the nation's interim government took office April 28.

May also is turning out to be the deadliest month since November for U.S. troops in Iraq, with 65 reported killed so far by insurgents, according to figures tabulated by Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, a group that tracks coalition troop deaths from Department of Defense releases.

"This town is kind of like a staging point for the rest of the country," said Capt. Geoff Mangus, 25, of Milledgeville, Ga., an Army intelligence officer in Tal Afar. "They know that weapons and foreign fighters can filter through here unscathed."

Army officials in northwest Iraq described a two-year cat-and-mouse game with insurgents who move from one outpost or town to the next, sustaining casualties but buoyed by an influx of fighters slipping across the Iraq-Syria border, which in many places isn't patrolled. From their sanctuaries in the area, the fighters then spread across the country, some volunteering to be suicide bombers.

They funnel cash, arms and recruits to the insurgency, Mangus said. Repeated efforts to secure the area have failed.

[Marine]

Chapter IV: Prewar Plans, Japanese and American
By the summer of 1941, as the United States was beginning to strengthen the Philippines, Japan had reached "the crossroads of her fate."[1] The economic sanctions imposed by America, Great Britain, and the Netherlands had cut her off from the strategic materials necessary to support he war in China and threatened eventually to so weaken the Japanese economy as to leave Japan defenseless in a struggle with a major power. The leaders of Japan were faced with a difficult choice. They could either reach agreement with the United States by surrendering their ambitions in China and southeast Asia, or they could seize Dutch and British possessions by force.
The second course, while it would give Japan the natural resources so sorely needed, almost certainly meant war with Great Britain and the Netherlands. In the view of the Japanese planners, the United States would also oppose such a course by war, even if American territory was not immediately attacked. Such a war seemed less dangerous to Japan in the fall of 1941 than ever before and, if their calculations proved correct, the Japanese had an excellent chance of success. The British Empire was apparently doomed and the menace of Russian action had been diminished by the German invasion of that country and by the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact.

The major obstacles to Japan's expansion in southeast Asia was the United States. But Japanese strategists were confident they could deprive the United States of its western Pacific base in the Philippines and neutralize a large part of its Pacific Fleet at the start of the war. In this way they hoped to overcome America's potential superiority and seize the southern area rapidly.

The Japanese Plan
Japanese strategy for a war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands was apparently developed in about six months by Imperial General Headquarters.[2] Although this strategy was never

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embodied on one document, it can be reconstructed from separate Army and Navy plans completed by the beginning of November 1941. Thereafter it was modified only in minor respects.[3]
Strategic Concepts
The immediate objective of Japanese strategy was the capture of the rich Dutch and British possessions in southeast Asia, especially Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. (Map 1) To secure these areas the Japanese believed it necessary to destroy or neutralize the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, deprive the United States of its base in the Philippines, and cut America's line of communications across the Pacific by the seizure of Wake and Guam. Once the coveted area to the south had been secured, Japan would occupy strategic positions in Asia and in the Pacific and fortify them immediately with all the forces available, chief reliance being placed on mobile naval and air forces. These positions were to form a powerful defensive perimeter around the newly acquired southern area, the home islands, and the vital shipping lanes connecting Japan with its sources of supply.
The area marked for conquest formed a vast triangle, whose east arm stretched from the Kuril Islands on the north, through Wake, to the Marshall Islands. The base of the triangle was formed by a line connecting the Marshall Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, Java, and Sumatra. The western arm extended from Malaya and southern Burma through Indochina, and thence along the China coast. The acquisition of the island-studded area would give to Japan control of the resources of southeast Asia and satisfy the national objectives in going to war. Perhaps later, if all went well, the area of conquest could be extended. But there is no evidence that it was the intention of the Japanese Government or of the Army and Navy to defeat the United States, and so far as is known no plan was ever drawn up for that purpose. Japan apparently planned to fight a war of limited objectives and, having gained what it wanted, expected to negotiate for a favorable peace.

Operations to secure these objectives and other would begin on the first day of war when Japanese military and naval forces would go into action simultaneously on many fronts. Navy carrier-based aircraft would attack Pearl Harbor. Immediately after, joint Army and Navy air forces would strike American air and naval forces in the Philippines, while other Japanese forces hit British Malaya. After these simultaneous attacks, advance Army units were to be landed at various point in Malaya and the Philippines to secure air bases and favorable



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page 53


MAP 1

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positions for further advances. The results thus obtained were to be immediately exploited by large-scale landings in the Philippines and in Malaya and the rapid occupation of those areas. At the same time Thailand was to be "stabilized," Hong Kong seized, and Wake and Guam occupied. The conquest of the Bismarck Archipelago would follow the seizure of the last two islands.
The occupation of Java and Sumatra was to begin after this initial period. While Java was being attacked from the air, Singapore was to be taken under fire from the land side by Japanese forces moving down the Malay Peninsula. Once that fortress was reduced these forces were to move on to northern Sumatra. Meanwhile, other Japanese forces moving southward through the Netherlands Indies were to join those in Sumatra in the final attack on Java.

Japanese planners anticipated that certain events might require an alteration of these plans and accordingly outlined alternative courses of action. The first possibility was that the Japanese-American negotiations then in progress would prove successful and make war unnecessary. If this unexpected success was achieved all operations were to be suspended, even if the final order to attack had been issued.[4] The second possibility was that the United States might take action before the attack on Pearl Harbor by sending elements of the Pacific Fleet to the Far East. In that event, the Combined Fleet would be deployed to intercept American naval forces. The attacks against the Philippines and Malaya were to proceed according to schedule.

If the Americans or British launched local attacks, Japanese ground forces were to meet these while air forces were brought into the area to destroy the enemy. These local operations were not to interrupt the execution of the grand plan. But if the United States or Great Britain seized the initiative by opening operations first, Japanese forces were to await orders from Imperial General Headquarters before beginning their assigned operations.

The possibility of a Soviet attack or of a joint United States-Soviet invasion from the north was also considered by the Japanese planners. If such an attack materialized, operations against the Philippines and Malaya would be carried out as planned while air units would be immediately transferred from the home islands or China to destroy Russian air forces in the Far East. Ground forces were to be deployed to Manchuria at the same time to meet Soviet forces on the ground.

The forces required to execute this ambitious plan were very carefully calculated by Imperial General Headquarters. At the beginning of December 1941 the total strength of the Army was 51 divisions, a cavalry group, 59 brigade-size units, and an air force of 51 air squadrons. In addition, there were ten depot divisions in Japan.[5] These forces were organized into area commands widely scattered throughout the Far East. (See Table 5.) The largest number of divisions was immobilized in China and large garrisons were maintained


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Table 5--Organization and Disposition of Japanese Army, 1 December 1941 Area Headquarters Divisions Brigadesa Air Squadrons
Homeland Imperial GHQ
General Defense Commandb
Eastern District Army


Central District Army

Western District Army
Northern District Army
1st Air Group

52 Division
Imperial Guard, 2d, 3d, 51st,
57th Depot Divisions
53, 54th Divisions
4th, 5th, 55th Depot Divisions
6th, 56th Depot Divisions
7th Divisions


4


3

3
1









9
Manchuria Kwantung Army
3d Army
4th Army
5th Army
6th Army
20th Army
Defense Command
Air Corps (Directly attached units)
2d Air Group 10th, 28th, 29th Divisions
9th, 12th Divisions
1st, 14th, 57th Divisions
11th, 24th Divisions
23d Division
8th, 25th Divisions


1
4
5
4
1
4
5








21
35
China China Expeditionary Army
North China Area Army
1st Army
12th Army
Mongolia Garrison Army
11th Army
23d Army


1st Air Brigade
27th, 35th, 110th Divisions
36th, 37th, 41st Divisions
17th, 32d Divisions
26th Division, Cavalry Group
3d, 6th, 13th, 34th, 39th, 40th Divisions
38th, 51st, 104th Divisions
4th Division (at Shanghai under direct
command of Imperial GHQ

5
3
3
1
2
5
1










16
Korea Korea Army 19th, 20th Divisions
Formosa Formosa Army
For the South Southern Armyc
14th Army
15th Army
16th Army
25th Army

3d Air Group
5th Air Group
21 Ind Air Unit
South Seas Detachment
(at Bonins under direct command of Imperial GHQ) 21st Division
16th, 48th Divisions
33d, 55th Divisions
2d Division
Imperial Guard,
5th, 18th, 56th Divisions





1
1

1






1






48
20
2


Total 51 59 151

Remarks:
[a] Brigades include all brigade size units, i.e., garrison forces in China and Manchuria, South Seas Det., etc.
[b] Command of the General Defense Command over each district army and the 1st Air Army in the Homeland was limited to only the matters pertaining to defense of the Homeland.
[c] Although the 21st, 33d and 56th Divisions were assigned to the Southern Army, they were still in North China, Central China and Kyushu, respectively, on 1 December 41. Their departures from the above areas were 20 January 1942, 13 December 1941 and 16 February 1942, respectively. 56th Division was placed under the command of 25th Army on 27 November 1941.
Source: Compiled by the Reports and Statistical Division of the Demobilization Bureau, 14 January 1952.


