February 10, 2005
9/11 Report Cites Many Warnings About Hijackings
By ERIC LICHTBLAU
ASHINGTON, Feb. 9 - In the months before the Sept. 11 attacks, federal aviation officials reviewed dozens of intelligence reports that warned about Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, some of which specifically discussed airline hijackings and suicide operations, according to a previously undisclosed report from the 9/11 commission.
But aviation officials were "lulled into a false sense of security," and "intelligence that indicated a real and growing threat leading up to 9/11 did not stimulate significant increases in security procedures," the commission report concluded.
The report discloses that the Federal Aviation Administration, despite being focused on risks of hijackings overseas, warned airports in the spring of 2001 that if "the intent of the hijacker is not to exchange hostages for prisoners, but to commit suicide in a spectacular explosion, a domestic hijacking would probably be preferable."
The report takes the F.A.A. to task for failing to pursue domestic security measures that could conceivably have altered the events of Sept. 11, 2001, like toughening airport screening procedures for weapons or expanding the use of on-flight air marshals. The report, completed last August, said officials appeared more concerned with reducing airline congestion, lessening delays, and easing airlines' financial woes than deterring a terrorist attack.
The Bush administration has blocked the public release of the full, classified version of the report for more than five months, officials said, much to the frustration of former commission members who say it provides a critical understanding of the failures of the civil aviation system. The administration provided both the classified report and a declassified, 120-page version to the National Archives two weeks ago and, even with heavy redactions in some areas, the declassified version provides the firmest evidence to date about the warnings that aviation officials received concerning the threat of an attack on airliners and the failure to take steps to deter it.
Among other things, the report says that leaders of the F.A.A. received 52 intelligence reports from their security branch that mentioned Mr. bin Laden or Al Qaeda from April to Sept. 10, 2001. That represented half of all the intelligence summaries in that time.
Five of the intelligence reports specifically mentioned Al Qaeda's training or capability to conduct hijackings, the report said. Two mentioned suicide operations, although not connected to aviation, the report said.
A spokeswoman for the F.A.A., the agency that bears the brunt of the commission's criticism, said Wednesday that the agency was well aware of the threat posed by terrorists before Sept. 11 and took substantive steps to counter it, including the expanded use of explosives detection units.
"We had a lot of information about threats," said the spokeswoman, Laura J. Brown. "But we didn't have specific information about means or methods that would have enabled us to tailor any countermeasures."
She added: "After 9/11, the F.A..A. and the entire aviation community took bold steps to improve aviation security, such as fortifying cockpit doors on 6,000 airplanes, and those steps took hundreds of millions of dollars to implement."
The report, like previous commission documents, finds no evidence that the government had specific warning of a domestic attack and says that the aviation industry considered the hijacking threat to be more worrisome overseas.
"The fact that the civil aviation system seems to have been lulled into a false sense of security is striking not only because of what happened on 9/11 but also in light of the intelligence assessments, including those conducted by the F.A.A.'s own security branch, that raised alarms about the growing terrorist threat to civil aviation throughout the 1990's and into the new century," the report said.
In its previous findings, including a final report last July that became a best-selling book, the 9/11 commission detailed the harrowing events aboard the four hijacked flights that crashed on Sept. 11 and the communications problems between civil aviation and military officials that hampered the response. But the new report goes further in revealing the scope and depth of intelligence collected by federal aviation officials about the threat of a terrorist attack.
The F.A.A. "had indeed considered the possibility that terrorists would hijack a plane and use it as a weapon," and in 2001 it distributed a CD-ROM presentation to airlines and airports that cited the possibility of a suicide hijacking, the report said. Previous commission documents have quoted the CD's reassurance that "fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction."
Aviation officials amassed so much information about the growing threat posed by terrorists that they conducted classified briefings in mid-2001 for security officials at 19 of the nation's busiest airports to warn of the threat posed in particular by Mr. bin Laden, the report said.
Still, the 9/11 commission concluded that aviation officials did not direct adequate resources or attention to the problem.
"Throughout 2001, the senior leadership of the F.A.A. was focused on congestion and delays within the system and the ever-present issue of safety, but they were not as focused on security," the report said.
The F.A.A. did not see a need to increase the air marshal ranks because hijackings were seen as an overseas threat, and one aviation official told the commission said that airlines did not want to give up revenues by providing free seats to marshals.
The F.A.A. also made no concerted effort to expand their list of terror suspects, which included a dozen names on Sept. 11, the report said. The former head of the F.A.A.'s civil aviation security branch said he was not aware of the government's main watch list, called Tipoff, which included the names of two hijackers who were living in the San Diego area, the report said.
