http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cf...=40&ItemID=8033
Torture's Part of the Territory
by Naomi Klein
June 08, 2005
Los Angeles Times
Brace yourself for a flood of gruesome new torture snapshots. Last week, a federal judge ordered the Defense Department to release dozens of additional photographs and videotapes depicting prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib.
The photographs will elicit what has become a predictable response: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld will claim to be shocked and will assure us that action is already being taken to prevent such abuses from happening again. But imagine, for a moment, if events followed a different script. Imagine if Rumsfeld responded like Col. Mathieu in "Battle of Algiers," Gillo Pontecorvo's famed 1965 film about the National Liberation Front's attempt to liberate Algeria from French colonial rule. In one of the film's key scenes, Mathieu finds himself in a situation familiar to top officials in the Bush administration: He is being grilled by a room filled with journalists about allegations that French paratroopers are torturing Algerian prisoners.
Full Version: Prisoner Abuse News, Commentary & Discussion
She is correct...
QUOTE
Judge: Public Has Right to See Abuse Photos
Associated Press | May 27, 2005
NEW YORK -- A federal judge has told the government it will have to release additional pictures of detainee abuse at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison, civil rights lawyers said.
Judge Alvin Hellerstein, finding the public has a right to see the pictures, told the government Thursday he will sign an order requiring it to release them to the American Civil Liberties Union, the lawyers said.
The judge made the decision after he and government attorneys privately viewed a sampling of nine pictures resulting from an Army probe into abuse and torture at the prison. The pictures were given to the Army by a military policeman assigned there.
ACLU lawyer Megan Lewis told the judge she believes the government has pictures of abuse beyond the Abu Ghraib images that sparked outrage around the world after they were leaked to the media last year.
Some of the thousands of pages of documents the government has released to the ACLU seem to refer to such images, and the government has not denied that additional photos exist, she said.
The judge decided some pictures from Abu Graib could be released to comply with the Freedom of Information Act while others must be redacted or were not relevant to the ACLU's request, Lewis said.
She said the judge's findings likely would clear the way for the release of other pictures of detainees taken around the world by U.S. authorities.
"I do think they could be extremely upsetting and depict conduct that would outrage the American public and be truly horrifying," she said outside court.
The judge ordered the transcript of comments made during his viewing of the pictures sealed. He did not disclose his findings in court, but said his order "will lead to production (of the pictures) or further proceedings."
"Further proceedings" presumably referred to possible appeals by government lawyers, who declined to comment as they left the hearing. A message left with a government spokeswoman was not immediately returned.
Before viewing the pictures, the judge said in court that he thought "photographs present a different level of detail and are the best evidence the public can have of what occurred."
Government lawyer Sean Lane argued that releasing pictures, even if faces and other features are obscured, would violate Geneva Convention rules on prisoner treatment by subjecting detainees to additional humiliation or embarrassment. He said the emotional wounds would be reopened because detainees could identify themselves and because the public would learn their identities.
The judge, however, said, "I don't believe with suitable redaction there is an unwarranted invasion of privacy." He also said he didn't think it was likely that detainees in redacted photos would be able to be identified.
The judge's decision stems from a lawsuit the ACLU filed in October 2003 seeking information on treatment of detainees in U.S. custody and the transfer of prisoners to countries known to use torture. The ACLU contends that prisoner abuse is systemic.
So far, 36,000 pages of documents and the reports of 130 investigations, mostly from the FBI and Army, have been turned over to the ACLU. The group is seeking documents from the CIA and the Defense Department as well.
Associated Press | May 27, 2005
NEW YORK -- A federal judge has told the government it will have to release additional pictures of detainee abuse at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison, civil rights lawyers said.
Judge Alvin Hellerstein, finding the public has a right to see the pictures, told the government Thursday he will sign an order requiring it to release them to the American Civil Liberties Union, the lawyers said.
The judge made the decision after he and government attorneys privately viewed a sampling of nine pictures resulting from an Army probe into abuse and torture at the prison. The pictures were given to the Army by a military policeman assigned there.
ACLU lawyer Megan Lewis told the judge she believes the government has pictures of abuse beyond the Abu Ghraib images that sparked outrage around the world after they were leaked to the media last year.
Some of the thousands of pages of documents the government has released to the ACLU seem to refer to such images, and the government has not denied that additional photos exist, she said.
The judge decided some pictures from Abu Graib could be released to comply with the Freedom of Information Act while others must be redacted or were not relevant to the ACLU's request, Lewis said.
She said the judge's findings likely would clear the way for the release of other pictures of detainees taken around the world by U.S. authorities.
"I do think they could be extremely upsetting and depict conduct that would outrage the American public and be truly horrifying," she said outside court.
The judge ordered the transcript of comments made during his viewing of the pictures sealed. He did not disclose his findings in court, but said his order "will lead to production (of the pictures) or further proceedings."
"Further proceedings" presumably referred to possible appeals by government lawyers, who declined to comment as they left the hearing. A message left with a government spokeswoman was not immediately returned.
Before viewing the pictures, the judge said in court that he thought "photographs present a different level of detail and are the best evidence the public can have of what occurred."
Government lawyer Sean Lane argued that releasing pictures, even if faces and other features are obscured, would violate Geneva Convention rules on prisoner treatment by subjecting detainees to additional humiliation or embarrassment. He said the emotional wounds would be reopened because detainees could identify themselves and because the public would learn their identities.
The judge, however, said, "I don't believe with suitable redaction there is an unwarranted invasion of privacy." He also said he didn't think it was likely that detainees in redacted photos would be able to be identified.
The judge's decision stems from a lawsuit the ACLU filed in October 2003 seeking information on treatment of detainees in U.S. custody and the transfer of prisoners to countries known to use torture. The ACLU contends that prisoner abuse is systemic.
So far, 36,000 pages of documents and the reports of 130 investigations, mostly from the FBI and Army, have been turned over to the ACLU. The group is seeking documents from the CIA and the Defense Department as well.
QUOTE(theglobalchinese @ Jun 9 2005, 03:34 AM)
I heard this on the Radio this morning. They said it was a Suprise Announcement made by Bush.
Looks like he just "Blinked."
June 22, 2005
Abu Ghraib, Rewarded
It is nice that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his team feel as if they have achieved closure on their prisoner abuse issues and are ready to move on. The problem is, they are still in deep denial. The Bush administration has not only refused to face the problem squarely, but it is also enabling a pervasive lack of accountability.
The most recent evidence of this sad state of affairs came this week in an article in The Times by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, who reported that the Pentagon believes the Abu Ghraib scandal has receded enough in the public's mind that Mr. Rumsfeld is considering a promotion for Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, who was commander of American forces in Iraq at the time of the disaster.
We can see why General Sanchez would expect a promotion; Mr. Bush has rewarded the people who drafted the policies that led to the illegal detention, abuse, humiliation and, ultimately, torture and even killing of prisoners at the hands of American military forces. A couple were nominated to the federal appeals court. One became attorney general. Mr. Rumsfeld still has his job.
And we feel General Sanchez's pain. As the Army's own investigation showed, he lacked the experience to command the forces in Iraq. Once given that job, he labored under Mr. Rumsfeld's obsession for waging war with too few troops inadequately equipped. For months, Mr. Bush and Mr. Rumsfeld were pretending the war was over, while General Sanchez faced a mushrooming insurgency. He ordered his soldiers to start getting tough with prisoners to get intelligence.
General Sanchez relied on established practice in Mr. Bush's military. He set aside American notions of decency and the Geneva Conventions, authorizing harsh interrogations - including forcing prisoners into painful positions for long periods, isolating them, depriving them of sleep and using guard dogs to, as he put it, "exploit Arab fears." These practices would have been controversial for captives with information that would save Americans' lives. But the vast majority of Abu Ghraib inmates knew nothing.
General Sanchez was exonerated by the last in a series of investigations meant to keep the heat off top generals and civilian policy makers. But his own words at the Texas A&M University commencement were damning. When conditions are at their worst, General Sanchez said, "That is when a leader must step forward and lead - our ethics mandate it and our subordinates expect it."
General Sanchez failed to do that. He should not be the only senior person to pay the price for failure, but neither should he be
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/22/opinion/...agewanted=print
Abu Ghraib, Rewarded
It is nice that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his team feel as if they have achieved closure on their prisoner abuse issues and are ready to move on. The problem is, they are still in deep denial. The Bush administration has not only refused to face the problem squarely, but it is also enabling a pervasive lack of accountability.
The most recent evidence of this sad state of affairs came this week in an article in The Times by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, who reported that the Pentagon believes the Abu Ghraib scandal has receded enough in the public's mind that Mr. Rumsfeld is considering a promotion for Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, who was commander of American forces in Iraq at the time of the disaster.
We can see why General Sanchez would expect a promotion; Mr. Bush has rewarded the people who drafted the policies that led to the illegal detention, abuse, humiliation and, ultimately, torture and even killing of prisoners at the hands of American military forces. A couple were nominated to the federal appeals court. One became attorney general. Mr. Rumsfeld still has his job.
And we feel General Sanchez's pain. As the Army's own investigation showed, he lacked the experience to command the forces in Iraq. Once given that job, he labored under Mr. Rumsfeld's obsession for waging war with too few troops inadequately equipped. For months, Mr. Bush and Mr. Rumsfeld were pretending the war was over, while General Sanchez faced a mushrooming insurgency. He ordered his soldiers to start getting tough with prisoners to get intelligence.
General Sanchez relied on established practice in Mr. Bush's military. He set aside American notions of decency and the Geneva Conventions, authorizing harsh interrogations - including forcing prisoners into painful positions for long periods, isolating them, depriving them of sleep and using guard dogs to, as he put it, "exploit Arab fears." These practices would have been controversial for captives with information that would save Americans' lives. But the vast majority of Abu Ghraib inmates knew nothing.
General Sanchez was exonerated by the last in a series of investigations meant to keep the heat off top generals and civilian policy makers. But his own words at the Texas A&M University commencement were damning. When conditions are at their worst, General Sanchez said, "That is when a leader must step forward and lead - our ethics mandate it and our subordinates expect it."
General Sanchez failed to do that. He should not be the only senior person to pay the price for failure, but neither should he be
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/22/opinion/...agewanted=print
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article9236.htm Abu Ghirab, extraordinary rendition, any prison in the US to one degree or another. Question, how much abuse is to much? Answer, any. What was that Dick Durbin said about Abu Gharab?
Doctors are working in collusion with interrogators at Gitmo, as reported in the New England Journal of Medicine.
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cf...=40&ItemID=8163
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cf...=40&ItemID=8163
QUOTE
Doctors and Interrogators at Guantanamo Bay
by Gregg Bloche and Jonathan Marks; New England Journal of Medicine; June 25, 2005
M. Gregg Bloche, M.D., and Jonathan H. Marks, M.A., B.C.L.
New England Journal of Medicine 353;1
http://www.nejm.org
July 7, 2005
Mounting evidence from many sources, including Pentagon documents, indicates that military interrogators at Guantanamo Bay have used aggressive counter-resistance measures in systematic fashion to pressure detainees to cooperate. These measures have reportedly included sleep deprivation, prolonged isolation, painful body positions, feigned suffocation, and beatings. Other stress-inducing tactics have allegedly included sexual provocation and displays of contempt for Islamic symbols. (1) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others charge that such tactics constitute cruel and inhuman treatment, even torture.
To what extent did interrogators draw on detainees' health information in designing and pursuing such approaches? The Pentagon has persistently denied this practice. After the ICRC charged last year that interrogators tapped clinical data to craft interrogation strategies, Defense Department officials issued a statement denying "the allegation that detainee medical files were used to harm detainees."(2) This spring, an inquiry led by Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, the inspector general of the U.S. Navy, concluded: "While access to medical information was carefully controlled at GTMO [Guantanamo Bay], we found in Afghanistan and Iraq that interrogators sometimes had easy access to such information."(3) The implication is that interrogators had no such access at Guantanamo and that medical confidentiality was shielded, albeit with exceptions. Other Pentagon officials have reinforced this message. In a memo made public last month, announcing "Principles . . . for the Protection and Treatment of Detainees," William Winkenwerder, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, said that limits on detainees' medical privacy are "analogous to legal standards applicable to U.S. citizens." But this claim, our inquiry has determined, is sharply at odds with orders given to military medical personnel â?? and with actual practice at Guantanamo. Health information has been routinely available to behavioral science consultants and others who are responsible for crafting and carrying out interrogation strategies. Through early 2003 (and possibly later), interrogators themselves had access to medical records. And since late 2002, psychiatrists and psychologists have been part of a strategy that employs extreme stress, combined with behavior-shaping rewards, to extract actionable intelligence from resistant captives.
A previously unreported U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) policy statement, in effect since August 6, 2002, instructs health care providers that communications from "enemy persons under U.S. control" at Guantanamo "are not confidential and are not subject to the assertion of privileges" by detainees. The statement, from SouthCom's chief of staff, also instructs medical personnel to "convey any information concerning . . . the accomplishment of a military or national security mission . . . obtained from detainees in the course of treatment to non-medical military or other United States personnel who have an apparent need to know the information. Such information," it adds, "shall be communicated to other United States personnel with an apparent need to know, whether the exchange of information with the non-medical person is initiated by the provider or by the non-medical person." The only limit this policy imposes on caregivers' role in intelligence gathering is that they cannot act as interrogators.
The statement, embedded â?? along with policies on parking and alcohol â?? in the personnel section of the SouthCom Web site,(4) not only requires caregivers to provide clinical information to military and Central Intelligence Agency interrogation teams on request; it calls on them to volunteer information that they believe might be of value. It thereby makes them part of Guantanamo's surveillance network, dissolving the Pentagon's purported separation between intelligence gathering and patient care.
Rather than being consistent with the presumption of confidentiality that applies to Americans even in prisons, the Guantanamo policy rejects this presumption. Within military prisons, personal health information cannot be given to correctional or law-enforcement officials unless they deem it necessary for health, safety, or security reasons. Confidentiality is also the starting point in federal and state prisons for civilians, albeit with similar exceptions for health, safety, and security. (Federal law permits disclosure of inmates' health information "to authorized federal officials for the conduct of lawful intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other national security activities.") There is debate over the scope of these exceptions, but there is consensus about the basic presumption of medical privacy.
Wholesale rejection of clinical confidentiality at Guantanamo also runs contrary to settled ethical precepts. Medical privacy is not an ethical absolute â?? caregivers in civilian and military settings have an obligation to report information to third parties when doing so can avert threats to the health or safety of identifiable persons â?? but confidentiality is the starting premise.
The laws of war defer to medical ethics. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides that medical personnel "shall not be compelled to perform acts or to carry out work contrary to the rules of medical ethics." Although the protocol has not been ratified by the United States, this principle has attained the status of customary international law. International human rights law (most important, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) provides additional protection for privacy in general â?? in wartime and peacetime. Although this protection isn't absolute, exceptions must be justified by pressing public need, and they must represent the least restrictive way to meet this need. Wholesale abandonment of medical confidentiality hardly qualifies, especially when the "need" invoked is the crafting of counter-resistance measures that are prohibited by international law.
In what ways did military intelligence personnel draw on medical information for interrogation and counter-resistance purposes? Instructions to Guantanamo veterans not to discuss their service publicly have been an obstacle to answering this question. But available documents, an account of a fall 2004 briefing by the camp's commander (Brigadier General Jay Hood), and interviews with behavioral science professionals enable us to assemble parts of this picture.
During the camp's early months, interrogators could gain access to personal health information (and did so to set limits on practices that might put detainees' health at risk) but did not use psychological assessments of individual subjects. Conventional army intelligence doctrine has been unsympathetic to such input: it has relied instead on a mix of standard interrogation methods meant to appeal variously to subjects' insecurities, pride, and fears, within constraints set by the laws of war.(5) But by late 2002, growing frustration with the slow pace of intelligence production at Guantanamo led to calls from commanders for innovative tactics. Major General Geoffrey Miller, who took command of Guantanamo in late 2002, approved the creation of a "Behavioral Science Consultation Team" (BSCT, pronounced "Biscuit") in order to develop new strategies and assess intelligence production. A principal BSCT function was to engineer the camp experiences of "priority" detainees to make interrogation more productive.
A psychiatrist and a psychologist staffed the Guantanamo BSCT. Those initially assigned to this team both came from health care backgrounds; neither had much training in behavioral analysis of the sort that civilian psychologists perform for law-enforcement agencies. According to Hood's briefing, BSCT consultants prepared psychological profiles for use by interrogators; they also sat in on some interrogations, observed others from behind one-way mirrors, and offered feedback to interrogators. The first BSCT psychologist, Major John Leso, a specialist in assessing aviators' fitness to fly, attended part of the interrogation of Mohammed al-Qahtani, thought by many to be the "20th hijacker." (An extract from a log of this interrogation published in Time magazine last month refers to Leso as "Maj. L.")
There are strong indications that the Guantanamo BSCT has had access to personal health information. An internal, May 24, 2005, memo from the Army Medical Command, offering guidance to caregivers responsible for detainees, refers to the "interpretation of relevant excerpts from medical records" for the purpose of "assistance with the interrogation process." The memo, provided to us by a military source, acknowledges this nontherapeutic role, urging health professionals who serve in this capacity to avoid involvement in detainee care, absent an emergency. This acknowledgment is consistent with other accounts of information flow from caregivers to behavioral science consultants to interrogators.
