Life in OUR America, Volume 5, the Livyjr Files Options

[Livyjr]

Just as soon as he learns how to write.

Amend that .....

To learns how to write ....

In some form of language ...

That is intelligible ....

As a language ......

And so ...

MAKE THE PIE HIGHER, jeffmoskin ...

GO FOR IT!

Because that is where it all is at ...

And so ....

[Livyjr]

And so ...

MAKE THE PIE HIGHER, jeffmoskin ...

GO FOR IT!

Because that is where it all is at ...

And so ....

And speaking about ....

MAKING THE PIE HIGHER .....

Here's some now .....

"U.S. commander finishes Haditha review"

By KIM GAMEL, Associated Press

Last updated: 4:23 a.m., Saturday, July 8, 2006

BAGHDAD, Iraq -- A top U.S. commander who reviewed an investigation into whether the Marines tried to cover up the Haditha case agreed that errors were made, a U.S. military official said.

Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli has forwarded his findings and recommendations to Gen. George W. Casey, the top commander in Iraq and the only one superior to Chiarelli.

The investigation was separate from an inquiry still under way into whether a group of Marines killed 24 civilians -- including women and children -- on Nov. 19 in a revenge attack after a fellow Marine died in a roadside bombing in the town of Haditha.

Chiarelli's report was based on an investigation conducted by Maj. Gen. Eldon Bargewell into whether the Marines from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment followed proper procedures in reporting the incident to commanders, or whether anyone engaged in a cover-up.

His investigation also may consider whether any criminal charges should be brought.

The military initially said the Iraqi deaths were the result of the roadside bomb and a subsequent gunfight with insurgents.

The U.S. military official said Chiarelli agreed with Bargewell's findings for the most part, but there were some areas in which he recommended a different course of action.

The official did not elaborate on that point.

But he said the investigation found that errors were made in the reporting and follow up of initial allegations after the killings and suggested some were of a criminal nature.

"It essentially bolsters the ongoing criminal investigation and lays bare some of the administrative faults that existed during November 2005," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because the findings have not been publicly released.

"What some of these people did wrong is certainly not illegal or criminal, but administratively their actions are something that Gen. Chiarelli wants to look at," the official said.

The New York Times quoted two U.S. Defense Department officials as saying that Chiarelli concluded that senior officers did not follow up on inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the initial reporting of the incident that should have raised questions.

He faulted the senior staff of the Second Marine Division, commanded at the time by Maj. Gen. Richard A. Huck, and the Second Regimental Combat Team, then headed by Col. Stephen W. Davis, and recommended unspecified disciplinary action for some officers, the newspaper reported.

"He concludes that some officers were derelict in their duties," one of the officials, who declined to identify which or how many officers were singled out, was quoted as saying.

The military official said the military hoped to release most of the findings in the next two weeks, but anything that could be used in the criminal investigation would not be made public.

"Some of the portions will be redacted because they could be used in a criminal investigation, either a current one or one in the future," he said.

Iraq has ordered its own probe of the killings, with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki using unusually strong language to condemn them.

The case is among the most serious against U.S. soldiers allegedly involved in the deaths of Iraqi civilians.

At least 14 U.S. troops have been convicted.

Steven D. Green, a former Army private, pleaded not guilty this week to federal court charges of slaying and raping a young Iraqi woman and killing her father, mother and sister in March near Mahmoudiya, south of Baghdad.

Up to four others still in uniform are under investigation in Iraq.

Seven Marines and one Navy medic are charged with premeditated murder in the shooting death of an Iraqi man near Fallujah west of Baghdad.

Other cases involve the deaths of three male detainees in Salahuddin province in May, the shooting death of unarmed Iraqi man near Ramadi in February, and the death of an Iraqi soldier after an interrogation in 2003 at a detention camp in Qaim.

Such cases threaten to further weaken popular support for the Iraq war in the United States and tarnish the military's image.

end color

Well .....

George W. Bush ...

SAID ...

He was going to make the pie higher .....

And it looks to me ...

Like he has succeeded ...

Which would make him ...

A MAN OF HIS WORD ....

And so .....

IF YOU LIKE ....

THE PIE REAL HIGH ....

Well ...

VOTE REPUBLICAN ....

Because they are the only ones ...

Who realy know how ...

To do that ...

REAL GOOD ....

And so ...

[Livyjr]

And speaking about ....

MAKING THE PIE HIGHER .....

Here's some more .....

And so .....

"Army cuts 1,000 for personality disorders"

By LOLITA C. BALDOR, Associated Press Writer

Fri Jul 7, 6:44 PM ET

WASHINGTON - The Army discharged more than 1,000 soldiers last year for personality disorders, the reason it gave for this year's discharge of a private now accused of raping a young Iraqi woman and killing her and her family.

That total represents about 1.2 percent of the 83,000 soldiers given early discharges during the fiscal year that ended Sept. 30, 2005.

That was a bit higher than the less than 1 percent discharged for those reasons during the 2001 fiscal year before the war in Iraq began.

Lt. Gen. Kevin C. Kiley, the Army's surgeon general, told reporters Friday that the disorder usually is not associated with combat trauma and may be a lifelong problem that is not always easy to identify in military screenings.

He said soldiers exhibiting such traits would not be automatically discharged because many can continue to perform well.

Steven D. Green, who pleaded not guilty through his public defenders Thursday, was discharged because of an "anti-social personality disorder" according to military officials and documents.

That condition is defined as chronic behavior that manipulates, exploits or violates the rights of others, such as someone who repeatedly lies, fights or breaks the law.

According to a federal affidavit, Green, 21, and other soldiers targeted a young Iraqi woman after spotting her at a traffic checkpoint near Mahmoudiya.

They later went to her house, raped and killed her and shot members of her family, the affidavit said.

Green is being tried in federal rather than military court because he no longer is in the Army

Kiley told Pentagon reporters that personality disorders — which are not forms of mental illness — do no necessarily exclude people from serving in the armed forces.

In fact, he said that up to 4 percent to 5 percent of the soldiers have taken sleep medications or antidepressant drugs at one time or another during their combat service.

Altogether, there were nearly 493,000 people in the Army during the 2005 fiscal year, compared with about 481,000 in 2001.

The Army discharged 805 soldiers for personality disorders in 2001, 734 in 2002, 980 in 2003, 988 in 2004 and 1,038 in 2005.

Mental disorders represented between less than 1 percent to 1.4 percent of the total early discharges for those years.

The total number of early discharges ranged from about 69,000 to more than 87,000.

Soldiers can receive early discharges for a number of reasons, but most often they are for physical fitness issues.

Kiley said the Army is allocating more resources that ever to combat stress and provide mental health counseling for soldiers on the battlefield.

Currently, he said, there are about 200 mental health and behavioral health personnel in Iraq and 25 in Afghanistan.

Many of them are assigned to different regions of the country and travel in small teams to the forward operating bases to meet with soldiers.

The Army, he said, is trying to find ways to encourage soldiers to use the mental health services and overcome the perception among the military that seeking mental health counseling is a sign of weakness.

"There is something very demanding and tough about being in combat," said Kiley.

"And anything that would be perceived as being weak and not ready and tough carries with it some stigma."

As a result, he said, the Army is trying to reach out regularly to soldiers while they are in combat, and officials are encouraging entire units to go through mental health screenings so that soldiers will feel more comfortable doing it if they see their commanders and unit leaders participating.

[Livyjr]

"Army cuts 1,000 for personality disorders"

By LOLITA C. BALDOR, Associated Press Writer

Fri Jul 7, 6:44 PM ET

WASHINGTON - The Army discharged more than 1,000 soldiers last year for personality disorders, the reason it gave for this year's discharge of a private now accused of raping a young Iraqi woman and killing her and her family.

Steven D. Green, who pleaded not guilty through his public defenders Thursday, was discharged because of an "anti-social personality disorder" according to military officials and documents.

That condition is defined as chronic behavior that manipulates, exploits or violates the rights of others, such as someone who repeatedly lies, fights or breaks the law.

By the plain language ....

Of that definition .....

Of "ANTI-SOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER" ......

GEORGE W. BUSH ...

SOUNDS LIKE A CLASSIC CASE .....

Especially the part .....

About repeatedly breaking the law .....

And lying .....

And chronically ....

Manipulating ....

Exploiting ...

And violating .....

The rights of others ....

And so .....

He should be discharged ....

AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF .......

Of OUR American military ...

By reason of this disorder .....

Which definitely affects him ...

In the discharge of his duties ...

As Commander-In-Chief .......

Of OUR American military ....

And so .....

[Livyjr]

And while we are on the subject ...

Of George W. Bush ...

Violating the law ....

HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al., continued ....