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in Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, and the home islands. Only a small fractions of Japan's strength, therefore, was available for operations in southeast Asia and the Pacific.
In the execution of this complicated and intricate plan, the Japanese planners realized, success would depend on careful timing and on the closest co-operation between Army and Navy forces. no provision was made for unified command of the services. Instead, separate agreements were made between Army and fleet commanders for each operation. These agreements provided simply for co-operation at the time of landing and for the distribution of forces.

The Plan for the Philippines
The Japanese plan for the occupation of the Philippines was but part of the larger plan for the Greater East Asia War in which the Southern Army was to seize Malaya and the Netherlands Indies while the Combined Fleet neutralized the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The Southern Army was organized on 6 November 1941, with Gen. Count Hisaichi Terauchi, who had been War Minister in 1936, as commander. His orders from Imperial General Headquarters were to prepare for operations in the event that negotiations with the United States failed. Under his command were placed the 14th, 15th, 16th and 25th Armies, comprising ten divisions and three mixed brigades. Southern Army's mission in case of war would be to seize American, British, and Dutch possessions in the "southern area" in the shortest time possible. Operations against the Philippines and British Malaya were to begin simultaneously, on orders from Imperial General Headquarters.[6]
Southern Army immediately began to prepare plans for seizure of the southern area. To 14th Army, consisting of the 16th and 48th Divisions and the 65th Brigade, was assigned the task of taking the Philippine Islands. The campaign in the East Indies was to be under the control of 16th Army; the 15th Army would take Thailand. The 25th Army was assigned the most important and difficult mission, the conquest of Malaya and Singapore, and was accordingly given four of the Southern Army's ten divisions. Air support for these operations was to be provided by two air groups and an independent air unit. The 5th Air Group was assigned to the Philippine campaign.[7]

Beginning on 10 November a number of meetings attended by the senior army and navy commanders were held in Tokyo to settle various details in the execution of the plans. The commanders of the 14th, 16th, and 25th Armies, in session with the Premier (who was also the War Minister), the Army Chief of Staff, and General Terauchi, were shown the Imperial General Headquarters operational plans, given an outline of the strategy, and told what their missions would be in the event of war. In the discussion s between Army and Navy commanders that followed this meeting a few modifications were made in the general strategy and specific operational plans


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were put into final form.[8] On the 20th Southern Army published its orders for the forthcoming operations, omitting only the date when hostilities would start.
Specific plans for the seizure of the Philippine Islands were first developed by the Japanese Army's General Staff in the fall of 1941. As the plans for the southern area were developed, the Philippine plan was modified to conform to the larger strategy being developed and to release some of the forces originally assigned 14th Army to other, more critical operations. The final plan was completed at the meetings between the 14th Army commander, Lt. Gen. Masaharu Homma, and the commanders of the 5th Air Group (Lt. Gen. Hideyoshi Obata), the 3d Fleet (Vice Adm. Nishizo Tsukahara), held at Iwakuni in southern Honshu from the 13th to the 15th of November.

The general scheme of operations for the Philippine campaign called for simultaneous air attacks starting on X Day, the first day of war, against American aircraft and installations in the Philippines by the 5th Air Group (Army) and the 11th Air Fleet (Navy). While the air attacks were in progress, advance Army and Navy units were to land on Batan Island, north of Luzon; at three places on Luzon: Aparri, Vigan, and Legaspi; and at Davao in Mindanao. The purpose of these landings was to seize airfields. The air force was to move to these fields as soon as possible and continue to the destruction of the American air and naval forces from these close-in bases.

When the major part of American air strength had been eliminated, the main force of the 14th Army was to land along Lingayen Gulf, north of Manila, while another force would land at Lamon Bay, southeast of the capital. These forces, with close air support, were to advance on Manila from the north and south. It was expected that the decisive engagement of the campaign would be fought around Manila. Once the capital was taken, the islands defending the entrance to Manila Bay were to be captured and Luzon occupied.

Imperial General Headquarters and Southern Army expected General Homma to complete his mission in about fifty days; at the end of that time, approximately half of the 14th Army, as well as the Army and Navy air units, were to leave the Philippines for operations in the south.[9] The remaining elements of the 14th Army were then to occupy the Visayas and Mindanao as rapidly as possible. Little difficulty was expected in this phase of the operations and detailed plans were to be made at the appropriate time. The Japanese considered it essential to the success of Southern Army operations to gain complete victory in the Philippines before the end of March 1942. Forces assigned to the Philippine campaign, small as they were, were required in other more vital areas.

The Japanese plan was based on a detailed knowledge of the Philippine Islands and a fairly accurate estimate of American and Philippine forces.[10] The Japanese were aware that the bulk of the American and


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Philippine forces was on Luzon and that the U.S. Army garrison had been increased since July 1941 from 12,000 to 22,000. Eighty percent of the officers and 40 percent of the enlisted men were thought to be Americans and the rest, Filipinos. American troops were regarded as good soldiers, but inclined to deteriorate physically and mentally in a tropical climate. The Filipino, though inured to the tropics, had little endurance or sense of responsibility, the Japanese believed, and was markedly inferior to the American as a soldier. The American garrison was correctly supposed to be organized into one division, an air units, and a "fortress unit" (Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays). The division was mistakenly thought to consist of two infantry brigades, a field artillery brigade, and supporting services. The Japanese knew that MacArthur also had one battalion of fifty-four tanks--which was true at that time--and believed that there was also an antitank battalion in the Islands. The harbor defenses were know to consist of four coast artillery regiments, including one antiaircraft regiment.
The Japanese estimated that the American air force in the Philippines was composed of one pursuit regiment of 108 planes, one bombardment regiment of about 38 planes, one pursuit squadron of 27 planes, and two reconnaissance squadrons of 13 planes. American aircraft were based on two major fields on Luzon, the Japanese believed. They placed the pursuit group at Nichols Field, in the suburbs of Manila, and the bombers at Clark Field. Other fields on Luzon were thought to base a total of 20 planes. The Japanese placed 52 navy patrol and carrier-based fighter planes at Cavite and 18 PBYs at Olangapo.

The strength of the Philippine Army and the Constabulary, the Japanese estimated, was 110,000 men. This strength, they thought would be increased to 125,000 by December. The bulk of the Philippine Army, organized into ten divisions, was known to consist mostly of infantry with only a few engineer and artillery units. This army was considered very much inferior to the U.S. Regular Army in equipment, training, and fighting qualities.

Though they had a good picture of the defending force, Japanese knowledge of American defense plans was faulty. They expected that the Philippine garrison would make its last stand around Manila and when defeated there would scatter and be easily mopped up. No preparation was made for an American withdrawal to the Bataan peninsula. In October, at a meeting of the 14th Army staff officers in Tokyo, Homma's chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Masami Maeda, had raised the possibility of a withdrawal to Bataan. Despite his protests, the subject was quickly dropped.[11] Staff officers of the


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48th Division also claimed to have discussed the question of Bataan before the division embarked at Formosa. The consensus then was that while resistance could be expected before Manila and on Corregidor, Bataan "being a simple, outlying position, would fall quickly."[12]
The Japanese originally planned to assign to the Philippine campaign six battalions for the advance landings, two full divisions for the main landings, and supporting troops. So meager were the forces available to Southern Army that General Homma was finally allotted for the entire operations only 2 divisions, the 16th and 48th. Supporting troops included 2 tank regiments, 2 regiments an 1 battalion of medium artillery, 3 engineer regiments, 5 antiaircraft battalions, and a large number of service units. Once Luzon had been secured, most of the air units and the 48th Division, as well as other units, were to be transferred to the Indies and Malaya. At that time Homma would receive the 65th Brigade to mop up remaining resistance and to garrison Luzon. The 16th Division would then move south and occupy the Visayas and Mindanao.

The 14th Army commander had also counted on having the support of a joint Army and Navy air force of 600 planes. But one of the two air brigades of the 5th Air Group and some of the naval air units originally destined for the Philippines were transferred to other operations. The addition of the 24th Air Regiment to the 5th Air Group at the last moment brought the combined air and naval strength committed to the Philippine campaign to about 500 combat aircraft.

Air and Naval Plans
Air operations against the Philippines would begin on the morning of X Day when planes of the Army's 5th Air Group and the Navy's 11th Air Fleet would strike American air forces on Luzon. These attacks would continue until American air strength had been destroyed. For reasons of security, there was to be no aerial or submarine reconnaissance before the attack, except for high-altitude aerial photographs of landing sites.[13]
By arrangement between the Japanese Army and Navy commanders, Army air units were to operate north of the 16th degree of latitude, a line stretching across Luzon from Lingayen on the west coast to the San Ildefonso Peninsula on the east. Naval air units were made responsible fore the area south of this line, which included Clark Field, the vital Manila area, Cavite, and the harbor defenses. This line was determined by the range of Army and Navy aircraft. The Navy Zero fighters had the longer range and were therefore assigned missions in the Manila area. Carrier planes of the 4th Carrier Division, originally based at Palau, were to provide


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air support for the landings at Davao and Legaspi.[14]
Once the advance units of 14th Army had landed and secured airfields, the main force of the 5th Air Group was to move up to the fields at Aparri, Laoag, and Vigan, while naval air units would base on the field at Legaspi and Davao. The airfield near Aparri was mistakenly believed to be suitable for heavy bombers and the bulk of the 5th Air Group was ordered there. It was anticipated that the forward displacement of the air forces would be completed by the sixth or seventh day of operations. During this week a naval task force from the 3d Fleet was to provide protection for the convoys and carry out antisubmarine measures in the Formosa area and in Philippine waters.