Competing behavioral science models have influenced the advice given to interrogators by BSCT members. One approach emphasizes fear and anxiety as counter-resistance tools; another favors rapport with detainees. The former approach, supported by some associated with the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center who have helped to formulate BSCT doctrine, builds on the premise that acute, uncontrollable stress erodes established behavior (e.g., resistance to questioning), creating opportunities to reshape behavior. Complex reward systems (e.g., the creation of multiple camp "levels" with different privileges) promote cooperation. Stressors tailored to the psychological and cultural vulnerabilities of individual detainees (e.g., phobias, personality features, and religious beliefs) are key to this approach and can be devised on the basis of detainee profiles.
Proponents of rapport-based interrogation counter that answers given under high stress are unreliable. Not only are people in acute distress inclined to say whatever they think might bring relief; the psychiatric sequelae of extreme stress â?? anxiety, depressed mood, and disordered thinking â?? impair the understanding of questions and produce incoherent answers. Rapport building, tailored to people's cognitive styles and cultural beliefs, takes time but yields better information, its defenders contend.
There is no scientific answer to the question of which interrogation strategy is more effective. For obvious ethical and legal reasons, there is unlikely to be one. At Guantanamo, the fearand- anxiety approach was often favored. The cruel and degrading measures taken by some, in violation of international human rights law and the laws of war, have become a matter of national shame.
Clinical expertise has a limited place in the planning and oversight of lawful interrogation. Psychologists play such a role in criminal investigations, and medical monitoring of detainees is called for by international legal instruments. But proximity of health professionals to interrogation settings, even when they act as caregivers, carries risk. It may invite interrogators to be more aggressive, because they imagine that these professionals will set needed limits. The logic of caregiver involvement as a safeguard also risks pulling health professionals in ever more deeply. Once caregivers share information with interrogators, why should they refrain from giving advice about how to best use the data? Won't such advice better protect detainees, while furthering the intelligence- gathering mission? And if so, why not oversee isolation and sleep deprivation or monitor beatings to make sure nothing terrible happens?
Wholesale disregard for clinical confidentiality is a large leap across the threshold, since it makes every caregiver into an accessory to intelligence gathering. Not only does this undermine patient trust; it puts prisoners at greater risk for serious abuse. The global political fallout from such abuse may pose more of a threat to U.S. security than any secrets still closely held by shackled internees at Guantanamo Bay.
Dr. Bloche is professor of law at Georgetown University and a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, both in Washington, D.C., and adjunct professor at Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. Mr. Marks is a barrister at Matrix Chambers, London, and Greenwall Fellow in Bioethics at Georgetown University Law Center and the Bloomberg School of Public Health.
An interview with Mr. Marks can be heard at www.nejm.org
1. Break them down: systematic use of psychological torture by U.S. forces. Cambridge, Mass.: Physicians for Human Rights, 2005.
2. Lewis NA. Red Cross finds detainee abuse at Guantanamo. New York Times. November 30, 2004:A1.
3.Church report: unclassified executive summary. (Accessed June 16, 2005, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe.pdf.)
4. Huck RA. U.S. Southern Command confidentiality policy for interactions between health care providers and enemy persons under U.S. control, detained in conjunction with Operation Enduring Freedom. August 6, 2002 (memorandum). (Accessed June 16, 2005, at http://www.southcom.mil/restrict/ J1/new%20web%20page/New%20Web% 20Pages/AG/Policy/Current%20SC% 20Policies/SC%20Current_pols.htm.)
5. Department of the Army. Field manual 34-52: intelligence interrogation. 1992. (Accessed June 21, 2005, at https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/.../FM/34-52/FM34_ 52.PDF.)
by Gregg Bloche and Jonathan Marks; New England Journal of Medicine; June 25, 2005
M. Gregg Bloche, M.D., and Jonathan H. Marks, M.A., B.C.L.
New England Journal of Medicine 353;1
http://www.nejm.org
July 7, 2005
Mounting evidence from many sources, including Pentagon documents, indicates that military interrogators at Guantanamo Bay have used aggressive counter-resistance measures in systematic fashion to pressure detainees to cooperate. These measures have reportedly included sleep deprivation, prolonged isolation, painful body positions, feigned suffocation, and beatings. Other stress-inducing tactics have allegedly included sexual provocation and displays of contempt for Islamic symbols. (1) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others charge that such tactics constitute cruel and inhuman treatment, even torture.
To what extent did interrogators draw on detainees' health information in designing and pursuing such approaches? The Pentagon has persistently denied this practice. After the ICRC charged last year that interrogators tapped clinical data to craft interrogation strategies, Defense Department officials issued a statement denying "the allegation that detainee medical files were used to harm detainees."(2) This spring, an inquiry led by Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, the inspector general of the U.S. Navy, concluded: "While access to medical information was carefully controlled at GTMO [Guantanamo Bay], we found in Afghanistan and Iraq that interrogators sometimes had easy access to such information."(3) The implication is that interrogators had no such access at Guantanamo and that medical confidentiality was shielded, albeit with exceptions. Other Pentagon officials have reinforced this message. In a memo made public last month, announcing "Principles . . . for the Protection and Treatment of Detainees," William Winkenwerder, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, said that limits on detainees' medical privacy are "analogous to legal standards applicable to U.S. citizens." But this claim, our inquiry has determined, is sharply at odds with orders given to military medical personnel â?? and with actual practice at Guantanamo. Health information has been routinely available to behavioral science consultants and others who are responsible for crafting and carrying out interrogation strategies. Through early 2003 (and possibly later), interrogators themselves had access to medical records. And since late 2002, psychiatrists and psychologists have been part of a strategy that employs extreme stress, combined with behavior-shaping rewards, to extract actionable intelligence from resistant captives.
A previously unreported U.S. Southern Command (SouthCom) policy statement, in effect since August 6, 2002, instructs health care providers that communications from "enemy persons under U.S. control" at Guantanamo "are not confidential and are not subject to the assertion of privileges" by detainees. The statement, from SouthCom's chief of staff, also instructs medical personnel to "convey any information concerning . . . the accomplishment of a military or national security mission . . . obtained from detainees in the course of treatment to non-medical military or other United States personnel who have an apparent need to know the information. Such information," it adds, "shall be communicated to other United States personnel with an apparent need to know, whether the exchange of information with the non-medical person is initiated by the provider or by the non-medical person." The only limit this policy imposes on caregivers' role in intelligence gathering is that they cannot act as interrogators.
The statement, embedded â?? along with policies on parking and alcohol â?? in the personnel section of the SouthCom Web site,(4) not only requires caregivers to provide clinical information to military and Central Intelligence Agency interrogation teams on request; it calls on them to volunteer information that they believe might be of value. It thereby makes them part of Guantanamo's surveillance network, dissolving the Pentagon's purported separation between intelligence gathering and patient care.
Rather than being consistent with the presumption of confidentiality that applies to Americans even in prisons, the Guantanamo policy rejects this presumption. Within military prisons, personal health information cannot be given to correctional or law-enforcement officials unless they deem it necessary for health, safety, or security reasons. Confidentiality is also the starting point in federal and state prisons for civilians, albeit with similar exceptions for health, safety, and security. (Federal law permits disclosure of inmates' health information "to authorized federal officials for the conduct of lawful intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other national security activities.") There is debate over the scope of these exceptions, but there is consensus about the basic presumption of medical privacy.
Wholesale rejection of clinical confidentiality at Guantanamo also runs contrary to settled ethical precepts. Medical privacy is not an ethical absolute â?? caregivers in civilian and military settings have an obligation to report information to third parties when doing so can avert threats to the health or safety of identifiable persons â?? but confidentiality is the starting premise.
The laws of war defer to medical ethics. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions provides that medical personnel "shall not be compelled to perform acts or to carry out work contrary to the rules of medical ethics." Although the protocol has not been ratified by the United States, this principle has attained the status of customary international law. International human rights law (most important, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) provides additional protection for privacy in general â?? in wartime and peacetime. Although this protection isn't absolute, exceptions must be justified by pressing public need, and they must represent the least restrictive way to meet this need. Wholesale abandonment of medical confidentiality hardly qualifies, especially when the "need" invoked is the crafting of counter-resistance measures that are prohibited by international law.
In what ways did military intelligence personnel draw on medical information for interrogation and counter-resistance purposes? Instructions to Guantanamo veterans not to discuss their service publicly have been an obstacle to answering this question. But available documents, an account of a fall 2004 briefing by the camp's commander (Brigadier General Jay Hood), and interviews with behavioral science professionals enable us to assemble parts of this picture.
During the camp's early months, interrogators could gain access to personal health information (and did so to set limits on practices that might put detainees' health at risk) but did not use psychological assessments of individual subjects. Conventional army intelligence doctrine has been unsympathetic to such input: it has relied instead on a mix of standard interrogation methods meant to appeal variously to subjects' insecurities, pride, and fears, within constraints set by the laws of war.(5) But by late 2002, growing frustration with the slow pace of intelligence production at Guantanamo led to calls from commanders for innovative tactics. Major General Geoffrey Miller, who took command of Guantanamo in late 2002, approved the creation of a "Behavioral Science Consultation Team" (BSCT, pronounced "Biscuit") in order to develop new strategies and assess intelligence production. A principal BSCT function was to engineer the camp experiences of "priority" detainees to make interrogation more productive.
A psychiatrist and a psychologist staffed the Guantanamo BSCT. Those initially assigned to this team both came from health care backgrounds; neither had much training in behavioral analysis of the sort that civilian psychologists perform for law-enforcement agencies. According to Hood's briefing, BSCT consultants prepared psychological profiles for use by interrogators; they also sat in on some interrogations, observed others from behind one-way mirrors, and offered feedback to interrogators. The first BSCT psychologist, Major John Leso, a specialist in assessing aviators' fitness to fly, attended part of the interrogation of Mohammed al-Qahtani, thought by many to be the "20th hijacker." (An extract from a log of this interrogation published in Time magazine last month refers to Leso as "Maj. L.")
There are strong indications that the Guantanamo BSCT has had access to personal health information. An internal, May 24, 2005, memo from the Army Medical Command, offering guidance to caregivers responsible for detainees, refers to the "interpretation of relevant excerpts from medical records" for the purpose of "assistance with the interrogation process." The memo, provided to us by a military source, acknowledges this nontherapeutic role, urging health professionals who serve in this capacity to avoid involvement in detainee care, absent an emergency. This acknowledgment is consistent with other accounts of information flow from caregivers to behavioral science consultants to interrogators.
Competing behavioral science models have influenced the advice given to interrogators by BSCT members. One approach emphasizes fear and anxiety as counter-resistance tools; another favors rapport with detainees. The former approach, supported by some associated with the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center who have helped to formulate BSCT doctrine, builds on the premise that acute, uncontrollable stress erodes established behavior (e.g., resistance to questioning), creating opportunities to reshape behavior. Complex reward systems (e.g., the creation of multiple camp "levels" with different privileges) promote cooperation. Stressors tailored to the psychological and cultural vulnerabilities of individual detainees (e.g., phobias, personality features, and religious beliefs) are key to this approach and can be devised on the basis of detainee profiles.
Proponents of rapport-based interrogation counter that answers given under high stress are unreliable. Not only are people in acute distress inclined to say whatever they think might bring relief; the psychiatric sequelae of extreme stress â?? anxiety, depressed mood, and disordered thinking â?? impair the understanding of questions and produce incoherent answers. Rapport building, tailored to people's cognitive styles and cultural beliefs, takes time but yields better information, its defenders contend.
There is no scientific answer to the question of which interrogation strategy is more effective. For obvious ethical and legal reasons, there is unlikely to be one. At Guantanamo, the fearand- anxiety approach was often favored. The cruel and degrading measures taken by some, in violation of international human rights law and the laws of war, have become a matter of national shame.
Clinical expertise has a limited place in the planning and oversight of lawful interrogation. Psychologists play such a role in criminal investigations, and medical monitoring of detainees is called for by international legal instruments. But proximity of health professionals to interrogation settings, even when they act as caregivers, carries risk. It may invite interrogators to be more aggressive, because they imagine that these professionals will set needed limits. The logic of caregiver involvement as a safeguard also risks pulling health professionals in ever more deeply. Once caregivers share information with interrogators, why should they refrain from giving advice about how to best use the data? Won't such advice better protect detainees, while furthering the intelligence- gathering mission? And if so, why not oversee isolation and sleep deprivation or monitor beatings to make sure nothing terrible happens?
Wholesale disregard for clinical confidentiality is a large leap across the threshold, since it makes every caregiver into an accessory to intelligence gathering. Not only does this undermine patient trust; it puts prisoners at greater risk for serious abuse. The global political fallout from such abuse may pose more of a threat to U.S. security than any secrets still closely held by shackled internees at Guantanamo Bay.
Dr. Bloche is professor of law at Georgetown University and a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, both in Washington, D.C., and adjunct professor at Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. Mr. Marks is a barrister at Matrix Chambers, London, and Greenwall Fellow in Bioethics at Georgetown University Law Center and the Bloomberg School of Public Health.
An interview with Mr. Marks can be heard at www.nejm.org
1. Break them down: systematic use of psychological torture by U.S. forces. Cambridge, Mass.: Physicians for Human Rights, 2005.
2. Lewis NA. Red Cross finds detainee abuse at Guantanamo. New York Times. November 30, 2004:A1.
3.Church report: unclassified executive summary. (Accessed June 16, 2005, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe.pdf.)
4. Huck RA. U.S. Southern Command confidentiality policy for interactions between health care providers and enemy persons under U.S. control, detained in conjunction with Operation Enduring Freedom. August 6, 2002 (memorandum). (Accessed June 16, 2005, at http://www.southcom.mil/restrict/ J1/new%20web%20page/New%20Web% 20Pages/AG/Policy/Current%20SC% 20Policies/SC%20Current_pols.htm.)
5. Department of the Army. Field manual 34-52: intelligence interrogation. 1992. (Accessed June 21, 2005, at https://atiam.train.army.mil/soldierPortal/.../FM/34-52/FM34_ 52.PDF.)
Partial of the transcript of today's show DemocracyNow! on LinkTV.
QUOTE
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN: What happened was in the 1990s, during the, I guess it was the Clinton administration at that time, Congress decided that it wanted to adopt laws to take it into full compliance with its obligations under an international torture statute and an international torture treaty and the Geneva Conventions. And so, it passed two laws. One is a statute making it a U.S. crime to engage in torture. It was passed two years before the 1996 law, and then you have the War Crimes Act of 1996.
And basically, what it does, it makes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions a federal crime. Got it? Just like kidnapping or interstate burglary or child pornography, it is a federal crime. And the other thing, that's interesting is that it carries the death penalty. If death results from torture or inhuman treatment, then there is a death penalty, and that means there's no statute of limitations. That means that if any high level official violates the War Crimes Act, and somebody died, they can be prosecuted. They are subject to prosecution for the rest of their lives.
AMY GOODMAN: So what did Gonzales do about President Bush?
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN: What Gonzales did to President Bush, he said, ‘Mr. President, we have got to worry about prosecutions under this statute, and what we can do is we can reduce the possibility of prosecutions by opting out of the Geneva Conventions.’ And guess what. The President opted out of the Geneva Conventions. He followed the advice of Gonzales. And by the way, the same advice was given by Attorney General Ashcroft in a memo to the President, as well, saying that he wanted to make sure that law enforcement officials, intelligence officials and others were not prosecuted under the War Crimes Act. So, here we have two high level U.S. government officials warning President Bush that the War Crimes Act, a U.S. statute, could make high level American officials criminally liable, if they -- unless they opted out of the Geneva Conventions.
And basically, what it does, it makes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions a federal crime. Got it? Just like kidnapping or interstate burglary or child pornography, it is a federal crime. And the other thing, that's interesting is that it carries the death penalty. If death results from torture or inhuman treatment, then there is a death penalty, and that means there's no statute of limitations. That means that if any high level official violates the War Crimes Act, and somebody died, they can be prosecuted. They are subject to prosecution for the rest of their lives.
AMY GOODMAN: So what did Gonzales do about President Bush?
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN: What Gonzales did to President Bush, he said, ‘Mr. President, we have got to worry about prosecutions under this statute, and what we can do is we can reduce the possibility of prosecutions by opting out of the Geneva Conventions.’ And guess what. The President opted out of the Geneva Conventions. He followed the advice of Gonzales. And by the way, the same advice was given by Attorney General Ashcroft in a memo to the President, as well, saying that he wanted to make sure that law enforcement officials, intelligence officials and others were not prosecuted under the War Crimes Act. So, here we have two high level U.S. government officials warning President Bush that the War Crimes Act, a U.S. statute, could make high level American officials criminally liable, if they -- unless they opted out of the Geneva Conventions.
So how does a President just simply "opt out" of the GC ? Wouldn't it require Congressional action ? or is Bush's decision valid ? If so, wouldn't that have implications deeper than just the GC itself ?
Certainly.... this seems to give prmia facie evidence of intent to break the law. Aren't there other laws which would apply. Wouldn't the intent of enforcing compliance with the provisions outlined in the GC be the intent of Congress... rather than simply the GC (document) itself. This would seem to be a blatant attempt to subvert the intent of the law if not the letter of the law.... and maybe still prosecutable.