Nor was there evidence that a senior F.A.A. working group on security had ever met in 2001 to discuss "the high threat period that summer," the report said.
Jane F. Garvey, the F.A.A. administrator at the time, told the commission "that she was aware of the heightened threat during the summer of 2001," the report said. But several other senior agency officials "were basically unaware of the threat," as were senior airline operations officials and veteran pilots, the report said.
The classified version of the commission report quotes extensively from circulars prepared by the F.A.A. about the threat of terrorism, but many of those references have been blacked out in the declassified version, officials said.
Several former commissioners and staff members said they were upset and disappointed by the administration's refusal to release the full report publicly.
"Our intention was to make as much information available to the public as soon as possible," said Richard Ben-Veniste, a former Sept. 11 commission member.
Full Version: 9/11 Report Cites Many
Common Ground Common Sense > Issues that Affect Our Lives > Foreign Policy and National Defense > Foreign Policy & National Defense Issues Archive
I was just listening about this on "Unfilitered" and soooo pissed me off!!!! They had a warning, according to the right math and right information, twice a week leading up to the attacks! There are even 52 accounts of Bin Ladin and Al-Quadia mentioned! Urgh. This so pissed me off. Of course you'll NEVER hear about it in MSM except maybe Keith Olbermann and Jon Stewart. And of course the Bush administration wouldn't have any justice. This shows to prove they KNEW it would happen! Didn't France and Germany even try to warn us and nobody listened? 
QUOTE(CrowNotAngelGRL @ Feb 10 2005, 08:50 AM)
I was just listening about this on "Unfilitered" and soooo pissed me off!!!! They had a warning, according to the right math and right information, twice a week leading up to the attacks! There are even 52 accounts of Bin Ladin and Al-Quadia mentioned! Urgh. This so pissed me off. Of course you'll NEVER hear about it in MSM except maybe Keith Olbermann and Jon Stewart. And of course the Bush administration wouldn't have any justice. This shows to prove they KNEW it would happen! Didn't France and Germany even try to warn us and nobody listened?
This was their "Pearl Harbor" to go into Iraq, they are sticking to their PNAC agenda. When will we say enough is enough. We were and still being screwed plain and simple.
I saw this this am on the scroll on the bottom screen on msnbc.
I am so mad. He needs to be held accountable!
How can we as Americans allow this to happen???
I'm going to forward this story to the local newspapers -
EVERYONE please do the same
I am so mad. He needs to be held accountable!
How can we as Americans allow this to happen???
I'm going to forward this story to the local newspapers -
EVERYONE please do the same
QUOTE(JILLinaz @ Feb 10 2005, 09:20 AM)
I saw this this am on the scroll on the bottom screen on msnbc.
I am so mad. He needs to be held accountable!
How can we as Americans allow this to happen???I'm going to forward this story to the local newspapers -
EVERYONE please do the same
I am so mad. He needs to be held accountable!
How can we as Americans allow this to happen???I'm going to forward this story to the local newspapers -
EVERYONE please do the same
You can say that about alot of things, remember that question before the election "is America heading in the right direction" if you answer NO, now is the time to do something, like maybe WAKE UP (this comment is not directed to those on this forum) Just venting.
I sent the article to my hometown paper.
I just did a mass email to every email address I could find for the reporters of my local paper.
I just asked why this wasn't on the front page, and copied the article.
If they print it, it will probably be buried inside. But if 5 more people read this, that will be 5 more that are educated.
grrrrr!
I just asked why this wasn't on the front page, and copied the article.
If they print it, it will probably be buried inside. But if 5 more people read this, that will be 5 more that are educated.
grrrrr!
This is part of what they wouldn't allow released until after the election. <_<
Israel has not had a hijacking since 1968 - here's why:
http://netscape.businessweek.com/bwdaily/d..._5134_db039.htm
Hindsight is always 20/20, but I know there's room for improvement.
http://netscape.businessweek.com/bwdaily/d..._5134_db039.htm
Hindsight is always 20/20, but I know there's room for improvement.
STILL FUMING ABOUT 9/11 AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S INEPTITUDE...
HERE' MORE TO FUME ABOUT....
9/11 Report Cites Many Warnings About Hijackings
NY TIMES | February 10, 2005
By ERIC LICHTBLAU
WASHINGTON - In the months before the Sept. 11 attacks, federal aviation officials reviewed dozens of intelligence reports that warned about Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, some of which specifically discussed airline hijackings and suicide operations, according to a previously undisclosed report from the 9/11 commission.