Naval surface forces assigned to the Philippines operations were under the 3d Fleet. This fleet, commanded by Admiral Takahashi, was primarily an amphibious force with supporting cruisers and destroyers. Its principal mission was to support the landings in the Philippines by minelaying, reconnaissance, escorting the troops during the voyage to the targets, and protecting them during landing operations. No provision was made for surface bombardment of shore objectives, presumably in the interests of secrecy.[15]

Because of the many landings to be made at widely scattered points in the Philippine archipelago it was necessary to organize the 3d Fleet into numerous special task forces. For the landing on Batan Island the Third Surprise Attack Force of 1 destroyer, 4 torpedo boats, and other small craft was organized. The naval escort for the landing of the advance units on Luzon consisted of the First, Second, and Fourth Surprise Attack Forces, each composed of 1 light cruiser, 6 or 7 destroyers, transports, and other auxiliary craft. The Legaspi Force (Forth Surprise Attack Force) was to be staged at Palau, and since it could not be supported by the planes of the 11th Air Fleet it included the South Philippines Support Force, comprising the 4th Carrier Division and 2 seaplane carriers with 20 planes each. The units landing at Davao were to be covered by this same force.

To support the main landings Admiral Takahashi created the Close Cover Force, which he commanded directly, composed of 1 light and 2 heavy cruisers, and 2 converted seaplane tenders. Two battleships and 3 heavy cruisers from Vice Adm. Nobutake Kondo's 2d Fleet then operating in Malayan and East Indian waters, were also to support he landings, which would be additionally supported by 3 of the escort groups. The Lamon Bay Attack Group, in addition to 1 light cruiser and 6 destroyers, included 6 converted gunboats and 1 battalion of naval troops.

Concentration of Forces
Early in November the forces assigned to the Philippine campaign began to move to their designated jump-off points. The 5th Air Group arrived in southern Formosa from Manchuria during the latter part of the month. On 23 November two of the advance detachments stationed in Formosa boarded ship at Takao and sailed to Mako in the Pescadores. Between 27

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November and 6 December the 48th Division (less detachments) concentrated at Mako, Takoa, and Kirun, and made final preparations for the coming invasion. The first units of the 16th Division sailed from Nagoya in Japan on 20 November, followed five days later by the remainder of the division. Part of this division concentrated at Palau and the main body at Amami Oshima in the Ryukyus. On 1 December, when General Homma established his command post at Takao, he received final instructions from Southern Army.Operations would begin on 8 December (Tokyo time).
The Plan of Defense
Plans for the defense of the Philippine Islands had been in existence for many years when General MacArthur returned to active duty. The latest revision of these plans, completed in April 1941 and called War Plan ORANGE-3 (WPO-3), was based on the joint Army-Navy ORANGE plan of 1938, one of the many "color" plans developed during the prewar years. Each color plan dealt with a different situation, ORANGE covering an emergency in which only the United States and Japan would be involved. In this sense, the plan was strategically unrealistic and completely outdated by 1941. Tactically , however, the plan was an excellent one and its provisions for defense were applicable under any local situation.[16]
WPO-3
In War Plan ORANGE it was assumed that the Japanese attack would come without a declaration of war and with less than forty-eight hours' warning so that it would not be possible to provide reinforcements from the United States for some time. The defense would therefore have t be conducted entirely by the military and naval forces already in the Philippines, supported by such forces as were available locally. The last category included any organized elements of the Philippine Army which might be inducted into the service of the United States under the Tydings-McDuffie Act.
An analysis of Japanese capabilities, as of 1 July 1940, led the Philippine Department planners to believe that the enemy would send an expedition of about 100,000 men to capture Manila and its harbor defenses n order to occupy the Philippines, sever the American line of communications, and deny the United States a naval base in the Far East. It was expected that this operation would be undertaken with the greatest secrecy and that it would precede or coincide with a declaration of war. The garrison therefore could expect little or no warning. The attack would probably come during the dry season, shortly after the rice crop was harvested, in December or January. The enemy was assumed to have extensive knowledge of the terrain and of American strength and dispositions, and would probably be assisted by the 30,000 Japanese in the Islands.

Army planners in the Philippines expected the Japanese to make their major attack against the island of Luzon and to employ strong ground forces with heavy air and naval support. They would probably


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land in many places simultaneously in order to spread thin the defending forces and assure the success of at least one of the landings. Secondary landings or feints were also expected. It was considered possible that the Japanese might attempt in a surprise move to seize the harbor defenses with a small force at the opening of hostilities. Enemy air operations would consist of long-range reconnaissance and bombardment, probably coming without warning and coordinated with the landings. The Japanese would probably also attempt to establish air bases n Luzon very early in the campaign in order to destroy American air power and bomb military installations.
Under WPO-3 the mission of the Philippine garrison was to hold the entrance to Manila Bay and deny its use to Japanese naval forces. There was no intention that American troops should fight anywhere but in central Luzon. U.S. Army forces, constituting the Initial Protective Force, had the main task of preventing enemy landings. Failing in this, they were to defeat those forces which succeeded in landing. If, despite these attempts, the enemy proved successful, the Initial Protective Force was to engage in delaying action but not at the expense of the primary mission, the defense of Manila Bay. Every attempt was to be made to hold back the Japanese advance while withdrawing to the Bataan peninsula. Bataan was recognized as the key to the control of Manila Bay, and it was to be defended to the "last extremity."

To reinforce the Initial Protective Force, Philippine Army units were to be mobilized immediately upon the outbreak of war and would be ready to participate in the defense of Bataan. If used as anticipated in WPO-3, which was prepared before July 1941, the Philippine Army would be under the command of the Philippine Department commander and would be utilized to defend Manila Bay. The plan did not contemplate using Philippine Army units for the defense of the entire archipelago.

WPO-3 divided Luzon, the principle theater of operations, into six sectors with a mobile reserve. Detailed plans for the defense of each sector were made by the sector commanders. The commander of the Philippine Division, the only U.S. Army division in the Philippines, in addition to conducting operations in the sector or sectors assigned to him, was to organize the defenses of Bataan and to command operations there if necessary.

Air support was to be provided by the 4th Composite Group, the predecessor of the Far East Air Force. This group was to obtain information of enemy location, strength, and disposition by continuous reconnaissance, attack the Japanese whenever conditions were favorable, and support ground operations. in order to keep this air force in operation as long as possible, its planes were to be employed "conservatively" and every effort was to be made to supplement the strength of the group by taking over the Philippine Army Air Corps and commercial planes.

The navy was to set up defensive coastal areas at the entrances to Manila and Subic Bays. At the first sign of an attack a defensive area was to be set up around Manila to control all shipping and a patrol system established for Manila and Subic Bays. The Army, through the Department quartermaster, would control all shore facilities at the port of Manila.

The supply plan in WPO-3 was a complicated one. Provision had to be made to


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supply the six sectors during the initial phase of operations and to withdraw supplies into Bataan where a base would be established to support a prolonged defense. Supply officers estimated that they would probably require enough supplies for 31,000 men (the Bataan Defense Force)--later raised to 40,000 men--to last 180 days. The defense reserve already on hand, except for ammunition, was considered by the planners sufficient to supply such a force for the period required in a defensive situation. The bulk of the supplies was stored in the Manila area which lacked adequate protection from attacking aircraft. In the event it became necessary to move the supplies to Corregidor and Bataan, the enemy would have to be delayed long enough to carry out this operation.
Prior to the start of operations on Bataan, supplies were to be moved rapidly to the peninsula. At the same time the Corregidor reserves, set first at a 6-month supply for 7,000 men and then for 10,000 men, were to be brought up to the authorized allotment. Philippine Department depots and installations in the Manila area were to be maintained just as long as the tactical situation permitted. Depots at Fort Stotsenburg, Fort William McKinley, Tarlac, San Fernando, Manila, and elsewhere would supply the various sectors. A Bataan Service Area was to be established, initially to assist in organizing the final defense positions and ultimately to supply the entire force after it had withdrawn to Bataan for the last stand. All stock in the Department, except those of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, would eventually be transferred to Bataan.

Plans for local procurement included the exploitation of the Manila area with its commercial warehouses, factories, and transportation facilities. Procurement districts, coinciding roughly with the sector boundaries, would be established later.

Troops would take the field with two days of Class I supplies (rations), one emergency rations, and two days of fire. Class I and III supplies (gasoline and lubricants) would be issued automatically thereafter at rail or navigation heads; Class II, IV, and V supplies (clothing, construction and other heavy equipment, and ammunition) would be requisitioned from depots as needed. The issue of supplies to Philippine Army units would depend upon the speed with which they were mobilized and their location.