Certainly.... this seems to give prmia facie evidence of intent to break the law. Aren't there other laws which would apply. Wouldn't the intent of enforcing compliance with the provisions outlined in the GC be the intent of Congress... rather than simply the GC (document) itself. This would seem to be a blatant attempt to subvert the intent of the law if not the letter of the law.... and maybe still prosecutable.
The transcript continues:
This discussion came about because of an article coming out in The Nation.
Sounds pretty serious to me, if the word gets out and it's fully explained.
QUOTE
AMY GOODMAN: You make a distinction between Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib and what happened in those two places.
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN: I don't make a distinction from the point of view of international law. What I'm saying is that even if you accept what Gonzales's solution was -- he said, ‘Mr. President, look, if we opt out of Geneva, we reduce the possibility of prosecution.’ And the Justice Department saying, ‘Look, if we change the definition of torture so that torture doesn't mean what it normally means but is something Orwellian,’ if you just grant them that, just say, ‘Okay, we'll accept for argument sake that you are right about that,’ they are still liable – still liable -- for the inhumane treatment that took place in Iraq, because we never opted out of Geneva for Iraq.
ELIZABETH HOLTZMAN: I don't make a distinction from the point of view of international law. What I'm saying is that even if you accept what Gonzales's solution was -- he said, ‘Mr. President, look, if we opt out of Geneva, we reduce the possibility of prosecution.’ And the Justice Department saying, ‘Look, if we change the definition of torture so that torture doesn't mean what it normally means but is something Orwellian,’ if you just grant them that, just say, ‘Okay, we'll accept for argument sake that you are right about that,’ they are still liable – still liable -- for the inhumane treatment that took place in Iraq, because we never opted out of Geneva for Iraq.
This discussion came about because of an article coming out in The Nation.
Sounds pretty serious to me, if the word gets out and it's fully explained.
Judge Tosses Out England Abuse Statements
Updated 7:26 PM ET July 8, 2005
By T.A. BADGER
http://dailynews.att.net/cgi-bin/news?e=pr...8b7gnbg0&src=ap
FORT HOOD, Texas (AP) - In a setback for the prosecution, a military judge ruled Friday that Pfc. Lynndie England's statements to Army investigators about her actions at Abu Ghraib prison cannot be used as evidence at her upcoming trial.
The judge, Col. James Pohl, said during a pretrial hearing that he believed England did not fully understand the consequences when she waived her rights against self-incrimination before speaking to the investigators in January 2004.
Pohl did not elaborate on his ruling, which came after testimony from expert witnesses who said England tended to try to please people in authority and that she had trouble understanding complex language.
However, the judge did agree to a prosecution request that they be allowed to present evidence to get one of the two statements readmitted.
The statements were important components of the prosecution's case against England, who is charged with committing abuses at Abu Ghraib in 2003.
Capt. Cullen Sheppard, a prosecution spokesman, said prosecutors have other evidence in the case, including television interviews in which England recounted her actions at the Baghdad prison.
England, 22, a reservist from West Virginia who appeared in some of the most notorious photographs from the scandal, is charged with conspiracy, maltreating detainees and committing an indecent act. The charges carry a maximum sentence of 11 years in prison.
Also Thursday, Pohl refused to step aside for the trial, saying he was not to blame for England's botched attempt in May to plead guilty to illegal acts.
Defense lawyers accused Pohl of undermining England's guilty plea by asking inappropriate questions of Pvt. Charles Graner, the reputed abuse ringleader who was called by the defense as a sentencing witness.
Pohl accepted England's guilty plea in May to the same charges she now faces, after questioning her to make sure she believed she was doing wrong at the time.
But the judge abruptly halted the sentencing after Graner's testimony, and after a long recess he declared the mistrial, which ended England's plea deal and put the case back on track for trial, now scheduled for early August.
England is the only soldier charged with abusing prisoners at Abu Ghraib whose case has not been resolved.
Graner and Spc. Sabrina Harman opted for trial on Abu Ghraib charges. Graner is serving a 10-year sentence for his role in the abuse. Harman was convicted of abuse in May and sentenced to about four months in prison. Six other soldiers have made plea deals that included sentences of up to eight years.
Updated 7:26 PM ET July 8, 2005
By T.A. BADGER
http://dailynews.att.net/cgi-bin/news?e=pr...8b7gnbg0&src=ap
FORT HOOD, Texas (AP) - In a setback for the prosecution, a military judge ruled Friday that Pfc. Lynndie England's statements to Army investigators about her actions at Abu Ghraib prison cannot be used as evidence at her upcoming trial.
The judge, Col. James Pohl, said during a pretrial hearing that he believed England did not fully understand the consequences when she waived her rights against self-incrimination before speaking to the investigators in January 2004.
Pohl did not elaborate on his ruling, which came after testimony from expert witnesses who said England tended to try to please people in authority and that she had trouble understanding complex language.
However, the judge did agree to a prosecution request that they be allowed to present evidence to get one of the two statements readmitted.
The statements were important components of the prosecution's case against England, who is charged with committing abuses at Abu Ghraib in 2003.
Capt. Cullen Sheppard, a prosecution spokesman, said prosecutors have other evidence in the case, including television interviews in which England recounted her actions at the Baghdad prison.
England, 22, a reservist from West Virginia who appeared in some of the most notorious photographs from the scandal, is charged with conspiracy, maltreating detainees and committing an indecent act. The charges carry a maximum sentence of 11 years in prison.
Also Thursday, Pohl refused to step aside for the trial, saying he was not to blame for England's botched attempt in May to plead guilty to illegal acts.
Defense lawyers accused Pohl of undermining England's guilty plea by asking inappropriate questions of Pvt. Charles Graner, the reputed abuse ringleader who was called by the defense as a sentencing witness.
Pohl accepted England's guilty plea in May to the same charges she now faces, after questioning her to make sure she believed she was doing wrong at the time.
But the judge abruptly halted the sentencing after Graner's testimony, and after a long recess he declared the mistrial, which ended England's plea deal and put the case back on track for trial, now scheduled for early August.
England is the only soldier charged with abusing prisoners at Abu Ghraib whose case has not been resolved.
Graner and Spc. Sabrina Harman opted for trial on Abu Ghraib charges. Graner is serving a 10-year sentence for his role in the abuse. Harman was convicted of abuse in May and sentenced to about four months in prison. Six other soldiers have made plea deals that included sentences of up to eight years.
http://www.sciencedaily.com/upi/?feed=TopN...-guantanamo.xml
QUOTE
CNN video censored at Guantanamo prison
GUANTANAMO BAY, Cuba, July 7 (UPI) -- Taking up U.S. President George Bush's challenge for reporters to visit the Guantanamo Bay military prison in Cuba, CNN did, but its video was censored.
In response to allegations of prisoner abuse at the U.S. Navy base in Cuba, Bush made the challenge in June, and again Wednesday while in Denmark.
However, a CNN crew that toured the facility was not allowed to see the worst-behaved inmates, who are kept in a block behind a mesh fence.
The prison holds about 520 prisoners from 44 countries, most of them captured during the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.
CNN employees were not allowed to speak to the prisoners, and military censors demanded the crew erase video footage they said would allow viewers to identify a prisoner.
In the hospital wing, one prisoner shouted in English, "We take the torture in here," but it was not possible to talk to the prisoner about his allegation, the network said.
GUANTANAMO BAY, Cuba, July 7 (UPI) -- Taking up U.S. President George Bush's challenge for reporters to visit the Guantanamo Bay military prison in Cuba, CNN did, but its video was censored.
In response to allegations of prisoner abuse at the U.S. Navy base in Cuba, Bush made the challenge in June, and again Wednesday while in Denmark.
However, a CNN crew that toured the facility was not allowed to see the worst-behaved inmates, who are kept in a block behind a mesh fence.
The prison holds about 520 prisoners from 44 countries, most of them captured during the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.
CNN employees were not allowed to speak to the prisoners, and military censors demanded the crew erase video footage they said would allow viewers to identify a prisoner.
In the hospital wing, one prisoner shouted in English, "We take the torture in here," but it was not possible to talk to the prisoner about his allegation, the network said.
This sure blows the "isolated incident" theory of abuse at Abu Ghirab way out of the water.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8557465/
Three top military lawyers said yesterday that they lodged complaints about the Justice Department's definition of torture and how it would be applied to interrogations of enemy prisoners captured by U.S. forces, the first time they have publicly acknowledged that they objected to the policy as it was being developed in early 2003.
At a Senate hearing yesterday, the judge advocate generals (JAGs) for the Army, Air Force and Marines said they expressed their concerns as the policy was being hashed out at the Pentagon in March and April 2003. Though their letters to the Defense Department's general counsel are classified, sources familiar with them said the lawyers worried that broadly defined, tough interrogation tactics would not only contravene long-standing military doctrine — leaving too much room for interpretation by interrogators — but also would cause public outrage if the tactics became known.
More on link....
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8557465/
Three top military lawyers said yesterday that they lodged complaints about the Justice Department's definition of torture and how it would be applied to interrogations of enemy prisoners captured by U.S. forces, the first time they have publicly acknowledged that they objected to the policy as it was being developed in early 2003.
At a Senate hearing yesterday, the judge advocate generals (JAGs) for the Army, Air Force and Marines said they expressed their concerns as the policy was being hashed out at the Pentagon in March and April 2003. Though their letters to the Defense Department's general counsel are classified, sources familiar with them said the lawyers worried that broadly defined, tough interrogation tactics would not only contravene long-standing military doctrine — leaving too much room for interpretation by interrogators — but also would cause public outrage if the tactics became known.
More on link....
I thought the Civilians were supposed to keep the Military in line, not the other way around. It may be CYA but at least they followed the rules and questioned a possible illegal order.
I would think that the high ranking officers in the military would have the intelligence to understand why torture is a very bad policy -- regardless of what the enemy does or doesn't do:
1. It isn't very effective and often results in bogus intelligence.
2. It opens our troops up to the same treatment.
3. It can cause us to lose a war via public opinion alone.
4. It inspires the enemy to fight to the death
5. It inspires the recruitment of enemy combatants
So -- is intelligence a requirement for becoming a high-ranking officer? Or is that not so important? If it is not so important, what does that say about our military?
1. It isn't very effective and often results in bogus intelligence.
2. It opens our troops up to the same treatment.
3. It can cause us to lose a war via public opinion alone.
4. It inspires the enemy to fight to the death
5. It inspires the recruitment of enemy combatants
So -- is intelligence a requirement for becoming a high-ranking officer? Or is that not so important? If it is not so important, what does that say about our military?
QUOTE(MrJim @ Jul 15 2005, 12:42 PM)
I would think that the high ranking officers in the military would have the intelligence to understand why torture is a very bad policy -- regardless of what the enemy does or doesn't do:
1. It isn't very effective and often results in bogus intelligence.
2. It opens our troops up to the same treatment.
3. It can cause us to lose a war via public opinion alone.
4. It inspires the enemy to fight to the death
5. It inspires the recruitment of enemy combatants
So -- is intelligence a requirement for becoming a high-ranking officer? Or is that not so important? If it is not so important, what does that say about our military?
1. It isn't very effective and often results in bogus intelligence.
2. It opens our troops up to the same treatment.
3. It can cause us to lose a war via public opinion alone.
4. It inspires the enemy to fight to the death
5. It inspires the recruitment of enemy combatants
So -- is intelligence a requirement for becoming a high-ranking officer? Or is that not so important? If it is not so important, what does that say about our military?
When Bush first announced that Gitmo would be excluded from the GC, a LOT of retiredmilitary officers and interrogation experts came across all the news talk shows saing how bad of an idea this was.
What we have here are a bunch of bumbling civilian politicians who have shouldered aside our best and most experiencd military and investigative minds and planned an incompetent war. They have micro managed everything from picking targets, to deploying troops, to developing new torture techniques. This is one of the reasons Bin Laden got away and why terrorism has replaced oil as Iraq's major export.
QUOTE(MrJim @ Jul 15 2005, 01:42 PM)
I would think that the high ranking officers in the military would have the intelligence to understand why torture is a very bad policy -- regardless of what the enemy does or doesn't do:
1. It isn't very effective and often results in bogus intelligence.
2. It opens our troops up to the same treatment.
3. It can cause us to lose a war via public opinion alone.
4. It inspires the enemy to fight to the death
5. It inspires the recruitment of enemy combatants
So -- is intelligence a requirement for becoming a high-ranking officer? Or is that not so important? If it is not so important, what does that say about our military?
1. It isn't very effective and often results in bogus intelligence.
2. It opens our troops up to the same treatment.
3. It can cause us to lose a war via public opinion alone.
4. It inspires the enemy to fight to the death
5. It inspires the recruitment of enemy combatants
So -- is intelligence a requirement for becoming a high-ranking officer? Or is that not so important? If it is not so important, what does that say about our military?
Military Intelligence is an oxymoron.
QUOTE
Military Intelligence is an oxymoron.
Isn't oxymoron the drug that Rush Limbaugh was addicted to?
QUOTE(MrJim @ Jul 15 2005, 03:24 PM)
Isn't oxymoron the drug that Rush Limbaugh was addicted to?
I think he was snorting oxyclean.
QUOTE(MrJim @ Jul 15 2005, 10:29 AM)
...but also would cause public outrage if the tactics became known.
And what do we have, ironically?
PUBLIC OUTRAGE FOR BEING AGAINST THE TROOPS,
like what happened after the AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 2005 REPORT was released, or to Senator Durbin, or what happens on this forum anytime anyone dares allude to the subject.
How is it done?
QUOTE
I think he was snorting oxyclean.
Then he moved up to "hard stuff": Drano
The military followed orders, honor required that some resign in protest (when the meetings are declassified we'll know who), but the CIVILIAN leadership at the Pentagon (who the military are answerable to) are the criminals in this.
I fully support civilian control, but something's missing when honor isn't more important than career.
I fully support civilian control, but something's missing when honor isn't more important than career.
QUOTE(MrJim @ Jul 15 2005, 07:01 PM)
Then he moved up to "hard stuff": Drano
Heeeyyy, maaannn, what are these blue crystals?
QUOTE(tomhye @ Jul 15 2005, 07:15 PM)
The military followed orders, honor required that some resign in protest (when the meetings are declassified we'll know who), but the CIVILIAN leadership at the Pentagon (who the military are answerable to) are the criminals in this.
I fully support civilian control, but something's missing when honor isn't more important than career.
I fully support civilian control, but something's missing when honor isn't more important than career.
I thought about this for a while and the fact is that honor has its price. You can resign as a point of honor but don't expect to find a decent job on the outside. none of those cushy jobs with some beltway bandit. I can tell you from personal experience that they will be lucky to find a job at all and if they do, persons of influence will soon poison the atmosphere of the workplace. People like that have a very high on the job accident rate.
QUOTE
Heeeyyy, maaannn, what are these blue crystals?
One of the funniest lines I've ever seen in a movie was in Cheech and Chong's "Up in Smoke". They were both sitting in their car, too stoned to move, when a cop "stops" them (they were already stopped) and asks to see Cheech's license.
The cop says "may I see your license?"
And Cheech says "Isn't it on the back of the car?"
The blue crystals line was from the same movie, I think. Someone gave them some Comet Cleanser to snort.
QUOTE(FormerCIA @ Jul 16 2005, 09:18 AM)
I thought about this for a while and the fact is that honor has its price. You can resign as a point of honor but don't expect to find a decent job on the outside. none of those cushy jobs with some beltway bandit. I can tell you from personal experience that they will be lucky to find a job at all and if they do, persons of influence will soon poison the atmosphere of the workplace. People like that have a very high on the job accident rate.
Yes the price is high, that's why it requires honor. A dear friend (actually like a second father to me) who passed away recently resigned as a matter of honor. He was on the NATO staff & demanded the VietNam war be explained to him if he was expected to defend it to our allies, to show their disapproval instead of bumping him a rank upon retirement they knocked him down to O6. Then again he was considered a giant and his honor was always beyond reproach. He got a job as a math teacher and soon became headmaster, he never had any regrets.
QUOTE(FormerCIA @ Jul 16 2005, 11:18 AM)
I thought about this for a while and the fact is that honor has its price. You can resign as a point of honor but don't expect to find a decent job on the outside. none of those cushy jobs with some beltway bandit. I can tell you from personal experience that they will be lucky to find a job at all and if they do, persons of influence will soon poison the atmosphere of the workplace. People like that have a very high on the job accident rate.
QUOTE(tomhye @ Jul 16 2005, 10:36 PM)
Yes the price is high, that's why it requires honor. A dear friend (actually like a second father to me) who passed away recently resigned as a matter of honor. He was on the NATO staff & demanded the VietNam war be explained to him if he was expected to defend it to our allies, to show their disapproval instead of bumping him a rank upon retirement they knocked him down to O6. Then again he was considered a giant and his honor was always beyond reproach. He got a job as a math teacher and soon became headmaster, he never had any regrets.
He was fortunate in being able to retire. Not to demean his sacrifice but a younger person who doesn't have that option has to think long and hard about how they are going to survive and provide for their dependents. Having a family and financial obligations is enough to deter most, no matter how strongly they feel about an issue.
QUOTE(FormerCIA @ Jul 17 2005, 03:54 AM)
He was fortunate in being able to retire. Not to demean his sacrifice but a younger person who doesn't have that option has to think long and hard about how they are going to survive and provide for their dependents. Having a family and financial obligations is enough to deter most, no matter how strongly they feel about an issue.
There were those O8 and above who faced this choice and made a different decision, the objection is by no means universally true.
