Snuffysmith's Blog, Articles and Commentary of the Day - Vol. 3 Options

[Snuffysmith]

The Gates Critique – Boston Globe editorial
Iraq Must Seize Precious Opportunity – Anthony Cordesman, Financial Times
Bush Isn’t the Only Decider on Iraq – Bruce Ackerman, Los Angeles Times
Iraq Accountability Due – David Limbaugh, Washington Times
Public Sees Progress in War – Pew Research Center
Good News on Bush’s Watch? – Rosa Brooks, Los Angeles Times
Al Qaeda’s Emerging Defeat – Austin Bay, Real Clear Politics
Rewarding One's Friends - Robert Scheer, San Francisco Chronicle
Military Readiness and Waging War – John Brinkerhoff, Washington Times
A Few Good People – Victor Davis Hanson, Real Clear Politics
A Tribute to Howard – Greg Sheridan, The Australian
Annapolis: The Long Haul - Baltimore Sun editorial
Annapolis: It's a Start - Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial
Palestine: Land of Prophets at a Loss – Alan Gold, The Australian
Annapolis Animosity - Meyrav Wurmser, National Review
Saudis Played Key Role - Haroon Siddiqui, Toronto Star
Annapolis Talks Likely to Fail – Rami Khouri, Daily Star
Pakistan: The General Retires – Washington Post editorial
Sharif, Bhutto and the (Ex-) General? – New York Times editorial
Ominous Future for Pakistan - Kamal Siddiqi, Boston Globe
Citizen Musharraf – Amir Taheri, New York Post
Destroying Lebanon for a Great Sinecure – Michael Young, Daily Star
Battle of the Youth Bulge - Gunnar Heinsohn, Weekly Standard
On the Archbishop of Canterbury – Giles Fraser, Sydney Morning Herald
‘Tolerance’ in Khartoum – New York Post editorial
British Muslims Should Protest Teddy Lunacy – Boris Johnson, London Daily Telegraph
Lesson in Russian Voter Fraud – Mark Almond, Canberra Times
Shutting Up Venezuela’s Chávez? – Roger Cohen, New York Times
Hugo Chávez's Vision in the Hills – Charles Lane, Washington Post

[Snuffysmith]

Pakistan’s nukes are safe. Maybe.
Thu, 08/13/2009 – 4:57pm
By Vipin Narang

An excellent series of recent articles on the subject by Shaun Gregory, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen (a former director of intelligence at the Department of Energy), and Brig. Gen. Feroz Hassan Khan (Ret.) assess the very grim threat of Pakistan losing control over its 60-warheads-and-growing nuclear weapons arsenal. Given the lack of publicly available data on this critical issue, such articles by extremely knowledgeable scholars and practitioners represent some of the best information we have on realistic threats to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Gregory’s article has gotten some recent attention for noting that there have worryingly been several attacks at the perimeter of bases that may house nuclear components, though U.S. intelligence officials are quick to point out that there is little reason to believe that nuclear assets were ever at risk. So whatare the primary risks to the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal?

In answering this question, it is important to differentiate between the various organizations involved with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and where and when nuclear assets are more or less vulnerable to internal and external threats. The bigger threat is probably not the Army losing control of nuclear assets, but rather insider-outsider collusion or diversion of nuclear material from the civilian nuclear agencies during either the production phase or transfer to Army locations.

The good news is that once the Pakistani Army takes custody of nuclear assets, the threat of terrorists successfully boosting a warhead or fissile cores — either through direct attack or facilitated by insiders — is reassuringly low. The Pakistani Army has every incentive to ensure firm control over the country’s nuclear assets since, should they be lost or stolen, there would literally be hell to pay.

More…
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/...re_safe_maybe_0

[Snuffysmith]

bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable

Edition 31 Volume 7 - August 13, 2009

The Obama approach

• The communicator's challenge - Aluf Benn
The administration's ignorance of Israeli views enabled Netanyahu to appear as the responsible centrist.

• A holistic approach - Ghassan Khatib
It would seem that Washington understands the long-term interests of Israel better than Israel's own right-wing government.

• An unforgivable mistake - Joshua Muravchik
The rush for reconciliation with enemies or antagonists often comes at the expense of traditional friends.

• Slouching toward Ramallah - Mark Perry
Dayton's other mission involves the US as a partner in Israel's campaign against Islamists.

The communicator's challenge
Aluf Benn

As he prepares to present his much-awaited peace plan for the Middle East, US President Barack Obama is facing a challenge: how to sell his initiative to a skeptical Israeli public.

This will not be the first time an American administration tries to promote an Israel-Arab "land for peace" deal despite the reluctance of a right-wing government in Jerusalem to negotiate or make territorial concessions. Past American efforts, however, were met with high hopes from Israelis who were seeking an alternative to the endless conflict. The political system was split along the lines of "yes or no" to the peace process.

In 2009, however, this is no longer the case. Israelis are doubtful that a peace deal with the Palestinians is possible at all, and in any event they don't see the point in another futile experiment. Scars from the recurring failures of the past 16 years--Oslo, Camp David, the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza and the Annapolis process--are fresh in the public mind. While the left and right are still debating who is to be blamed, the lesson drawn by most Israelis is one of frustration. Territories that were given away turned into terrorist bases and rocket-launching pads. The Palestinian Authority is split between hostile, Hamas-controlled Gaza and the friendlier but weaker Fateh government in the West Bank. Security and quiet were achieved through a combination of defensive measures like fences and walls along with military offensives in the West Bank, Lebanon and Gaza, rather than via negotiations.

Opinion polls have shown that while most Israelis would support the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, they also believe it will not happen. Since the Camp David debacle of 2000, the Israeli mainstream has adopted Ehud Barak's argument that "we have no partner" on the Palestinian side (or in Syria, for that matter.)

This explains the policy of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Returning to the helm after a decade, Netanyahu aims to position himself at the political center. His position dovetails with the majority of public opinion: supporting the idea of Palestinian statehood in principle while overloading it with a stack of preconditions that are unacceptable to Palestinians. In other words, Palestine could be a nice idea, but in practice it's impossible.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has mirrored Netanyahu's stance with his own preconditions, unacceptable to Israelis, all but showing disinterest in negotiations. While Netanyahu prefers the territorial status quo ("economic peace"), Abbas wants an imposed settlement based on "Palestinian rights."

Against this backdrop, Obama's leadership is the key to reviving the peace process and to any successful outcome. It's his call: he alone can overcome the reluctance and intransigence on both sides and re-launch a serious diplomatic effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

From an Israeli standpoint, however, Obama faces a rocky start. In many countries in the world Obama enjoys almost messianic status, rebuilding America's stance as the global leader following the unhappy years of George W. Bush. But not in Israel. Here Obama is seen as an unfriendly president who distances America from Israel in order to please "the Arabs". According to a Pew poll published in late July, Israelis are less in love with America following Obama's address to the Arab world in Cairo on June 4.

Obama's demand that Israel freeze settlement construction, meant to facilitate resurrection of the peace process, was interpreted here as a thinly veiled attempt to twist Netanyahu's arm and push him into a corner while taking little political risk at home. After all, the settlements have few friends on Capitol Hill or in the American Jewish community.

Efforts to win friends in Congress notwithstanding, Obama and his lieutenants have not bothered to make their case to the Israeli public. The president has reached out to many peoples around the world, from Russia to Ghana, but has not bothered to speak to Israelis. The Cairo address and its immediate follow-up visit to Buchenwald depicted the birth of Israel as a result of the Holocaust, in essence adopting the narrative of Israel's enemies like Mahmoud Ahmedinezhad. Israelis are taught that Zionist idealism, hard work and struggle brought about the existence of Israel, not political handouts from the guilt-ridden West at the expense of the Palestinians after WWII. Obama may have mixed up Israelis with American Jews, whose historic narrative emphasizes the Holocaust.

The administration's ignorance of Israeli views enabled Netanyahu to appear as the responsible centrist, paying no domestic price for one of the worst crises in American-Israeli relations--after 17 years of a continuous love affair. Netanyahu's refusal to freeze the settlements (he agrees only to a construction limit) enjoys the backing of the political system. No Israeli politician, not even from the left-wing opposition, has stood up to the prime minister to demand: "Say 'yes' to Obama." This stands in stark contrast with the political debates around past peace efforts. Even Meretz, at the left end of the Knesset spectrum, focuses on gay rights and government conduct rather than on "stopping the settlements" as Obama demanded in Cairo.

Obama won the presidency, and global admiration, thanks to his considerable talents as a communicator. If he wants to promote peace in the Middle East, he should communicate better with Israelis. Bill Clinton could do it with his personal charm, George W. Bush with his steadfast support for Israel's security. Most Israelis crave attention and friendship from America more than they care about the settlements. But they hate to be dupes and fear they have been misled too many times by false hopes. Obama's challenge will be to convince them that freezing settlements and creating a Palestinian state are not just another dose of snake oil.- Published 13/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Aluf Benn is editor-at-large of Haaretz.

A holistic approach
Ghassan Khatib

There is no doubt that the Middle East approach of the new American administration under President Barack Obama is significantly different to that of his predecessor, George W. Bush.

In fact, however, the change was begun during the previous administration and was instigated mainly by the failures of that administration in dealing with almost every single aspect of Middle East policy. The groundwork for change was laid in 2006 by the Iraq Study Group led by James Baker and Lee Hamilton.

The Baker-Hamilton report indicated, after a thorough evaluation and assessment, several shortcomings of then current US policy in the region. Coupled with the unprecedented decline in the credibility of the US government and its allies in the region in the last half decade, the report confirmed a conclusion that many politicians and analysts had already reached, namely that the US needed to change its approach to the region.