But aviation officials were "lulled into a false sense of security," and "intelligence that indicated a real and growing threat leading up to 9/11 did not stimulate significant increases in security procedures," the commission report concluded.
The report discloses that the Federal Aviation Administration, despite being focused on risks of hijackings overseas, warned airports in the spring of 2001 that if "the intent of the hijacker is not to exchange hostages for prisoners, but to commit suicide in a spectacular explosion, a domestic hijacking would probably be preferable."
The report takes the F.A.A. to task for failing to pursue domestic security measures that could conceivably have altered the events of Sept. 11, 2001, like toughening airport screening procedures for weapons or expanding the use of on-flight air marshals. The report, completed last August, said officials appeared more concerned with reducing airline congestion, lessening delays, and easing airlines' financial woes than deterring a terrorist attack.
The Bush administration has blocked the public release of the full, classified version of the report for more than five months, officials said, much to the frustration of former commission members who say it provides a critical understanding of the failures of the civil aviation system. The administration provided both the classified report and a declassified, 120-page version to the National Archives two weeks ago and, even with heavy redactions in some areas, the declassified version provides the firmest evidence to date about the warnings that aviation officials received concerning the threat of an attack on airliners and the failure to take steps to deter it.
Among other things, the report says that leaders of the F.A.A. received 52 intelligence reports from their security branch that mentioned Mr. bin Laden or Al Qaeda from April to Sept. 10, 2001. That represented half of all the intelligence summaries in that time.
Five of the intelligence reports specifically mentioned Al Qaeda's training or capability to conduct hijackings, the report said. Two mentioned suicide operations, although not connected to aviation, the report said.
A spokeswoman for the F.A.A., the agency that bears the brunt of the commission's criticism, said Wednesday that the agency was well aware of the threat posed by terrorists before Sept. 11 and took substantive steps to counter it, including the expanded use of explosives detection units.
"We had a lot of information about threats," said the spokeswoman, Laura J. Brown. "But we didn't have specific information about means or methods that would have enabled us to tailor any countermeasures."
She added: "After 9/11, the F.A..A. and the entire aviation community took bold steps to improve aviation security, such as fortifying cockpit doors on 6,000 airplanes, and those steps took hundreds of millions of dollars to implement."
The report, like previous commission documents, finds no evidence that the government had specific warning of a domestic attack and says that the aviation industry considered the hijacking threat to be more worrisome overseas.
"The fact that the civil aviation system seems to have been lulled into a false sense of security is striking not only because of what happened on 9/11 but also in light of the intelligence assessments, including those conducted by the F.A.A.'s own security branch, that raised alarms about the growing terrorist threat to civil aviation throughout the 1990's and into the new century," the report said.
In its previous findings, including a final report last July that became a best-selling book, the 9/11 commission detailed the harrowing events aboard the four hijacked flights that crashed on Sept. 11 and the communications problems between civil aviation and military officials that hampered the response. But the new report goes further in revealing the scope and depth of intelligence collected by federal aviation officials about the threat of a terrorist attack.
The F.A.A. "had indeed considered the possibility that terrorists would hijack a plane and use it as a weapon," and in 2001 it distributed a CD-ROM presentation to airlines and airports that cited the possibility of a suicide hijacking, the report said. Previous commission documents have quoted the CD's reassurance that "fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction."
Aviation officials amassed so much information about the growing threat posed by terrorists that they conducted classified briefings in mid-2001 for security officials at 19 of the nation's busiest airports to warn of the threat posed in particular by Mr. bin Laden, the report said.
Still, the 9/11 commission concluded that aviation officials did not direct adequate resources or attention to the problem.
"Throughout 2001, the senior leadership of the F.A.A. was focused on congestion and delays within the system and the ever-present issue of safety, but they were not as focused on security," the report said.
The F.A.A. did not see a need to increase the air marshal ranks because hijackings were seen as an overseas threat, and one aviation official told the commission said that airlines did not want to give up revenues by providing free seats to marshals.
The F.A.A. also made no concerted effort to expand their list of terror suspects, which included a dozen names on Sept. 11, the report said. The former head of the F.A.A.'s civil aviation security branch said he was not aware of the government's main watch list, called Tipoff, which included the names of two hijackers who were living in the San Diego area, the report said.
Nor was there evidence that a senior F.A.A. working group on security had ever met in 2001 to discuss "the high threat period that summer," the report said.