Younger officers also have more options after they leave, it balances out. Besides, when it comes to drawing attention to a problem only senior officers draw much attention by resigning so the choice points are different.
Honor doesn't ask what price will be paid, sorry, we aren't getting the officers we need if that's the deciding factor. They expect men to die at their command, if they aren't even willing to risk some money and prestige they're failures as officers. My father faced a similar situation in civilian life right after my sister was born, he chose honor not knowing if he could support his family after that (or even if he'd lose his career), he was lucky, it ended up being great for him, but no matter how it turns out it's the right choice.
We aren't getting the officers we need because parents and educators fail to instill basic values into their children. Schoolyard bullies are allowed to ply their trade. Fraternities and Sororities place loyalty and gang mentality as sacred values. The long blue line, don't rat on them and they won't rat on you. Look at how the Bushes operate. It's classic gang mentality.
QUOTE(FormerCIA @ Jul 17 2005, 05:55 AM)
We aren't getting the officers we need because parents and educators fail to instill basic values into their children. Schoolyard bullies are allowed to ply their trade. Fraternities and Sororities place loyalty and gang mentality as sacred values. The long blue line, don't rat on them and they won't rat on you. Look at how the Bushes operate. It's classic gang mentality.
I agree, but I'd throw in a couple more factors. One is that people aren't forced to face the consequences of their hubris and stupidity anymore, now we rescue people from being inconvenienced (while letting the most vulnerable be victimized or even die), we've seen people on TV thinking they're cute because they had to be rescued when they weren't in real danger, when I was a kid we would have been left for a day or two to learn our lesson. Another is "nature lovers" have blurred the line between yuppie security and pampering and enjoying the wilderness, nature doesn't take excuses , BS or hypocrisy. In other words our value system is no longer reality based, people expect to be coddled as long as they play the game. Yes, it's gang mentality but it's worse, it's the blindness, aggression and exclusivity of a gang without demanding any guts.
or accountability. All you have to do is show absolute loyalty, follow orders without question, no matter how illegal or insane because you know there's a pardon, full retirement and a cushy civilian job waiting for you if you play along.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...3001680_pf.html
washingtonpost.com
The Stain of Torture
By Burton J. Lee III
Friday, July 1, 2005; A25
Having served as a doctor in the Army Medical Corps early in my career and as presidential physician to George H.W. Bush for four years, I might be expected to bring a skeptical and partisan perspective to allegations of torture and abuse by U.S. forces. I might even be expected to join those who, on the one hand, deny that U.S. personnel have engaged in systematic use of torture while, on the other, claiming that such abuse is justified. But I cannot do so.
It's precisely because of my devotion to country, respect for our military and commitment to the ethics of the medical profession that I speak out against systematic, government-sanctioned torture and excessive abuse of prisoners during our war on terrorism. I am also deeply disturbed by the reported complicity in these abuses of military medical personnel. This extraordinary shift in policy and values is alien to my concept of modern-day America and of my government and profession.
The military prides itself, as do physicians, on being professional in every sense of the word. It fosters leadership and discipline. When I served as White House physician, my entire professional staff was drawn from the military, and they were among the best and most competent people I have met, without qualification.
The military ethics that I know absolutely prohibit anything resembling torture. There are several good reasons for this. Prisoners should be treated as we would expect our prisoners to be treated. Discipline and order in the military ranks depend to a large extent on compliance with the prohibition of torture -- indeed, weak or damaged psyches inclined toward torture or abuse have generally been weeded out of the military, or at the very least given less responsibility. In addition, military leaders have long been aware that torture inflicts lasting damage on both the victim and the torturer. The systematic infliction of torture engenders deep hatred and hostility that transcends generations. And it perverts the role of medical personnel from healers to instruments of abuse.
Today, however, it seems as though our government and the military have slipped into Joseph Conrad's "Heart of Darkness." The widespread reports of torture and ill-treatment -- frequently based on military and government documents -- defy the claim that this abusive behavior is limited to a few noncommissioned officers at Abu Ghraib or isolated incidents at Guantanamo Bay. When it comes to torture, the military's traditional leadership and discipline have been severely compromised up and down the chain of command. Why? I fear it is because the military has bowed to errant civilian leadership.
Our medical code of ethics requires us to oppose torture wherever it is inflicted, for any reason. Guided by this ethic, I served as a volunteer with the international group MEDICO in 1963, taking care of people who had been tortured by the French during Algeria's civil war. I remain deeply affected by that experience today -- by the people I tried to help and could not, and by their families, which suffered the most terrible grief. I heard the victims' stories, examined their permanently broken bodies and looked into faces that could not see me because of the irreparable damage done not only to their senses but also to their brains. As I have studied reports of torture throughout our troubled world since then, I have always found comfort in knowing that at least it did not occur here, not among Americans.
Now that comfort is shattered. Reports of torture by U.S. forces have been accompanied by evidence that military medical personnel have played a role in this abuse and by new military ethical guidelines that in effect authorize complicity by health professionals in ill-treatment of detainees. These new guidelines distort traditional ethical rules beyond recognition to serve the interests of interrogators, not doctors and detainees.
I urge my fellow health professionals to join me and many others in reaffirming our ethical commitment to prevent torture; to clearly state that systematic torture, sanctioned by the government and aided and abetted by our own profession, is not acceptable. As health professionals, we should support the growing calls for an independent, bipartisan commission to investigate torture in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, and demand restoration of ethical standards that protect physicians, nurses, medics and psychologists from becoming facilitators of abuse.
America cannot continue down this road. Torture demonstrates weakness, not strength. It does not show understanding, power or magnanimity. It is not leadership. It is a reaction of government officials overwhelmed by fear who succumb to conduct unworthy of them and of the citizens of the United States.
The writer is a former physician to the president to George H.W. Bush and a board member of Physicians for Human Rights.
washingtonpost.com
The Stain of Torture
By Burton J. Lee III
Friday, July 1, 2005; A25
Having served as a doctor in the Army Medical Corps early in my career and as presidential physician to George H.W. Bush for four years, I might be expected to bring a skeptical and partisan perspective to allegations of torture and abuse by U.S. forces. I might even be expected to join those who, on the one hand, deny that U.S. personnel have engaged in systematic use of torture while, on the other, claiming that such abuse is justified. But I cannot do so.
It's precisely because of my devotion to country, respect for our military and commitment to the ethics of the medical profession that I speak out against systematic, government-sanctioned torture and excessive abuse of prisoners during our war on terrorism. I am also deeply disturbed by the reported complicity in these abuses of military medical personnel. This extraordinary shift in policy and values is alien to my concept of modern-day America and of my government and profession.
The military prides itself, as do physicians, on being professional in every sense of the word. It fosters leadership and discipline. When I served as White House physician, my entire professional staff was drawn from the military, and they were among the best and most competent people I have met, without qualification.
The military ethics that I know absolutely prohibit anything resembling torture. There are several good reasons for this. Prisoners should be treated as we would expect our prisoners to be treated. Discipline and order in the military ranks depend to a large extent on compliance with the prohibition of torture -- indeed, weak or damaged psyches inclined toward torture or abuse have generally been weeded out of the military, or at the very least given less responsibility. In addition, military leaders have long been aware that torture inflicts lasting damage on both the victim and the torturer. The systematic infliction of torture engenders deep hatred and hostility that transcends generations. And it perverts the role of medical personnel from healers to instruments of abuse.
Today, however, it seems as though our government and the military have slipped into Joseph Conrad's "Heart of Darkness." The widespread reports of torture and ill-treatment -- frequently based on military and government documents -- defy the claim that this abusive behavior is limited to a few noncommissioned officers at Abu Ghraib or isolated incidents at Guantanamo Bay. When it comes to torture, the military's traditional leadership and discipline have been severely compromised up and down the chain of command. Why? I fear it is because the military has bowed to errant civilian leadership.
Our medical code of ethics requires us to oppose torture wherever it is inflicted, for any reason. Guided by this ethic, I served as a volunteer with the international group MEDICO in 1963, taking care of people who had been tortured by the French during Algeria's civil war. I remain deeply affected by that experience today -- by the people I tried to help and could not, and by their families, which suffered the most terrible grief. I heard the victims' stories, examined their permanently broken bodies and looked into faces that could not see me because of the irreparable damage done not only to their senses but also to their brains. As I have studied reports of torture throughout our troubled world since then, I have always found comfort in knowing that at least it did not occur here, not among Americans.
Now that comfort is shattered. Reports of torture by U.S. forces have been accompanied by evidence that military medical personnel have played a role in this abuse and by new military ethical guidelines that in effect authorize complicity by health professionals in ill-treatment of detainees. These new guidelines distort traditional ethical rules beyond recognition to serve the interests of interrogators, not doctors and detainees.
I urge my fellow health professionals to join me and many others in reaffirming our ethical commitment to prevent torture; to clearly state that systematic torture, sanctioned by the government and aided and abetted by our own profession, is not acceptable. As health professionals, we should support the growing calls for an independent, bipartisan commission to investigate torture in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, and demand restoration of ethical standards that protect physicians, nurses, medics and psychologists from becoming facilitators of abuse.
America cannot continue down this road. Torture demonstrates weakness, not strength. It does not show understanding, power or magnanimity. It is not leadership. It is a reaction of government officials overwhelmed by fear who succumb to conduct unworthy of them and of the citizens of the United States.
The writer is a former physician to the president to George H.W. Bush and a board member of Physicians for Human Rights.
CHENEY LEADING EFFORT TO THWART LEGISLATION ON DETAINEES
Eric Schmitt
WASHINGTON Vice President Dick Cheney is leading a high level White House lobbying effort to draft legislation offered by Republican senators that would regulate the detention, treatment and trials of detainees held by the U S military,
In an unusual, 30 minute private meeting on Capitol Hill on Thursday night, Cheney warned three senior Republican members of the Armed Services Committee that their proposed legislation would interfere with the president's authority and ability to protect American's against terrorist attacks.
The legislation, which is still being drafted, includes provisions to bar the military from hiding prisoners from the Red Cross: prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees; and use only interrogation techniques authorized in a new army field manual.
The three Republicans are John McCain of Arizona, Lindsey Graham of South Carolina and John Warner of Virginia, the committee chairman.
They have complained that the Pentagon has failed to hold senior defense officials and military officers responsible for the abuses that took place at the Abu Graib prison outside of Baghdad, and at other detention centers in Iraq, Cuba, and Afghanistan.
The senators could attach their legislation to the $442 billion Pentagon authorization bill for the 2006 fiscal year, which is scheduled to be debated on the senate floor his week. Senate Democrats, led by Carl Levin of Michigan and Jack Reed of Rhode Island, have said that they will offer a competing amendment to establish an independent commission modeled after the 9/11 panel, to investigate detainee abuses and operations.
On Thursday, just before Cheney's meeting, White House officials warned in a bluntly worded statement that Senate approval of a Republican or Democratic amendment was likely to prompt Bush's top advisers ti recommend that he veto the measure.
Cheney's meeting with the senators was first reported Saturday by the Washington Post.
A spokesman for Warner, John Ullyot, declined to comment on the senators'meeting with Cheney and said ''the matter continues to be studied'' adding that the Senate could vote on all or some of the provisions this week.
Cheney's involvement in the issue illustrates the White House's level of concern that the Republican bill could pass. Cheney is president of the Senate, and most potent lobbyist on Capitol Hill.
A senior Defense Department spokesman, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk publicly about the matter, said Cheney took the administration's lead role because the issue cut across the jurisdictions of several federal agencies - and because he had long been the administration's chief defender of presidential prerogative.
According to Senate officials, McCain is considering introducing several amendments. One would prohibit the practice of seizing people and sending them abroad for interrogation. That practice has become the subject of mounting international criticism, as some of the countries involved are known to use torture. It has caused a deepening rift between the United States and some of its strongest allies.
(The New York Times.)(International Herald Tribune) 25 July 05
Eric Schmitt
WASHINGTON Vice President Dick Cheney is leading a high level White House lobbying effort to draft legislation offered by Republican senators that would regulate the detention, treatment and trials of detainees held by the U S military,
In an unusual, 30 minute private meeting on Capitol Hill on Thursday night, Cheney warned three senior Republican members of the Armed Services Committee that their proposed legislation would interfere with the president's authority and ability to protect American's against terrorist attacks.
The legislation, which is still being drafted, includes provisions to bar the military from hiding prisoners from the Red Cross: prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees; and use only interrogation techniques authorized in a new army field manual.
The three Republicans are John McCain of Arizona, Lindsey Graham of South Carolina and John Warner of Virginia, the committee chairman.
They have complained that the Pentagon has failed to hold senior defense officials and military officers responsible for the abuses that took place at the Abu Graib prison outside of Baghdad, and at other detention centers in Iraq, Cuba, and Afghanistan.
The senators could attach their legislation to the $442 billion Pentagon authorization bill for the 2006 fiscal year, which is scheduled to be debated on the senate floor his week. Senate Democrats, led by Carl Levin of Michigan and Jack Reed of Rhode Island, have said that they will offer a competing amendment to establish an independent commission modeled after the 9/11 panel, to investigate detainee abuses and operations.
On Thursday, just before Cheney's meeting, White House officials warned in a bluntly worded statement that Senate approval of a Republican or Democratic amendment was likely to prompt Bush's top advisers ti recommend that he veto the measure.
Cheney's meeting with the senators was first reported Saturday by the Washington Post.
A spokesman for Warner, John Ullyot, declined to comment on the senators'meeting with Cheney and said ''the matter continues to be studied'' adding that the Senate could vote on all or some of the provisions this week.
Cheney's involvement in the issue illustrates the White House's level of concern that the Republican bill could pass. Cheney is president of the Senate, and most potent lobbyist on Capitol Hill.
A senior Defense Department spokesman, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to talk publicly about the matter, said Cheney took the administration's lead role because the issue cut across the jurisdictions of several federal agencies - and because he had long been the administration's chief defender of presidential prerogative.
According to Senate officials, McCain is considering introducing several amendments. One would prohibit the practice of seizing people and sending them abroad for interrogation. That practice has become the subject of mounting international criticism, as some of the countries involved are known to use torture. It has caused a deepening rift between the United States and some of its strongest allies.
(The New York Times.)(International Herald Tribune) 25 July 05
A Need for Congress
Post
Sunday, July 24, 2005; B06
THIS MONTH a federal appeals court overturned a lower court's decision halting the Bush administration's plans for military tribunals at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The earlier decision contained some legal errors, so the ruling was not a surprise. But the judgment has the effect of allowing the Bush administration to resume its ill-advised attempt to craft an almost entirely new justice system for enemy combatants accused of war crimes. The Pentagon announced that the tribunals, known as commissions, would resume as soon as possible.
The far better course would be to take a deep breath and a look at the big picture: Nearly four years after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the military has failed to bring a single person to trial before the military commissions. When it finally does so, the trials will be an uncertain project in terms of both fairness and effectiveness. Meanwhile, the system for detaining and interrogating detainees before trial remains in a legal limbo that has led to serious abuses and caused enormous damage to America's global prestige. The administration's policy for foreign prisoners requires an across-the-board rethinking and close congressional collaboration.
The delay of trials was partly the result of the current litigation, and an appeal to the Supreme Court could stretch out the matter even longer. But it is wrong to blame the administration's problems on the federal courts. The administration invited trouble when it abandoned the Geneva Conventions and the Army interrogation manual as standards for detainees; instead of drawing on the well-established system of military trials known as courts-martial, it sought to revive the cruder and less protective commission process. Part of the reason for these decisions was the legitimate worry that certain rules of Geneva or of courts-martial would create dangerous difficulties in terrorism cases. But a big part of the policy was ideological, a commitment not to give accused terrorists more legal process than absolutely necessary.
There is an alternative, if the administration is wise enough to take it: Accept congressional involvement in setting the rules in exchange for the legitimacy that only the national legislature can confer. This would put the administration on far more solid legal footing and, in addition, could put society's stamp of approval on reasonable procedures both for classifying detainees and for bringing them to justice. Interest in playing a constructive role has grown in Congress in recent months. Senior Republican senators such as John W. Warner (Va.), Lindsey O. Graham (S.C.) and John McCain (Ariz.) are preparing legislation.
As a first step, Mr. McCain and Mr. Graham may propose language early this week as an amendment to the defense operations bill. Their measure would require all interrogations to be conducted according to the norms of the Army manual and forbid "cruel, inhumane and degrading" treatment of all foreign detainees. Currently, the administration contends that prisoners held by the CIA abroad may be subject to such abuse.
The GOP amendment could correct some of the most serious problems behind the continuing scandal over abuses of prisoners at Guantanamo, the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and elsewhere. Yet rather than work with the Republican senators, the White House is crudely threatening to veto the defense bill if it contains any language on prisoners. The administration's message is that Congress should have no say over how the United States questions or prosecutes the thousands of foreigners it is holding, including those on American bases. Just such highhandedness helped get the administration into the mess it faces with foreign detainees. Congress should insist on a different approach.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2300738_pf.html
Post
Sunday, July 24, 2005; B06
THIS MONTH a federal appeals court overturned a lower court's decision halting the Bush administration's plans for military tribunals at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The earlier decision contained some legal errors, so the ruling was not a surprise. But the judgment has the effect of allowing the Bush administration to resume its ill-advised attempt to craft an almost entirely new justice system for enemy combatants accused of war crimes. The Pentagon announced that the tribunals, known as commissions, would resume as soon as possible.