The transportation of troops and equipment, the planners realized, would be a difficult problem. There was a large number of passenger buses on Luzon, centrally organized and operated. The 4,000 trucks on the islands were of varying type, size, and condition and were mainly individually owned. Passenger buses were to be requisitioned immediately by the Army for use as personnel carriers. Since it would take longer to requisition trucks, cargo requirements were to be kept to an absolute minimum. In the initial move by the mobile forces toward the threatened beaches, little difficulty was expected with motor transportation. later, as supply requirements rose and as troops moved back toward Bataan (if the enemy could not be repelled at the beaches), motor pools were to be formed. When Philippine Army units were mobilized the drain on the motor transport services was expected to increase greatly since these units had no organic motor transportation.

Nothing was said in WPO-3 about what


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was to happen after the defenses on Bataan crumbled. Presumably by that time, estimated at six months, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have fought its way across the Pacific, won a victory over the Combined Fleet, and made secure the line of communications. The men and supplies collected on the west coast during that time would then begin to reach the Philippines in a steady stream. The Philippine garrison, thus reinforced, could then counterattack and drive the enemy into the sea.
Actually , no one in a position of authority at that time (April 1941) believed that anything like this would happen. Informed naval opinion estimated that it would require at least two years for the Pacific Fleet to fight its way across the Pacific. There was no plan to concentrate men and supplies on the west coast and no schedule for their movement to the Philippines. Army planners in early 1941 believed that at the end of six months, if not sooner, supplies would be exhausted and the garrison would go down in defeat. WPO-3 did not say this; instead it said nothing at all. And everyone hoped that when the time came something could be done, some plan improvised to relieve or rescue the men stranded 7,000 miles across the Pacific.[17]

The MacArthur Plan
General MacArthur had the answer to those who saw no way out of the difficulty in the Philippines. The defeatist and defensive WPO-3 was to be transformed into an aggressive plan whose object would be the defeat on any enemy that attempted the conquest of the Philippines. An optimist by nature, with implicit faith in the Philippine people, MacArthur was able to inspire the confidence and loyalty of his associates and staff. His optimism was contagious and infected the highest officials in the War Department and the government. By the fall of 1941 there was a firm conviction in Washington and in the Philippines that, given sufficient time, a Japanese attack could be successfully resisted.
In pressing for a more aggressive plan, enlarged in scope to include the entire archipelago, MacArthur could rely on having a far stronger force than any of his predecessors. His growing air force included by the end of November 1941 thirty-five B-17s and almost 100 fighters of the latest type. Many more were on their way. The performance of the heavy bombers in early 1941 justified the hope that the South China Sea would be successfully blockaded by air and that the Islands could be made a "self-sustaining fortress."[18]

MacArthur could also count on the Philippine Army's ten reserve divisions, then being mobilized and trained, and one regular division. During his term as Military Advisor, he had worked out the general concept of his strategy as well as detailed plans for the use of this national army. As commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East he could plan on the use of the regular U.S. Army garrison as well as the Philippine Army. He was in an excellent position, therefore, to persuade the War Department to approve his own concepts for the defense of the Philippines.

Almost from the date of his assumption of command, MacArthur began to think about replacing WPO-3 with a new


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plan.[19] From the first, as is evident from his establishment of the Philippine Coast Artillery Command, he apparently intended to defend the inland seas and the entrances to Manila and Subic Bays. By September his plans had progressed sufficiently to enable him to inform General Wainwright of his intention to reorganize the forces in the Philippines and to give that officer his choice of commands.[20]
The opportunity to request a change in plans for the defense of the Philippines came in October, after MacArthur received a copy of the new war plan, RAINBOW 5, prepared by the Joint Board some months earlier. This plan, which was world-wide in its provisions and conformed to arrangements with the British staff, called for a defensive strategy in the Pacific and Far East and recognized Germany as the main enemy in the event of a war with the Axis. Based on the assumption that the United States would be at war with more than one nation and would be allied with Great Britain, RAINBOW accepted implicitly the loss of the Philippines, Wake, and Guam. Like ORANGE, it assigned Army and Navy forces in the Philippines the mission of defending the Philippine Coastal Frontier, defined as those land and sea areas which it would be necessary to hold in order to defend Manila and Subic Bays. Also, as in ORANGE, the defense was to be conducted entirely by Army and Navy forces already in the Philippines, augmented by such local forces as were available.[21] No reinforcements could be expected.

MacArthur immediately objected to those provisions of RAINBOW relating to the Philippines and called for the revision of the plan on the ground that it failed to recognize either the creation of a high command for the Far East or the mobilization of the Philippine Army. In a strong letter to the War Department on 1 October, the former Chief of Staff pointed out that he would soon have a force of approximately 200,000 men organized into eleven divisions with corresponding corps and army troops, as well as a strengthened air force. There could be no adequate defense of Manila Bay or of Luzon, he said, if an enemy was to be allowed to land and secure control of any of the southern islands. With the "wide scope of possible enemy operations, especially aviation," he thought such landings possible. He urged, therefore, that the "citadel type defense" of Manila Bay provided in the ORANGE and RAINBOW plans be changed to an active defense of all the island sin the Philippines. "The strength and composition of the defense forces projected here," General MacArthur asserted, "are believed to be sufficient to accomplish such a mission." [22]

The reply form Washington came promptly. On the 18th General Marshall informed MacArthur that a revision of the Army mission had been drafted in the War Department and was then awaiting action by the Joint Board, "with approval


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GENERAL MACARTHUR with Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright on 10 October 1941.

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expected within the next ten days." MacArthur's recommendation that the Philippine Coastal Frontier be redefined to include all the islands in the archipelago, Marshall continued, would also be presented to the Joint Board for approval. The assignment of a broader mission than that contained in RAINBOW, Marshall explained, was made possible because of the increased importance of the Philippines "as a result of the alignment of Japan with the Axis, followed by the outbreak of was between Germany and Russia."[23] General Marshall took advantage of the fact that Brereton was just then leaving for the Far East to send his reply to MacArthur by personal courier.
Brereton arrived in Manila on 3 November and was warmly greeted by his commander in chief. After reading Marshall's note, MacArthur, in Brereton's words, "acted like a small boy who had been told that he is going to get a holiday from school." He jumped up from his desk, threw his arms around Brereton and exclaimed, "Lewis you are just as welcome as the flowers in May." Turning to his chief of staff, General Sutherland, he said, "Dick, they are going to give us everything we have asked for."[24]

With this notice that his plans would soon be approved by the Joint Board, MacArthur immediately organized his forces to execute the larger mission. On 4 November he formally established the North and South Luzon Forces, and the Visayan-Mindanao Force, all of which had actually been in existence for several months already.[25]

Approval by the Joint Board of the RAINBOW revisions requested by MacArthur was forwarded from Washington on 21 November. In the accompanying letter, General Marshall made the significant observation that air reinforcements to the Philippines had "modified that conception [purely defensive operations] of Army action in this area to include strong air operations in the furtherance of the strategic defensive."[26] He also told MacArthur to go ahead with his plans "on the basis of your interpretation of the basic war plan."

In the revised joint RAINBOW plan, the Philippine Coastal Frontier, which had been defined as consisting of Luzon and the land and sea areas necessary to defend that island, was redefined to include "all the land and sea areas necessary for the defense of the Philippine Archipelago."[27] In effect, this gave MacArthur authority to defend all of the Philippine Islands.

The Army task originally assigned in RAINBOW was simply to defend the coastal frontier. The November revision not only enlarged the coastal frontier but gave MacArthur the following additional tasks:


Support the Navy in raiding Japanese sea communications and destroying Axis forces.
Conduct air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases.
Co-operate with the Associated Powers in the defense of the territories of these Powers in accordance with approved policies and agreements.[28]

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MAP 2

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It also provided specifically for a defense reserve for 180 days, instead of the 90-day level originally granted to General Grunert. These additional tasks recognized the existence of an effective air force in the Philippines capable of striking at Japanese lines of communications and bases, such as Formosa, and the fact that the Philippine Army had been inducted into federal service by including it with forces available to accomplish the tasks assigned.
Once his plan to defend all of the islands had been approved, General MacArthur was able, on 3 December, to define the missions of the four major tactical commands created a month earlier. (Map 2) The North Luzon Force, which had been under the command of Brig. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr., from 3 to 28 November, now came under General Wainwright. This force had responsibility for the most critical sector in the Philippines, including part of the central plains area, Lingayen Gulf, the Zambales coast, and the Bataan peninsula. General Wainwright was instructed to protect airfields and prevent hostile landings in his area, particularly at those points opening into the central plains and the road net leading to Manila. In case of a successful landing the enemy was to be destroyed. In contrast to WPO-3, which provided for a withdrawal to Bataan, MacArthur's plan stated there was to be "no withdrawal from beach positions." The beaches were to "be held at all costs."[29]

Immediately on receipt of these instructions General Wainwright was to prepare detailed plans to execute his mission. Frontline units were to make a reconnaissance of their sectors and emplace their weapons. Positions four hours distant from the front lines were to be selected for the assembly of troops.

