What IS the actual federal abortion law?
From wikipedia.org
Roe v. Wade
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Holding: Texas laws criminalizing abortion violated women's Fourteenth Amendment right to choose whether or not to continue a pregnancy. Judgment of U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed in part, reversed in part.
The Supreme Court's decision
The Court issued its opinion on January 22, 1973, with a 7-2 majority voting to strike down the law and Justices White and Rehnquist dissenting. On the same day, the same 7-2 majority invalidated a Georgia abortion law in the lesser-known case of Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), involving Georgia's abortion laws.
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Abortion
The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Harry Blackmun, notes that "the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent vintage" with criminalization of abortion mostly occurring from law enacted in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Section VI of the opinion was devoted to an analysis of historical attitudes, including those of: the Persian Empire, Greek times, the Roman era, the Hippocratic oath, the common law, English statutory law, American law, the American Medical Association, the American Public Health Association (http://www.apha.org/), and the American Bar Association.
Without finding a historical basis for the laws, the Court identified three justifications in Section VII of the opinion to explain the criminalization of abortion: (1) women who can receive an abortion are more likely to engage in "illicit sexual conduct", (2) the medical procedure was extremely risky prior to the development of antibiotics and, even with modern medical techniques, is still risky in late stages of pregnancy, and (3) the state has an interest in protecting prenatal life. As to the first, "no court or commentator has taken the argument seriously" and the statute failed to "distinguish between married and unwed mothers." However, according to the Court, the second and third constitute valid state interests. In Section X, the Court reiterated, "[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman ... and that it has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life."
Valid state interests, however, must be weighed against the constitutional rights granted to individuals in order to determine whether a law is a constitutional exercise of power. Even though the "Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy" the court found support for a constitutional right of privacy in the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Ninth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. The court found "this right of privacy" to be "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."
However, the Court determined that "arguments that Texas either has no valid interest at all in regulating the abortion decision, or no interest strong enough to support any limitation upon the woman's sole determination, are unpersuasive." The Court declared, "We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation."
When weighing the competing interests the Court also noted that if the fetus was defined as a person for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment then the fetus would have a specific right to life under that Amendment. However, given the relatively recent nature of abortion criminalization, the Court determined that the original intent of the Constitution up to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 did not include the unborn. It should be noted that the Court's determination of whether a fetus can enjoy Constitutional protection is separate from the notion of when life begins. To that, the Court said, "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer."
Relying on the current state of medical knowledge, the decision established a system of trimesters that attempted to balance the state's legitimate interests with the individual's constitutional rights. The Court ruled that the state cannot restrict a woman's right to an abortion during the first trimester, the state can regulate the abortion procedure during the second trimester "in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health," and in the third trimester, demarcating the viability of the fetus, a state can choose to restrict or even to proscribe abortion as it sees fit.
Justice Byron White, joined by Justice William H. Rehnquist, vigorously dissented, calling the Court's decision "an exercise of raw judicial power." He wrote:
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court's judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers and, with scarcely any reason or authority for its action, invests that right with sufficient substance to override most existing state abortion statutes. The upshot is that the people and the legislatures of the 50 States are constitutionally disentitled to weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and development of the fetus, on the one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the mother, on the other hand.
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The 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey overturned Roe's strict trimester formula, and emphasized the right to abortion as grounded in the general sense of liberty protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, rather than a generalized right to privacy. Advancements in medical technology, expected to continue, meant that a fetus might be considered viable, and thus have some basis of a right to life, at 22 or 23 weeks rather than at the 28 that was more common at the time Roe was decided. For this reason, the old trimester formula was ruled obsolete, with a new focus on viability of the fetus.