The far better course would be to take a deep breath and a look at the big picture: Nearly four years after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the military has failed to bring a single person to trial before the military commissions. When it finally does so, the trials will be an uncertain project in terms of both fairness and effectiveness. Meanwhile, the system for detaining and interrogating detainees before trial remains in a legal limbo that has led to serious abuses and caused enormous damage to America's global prestige. The administration's policy for foreign prisoners requires an across-the-board rethinking and close congressional collaboration.
The delay of trials was partly the result of the current litigation, and an appeal to the Supreme Court could stretch out the matter even longer. But it is wrong to blame the administration's problems on the federal courts. The administration invited trouble when it abandoned the Geneva Conventions and the Army interrogation manual as standards for detainees; instead of drawing on the well-established system of military trials known as courts-martial, it sought to revive the cruder and less protective commission process. Part of the reason for these decisions was the legitimate worry that certain rules of Geneva or of courts-martial would create dangerous difficulties in terrorism cases. But a big part of the policy was ideological, a commitment not to give accused terrorists more legal process than absolutely necessary.
There is an alternative, if the administration is wise enough to take it: Accept congressional involvement in setting the rules in exchange for the legitimacy that only the national legislature can confer. This would put the administration on far more solid legal footing and, in addition, could put society's stamp of approval on reasonable procedures both for classifying detainees and for bringing them to justice. Interest in playing a constructive role has grown in Congress in recent months. Senior Republican senators such as John W. Warner (Va.), Lindsey O. Graham (S.C.) and John McCain (Ariz.) are preparing legislation.
As a first step, Mr. McCain and Mr. Graham may propose language early this week as an amendment to the defense operations bill. Their measure would require all interrogations to be conducted according to the norms of the Army manual and forbid "cruel, inhumane and degrading" treatment of all foreign detainees. Currently, the administration contends that prisoners held by the CIA abroad may be subject to such abuse.
The GOP amendment could correct some of the most serious problems behind the continuing scandal over abuses of prisoners at Guantanamo, the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and elsewhere. Yet rather than work with the Republican senators, the White House is crudely threatening to veto the defense bill if it contains any language on prisoners. The administration's message is that Congress should have no say over how the United States questions or prosecutes the thousands of foreigners it is holding, including those on American bases. Just such highhandedness helped get the administration into the mess it faces with foreign detainees. Congress should insist on a different approach.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2300738_pf.html
from the July 26, 2005 edition -
Controversy dogs terror tribunals
Pentagon vows the wartime hearings will be fair, but critics worry about secret testimony.
By Peter Grier | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
WASHINGTON - Long-stalled military trials of terror suspects at Guantánamo Bay may soon restart, but debate over their fairness remains as intense as ever.
To Pentagon officials, the planned US approach is at least as fair as the international tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. In those proceedings, prosecutors can appeal not-guilty verdicts, for instance. That won't be possible in the US process.
But critics complain that the US tribunals can keep evidence secret from the accused - something that would never be tolerated in the domestic justice system. And revelations about US prisoner abuse have caused some to question the military's overall handling of detainees, including their plans for prosecutions.
"There is a lack of confidence in the people who put this together," says Stephen Saltzburg, a George Washington University law professor and director of the National Institute of Military Justice.
The spark that restarted the military tribunal machinery was a July 15 federal court ruling. The decision by a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit of the US Court of Appeals held that the Bush administration's plan to try some detainees in this novel fashion did not violate the Constitution, or international or military law.
The panel's reasoning: Congress authorized the president to set up whatever legal machinery he deems appropriate by voting to allow him to use "all necessary and appropriate force" to fight terrorism followingSept. 11.
Tribunals are likely to restart in 30 to 45 days, a Pentagon official told reporters. Overall, 12 Guantánamo detainees have been judged eligible for trial, said Air Force Brig. Gen. Thomas Hemingway, Pentagon legal adviser for military commissions. None is likely to face the death penalty.
General Hemingway denied that the tribunals will be kangaroo courts, and said their fairness matched, and even surpassed, other proceedings - such as those of the International Criminal Court. Comparable trials of enemy combatants, such as the Nuremberg trials following World War II, occurred after victory was achieved, Hemingway pointed out. The fact that the Guantánamo tribunals will take place during ongoing conflict accounts for some of their differences from courts-martial and civilian trials, he said.
"When the enemy has been vanquished, you don't have the same national security concerns that you have when you are conducting them during an ongoing conflict," Hemingway said.
Critics complain that defendants in the tribunals can be excluded from some portions of their trial. They may also face secret evidence which they will be unable to rebut. The right to counsel of choice is severely restricted, they add, and the whole enterprise is tinged with a presumption of guilt.
Administration officials have continually referred to the detainees at Guantánamo as "thugs" and "terrorists," notes an Amnesty International report - though a handful have been released after the US deemed them no such thing.
The tribunals "would flagrantly violate international fair trial standards and result neither in justice being done nor being seen to be done," reads an Amnesty International study.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0726/p02s01-usju.htm
Controversy dogs terror tribunals
Pentagon vows the wartime hearings will be fair, but critics worry about secret testimony.
By Peter Grier | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
WASHINGTON - Long-stalled military trials of terror suspects at Guantánamo Bay may soon restart, but debate over their fairness remains as intense as ever.
To Pentagon officials, the planned US approach is at least as fair as the international tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. In those proceedings, prosecutors can appeal not-guilty verdicts, for instance. That won't be possible in the US process.
But critics complain that the US tribunals can keep evidence secret from the accused - something that would never be tolerated in the domestic justice system. And revelations about US prisoner abuse have caused some to question the military's overall handling of detainees, including their plans for prosecutions.
"There is a lack of confidence in the people who put this together," says Stephen Saltzburg, a George Washington University law professor and director of the National Institute of Military Justice.
The spark that restarted the military tribunal machinery was a July 15 federal court ruling. The decision by a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit of the US Court of Appeals held that the Bush administration's plan to try some detainees in this novel fashion did not violate the Constitution, or international or military law.
The panel's reasoning: Congress authorized the president to set up whatever legal machinery he deems appropriate by voting to allow him to use "all necessary and appropriate force" to fight terrorism followingSept. 11.
Tribunals are likely to restart in 30 to 45 days, a Pentagon official told reporters. Overall, 12 Guantánamo detainees have been judged eligible for trial, said Air Force Brig. Gen. Thomas Hemingway, Pentagon legal adviser for military commissions. None is likely to face the death penalty.
General Hemingway denied that the tribunals will be kangaroo courts, and said their fairness matched, and even surpassed, other proceedings - such as those of the International Criminal Court. Comparable trials of enemy combatants, such as the Nuremberg trials following World War II, occurred after victory was achieved, Hemingway pointed out. The fact that the Guantánamo tribunals will take place during ongoing conflict accounts for some of their differences from courts-martial and civilian trials, he said.
"When the enemy has been vanquished, you don't have the same national security concerns that you have when you are conducting them during an ongoing conflict," Hemingway said.
Critics complain that defendants in the tribunals can be excluded from some portions of their trial. They may also face secret evidence which they will be unable to rebut. The right to counsel of choice is severely restricted, they add, and the whole enterprise is tinged with a presumption of guilt.
Administration officials have continually referred to the detainees at Guantánamo as "thugs" and "terrorists," notes an Amnesty International report - though a handful have been released after the US deemed them no such thing.
The tribunals "would flagrantly violate international fair trial standards and result neither in justice being done nor being seen to be done," reads an Amnesty International study.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0726/p02s01-usju.htm
Here is what Rush Limbaugh is doing about it. Prepare to be outraged (as usual):
http://store.rushlimbaugh.com/
Why does this man still have a radio program?
http://store.rushlimbaugh.com/
Why does this man still have a radio program?
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_2892191
QUOTE
Guardsman: CIA beat Iraqis with hammer handles
By Arthur Kane
Denver Post Staff Writer
DenverPost.com
07/27/2005 03:27:02 AM
CIA officials used a sledgehammer handle to beat various prisoners in Iraq, and one official, whose name is classified, would often brag about his abuse of prisoners, according to testimony in a closed session of a military hearing.
The transcript, obtained this week by The Denver Post under a court order, was of a March hearing to determine whether three Fort Carson Army soldiers should stand trial for the death of Iraqi Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush during an interrogation in 2003.
Chief Warrant Officer Jefferson Williams and Spec. Jerry Loper face murder charges in the case.
A third soldier, Sgt. 1st Class William Sommer, has not had final charges approved, though he also was involved in the March preliminary Article 32 hearing.
Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer waived his hearing but is charged with murder.
In the March hearing, Sgt. 1st Class Gerold Pratt of the Utah National Guard said he saw classified personnel use a 15-inch wooden sledgehammer handle to hit prisoners.
"They'd ask you a question, and if they didn't like it, they'd hit you," he said.
"With Chief Welshofer, he'd at least give the detainee a chance to tell the truth," testified Pratt, who was running logistics at the detention facility near Qaim dubbed the Blacksmith Hotel.
A CIA spokeswoman, who declined to give her name, would not comment.
While identifying information in the transcript is redacted in most cases, an exchange between Pratt and a defense attorney show that the CIA was involved.
"To your knowledge, SFC Sommer did not accompany any of these CIA folks?" Capt. Michael Melito, who was then representing Sommer, asked Pratt.
While allegations about CIA officials and special forces beating Mowhoush with fists and a rubber hose have been previously reported, the court transcript is the first evidence that those officials repeatedly beat other detainees in northwestern Iraq.
In open session during the hearing, Pratt also testified that Williams threw a heavy box of food at Mowhoush. That testimony resulted in an additional charge of assault against Williams.
Williams' attorney, William Cassara, disputed the incident with the box and previously questioned Pratt's credibility. But Cassara said he was sure other officials were involved in prisoner abuse.
"I have no doubts that other government agencies used methods of interrogation that were much worse than what Chief Welshofer used," Cassara said.
Later, Pratt testified that the official was mocking the prisoners he was beating.
"Well, particularly after the general was killed. I don't remember the exact words, but he was mocking the fact that the general died," Pratt testified.
Williams and Welshofer, through their attorneys, had previously denied any wrongdoing.
Welshofer's attorney could not be reached for comment.
By Arthur Kane
Denver Post Staff Writer
DenverPost.com
07/27/2005 03:27:02 AM
CIA officials used a sledgehammer handle to beat various prisoners in Iraq, and one official, whose name is classified, would often brag about his abuse of prisoners, according to testimony in a closed session of a military hearing.
The transcript, obtained this week by The Denver Post under a court order, was of a March hearing to determine whether three Fort Carson Army soldiers should stand trial for the death of Iraqi Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush during an interrogation in 2003.
Chief Warrant Officer Jefferson Williams and Spec. Jerry Loper face murder charges in the case.
A third soldier, Sgt. 1st Class William Sommer, has not had final charges approved, though he also was involved in the March preliminary Article 32 hearing.
Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer waived his hearing but is charged with murder.
In the March hearing, Sgt. 1st Class Gerold Pratt of the Utah National Guard said he saw classified personnel use a 15-inch wooden sledgehammer handle to hit prisoners.
"They'd ask you a question, and if they didn't like it, they'd hit you," he said.
"With Chief Welshofer, he'd at least give the detainee a chance to tell the truth," testified Pratt, who was running logistics at the detention facility near Qaim dubbed the Blacksmith Hotel.
A CIA spokeswoman, who declined to give her name, would not comment.
While identifying information in the transcript is redacted in most cases, an exchange between Pratt and a defense attorney show that the CIA was involved.
"To your knowledge, SFC Sommer did not accompany any of these CIA folks?" Capt. Michael Melito, who was then representing Sommer, asked Pratt.
While allegations about CIA officials and special forces beating Mowhoush with fists and a rubber hose have been previously reported, the court transcript is the first evidence that those officials repeatedly beat other detainees in northwestern Iraq.
In open session during the hearing, Pratt also testified that Williams threw a heavy box of food at Mowhoush. That testimony resulted in an additional charge of assault against Williams.
Williams' attorney, William Cassara, disputed the incident with the box and previously questioned Pratt's credibility. But Cassara said he was sure other officials were involved in prisoner abuse.
"I have no doubts that other government agencies used methods of interrogation that were much worse than what Chief Welshofer used," Cassara said.
Later, Pratt testified that the official was mocking the prisoners he was beating.
"Well, particularly after the general was killed. I don't remember the exact words, but he was mocking the fact that the general died," Pratt testified.
Williams and Welshofer, through their attorneys, had previously denied any wrongdoing.
Welshofer's attorney could not be reached for comment.
Transcript Suggests CIA Involved in Abuse
Updated 7:35 AM ET July 28, 2005
http://dailynews.att.net/cgi-bin/news?e=pr...8bkc61o0&src=ap
DENVER (AP) - A National Guardsman testifying at a hearing for U.S. soldiers accused of killing an Iraq general said he saw classified U.S. personnel beat prisoners with a sledgehammer handle and mock the general's death, according to a transcript. The transcript, obtained by The Denver Post, includes an exchange during the hearing that suggests the CIA was involved.
Sgt. 1st Class Gerold Pratt of the Utah National Guard said he saw unidentified U.S. personnel use the 15-inch wooden handle to hit prisoners.
"They'd ask you a question, and if they didn't like it, they'd hit you," he said, according to the transcript obtained this week by the Post under a court order. Pratt testified at the hearing in March.
The hearing will determine whether three soldiers from Fort Carson will stand trial for the death of Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush during an interrogation in 2003.
The soldiers have denied wrongdoing and say commanders sanctioned their actions.
Most identifying information in the transcript was redacted, but one exchange suggests CIA involvement. "To your knowledge, SFC Sommer did not accompany any of these CIA folks?" defense attorney Capt. Michael Melito asked Pratt.
A CIA spokeswoman who declined to give the Post her name would not comment.
Pratt _ who had run logistics at the detention facility near Qaim, a city in Iraq's western desert _ said he recalled an official mocking the prisoners he was beating.
"Well, particularly after the general was killed. I don't remember the exact words, but he was mocking the fact that the general died," Pratt testified.
The Army said Mowhoush died of asphyxiation from chest compression. Documents in the case said he was killed with an electrical cord, and a Pentagon investigation reportedly says a soldier sat on Mowhoush as he was restrained headfirst inside a sleeping bag.
Previous testimony indicated the Iraqi general's body was badly bruised and he may have been severely beaten two days before he was suffocated.
Charged with murder are Chief Warrant Officer Jefferson Williams, Spec. Jerry Loper and Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer, who was not part of the hearing. Final charges are pending against the fourth accused soldier, Sgt. 1st Class William Sommer.
The hearing officer has forwarded the case report, and Fort Carson's commander, Maj. Gen. Robert Mixon, will make the final decision on whether the soldiers will be court-martialed.
The soldiers could get life in prison without parole if they are convicted of murder.
Williams' attorney, William Cassara, said he was sure other officials were involved in prisoner abuse.
"I have no doubts that other government agencies used methods of interrogation that were much worse," Cassara said.
Updated 7:35 AM ET July 28, 2005
http://dailynews.att.net/cgi-bin/news?e=pr...8bkc61o0&src=ap
DENVER (AP) - A National Guardsman testifying at a hearing for U.S. soldiers accused of killing an Iraq general said he saw classified U.S. personnel beat prisoners with a sledgehammer handle and mock the general's death, according to a transcript. The transcript, obtained by The Denver Post, includes an exchange during the hearing that suggests the CIA was involved.
Sgt. 1st Class Gerold Pratt of the Utah National Guard said he saw unidentified U.S. personnel use the 15-inch wooden handle to hit prisoners.
"They'd ask you a question, and if they didn't like it, they'd hit you," he said, according to the transcript obtained this week by the Post under a court order. Pratt testified at the hearing in March.
The hearing will determine whether three soldiers from Fort Carson will stand trial for the death of Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush during an interrogation in 2003.
The soldiers have denied wrongdoing and say commanders sanctioned their actions.
Most identifying information in the transcript was redacted, but one exchange suggests CIA involvement. "To your knowledge, SFC Sommer did not accompany any of these CIA folks?" defense attorney Capt. Michael Melito asked Pratt.
A CIA spokeswoman who declined to give the Post her name would not comment.
Pratt _ who had run logistics at the detention facility near Qaim, a city in Iraq's western desert _ said he recalled an official mocking the prisoners he was beating.
"Well, particularly after the general was killed. I don't remember the exact words, but he was mocking the fact that the general died," Pratt testified.
The Army said Mowhoush died of asphyxiation from chest compression. Documents in the case said he was killed with an electrical cord, and a Pentagon investigation reportedly says a soldier sat on Mowhoush as he was restrained headfirst inside a sleeping bag.
Previous testimony indicated the Iraqi general's body was badly bruised and he may have been severely beaten two days before he was suffocated.
Charged with murder are Chief Warrant Officer Jefferson Williams, Spec. Jerry Loper and Chief Warrant Officer Lewis Welshofer, who was not part of the hearing. Final charges are pending against the fourth accused soldier, Sgt. 1st Class William Sommer.
The hearing officer has forwarded the case report, and Fort Carson's commander, Maj. Gen. Robert Mixon, will make the final decision on whether the soldiers will be court-martialed.
The soldiers could get life in prison without parole if they are convicted of murder.
Williams' attorney, William Cassara, said he was sure other officials were involved in prisoner abuse.