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 05-184. 

Argued March 28, 2006--Decided June 29, 2006

Hamdan raises both general and particular objections to the procedures set forth in Commission Order No. 1.

His general objection is that the procedures' admitted deviation from those governing courts-martial itself renders the commission illegal.

Chief among his particular objections are that he may, under the Commission Order, be convicted based on evidence he has not seen or heard, and that any evidence admitted against him need not comply with the admissibility or relevance rules typically applicable in criminal trials and court-martial proceedings.

The Government objects to our consideration of any procedural challenge at this stage on the grounds that (1) the abstention doctrine espoused in Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, precludes pre-enforcement review of procedural rules, (2) Hamdan will be able to raise any such challenge following a "final decision" under the DTA, and (3) "there is ... no basis to presume, before the trial has even commenced, that the trial will not be conducted in good faith and according to law."

Brief for Respondents 45-46, nn. 20-21.

The first of these contentions was disposed of in Part III, supra, and neither of the latter two is sound.

First, because Hamdan apparently is not subject to the death penalty (at least as matters now stand) and may receive a sentence shorter than 10 years' imprisonment, he has no automatic right to review of the commission's "final decision" before a federal court under the DTA.

See §1005(e)(3), 119 Stat. 2743.

Second, contrary to the Government's assertion, there is a "basis to presume" that the procedures employed during Hamdan's trial will violate the law:

The procedures are described with particularity in Commission Order No. 1, and implementation of some of them has already occurred.

One of Hamdan's complaints is that he will be, and indeed already has been, excluded from his own trial.

See Reply Brief for Petitioner 12; App. to Pet. for Cert. 45a.

Under these circumstances, review of the procedures in advance of a "final decision"--the timing of which is left entirely to the discretion of the President under the DTA--is appropriate.

We turn, then, to consider the merits of Hamdan's procedural challenge.

In part because the difference between military commissions and courts-martial originally was a difference of jurisdiction alone, and in part to protect against abuse and ensure evenhandedness under the pressures of war, the procedures governing trials by military commission historically have been the same as those governing courts-martial.

See, e.g., 1 The War of the Rebellion 248 (2d series 1894) (General Order 1 issued during the Civil War required military commissions to "be constituted in a similar manner and their proceedings be conducted according to the same general rules as courts-martial in order to prevent abuses which might otherwise arise").

Accounts of commentators from Winthrop through General Crowder--who drafted Article of War 15 and whose views have been deemed "authoritative" by this Court, Madsen, 343 U. S., at 353--confirm as much.

As recently as the Korean and Vietnam wars, during which use of military commissions was contemplated but never made, the principle of procedural parity was espoused as a background assumption.

See Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 3-5 (2001-2002).

There is a glaring historical exception to this general rule.

The procedures and evidentiary rules used to try General Yamashita near the end of World War II deviated in significant respects from those then governing courts-martial.

See 327 U. S. 1.

The force of that precedent, however, has been seriously undermined by post-World War II developments.

Yamashita, from late 1944 until September 1945, was Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese Army, which had exercised control over the Philippine Islands.

On September 3, 1945, after American forces regained control of the Philippines, Yamashita surrendered.

Three weeks later, he was charged with violations of the law of war.

A few weeks after that, he was arraigned before a military commission convened in the Philippines.

He pleaded not guilty, and his trial lasted for two months.

On December 7, 1945, Yamashita was convicted and sentenced to hang.

See id., at 5; id., at 31-34 (Murphy, J., dissenting).

This Court upheld the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The procedures and rules of evidence employed during Yamashita's trial departed so far from those used in courts-martial that they generated an unusually long and vociferous critique from two Members of this Court.

See id., at 41-81 (Rutledge, J., joined by Murphy, J., dissenting).

Among the dissenters' primary concerns was that the commission had free rein to consider all evidence "which in the commission's opinion 'would be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge,' without any of the usual modes of authentication."

Id., at 49 (Rutledge, J.).

The majority, however, did not pass on the merits of Yamashita's procedural challenges because it concluded that his status disentitled him to any protection under the Articles of War (specifically, those set forth in Article 38, which would become Article 36 of the UCMJ) or the Geneva Convention of 1929, 47 Stat. 2021 (1929 Geneva Convention).

The Court explained that Yamashita was neither a "person made subject to the Articles of War by Article 2" thereof, 327 U. S., at 20, nor a protected prisoner of war being tried for crimes committed during his detention, id., at 21.

At least partially in response to subsequent criticism of General Yamashita's trial, the UCMJ's codification of the Articles of War after World War II expanded the category of persons subject thereto to include defendants in Yamashita's (and Hamdan's) position, and the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 extended prisoner-of-war protections to individuals tried for crimes committed before their capture.

See 3 Int'l Comm. of Red Cross, Commentary: Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 413 (1960) (hereinafter GCIII Commentary) (explaining that Article 85, which extends the Convention's protections to "[p]risoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture," was adopted in response to judicial interpretations of the 1929 Convention, including this Court's decision in Yamashita).

The most notorious exception to the principle of uniformity, then, has been stripped of its precedential value.

The uniformity principle is not an inflexible one; it does not preclude all departures from the procedures dictated for use by courts-martial.

But any departure must be tailored to the exigency that necessitates it.

See Winthrop 835, n. 81.

That understanding is reflected in Article 36 of the UCMJ, which provides:

"(a) The procedure, including modes of proof, in cases before courts-martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military tribunals may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.

"(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable and shall be reported to Congress." 70A Stat. 50.

Article 36 places two restrictions on the President's power to promulgate rules of procedure for courts-martial and military commissions alike.

First, no procedural rule he adopts may be "contrary to or inconsistent with" the UCMJ--however practical it may seem.

Second, the rules adopted must be "uniform insofar as practicable."

That is, the rules applied to military commissions must be the same as those applied to courts-martial unless such uniformity proves impracticable.

Hamdan argues that Commission Order No. 1 violates both of these restrictions; he maintains that the procedures described in the Commission Order are inconsistent with the UCMJ and that the Government has offered no explanation for their deviation from the procedures governing courts-martial, which are set forth in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2005 ed.) (Manual for Courts-Martial).

Among the inconsistencies Hamdan identifies is that between §6 of the Commission Order, which permits exclusion of the accused from proceedings and denial of his access to evidence in certain circumstances, and the UCMJ's requirement that "[a]ll ... proceedings" other than votes and deliberations by courts-martial "shall be made a part of the record and shall be in the presence of the accused." 10 U. S. C. A. §839© (Supp. 2006).

Hamdan also observes that the Commission Order dispenses with virtually all evidentiary rules applicable in courts-martial.

The Government has three responses.

First, it argues, only 9 of the UCMJ's 158 Articles--the ones that expressly mention "military commissions"--actually apply to commissions, and Commission Order No. 1 sets forth no procedure that is "contrary to or inconsistent with" those 9 provisions.

Second, the Government contends, military commissions would be of no use if the President were hamstrung by those provisions of the UCMJ that govern courts-martial.

Finally, the President's determination that "the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international terrorism" renders it impracticable "to apply in military commissions ... the principles of law and rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts," November 13 Order §1(f), is, in the Government's view, explanation enough for any deviation from court-martial procedures.

See Brief for Respondents 43-47, and n. 22.

Hamdan has the better of this argument.

Without reaching the question whether any provision of Commission Order No. 1 is strictly "contrary to or inconsistent with" other provisions of the UCMJ, we conclude that the "practicability" determination the President has made is insufficient to justify variances from the procedures governing courts-martial.

Subsection (b) of Article 36 was added after World War II, and requires a different showing of impracticability from the one required by subsection (a).

Subsection (a) requires that the rules the President promulgates for courts-martial, provost courts, and military commissions alike conform to those that govern procedures in Article III courts, "so far as he considers practicable."

10 U. S. C. §836(a) (emphasis added).

Subsection (b), by contrast, demands that the rules applied in courts-martial, provost courts, and military commissions--whether or not they conform with the Federal Rules of Evidence--be "uniform insofar as practicable." §836(b) (emphasis added).

Under the latter provision, then, the rules set forth in the Manual for Courts-Martial must apply to military commissions unless impracticable.

The President here has determined, pursuant to subsection (a), that it is impracticable to apply the rules and principles of law that govern "the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts," §836(a), to Hamdan's commission.

We assume that complete deference is owed that determination.

The President has not, however, made a similar official determination that it is impracticable to apply the rules for courts-martial.

And even if subsection (b)'s requirements may be satisfied without such an official determination, the requirements of that subsection are not satisfied here.

Nothing in the record before us demonstrates that it would be impracticable to apply court-martial rules in this case.