There are four main notable changes that characterize the Obama administration's approach to the region. The first and most obvious is the administration's immediate and consistent engagement with the different conflicts in the Middle East, starting with the Arab-Israel conflict. Indeed, the White House appointed George Mitchell as its special envoy almost immediately after Obama's inauguration. Since then, Mitchell has been a regular and consistent presence here.

This is important because the absence of almost any engagement until the last year of the previous administration was among the factors responsible for the deterioration in Palestinian-Israeli relations, the increase in violence and the radicalization that has afflicted both Israeli and Palestinian society.

Second, the Obama administration has replaced the Bush administration's exclusivist approach with an inclusive approach to the region's ills. Thus Washington has reached out to Tehran, encouraged domestic dialogue in Iraq, opened channels to Syria and called upon Egypt to try to reconcile the estranged Fateh and Hamas factions, with the implied message that any Palestinian national unity government thus established would not be shunned by the international community.

The current White House also appears to have grasped the fundamental inter-relationship between the various conflicts in the Middle East. There are linkages between Iranian-American tensions and the domestic Palestinian division as well as with the Palestinian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli fronts. In other words, and as evidenced by Obama's speech in Cairo to the Arab and Muslim worlds, the new administration has adopted a holistic approach to the Middle East.

The final and most interesting change is in American-Israeli relations. Here, the new administration seems consistent in its demands on Israel even in the face of Israeli objections. For example, the American "request" for Israel to stop its expansion of settlements and the consistency with which this has been repeated, is unprecedented in the history of US-Israel relations since the beginning of the peace process, maybe even before.

That is not at all an indication that the current US administration is less friendly to Israel. Rather, it would seem that Washington understands the long-term interests of Israel better than Israel's own right-wing government. Such a conclusion may be supported by the fact that a clear majority in the American-Jewish community appears to back Obama's attempts to convince Israel to stop its settlement construction.

Certainly, there is general consensus that there is a clear contradiction between Israel's settlement construction and the international community's strategy for securing peace between Palestinians and Israeli--of a kind that can also positively impact regional stability.

However, there is one major shortcoming with the new tone from Washington: it has so far failed to yield any practical results. Perhaps it just needs more time, especially since more time is required to change Palestinian, Israeli and Arab public opinion. The public moods among both Palestinians and Israelis pose a significant obstacle to progress on a peace process.

But equally, the US must also convince Israel that failure to comply with its obligations under the roadmap, especially vis-a-vis settlements, will have consequences for Israel's relations with the international community, including the US.- Published 13/8/2009 © bitterlemons.org

Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications. He is vice-president for community outreach at Birzeit University and a former Palestinian Authority minister of planning.

An unforgivable mistake
Joshua Muravchik

Israelis or Israel-supporters who think of President Barack Obama as anti-Israel are mistaken. He is not as staunchly pro-Israel as his predecessor, and he has chosen to tangle with Israel over settlements. But surely he is convinced that this is for Israel's own good.

Nonetheless, he may do Israel a good deal of harm. Indeed, he may already have begun doing so. This is not so much due to the issue of settlements but to his overarching strategy for dealing with the Middle East.

Obama seems to believe that America's problems in the world are self-inflicted, indeed that many of the world's problems were created by George W. Bush. International polls during the Bush years showed that many people believed that America was the greatest danger to world peace. Some Americans believe it too, and Obama apparently leans toward that view.

That would explain why he imagines he can solve disputes with Iran, Syria, Russia, China, North Korea, Cuba, Burma and Sudan by means of "diplomacy" and "engagement". In this view, if only America will show the rulers of these countries that it now has good intentions toward them (unlike during the benighted Bush years), then surely they will agree to work things out amicably.

The rush for reconciliation with enemies or antagonists often comes at the expense of traditional friends. If Washington appeases Moscow by canceling a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, then the Poles and Czechs who went out on a limb in agreeing to host such facilities will see that limb sawed off behind them. New amity with China may cost Taiwan; with Pyongyang the loser may be Seoul. With all of the target countries, warmer government-to-government relations mean handshakes, smiles and photo opportunities with bloody tyrants and muting US complaints about the sufferings they impose on their subjects, as Secretary of State Clinton made clear on her visit to China.

Jimmy Carter took a similar approach, and the result was the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Obama's apologies for the exercise of American power by his predecessors and his cuts in defense spending also mirror Carter's policies. During Carter's presidency, this projection of weakness provided a context in which anti-American revolutionaries took power in a string of Third World countries in addition to Iran and Nicaragua and in which the Soviet Union was emboldened to invade Afghanistan.

Obama's strategy in the Middle East is to reduce America's unpopularity by accelerating withdrawal from Iraq, making a display of differences with Israel and offering statements and symbolic gestures of American humility and respect for Islam. These have improved America's poll ratings, but it is doubtful they will induce the region's power-brokers to adopt policies more conducive to America's interests. After all, these potentates do not show much concern for their own poll ratings.

How does all of this affect Israel? Israel hopes one day to enjoy warm peace with its neighbors, but the path to such an idyll lies through a more prosaic type of peace, born of pragmatism. In this scenario, the Arab states may continue to resent Israel's founding but recognize that Israel has become a reality with which they are better off coming to terms. America's unmatched power and its unflinching support for Israel encourage the Arabs to reach such a conclusion and to forgo fantasies of wiping Israel off the map. An American projection of weakness and diminished support for Israel will have the opposite effect.

Of course, the perpetuation or even reinvigoration of hopes of destroying Israel does not mean Israel will be destroyed; Israel is very good at defending itself. But it may well mean more wars, more terror attacks and fewer steps toward the normalization of Israel-Arab relations.

Iran's drive for nuclear weapons and regional hegemony makes this issue far from theoretical. Iran has made itself the patron of those who continue to advocate Israel's annihilation, and nuclear power might give it the means to that goal. Obama's approach to this problem has been "diplomacy", i.e., the hope that he can somehow talk Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei into abandoning the ambition of making Iran the world's tenth nuclear weapons state with all the prestige and power this would confer.

It is doubtful that an American president has ever entertained a more quixotic idea, and it has already led the US administration to badly mishandle Iran's electoral crisis. It took a week before Obama spoke clearly in support of Iranian protestors. Then his spokesman referred to Ahmadinezhad as Iran's "elected president." And his administration has continued to insist that Iran's internal issues do not dim Washington's eagerness to "engage." The Iranian protesters don't want US funding, much less military intervention, but they have been bitterly disappointed by the failure of the US to give them unequivocal moral support.

The painful irony in this is that Obama has squandered the best hope for a solution to the Iran nuclear threat--a change of government in Tehran. Yes, a reformist regime would still want nuclear energy, but it would shift toward a more peaceful approach to the outside world and would likely be amenable to a solution that would exclude nuclear weapons. By allowing the phantom of "engagement" to deter him from doing everything that he could usefully do to back the protestors, Obama has made an unforgivable mistake. It may prove immensely harmful to the Iranian people, to the region, to the United States and, not least, to Israel.- Published 13/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Joshua Muravchik, a fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is the author of "The Next Founders: Voices of Democracy in the Middle East".

Slouching toward Ramallah
Mark Perry

The salient feature of stereotypes--the thing that makes them a stereotype--is that they contain an element of truth. For a young boy growing up in America in the 1950s, the world was filled with easily identifiable heroes and villains conveniently labeled: those in white shirts were good guys, those in black shirts bad guys.

We played cowboys and Indians; the cowboys were virtuous, the Indians savages. The only joy in being an Indian was that you got to scalp your prisoner, raising a rubber tomahawk and bringing it down on your captive's forehead while he screamed in feigned pain. America was awash in toy guns, replicas of those our fathers and uncles had carried across Europe and the Pacific. They sold them downtown in the department store: metal representations of M-1 rifles and Tommy guns. Let's play war, we'd say, and we'd charge around making battle sounds.

To say that the America of the 1950s was young and innocent and convinced of its own destiny is not simply a stereotype, it happens to be true. But in thinking about those years now, I've come to the conclusion that America was suffering from what British author Douglas Adams calls an "SEP", someone else's problem. In one of his books, one of Adams' characters describes an SEP as "something that we can't see, or don't see, or our brain doesn't let us see, because we think it's somebody else's problem . . . the brain just edits it out, it's like a blind spot . . ." An SEP "relies on people's natural predisposition not to see anything they don't want to, weren't expecting, or can't explain."

The Obama administration is suffering from SEP in the West Bank: it is refusing to correct practices that it doesn't want to see, wasn't expecting and can't explain.

Since December of 2005, Lt. General Keith Dayton has served as the US Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Dayton's team has trained 1,600 members of the PA's Presidential Guard and National Security Force. Dayton is proud of his work: "Across the West Bank," he told the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "these security campaigns have featured clamping down on armed gangs ... dismantling illegal militias, working against illegal Hamas activities, and focusing on the safety and security of Palestinian citizens."

No one argues that the PA shouldn't build a police presence to enforce law and order, but Dayton's other mission involves the US as a partner in Israel's campaign against Islamists. The NSF forces that Dayton has trained have shuttered charitable Islamist societies, diverted Hamas charity money to PA coffers, disrupted Hamas' political meetings, invaded mosques, broken up pro-Hamas demonstrations and arrested Hamas leaders. For those who view Hamas as a terrorist movement seeking the destruction of Israel, this is all to the good. But for Americans who believe that the key to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is for the US to act as a credible mediator, Dayton's activities are decidedly counterproductive: they signal that the US has chosen sides in the political dispute between the PA and Hamas, have involved the US as a partner in Israel's occupation of the West Bank and have reversed the mandate won by Hamas at the polls in January of 2006. Dayton's mission has built! the rule of law, but it has undermined democracy and poisoned the prospects for Palestinian unity.