"I have no doubts that other government agencies used methods of interrogation that were much worse," Cassara said.
Ex-Abu Ghraib Warden: Boss Urged Dog Use
Updated 7:31 AM ET July 28, 2005
http://dailynews.att.net/cgi-bin/news?e=pr...8bkc4280&src=ap
By DAVID DISHNEAU
FORT MEADE, Md. (AP) - The use of dogs during interrogations at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq was recommended by the commander of the Guantanamo Bay detention center during a visit in 2003, the former warden of Abu Ghraib said.
"We understood that he was sent over by the secretary of defense," Maj. David Dinenna testified Wednesday during a hearing for two Army dog handlers accused of prisoner abuse.
Dinenna also testified that teams of trainers were sent to Abu Ghraib from Guantanamo Bay to try to incorporate certain interrogation techniques in Iraq.
The defense maintains the use of unmuzzled dogs to intimidate Abu Ghraib inmates was sanctioned high up in the chain of command and was not just a game played by two rogue soldiers, as the government claims.
"They did what they were instructed to do," defense attorney Harvey J. Volzer said.
Prosecutors say the two soldiers used their dogs in a competition to frighten prisoners into urinating on themselves in December 2003 and January 2004.
Dinenna's testimony came at the end of a two-day preliminary hearing to determine whether the dog handlers, Sgts. Santos A. Cardona and Michael J. Smith, should face a court-martial. The investigating officer, Maj. Glenn Simpkins, will take up to two weeks to consider the evidence and make a recommendation.
Investigations into detainee abuse have led to charges against several soldiers at the prison but have found no fault with high-level leaders such as Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, although critics charge the military has been unable to properly investigate its top-level leadership.
The then-commander of the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, who later went to Iraq to oversee detainee operations and is now in a Pentagon position unrelated to prisons.
One interrogator, Staff Sgt. Christopher S. Aston, testified that the only clear instruction about how dogs were to be used during interrogations at Abu Ghraib came from Col. Thomas M. Pappas, the highest-ranking military intelligence officer at the prison. Pappas said dogs could be used, but only if they were muzzled, Aston said.
Pappas was reprimanded and fined in May for failing to get approval from his commander, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, before approving limited use of dogs.
Cardona, 31, of Fullerton, Calif., and Smith, 24, of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., are charged with cruelty and maltreatment, conspiracy to maltreat detainees, aggravated assault, dereliction of duty and making false official statements.
Cardona faces a maximum 16 1/2 years in prison if convicted on all nine counts against him. Smith, who also is charged with committing an indecent act, could be imprisoned for 29 1/2 years if convicted on 14 counts.
Updated 7:31 AM ET July 28, 2005
http://dailynews.att.net/cgi-bin/news?e=pr...8bkc4280&src=ap
By DAVID DISHNEAU
FORT MEADE, Md. (AP) - The use of dogs during interrogations at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq was recommended by the commander of the Guantanamo Bay detention center during a visit in 2003, the former warden of Abu Ghraib said.
"We understood that he was sent over by the secretary of defense," Maj. David Dinenna testified Wednesday during a hearing for two Army dog handlers accused of prisoner abuse.
Dinenna also testified that teams of trainers were sent to Abu Ghraib from Guantanamo Bay to try to incorporate certain interrogation techniques in Iraq.
The defense maintains the use of unmuzzled dogs to intimidate Abu Ghraib inmates was sanctioned high up in the chain of command and was not just a game played by two rogue soldiers, as the government claims.
"They did what they were instructed to do," defense attorney Harvey J. Volzer said.
Prosecutors say the two soldiers used their dogs in a competition to frighten prisoners into urinating on themselves in December 2003 and January 2004.
Dinenna's testimony came at the end of a two-day preliminary hearing to determine whether the dog handlers, Sgts. Santos A. Cardona and Michael J. Smith, should face a court-martial. The investigating officer, Maj. Glenn Simpkins, will take up to two weeks to consider the evidence and make a recommendation.
Investigations into detainee abuse have led to charges against several soldiers at the prison but have found no fault with high-level leaders such as Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, although critics charge the military has been unable to properly investigate its top-level leadership.
The then-commander of the prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, who later went to Iraq to oversee detainee operations and is now in a Pentagon position unrelated to prisons.
One interrogator, Staff Sgt. Christopher S. Aston, testified that the only clear instruction about how dogs were to be used during interrogations at Abu Ghraib came from Col. Thomas M. Pappas, the highest-ranking military intelligence officer at the prison. Pappas said dogs could be used, but only if they were muzzled, Aston said.
Pappas was reprimanded and fined in May for failing to get approval from his commander, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, before approving limited use of dogs.
Cardona, 31, of Fullerton, Calif., and Smith, 24, of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., are charged with cruelty and maltreatment, conspiracy to maltreat detainees, aggravated assault, dereliction of duty and making false official statements.
Cardona faces a maximum 16 1/2 years in prison if convicted on all nine counts against him. Smith, who also is charged with committing an indecent act, could be imprisoned for 29 1/2 years if convicted on 14 counts.
August 1, 2005
Two Prosecutors Faulted Trials for Detainees
By NEIL A. LEWIS
WASHINGTON, July 31 - As the Pentagon was making its final preparations to begin war crimes trials against four detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, two senior prosecutors complained in confidential messages last year that the trial system had been secretly arranged to improve the chance of conviction and to deprive defendants of material that could prove their innocence.
The electronic messages, obtained by The New York Times, reveal a bitter dispute within the military legal community over the fairness of the system at a time when the Bush administration and the Pentagon were eager to have the military commissions, the first for the United States since the aftermath of World War II, be seen as just at home and abroad.
During the same time period, military defense lawyers were publicly criticizing the system, but senior officials dismissed their complaints and said they were contrived as part of the efforts to help their clients.
The defense lawyers' complaints and those of outside groups like the American Bar Association were, it is now clear, simultaneously being echoed in confidential messages by the two high-ranking prosecutors whose cases would, if anything, benefit from any slanting of the process.
In a separate e-mail message, the chief prosecutor flatly rejected the accusations by his subordinates. And a military review supported him.
Among the striking statements in the prosecutors' messages was an assertion by one that the chief prosecutor had told his subordinates that the members of the military commission that would try the first four defendants would be "handpicked" to ensure that all would be convicted.
The same officer, Capt. John Carr of the Air Force, also said in his message that he had been told that any exculpatory evidence - information that could help the detainees mount a defense in their cases - would probably exist only in the 10 percent of documents being withheld by the Central Intelligence Agency for security reasons.
Captain Carr's e-mail message also said that some evidence that at least one of the four defendants had been brutalized had been lost and that other evidence on the same issue had been withheld. The March 15, 2004, message was addressed to Col. Frederick L. Borch, the chief prosecutor who was the object of much of Captain Carr's criticism.
The second officer, Maj. Robert Preston, also of the Air Force, said in a March 11, 2004, message to another senior officer in the prosecutor's office that he could not in good conscience write a legal motion saying the proceedings would be "full and fair" when he knew they would not.
Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Hemingway of the Air Force, a senior adviser to the office running the war crimes trials who provided a response from the Defense Department, said that the e-mail messages had prompted a formal investigation by the Pentagon's inspector general that found no evidence to support the two officers' accusations of legal or ethical problems.
Colonel Borch, who has since retired from the military, sent his own e-mail message to Captain Carr and Major Preston on March 15, 2004, with copies to several other members of the prosecution team the same day, outlining his response.
In his message, Colonel Borch said he had great respect and admiration for Captain Carr and Major Preston. But their accusations, he said, were "monstrous lies." He did not, however, address any specifics, like stacking the panel.
"I am convinced to the depth of my soul that all of us on the prosecution team are truly dedicated to the mission of the office of military commissions," he wrote, "and that no one on the team has anything but the highest ethical principles."
Colonel Borch did not respond to telephone messages left at his home. Captain Carr, who has since been promoted to major, declined to comment when reached by telephone, as did Major Preston. Both Captain Carr and Major Preston left the prosecution team within weeks of their e-mail messages and remain on active duty.
General Hemingway said the assertions in the e-mail messages had been "taken very seriously and an investigation was conducted because of the allegations about potential violations of ethics and the law."
He said in an interview that the Defense Department's inspector general spent about two months investigating the accusations and reviewing the operations of the prosecutor's office. "It disclosed no evidence of any criminal misconduct, no evidence of any ethical violations, and no disciplinary action was taken against anybody," the general said. He also said that no evidence had been "tampered with, falsified or hidden."
General Hemingway declined to discuss any specifics of the two prosecutors' accusations, but he said he now believed that the problems underlying the complaints were "miscommunication, misunderstanding and personality conflicts." The inspector general's report has not been made public but was sent to the Pentagon's top civilian lawyer, he said.
Copies of the e-mail messages were provided to The Times by members of the armed forces who are critics of the military commission process. The documents' authenticity was independently confirmed by other military officials.
The Bush administration and the Pentagon have faced criticism about the legitimacy of the military commission procedures almost since the regulations describing them were announced in 2002.
The rules, which in essence constitute a new body of law distinct from military and civilian law, allow, for example, witnesses to testify anonymously for the prosecution. Also, any information may be admitted into evidence if the presiding officer judges it to be "probative to a reasonable person," a new standard far more favorable to the prosecution than anything in civilian law or military law. It is unclear whether information that may have been obtained under coercion or torture can be admissible.
The trials of the first four defendants began last August in a secure courtroom in a converted dental clinic at the naval base at Guantánamo. Before they could start in earnest, the trials were abruptly halted in November when a federal judge ruled they violated both military law and the United States' obligations to comply with the Geneva Conventions.
But a three-judge appeals court panel that included Judge John G. Roberts, President Bush's Supreme Court nominee, unanimously reversed that ruling on July 15.
Defense Department officials have said they plan to resume the trials in the next several weeks. They said they also planned soon to charge an additional eight detainees with war crimes.
The two trials expected to resume shortly are those of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni who was a driver in Afghanistan for Osama bin Laden; and David Hicks, an Australian who was captured in Afghanistan, where, prosecutors say, he had gone to fight for the Taliban government.
In his March 2004 message, Captain Carr told Colonel Borch that "you have repeatedly said to the office that the military panel will be handpicked and will not acquit these detainees and we only needed to worry about building a record for the review panel" and academicians who would pore over the record in years to come.
Captain Carr said in the message that the problems could not be dismissed as personality differences, as some had tried to depict them, but "may constitute dereliction of duty, false official statements or other criminal conduct."
He added that "the evidence does not indicate that our military and civilian leaders have been accurately informed of the state of our preparation, the true culpability of the accused or the sustainability of our efforts." The office, he said, was poised to "prosecute fairly low-level accused in a process that appears to be rigged."
He said that Colonel Borch also said that he was close to Maj. Gen. John D. Altenburg Jr., the retired officer who is in overall charge of the war crimes commissions, and that this would favor the prosecution.
General Altenburg selected the commission members, including the presiding officer, Col. Peter S. Brownback III, a longtime close friend of his. Defense lawyers objected to the presence of Colonel Brownback and some other officers, saying they had serious conflicts of interest. General Altenburg removed some of the other officers but allowed Colonel Brownback to remain.
In his electronic message, Captain Carr said the prosecution team had falsely stated to superiors that it had no evidence of torture of Ali Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al-Bahlul of Yemen. In addition, Captain Carr said the prosecution team had lost an F.B.I. document detailing an interview in which the detainee claimed he had been tortured and abused.
Major Preston, in his e-mail message of March 11, 2004, said that pressing ahead with the trials would be "a severe threat to the reputation of the military justice system and even a fraud on the American people."
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/politics...agewanted=print
Two Prosecutors Faulted Trials for Detainees
By NEIL A. LEWIS
WASHINGTON, July 31 - As the Pentagon was making its final preparations to begin war crimes trials against four detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, two senior prosecutors complained in confidential messages last year that the trial system had been secretly arranged to improve the chance of conviction and to deprive defendants of material that could prove their innocence.
The electronic messages, obtained by The New York Times, reveal a bitter dispute within the military legal community over the fairness of the system at a time when the Bush administration and the Pentagon were eager to have the military commissions, the first for the United States since the aftermath of World War II, be seen as just at home and abroad.
During the same time period, military defense lawyers were publicly criticizing the system, but senior officials dismissed their complaints and said they were contrived as part of the efforts to help their clients.
The defense lawyers' complaints and those of outside groups like the American Bar Association were, it is now clear, simultaneously being echoed in confidential messages by the two high-ranking prosecutors whose cases would, if anything, benefit from any slanting of the process.
In a separate e-mail message, the chief prosecutor flatly rejected the accusations by his subordinates. And a military review supported him.
Among the striking statements in the prosecutors' messages was an assertion by one that the chief prosecutor had told his subordinates that the members of the military commission that would try the first four defendants would be "handpicked" to ensure that all would be convicted.
The same officer, Capt. John Carr of the Air Force, also said in his message that he had been told that any exculpatory evidence - information that could help the detainees mount a defense in their cases - would probably exist only in the 10 percent of documents being withheld by the Central Intelligence Agency for security reasons.
Captain Carr's e-mail message also said that some evidence that at least one of the four defendants had been brutalized had been lost and that other evidence on the same issue had been withheld. The March 15, 2004, message was addressed to Col. Frederick L. Borch, the chief prosecutor who was the object of much of Captain Carr's criticism.
The second officer, Maj. Robert Preston, also of the Air Force, said in a March 11, 2004, message to another senior officer in the prosecutor's office that he could not in good conscience write a legal motion saying the proceedings would be "full and fair" when he knew they would not.
Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Hemingway of the Air Force, a senior adviser to the office running the war crimes trials who provided a response from the Defense Department, said that the e-mail messages had prompted a formal investigation by the Pentagon's inspector general that found no evidence to support the two officers' accusations of legal or ethical problems.
Colonel Borch, who has since retired from the military, sent his own e-mail message to Captain Carr and Major Preston on March 15, 2004, with copies to several other members of the prosecution team the same day, outlining his response.
In his message, Colonel Borch said he had great respect and admiration for Captain Carr and Major Preston. But their accusations, he said, were "monstrous lies." He did not, however, address any specifics, like stacking the panel.
"I am convinced to the depth of my soul that all of us on the prosecution team are truly dedicated to the mission of the office of military commissions," he wrote, "and that no one on the team has anything but the highest ethical principles."
Colonel Borch did not respond to telephone messages left at his home. Captain Carr, who has since been promoted to major, declined to comment when reached by telephone, as did Major Preston. Both Captain Carr and Major Preston left the prosecution team within weeks of their e-mail messages and remain on active duty.
General Hemingway said the assertions in the e-mail messages had been "taken very seriously and an investigation was conducted because of the allegations about potential violations of ethics and the law."
He said in an interview that the Defense Department's inspector general spent about two months investigating the accusations and reviewing the operations of the prosecutor's office. "It disclosed no evidence of any criminal misconduct, no evidence of any ethical violations, and no disciplinary action was taken against anybody," the general said. He also said that no evidence had been "tampered with, falsified or hidden."
General Hemingway declined to discuss any specifics of the two prosecutors' accusations, but he said he now believed that the problems underlying the complaints were "miscommunication, misunderstanding and personality conflicts." The inspector general's report has not been made public but was sent to the Pentagon's top civilian lawyer, he said.
Copies of the e-mail messages were provided to The Times by members of the armed forces who are critics of the military commission process. The documents' authenticity was independently confirmed by other military officials.
The Bush administration and the Pentagon have faced criticism about the legitimacy of the military commission procedures almost since the regulations describing them were announced in 2002.
The rules, which in essence constitute a new body of law distinct from military and civilian law, allow, for example, witnesses to testify anonymously for the prosecution. Also, any information may be admitted into evidence if the presiding officer judges it to be "probative to a reasonable person," a new standard far more favorable to the prosecution than anything in civilian law or military law. It is unclear whether information that may have been obtained under coercion or torture can be admissible.
The trials of the first four defendants began last August in a secure courtroom in a converted dental clinic at the naval base at Guantánamo. Before they could start in earnest, the trials were abruptly halted in November when a federal judge ruled they violated both military law and the United States' obligations to comply with the Geneva Conventions.
But a three-judge appeals court panel that included Judge John G. Roberts, President Bush's Supreme Court nominee, unanimously reversed that ruling on July 15.
Defense Department officials have said they plan to resume the trials in the next several weeks. They said they also planned soon to charge an additional eight detainees with war crimes.
The two trials expected to resume shortly are those of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni who was a driver in Afghanistan for Osama bin Laden; and David Hicks, an Australian who was captured in Afghanistan, where, prosecutors say, he had gone to fight for the Taliban government.
In his March 2004 message, Captain Carr told Colonel Borch that "you have repeatedly said to the office that the military panel will be handpicked and will not acquit these detainees and we only needed to worry about building a record for the review panel" and academicians who would pore over the record in years to come.
Captain Carr said in the message that the problems could not be dismissed as personality differences, as some had tried to depict them, but "may constitute dereliction of duty, false official statements or other criminal conduct."
He added that "the evidence does not indicate that our military and civilian leaders have been accurately informed of the state of our preparation, the true culpability of the accused or the sustainability of our efforts." The office, he said, was poised to "prosecute fairly low-level accused in a process that appears to be rigged."
He said that Colonel Borch also said that he was close to Maj. Gen. John D. Altenburg Jr., the retired officer who is in overall charge of the war crimes commissions, and that this would favor the prosecution.