Jane F. Garvey, the F.A.A. administrator at the time, told the commission "that she was aware of the heightened threat during the summer of 2001," the report said. But several other senior agency officials "were basically unaware of the threat," as were senior airline operations officials and veteran pilots, the report said.
The classified version of the commission report quotes extensively from circulars prepared by the F.A.A. about the threat of terrorism, but many of those references have been blacked out in the declassified version, officials said.
Several former commissioners and staff members said they were upset and disappointed by the administration's refusal to release the full report publicly.
"Our intention was to make as much information available to the public as soon as possible," said Richard Ben-Veniste, a former Sept. 11 commission member.
HERE' MORE TO FUME ABOUT....
QUOTE
9/11 Report Cites Many Warnings About Hijackings
NY TIMES | February 10, 2005
By ERIC LICHTBLAU
WASHINGTON - In the months before the Sept. 11 attacks, federal aviation officials reviewed dozens of intelligence reports that warned about Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, some of which specifically discussed airline hijackings and suicide operations, according to a previously undisclosed report from the 9/11 commission.
But aviation officials were "lulled into a false sense of security," and "intelligence that indicated a real and growing threat leading up to 9/11 did not stimulate significant increases in security procedures," the commission report concluded.
The report discloses that the Federal Aviation Administration, despite being focused on risks of hijackings overseas, warned airports in the spring of 2001 that if "the intent of the hijacker is not to exchange hostages for prisoners, but to commit suicide in a spectacular explosion, a domestic hijacking would probably be preferable."
The report takes the F.A.A. to task for failing to pursue domestic security measures that could conceivably have altered the events of Sept. 11, 2001, like toughening airport screening procedures for weapons or expanding the use of on-flight air marshals. The report, completed last August, said officials appeared more concerned with reducing airline congestion, lessening delays, and easing airlines' financial woes than deterring a terrorist attack.
The Bush administration has blocked the public release of the full, classified version of the report for more than five months, officials said, much to the frustration of former commission members who say it provides a critical understanding of the failures of the civil aviation system. The administration provided both the classified report and a declassified, 120-page version to the National Archives two weeks ago and, even with heavy redactions in some areas, the declassified version provides the firmest evidence to date about the warnings that aviation officials received concerning the threat of an attack on airliners and the failure to take steps to deter it.
Among other things, the report says that leaders of the F.A.A. received 52 intelligence reports from their security branch that mentioned Mr. bin Laden or Al Qaeda from April to Sept. 10, 2001. That represented half of all the intelligence summaries in that time.
Five of the intelligence reports specifically mentioned Al Qaeda's training or capability to conduct hijackings, the report said. Two mentioned suicide operations, although not connected to aviation, the report said.
A spokeswoman for the F.A.A., the agency that bears the brunt of the commission's criticism, said Wednesday that the agency was well aware of the threat posed by terrorists before Sept. 11 and took substantive steps to counter it, including the expanded use of explosives detection units.
"We had a lot of information about threats," said the spokeswoman, Laura J. Brown. "But we didn't have specific information about means or methods that would have enabled us to tailor any countermeasures."
She added: "After 9/11, the F.A..A. and the entire aviation community took bold steps to improve aviation security, such as fortifying cockpit doors on 6,000 airplanes, and those steps took hundreds of millions of dollars to implement."
The report, like previous commission documents, finds no evidence that the government had specific warning of a domestic attack and says that the aviation industry considered the hijacking threat to be more worrisome overseas.
"The fact that the civil aviation system seems to have been lulled into a false sense of security is striking not only because of what happened on 9/11 but also in light of the intelligence assessments, including those conducted by the F.A.A.'s own security branch, that raised alarms about the growing terrorist threat to civil aviation throughout the 1990's and into the new century," the report said.
In its previous findings, including a final report last July that became a best-selling book, the 9/11 commission detailed the harrowing events aboard the four hijacked flights that crashed on Sept. 11 and the communications problems between civil aviation and military officials that hampered the response. But the new report goes further in revealing the scope and depth of intelligence collected by federal aviation officials about the threat of a terrorist attack.
The F.A.A. "had indeed considered the possibility that terrorists would hijack a plane and use it as a weapon," and in 2001 it distributed a CD-ROM presentation to airlines and airports that cited the possibility of a suicide hijacking, the report said. Previous commission documents have quoted the CD's reassurance that "fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction."