There is no suggestion, for example, of any logistical difficulty in securing properly sworn and authenticated evidence or in applying the usual principles of relevance and admissibility.

Assuming arguendo that the reasons articulated in the President's Article 36(a) determination ought to be considered in evaluating the impracticability of applying court-martial rules, the only reason offered in support of that determination is the danger posed by international terrorism.

Without for one moment underestimating that danger, it is not evident to us why it should require, in the case of Hamdan's trial, any variance from the rules that govern courts-martial.

The absence of any showing of impracticability is particularly disturbing when considered in light of the clear and admitted failure to apply one of the most fundamental protections afforded not just by the Manual for Courts-Martial but also by the UCMJ itself:

the right to be present.

See 10 U. S. C. A. §839© (Supp. 2006).

Whether or not that departure technically is "contrary to or inconsistent with" the terms of the UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. §836(a), the jettisoning of so basic a right cannot lightly be excused as "practicable."

Under the circumstances, then, the rules applicable in courts-martial must apply.

Since it is undisputed that Commission Order No. 1 deviates in many significant respects from those rules, it necessarily violates Article 36(b).

The Government's objection that requiring compliance with the court-martial rules imposes an undue burden both ignores the plain meaning of Article 36(b) and misunderstands the purpose and the history of military commissions.

The military commission was not born of a desire to dispense a more summary form of justice than is afforded by courts-martial; it developed, rather, as a tribunal of necessity to be employed when courts-martial lacked jurisdiction over either the accused or the subject matter.

See Winthrop 831.

Exigency lent the commission its legitimacy, but did not further justify the wholesale jettisoning of procedural protections.

That history explains why the military commission's procedures typically have been the ones used by courts-martial.

That the jurisdiction of the two tribunals today may sometimes overlap, see Madsen, 343 U. S., at 354, does not detract from the force of this history; Article 21 did not transform the military commission from a tribunal of true exigency into a more convenient adjudicatory tool.

Article 36, confirming as much, strikes a careful balance between uniform procedure and the need to accommodate exigencies that may sometimes arise in a theater of war.

That Article not having been complied with here, the rules specified for Hamdan's trial are illegal.

[Livyjr]

HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al., continued ....

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 05-184. 

Argued March 28, 2006--Decided June 29, 2006

Hamdan raises both general and particular objections to the procedures set forth in Commission Order No. 1.

His general objection is that the procedures' admitted deviation from those governing courts-martial itself renders the commission illegal.

Chief among his particular objections are that he may, under the Commission Order, be convicted based on evidence he has not seen or heard, and that any evidence admitted against him need not comply with the admissibility or relevance rules typically applicable in criminal trials and court-martial proceedings.

The Government objects to our consideration of any procedural challenge at this stage on the grounds that (1) the abstention doctrine espoused in Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, precludes pre-enforcement review of procedural rules, (2) Hamdan will be able to raise any such challenge following a "final decision" under the DTA, and (3) "there is ... no basis to presume, before the trial has even commenced, that the trial will not be conducted in good faith and according to law." Brief for Respondents 45-46, nn. 20-21.

The first of these contentions was disposed of in Part III, supra, and neither of the latter two is sound.

This is really something .....

When you think of it .....

This alleged TAY-RIST .....

From out of the wilds ....

Of Afghanist-NAM ......

Or someplace like that, anyway .....

KNOWING OUR LAW ...

BETTER THAN GEORGE W. BUSH DOES ....

So that the supposed TAY-RIST ......

COULD CLEAN GEORGE W. BUSH'S CLOCK .....

In a legal battle .....

In OUR United States Supreme Court .....

Despite George's coterie ...

Of real fancy lawyers ....

And smarmy mouthpieces .....

Which is really quite a message ...

To all the candid world ...

When you think on it .....

And so .....

In a lot of ways ...

IT IS A REAL TESTIMONIAL ....

TO OUR SYSTEM OF LAWS .....

THAT THEY WOULD AFFORD PROTECTION ...

TO EVEN THIS PERSON FROM AFGHANIST-NAM .....

BUT AT THE SAME TIME ...

IT IS A REAL EMBARASSMENT .....

THAT GEORGE W. BUSH'S COMPREHENSION ...

OF THOSE SAME LAWS ...

AND PROTECTIONS ....

IS SO DISMALLY POOR .....

AND NOW HE HAS ....

TROTTED ....

THAT ABYSMAL IGNORANCE ....

THAT HE POSSESSES ....

OF OUR SYSTEM OF LAWS OVER HERE .....

OUT IN FRONT OF THE WHOLE CANDID WORLD .....

FOR ALL TO SEE .....

AND WONDER AT .....

GIVEN GEORGE'S CLAIMS ....

TO BE REPRESENTING ...

THE FORCES ....

OF CIVILIZATION ....

AND LAW ...

AND ORDER ...

IN THIS DRAMA ....

BETWEEN HIM .....

AND HAMDAN ....

WHO NEVER WENT ...

TO YALE ...

OR HARVARD ....

LIKE GEORGE DID ......

AND MOREOVER ...

GEORGE W. BUSH ...

WAS AN OFFICER ...

IN OUR AMERICAN MILITARY ...

AND SO ...

HE SHOULD KNOW THE UNITED STATES UNIFORM CODE ....

OF MILITARY JUSTICE ....

FAR BETTER .....

THAN THIS FOREIGNER HAMDAN DOES ....

WHICH MAKES IT EVEN MORE EMBARASSING .....

GEORGE W. BUSH ...

GETTING ...

HIS CLOCK CLEANED .....

IN OUR UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT .....

BY THIS ALLEGED TAY-RIST HAMDAN .....

And so ...

[Livyjr]

BUT AT THE SAME TIME ...

IT IS A REAL EMBARASSMENT .....

THAT GEORGE W. BUSH'S COMPREHENSION ...

OF THOSE SAME LAWS ...

AND PROTECTIONS ....

IS SO DISMALLY POOR .....

AND NOW HE HAS ....

TROTTED ....

THAT ABYSMAL IGNORANCE ....

THAT HE POSSESSES ....

OF OUR SYSTEM OF LAWS OVER HERE .....

OUT IN FRONT OF THE WHOLE CANDID WORLD .....

FOR ALL TO SEE .....

AND WONDER AT .....

GIVEN GEORGE'S CLAIMS ....

TO BE REPRESENTING ...

THE FORCES ....

OF CIVILIZATION ....

AND LAW ...

AND ORDER ...

IN THIS DRAMA ....

BETWEEN HIM .....

AND HAMDAN ....

WHO NEVER WENT ...

TO YALE ...

OR HARVARD ....

LIKE GEORGE DID ......

AND MOREOVER ...

GEORGE W. BUSH ...

WAS AN OFFICER ...

IN OUR AMERICAN MILITARY ...

AND SO ...

HE SHOULD KNOW THE UNITED STATES UNIFORM CODE ....

OF MILITARY JUSTICE ....

FAR BETTER .....

THAN THIS FOREIGNER HAMDAN DOES ....

WHICH MAKES IT EVEN MORE EMBARASSING .....

GEORGE W. BUSH ...

GETTING ...

HIS CLOCK CLEANED .....

IN OUR UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT .....

BY THIS ALLEGED TAY-RIST HAMDAN .....

And so ...

HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al., continued ....

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 05-184. 

Argued March 28, 2006--Decided June 29, 2006

The procedures adopted to try Hamdan also violate the Geneva Conventions.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Hamdan's Geneva Convention challenge on three independent grounds:

(1) the Geneva Conventions are not judicially enforceable;

(2) Hamdan in any event is not entitled to their protections; and

(3) even if he is entitled to their protections, Councilman abstention is appropriate.

Judge Williams, concurring, rejected the second ground but agreed with the majority respecting the first and the last.

As we explained in Part III, supra, the abstention rule applied in Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, is not applicable here.

And for the reasons that follow, we hold that neither of the other grounds the Court of Appeals gave for its decision is persuasive.

The Court of Appeals relied on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), to hold that Hamdan could not invoke the Geneva Conventions to challenge the Government's plan to prosecute him in accordance with Commission Order No. 1.

Eisentrager involved a challenge by 21 German nationals to their 1945 convictions for war crimes by a military tribunal convened in Nanking, China, and to their subsequent imprisonment in occupied Germany.

The petitioners argued, inter alia, that the 1929 Geneva Convention rendered illegal some of the procedures employed during their trials, which they said deviated impermissibly from the procedures used by courts-martial to try American soldiers. See id., at 789.