General Altenburg selected the commission members, including the presiding officer, Col. Peter S. Brownback III, a longtime close friend of his. Defense lawyers objected to the presence of Colonel Brownback and some other officers, saying they had serious conflicts of interest. General Altenburg removed some of the other officers but allowed Colonel Brownback to remain.
In his electronic message, Captain Carr said the prosecution team had falsely stated to superiors that it had no evidence of torture of Ali Hamza Ahmed Sulayman al-Bahlul of Yemen. In addition, Captain Carr said the prosecution team had lost an F.B.I. document detailing an interview in which the detainee claimed he had been tortured and abused.
Major Preston, in his e-mail message of March 11, 2004, said that pressing ahead with the trials would be "a severe threat to the reputation of the military justice system and even a fraud on the American people."
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/politics...agewanted=print
August 1, 2005
Who We Are
By BOB HERBERT
You won't find many people willing to accuse John McCain, John Warner or Lindsey Graham of being soft on terrorism. But the three Republican senators are giving the White House fits with their attempt to get legislation approved that would expressly prohibit cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of detainees in U.S. custody.
There was a dramatic encounter during the floor debate last week when Senator Jeff Sessions, a Republican from Alabama, spoke out against the legislation, saying there was no need for it because, as he put it, the detainees are not prisoners of war, "they are terrorists."
Senator McCain, of Arizona, argued that the debate "is not about who they are. It's about who we are." Americans, said Mr. McCain, "hold ourselves" to a higher standard.
The stakes in this confrontation are high. Senators McCain, Warner and Graham are all influential members of the Armed Services Committee (Senator Warner is the chairman), and they have introduced the legislation in the form of amendments to the nearly half-trillion-dollar Pentagon authorization bill for fiscal 2006.
That such an initiative would come from high-ranking, hawkish Republicans is extraordinary, and the White House is not happy about it. In addition to prohibiting cruel and degrading treatment, the legislation would restrict military interrogation techniques to those authorized in a new Army field manual.
The senators seemed clearly to have been moved by the dismay expressed by current and former members of the military over the lack of uniform standards for the treatment of detainees. Many have argued that the lack of standards and clear guidance from the highest levels of government have led inexorably to abuses.
Senator McCain has been the point person on the legislative amendments, and his office has released a letter from more than a dozen retired officers, including generals, admirals and former prisoners of war, offering support for his effort to establish standards designed to rein in the abusive treatment of prisoners.
The letter said, in part, "The abuse of prisoners hurts America's cause in the war on terror, endangers U.S. service members who might be captured by the enemy, and is anathema to the values Americans have held dear for generations."
Senator Graham, who is from South Carolina, successfully sought the declassification and release of memos from current high-ranking military lawyers who were critical of the legal interpretations by the Bush administration that led to the harsh interrogation policy at Guantánamo. One of the memos, from Maj. Gen. Jack Rives, deputy judge advocate general of the Air Force, said, "Several of the more extreme interrogation techniques, on their face, amount to violations of domestic criminal law" as well as military law.
The White House has fought intensely, but so far unsuccessfully, against this revolt in the usually steadfast Republican ranks. Vice President Dick Cheney, in a meeting with Senators Warner, McCain and Graham, said the legislation would interfere with President Bush's ability to fight terrorism. He was not able to change their minds.
Unable to fend off the amendments, the Senate majority leader, Bill Frist, put off further consideration of the defense bill until September. Senator McCain and his allies will try to build further support for the amendments during that period. The White House has threatened to veto the defense bill if the amendments are approved.
We should take a moment, however this debate turns out, to applaud the effort by three Republican senators to stand up to the White House and insist that the United States not just fight harder than its enemies, but also stand taller. No one should be surprised that these voices of reason are coming from men experienced in the ways of war. Senator McCain was a P.O.W. for five years in Vietnam. Senator Graham spent many years as an Air Force lawyer. And Senator Warner is a veteran of World War II and Korea.
A few days ago I spoke with John Hutson, a former admiral who is now president of the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, N.H. He was one of the signers of the letter to Senator McCain. He stressed that this is a very big issue for the country. If the United States fails to get its act together with regard to the humane treatment of detainees, he said, we will "have changed the DNA of what it means to be an American."
E-mail: bobherb@nytimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/opinion/...agewanted=print
Who We Are
By BOB HERBERT
You won't find many people willing to accuse John McCain, John Warner or Lindsey Graham of being soft on terrorism. But the three Republican senators are giving the White House fits with their attempt to get legislation approved that would expressly prohibit cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of detainees in U.S. custody.
There was a dramatic encounter during the floor debate last week when Senator Jeff Sessions, a Republican from Alabama, spoke out against the legislation, saying there was no need for it because, as he put it, the detainees are not prisoners of war, "they are terrorists."
Senator McCain, of Arizona, argued that the debate "is not about who they are. It's about who we are." Americans, said Mr. McCain, "hold ourselves" to a higher standard.
The stakes in this confrontation are high. Senators McCain, Warner and Graham are all influential members of the Armed Services Committee (Senator Warner is the chairman), and they have introduced the legislation in the form of amendments to the nearly half-trillion-dollar Pentagon authorization bill for fiscal 2006.
That such an initiative would come from high-ranking, hawkish Republicans is extraordinary, and the White House is not happy about it. In addition to prohibiting cruel and degrading treatment, the legislation would restrict military interrogation techniques to those authorized in a new Army field manual.
The senators seemed clearly to have been moved by the dismay expressed by current and former members of the military over the lack of uniform standards for the treatment of detainees. Many have argued that the lack of standards and clear guidance from the highest levels of government have led inexorably to abuses.
Senator McCain has been the point person on the legislative amendments, and his office has released a letter from more than a dozen retired officers, including generals, admirals and former prisoners of war, offering support for his effort to establish standards designed to rein in the abusive treatment of prisoners.
The letter said, in part, "The abuse of prisoners hurts America's cause in the war on terror, endangers U.S. service members who might be captured by the enemy, and is anathema to the values Americans have held dear for generations."
Senator Graham, who is from South Carolina, successfully sought the declassification and release of memos from current high-ranking military lawyers who were critical of the legal interpretations by the Bush administration that led to the harsh interrogation policy at Guantánamo. One of the memos, from Maj. Gen. Jack Rives, deputy judge advocate general of the Air Force, said, "Several of the more extreme interrogation techniques, on their face, amount to violations of domestic criminal law" as well as military law.
The White House has fought intensely, but so far unsuccessfully, against this revolt in the usually steadfast Republican ranks. Vice President Dick Cheney, in a meeting with Senators Warner, McCain and Graham, said the legislation would interfere with President Bush's ability to fight terrorism. He was not able to change their minds.
Unable to fend off the amendments, the Senate majority leader, Bill Frist, put off further consideration of the defense bill until September. Senator McCain and his allies will try to build further support for the amendments during that period. The White House has threatened to veto the defense bill if the amendments are approved.
We should take a moment, however this debate turns out, to applaud the effort by three Republican senators to stand up to the White House and insist that the United States not just fight harder than its enemies, but also stand taller. No one should be surprised that these voices of reason are coming from men experienced in the ways of war. Senator McCain was a P.O.W. for five years in Vietnam. Senator Graham spent many years as an Air Force lawyer. And Senator Warner is a veteran of World War II and Korea.
A few days ago I spoke with John Hutson, a former admiral who is now president of the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, N.H. He was one of the signers of the letter to Senator McCain. He stressed that this is a very big issue for the country. If the United States fails to get its act together with regard to the humane treatment of detainees, he said, we will "have changed the DNA of what it means to be an American."
E-mail: bobherb@nytimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/opinion/...agewanted=print
The article in this thread and the op-ed by Bob Herbert certainly go together. With Bush in the Whitehouse it gets harder everyday to recognize the values that America once held dear.
August 1, 2005
Who We Are
By BOB HERBERT
You won't find many people willing to accuse John McCain, John Warner or Lindsey Graham of being soft on terrorism. But the three Republican senators are giving the White House fits with their attempt to get legislation approved that would expressly prohibit cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of detainees in U.S. custody.
There was a dramatic encounter during the floor debate last week when Senator Jeff Sessions, a Republican from Alabama, spoke out against the legislation, saying there was no need for it because, as he put it, the detainees are not prisoners of war, "they are terrorists."
Senator McCain, of Arizona, argued that the debate "is not about who they are. It's about who we are." Americans, said Mr. McCain, "hold ourselves" to a higher standard.
The stakes in this confrontation are high. Senators McCain, Warner and Graham are all influential members of the Armed Services Committee (Senator Warner is the chairman), and they have introduced the legislation in the form of amendments to the nearly half-trillion-dollar Pentagon authorization bill for fiscal 2006.
That such an initiative would come from high-ranking, hawkish Republicans is extraordinary, and the White House is not happy about it. In addition to prohibiting cruel and degrading treatment, the legislation would restrict military interrogation techniques to those authorized in a new Army field manual.
The senators seemed clearly to have been moved by the dismay expressed by current and former members of the military over the lack of uniform standards for the treatment of detainees. Many have argued that the lack of standards and clear guidance from the highest levels of government have led inexorably to abuses.
Senator McCain has been the point person on the legislative amendments, and his office has released a letter from more than a dozen retired officers, including generals, admirals and former prisoners of war, offering support for his effort to establish standards designed to rein in the abusive treatment of prisoners.
The letter said, in part, "The abuse of prisoners hurts America's cause in the war on terror, endangers U.S. service members who might be captured by the enemy, and is anathema to the values Americans have held dear for generations."
Senator Graham, who is from South Carolina, successfully sought the declassification and release of memos from current high-ranking military lawyers who were critical of the legal interpretations by the Bush administration that led to the harsh interrogation policy at Guantánamo. One of the memos, from Maj. Gen. Jack Rives, deputy judge advocate general of the Air Force, said, "Several of the more extreme interrogation techniques, on their face, amount to violations of domestic criminal law" as well as military law.
The White House has fought intensely, but so far unsuccessfully, against this revolt in the usually steadfast Republican ranks. Vice President Dick Cheney, in a meeting with Senators Warner, McCain and Graham, said the legislation would interfere with President Bush's ability to fight terrorism. He was not able to change their minds.
Unable to fend off the amendments, the Senate majority leader, Bill Frist, put off further consideration of the defense bill until September. Senator McCain and his allies will try to build further support for the amendments during that period. The White House has threatened to veto the defense bill if the amendments are approved.
We should take a moment, however this debate turns out, to applaud the effort by three Republican senators to stand up to the White House and insist that the United States not just fight harder than its enemies, but also stand taller. No one should be surprised that these voices of reason are coming from men experienced in the ways of war. Senator McCain was a P.O.W. for five years in Vietnam. Senator Graham spent many years as an Air Force lawyer. And Senator Warner is a veteran of World War II and Korea.
A few days ago I spoke with John Hutson, a former admiral who is now president of the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, N.H. He was one of the signers of the letter to Senator McCain. He stressed that this is a very big issue for the country. If the United States fails to get its act together with regard to the humane treatment of detainees, he said, we will "have changed the DNA of what it means to be an American."
E-mail: bobherb@nytimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/opinion/...agewanted=print
August 1, 2005
Who We Are
By BOB HERBERT
You won't find many people willing to accuse John McCain, John Warner or Lindsey Graham of being soft on terrorism. But the three Republican senators are giving the White House fits with their attempt to get legislation approved that would expressly prohibit cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of detainees in U.S. custody.
There was a dramatic encounter during the floor debate last week when Senator Jeff Sessions, a Republican from Alabama, spoke out against the legislation, saying there was no need for it because, as he put it, the detainees are not prisoners of war, "they are terrorists."
Senator McCain, of Arizona, argued that the debate "is not about who they are. It's about who we are." Americans, said Mr. McCain, "hold ourselves" to a higher standard.
The stakes in this confrontation are high. Senators McCain, Warner and Graham are all influential members of the Armed Services Committee (Senator Warner is the chairman), and they have introduced the legislation in the form of amendments to the nearly half-trillion-dollar Pentagon authorization bill for fiscal 2006.
That such an initiative would come from high-ranking, hawkish Republicans is extraordinary, and the White House is not happy about it. In addition to prohibiting cruel and degrading treatment, the legislation would restrict military interrogation techniques to those authorized in a new Army field manual.
The senators seemed clearly to have been moved by the dismay expressed by current and former members of the military over the lack of uniform standards for the treatment of detainees. Many have argued that the lack of standards and clear guidance from the highest levels of government have led inexorably to abuses.
Senator McCain has been the point person on the legislative amendments, and his office has released a letter from more than a dozen retired officers, including generals, admirals and former prisoners of war, offering support for his effort to establish standards designed to rein in the abusive treatment of prisoners.
The letter said, in part, "The abuse of prisoners hurts America's cause in the war on terror, endangers U.S. service members who might be captured by the enemy, and is anathema to the values Americans have held dear for generations."
Senator Graham, who is from South Carolina, successfully sought the declassification and release of memos from current high-ranking military lawyers who were critical of the legal interpretations by the Bush administration that led to the harsh interrogation policy at Guantánamo. One of the memos, from Maj. Gen. Jack Rives, deputy judge advocate general of the Air Force, said, "Several of the more extreme interrogation techniques, on their face, amount to violations of domestic criminal law" as well as military law.
The White House has fought intensely, but so far unsuccessfully, against this revolt in the usually steadfast Republican ranks. Vice President Dick Cheney, in a meeting with Senators Warner, McCain and Graham, said the legislation would interfere with President Bush's ability to fight terrorism. He was not able to change their minds.
Unable to fend off the amendments, the Senate majority leader, Bill Frist, put off further consideration of the defense bill until September. Senator McCain and his allies will try to build further support for the amendments during that period. The White House has threatened to veto the defense bill if the amendments are approved.
We should take a moment, however this debate turns out, to applaud the effort by three Republican senators to stand up to the White House and insist that the United States not just fight harder than its enemies, but also stand taller. No one should be surprised that these voices of reason are coming from men experienced in the ways of war. Senator McCain was a P.O.W. for five years in Vietnam. Senator Graham spent many years as an Air Force lawyer. And Senator Warner is a veteran of World War II and Korea.
A few days ago I spoke with John Hutson, a former admiral who is now president of the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, N.H. He was one of the signers of the letter to Senator McCain. He stressed that this is a very big issue for the country. If the United States fails to get its act together with regard to the humane treatment of detainees, he said, we will "have changed the DNA of what it means to be an American."
E-mail: bobherb@nytimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/opinion/...agewanted=print
QUOTE(no retreat @ no surrender,Aug 1 2005, 04:41 AM)
August 1, 2005
Who We Are
By BOB HERBERT
The letter said, in part, "The abuse of prisoners hurts America's cause in the war on terror, endangers U.S. service members who might be captured by the enemy, and is anathema to the values Americans have held dear for generations."
The White House has fought intensely, but so far unsuccessfully, against this revolt in the usually steadfast Republican ranks. Vice President Dick Cheney, in a meeting with Senators Warner, McCain and Graham, said the legislation would interfere with President Bush's ability to fight terrorism. He was not able to change their minds.
E-mail: bobherb@nytimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/opinion/...agewanted=print
Who We Are
By BOB HERBERT
The letter said, in part, "The abuse of prisoners hurts America's cause in the war on terror, endangers U.S. service members who might be captured by the enemy, and is anathema to the values Americans have held dear for generations."
The White House has fought intensely, but so far unsuccessfully, against this revolt in the usually steadfast Republican ranks. Vice President Dick Cheney, in a meeting with Senators Warner, McCain and Graham, said the legislation would interfere with President Bush's ability to fight terrorism. He was not able to change their minds.
E-mail: bobherb@nytimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/opinion/...agewanted=print
How will the amendments hurt Bush's ability to fight terrorism? Is anyone here capable of understanding Cheney's thinking? My imagination is not fertile enough to see the world through Cheney's eyes.
QUOTE(no retreat @ no surrender,Aug 1 2005, 12:41 AM)
August 1, 2005
Who We Are
By BOB HERBERT
... There was a dramatic encounter during the floor debate last week when Senator Jeff Sessions, a Republican from Alabama, spoke out against the legislation, saying there was no need for it because, as he put it, the detainees are not prisoners of war, "they are terrorists."
Senator McCain, of Arizona, argued that the debate "is not about who they are. It's about who we are." Americans, said Mr. McCain, "hold ourselves" to a higher standard.
... That such an initiative would come from high-ranking, hawkish Republicans is extraordinary...
E-mail: bobherb@nytimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/opinion/...agewanted=print
Who We Are
By BOB HERBERT
... There was a dramatic encounter during the floor debate last week when Senator Jeff Sessions, a Republican from Alabama, spoke out against the legislation, saying there was no need for it because, as he put it, the detainees are not prisoners of war, "they are terrorists."
Senator McCain, of Arizona, argued that the debate "is not about who they are. It's about who we are." Americans, said Mr. McCain, "hold ourselves" to a higher standard.
... That such an initiative would come from high-ranking, hawkish Republicans is extraordinary...
E-mail: bobherb@nytimes.com
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/opinion/...agewanted=print
That there should be the need for such an amendment is beyond the comprehension of most Americans. Now China and Iran, and any other country which tortures it's prisoners, can thumb their noses at us when we cry out about their abuses; we've lost the moral high ground.
