U.S. 'Almost All Wrong' on Weapons
Report on Iraq Contradicts Bush Administration Claims

By Dana Priest and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, October 7, 2004; Page A01

The 1991 Persian Gulf War and subsequent U.N. inspections destroyed Iraq's illicit weapons capability and, for the most part, Saddam Hussein did not try to rebuild it, according to an extensive report by the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq that contradicts nearly every prewar assertion made by top administration officials about Iraq.

Charles A. Duelfer, whom the Bush administration chose to complete the U.S. investigation of Iraq's weapons programs, said Hussein's ability to produce nuclear weapons had "progressively decayed" since 1991. Inspectors, he said, found no evidence of "concerted efforts to restart the program."

The findings were similar on biological and chemical weapons. While Hussein had long dreamed of developing an arsenal of biological agents, his stockpiles had been destroyed and research stopped years before the United States led the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Duelfer said Hussein hoped someday to resume a chemical weapons effort after U.N. sanctions ended, but had no stocks and had not researched making the weapons for a dozen years.

Duelfer's report, delivered yesterday to two congressional committees, represents the government's most definitive accounting of Hussein's weapons programs, the assumed strength of which the Bush administration presented as a central reason for the war. While previous reports have drawn similar conclusions, Duelfer's assessment went beyond them in depth, detail and level of certainty.

"We were almost all wrong" on Iraq, Duelfer told a Senate panel yesterday.

President Bush, Vice President Cheney and other top administration officials asserted before the U.S. invasion that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, had chemical and biological weapons and maintained links to al Qaeda affiliates to whom it might give such weapons to use against the United States.

But after extensive interviews with Hussein and his key lieutenants, Duelfer concluded that Hussein was not motivated by a desire to strike the United States with banned weapons, but wanted them to enhance his image in the Middle East and to deter Iran, against which Iraq had fought a devastating eight-year war. Hussein believed that "WMD helped save the regime multiple times," the report said.

The report also provides a one-of-a-kind look at Hussein's personality. The former Iraqi leader participated in numerous interviews with one Arabic-speaking FBI interrogator. Hussein told his questioner he felt threatened by U.S. military power, but even then, he maintained a fondness for American movies and literature. One of his favorite books was Ernest Hemingway's "The Old Man and the Sea." He hoped for improved relations with the United States and, over several years, sent proposals through intermediaries to open a dialogue with Washington. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...2004Oct6_2.html

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Comprehensive
Report
_____________________

of the
Special Advisor to the DCI
on
Iraq’s WMD




30 September 2004
This report relays the findings of the Special Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence on Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The files comprising the PDF edition of this 1,000-page report are extremely large and, in practice, available only to visitors who have a broadband connection. The HTML edition is available to all, regardless of connection speed.

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HTML edition:
Volume 1

Charles Duelfer's Transmittal Message
Acknowledgements
Scope Note
Regime Strategic Intent
Regime Finance and Procurement
Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline Events

Volume 2

Delivery Systems
Nuclear

Volume 3

Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program
Biological Warfare
Glossary and Acronyms

Complete Table of Contents



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PDF edition:
The files linked below are in PDF format and require Adobe's free Acrobat® Reader™ to view.

Key Findings (194 KB)

Volume 1 (53,807 KB)

Volume 2 (76,070 KB)

Volume 3 (69,895 KB)



Updated: 12/13/2004 11:36:27. GMT


http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/