We rejected that claim on the merits because the petitioners (unlike Hamdan here) had failed to identify any prejudicial disparity "between the Commission that tried [them] and those that would try an offending soldier of the American forces of like rank," and in any event could claim no protection, under the 1929 Convention, during trials for crimes that occurred before their confinement as prisoners of war. Id., at 790.56

Buried in a footnote of the opinion, however, is this curious statement suggesting that the Court lacked power even to consider the merits of the Geneva Convention argument:

"We are not holding that these prisoners have no right which the military authorities are bound to respect."

"The United States, by the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, concluded with forty-six other countries, including the German Reich, an agreement upon the treatment to be accorded captives."

"These prisoners claim to be and are entitled to its protection."

"It is, however, the obvious scheme of the Agreement that responsibility for observance and enforcement of these rights is upon political and military authorities."

"Rights of alien enemies are vindicated under it only through protests and intervention of protecting powers as the rights of our citizens against foreign governments are vindicated only by Presidential intervention." Id., at 789, n. 14.

The Court of Appeals, on the strength of this footnote, held that "the 1949 Geneva Convention does not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its provisions in court." 415 F. 3d, at 40.

Whatever else might be said about the Eisentrager footnote, it does not control this case.

We may assume that "the obvious scheme" of the 1949 Conventions is identical in all relevant respects to that of the 1929 Convention, and even that that scheme would, absent some other provision of law, preclude Hamdan's invocation of the Convention's provisions as an independent source of law binding the Government's actions and furnishing petitioner with any enforceable right.

For, regardless of the nature of the rights conferred on Hamdan, cf. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407 (1886), they are, as the Government does not dispute, part of the law of war.

See Hamdi, 542 U. S., at 520-521 (plurality opinion).

And compliance with the law of war is the condition upon which the authority set forth in Article 21 is granted.

For the Court of Appeals, acknowledgment of that condition was no bar to Hamdan's trial by commission.

As an alternative to its holding that Hamdan could not invoke the Geneva Conventions at all, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Conventions did not in any event apply to the armed conflict during which Hamdan was captured.

The court accepted the Executive's assertions that Hamdan was captured in connection with the United States' war with al Qaeda and that that war is distinct from the war with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

It further reasoned that the war with al Qaeda evades the reach of the Geneva Conventions. See 415 F. 3d, at 41-42.

We, like Judge Williams, disagree with the latter conclusion.

The conflict with al Qaeda is not, according to the Government, a conflict to which the full protections afforded detainees under the 1949 Geneva Conventions apply because Article 2 of those Conventions (which appears in all four Conventions) renders the full protections applicable only to "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." 6 U. S. T., at 3318.59

Since Hamdan was captured and detained incident to the conflict with al Qaeda and not the conflict with the Taliban, and since al Qaeda, unlike Afghanistan, is not a "High Contracting Party"--i.e., a signatory of the Conventions, the protections of those Conventions are not, it is argued, applicable to Hamdan.

We need not decide the merits of this argument because there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories.

Article 3, often referred to as Common Article 3 because, like Article 2, it appears in all four Geneva Conventions, provides that in a "conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum," certain provisions protecting "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by ... detention." Id., at 3318.

One such provision prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Ibid.

The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that Common Article 3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being " 'international in scope,' " does not qualify as a " 'conflict not of an international character.' " 415 F. 3d, at 41.

That reasoning is erroneous.

The term "conflict not of an international character" is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.

So much is demonstrated by the "fundamental logic [of] the Convention's provisions on its application." Id., at 44 (Williams, J., concurring).

Common Article 2 provides that "the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." 6 U. S. T., at 3318 (Art. 2, ¶1).

High Contracting Parties (signatories) also must abide by all terms of the Conventions vis-À-vis one another even if one party to the conflict is a nonsignatory "Power," and must so abide vis-À-vis the nonsignatory if "the latter accepts and applies" those terms. Ibid. (Art. 2, ¶3).

Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory "Power" who are involved in a conflict "in the territory of" a signatory.

The latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described in Common Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or not).

In context, then, the phrase "not of an international character" bears its literal meaning.

See, e.g., J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 6, 296 (J. Burns & H. Hart eds. 1970) (using the term "international law" as a "new though not inexpressive appellation" meaning "betwixt nation and nation"; defining "international" to include "mutual transactions between sovereigns as such"); Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, p. 1351 (1987) ("[A] non-international armed conflict is distinct from an international armed conflict because of the legal status of the entities opposing each other").

Although the official commentaries accompanying Common Article 3 indicate that an important purpose of the provision was to furnish minimal protection to rebels involved in one kind of "conflict not of an international character," i.e., a civil war, see GCIII Commentary 36-37, the commentaries also make clear "that the scope of the Article must be as wide as possible," id., at 36.63.

In fact, limiting language that would have rendered Common Article 3 applicable "especially [to] cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion," was omitted from the final version of the Article, which coupled broader scope of application with a narrower range of rights than did earlier proposed iterations. See GCIII Commentary 42-43.

Common Article 3, then, is applicable here and, as indicated above, requires that Hamdan be tried by a "regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."

6 U.S.T., at 3320 (Art. 3, ¶1(d)).

While the term "regularly constituted court" is not specifically defined in either Common Article 3 or its accompanying commentary, other sources disclose its core meaning.

The commentary accompanying a provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention, for example, defines " 'regularly constituted' " tribunals to include "ordinary military courts" and "definitely exclud[e] all special tribunals."

GCIV Commentary 340 (defining the term "properly constituted" in Article 66, which the commentary treats as identical to "regularly constituted"); see also Yamashita, 327 U. S., at 44 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (describing military commission as a court "specially constituted for a particular trial").

And one of the Red Cross' own treatises defines "regularly constituted court" as used in Common Article 3 to mean "established and organized in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country."

Int'l Comm. of Red Cross, 1 Customary International Humanitarian Law 355 (2005); see also GCIV Commentary 340 (observing that "ordinary military courts" will "be set up in accordance with the recognized principles governing the administration of justice").

The Government offers only a cursory defense of Hamdan's military commission in light of Common Article 3.

See Brief for Respondents 49-50.

As Justice Kennedy explains, that defense fails because "[t]he regular military courts in our system are the courts-martial established by congressional statutes."

Post, at 8 (opinion concurring in part).

At a minimum, a military commission "can be 'regularly constituted' by the standards of our military justice system only if some practical need explains deviations from court-martial practice." Post, at 10.

As we have explained, see Part VI-C, supra, no such need has been demonstrated here.

[Snuffysmith]

Bush Is Pressed on Reporting Domestic Surveillance

By Charles Babington

In a sharply worded letter, the Republican chairman of the House intelligence committee has told President Bush that the administration is angering lawmakers, and possibly violating the law, by giving Congress too little information about domestic surveillance programs.

To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle

[Snuffysmith]

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/09/world/mi...st/09abuse.html

US Military Braces for Flurry of Criminal Cases in Iraq
Robert Worth

[Livyjr]

HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al., continued ....

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 05-184. 

Argued March 28, 2006--Decided June 29, 2006

The conflict with al Qaeda is not, according to the Government, a conflict to which the full protections afforded detainees under the 1949 Geneva Conventions apply because Article 2 of those Conventions (which appears in all four Conventions) renders the full protections applicable only to "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." 6 U. S. T., at 3318.59

Since Hamdan was captured and detained incident to the conflict with al Qaeda and not the conflict with the Taliban, and since al Qaeda, unlike Afghanistan, is not a "High Contracting Party"--i.e., a signatory of the Conventions, the protections of those Conventions are not, it is argued, applicable to Hamdan.

We need not decide the merits of this argument because there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories.

Article 3, often referred to as Common Article 3 because, like Article 2, it appears in all four Geneva Conventions, provides that in a "conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum," certain provisions protecting "[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by ... detention." Id., at 3318.

One such provision prohibits "the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Ibid.

The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that Common Article 3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being " 'international in scope,' " does not qualify as a " 'conflict not of an international character.' " 415 F. 3d, at 41.

That reasoning is erroneous.

The term "conflict not of an international character" is used here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations.

So much is demonstrated by the "fundamental logic [of] the Convention's provisions on its application." Id., at 44 (Williams, J., concurring).

Common Article 2 provides that "the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties." 6 U. S. T., at 3318 (Art. 2, ¶1).

High Contracting Parties (signatories) also must abide by all terms of the Conventions vis-À-vis one another even if one party to the conflict is a nonsignatory "Power," and must so abide vis-À-vis the nonsignatory if "the latter accepts and applies" those terms. Ibid. (Art. 2, ¶3).

Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory "Power" who are involved in a conflict "in the territory of" a signatory.

The latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described in Common Article 2 chiefly because it does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or not).

In context, then, the phrase "not of an international character" bears its literal meaning.