On 3 December, when Wainwright received his mission, his North Luzon Force consisted of three Philippine Army divisions--the 11th, 21st, and 31st--the 26th Cavalry (PS), one battalion of the 45th Infantry (PS) on Bataan, two batteries of 155-mm guns, and one battery of 2.95-inch mountain guns. The 71st Division (PA), though assigned to North Luzon Force, could be committed only on the authority of USAFFE. Wainwright was promised additional troops when they arrived from the United States or were mobilized by the Philippine Army.

The South Luzon Force, under Brig. Gen. George M. Parker, Jr., was assigned the area generally south and east of Manila. Like the force to the north, it was to protect the airfields in its sector and prevent hostile landings. General Parker was also enjoined to hold the beaches at all costs. The South Luzon Force was much smaller than that in the north. It consisted initially of only two Philippine Army divisions, the 41st and 51st, and a battery of field artillery. Additional units were to be assigned at a later date when they became available.[30]

The Visayan-Mindanao Force under Brig. Gen. William F. Sharp was charged with the defense of the rest of the archipelago. Its primary mission was to protect the airfields to be built in the Visayas; its secondary mission was to "prevent landings of hostile raiding parties, paying particular attention to the cities and essential public utilities." Since landing in force south of


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Luzon would not have had any decisive results, no mention was made of the necessity of holding the beaches.[31]

Table 6--Assignment of Forces, USAFFE, 3 December 1941
Troop Assignment
Sector U.S. Army Philippine Army
North Luzon Force Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.)
26th Cavalry (PS)
One bn, 45th Inf (PS)
Btry A, 23 FA (pk) (PS)
Btrys B and C, 86th FA (PS)
66th QM Troop (Pk) (PS) 11th Division
21st Division
31st Division
71 Division (used as
directed by USAFFE)
South Luzon Force Force Hq and Hq Co (U.S.)
Hq and Hq Btry, Btry A, 86th FA (PS) 41st Division
51st Division
Visayan-Mindanao Force Force Hq and Hq Co (PS)

61st Division
81st Division
101st Division
Reserve Force Hq, Philippine Dept
Philippine Division (less one bn)
86th FA (PS) less dets
Far East Air Force 91st Division
Hq, Philippine Army


Harbor Defenses Headquarters
59th CA (U.S.)
60th CA (AA) (U.S.)
91st CA (PS)
92d CA (PS)
200th CA (U.S.), assigned to PCAC

Source: Ltr Orders, CG USAFFE to CG NLF, SLF, V-MF, 3 Dec 41, AG 381 (12-3-41) Phil Rcds; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 17-18.
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The Visayan-Mindanao sector would also include the coastal defenses of the inland seas when these were completed and General Sharp was to provide protection for these as well. One battalion of the force was to be prepared to move to Del Monte in Mindanao with the mission of guarding the recently completed bomber base there. No American or Philippine Scout troops were assigned to the Visayan-Mindanao Force, except those in headquarters. [NOTE: The 1st Bn, 43d Infantry (PS) was stationed at Zamboanga, Mindanao, to guard the alternate B-17 staging field.] For the rest, the force consisted of the 61st, 81st, and 101st Division, all Philippine Army. (See Table 6)

On Luzon, between the North and South Luzon Forces was the reserve area, including the city of Manila and the heavily congested area just to the north. This area was directly under the control of MacArthur's headquarters and contained the Philippine Division (less one battalion), the 91st Division (PA), the 86th Field Artillery (PS),


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the Far East Air Force, and the headquarters of the Philippine Department and the Philippine Army. The defense of the entrance to manila and Subic Bays was left, as it always had been, to Gen. Moore's Harbor Defenses augmented by the Philippine Coast Artillery Command.[32]
During the last few months of 1941 the training of both U.S. Army and Philippine Army units progressed at an accelerated pace. The strength of the Scouts, an elite organization with a high esprit de corps, had been brought up to its authorized strength of 12,000 quickly. Membership in Scout units was considered a high honor by Filipinos and the strictest standards were followed in selection. To provide the training for the new Scout units, as well as Philippine Army units, a large number of officers was authorized for USAFFE. By the fall of 1941 they began to arrive in Manila. Training of U.S. Army units was also intensified during this period. By the beginning of December, General Wainwright later wrote, "the American and Philippine Scout organizations were fit, trained in combat principles and ready to take the field in any emergency." The omission of Philippine Army units is significant.[33]

The Last Days of Peace
Already there had been warnings of an approaching crisis. On 24 November the Pacific and Asiatic Fleet commanders had been told that the prospects for an agreement with Japan were slight and that Japanese troop movements indicated that "a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam was a possibility."[34] Three days later a stronger message, which the War Department considered a "final alert," went out to Hawaii and the Philippines. The Army commanders, MacArthur and lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, were told:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in RAINBOW 5. . .[35]
At the same time the Navy Department sent to its Pacific commanders an even stronger message, to be passed on to the Army commanders in Hawaii and the Philippines. "This dispatch," it read, "is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan . . . have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected


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within the next few days." Navy commanders were alerted against the possibility of a Japanese invasion of the Philippines, Thailand, or Malaya, and were told to take appropriate defensive measures.[36]
Immediately on receipt of the 27 November warning, MacArthur, Hart, and the Hon. Francis B. Sayre, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, met to discuss the measures to be taken. Sayre presented the President's view to Mr. Quezon and told him that Roosevelt was relying upon the full co-operation of the Commonwealth.[37] The next day MacArthur reported to the Chief of Staff the measures taken in the Philippines to prepare for a Japanese attack. Air reconnaissance had been extended and intensified "in conjunction with the Navy" and measures for ground security had been taken. "Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theater of operations," he said, "everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense."[38]

The first week of December 1941 was a tense one for those in the Philippines who had been informed of the latest steps in the negotiations with Japan. American planes continued to notice heavy Japanese ships movements in the direction of Malaya, and unidentified aircraft--presumed to be Japanese--were detected over Luzon. On the 5th of December the commander of Britain's Far Easter Fleet, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, came to Manila to confer with Admiral Hart and General MacArthur about joint plans for defense. The next day news was received that a Japanese force had been sighted in the Gulf of Siam heading westward. Admiral Phillips left immediately by plane for Singapore where his flagship, Prince of Wales, lay at anchor, next to the battle cruiser Repulse.[39]

On 6 December, Saturday, MacArthur's headquarters ordered North Luzon Force to be ready to move promptly to its assigned positions on beach defense, and Wainwright noted that around his headquarters at Stotsenburg "the tension could be cut with a knife."[40] In response to a warning against sabotage, MacArthur told General Arnold that a full air alert was in effect and all aircraft dispersed and placed under guard.[41]

Sunday, 7 December--it was the 6th in Washington--was a normal day, "nothing ominous in the atmosphere, no forebodings or shadows cast by coming events."[42] Men went about their work as usual. The only excitement arose from the fact that the Clipper, with its anxiously awaited mail sacks, was due. The last letters from home had reached the Islands ten days before.

That night the 27th Bombardment Group gave a party, recalled as a gala affair with "the best entertainment this side of Minsky's," at the Manila Hotel in honor of General Brereton.[43] Brereton records conversations with Rear Adm. William R. Purnell


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and Brig. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, Hart's and MacArthur's chiefs of staff, during the course of the evening. Purnell told him that "It was only a question of days or perhaps hours until the shooting started" and that he was standing by for a call from Admiral Hart. Sutherland confirmed what Purnell had said, adding that the War and Navy Departments believed hostilities might begin at any time. Brereton then immediately instructed his chief of staff to place all air units on "combat alert" as of Monday morning, 8 December.[44]
Except for the few senior officers who had an intimate knowledge of events, men went to bed that night with no premonition that the next day would be different from the last. The Clipper had not arrived, and the last thoughts of many were of family and home, and the hope that the morrow would bring "cheerful and newsy letters."[45] Many listened to the radio before going to bed, but the news was not much different from that of previous days. Some heard American music for the last time. At Fort Stotsenburg a few officers of the 194th Tank Battalion listened to the Concerto in B Flat Minor before turning in. On the last night of peace Tschaikowsky's poignant music made an impression which was to be deep and lasting.[46]


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Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (3) * Next Chapter (5)


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Footnotes
[1] History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-45, p. 9. This volume is No. 72 in the series, Japanese Studies in World War II, of which 113 are now available in OCMH in both the original and translated versions. Although both versions have been used in the preparation of this volume, reference throughout is to the translated version unless otherwise noted. For a description of this series see below, The Sources, pp. 595-96.
[2] Statement of Lt Gen Masami Maeda, CofS 14th Army, 7 Mar 50, Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS), Document 56234, in Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Philippines-Japanese Invasion, Mil Hist Div, GHQ Far East Command (FEC) and Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP), 2 vols. II. Joint Statements of Col Takushiro Hattori and Capt Sadatoshi Tomioka, chiefs of the Army and Navy Operations Sections, repectively, of Imperial GHQ, 3 May 49, ATIS Doc 50459, and of Lt Gen Shinichi Tanaka and Col Hattori, 3 May 49, ATIS Doc 52361, both in Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, 4 vols. I, 352-53, IV, 196.