Currently in the United States 50% of all abortions are performed in the first eight weeks of pregnancy and 89% in the first twelve weeks. There were 21.3 abortions per 1,000 women aged 15-44 in the United States in 2001-02; the highest rate was 29.3 per 1,000 in 1980-81.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey
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Holding: A Pennsylvania law that required spousal notification prior to obtaining an abortion was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment because it created an undue burden on married women seeking an abortion. Parental notification, informed consent, and 24-hour waiting period were constitutionally valid regulations. Judgment of Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Background of the case
Four provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 were being challenged as unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade, which first recognized a constitutional right to have an abortion in the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The "informed consent" rule under the Act required doctors to provide women with information about the health risks and possible complications of having an abortion before one could be performed. The "spousal notification" rule required women to give prior notice to their husbands, and the "parental notification" rule required the same of minors to their parents. The fourth provision imposed a 24-hour waiting period before obtaining an abortion. When the case came before the Court on review, Pennsylvania defended the Act in part by urging the Court to overturn Roe as having been wrongly decided.
The case was a seminal one in the history of abortion rights in the United States, as it was the first direct challenge of Roe since the liberal Justice Brennan was replaced in 1990 with the Bush-appointed and ostensibly conservative Justice Souter. Even most pro choice advocates expected Roe to be overruled and were gearing up for a subsequent State-by-State campaign against particular laws. However, Souter defied expectations and voted to uphold the constitutional right to have an abortion, preserving the precarious 5-4 Court vote in favor, though still changing the Court's abortion rights jurisprudence.
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The Court's opinions
Casey is a divided judgment, in that none of the Justices' opinions was joined by a majority of justices. However, the plurality decision jointly written by Justices Souter, O'Connor, and Kennedy is recognized as the lead opinion with precedential weight because each of its parts were concurred in by at least two other Justices, albeit different ones for each part.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens concurred with the parts of the Court's decision that upheld Roe and invalidated one of the Pennsylvania regulations. On the other side, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia each wrote opinions concurring in the parts of the Court's decisions that weakened Roe and upheld abortion regulations and dissented from the rest. Both Rehnquist and Scalia joined each other's concurrence/dissent, and Justice White joined both.
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The O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter plurality opinion
Though the plurality opinion stated that it was upholding what it called the "essential holding" of Roe, it did not leave it intact. The Court emphasized the right to abortion as "grounded in the general sense of liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than recognizing a general right to privacy that had been implied in previous cases.
However, the Court overturned the strict trimester formula used in Roe to weigh the woman's interest in obtaining an abortion against the State's interest in the life of the fetus. Continuing advancements in medical technology meant that at the time Casey was decided, a fetus might be considered viable at 22 or 23 weeks rather than at the 28 weeks that was more common at the time of Roe. The Court recognized viability as the point at which the State interest in the life of the fetus outweighs the rights of the woman and abortion may be banned entirely.
The Court also replaced the heightened scrutiny of abortion regulations under Roe, which was standard for fundamental rights in the Court's case law, with a lesser "undue burden" standard previously unknown in the Court's case law. A legal restriction posing an undue burden was defined as one having "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."
Applying this new standard to the Pennsylvania Act under challenge, the Court struck the spousal notification requirement, stating that it gave too much power to husbands over their wives and would worsen situations of spousal abuse. The Court upheld the State's 24 hour waiting period, informed consent, and parental notification requirements, holding that none constituted an undue burden.
Partial Birth Abortion Act
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Status of the Law
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June 1, 2004
Federal District Judge Phyllis Hamilton of California struck it down on June 1, 2004 on three grounds (2):
Because it places an 'undue burden' (i.e., "a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.") on women seeking abortion.
Because its language is unconstitutionally vague.
Because it lacks constitutionally-required provisions to preserve women's health (the law only provides for cases in which a woman's life is at risk).
A nationwide injunction was withheld while waiting for similar decisions from Federal Courts of Nebraska and New York.
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August 26, 2004
United States District Judge Richard C. Casey found the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act unconstitutional. He ruled that the act must contain exceptions to protect a woman's life and health; the text of the act allows an exception to the ban in the case of risk to the woman's life, but it does not consider risks to her health.