See, e.g., J. Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 6, 296 (J. Burns & H. Hart eds. 1970) (using the term "international law" as a "new though not inexpressive appellation" meaning "betwixt nation and nation"; defining "international" to include "mutual transactions between sovereigns as such"); Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, p. 1351 (1987) ("[A] non-international armed conflict is distinct from an international armed conflict because of the legal status of the entities opposing each other").

Although the official commentaries accompanying Common Article 3 indicate that an important purpose of the provision was to furnish minimal protection to rebels involved in one kind of "conflict not of an international character," i.e., a civil war, see GCIII Commentary 36-37, the commentaries also make clear "that the scope of the Article must be as wide as possible," id., at 36.63.

In fact, limiting language that would have rendered Common Article 3 applicable "especially [to] cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion," was omitted from the final version of the Article, which coupled broader scope of application with a narrower range of rights than did earlier proposed iterations. See GCIII Commentary 42-43.

Common Article 3, then, is applicable here and, as indicated above, requires that Hamdan be tried by a "regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."

A "regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" .....

That's what the TAY-RIST was able to demonstrate to the United States Supreme Court ......

That George W. Bush .....

WAS DENYING HIM .....

ALL JUDICIAL GUARANTEES ....

WHICH ARE RECOGNIZED .....

AS INDISPENSIBLE ....

BY CIVILIZED PEOPLES ......

SO .....

Since it was George W. Bush ...

WHO WAS CAUGHT .....

HERE IN OUR AMERICA ....

DISPENSING WITH .....

ALL JUDICIAL GUARANTEES ....

WHICH ARE RECOGNIZED .....

AS INDISPENSIBLE ....

BY CIVILIZED PEOPLES ......

WHAT DOES THAT MAKE GEORGE W. BUSH?

BESIDES UNCIVILIZED?

And without MORAL AUTHORITY .....

As a result .....

And so ....

[Livyjr]

SO .....

Since it was George W. Bush ...

WHO WAS CAUGHT .....

HERE IN OUR AMERICA ....

DISPENSING WITH .....

ALL JUDICIAL GUARANTEES ....

WHICH ARE RECOGNIZED .....

AS INDISPENSIBLE ....

BY CIVILIZED PEOPLES ......

WHAT DOES THAT MAKE GEORGE W. BUSH?

BESIDES UNCIVILIZED?

And without MORAL AUTHORITY .....

As a result .....

And so ....

And speaking about UNCIVILIZED .....

And WITHOUT MORAL AUTHORITY ....

All in one breath .....

"5 more charged in Iraq rape-slayings case"

By RYAN LENZ, Associated Press
Last updated: 5:55 p.m., Sunday, July 9, 2006

TIKRIT, Iraq -- Four more U.S. soldiers have been charged with rape and murder and a fifth with dereliction of duty in the alleged rape-slaying of a young Iraqi woman and the killings of her relatives in Mahmoudiya, the military said Sunday.

The five were accused Saturday following an investigation into allegations that American soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division raped the teenager and killed her and three relatives at her home south of Baghdad.

Ex-soldier Steven D. Green was arrested last week in North Carolina and has pleaded not guilty to one count of rape and four counts of murder.

The U.S. statement said the five soldiers still on active duty will face an Article 32 investigation, similar to a grand jury hearing in civilian law.

The Article 32 proceeding will determine whether there is enough evidence to place them on trial.

One of the soldiers was charged with failing to report the attack but is not believed to have participated in it directly, the statement said.

The four facing murder charges could face the death penalty if convicted.

The names of the five were not released, but a U.S. military official, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the ongoing investigation, said Sunday that the soldiers recently charged are two sergeants, two privates first-class and one specialist.

The March 12 attack on the family was among the worst in a series of cases of U.S. troops accused of killing and abusing Iraqi civilians.

U.S. officials are concerned the alleged rape-slaying will strain relations with the new U.S.-backed government and increase calls for changes in an agreement that exempts American soldiers from prosecution in Iraqi courts.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has demanded an independent investigation into the case, which followed a series of claims that U.S. troops killed and mistreated Iraqi civilians.

According to an FBI affidavit filed in Green's case, he and at least two others targeted the teenager and her family for a week before the attack, which was not revealed until witnesses came forward in late June.

The soldiers drank alcohol, abandoned their checkpoint, changed clothes to avoid detection and headed to the victims' house, about 200 yards from a U.S. military checkpoint in the so-called "Triangle of Death," a Sunni Arab area south of Baghdad known for its violence, the affidavit said.

The affidavit estimated the rape victim was about 25.

But a doctor at the Mahmoudiya hospital gave her age as 14.

He refused to be identified for fear of reprisals.

Green is accused of raping the woman and killing her and three relatives -- an adult male and female and a girl estimated to be 5 years old.

An official familiar with the investigation said he set fire to the rape victim's body in an apparent cover-up attempt.

Iraqi authorities identified the rape victim as Abeer Qassim Hamza.

The other victims were her father, Qassim Hamza; her mother, Fikhriya Taha; and her sister, Hadeel Qassim Hamza.

end quotes

When the Commander-In-Chief makes it clear ...

By his actions ...

In violation ...

Of law ...

And treaty .....

That such violations ...

By him ...

Are acceptable .....

Those troops ....

Who follow George W. Bush ...

Will have this sense that the lawlessness ....

Which pervades the administration ...

Of George W. Bush ....

Is acceptable practice for them, as well .....

And so ....

The real man ....

Responsible ...

For this rape ....

Is the Commander-In-Chief .....

For setting this example ....

That anything goes ...

So long as you are LOYAL to him ....

And so ...

[Livyjr]

A "regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" .....

That's what the TAY-RIST was able to demonstrate to the United States Supreme Court ......

That George W. Bush .....

WAS DENYING HIM .....

ALL JUDICIAL GUARANTEES ....

WHICH ARE RECOGNIZED .....

AS INDISPENSIBLE ....

BY CIVILIZED PEOPLES ......

SO .....

Since it was George W. Bush ...

WHO WAS CAUGHT .....

HERE IN OUR AMERICA ....

DISPENSING WITH .....

ALL JUDICIAL GUARANTEES ....

WHICH ARE RECOGNIZED .....

AS INDISPENSIBLE ....

BY CIVILIZED PEOPLES ......

WHAT DOES THAT MAKE GEORGE W. BUSH?

BESIDES UNCIVILIZED?

And without MORAL AUTHORITY .....

As a result .....

And so ....

HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al., continued ....

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 05-184. 

Argued March 28, 2006--Decided June 29, 2006

Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I through IV, Parts VI through VI-D-iii, Part VI-D-v, and Part VII, and an opinion with respect to Parts V and VI-D-iv, in which Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join.

Inextricably intertwined with the question of regular constitution is the evaluation of the procedures governing the tribunal and whether they afford "all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."

6 U. S. T., at 3320 (Art. 3, ¶1(d)).

Like the phrase "regularly constituted court," this phrase is not defined in the text of the Geneva Conventions.

But it must be understood to incorporate at least the barest of those trial protections that have been recognized by customary international law.

Many of these are described in Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, adopted in 1977 (Protocol I).

Although the United States declined to ratify Protocol I, its objections were not to Article 75 thereof.

Indeed, it appears that the Government "regard[s] the provisions of Article 75 as an articulation of safeguards to which all persons in the hands of an enemy are entitled."

Taft, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 Yale J. Int'l L. 319, 322 (2003).

Among the rights set forth in Article 75 is the "right to be tried in [one's] presence." Protocol I, Art. 75(4)(e).66

We agree with Justice Kennedy that the procedures adopted to try Hamdan deviate from those governing courts-martial in ways not justified by any "evident practical need," post, at 11, and for that reason, at least, fail to afford the requisite guarantees.

See post, at 8, 11-17.

We add only that, as noted in Part VI-A, supra, various provisions of Commission Order No. 1 dispense with the principles, articulated in Article 75 and indisputably part of the customary international law, that an accused must, absent disruptive conduct or consent, be present for his trial and must be privy to the evidence against him. See §§6(B)(3), (D).

That the Government has a compelling interest in denying Hamdan access to certain sensitive information is not doubted. Cf. post, at 47-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

But, at least absent express statutory provision to the contrary, information used to convict a person of a crime must be disclosed to him.

Common Article 3 obviously tolerates a great degree of flexibility in trying individuals captured during armed conflict; its requirements are general ones, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems.

But requirements they are nonetheless.

The commission that the President has convened to try Hamdan does not meet those requirements.

We have assumed, as we must, that the allegations made in the Government's charge against Hamdan are true.

We have assumed, moreover, the truth of the message implicit in that charge--viz., that Hamdan is a dangerous individual whose beliefs, if acted upon, would cause great harm and even death to innocent civilians, and who would act upon those beliefs if given the opportunity.