Worse yet, Dayton's mission has been dogged by persistent reports that Palestinian security personnel whom he has trained have tortured Hamas detainees in their custody. Dayton denies these charges, saying that no one in the NSF has engaged in torture. Dayton's team has instituted a training regimen on the proper treatment of Palestinian detainees and Human Rights Watch has reported that other Palestinian security organizations--not the NSF--are responsible for most of the abuses. Still, the reports persist: including from Hamas partisans who have said they were beaten and shackled by officers in NSF uniforms.

The predicted response to all of these reports is now common: Hamas' security forces in Gaza engage in these same practices or worse. Those reports are no doubt true: but Hamas' security forces in Gaza do not patrol with the IDF and are not trained by the United States--which claims obedience to the rule of law and respect for human rights. And Hamas' security forces have not been trained by an American general who takes pride in the praise offered by a senior Israeli military officer impressed by what he has done: "How many more of these new Palestinians can you generate," this Israeli asked, "and how quickly, because they are our way to leave the West Bank." Aw shucks. How proud we Americans are to be paid such a compliment by an officer of "the most moral army in the world".

President Barack Obama has pledged his administration to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He has appointed a man of stature as an emissary to help resolve that conflict. He has reached out to the Arab world. His administration has condemned Israel's policy of settlement expansion. He says he has a program and a plan. He has said he will see it to the end. But the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not just about settlements or borders. It's about human dignity, the rule of law and respecting the vote of the people.

"You know, there's a lot of talk in this country about the federal deficit," then-Senator Obama said in New Orleans in 2006. "But I think we should talk more about our empathy deficit--the ability to put ourselves in someone else's shoes; to see the world through the eyes of those who are different from us--the child who's hungry, the steelworker who's been laid-off, the family who lost the entire life they built together when the storm came to town."

Yes, that's right. And empathy for the Palestinian held now in Israel for winning an election, or detained in a Palestinian prison for being a member of a political movement or tortured in his cell by a security force associated with the occupier and supported by that occupier's ally. We are not universally viewed as clothed in white, those who oppose us are not savages, the screams we hear are not feigned. This is not someone else's problem.- Published 13/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mark Perry is a military and political analyst living in Washington DC and the author of Partners in Command, Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall in War and Peace. He is the author of the soon-to-be released treatment of the US war on terror: Talking To Terrorists (Basic Books, 2009).



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Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respe

[Snuffysmith]

bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable


We wish our Muslim readers Ramadan Kareem
Edition 32 Volume 7 - August 20, 2009

The Lebanon-Israel territorial dispute

• What's in a track? - Joseph Bahout
Obama's Middle-East sherpas would be well advised to get quickly rid of three illusions regarding any Lebanese-Israeli process.

• The Seven Villages dispute - Nicholas Blanford
Hizballah occasionally raises the demand for the Seven Villages as part of its ongoing psychological warfare against Israel.

• Israel should use its leverage - an interview with David Welch
Having a Lebanon more like Jordan, remote as that might seem, is much more in Israel's interest.

• Israel between Shebaa and Ghajar - Eyal Zisser
Israel's assumption is that if these excuses are removed from the table, Hizballah will find new ones.

What's in a track?
Joseph Bahout

War, peace, enforced truce: the Lebanese-Israeli issue has recently been caught in a web of diametrically opposed outlooks. On the one hand, ideas are floated that US President Barack Obama's Middle-East strategy would seek to tackle this track first, since it is considered the easiest. On the other hand, the drumbeats of war are sounding, induced by Hizballah's activities south of the Litani (the Hirbet Salim depot explosion) as well as by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's verbal escalation and threats.

In between, and much more realistically--though this realism remains to be coldly reassessed, lays the idea of a resurrection of the truce agreement that put an end to the 1948-49 war between the two countries. This agreement is still considered by some, especially in Lebanon, as the only workable device to ensure a durable ceasefire in this spot of the Arab-Israel dispute provided some "pending" issues are resolved, foremost among them the Shebaa Farms.

The Lebanese-Israeli track may seem the easiest to resolve. However, the historical sequence of events and geopolitical legacies, as well as the many entanglements and ramifications of this track, could just as well lead to the quite opposite conclusion. If it is true that the 1948-49 war ended with no territorial difference between Lebanon and Israel, it planted the seeds of a much deeper problem for the Lebanese polity, that of the Palestinian refugees and their fate. If it is also true that the subsequent 1967 war left Lebanon on the side, consequently unconcerned with the process induced by UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, the Shebaa Farms issue finds its nexus exactly here, since this tiny strip of land that was occupied then was formally Lebanese, even if de-facto Syrian controlled and lost to Israel by the Syrian army.

Soon after 1968, the Palestinian human factor became consolidated as an inseparable part of the Lebanese domestic political agenda, giving birth to the Cairo Agreement and the creation of Fateh-land, a Palestinian-controlled enclave in the south of Lebanon that two Israeli invasions, in 1978 and 1982, sought to sweep away. These in turn brought further UN resolutions such as 425 and 520. The PLO and its military wing were eventually ousted, but a substantial part of the Palestinian population remained in the suburbs of big Lebanese towns. Finally, the Israeli withdrawal of 2000 reminded everyone again of the forgotten Shebaa Farms issue, and the July 2006 war, ending with the latest in that line of resolutions, 1701, stressed the necessity to address it along with all other issues.

With this brief chronology of the Lebanese-Israeli dispute in mind, and if one has to be truly realistic, it is obvious that it is no longer a truce but Resolution 1701 that is today the only game in town to ensure a durable cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel while we await a potential peace. And this is despite all the grievances each party has about the incomplete implementation of the resolution and its many shortcomings. If Israel is alarmed by persistent quasi-military activity by Hizballah south of the Litani and worried by the flow of weapons the resistance still receives, the Lebanese side feels constantly provoked by repeated Israeli military overflights, the several infringements across the Blue Line, the expansion of spy rings inside the country as well as the non-solution to the Shebaa Farms issue and other territorial questions such as the Ghajar village.

Mutual recriminations aside, however, the true question is how to consolidate, widen and upgrade the scope of Resolution 1701 in order to ensure a long-term cooling of the front. It is exactly at this point that the internal Lebanese political reality pops up, a reality that Netanyahu himself is stubbornly trying to constrain and alter. In the real world, any effective Lebanese government today is a government that will include an active and ever-more decisive Hizballah factor. This means that Israel, on its way to obtain any enhancement of 1701, including on its Shebaa element, will have to acknowledge that it is engaging Hizballah in one way or another, with all the regional implications that such a move might entail.

On a longer-term perspective, and if one is to accept that there is a US desire to obtain a rapid breakthrough on the Lebanese-Israeli track, it must be remembered that things are not as easy as they may appear. Lebanon essentially faces two options, either to enter into separate and direct negotiations with Israel or to join, at some point and in coordination with Damascus, the track of talks between Syria and Israel. The first is a choice completely ruled out by today's official Lebanon. President Michel Suleiman himself gave his word to Syrian President Bashar Assad, as a sine qua non guarantee before his consensual election, that Beirut would wait for significant progress by Damascus before getting into any separate process with Israel. The second is a choice the Lebanese majority still considers unacceptable, since it represents a sad return to the inglorious days of Syrian tutelage over Beirut's policies.

There is a third, fragile alternative, that of sticking to the global umbrella of the Arab Peace Initiative, within which Lebanon itself insisted on adding the clause on the right of return of Palestinian refugees, given the inflammatory and sensitive character of this question for domestic Lebanese politics.

Obama's Middle-East sherpas would be well advised to get quickly rid of three illusions regarding a Lebanese-Israeli process. Any serious authority in today's Lebanon is one that will not ignore Syria's own progress in talks. Any talks that ignore Hizballah will backfire sooner rather than later, torpedoing the whole venture. And any structural solution that ignores the Palestinian dimension is a sure recipe for Lebanese turmoil.

The Lebanese track may seem an easy path to go down. It is not.- Published 20/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Joseph Bahout is a professor at Sciences-Po Paris, and researcher at Academie Diplomatique Internationale.

The Seven Villages dispute
Nicholas Blanford

While Lebanon's campaign for the return of the Shebaa Farms has became well known over the past nine years, it is not the only outstanding territorial dispute between Lebanon and Israel.

A more arcane--and generally misunderstood--Lebanese grievance with Israel is the fate of the Seven Villages, originally populated by Shi'ites who found themselves in the French mandate of Greater Lebanon in 1920 before being transferred to Palestine in 1924.

Hizballah occasionally raises the demand for the Seven Villages as part of its ongoing psychological warfare against Israel, hinting that winning back the Shebaa Farms alone is insufficient reason for the party to disarm. In fact, Hizballah long ago dropped conditioning the retention of its military wing on the return of Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory.

Today, Hizballah claims its resistance is a vital component of national defense against future Israeli aggression. As Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah's leader, said as long ago as 2000, before Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon, "so long as our neighbor is an entity that has committed aggression, is aggressive by nature and could attack our country at any moment, we should adhere to our resistance, if only to defend our country."

The Seven Villages dispute arose because of an overlap in the early 1920s between the initial administrative line separating the French mandate of Lebanon and the British mandate of Palestine and the time it took to ratify the international boundary between the two countries.

At the end of World War I, the British and French established military-run Occupied Enemy Territorial Administrations (OETA) covering Syria and Palestine. The line separating the northern French OETA and the southern British OETA ran eastward from Ras Naqoura more or less horizontally terminating just north of the now dried-up Lake Huleh in Upper Galilee. In December 1920, the British and French signed an agreement that defined the borders of the Middle East territories under their supervision, including that of Lebanon and Palestine.