[3] The plan of operations worked out by Imperial GHQ about the middle of November 1941 was destroyed by fire. Certificate of Yozo Miyama, Chief, Archives Sec, 1st Demobilization Bureau, Defense Doc 2726, International military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE).

The description of Japanese strategic concepts is derived from the following documents: (1) Central Agreement Between the Japanese Navy and Army, (2) The Imperial Navy's Course of Axtion in Operations Against U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands, (3) Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order 1, 5 November 1941, adn (4) Comments of Former Japanese Officers regarding The Fall of the Philippines. The first two are reproduced in United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washgton, 1946), Apps. 13 and 14, pp. 43-49; copies of the last two are in OCMH. The orders and plans of the Army General Staff can be found in Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ; History of Southern Army 1941-1945, Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 21; 14th Army Opns, 2 vols., Japanese Studies in World War II, Nos. 1 and 2.

[4] Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, pp. 10, 15; 14th Army Opns, I, 15.

[5] Data on the strength of the Japanese Army and Navy are derived from Hist Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, p. 30. A mixed brigade at this time consisted of three to six infantry battalions in addition to supporting and service troops. Strength varied from 3,000 to 10,000 men. An air regiment was generally composed of three squadrons and was the basic operational unit in the Japanese Army Air Force.

[6] Southern Army Opns, p. 6. The operations order given by the commander of the Southern Army was destroyed by fire. Certificate of Yozo Miyama, 1st Demob Bureau, Defense Doc 2726, IMTFE.

[7] Southern Army Opns, pp. 4-6. An air group was roughly the equivalent of a U.S. numbered air force, and was the largest tactical unit in the Japanese Army Air Force at that time.

[8] Ibid., pp. 6-8; 14th Army Opns, I, 14. Unless otherwise speciifed, this account of the 14th Army's plan for the conquest of the Philippines is taken from the 14th Army Opns, I and II. The translation has been checked against the original Japanese study prepared by the 1st Demob Bureau.

[9] Statement of Col Hattori, 2 Nov 47, ATIS Doc 49125, Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II, GHQ FEC, Mil Intel Sec, IV, 315.

[10] Japanese estimates of the strength and composition of the Philippine garrison, military installations, terrain, and weather, are discussed in 14th Army Opns, I, 5-8, 10-14.

[11] Interrog of Gen Maeda, 10 May 47, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEC; statement of Gen Maeda, 2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56234; statement of Lt Col Yoshio Nakajima, 6 Feb 50, ATIS Doc 56349; statement of Lt Col Monjiro Akiyama, 2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56232; statement of Lt Col Hikaru Haba, 2 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56233; statement of Col Motoo Nakayama, 21 Mar 50, ATIS Doc 56640. Colonel Makajima was, at the beginning of the Philippine Campagin, Intelligence Officer. When Colonel Nakajima was made Operations Officer, Colonel Haba, formerly Assistant Intelligence Officer, 14th Army, was promoted to Intelligence Officer. Colonel Akiyama w

[Alexander38]

Other battles that could be talked about.

Manzikert : 1071.

Mohi : 1241.

Ain Jalut : 1260.

Agincourt : 1415.

Wien :1529.

Lutzen : 1632.

Leuthen : 1757.

Isandlwana : 1879.

Port Arthur : 1905.

Let see how many in here that can guess what was special whit these battles whitout goggling them.
Hint : they were victories and defeats whit profound effects on the time they were fought.
Just for the fun of it, i can make a little thread were you can test your knowledge

[The_Bammo]

Don't see many reply's on those Alexander, but sure you will get some big-time cheater answers!

Marice will have a definate answer and add some at that, for you Bro'!!!

I'll admit it Bro', your question about those posted got me stumped!

Hang Tough~

Judith Miller: Embedded Over Her Head
Robert Scheer



Tim Robbins, in tackling the pretenses of patriotism, has risen to a challenge that mainstream journalism has largely failed to meet. Robbins' provocative play about the Bush Administration's handling of the Iraq war and the obsequiousness of an embedded press made its TV debut Sunday on the Sundance Channel.

*Embedded/Live* nails the media's craven complicity in amplifying the drums of war. As the Los Angeles Times noted in its review of the filmed version of the play (which premiered here in 2003), when a chorus invokes the name of Robert Novak, the audience's "laughter is followed by uneasy recognition. We might wish this were old news, but it's still there staring us in the face every day."

Indeed it is, for columnist Novak was the first to "out" Valerie Plame -- wife of whistle-blower Joe Wilson, a former ambassador--as a CIA agent. The case landed New York Times reporter Judith Miller in jail, turning her into a *cause celebre* for her refusal to testify before a grand jury about her contact with sources in the Plame case. "If journalists cannot be trusted to guarantee confidentiality, then journalists cannot function and there cannot be a free press," said Miller, dramatically equating the protection of secret sources with the survival of a free press.


But what her avowedly principled defense of journalistic sources may turn out to be is a window into the practice of official corruption of journalistic integrity in times of war, which is what Embedded/Live so effectively highlights.

Unfortunately, rather than a story about a martyr to the cause of journalistic ethics and a free press, this is about a reporter embedded over her head. It is a depressing example of how far Big Media has moved away from the journalistic ideal of "comforting the afflicted and afflicting the comfortable."

Sure, the idea of protecting sources is a good one, in that reporters should keep their word and, by doing so, maintain their ability to secure information in the future. But ultimately the journalist is not morally or professionally beholden to sources but rather to the public. The salient fact of this ugly episode is that the White House was trying to use cultivated journalists, secret sourcing and classified information in an attempt to smear a legitimate whistle-blower who was challenging its rationale for leading the nation into war.

Wilson's information was clearly important to the public debate, as evidenced by the CIA's admission that he was right to be angry that phony reports of Iraq attempting to purchase enriched uranium had made it into President Bush's State of the Union speech. Yet Miller and her defenders can't or won't understand that a free press in a democracy depends on the protection of honest witnesses and not on the coddling of those who use the power of government to smear critics.

Miller is still in jail, refusing to talk, even though one of her purported sources, Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, supposedly has signed a general waiver freeing journalists to speak to the grand jury about their conversations with him. But the biggest problem with Miller is that her commitment to a biased and manipulative Bush Administration and Iraqi exile sources clearly has been stronger than her commitment to reporting the truth.

Here are some of the front-page headlines for "scoops" Miller landed before and after the invasion that have since been discredited: "U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest for A-Bomb Parts"; "Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve of War, an Iraqi Scientist Is Said to Assert"; "U.S. Analysts Link Iraq Labs To Germ Arms"; "Iraqi Tells of Renovations at Sites for Chemical and Nuclear Arms"

To be sure, Miller didn't make anything up, she just relayed whatever her anonymous sources told her--nearly all of which turned out to be garbage. In this way, Miller and other reporters like her can pretend to follow the letter of journalistic protocol while flouting its spirit and purpose. What she should have done was challenge her sources and then stop protecting them when she found out their information was false.

All of which was conceded by the New York Times in a too-little, too-late mea culpa about the reporting of Miller and others that appeared on page A-10 in May of last year. "[W]e have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have been ... information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged," wrote the Times. "Complicating matters for journalists, the accounts of [Iraqi] exiles were often eagerly confirmed by United States officials convinced of the need to intervene in Iraq."

Unanswered was how this embarrassment came to pass. Miller is surely not stupid, so how was she duped so regularly for so long?

Raw ambition is one likely culprit, yet Miller's protection of her secret sources begs the question of whether she is ideologically loyal to the neocons who guided her for so long.

The bottom line is that every aspect of practicing journalism involves a complex maze of ethical decisions. And, despite being one of the most powerful journalists in the nation, Miller horribly lost her journalistic way when it mattered to our democracy most. Too bad she couldn't see Embedded/Live before she set out to report.

[flydangler]

Not always so bad methinks: "Army Colonel Receives Award for Valor" shows another side of it, eh? Maybe the opposite of happenins' like Isandlwana.

[Marine]

Other battles that could be talked about.

Manzikert : 1071.

Mohi : 1241.

Ain Jalut : 1260.

Agincourt : 1415.

Wien :1529.

Lutzen : 1632.

Leuthen : 1757.

Isandlwana : 1879.

Port Arthur : 1905.

Let see how many in here that can guess what was special whit these battles whitout goggling them.
Hint : they were victories and defeats whit profound effects on the time they were fought.
Just for the fun of it, i can make a little thread were you can test your knowledge 

And who can forget every incursions the British made into Afghanistan when we discuss great military disasters.

THE BATTLE CHRONICLES

OF

THE QUEEN'S LANCASHIRE REGIMENT

The Red Rose Regiment
40th, 59th, 81st REGTS & 1st SOUTH LANCASHIRES

in

AFGHANISTAN 1839-1842, 1878-80 & 1919

an article by JOHN DOWNHAM

‘The Afghans are the best umpires in the world, because they seldom allow a tactical error to go unpunished.’