It bears emphasizing that Hamdan does not challenge, and we do not today address, the Government's power to detain him for the duration of active hostilities in order to prevent such harm.

But in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

[Livyjr]

Make the Pie Higher

As a child, he was not all that special.
Not a hint of a great destiny.
Not the worst, not the best,
sort of average, I guess,
but still blessed with the name of his daddy.

As a youth, he had no clear direction.
He just moseyed along down the trail,
to a college career,
where he majored in beer,
cutting classes, he was proud
not to fail.

He preferred not to fight for his country.
As an oil man, his well came up dry.
He was feeling no pain,
as he stayed entertained,
he was known for his jokes
and effrontery.

Then one day, someone said, “You’re not ugly.
You have fingers and eyeballs and hair.
You should get in the game.
They will vote for your name.”
So he said, “What the heck?
Dude, I’m there!”

(Chorus) He said, “We should make the pie higher.
Families is where
our nation finds hope,
where wings take dream.
Well, when you say that
you’re gonna do something,
and then you don’t do it,
that is trustworthiness.
You know that is trustworthiness.”

The campaign was intense, as expected.
Full of slander, distortions, and lies.
He held on for the ride,
and he soon turned the tide,
for his message brought tears
to our eyes.

(Chorus)He said, “We should make the pie higher.
Families is where
our nation finds hope,
where wings take dream.
Well, when you say that
you’re gonna do something,
and then you don’t do it,
that is trustworthiness.
You know that is trustworthiness.”

Some may say the election was stolen.
But I feel that perhaps that’s too strong.
Call it luck.
It was fate.
He was meant to be “great,”
to be feted in story
and song,
like this one called...

(Chorus)He said, “We should make the pie higher.
Families is where
our nation finds hope,
where wings take dream.
Well, when you say that
you’re gonna do something,
and then you don’t do it,
that is trustworthiness.
You know that is trustworthiness.”

The Happytones
PO Box 28448
Austin, Texas, 78755-8448.
E-mail: mail@thehappytones.com

"Bush seeks to build standing with public"

By JENNIFER LOVEN, Associated Press Writer

CHICAGO - The president who loves to get home to his own bed is planning more nights on the road.

It's part of a public-relations effort aimed at boosting President Bush's low standing in polls and bolstering the chances of the Republican Party he leads in this fall's midterm elections.

The idea is to place Bush in more freewheeling settings where he comes across best and before local media that tend to give softer coverage.

Last week in Ohio, for instance, the president's motorcade pulled over at a lemonade stand across the street from a Republican fundraiser where he helped bring in $1.3 million.

And while George is out there ...

On the world stage ....

Violating laws ....

And treaties ....

That were meant ....

To keep the world at least semi-civilized ....

When he is not otherwise occupied, of course ......

CADGING AND WHEEDLING AND BEGGING MONEY .....

FOR THE LAWLESS REPUBLICANS ....

What is going on ...

Over there ...

In George's new DE-MOCKERY .....

Of IRAQISTAN?

Besides chaos, death and destruction, that is ......

Which is the normal for George's world .....

And LAWLESSNESS .....

Which George introduced to IRAQINAM ..........

When he invaded the place ...

To steal its oil ....

And so ....

"Baghdad slaughter raises Iraq tensions - Shiite, Sunni officials lament violence that leaves dozens dead"

By JOSHUA PARTLOW and SAAD AL-IZZI

First published: Monday, July 10, 2006, Washington Post

BAGHDAD, Iraq -- Shiite Muslim militiamen rampaged through a Sunni Arab neighborhood in Baghdad early Sunday morning, killing more than 50 people and discarding bodies in the streets, according to Iraqi officials and witnesses.

Hours later, attackers struck back, detonating two car bombs near a Shiite mosque.

Sunni politicians described the violence against the Sunni residents of the al-Jihad neighborhood in western Baghdad as one of the most coldblooded murder sprees since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003.

The killings occurred on a day when the U.S. military announced charges against four soldiers in the alleged rape and murder of a girl and the killing of three members of her family in the southern Iraqi town of Mahmudiyah.

A fifth soldier was charged with dereliction of duty.

The accused were not identified.

Last week, a former U.S. Army private, Steven D. Green, was charged with rape and murder in federal court in Charlotte, N.C.

He pleaded not guilty.

Sectarian killings escalated sharply across Iraq after a bomb destroyed a revered golden-domed Shiite shrine in Samarra on Feb. 22.

The bombing prompted reprisal attacks on Sunni mosques and pushed the country further toward all-out civil war.

In Baghdad, the armed men, some wearing masks and dressed in black, descended on the al-Jihad neighborhood in buses after sunrise.

They set up checkpoints along a main commercial street, demanded identification cards from passers-by and burst into homes to single out Sunni Arabs to kill, residents said.

One resident, Hazim al-Rawi, said he gathered up his family and fled the neighborhood after he saw 15 bodies outside his home.

"Some of them were tortured with drills," he said of the bodies.

"Some of them were hanged by ropes."

A U.S. military spokesman said that Iraqi national police and American soldiers found 11 dead Iraqis in three locations in the neighborhood.

The higher casualty reports "do not marry up with what we have found," Lt. Col. Jonathan Withington said.

Still, Sunni politicians said the spate of killings exacerbated the problems in Baghdad, where killings occur almost daily, and they accused Iraqi police of collaborating with Shiite militiamen in the violence.

"This is a new step."

"A red line has been crossed," said Alaa Makky, a Sunni member of parliament.

"People have been killed in the streets; now they are killed inside their homes."

Attackers retaliated by detonating two bombs in cars parked at al-Timim Shiite mosque in central Baghdad.

At least 12 people were killed, including five policemen, and 18 were wounded, according to Lt. Col. Memduh Abdulla of the Rusafa police district.

The Associated Press reported that 17 people were killed and 38 hurt.

"We've said it several times that there are people who want to create civil war," Wafeeq al-Samarrae, an adviser to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, said on the al-Jazeera satellite television network.

"Today, this country is on the edge of civil war, not sectarian strife."

Police picked up 57 bodies from the al-Jihad neighborhood, and three Interior Ministry police were also killed there, said Ali Hussein, a commando with the Interior Ministry who ferried bodies to Baghdad's Yarmouk Hospital.

Gen. Saad Mohammed al-Tamini of the Interior Ministry confirmed that more than 50 people were killed.

Some of the corpses that littered the streets lay handcuffed, pocked with bullet holes, while others were pierced with bolts and nails, witnesses said.

end quotes

Oh, well ...

It's just another day .....

In the neighborhood ....

IN AN UNCIVILIZED WORLD .....

WITH AN UNCIVILIZED PRESIDENT .....

ON ITS THRONE .....

And so .....

[Snuffysmith]

http://www.rawstory.com/news/2006/Report_o...ed_by_0710.html
Report: US 'systematically' violates Geneva, Supreme Court

RAW STORY
Published: Monday July 10, 2006

Documents delcassified by the Pentagon to a civil liberties organization show that inmates at Guantanamo Bay have been "systematically tortured," RAW STORY has learned.

The Center on Constitutional Rights' 51-page "Report on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment of Prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba" is drawn from primary accounts given by current detainees and their American attorneys at the Guantánamo Bay prison.

According to the report, several accounts indicate that physical, psychological, sexual and religious abuse is commonplace at the prison. Many incidents catalogued by attorneys would be in violation of the Geneva convention, and as such, also in violation of the Court's ruling.

"I think the torture and abuse detailed here will shock Congress and the American public," said CCR Legal Director Bill Goodman, "because it reveals a lawless, immoral and ineffective detention facility and undermines the administration's increasingly desperate attempts to lie about what is happening down there."

CCR represents over 200 detainees at Guantánamo. In 2004, it successfully argued to the Supreme Court that detainees had a right to challenge their detention.

The report is available at CCR's website.

[Snuffysmith]

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,6-2262961,00.html

King George, alive and well
William Rees-Mogg

Bush has inherited regal powers — but they can never put him above the Supreme Court


GEORGE W. BUSH will never have to campaign for office again. That is rather a pity, as he has developed and matured as a campaigner during his years in office as US President. Last Friday, on his sixtieth birthday, he was holding a press conference in Chicago, the first of his campaign to save the mid-term congressional elections for the Republican Party.
The most amusing moment came on the unlikely subject of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. The President said that he did not know whether the number of these weapons had increased in recent years. The journalist who had asked the question commented: “Maybe you know but are not telling.” The President replied: “That’s an option . . . Maybe I don’t know but I don’t want to tell you I don’t know.” Such a light semantic play is a sign of the President’s relaxation after six years in office.