The Lebanon-Palestine border was demarcated between March and July 1921, and the final documents--a sketch map of the boundary line and a detailed written description--were submitted to the British and French governments in February 1922. The following month the French mandatory authorities in Beirut authorized elections for a Representative Council, the forerunner of the Lebanese parliament. A census--of highly questionable accuracy--was conducted covering the area of the French administered OETA, which included the Upper Galilee and its villages and farms and its Jewish populated areas such as Metulla. Those covered by the census were given Lebanese identity cards entitling them to vote in the April 1922 elections.

Although Britain and France were awarded their respective mandates at the San Remo peace conference in 1920, the League of Nations only formally approved the mandates in February 1923. That step allowed Britain and France finally to ratify the Lebanon-Palestine border, which replaced the OETA line.

The final act came in April 1924 when around 24 villages and farms that had found themselves north of the OETA line (thus under French administration) but south of the new border were formally transferred to the jurisdiction of British mandate Palestine. Of these, 12 were populated by Sunnis, two were Maronite, one was Greek Catholic, two were Jewish, six were Shi'ite and one was divided between Shi'ites and Greek Catholics. The six Shi'ite villages were Terbikha, Saliha, Malkiyah, Nabi Yusha, Kades and Hunin. The mixed Shi'ite-Greek Catholic village was Ibl Qamh. Collectively, these villages today form what is known as the Seven Villages. During the 1948 Arab-Israel war, most of the residents of the Seven Villages met the same fate as other Palestinians and were driven from their homes to become refugees in Lebanon. They were granted Lebanese citizenship in 1994.

Lebanon's argument for the return of the Seven Villages is premised on the fact that the residents were Lebanese citizens before they were transferred to Palestine and became Palestinian citizens. But citizenship does not denote sovereignty, otherwise the Shebaa Farms dispute would have been resolved in 2000. Lebanon was unable to persuade the United Nations of the validity of its claim over the Shebaa Farms because it could not satisfactorily prove sovereignty over the area, despite the former residents possessing Lebanese citizenship and property deeds registered in Lebanon.

The OETA line was a purely administrative boundary, not a legal and internationally-recognized border, much as the UN-delineated Blue Line also is not a border but a temporary military line drawn up in 2000 to confirm that Israel had pulled out of Lebanon in conformity with UN resolutions.

The case for the Seven Villages is further undermined by past precedent. Previous Lebanese governments have recognized the legitimacy of the southern border with Israel on many occasions, including in 1949 when it formed the basis of the Armistice Demarcation Line and in 1978 when UN Resolution 425 called on Israel to withdraw from all Lebanese territory "within [Lebanon's] internationally recognized boundaries".

There is nothing to prevent Lebanon and Israel mutually agreeing to amend the border in the future if they so wish. But demanding an amendment that would place the Seven Villages inside Lebanon would also allow Israel to press for its own alterations to a border with which it has never been satisfied.- Published 20/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor.

Israel should use its leverage
an interview with David Welch

BI: Are the Israel-Lebanon territorial issues relevant to regional peace and stability?

Welch: I don't think they specifically are very critical to regional stability. But I do believe that, more generally, Lebanon is important for regional stability.

BI: Can you distinguish between the Ghajar issue and the Shebaa Farms issue?

Welch: They are part of the same bundle of questions. There are different ways to look at them: the political context in Lebanon, the political context in Israel and [the interplay] between the two.

Ghajar is the one place where the Israel Defense Forces are physically present in an area that even Israel recognizes as Lebanese land. There have been various attempts, including by the IDF, to figure out how to withdraw while preserving the security of the village and of Israel itself.

Regarding Shebaa, there are contending definitions. This scrap of rock has assumed a life of its own. It's a cause celebre for Hizballah and an article of faith for some Israeli politicians [who argue] that you cannot concede to terrorists. It has security implications for Israel, but the issue of IDF listening stations in the region can be dealt with.

BI: And Shebaa as a Syrian-Lebanese issue?

Welch: I always thought that by defining Shebaa Farms as Syrian, Israel was forsaking a political opportunity. It could turn the tables on Hizballah simply by agreeing to bargain over Shebaa. Instead, Israel presents giving up Shebaa as a victory for Hizballah. Especially after May 6, 2008 when Hizballah took to the streets of Beirut, we have to ask why this organization is still armed. Giving up Shebaa would call that into question.

BI: Can you comment on the US role since 2000?

Welch: The year 2000 is an interesting mark, since it's the point when the IDF pulled out after 22 years. The US had a key role, and I personally was involved, in defining what would be recognized as withdrawal. I think this is one place where the US can be effective because it takes some ingenuity to bring the actors together: the UN, the Lebanese in all their configurations. That's the role we attempted to play in 2000 [and again] in much less promising circumstances in 2006.

BI: And the Lebanese-Israeli situation today?

Welch: I don't see why Lebanon should be allowed to exempt itself from peace negotiations. If the Palestinians want to have them and the Arabs back that demand, and if Syria wants them, then why is Lebanon so shy? This is the fault of Lebanese politicians in failing to redefine the problem as an Arab interest. Why are they allowing the issue to be defined for them? That's the counterpoint to my argument about how Israel is giving away leverage over Hizballah [on the territorial issues].

BI: So are Israeli territorial concessions important for Lebanese government formation and stability?

Welch: I don't like the word concession. [Rather] this is using leverage more creatively. Perhaps some in Israel think it is better for Israeli security that there be a Lebanon divided internally, including Hizballah with its military capability. Rationally, I don't accept that argument. It's much more in Israel's strategic interest that its northern frontier be protected not only by the IDF but by a Lebanese government with an interest in stability. Having a Lebanon more like Jordan, as remote as that might seem, is much more in Israel's interest. By using Israeli leverage to deteriorate Hizballah's rationale for a military existence, you are absolutely moving Lebanon in that direction.- Published 20/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

David Welch is former US assistant secretary of state responsible for the Middle East and former ambassador to Egypt. In 2006 he was the US envoy to Israel and Lebanon during the war between Israel and Hizballah.

Israel between Shebaa and Ghajar
Eyal Zisser

In recent weeks, international pressure on Israel to advance a solution for the Ghajar village and Shebaa Farms problems has increased considerably. The pressure has intensified in particular in light of the June 7 Lebanese parliamentary elections that gave an unexpected victory to the moderate March 14 camp led by Saad al-Din al-Hariri, head of the Sunni community in Lebanon. It goes without saying that the electoral successes of Hariri and his partners constitute a painful defeat for the Hizballah organization, its partners in Lebanon and of course its foreign patrons, Syria and mainly Iran.

The pressure on Israel in regard to Ghajar and the Shebaa Farms thus stems to a large extent from the hope among many in the international community that a resolution of these disputed issues will assist the moderate camp in Lebanon in its struggle against Hizballah and consequently erode that organization's legitimacy inside the country, especially in regard to the matter of bearing arms and using them against Israel. In other words, it is assumed that an Israeli withdrawal from the northern part of Ghajar and from the Shebaa Farms in the framework of a political arrangement will remove Hizballah's justification for continuing "muqawama" or armed resistance against Israel.

Israel's response to these pressures has been marked by skepticism and hesitancy. A number of considerations inform Israel's reluctance to act. First, while many in the West may view the Lebanese government as an actor that can assure quiet and stability on the Israeli-Lebanese border, Israelis tend to view the Lebanese government as part of the problem and not the solution. This is because the Lebanese government lacks teeth in confronting Hizballah. In practice it has never--certainly not in the last three years since the Second Lebanon War--done anything to prevent Hizballah from arming itself or its members from bearing arms. Indeed, not only is the Lebanese government powerless vis-a-vis Hizballah, but in practice it shelters and embraces the organization: the government, after all, includes Hizballah representatives.

The conclusion from Israel's point of view is that the Lebanese government cannot be relied upon, and the hope that an Israeli withdrawal from Ghajar or the Shebaa Farms would assist and encourage it to act against Hizballah is nothing but a fantasy or illusion lacking any basis in reality. In this regard, we should recall the threat issued by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who warned that if Israel's northern border heated up again, Israel's military response would be addressed to the Lebanese government because of the legitimacy it grants Hizballah.

Second, Israel is convinced that the Ghajar and Shebaa Farms issues are simply excuses to justify Hizballah's continued military action against Israel. Israel's assumption is that if these excuses are removed from the table, Hizballah will find new ones. For example, it might call for the return of the bodies of prisoners that Hizballah claims Israel still holds, or the handing over of the seven Shi`ite villages located in mandatory Palestine that were destroyed in the 1948 war or any number of other matters from the past that could be raised. In other words, Israel holds that not only will any concession to Hizballah fail to assure quiet and stability, but just the opposite.

Finally, the explosion at the Hizballah ammunitions depot in the Shi`ite village of Hirbet Salim in mid-July proves that under the nose and half-closed eyes of UNIFIL, Hizballah continues to construct a military infrastructure for itself, not only in the north but also in southern Lebanon, south of the Litani River. From Israel's point of view, given UNIFIL's limitations and ineffectiveness in preventing Hizballah activity in southern Lebanon, handing over the northern part of Ghajar to the UN organization is liable to create enormous difficulties.

For example, UNIFIL is prohibited from entering villages, and consequently homes, without a Lebanese army escort, and UNIFIL's ability to act vis-a-vis Lebanese citizens in general is definitely limited. Yet the compromise proposal formulated by UNIFIL provides for the northern part of Ghajar to be handed over to its full control, and in return it would prevent the infiltration of Hizballah into the village.

Nevertheless, in Israel's view there is a fundamental difference between Ghajar and the Shebaa Farms. Israel acknowledges that the northern part of Ghajar village is located on Lebanese territory. Consequently, Israel is aware that sooner or later it must withdraw from the area. The only question is how to find a suitable policing arrangement that will meet Israel's security needs. Against this backdrop, the declaration made by Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman in July is interesting. Lieberman, who was appointed to deal with the Ghajar issue, stated that it is a humanitarian matter and the option should be weighed of removing the residents who live in the northern part of the village, on Lebanese territory, to the southern part, which will remain in Israel's hands, and in this way to put an end to the affair.