(Military Report on Afghanistan, General Staff India, 1914)

A selection from the Battle Honours of The Queen’s Lancashire Regiment:

Candahar 1842, Ghuznee1842, Cabul 1842,Ali Masjid, Ahmed Khel, Afghanistan 1878-80,

Afghanistan 1919

One of the great mysteries of the ‘War against Terror’ is why the leaders of the western world have not as yet called upon the advice of an élite British military unit with unrivalled experience and an unbeaten record in Afghanistan. I am, of course, referring to The Queen’s Lancashire Regiment, which not only carries more Afghan Battle Honours than any other regiment, seven in all, but is the only regiment to have fought in all three of Britain’s previous Afghan Wars, those of 1839-1842, 1878-1880, and 1919, emerging victorious on each and every occasion.

Afghanistan 1839-1842
The first British intervention in Afghanistan was to counter the eastward expansion of imperial Russia, which was supporting the usurper Dost Mohammed and threatened British India. In 1839 an Anglo-Indian expedition marched the twelve hundred miles to Kabul, restored the legitimate ruler, Shah Shuja, to his throne, supported him with subsidies, and occupied the capital and other strategic places, including Kandahar.

As on each subsequent occasion, the British interest was to achieve some stability in Afghanistan, not for its own sake but to prevent its turbulence spilling over the North West Frontier into India. Consequently, each intervention was intended to be of limited duration, though, as we have rediscovered in more recent times, a satisfactory exit strategy from that chronically anarchic failed state was invariably elusive and seldom entirely satisfactory.

The 40th Regiment (later 1st Bn The South Lancashire Regt) had been in India for some years when, in 1839, it was moved north to support the invasion of Afghanistan, capturing Karachi and campaigning in upper Sindh. The Regiment, commanded by George Hibbert, a veteran of Waterloo, appears to have been in remarkably good form at this time. Their Chaplain, Allen, recorded in his diary that: ‘The officers were most kindly attentive to the comforts and real interests of the men – the men, as a natural consequence, attached to their officers – and a general good feeling prevailed from the highest to the lowest.’

On 23rd October 1841 the 40th Regiment marched into Kandahar from Quetta.. The situation in Afghanistan was now deteriorating rapidly, with a general insurrection against Shah Shuja and his British backers, and in December the British envoy in Kabul was murdered and dismembered. The position of the small Anglo-Indian garrison of Kabul, one British and four Indian regiments, became untenable, and in January 1842, having been assured of safe conduct back to India, the force set out for the Khyber Pass. As might have been expected, the Afghans did not honour their agreement, and the withdrawing force was treacherously attacked in the wintry mountain passes and annihilated in one of the two major disasters to befall British arms in that country (the other being Maiwand in 1880). Famously, only one survivor reached Jellalabad, the remainder being killed or taken captive. It is this early debacle that has coloured British perceptions of Afghanistan ever since.

‘Candahar’
The insurgent Afghans also advanced on Kandahar, which was held by two British regiments (the 40th and 41st) and twelve Indian regiments under Major-General William Nott (an ancestor, incidentally, of Sir John Nott, Defence Secretary at the time of the Falklands War, 1982). On 12th January he moved out with some 3,500 men to meet 18,000 enemy and routed them with ease; the 40th, who led the British attack, suffering only ten wounded. Severe winter weather precluded further offensive operations until early March, when Nott mounted a sortie to attack the enemy’s headquarters, some 30-40 miles away. Contact was soon made with the Afghan cavalry, but they refused battle, and on Nott’s return to Kandahar the reason for this was obvious.

The Afghans had taken advantage of the army’s absence to attack its base on March 10th, attempting to fire the gates of the city. They succeeded in burning down the Herat Gate and made a determined assault there, but the gallant defenders – notably including 94 sick and wounded of the 40th , who turned out to fight in their hospital clothing – beat them off from behind improvised barricades of flour sacks. A simultaneous attack on the Citadel Gate, which would have been fatal for the little garrison, was thwarted by Quartermaster Philips of the 40th, who, happening to look outside the gate before securing it for the night, removed the faggots laid there before they could be set alight.

‘Ghuznee’
On 19th May the 40th marched with a brigade to the relief of the beleaguered Indian garrison of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, returning to Kandahar on successful completion of this operation. Nott was now ordered to evacuate Kandahar and return to India, but instead of slipping out by the back door, direct to Quetta, he elected to leave by the front door, by way of Kabul and the Khyber, with his best troops, including the 40th. The force set out on 9th August, carrying provisions for two months, marching and skirmishing all the way.

At the fort of Goain, on the 30th, Nott fought a short but spirited action with over twelve thousand Afghans, who were again completely defeated with the loss of all their guns. The action commenced with an artillery duel, and Captain Martin Bladen Neill of the 40th was amused at ‘the graceful but involuntary obeisance made along the whole of our line, as each succeeding shot from the enemy’s guns seemed almost to graze our heads.’ Padre Allen was surprised at the levity of the Regiment as they stood under fire: ‘Jokes and laughter resounded on all sides, and the general feeling appeared to be rather that of a set of schoolboys at a game of snowballs, than of men whose lives were in instant peril. An Irish sergeant of the 40th had his head grazed by a spent ball; it confused him for the moment, and he exclaimed “Och! Somebody take my piece! I’m kilt – I’m kilt – I’m kilt!” As they were leading him off, he looked over his shoulder, and cried out, “Faith, boys, and I don’t think I’m kilt entirely yet!” His second thought called forth shouts of laughter.’

The enemy attempted a move round the flank, but the British infantry, covered by the light companies and guns, advanced to meet them. ‘As we neared the enemy,’ wrote Neill, ‘we formed a widely-extended line, and continued to move steadily on; we were received with shouts and many volleys from the matchlock-men, but, as usual, their fire was ill-directed. Having gained the bottom of the hill, on the crest of which the opposing army had made their stand, a loud hurrah burst from our line; this was succeeded by an irresistible British charge, and the enemy, succumbing to the superiority of the bayonet over the sword and shield, broke and fled.’ British casualties were again light, including thirteen of the 40th wounded.

On September 6th the mighty fortress of Ghazni (Ghuznee) was captured after a brief siege – during which the Officer’s Mess tent of the 40th was effectively engaged (at breakfast-time!) by the sixty-four pounder brass gun known as Jabar Jhang – and 327 captive sepoys were released from slavery.

‘Kabul’

On the 14th, at Beni Badam, Nott found his line of advance blocked by some twelve thousand enemy occupying a succession of strong positions, but Nott ordered up Captain ‘Blanco’ White of the 40th with the light companies of the force to clear the heights, which he did ‘with his usual zeal and ability’, while Lieutenant Wakefield took the Grenadier Company of the 40th to clear a detached hill occupied by the enemy, which they did ‘with much spirit.’ The 40th had one drummer and a private killed and a subaltern and three privates wounded in this action, while Captain White was mentioned in despatches ‘for the gallantry displayed by him and the companies under his command in ascending the mountains and driving the enemy from their positions’, and was later awarded a CB.

On the 18th, after an arduous and unsupported march of over three hundred miles through hostile country, Nott and his little army reached Kabul. It had been a remarkable feat of arms. They found the British flag already flying over the upper citadel of the Balla Hissar, for General Pollock had arrived a few days earlier with another relief force, which had crossed the Punjab and come up the Khyber Pass.

With the prisoners released, on 12th October the British columns left Kabul and began a fighting withdrawal through the Khurd Kabul and Khyber passes, where the evidence of the earlier disaster was only too apparent. In the former, wrote Neill, ‘the pass was literally strewed with the horrid remains of men – skeletons they could not be called, for in many the features were so hideously perfect, that little difficulty was experienced in recognising . . . those who had been known in life.’ The columns were constantly under actual or threatened attack, and the 40th were as frequently in action. On the 6th November the rearguard emerged from the Khyber Pass, and the Grenadier Company of the 40th had the honour of being among the last of ‘The Avenging Army of Afghanistan’ to quit that country.

Afghanistan 1878-1880

Relations with Afghanistan remained uneasy, and the Russians continued their expansion to the south, where they were contained by the Crimean War of 1854-55, and the east, where their empire touched the Afghan frontier. Then in 1878 a Russian mission was received in Kabul, while a balancing British mission was stopped at the fort of Ali Masjid in the Khyber Pass. The growing Russian influence posed a direct threat to British India, and war again became inevitable.

Ali Masjid.

On 21st November 1878 Lieutenant-General Sir Sam Browne (originator of the belt of the same name) attacked and captured Ali Masjid, the key to the Khyber, with a force including the 81st Regiment – recruited in Lancashire since 1873 and shortly to be re-titled 2nd Battalion The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment. The Regiment suffered no casualties in this action, in which it took part in a frontal attack to engage the Afghan defenders while other troops made a wide flanking move to turn them out of this strong position. The way was now open to Kabul, and the Afghan leader fled to Russia. A British envoy, Major Cavagnari, was established in Kabul, and the British force, including the 81st, began to withdraw.

Sartorius VC
Following the route taken by the 40th nearly forty years before, the 59th Regiment (later 2nd Bn, The East Lancashire Regiment) had reached Kandahar on 9th January 1879 and joined a field force based there under Lieutenant-General Stewart. Later that month they marched on the fortress of Kelat-i-Ghilzai, which surrendered without opposition.