Aviation officials amassed so much information about the growing threat posed by terrorists that they conducted classified briefings in mid-2001 for security officials at 19 of the nation's busiest airports to warn of the threat posed in particular by Mr. bin Laden, the report said.
Still, the 9/11 commission concluded that aviation officials did not direct adequate resources or attention to the problem.
"Throughout 2001, the senior leadership of the F.A.A. was focused on congestion and delays within the system and the ever-present issue of safety, but they were not as focused on security," the report said.
The F.A.A. did not see a need to increase the air marshal ranks because hijackings were seen as an overseas threat, and one aviation official told the commission said that airlines did not want to give up revenues by providing free seats to marshals.
The F.A.A. also made no concerted effort to expand their list of terror suspects, which included a dozen names on Sept. 11, the report said. The former head of the F.A.A.'s civil aviation security branch said he was not aware of the government's main watch list, called Tipoff, which included the names of two hijackers who were living in the San Diego area, the report said.
Nor was there evidence that a senior F.A.A. working group on security had ever met in 2001 to discuss "the high threat period that summer," the report said.
Jane F. Garvey, the F.A.A. administrator at the time, told the commission "that she was aware of the heightened threat during the summer of 2001," the report said. But several other senior agency officials "were basically unaware of the threat," as were senior airline operations officials and veteran pilots, the report said.
The classified version of the commission report quotes extensively from circulars prepared by the F.A.A. about the threat of terrorism, but many of those references have been blacked out in the declassified version, officials said.
Several former commissioners and staff members said they were upset and disappointed by the administration's refusal to release the full report publicly.
"Our intention was to make as much information available to the public as soon as possible," said Richard Ben-Veniste, a former Sept. 11 commission member.
From Niteowl's article: "Among other things, the report says that leaders of the F.A.A. received 52 intelligence reports from their security branch that mentioned Mr. bin Laden or Al Qaeda from April to Sept. 10, 2001. That represented half of all the intelligence summaries in that time. "
I dont understand how the FAA's security branch is able to receive intelligence reports that the CIA and other govt. security branches dont receive. It is hard to believe that the FAA was privy to this information and did not share it with the CIA--or did they?
According to Condi--the memo stating that "Bin Laden wants to attack in the US" was the only info she knew of regarding Bin Laden and possibility of attacks. It seems obvious now that the Bush admin did have access to numerous reports that should have raised enough red flags to take precautions on all US airlines.
The quote above says "among other things, the report says...", so it is clear that there is a great deal more needed to be released. It is clear why the Bush admin didnt want this out before the election. It would have been front page news and the Kerry campaign could have used this info to their advantage.
It is also clear that this report is pointing the finger of blame at the airlines and not the CIA or the Bush admin--sounds like another scapegoat.
I dont understand how the FAA's security branch is able to receive intelligence reports that the CIA and other govt. security branches dont receive. It is hard to believe that the FAA was privy to this information and did not share it with the CIA--or did they?
According to Condi--the memo stating that "Bin Laden wants to attack in the US" was the only info she knew of regarding Bin Laden and possibility of attacks. It seems obvious now that the Bush admin did have access to numerous reports that should have raised enough red flags to take precautions on all US airlines.
The quote above says "among other things, the report says...", so it is clear that there is a great deal more needed to be released. It is clear why the Bush admin didnt want this out before the election. It would have been front page news and the Kerry campaign could have used this info to their advantage.
It is also clear that this report is pointing the finger of blame at the airlines and not the CIA or the Bush admin--sounds like another scapegoat.
QUOTE(CrowNotAngelGRL @ Feb 10 2005, 09:50 AM)
I was just listening about this on "Unfilitered" and soooo pissed me off!!!! They had a warning, according to the right math and right information, twice a week leading up to the attacks! There are even 52 accounts of Bin Ladin and Al-Quadia mentioned! Urgh. This so pissed me off. Of course you'll NEVER hear about it in MSM except maybe Keith Olbermann and Jon Stewart. And of course the Bush administration wouldn't have any justice. This shows to prove they KNEW it would happen! Didn't France and Germany even try to warn us and nobody listened?
I believe Russia and Turkey (for sure) as well as several other countries' intelligence agencies sent urgent warnings of an impending attack. They were all ignored, as far as I can ascertain.
The parts about the planes holding rockets underneath them is a bit out there for me but only seen once news reel video shots of the Pentagon immediately following the attack are very telling.
http://www.fourwinds10.com/news/05-governm...o-citizens.html
http://www.fourwinds10.com/news/05-governm...o-citizens.html
It's being discussed on Hardball now.