The traditional view of Washington insiders is that foreign policy never decides national elections. I am not sure why they think this. Plainly, the presidential elections of 1916 (First World War), 1932 (world slump), 1940 and 1944 (Second World War), 1952 (Korean War), 1960 (missile gap), 1968 and 1972 (Vietnam War), 1980 (Iran hostages) and 2004 (Iraq), were all strongly influenced by foreign policy; both world wars and Vietnam certainly impacted on the mid-term elections.

The Chicago press conference was intended, among other things, to give the local press an opportunity to raise local and domestic issues. That hardly happened at all. The journalists all asked questions about world issues. That was what interested them. The President talked with energy and force about his problems in world affairs. They were what interested him. No doubt these issues will interest the electorate in November.

In the press conference, I noted only two domestic issues — both of which turned out to be international. The first was the price of oil; that depends on the progress of the war in the Middle East and of US relations with Iran. The President knows this is an important popular issue. His policy is to diversify away from reliance on crude oil and to promote nuclear power. The one thing that would make the price of oil fall would be a reduction of tension between Washington and Tehran — which does not seem likely at present.

There was only one other local question, and that concerned Iraq. The President was asked what he would say to the parents of the three Illinois Guards units that have recently left for that country. He replied, with considerable dignity, that the Guards were “participating in a noble and important cause . . . If I didn’t think we could win, I wouldn’t be here”.

President Bush makes an impressive case for his policy of maintaining sufficient US forces until Iraq becomes “a free country that can govern itself and sustain itself”. Yet the war — which is becoming unpopular — will inevitably be a major issue in November.

There was a certain selectivity about the journalists’ concerns. There was little or no focus on Afghanistan, which probably worries British defence chiefs more than Iraq itself, and there was surprisingly little attention to the deteriorating situation in Gaza. Yet there was no doubt about the priorities of the journalists or those of the President. As he put it: “National security interests trump economic interests.”

There were passages in which the President made a traditional appeal to American idealism. I think that most Americans would respond favourably to his emphatic statement that “you win elections by believing something”. He is certainly a believer in spreading democracy. His model is the US governance of post-1945 Japan. Force may be unavoidable, but it should be followed by the development of a broader area of liberty and democracy. Mr Bush is in this sense a sincere neoconservative, though an increasingly cautious one. He used to be a Cheney-Rumsfeld type of neo-con; he now speaks with real warmth of Condoleezza Rice, who is Secretary of State. I think he trusts her the most.

There was one reply that seemed much less self-confident, and was therefore much less convincing than the rest of the press conference. That was the President’s answer to a question about the Supreme Court ruling on the military tribunal that was supposed to try the Guantánamo prisoners. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the military tribunal had no legal validity, because it did not constitute “due process of law”.

The President said that he would abide by the ruling, but he obviously wished that he did not have to do so. He would have liked to wriggle. He said he would work with Congress to create a new tribunal, but Congress will obviously be reluctant to give him what he wants. The President said that the Supreme Court had upheld Guantánamo, but then had to correct himself. He said that the court had been “silent” on Guantánamo; indeed the whole of Guantánamo is the antithesis of due process.

This is dangerous territory. In constitutional terms the President has powers that descend from the 18th-century English monarchs; he is the heir to George III. Even the English monarchs who tried to put themselves above the law were always in danger: Charles I was executed; James II was expelled. Some presidents have made claim to a similar imperial power, including Lincoln in the Civil War and Franklin Roosevelt in the slump; Roosevelt’s attempt to pack the Supreme Court failed.

Another imperial president, Richard Nixon, was forced to resign by the threat of impeachment. President Bush, in prosecuting the War on Terror, has also been tempted to put himself about the restraints of national and international law, including the Fourteenth Amendment on “due process” and the Geneva Convention. Now the Supreme Court has refused to uphold him, though on a narrower point. He had better accept its ruling as gracefully as he can.

[Snuffysmith]

http://www.counterpunch.org/
A Dreadful Mistake
The War in Iraq
By ALEXANDER COCKBURN

At the heart of what is often touted as the mightiest empire in world history, it's not a pretty sight at the start of July. After a few chipmunk squeaks from the White House a couple of weeks ago about there being somehow a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel in Iraq the news rolls in that itis as bad, if not worse, than ever.

Bomb explosions in Baghdad wipe out scores of ordinary people in a single minute, the motive advertised n maybe truthfully n as sectarian hatred, between Shia and Sunni. The entire country, with the exception of the Kurdish provinces in the north, is transfixed with terror, as people flee neighborhoods because they are in the wrong religious faction.

Come to a road block and you don't know whether it's a unit of Iraqi police, a unit of Iraqi killers disguised as police, a group of US soldiers intent on revenge on anyone because one of their buddies just got blown up by a roadside bomb.

The world's headlines are filled with one terrible story after another about atrocities perpetrated by US forces. The latest is particularly stark in its savagery. The US army--not, it should be emphasized, some pinko columnist or reporter--says soldiers saw an attractive young Iraqi woman, planned her abduction and rape. Then they killed her and tried to burn her body. Then they murdered her family. Such are the charges.

Veterans of Vietnam say that in Iraq the situation isx analogous to that prevailing in Vietnam in 1968 when frightful atrocities like My Lai were perpetrated. The troops are over-extended, badly trained, demoralized and know that they are risking their lives in a war with no optimistic outcome.

The circumstances which produce soldiers and units capable of war crimes include the following, according to experts in analyzing the causes of post-traumatic stress disorder:

The soldiers are involved in operations which inevitably involve attacks on, and slaughter of, civilians.

Many have seen comrades killed. In this war the platoon is the soldieris sole life support and emotional and physical sanctuary. All officers are mistrusted and often despised. A death in the platoon engenders the frenzied bloodlust and cold blooded slaughters of incidents like that in Haditha.

Indeed the low quality of the officers in the US armed forces as it has developed across the past twenty years has not been sufficiently addressed by the press, and certainly not by the spineless Congress. On the private testimony of many veterans, it has declined steadily, up through the highest ranks, where there are endless examples of the failure of capable leadership.

So America will see, over the years to come, thousands of traumatized soldiers trying to reenter civil society and resume their peace time lives. Many will never shake off the traumas instilled by months of service in Iraq, and thousands of families, and communities, not to mention the soldiers themselves will be paying the price while the supreme commanders who launched this war will be making money from lectures and memoirs.

And of course back in Iraq there are already thousands who will only remember America as the land that sent soldiers who shot their brothers or sisters or cousins, or tortured them in prison, or destroyed their homes, or leveled their neighborhoods with high explosive from an airplane.

It's tragic to say it, but more and more Iraqis are doing so: Life was better for a large percentage of that countryis inhabitants under the dictator Saddam Hussein, horrible though he was. The war of iliberationi launched by Bush in 2003 with the stentorian support of many liberals here has produced more deaths, more suffering, more blighted lives with zero prospects except emigration for those who can afford it.

Is there any political force here in the US capable of hastening the end of this tragedy. None is visible. The Republicans are tub-thumping, as their best tactic for self-preservation in the fall elections. As a party, with a very few honorable exceptions, the Democrats are doing likewise. The peasce movement is ineffective. There is no light at the end of the tunnel.

[Snuffysmith]

QUOTATIONS FOR THE DAY

"BECAUSE WHICH FUNERAL DO YOU GO TO? IN MY JUDGMENT, I THINK IF I GO TO ONE I SHOULD GO TO ALL."

--President George W. Bush, answering why, to date, he has not attended the funeral of a single U.S. soldier who has been killed in his Iraq war; cited in Edward M. Gomez, "Bush Finally Explains Why He Won't Attend U.S. Soldiers' Funerals" (SFGate.com July 10)
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/det...5&entry_id=6914

[Livyjr]

HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al., continued ....

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 05-184. 

Argued March 28, 2006--Decided June 29, 2006

Justice Stevens announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I through IV, Parts VI through VI-D-iii, Part VI-D-v, and Part VII, and an opinion with respect to Parts V and VI-D-iv, in which Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join.

We have assumed, moreover, the truth of the message implicit in that charge--viz., that Hamdan is a dangerous individual whose beliefs, if acted upon, would cause great harm and even death to innocent civilians, and who would act upon those beliefs if given the opportunity.

It bears emphasizing that Hamdan does not challenge, and we do not today address, the Government's power to detain him for the duration of active hostilities in order to prevent such harm.

But in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al., continued ....

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 05-184. 

Argued March 28, 2006--Decided June 29, 2006

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

[Livyjr]

And for something completely different .....