It goes without saying that the village's residents are opposed to such a solution, which involves significant legal problems similar to those that arose with the evacuation of the residents of the Katif Bloc in the Gaza Strip in summer 2005. On the other hand, any other solution that presently appears possible, such as dividing the village and letting UNIFIL become responsible for the northern part, would surely entail insoluble security problems for Israel.

In contrast to its attitude toward the northern part of Ghajar, Israel views the Shebaa Farms as Israeli territory in every sense, since it is part of the Golan Heights that Israel took over in 1967 and annexed in 1981. This means there is no apparent solution to the Shebaa Farms issue at this time. Israel does not acknowledge any obligation to withdraw from this territory, and it is difficult to see any real resolution of the issue in view of the impasse between Syria, Lebanon and the UN over the question of Syria formally relinquishing the territory to Lebanon. Damascus' position is that the resolution of the Shebaa Farms issue can only come as part of the resolution of the entire Golan Heights issue.

In sum, since Israel has no interest in continuing to hold the northern part of Ghajar, which it recognizes as Lebanese, this issue will evidently find its solution in the near future. In contrast, the question of the Shebaa Farms will continue to occupy Israel and the international community until a way is found for Israel and Syria to make peace or, alternatively, until Damascus is reconciled and recognizes the area as Lebanese, which seems highly unlikely.- Published 20/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Eyal Zisser is director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Tel Aviv University.



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Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.

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Reality Is Its Own Caricature for US in Afghanistan and Pakistan by William Pfaff

http://original.antiwar.com/pfaff/2009/08/...n-and-pakistan/

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Israel: A Stalemated Action of History
By GABRIEL KOLKO

In late 1949 I worked on a boat taking Jews from Marseilles to Haifa, Israel. Jews from Arab nations were in the front of the boat, Europeans in the rear. I was regarded by many of the Europeans as some sort of freak because I had a United States passport and so could stay in the land of milk and honey. One man wanted me to marry his daughter – which meant he too could live in the land of milk and honey. My Hebrew became quite respectable but the experience was radicalizing or, I should say, kept me radical, and I have stayed that way.

Later I learned from someone who ran a displaced persons camp in Germany that the large majority of Jews wanted to go anywhere but Palestine. They were compelled to state Palestine or else risk receiving no aid. I understood very early that there was much amiss in the countless Arab villages and homes I saw destroyed, and that the entire Zionist project – regardless of the often venal nature of the Arab opposition to it – was a dangerous sham.

The result of the creation of a state called Israel was abysmal. Jews from Poland have nothing in common with Germans and neither has anything to do with those from the Arab world. It is nationality, not religion, that counts most. Jews in Israel, especially the Germans, largely ghettoized themselves by their place of origin during the first generation, when a militarized culture produced the mixed new breed called sabras – an essentially anti-intellectual personality far different from the one the early Zionists, who were mostly socialists who preached the nobility of labor, expected to emerge. The large majority of Israelis are not in the least Jewish in the cultural sense, are scarcely socialist in any sense, and daily life and the way people live is no different in Israel than it is in Chicago or Amsterdam. There is simply no rational reason that justifies the state’s creation.

The outcome is a small state with a military ethos that pervades all aspects of Israel’s culture, its politics and, above all, its response to the existence of Arabs in its midst and at its borders. From its inception, the ideology of the early Zionists – of Labor Zionism as well as the rightist Revisionism that Vladimir Jabotinsky produced – embodied a commitment to violence, erroneously called self-defense, and a virtual hysteria. As a transcendent idea, Zionism has no validity because the national differences between Jews are overwhelming.

What Zionism confirmed, if any confirmation were needed, is that accidents are more important in shaping history than is all too often allowed. Here was the intellectual café, which existed in key cities – Vienna at the turn of the twentieth century or the Lower East Side of New York before World War I – filled with immensely creative people full of ideas and longing for a golden era to come. Ideas – good, bad, and indifferent – flourished. In this heady atmosphere, Zionism was born.

But Zionism has produced a Sparta that traumatized an already artificially divided region partitioned after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during World War I led to the Versailles Treaty and the creation of the modern Middle East. The state of Israel has always relied on military solutions to political and sociological problems with the Arabs. The result is constant mobilization.

Even more troublesome for peace and stability in the vast Middle East, Zionism has always been symbiotic on some great power for the security of its national project, realized in a state called Israel. Before 1939 it was the British; during the 1950s it was France. Israel has survived since the late 1960s on the influx of US arms and money, and this has allowed it to encourage its fears of annihilation – a fate its possession of nuclear weapons makes most unlikely. But Israel also has an importance far beyond the fantasies of a few confused literati. Today its significance for American foreign policy is far greater because the Soviet Union no longer exists and the Middle East provokes the fear so essential to mobilizing Congress and the US public. “The best hopes and the worst fears of the planet are invested in that relatively small patch of earth” – as George Tenet, the former head of the CIA, put it in his memoir – and so understanding how and why that patch came into being, and the grave limits of the martial course it is following, has a very great, even transcendent value.

In July 2003 Foreign Minister Shalom predicted that Iran would have nuclear bomb capability by 2006. It did not have nuclear weapons in 2006, though in fact a successful strike by conventional missiles on Dimona, Israel’s nuclear facility, would radioactivate a good part of Israel – and both Iran and Syria have such missiles. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, during Vice-President Dick Cheney’s visit in late March 2008, stated that “Iran’s weapons program threatens not only the stability of the region, but of the whole world,” and he did not rule out a war with it. By spring 2008 Israel was also very concerned about the growing ascendancy of Hizbollah in Lebanon and its greatly increased firepower – mainly in the form of rockets capable of striking much of Israel. It regards Hizbollah as a tool of Iran, and its focus on Iran concerns its control over Hizbollah as well as its ability to challenge Israel’s nuclear monopoly. But there can be no doubt that Hizbollah’s strength has only grown since Israel attacked it in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Israel now has an enemy that can inflict immense damage on it, probably resulting in highly skilled Jews migrating far faster than they already are at present – even now, more Jews are leaving Israel than migrating to it.

The existence of Israel is scarcely the only reason American policy in the region is as bad as it is. After all, it did not take Zionism to encourage Washington to seek the elimination of British influence in the region, and today no one can tell how long the US will remain mired in the affairs of the Middle East. But Israel is now a vital factor. While the extent of its role can be debated, without it the politics of the entire Middle East would be different – troubled but very different.

At least equally nefarious in the long run, Israel’s existence has radicalized – but in a negative sense – the Arab world, distracting it from natural class differences that often overcome religious and tribal ties. It has fanned Arab nationalism abysmally and given it a transcendent negative identity.

I am very realistic – and pessimistic – about an eventual negotiated solution to the crisis that has surrounded Palestine and Israel. Given the magnitude of the changes needed, the present situation justifies the most dismal conclusions. After all, the Arabs that live under Israeli control will quite soon outnumber the Jewish population, leaving a de facto Jewish state in which Jews are a minority! This fact is becoming deeply troublesome within Israeli politics today, causing former expansionists to reverse their position and leading to more and more internal controversy. Nor will there ever be an administration in Washington ready to do diplomatically what none has ever dared do since 1947, namely compel Israel to make an equitable peace with the Arabs.

Neither a one- nor two-state solution will come to pass. But the Jewish population is very likely to decline, and if it falls sufficiently then demography may prove to be a crucial factor. The ratio of Jews to Arabs would then become highly significant. The Jews in Israel are highly skilled and many have gotten out, migrating abroad. The Israeli military is the most powerful in the region because it has been deluged with American equipment, which it has learned to service. But US forces need repairmen to service the very same equipment, more than ever because recruitment into the American military is now lower than it has been in a quarter-century (not to mention its astronomical suicide rate), and skilled Israelis can take jobs with America’s armed forces that they are eminently qualified to fill. Moreover, Iran and the other Arab states will eventually develop or acquire nuclear weapons, making Israel incredibly insecure for its highly mobile Jewish population – one exhausted by regular service in compulsory reserves. And as already suggested, destroying Dimona with conventional missiles or mortars would be a cheap way to radioactivate a good part of Israel. Even worse, Osama bin Laden, or someone like him, may acquire a nuclear device, and one nuclear bomb detonated in or near Israel will effectively destroy what is a tiny area. Whoever destroys Israel will be proclaimed a hero in the Arab world. To those with skills, the answer is clear: get out. And getting out they are.

There are also Orthodox Jews in Israel but Israeli mass culture is now virtually indistinguishable from consumerism anywhere – in many crucial respects, there is more Judaism in parts of Brooklyn or Toronto than in most of Israel. The Orthodox too may be ready to leave behind the insecurity and troubles confronting those who live in a nation that is, after all, a part of a highly unstable region.

Sober and quite rational Israelis exist, of course, and I cite them often enough, but American policy will be determined by factors having nothing to do with them. Unfortunately, rational Israelis are an all too small minority.

Gabriel Kolko is the leading historian of modern warfare. He is the author of the classic Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914, Another Century of War? and The Age of War: the US Confronts the World and After Socialism. He has also written the best history of the Vietnam War, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the US and the Modern Historical Experience. His latest book is World in Crisis, from which this essay has been excerpted.

http://www.counterpunch.org/kolko08252009.html

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bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable

Edition 33 Volume 7 - August 27, 2009

Egypt-Israel: upgrading strategic relations?

• Interests aligning - Ashraf Khalil
It's becoming harder for Cairo to hide the fact that its foreign policy interests are more in line with Tel Aviv than ever.