When news of the massacre at Kabul of Cavagnari and his escort reached Kandahar, one wing of the 59th was on the march back to Quetta, and the other away from camp. They were soon recalled, and on 23rd September marched again for Kelat-i-Ghilzai, where two companies were left in garrison while the remainder moved towards Ghazni. On the 24th October the 59th were in action at Shahjui, where Captain Eustace Sartorius led a party to storm a rocky and almost inaccessible hill, which could be approached only in single file up a zig-zag path. Lieutenant Irwin of the 59th, who was present and sketched the incident, wrote the following account:

‘Captain Sartorius ordered his men to fix bayonets, and to clamber up. The hill was very steep, and when they got to within a few feet of the top the Afghans sprang up with a yell, and, sword in hand, slashing right and left, simply jumped down upon our fellows. For a few moments all was confusion, friend and foe falling down together, but it was speedily all over. We had gained the hill, and the standards on it, not one of the enemy having escaped. We lost one man, and Captain Sartorius was wounded in both hands. The fanatics were splendid, though ferocious-looking scoundrels, and fought like fiends, having evidently mad up their minds to die, and to do as much damage as possible before doing so.’

Sartorius was awarded the Victoria Cross.

Ahmed Khel
In the spring of 1880 the 59th Regiment was with a mainly Indian Army force under General Stewart, moving north from Kandahar to Ghazni. They had marched 150 miles and were some 23 miles south of Ghazni when, on19th April 1880, they encountered an Afghan army estimated at twelve to fifteen thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry. The enemy, who had been withdrawing before the British force, had taken up a position on a ridge, and Stewart prepared to attack. The leading brigade began to deploy behind a low rise in the ground, with the 59th on the right, 2nd Sikhs in the centre and 3rd Ghurkhas on the left. The 19th Bengal Lancers were on the far left, while artillery batteries, with their infantry escorts, were positioned well forward.

The British guns then began their preparatory fire, but at 9 o’clock, before the infantry attack could be developed, the mass of Afghans on the crest-line suddenly surged forward in a wild charge, drums beating, standards flying and swords waving. Three to four thousand fanatical Ghazis in three waves swept down on the infantry and guns, stretching out on both flanks and seeming to envelop them. Some carried rifles or matchlocks, others were armed with tulwars, knives and pistols as they bounded across the five to six hundred yards to come to close quarters with the British line. ‘Their bravery was magnificent’, wrote Captain Elias of the 59th, ‘and the fury of their onset tried the nerves of our troops for a few minutes. Most of them were big men with long white robes flowing in the wind, right arms with swords or other weapons extended, and trying to guard their bodies (against Martini-Henry bullets!) with shields.’

At the same time a large body of enemy horse emerged from two ravines and charged the 19th Bengal Lancers, who fell back in some confusion, disordering the 3rd Ghurkhas and smashing into Stewart’s infantry reserves, ammunition mules and headquarters staff as they careered towards the right rear. Fortunately, the Ghurkhas at once recovered and, forming company rallying squares, held firm as friend and foe rode round them. Meanwhile the guns fired case and shrapnel at close range into the swarming Afghans, but neither this nor the volleys of the infantry could stop the rush of the Ghazis.

On the right flank, the horse artillery and their infantry escort were soon compelled to fall back, and the 59th were ordered to throw back their right to check the oncoming rush. This movement occasioned momentary confusion in the ranks, for the Ghazis were now very close, but the 59th hurriedly formed a new firing line and the Lancashire soldiers settled down to fire steady and continuous volleys from their breech-loading rifles. For some minutes the situation remained critical, for the Afghan foot-soldiers assailed the infantry line on three sides, while their cavalry were within twenty yards of Stewart and his staff, who drew their swords. Lieutenant-Colonel Lawson of the 59th, and the Adjutant, both prominent on horseback, were wounded. At this moment a fierce wind arose, enveloping the entire field of battle in dense clouds of dust and obscuring the charging Ghazis as they closed with the British line. Hand-to-hand fighting followed, as the enemy fought with reckless bravery, but at length superior discipline and withering firepower began to tell. Mowed down in their hundreds by the volleys of the 59th, Sikhs and Ghurkhas, the enemy slackened their attack and began to retire, followed by well-directed artillery fire. Once the fanatical onslaught was stemmed, the Afghan defeat rapidly became a rout, and at 10 o’clock the buglers sounded the ‘cease fire’.

More than a thousand dead lay in front of the British position, and the Quartermaster is said to have counted six hundred around the 59th, while at least two thousand more are believed to have been wounded. British losses totalled 17 killed and 124 wounded, of whom the 59th had one private killed and two officers, one sergeant, a drummer and eight privates wounded, one mortally. Second-Lieutenant Twynam was recommended for a VC for going out to rescue a wounded soldier, but had to be content with a mention in despatches.

Following Ahmed Khel, Stewart advanced to Ghazni, and on 23rd April the 59th were again in action at Urzoo, where they took part in a brigade attack to clear four thousand Afghans from a series of walled enclosures. These were assaulted one after the other in fine style, and the tribesmen fled leaving three to four hundred casualties. The 59th suffered no loss. This was the Regiment’s last major engagement of the campaign, and after a few months in Kabul they marched through the Khyber Pass, bound for home.

Afghanistan 1919

In May 1919, the ill-advised Afghan government of King Amanullah declared war and attempted to invade British India. 1st Battalion The South Lancashire Regiment (the old 40th) were at that time a resident battalion in India, where their principal task had been to maintain watch and ward on the North West Frontier with Afghanistan. Based at Quetta since 1914, their tour had not been without incident, for in 1918 they had fought a short campaign against the Marri tribe of Baluchistan, marching for some six hundred miles before defeating them in pitched battle. This was a typical mountain warfare operation, characterised by careful picquetting of the line of march by day (physically demanding, thirsty and potentially dangerous work) and watchful perimeter defence by night.

On the outbreak of the 3rd Afghan War, the South Lancashires were moved up to garrison Jamrud, the important fort guarding the exit from the Khyber Pass. Later the Battalion took part in operations against Pathan bands in the Kajuri Plain and the Bazar Valley. Then on the 15th July it was ordered forward to occupy Ali Masjid, key to the Khyber. There the South Lancashires stayed until the end of October, during which time they took part in several operations against dissident tribesmen, the most important of which was the destruction of the Afridi stronghold of Chora. On completion of this mission, the Battalion had the task of acting as rearguard to the column on its withdrawal, always one of the most difficult phases of mountain warfare, but the South Lancashires were thoroughly versed in the tactics of this form of warfare and completed the operation without untoward incident.

Concluding Thoughts
The North West Frontier, and its Afghan hinterland, was once, for British soldiers in India, what Northern Ireland has been in more recent years - a relatively low-intensity proving ground for junior commanders, one in which an experienced and at times fanatical enemy would make the unwary, arrogant, naive or undisciplined soldier pay dearly for his mistakes but where good training, high morale, discipline and leadership would invariably be rewarded. In other words, it was a challenging infantry environment, but one in which our gallant Regimental predecessors constantly thrived.

This is all very interesting, I hear you say, but what relevance does it have today? Well, quite a lot. Firstly, by the time the British Army left India we had acquired, through hard lessons, persistent intelligence-gathering, and constant practice, an immense body of knowledge of Afghan conditions and of the tactics best suited to that theatre. Some factors have clearly changed since then, but there are many important constants – the terrain, the climate, and the peculiar characteristics of the various Afghan peoples – which would repay study by those confronted with those same factors in Afghanistan today. It’s all there in our archives.

EJD

Here you go Tom, poetry included just for you.


‘The Battle of Ahmed Khel’
The following lines were written by a bandsman of the 59th Regiment shortly after the battle and were originally printed on the regimental press, then at Dargai:



It was on the 19th of April we marched to Ahmed Khel

And there we met the enemy and quickly made them feel

That we were British soldiers bent on vengeance for the dead

And fought for dear old England for which Sir Louis bled.



The sun was shining brightly, ’twas a warm and sunny day,

But on the Afghan hill tops, the wintry snow still lay.

The lark was singing sweetly, and carolling in the sky

When we went forth to meet the foe, resolved to do or die.



We had marched but six miles on our way when first we met the foe

Assembled in their thousands on the hills and vales below.

We opened fire upon them, but they stood defiant and still,

Until six thousand of their tribes came rushing down the hill.



Along our line the wild mass charged, and fought in wild despair.

Their banners glistened in the sun, their wild cries rent the air.

They charged the gallant 59th, but that brave devoted band

Poured on them such a hell of fire, nought living could withstand.



Ahmed Khel was fought and won, for the enemy now had fled.

As we rode o’er the battlefield, two thousand there lay dead,

Cold and stiff in the arms of death, and others in fearful pain.

Such scenes of bloodshed may God grant we ne’er shall see again.



Our men fought well, let history tell, how our shot and shell did fly

And how the 59th stood firm, resolved to do or die.

Then praise be to those soldier lads whose hearts were firm as steel

When they fought for Queen and Country on the plains of Ahmed Khel