"Excavation yields artifacts left by the ancients - Dig by students and others reveals site may date back 10,000 years"

By JENNIFER PATTERSON, Staff writer, Albany, New York Times Union

First published: Monday, July 10, 2006

CENTRAL BRIDGE -- European glass trading beads and the remains of at least one longhouse have been unearthed at a Schoharie Valley excavation site that professional archaeologists have called one of the most important in the state.

Located on a terrace overlooking the Schoharie Creek, the excavation -- named the Pethick Site -- has so far uncovered more than 80,000 artifacts.

The site even drew dozens of amateur archaeologists and curious townspeople midway through the eight-week dig as word spread of the chance to experience firsthand a professional archaeological excavation.

The site -- 40 miles west of Albany and in its third year of excavation -- is run as a field school through cooperative effort by the University at Albany department of anthropology and the Division of Research and Collections at the New York State Museum.

"This is probably the most significant excavation I've ever been a part of," said Sean Rafferty, site co-director and assistant professor.

Rafferty directed a previous excavation about a half-mile away from the current site and has participated in other digs throughout his career.

"It still amazes me that we found one of the most prolific sites in the state completely by chance."

In 2004, the field school was denied access to a site, called Smith-Holloway, a stone's throw away from Pethick.

But, after that denial, a local archaeology enthusiast, Carleton Smith of Central Bridge, led the team to an open field where he had uncovered numerous artifacts.

Shovel test pits (a systematic survey using small holes spaced every five meters in a grid to gauge the presence of artifacts) were dug, yielding rich archaeological deposits.

And the Pethick site was born.

The field school program trains undergraduate and postgraduate students in the techniques of professional archaeology.

For eight weeks, students learn the basics of archaeological field work, laboratory processing and artifact analysis.

Those who complete the work are then able to seek jobs at private or public contract archaeology firms throughout the country.

Pit crews of four to five students dig in squares that measure 2 meters by 2 meters and excavate following the golden rule of archaeology, which states artifacts are to be documented by context and association.

That is, artifacts are recorded by noting where something is found (context) and what it's found with (association).

By digging in squares, the crew can accurately record the three-dimensional location of artifacts and features.

With a measuring tape, workers record an artifact's location by measuring its height and width within the unit, as well as its depth.

Artifacts recovered are cleaned and cataloged at the State Museum, where they are available for study by researchers, students and others.

"We discovered a pitted stone, scraper, projectile point and part of a drill so far today," said UAlbany senior Joshua Porter of Latham.

"We've been slowly excavating a fire pit on top of a storage pit, which is a pretty impressive find."

Newly discovered artifacts and their carbon dating indicate that people have inhabited the site since the Early Archaic Period, dating to as early as 8,000 B.C.

Mounting evidence indicates it has been continuously occupied since at least 3,000 B.C., with the most evidence coming from the Late Woodland Period, which dates to approximately the 11th century to A.D. 1400.

The occupants of the Schoharie Valley at that time are generally believed to be the ancestors of modern Iroquois cultures, including the Mohawk.

Numerous artifacts from that period have been recovered, including countless chipped stone waste flakes called chert, a byproduct of stone tool manufacture; projectile points, including Brewerton side-notched, Meadowood and Levanna; animal bone; seeds; and pottery chards.

Many hearths, fire-cracked rock deposits, storage pits and pieces of pottery patterns have also been documented.

Preliminary analysis suggests the presence of numerous house outlines and at least one longhouse.

Many of these finds were on site for viewing during a community appreciation day, held earlier this week.

Visitors were given interpretive tours and many brought artifacts from their own collections to be identified by professional archaeologists.

"A lot of people have inherited items from family members and have no idea how historically relevant they are," said state archaeologist and site co-director Christina Rieth.

"We're encouraging everyone to fill out site forms, so we (State Museum) know where items were found and how they relate to history."

The daylong event was planned and executed by UAlbany graduate students Steve Moragne and Jamie Moore to generate public interest in archaeology.

They were surprised by the number of people who attended and their interest in the history of the Schoharie Valley.

"It's our professional obligation to make personal connections with the community," Rafferty said.

"Local people often have a better idea of site locations and what types of material can be found."

"Our current excavation is a perfect example of the public and archaeologists working together, which I hope will continue in the future."

Jennifer Patterson can be reached at 454-5340 or by e-mail at jpatterson@timesunion.com.

To participate

For more information on the site in the Schoharie Valley and future excavations, call the UAlbany anthropology department, 442-4700, or the New York State Museum Cultural Education Center, 474-5976, or go to http://www.albany.edu or http://www.oce.nysed.gov.

[Livyjr]

HAMDAN v. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, et al., continued ....

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 05-184. 

Argued March 28, 2006--Decided June 29, 2006

The Chief Justice took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

"Judge: FBI raid on lawmaker's office legal"

By TONI LOCY, Associated Press Writer

30 minutes ago

WASHINGTON - An FBI raid on a Louisiana congressman's Capitol Hill office was legal, a federal judge ruled Monday.

Chief U.S. District Judge Thomas F. Hogan said members of Congress are not above the law.

He rejected requests from lawmakers and Democratic Rep. William Jefferson to return material seized by the FBI in a May 20-21 search of Jefferson's office.[/size]

In a 28-page opinion, Hogan dismissed arguments that the first-ever raid on a congressman's office violated the Constitution's protections against intimidation of elected officials.

Jefferson's theory of legislative privilege "would have the effect of converting every congressional office into a taxpayer-subsidized sanctuary for crime," the judge said.

Hogan acknowledged the "unprecedented" nature of the case but said "a Member of Congress is generally bound to the operation of the criminal laws as are ordinary persons."

Congress' effectiveness "is not threatened by permitting congressional offices to be searched pursuant to validly issued search warrants," said Hogan, who had approved the FBI's request to conduct the overnight search of Jefferson's office.

Jefferson had sought the return of several computer hard drives, floppy disks and two boxes of paper documents that FBI agents seized during an 18-hour search of his Rayburn Building office.

At issue was a constitutional provision known as the speech and debate clause, which protects elected officials from being questioned by the president, a prosecutor or a plaintiff in a lawsuit about their legislative work.

"No one argues that the warrant executed upon Congressman Jefferson's office was not properly administered," Hogan wrote.

"Therefore, there was no impermissible intrusion on the Legislature."

"The fact that some privileged material was incidentally captured by the search does not constitute an unlawful intrusion."

The raid on Jefferson's office angered members of Congress, some of whom threatened to retaliate by tinkering with the FBI and Justice Department budgets.

President Bush stepped in and ordered the solicitor general to take custody of the seized materials so Congress and the Justice Department could work out procedures to deal with similar situations in the future.

The president's 45-day "cooling off period" ended Sunday with no compromise worked out but with assurances from the Justice Department that it would not seek to regain custody of the materials until Hogan ruled on Jefferson's request.

Because Hogan signed the search warrant authorizing the search, Jefferson's legal team was not surprised by his ruling upholding it.

"While a Congressman is not above the law, the executive branch must also follow the law," said Jefferson's lawyer, Robert Trout.

"We appreciate the consideration the judge accorded our motion for the return of the seized property, but we respectfully disagree with his conclusion, and we intend to appeal the ruling."

Hogan said a search warrant seeking material is very different than a subpoena seeking testimony.

"Jefferson may never be questioned regarding his legitimate legislative activities, is immune from civil or criminal liability for those activities, and no privileged material may ever be used against him in court," the judge wrote.

Jefferson has been under investigation since March 2005 for allegedly using his position to promote the sale of telecommunications equipment and services offered by iGate, a Louisville-based firm, that sought contracts with Nigeria, Ghana and other African nations.

In return for his help, Jefferson allegedly demanded stock and cash payments.

Jefferson has not been charged and has denied wrongdoing.

An affidavit filed with Hogan to justify the May search says the FBI videotaped Jefferson in August 2005 accepting $100,000 from a business executive, who actually was a government informant.

The FBI said it subsequently recovered $90,000 from a freezer at Jefferson's home.

A bipartisan group of House leaders told Hogan in a court filing that the Justice Department had overstepped its authority by prohibiting Jefferson's private lawyer, House counsel and the Capitol Police from observing the search of Jefferson's office.

They also complained that agents showed up at the Rayburn Office Building unannounced and demanded that the Capitol Police chief let them into Jefferson's office immediately or they would "pick the office door lock."

Hogan said investigators don't have to seek approval from elected officials or their lawyers to seize possible proof of a crime.

"The power to determine the scope of one's own privilege is not available to any other person, including members of the co-equal branches of government: federal judges ... or the President of the United States," the judge said.

He also said judges have a legitimate role to play in ensuring prosecutors don't overstep their authority in investigating legislators.

"A federal judge is not a mere rubber stamp in the warrant process, but rather an independent and neutral official sworn to uphold and defend the Constitution," Hogan said.