• Overcoming the constraints - James A. Larocco
Egypt is not even a priority to the Israel Defense Forces.

• Egypt wants to remain a regional player - an interview with Mustafa al-Sawwaf
The tense relations between the Egyptian leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are reflected in relations between Egypt and Gaza.

• The elusive alliance - Ephraim Sneh
The immediate order of the day is to formulate a shared strategy for ending Hamas rule in Gaza.

Interests aligning
Ashraf Khalil

The Israelis like to call it the "cold peace". The Egyptians would rather not call it anything at all because that would admit there's actually something there to name.

For years the exact extent of political and economic cooperation between the two neighbors has been a subject of hot-button speculation and the occasional press campaign in Cairo. The government of President Hosni Mubarak, whose predecessor Anwar Sadat signed the 1978 Camp David accords, generally tries to keep the specifics of the two countries' relationship low-key, only admitting it when things become too obvious to deny.

"An Israeli is not the type of person that you want all your neighbors to know you're dating," chuckled Menachim Klein, a former Israeli negotiator and Bar-Ilan University political science professor.

Several years ago, a former agriculture minister fended off a prolonged opposition media campaign calling him a secret normalizer for his ministry's working relationship with its Israeli counterpart. Popular reaction was straight out of the movie Casablanca: people were shocked to discover something that most regional observers already saw as patently obvious. More recently, the local press has accused the government of selling natural gas to Israel for sweetheart prices.

Egyptians in general do know that there are extensive economic and agricultural ties with Israel, but prefer not to think too hard about it. (A personal example: when I first moved to Jerusalem in February 2008 as a correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, my Egyptian relatives were genuinely curious as to what route I used to visit Cairo. They honestly had no idea that there are multiple EgyptAir and El Al flights every week between Cairo and Tel Aviv.)

But now, something seems to be changing in the usual don't ask/don't tell nature of the Egyptian-Israeli partnership. It's becoming harder for Cairo to hide the fact that its foreign policy interests are more in line with Tel Aviv than ever. The main source of common ground is a mutual desire to contain Iran's regional and nuclear ambitions. Both governments have arrived at this place via different routes. Israel fears an Iranian nuclear capability will challenge its own (nominally secret) nuclear arsenal and open the door to a devastating attack on the Jewish state. Egypt doesn't fear Iran militarily, but dreads the gradual expansion of revolutionary Shi'ite ideology into the Sunni sphere.

Egypt's own bilateral relations with Tehran are fraught with tension--partially stemming from Iran's insistence on glorifying Sadat's assassins. "The way Iran acts has actually pulled (Egypt and Israel) closer together," said Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born Israeli political analyst.

This common interest has already produced some interesting public displays of cooperation. Earlier this summer, an Israeli submarine passed through the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, touching off a weeklong media firestorm in Egypt. Israeli warships have traversed the canal for years, but this was the first submarine passage. The hype surrounding the event was only intensified by the fact that no one seems to know for sure the exact capabilities of the German-made Dolphin class sub.

Egyptian officials were generally tight-lipped, saying that the two countries have a peace treaty and the canal is open for all nations. But Israeli media openly declared the passage a coordinated message aimed directly at Tehran. "They want Iran to realize that nothing is impossible," Javedanfar said. Does that include a scenario where Egypt actively assists an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran? Nobody is sure and Javedanfar says that is exactly how both governments want it.

The submarine passage was far more than a symbolic show of cooperation. Usage of the Suez Canal would enable the Israeli navy to quickly get in position for a naval strike or blockade against Iranian ports. Without the canal, Israeli ships would have to make a weeks-long voyage around Africa in order to attack Iranian shores.

Emad Gad, an expert on Israeli policy with Cairo-based Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, warns not to read too much into the submarine incident. "There may be some Egyptian cooperation," with Israel, he says. "But it hasn't reached the level of joint planning." Gad believes Egypt's permitting the submarine to use the canal, "was more for the Americans than for the Israelis".

The two countries still have just as many points of conflict as they do areas of common interest. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a sore spot, with each government seemingly pulling in opposite directions. Egypt has worked (unsuccessfully) for years to produce a reconciliation and unity government between Hamas and Fateh--something that Israel staunchly opposes.

Earlier this month, President Mubarak lobbied US President Barack Obama to push Israel for an immediate jump to final status negotiations with the Palestinians. That would essentially be a direct repudiation of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's plan to delay final status talks for years while building up the economy and infrastructure of the occupied West Bank.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ashraf Khalil is the news editor for the English-language edition of Al Masry Al Youm newspaper.

Overcoming the constraints
James A. Larocco

Egypt and Israel currently have a confluence of strategic interests unparalleled in their histories as nation-states. And those shared interests are increasing, driven by events and trends, both positive and negative, within the region and elsewhere.

These shared strategic interests also happen to be among the top priorities of both nations: Iran; Gaza/Hamas; border control (smuggling, including and especially weapons, trafficking in persons, infiltration); counterterrorism (including and especially Hizballah and al-Qaeda); and Israeli/Egyptian/Palestinian relations and the peace process.

The natural conclusion one might draw from the above is that Egypt and Israel, acting in their own national interests, have been working assiduously to upgrade their strategic relations. To be sure, there have been some notable achievements in recent years, and the current period is arguably the most productive. In my own review, however, the record indicates that these efforts are episodic, marked by profound distrust on both sides, an unwillingness by some in the senior political and military leaderships to accept any upgrading and a weakness in the bilateral institutional framework that thwarts efforts to build on achievements.

There are a number of major constraints on translating these shared interests into concrete actions. For one, leaders and citizens of both nations remain deeply distrustful of the intentions of the other side. This is so visceral that it colors virtually every conversation, every private meeting and every public commentary. While Egyptians understand the strategic value of their cold peace with Israel, they are extremely reluctant to deal with Israelis on anything beyond their most important interests. To Israelis, Egyptians remain a frustrating enigma. As for Egypt's leadership, Israelis feel they can trust President Hosni Mubarak but wonder what will happen when he leaves the scene.

Then too, Egypt cannot be seen publicly as doing Israel's bidding. This constraint limits dramatically what Egypt is prepared to do. It therefore is no surprise that Egyptian-Israeli intelligence cooperation is by far the most developed, the most frequent, the most institutionalized, the most personalized and without question the most productive of all bilateral ties. It is largely outside public scrutiny, and there is always plausible deniability by either side. Military-to-military ties have some institutional framework, but they are extremely weak and limited largely to liaison. There is no ongoing cooperation in this area of any major significance.

Further, Israel does not devote priority to nurturing the relationship with Egypt. Israeli leaders occasionally "rediscover" Egypt, but all too often that does not come from anything positive that has happened, but rather from negative trends in the relationship. Ties are simply not pursued on a sustained basis. And even when they are pursued by individual Israeli leaders, the Egyptian leaders, who stay in place for decades, see their Israeli counterparts shifting seemingly at the blink of an eye as political coalitions keep changing. There are no parliamentary ties, and comments from the Knesset, when they are made about Egypt at all, are usually negative.

Egypt is not even a priority to the Israel Defense Forces. This may seem a harsh assessment, but it's a fact. The IDF spends the majority of its attention on Israel's northern border, with longer-range concerns like Iran gobbling up senior attention. Particularly devastating was a downsizing of the IDF three years ago that led to the shifting of the liaison staff from the Operations Directorate to the Planning Directorate and the abolishment of the only flag-rank officer devoted exclusively to liaison. In fact, because of the crushing demands on the understaffed Planning Directorate, even the colonel ostensibly assigned for liaison is often required to devote time to other tasks. In contrast, the Egyptian liaison staff recently had three flag-rank officers at the top; it currently has two.

Personal relationships are also lacking. It is not mere conventional wisdom that personal relationships are vital both for mutual understanding and for any hope of sustained achievements. While such relationships do exist between some key intelligence officials, they rarely exist elsewhere. Israeli officers and officials at all levels rotate far too quickly.

Despite these constraints, some of which cannot or will not be overcome, I believe there is an urgent imperative to move as far and as quickly as politically possible to strengthen the strategic relationship. I am concerned that with the frequent transitions in Israel and the lack of an institutionalized dialogue, Egypt cannot benefit fully from achievements in its interest. Similarly, this lack of institutionalization of security ties as well as the failure on Israel's part to place very high priority on upgrading security ties may well prove a costly mistake for Israel's interests as Egypt draws closer to its first senior leadership transition in a generation.

With these thoughts in mind, both sides need to act:

* The Israeli leadership must make clear that upgrading the security relationship with Egypt is a key short- and long-term national security priority, and be prepared to devote the necessary time and human resources on a sustained basis. There should be a holistic approach, starting with the leaders themselves but bringing together all elements at all levels, within and outside the government.
* The IDF should establish a true liaison office, in the Operations Directorate, headed by a flag-rank officer. That office should retain key staff as long as possible, allowing for the building and maintaining of personal and professional relationships with their Egyptian counterparts. If necessary, retired officers with existing ties should be brought into the office.
* Egypt should accept the institutionalization of military-to-military ties, especially between operational officers at all levels, recognizing this is not only key to building trust during a time of transition but is also essential for any prospect of achieving the longer-term goal of replicating what Israel has with Jordan: no demilitarized zone and no foreign forces.
* Egypt should be open to expanding bilateral intelligence cooperation, to include intelligence agencies that have a key role in the Sinai and other border areas.
* Israel should consider ways to ease the burden of Gaza on Egypt, perhaps through the establishment of a border crossing regime that ensures that Gazans have sustained access to needed goods and services. In exchange, Egypt must convincingly do all it can to stop smuggling of certain items into Gaza.
* Both sides should expand their dialogue on their shared border, with regular biannual meetings chaired by senior operational military leadership and quarterly meetings at the technical level.

