QUOTE(graham4anything @ Oct 8 2009, 08:20 AM)

Read some history.
Polititians (Kennedy, Johnson, even Nixon) didn't want Viet Nam.
They were misled by generals until it was too late.
"Oh yes, we're winning...we just need a few more (thousand) troops..."
JULY 1965Greene (Commandant of the United States Marine Corps) experienced conflicting feelings during the consultation with the (House Armed Services) committee members.
Sympathetic to his commander in chief in the April (1965) White House meetings, when LBJ seemed beseiged by opponents of the U.S. role in Vietnam, Greene was nonetheless "ASTOUNDED BY HOW FEW OF THE FACTS REGARDING THE SITUATION SEEMED TO BE KNOWN" to the people's representatives.
GREENE'S LOYALTY TO THE PRESIDENT AND RELUCTANCE TO CONTRADICT HIS COLLEAGUES (United States Military Joint Chiefs of Staff), HOWEVER, PREVENTED HIM FROM GIVING THE LEGISLATORS HIS FULL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.
Two hours after the meeting, he called John Blandford (House Armed Services Committee's chief counsel).
GREENE TOLD BLANDFORD WHAT HE DECLINED TO SAY IN THE MEETING.
THE UNITED STATES, GREENE SAID, WAS ON THE VERGE OF A "MAJOR WAR" THAT WOULD ULTIMATELY INVOLVE A MINIMUM OF FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND TROOPS.
THE WAR WOULD TAKE AT LEAST FIVE YEARS, AND THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUFFER A LARGE NUMBER OF CASUALTIES.
TO SET CONDITIONS FOR WINNING THE WAR, THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO UNDERTAKE AN "IMMEDIATE INTENSIFICATION" OF OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM AND WITHIN SOUTH VIETNAM.
GREENE HAD GIVEN BLANDFORD PRIVATELY THE ASSESSMENT THAT THE CHIEFS HAD FAILED TO PROVIDE EITHER TO CONGRESS OR TO THE ADMINISTRATION.
WITH THE ADMINISTRATION DECEIVING THE PEOPLE AND CONGRESS ABOUT THE DEPTH OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY COMMITMENT IN VIETNAM, THE CHIEFS WERE IN A QUANDARY.ALTHOUGH THE CONSTITUTION DESIGNATED THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE MILITARY, EACH MEMBER OF THE JCS WAS SWORN TO "SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES."
THE CONSTITUTION CHARGED CONGRESS, AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY TO DECIDE WHETHER TO DECLARE WAR.
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, THROUGH THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS, WERE TO DETERMINE WHETHER SOUTH VIETNAM'S "FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE" WAS WORTH THE COSTS AND RISKS.
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF GREENE (AND THEN ONLY IN PRIVATE TO A STAFF MEMBER), THE CHIEFS HAD DECIDED TO SUPPORT THEIR COMMANDER IN CHIEF BY MISREPRESENTING THEIR OWN ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM.GREENE FELT KEENLY THE TENSION BETWEEN LOYALTY TO THE PRESIDENT AND HIS RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND HAD CHOSEN A MIDDLE COURSE OF PUBLICLY SUPPORTING THE ADMINISTRATION WHILE PRIVATELY PROVIDING HIS ACTUAL VIEWS TO THE CONGRESS.
THE CHIEFS' OBLIGATIONS TO THEIR SOLDIERS, AIRMEN, SAILORS, AND MARINES COMPLICATED ALREADY CONFLICTING RESPONSIBILITIES.
AS AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR DEEPENED, LYNDON JOHNSON REMAINED DETERMINED TO DEPICT THE WAR VERY DIFFERENTLY FROM THE WAY THAT GREENE HAD DESCRIBED IT.- Pages 311,312,
Dereliction of Duty - Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, AND THE LIES THAT LED TO VIET NAM by H.R. McMaster