QUOTE(Gabrielle @ Feb 10 2005, 04:37 PM)
The parts about the planes holding rockets underneath them is a bit out there for me but only seen once news reel video shots of the Pentagon immediately following the attack are very telling.
http://www.fourwinds10.com/news/05-governm...o-citizens.html
http://www.fourwinds10.com/news/05-governm...o-citizens.html
A bit out there for me, too. Tin foil hat stuff. I DO know, however, that when you ram a 600,000 pound aluminum missile filled with jet fuel into a solid building, there will be a hugh fire as a result.
People keep harping on the fact that there was no airplane debris at the Pentagon crash site. Well, there wasn't any in New York either. And precious little in Shanksville, PA. That is the result of a High-Speed collision with an immovable object.
Another doc released to the National security Archive. It is becoming clearer that Bush was well aware of the possibility of an Al Qaeda attack, but chose to ignore the threats. It is a disgrace that these docs were considered classified and not released to the public before the elections.
Bush Ignored Warning of al Qaeda Threat Eight Months Before 9/11
By Staff and Wire Reports
Feb 11, 2005, 08:04
President George W. Bush ignored a memo, written almost eight months before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, that warned the White House al Qaeda represented a threat throughout the Islamic world.
The memo dated Jan. 25, 2001 -- five days after Bush took office -- was an essential feature of last year's hearings into intelligence failures before the attacks on New York and Washington. A copy of the document was posted on the National Security Archive Web site on Thursday.
The memo, from former counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke to then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, had been described during the hearings but its full contents had not been disclosed.
Clarke, a holdover from the Clinton administration, had requested an immediate meeting of top national security officials as soon as possible after Bush took office to discuss combating al Qaeda. He described the network as a threat with broad reach.
"Al Qaeda affects centrally our policies on Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, North Africa and the GCC (Gulf Arab states). Leaders in Jordan and Saudi Arabia see al Qaeda as a direct threat to them," Clarke wrote.
"The strength of the network of organizations limits the scope of support friendly Arab regimes can give to a range of U.S. policies, including Iraq policy and the (Israeli-Palestinian) Peace Process. We would make a major error if we underestimated the challenge al Qaeda poses."
The memo also warned of overestimating the stability of moderate regional allies threatened by al Qaeda.
It recommended that the new administration urgently discuss the al Qaeda network, including the magnitude of the threat it posed and strategy for dealing with it.
The document was declassified on April 7, 2004, one day before Rice's testimony before the Sept. 11 commission. It was released recently by the National Security Council to the National Security Archive -- a private library of declassified U.S. documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
The meeting on al Qaeda requested by Clarke did not take place until Sept. 4, 2001.
© Copyright 2004 Capitol Hill Blue
Bush Ignored Warning of al Qaeda Threat Eight Months Before 9/11
By Staff and Wire Reports
Feb 11, 2005, 08:04
President George W. Bush ignored a memo, written almost eight months before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, that warned the White House al Qaeda represented a threat throughout the Islamic world.
The memo dated Jan. 25, 2001 -- five days after Bush took office -- was an essential feature of last year's hearings into intelligence failures before the attacks on New York and Washington. A copy of the document was posted on the National Security Archive Web site on Thursday.
The memo, from former counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke to then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, had been described during the hearings but its full contents had not been disclosed.
Clarke, a holdover from the Clinton administration, had requested an immediate meeting of top national security officials as soon as possible after Bush took office to discuss combating al Qaeda. He described the network as a threat with broad reach.
"Al Qaeda affects centrally our policies on Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, North Africa and the GCC (Gulf Arab states). Leaders in Jordan and Saudi Arabia see al Qaeda as a direct threat to them," Clarke wrote.
"The strength of the network of organizations limits the scope of support friendly Arab regimes can give to a range of U.S. policies, including Iraq policy and the (Israeli-Palestinian) Peace Process. We would make a major error if we underestimated the challenge al Qaeda poses."
The memo also warned of overestimating the stability of moderate regional allies threatened by al Qaeda.
It recommended that the new administration urgently discuss the al Qaeda network, including the magnitude of the threat it posed and strategy for dealing with it.
The document was declassified on April 7, 2004, one day before Rice's testimony before the Sept. 11 commission. It was released recently by the National Security Council to the National Security Archive -- a private library of declassified U.S. documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
The meeting on al Qaeda requested by Clarke did not take place until Sept. 4, 2001.
© Copyright 2004 Capitol Hill Blue
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