All of the above should be carried out with a full appreciation for the sensitivities of both sides. While maximum secrecy should be the watchword for ongoing discussions, it must be conveyed to outside observers when any steps are agreed upon and implemented that they are in each country's individual national interest.

In conclusion, we have already entered a historic window of opportunity for a meaningful and sustained upgrading of bilateral Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation based on shared and individual interests. Let there be no misunderstanding: significant constraints will limit the scope of this cooperation. That said, there are steps that can be taken within those constraints today to fulfill what so many had hoped would be key fruits of the Camp David treaty.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ambassador James A. Larocco served from 2004 until July 2009 as director general of the MFO in Sinai. Since August 3 he is distinguished professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government.

Egypt wants to remain a regional player
an interview with Mustafa al-Sawwaf

BI: Egypt appears to be stepping up its mediation between Hamas and Israel over a prisoner exchange. What can Cairo offer the two sides to secure such an exchange and are Egypt's assurances seen as strong enough?

Al-Sawwaf: I believe Egypt doesn't have anything to offer anymore. That's why it sought German intervention to exert pressure on Israel. Egypt doesn't possess any means of pressure on Israel to accomplish such a deal. Neither Egypt nor any other country in the region can offer strong assurances. Israel can only be held to its word by force and it will take a powerful side to oblige Israel to commit to any exchange deal, otherwise Israel will simply re-arrest prisoners or assassinate them.

BI: Why is Egypt interested in mediating between Israel and Hamas?

Al-Sawwaf: Egypt wants to achieve some success with some of the issues in its hands. The prisoner swap is one of those. Indeed, Egypt considers the whole Gaza Strip an Egyptian issue. Thus, to achieve some success with one of the Gaza-related issues is a way for Egypt to show the US administration and European public opinion that Cairo is capable of solving regional crises. This has become especially important to Cairo after the decline of Egypt's regional role and attempts by others to step into that role. In other words, Egypt wants to prove, first to itself, then to others, that it remains an important regional player that can fulfill a unique regional role. To prove this Cairo needs to secure success on a prisoner exchange deal, on Palestinian-Palestinian reconciliation and/or on the ceasefire issue between Hamas and Israel.

BI: There has been a lot of talk about Egypt and Israel deepening their strategic relations in view of what some see as a joint interest in countering Iran as well as recent military maneuvers, including Israeli submarines crossing the Suez. Do you think this is true, and if so, why?

Al-Sawwaf: This is not a case of joint interests, rather of individual interests that happen to have some commonalities. First, if Iran comes to possess nuclear weapons, it will immediately become the strongest country in the region. Accordingly, this will pull the carpet out from under the Egyptian government and Egypt's traditional regional role. Egypt thus seeks to undermine Iranian power and prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons in order to maintain the regional equilibrium that sees Egypt as the most powerful country on the North African side of the Middle East and Iran the most powerful on the Asian side of the Middle East. But in spite of some passive Egyptian positions on the Palestinian issue, I don't think we can really talk about joint Egyptian-Israeli interests, since Egypt's motivation vis-a-vis policy on Iran differs from Israel's.

BI: How do Israel-Egypt relations affect Gaza border issues and trade restrictions?

Al-Sawwaf: Egypt deals with Gaza according to its own evaluation of its interests. This relationship is constantly under American and European scrutiny and pressure, because Egypt receives a significant amount of aid from there and Cairo is wary of in any way endangering that support. The Egyptian leadership is aware that if the US should seek to change any regime in the region it could do so and, consequently, the Egyptian regime is careful to protect itself.

BI: How do Israel-Egypt relations affect Hamas-Israel and Hamas-Egypt relations?

Al-Sawwaf: I don't want to put Israel in the middle between Hamas and Egypt. The relationship between Egypt and the Gaza Strip is the same as that between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, has both direct and indirect links to the global Muslim Brotherhood. Hence the tense relations between the Egyptian leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are reflected in relations between Egypt and Gaza. In consequence, some of the suffering of the people of Gaza is due to the poor relations between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood there. Egypt considers Hamas a danger to itself because it sees in Hamas a reflection of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and worries that the popularity of Hamas, as reflected in the 2006 parliamentary elections, could be replicated in Egypt.

BI: In view of Egypt-Israel relations, can Egypt act as a neutral mediator with Hamas over Gaza?

Al-Sawwaf: I believe Egypt has never been and will never be neutral when it comes to domestic Palestinian issues. But when it comes to Palestinian-Israeli issues, Egypt will, of course, support the Palestinians.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mustafa al-Sawwaf is editor-in-chief of the Gaza-based Falasteen daily newspaper.

The elusive alliance
Ephraim Sneh

The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty has withstood tough tests throughout its three decades. Two wars in Lebanon and two Palestinian intifadas caused neither its cancellation nor its suspension. Yet the treaty has never reached the level of an Israeli-Egyptian strategic alliance.

Such an alliance is objectively justified; it emerges from the confluence of the two countries' existential interests. The stability of Egypt's secular regime is a supreme Israeli interest. Israel is not and will never be an Arab country. Despite its military power and per capita economic production that is ten times that of Egypt, Israel does not contest Egypt's preeminent status in the Arab world. It neither seeks nor is able to replace Egypt in its regional role.

Thus there is room here for a partnership without competition. As each of the partners is strengthened economically and militarily, it would strengthen its counterpart. Sadly, though, the Egyptian establishment is not interested in such an alliance. Why?

The Egyptian political, military and intellectual establishment has yet to internalize the change that is taking place in the region. This establishment lives and breathes the old fault line, the one that separated Israel on one side from all the Arab states on the other. Yet this line ceased to exist years ago. It has been replaced by a new fault line: on one side Iran and its proxies and on the other the rest of the countries in the region.

The refusal to recognize the fact that Israel and Egypt are on the same side of the regional divide has deep emotional roots, particularly in the Egyptian intellectual establishment that was cultivated by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president who believed in pan-Arabism and led the Arab world's war on Israel. Yet this is not the only emotional factor preventing important senior Egyptians from confronting the objective imperative for a strategic alliance with Israel.

There are some in Egypt who believe if there is even the shadow of a confrontation hovering permanently over the region, Egypt can maintain its preeminence better than when there is no longer a trace of Arab-Israel confrontation. Egypt's military power (built up over the past three decades with generous American help) is more necessary and significant in a tense region than in one where states are tested primarily on the basis of their economic prowess. This distorted approach holds that Israel's strategic capabilities detract from Egypt's regional Arab preeminence: that Israel is a competitor.

There is no other way to explain the obsessive struggle led by Egypt, inspired personally by former Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, against Israel's nuclear capabilities. That Israel's opaque nuclear policy deters Egypt's enemies as well as Israel's is extremely difficult for the Egyptian political and diplomatic establishment to internalize.

Here we must note--a reality no Israeli can ignore--that the continued existence of the Israel-Arab conflict and our control over the Palestinian people in the West Bank provide an effective excuse for the Egyptian opponents of rapprochement with Israel. Yet I am not certain that even if we do what we should do and reach agreement with the Palestinians, the stand of those hostile toward us in Egypt would change for the better.

When Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007, I thought this would trigger a reversal of the Egyptian position. I reasoned that the precedent of Muslim Brotherhood rule (in the guise of the Palestinian Hamas) on Egypt's border would constitute a kind of wake-up call and catalyze change in the Egyptian approach.

Unfortunately, this was not the case. In the course of the ensuing two years, Egypt has not acted to eliminate Hamas rule in Gaza as its shared interest with the Palestinian Authority and Israel would appear to dictate. Instead, Egypt has made every effort to conciliate between the Hamas leadership in Gaza and the rest of the world. Egypt has mediated between Hamas and Israel and in particular has tried energetically to reconcile Hamas with Fateh. Were this ever accomplished, it would completely eliminate any chance of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. From the standpoint of Egypt's real interests, Hamas-Fateh reconciliation would invigorate the rule of extremist Islam in Gaza, not eliminate it.

Some 1,400 tunnels currently link Egypt with Gaza. Everything finds its way through them--not just Iranian funds for Hamas. Yet in recent months, something has begun to happen, something that could finally have a positive effect on Egyptian-Israeli relations. The capture of Hizballah's anti-Egyptian espionage and sabotage network may have shaken the Egyptian government by demonstrating exactly where the regional fault line lies and against which shared enemy we need to join hands.

The immediate order of the day is to formulate a strategy shared by Egypt, the Palestinians and Israel for ending Hamas rule in Gaza. It was Palestinian incompetence, Egyptian negligence and Israeli indifference that enabled the Hamas takeover in the first place. Now the three parties responsible for this disaster must cooperate in order to eliminate the Iranian outpost on the Israeli-Egyptian border and bring freedom and economic salvation to 1.5 million Gazans.

It is from this joint effort that a future Israeli-Egyptian strategic alliance might possibly emerge.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ephraim Sneh, a retired IDF general, served in Israeli governments as minister of health, minister of transportation and deputy minister of defense. He is currently chairman of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue at the Netanya Academic College.

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Obama Is No Realist
By Paul Wolfowitz

Amid war and recession, Americans are in a no-nonsense, matter-of-fact mood. But that, says a leading architect of George W. Bush’s foreign policy, is no reason to adopt a misguided doctrine.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009...k_again_realism

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The Real Failure in Afghanistan
By Douglas Farah

It is clear that the counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan (only now seriously beginning as a counterinsurgency effort) is in serious difficulty. As the New York Times reports, there is little actual support from the central government's police or military forces outside of Kabul.

Support for the war is dropping at home and among key allies, particularly Britain. The most optimistic assessment that the commanding general there, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, can come up with is that the situation is serious but salvageable. Hardly the rose colored glasses.

But the underlying problem, as McChrystal and others know, is not the military, but the complete and utter incompetence of the Karzi regime, to which we are so tightly wedded.

The corrosive corruption and unwillingness/inability/blindness of the Karzi is what will be the ultimate demise of that war. A foreign fighting force cannot win unless a host government, viewed as legitimate by its people, is fighting the war as well. That is not the case in Afghanistan.

History should not be forgotten. What propelled the Taliban to power in 1996 was the public disgust with the corruption and state violence of that time. Transportation was impossible because of the multiple road blocks. Constant bribes made it impossible to rebuild the country or attract anything like foreign investment. Warlords fighting over poppy revenues and ethnic interests left the country a wreck.

The Taliban's appeal then, as now, is rooted in the promise of restoring order and eliminating corruption. My full blog is here.

http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/499/af...rinsurgency.com

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NEFA Foundation: Al-Qaida Claims Attempted Assassination of Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Nayef
By Evan Kohlmann

aqyemen.jpgThe NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a new communique from Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula claiming responsibility for the attempted assassination of the Deputy Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef al-Saud. The statement identified the suicide bomber behind the attack as 23-year old Abdullah Hassan Aseri (a.k.a. "Abu al-Khayr"), one of the 85 most wanted Al-Qaida fugitives sought by the Saudi government. According to the communique, Aseri "was able to enter [Nayef's] palace and circulate amongst his bodyguards, thereupon igniting his explosive device-we will not disclose how it was made or the method of detonation-after he passed through all the checkpoints in Najran and Jeddah airports, and was transferred aboard the plane that belongs to the aforementioned [Nayef]." Al-Qaida also claimed to have uncovered "a network of spies and collaborators who are in league with that criminal [Nayef] and which the government of Yemen is oblivious to. There are exciting details that we will announce later, Allah-willing."

An English translation of the Al-Qaida communique can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.
http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneou...n0809_nayef.pdf

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Why The U.S. Missed Zapping Bin Laden 11 Years Ago
By James Gordon Meek

It all came down to a call from Pakistan.

Had Osama Bin Laden not received that message 11 years ago today, dozens of U.S. Navy cruise missiles might have found their primary target and America arguably would not have been attacked on Sept. 11, 2001. Afghanistan probably would have remained a blighted backwater run by the Taliban, and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein might even still be in power.

More importantly, if Al Qaeda’s leader had been killed on Aug. 20, 1998 by the missiles aimed at his Al Farouk terror training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan, 2,973 innocent Americans might not have been slaughtered in Al Qaeda’s assault on New York City, Washington and Pennsylvania. And 5,439 families in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Germany, Italy and scores of other coalition countries probably never would have been informed that a loved one in the military had made the ultimate sacrifice in Iraq, Afghanistan or the far reaches of the war on Bin Laden’s Islamic terror network.

How did the U.S. miss him? A lingering 9/11 mystery may finally have been explained.

A St. Martin’s Press book set for fall release by Bin Laden’s son Omar and first wife Najwa, “Growing Up Bin Laden,” appears to credibly answer the question of how the Saudi terror kingpin narrowly dodged - by two hours - the Clinton administration’s biggest attempt to assassinate him. It came days after the East Africa U.S. embassy bombings that killed 224 and wounded more than 5,000 on Aug. 7, 1998.

It was America’s biggest missed opportunity to alter the course of history - but the evidence increasingly points a damning finger at a current U.S. ally Washington relies so heavily on to help prevent the next attack on the homeland.

Omar Bin Laden reveals in the new memoir, as we reported in the New York Daily News last month, that his father moved from his compound in Kandahar following the embassy attacks (which Al Qaeda implausibly denied perpetrating), traveling northeast to Khowst on the Pakistan border in late August 1998.

After a few days at Al Farouk, Osama Bin Laden “received a highly secretive communication” on Aug. 20, Omar writes. The family immediately left Khowst for Kabul - only two hours before the camp was obliterated by 75 cruise missiles. (Clinton was immediately accused of a “Wag the Dog” strike intended to distract the country from his Aug. 17 admission of a sex affair with Monica Lewinsky.)

Richard Clarke, then Clinton’s counterterror czar, recently told me that Omar’s account is important because it “squares with what we had.”

It also settles a question the 9/11 commission couldn't definitively answer. “Officials in Washington speculated that one or another Pakistani official might have sent a warning to the Taliban or Bin Laden,” the panel’s 2004 final report stated, citing only its 2003 interview of Clarke and reaching no conclusion.

The U.S. later learned that Pakistani officials had spotted Navy warships off their coast, “deduced there would be a missile attack,” and tipped off Al Qaeda, Clarke reasons.

Bin Laden expert Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation agrees that Omar’s tale rings true, but says the terror leader’s precautions could also be explained by merely “being cognizant” of a likely U.S. reprisal.

http://counterterrorismblog.org/2009/08/wh...zapping_bin.php

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Obama Readies Afghan Escalation

by Robert Dreyfuss

http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/09/09-6

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Careerists Pull Obama to Afghan Mess
Media and political careerists want President Obama to plunge deeper into the Afghan morass, says Melvin A. Goodman. September 8, 2009

http://www.consortiumnews.com/2009/090809b.html

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Iran Banks Move to Ecuador to Avoid Sanctions
By Douglas Farah

In its latest bid to avoid international banking sanctions, Iran has reached an agreement with the Central Bank of Ecuador to allow the Export Development Bank of Iran to operate in this Andean nation.

The move came even though Ecuador is fully aware that EDBI is under U.S. Treasury Department sanction for illicitly providing or attempting to provide financial services to Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

According to the Treasury Department's designation statement:

"In response to international sanctions and the refusal of many responsible banks to do business with Iranian banks, Iran has adopted a strategy of using less prominent institutions, such as the Export Development Bank of Iran, to handle its illicit transactions." said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey. "Today's action exposes EDBI's role in helping Iran violate UN sanctions so that financial institutions around the world can take appropriate steps to protect themselves."

Established in 1991, the EDBI is an Iranian state-owned financial institution whose primary purpose is to serve Iran's import and export communities. In addition, the EDBI operates as the Iranian representative for the Islamic Development Bank, a multinational institution that cultivates economic and social improvements in member nations, in accordance with Islamic law.

However, the EDBI provides financial services to multiple MODAFL-subordinate entities that permit these entities to advance Iran's WMD programs. Furthermore, the EDBI has facilitated the ongoing procurement activities of various front companies associated with MODAFL-subordinate entities.

At the same it designated EDBI, Treasury also designated the "Venezuelan" Banco Internacional de Desarrollo (BID), a wholly-owned Iranian bank that was constituted in 2007.

Its founding documents show the BID (not to be confused with the multi-national lending agency, Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, also known as BID) is wholly owned (all 40,000 shares) by Bank Saderat, an Iranian bank under U.S. and UN sanction. The BID (Venezuela) was also granted an operating license, along with EDBI, in Ecuador. My full blog is here.
http://www.douglasfarah.com/article/501/ir...n-sanctions.com

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Al Qaeda's European Charm Offensive - Brookings Institution

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/092...stFromBrookings

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The Uncertain Lessons of Iraq & Afghanistan - CSIS

http://csis.org/publication/shape-clear-ho...fghan-iraq-wars


Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build: "The Uncertain Lessons of the Afghan & Iraq Wars"

*
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Sep 23, 2009

The US is losing the war in Afghanistan, and we risk losing the gains we have made in Iraq, largely as a result of our own mistakes. After eight years of war, the US is still seeking to learn how to address the problems of armed nation building.

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Egypt Silences Dissent - Hudson Institute

http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction...ils&id=6501

The Obama administration's Arab-Israeli peace process is in more trouble than even the White House realizes. To be sure, the Israelis and Palestinians are both dug in, and when the president sought baby steps from the Arabs toward normalizing relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait rebuffed the administration. But now even Cairo, where Obama hit his reset button with the Muslim world, has made its stand, albeit much less publicly. The campaign against Egyptian editor and analyst Hala Mustafa for meeting with Israel's ambassador to Cairo is sufficient evidence that the first country to have a peace treaty with Jerusalem is no closer to normalization than it was when Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Accords 30 years ago.

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Problems With Obama's Missile Defense - Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-...le-defense-plan


Article Highlights

* The Obama administration should be commended for changing course on the Bush administration's plan to deploy missile defense installations in Eastern Europe.
* However, its alternative--using the existing ship-based Aegis defense system to protect Europe from a possible Iranian missile strike--also uses technology that's unproven.
* Additionally, like the Bush plan, the Obama missile defense strategy could potentially embolden hawks in both Russia and China.

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How to Manage a Nuclear Iran
Gregory L. Schulte, Foreign Policy
On Sept. 25, flanked by his French and British counterparts, Barack Obama announced that Iran was building a second underground facility for uranium enrichment. The U.S. president warned that Iran's decision to build yet another nuclear facility without notifying the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) represented a direct challenge to the nonproliferation regime.
Full Article
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009..._a_nuclear_iran

* Dealing with Iran: The Power of Legitimacy
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publicati...p&proj=znpp

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ASEAN Response to Nuclear Risks
Mark Fitzpatrick, The Japan Times
As the nuclear renaissance comes to Southeast Asia, the countries of the region face an important turning point. Decisions taken today will help determine whether nuclear energy will play a positive role in their economic development, or whether a shadow of nuclear danger will accompany the benefits of this energy source.
Full Article
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20091011a1.html

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Central Asia united on economic crisis response
Beijing (AFP) Oct 14, 2009 - Leaders from Russia, China and four Central Asian nations on Wednesday pledged to work together to coordinate their responses to the global economic crisis. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, host Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, and leaders from four ex-Soviet countries - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan - also agreed their top finance officials would meet by year's end. ... more
http://www.terradaily.com/reports/Central_...sponse_999.html