It is quite disgusting that such an amendment ever had to be offered. Unfortunately, there are far too many people that support Bush & Cheney who lack a moral compass of their own. These people embrace whatever this adminstration does no matter how fundamentaly wrong it is. We also have far too many citizens who through their ignorance of the issues allow this administration to get away with it. I certainly hope that history accurately portrays what this administration is all about. I also hope that somehow their actions can be exposed in a way that people will finally begin to grasp what they have done in our names.
Documents Tell of Brutal Improvisation by GIs
Interrogated General's Sleeping-Bag Death, CIA's Use of Secret Iraqi Squad Are Among Details
By Josh White
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, August 3, 2005; A01
Iraqi Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush was being stubborn with his American captors, and a series of intense beatings and creative interrogation tactics were not enough to break his will. On the morning of Nov. 26, 2003, a U.S. Army interrogator and a military guard grabbed a green sleeping bag, stuffed Mowhoush inside, wrapped him in an electrical cord, laid him on the floor and began to go to work. Again.
It was inside the sleeping bag that the 56-year-old detainee took his last breath through broken ribs, lying on the floor beneath a U.S. soldier in Interrogation Room 6 in the western Iraqi desert. Two days before, a secret CIA-sponsored group of Iraqi paramilitaries, working with Army interrogators, had beaten Mowhoush nearly senseless, using fists, a club and a rubber hose, according to classified documents.
The sleeping bag was the idea of a soldier who remembered how his older brother used to force him into one, and how scared and vulnerable it made him feel. Senior officers in charge of the facility near the Syrian border believed that such "claustrophobic techniques" were approved ways to gain information from detainees, part of what military regulations refer to as a "fear up" tactic, according to military court documents.
The circumstances that led up to Mowhoush's death paint a vivid example of how the pressure to produce intelligence for anti-terrorism efforts and the war in Iraq led U.S. military interrogators to improvise and develop abusive measures, not just at Abu Ghraib but in detention centers elsewhere in Iraq, in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Mowhoush's ordeal in Qaim, over 16 days in November 2003, also reflects U.S. government secrecy surrounding some abuse cases and gives a glimpse into a covert CIA unit that was set up to foment rebellion before the war and took part in some interrogations during the insurgency.
The sleeping-bag interrogation and beatings were taking place in Qaim about the same time that soldiers at Abu Ghraib, outside Baghdad, were using dogs to intimidate detainees, putting women's underwear on their heads, forcing them to strip in front of female soldiers and attaching at least one to a leash. It was a time when U.S. interrogators were coming up with their own tactics to get detainees to talk, many of which they considered logical interpretations of broad-brush categories in the Army Field Manual, with labels such as "fear up" or "pride and ego down" or "futility."
Other tactics, such as some of those seen at Abu Ghraib, had been approved for one detainee at Guantanamo Bay and found their way to Iraq. Still others have been linked to official Pentagon guidance on specific techniques, such as the use of dogs.
Two Army soldiers with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Fort Carson, Colo., are charged with killing Mowhoush with the sleeping-bag technique, and his death has been the subject of partially open court proceedings at the base in Colorado Springs. Two other soldiers alleged to have participated face potential nonjudicial punishment. Some details of the incident have been released and were previously reported. But an examination of numerous classified documents gathered during the criminal investigation into Mowhoush's death, and interviews with Defense Department officials and current and former intelligence officials, present a fuller picture of what happened and outline the role played in his interrogation by the CIA, its Iraqi paramilitaries and Special Forces soldiers.
Determining the details of the general's demise has been difficult because the circumstances are listed as "classified" on his official autopsy, court records have been censored to hide the CIA's involvement in his questioning, and reporters have been removed from a Fort Carson courtroom when testimony relating to the CIA has surfaced.
Despite Army investigators' concerns that the CIA and Special Forces soldiers also were involved in serious abuse leading up to Mowhoush's death, the investigators reported they did not have the authority to fully look into their actions. The CIA inspector general's office has launched an investigation of at least one CIA operative who identified himself to soldiers only as "Brian." The CIA declined to comment on the matter, as did an Army spokesman, citing the ongoing criminal cases.
Although Mowhoush's death certificate lists his cause of death as "asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression," the Dec. 2, 2003, autopsy, quoted in classified documents and released with redactions, showed that Mowhoush had "contusions and abrasions with pattern impressions" over much of his body, and six fractured ribs. Investigators believed a "long straight-edge instrument" was used on Mowhoush, as well an "object like the end of an M-16" rifle.
"Although the investigation indicates the death was directly related to the non-standard interrogation methods employed on 26 NOV, the circumstances surrounding the death are further complicated due to Mowhoush being interrogated and reportedly beaten by members of a Special Forces team and other government agency (OGA) employees two days earlier," said a secret Army memo dated May 10, 2004.
The Walk-In
Hours after Mowhoush's death in U.S. custody on Nov. 26, 2003, military officials issued a news release stating that the prisoner had died of natural causes after complaining of feeling sick. Army psychological-operations officers quickly distributed leaflets designed to convince locals that the general had cooperated and outed key insurgents.
The U.S. military initially told reporters that Mowhoush had been captured during a raid. In reality, he had walked into the Forward Operating Base "Tiger" in Qaim on Nov. 10, 2003, hoping to speak with U.S. commanders to secure the release of his sons, who had been arrested in raids 11 days earlier.
Officials were excited about Mowhoush's appearance.
The general, they believed, had been a high-ranking official in Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard and a key supporter of the insurgency in northwestern Iraq. Mowhoush was one of a few generals whom Hussein had given "execution authority," U.S. commanders believed, meaning that he could execute someone on sight, and he had been notorious among Shiites in southern Iraq for brutality.
Mowhoush had been visited by Hussein at his home in Sadah in October 2003 "to discuss, among other undisclosed issues, a bounty of US$10,000 to anyone who video-taped themselves attacking coalition forces," according to a Defense Intelligence Agency report.
Military intelligence also believed that Mowhoush was behind several attacks in the Qaim area.
After being taken into custody, Mowhoush was housed in an isolated area of the Qaim base within miles of the Syrian border, according to a situation summary prepared by interrogators.
The heavyset and imposing man was moderately cooperative in his first days of detention. He told interrogators that he was the commander of the al Quds Golden Division, an organization of trusted loyalists fueling the insurgency with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, sniper rifles, machine guns and other small arms.
In the months before Mowhoush's detention, military intelligence officials across Iraq had been discussing interrogation tactics, expressing a desire to ramp things up and expand their allowed techniques to include more severe methods, such as beatings that did not leave permanent damage, and exploiting detainees' fear of dogs and snakes, according to documents released by the Army.
Officials in Baghdad wrote an e-mail to interrogators in the field on Aug. 14, 2003, stating that the "gloves are coming off" and asking them to develop "wish lists" of tactics they would like to use.
An interrogator with the 66th Military Intelligence Company, who was assigned to work on Mowhoush, wrote back with suggestions in August, including the use of "close confinement quarters," sleep deprivation and using the fear of dogs, adding: "I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off."
Another e-mail exchange from interrogators with the 4th Infantry Division based in Tikrit also suggested "close quarter confinement" in extremely claustrophobic situations, because "discomfort induces compliance and cooperation."
Taking the Gloves Off
A week into Mowhoush's detainment, according to classified investigative documents, interrogators were getting fed up with the prisoner. In a "current situation summary" PowerPoint presentation dated Nov. 18, Army officials wrote about his intransigence, using his first name (spelled "Abid" in Army documents):
"Previous interrogations were non-threatening; Abid was being treated very well. Not anymore," the document reads. "The interrogation session lasted several hours and I took the gloves off because Abid refused to play ball."
But the harsher tactics backfired.
In an interrogation that could be witnessed by the entire detainee population, Mowhoush was put into an undescribed "stress position" that caused the other detainees to stand "with heads bowed and solemn looks on their faces," said the document.
"I asked Abid if he was strong enough a leader to put an end to the attacks that I believed he was behind," the document said, quoting an unidentified interrogator. "He did not deny he was behind the attacks as he had denied previously, he simply said because I had humiliated him, he would not be able to stop the attacks. I take this as an admission of guilt."
Three days later, on Nov. 21, 2003, Mowhoush was moved from the border base at Qaim to a makeshift detention facility about six miles away in the Iraqi desert, a prison fashioned out of an old train depot, according to court testimony and investigative documents. Soldiers with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 101st Airborne Division were running a series of massive raids called Operation Rifles Blitz, and the temporary holding facility, nicknamed Blacksmith Hotel, was designed to hold the quarry.
U.S. troops searched more than 8,000 homes in three cities, netting 350 detainees, according to court testimony. Even though Mowhoush was not arrested during the raids, he was moved to Blacksmith Hotel, where teams of Army Special Forces soldiers and the CIA were conducting interrogations.
At Blacksmith, according to military sources, there was a tiered system of interrogations. Army interrogators were the first level.
When Army efforts produced nothing useful, detainees would be handed over to members of Operational Detachment Alpha 531, soldiers with the 5th Special Forces Group, the CIA or a combination of the three. "The personnel were dressed in civilian clothes and wore balaclavas to hide their identity," according to a Jan. 18, 2004, report for the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division.
If they did not get what they wanted, the interrogators would deliver the detainees to a small team of the CIA-sponsored Iraqi paramilitary squads, code-named Scorpions, according to a military source familiar with the operation. The Jan. 18 memo indicates that it was "likely that indigenous personnel in the employ of the CIA interrogated MG Mowhoush."
Sometimes, soldiers and intelligence officers used the mere existence of the paramilitary unit as a threat to induce detainees to talk, one Army soldier said in an interview. "Detainees knew that if they went to those people, bad things would happen," the soldier said. "It was used as a motivator to get them to talk. They didn't want to go with the masked men."
The Scorpions went by nicknames such as Alligator and Cobra. They were set up by the CIA before the war to conduct light sabotage. After the fall of Baghdad, they worked with their CIA handlers to infiltrate the insurgency and as interpreters, according to military investigative documents, defense officials, and former and current intelligence officials.
Soon after Mowhoush's detention began, soldiers in charge of him "reached a collective decision that they would try using the [redacted] who would, you know, obviously spoke the local, native Iraqi Arabic as a means of trying to shake Mowhoush up, and that the other thing that they were going to try to do was put a bunch of people in the room, a tactic that Mr. [redacted] called 'fear up,' " Army Special Agent Curtis Ryan, who investigated the case, testified, according to a transcript.
Classified e-mail messages and reports show that "Brian," a Special Forces retiree, worked as a CIA operative with the Scorpions.
On Nov. 24, the CIA and one of its four-man Scorpion units interrogated Mowhoush, according to investigative records.
"OGA Brian and the four indig were interrogating an unknown detainee," according to a classified memo, using the slang "Other Government Agency" for the CIA and "indig" for indigenous Iraqis.
"When he didn't answer or provided an answer that they didn't like, at first [redacted] would slap Mowhoush, and then after a few slaps, it turned into punches," Ryan testified. "And then from punches, it turned into [redacted] using a piece of hose."
"The indig were hitting the detainee with fists, a club and a length of rubber hose," according to classified investigative records.
Soldiers heard Mowhoush "being beaten with a hard object" and heard him "screaming" from down the hall, according to the Jan. 18, 2004, provost marshal's report. The report said four Army guards had to carry Mowhoush back to his cell.
Two days later, at 8 a.m., Nov. 26, Mowhoush -- prisoner No. 76 -- was brought, moaning and breathing hard, to Interrogation Room 6, according to court testimony.
Chief Warrant Officer Lewis E. Welshofer Jr. did a first round of interrogations for 30 minutes, taking a 15-minute break and resuming at 8:45. According to court testimony, Welshofer and Spec. Jerry L. Loper, a mechanic assuming the role of guard, put Mowhoush into the sleeping bag and wrapped the bag in electrical wire.
Wels
Interrogated General's Sleeping-Bag Death, CIA's Use of Secret Iraqi Squad Are Among Details
By Josh White
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, August 3, 2005; A01
Iraqi Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush was being stubborn with his American captors, and a series of intense beatings and creative interrogation tactics were not enough to break his will. On the morning of Nov. 26, 2003, a U.S. Army interrogator and a military guard grabbed a green sleeping bag, stuffed Mowhoush inside, wrapped him in an electrical cord, laid him on the floor and began to go to work. Again.
It was inside the sleeping bag that the 56-year-old detainee took his last breath through broken ribs, lying on the floor beneath a U.S. soldier in Interrogation Room 6 in the western Iraqi desert. Two days before, a secret CIA-sponsored group of Iraqi paramilitaries, working with Army interrogators, had beaten Mowhoush nearly senseless, using fists, a club and a rubber hose, according to classified documents.
The sleeping bag was the idea of a soldier who remembered how his older brother used to force him into one, and how scared and vulnerable it made him feel. Senior officers in charge of the facility near the Syrian border believed that such "claustrophobic techniques" were approved ways to gain information from detainees, part of what military regulations refer to as a "fear up" tactic, according to military court documents.
The circumstances that led up to Mowhoush's death paint a vivid example of how the pressure to produce intelligence for anti-terrorism efforts and the war in Iraq led U.S. military interrogators to improvise and develop abusive measures, not just at Abu Ghraib but in detention centers elsewhere in Iraq, in Afghanistan and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Mowhoush's ordeal in Qaim, over 16 days in November 2003, also reflects U.S. government secrecy surrounding some abuse cases and gives a glimpse into a covert CIA unit that was set up to foment rebellion before the war and took part in some interrogations during the insurgency.
The sleeping-bag interrogation and beatings were taking place in Qaim about the same time that soldiers at Abu Ghraib, outside Baghdad, were using dogs to intimidate detainees, putting women's underwear on their heads, forcing them to strip in front of female soldiers and attaching at least one to a leash. It was a time when U.S. interrogators were coming up with their own tactics to get detainees to talk, many of which they considered logical interpretations of broad-brush categories in the Army Field Manual, with labels such as "fear up" or "pride and ego down" or "futility."
Other tactics, such as some of those seen at Abu Ghraib, had been approved for one detainee at Guantanamo Bay and found their way to Iraq. Still others have been linked to official Pentagon guidance on specific techniques, such as the use of dogs.
Two Army soldiers with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Fort Carson, Colo., are charged with killing Mowhoush with the sleeping-bag technique, and his death has been the subject of partially open court proceedings at the base in Colorado Springs. Two other soldiers alleged to have participated face potential nonjudicial punishment. Some details of the incident have been released and were previously reported. But an examination of numerous classified documents gathered during the criminal investigation into Mowhoush's death, and interviews with Defense Department officials and current and former intelligence officials, present a fuller picture of what happened and outline the role played in his interrogation by the CIA, its Iraqi paramilitaries and Special Forces soldiers.
Determining the details of the general's demise has been difficult because the circumstances are listed as "classified" on his official autopsy, court records have been censored to hide the CIA's involvement in his questioning, and reporters have been removed from a Fort Carson courtroom when testimony relating to the CIA has surfaced.
Despite Army investigators' concerns that the CIA and Special Forces soldiers also were involved in serious abuse leading up to Mowhoush's death, the investigators reported they did not have the authority to fully look into their actions. The CIA inspector general's office has launched an investigation of at least one CIA operative who identified himself to soldiers only as "Brian." The CIA declined to comment on the matter, as did an Army spokesman, citing the ongoing criminal cases.
Although Mowhoush's death certificate lists his cause of death as "asphyxia due to smothering and chest compression," the Dec. 2, 2003, autopsy, quoted in classified documents and released with redactions, showed that Mowhoush had "contusions and abrasions with pattern impressions" over much of his body, and six fractured ribs. Investigators believed a "long straight-edge instrument" was used on Mowhoush, as well an "object like the end of an M-16" rifle.
"Although the investigation indicates the death was directly related to the non-standard interrogation methods employed on 26 NOV, the circumstances surrounding the death are further complicated due to Mowhoush being interrogated and reportedly beaten by members of a Special Forces team and other government agency (OGA) employees two days earlier," said a secret Army memo dated May 10, 2004.
The Walk-In
Hours after Mowhoush's death in U.S. custody on Nov. 26, 2003, military officials issued a news release stating that the prisoner had died of natural causes after complaining of feeling sick. Army psychological-operations officers quickly distributed leaflets designed to convince locals that the general had cooperated and outed key insurgents.
The U.S. military initially told reporters that Mowhoush had been captured during a raid. In reality, he had walked into the Forward Operating Base "Tiger" in Qaim on Nov. 10, 2003, hoping to speak with U.S. commanders to secure the release of his sons, who had been arrested in raids 11 days earlier.
Officials were excited about Mowhoush's appearance.
The general, they believed, had been a high-ranking official in Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard and a key supporter of the insurgency in northwestern Iraq. Mowhoush was one of a few generals whom Hussein had given "execution authority," U.S. commanders believed, meaning that he could execute someone on sight, and he had been notorious among Shiites in southern Iraq for brutality.
Mowhoush had been visited by Hussein at his home in Sadah in October 2003 "to discuss, among other undisclosed issues, a bounty of US$10,000 to anyone who video-taped themselves attacking coalition forces," according to a Defense Intelligence Agency report.
Military intelligence also believed that Mowhoush was behind several attacks in the Qaim area.
After being taken into custody, Mowhoush was housed in an isolated area of the Qaim base within miles of the Syrian border, according to a situation summary prepared by interrogators.
The heavyset and imposing man was moderately cooperative in his first days of detention. He told interrogators that he was the commander of the al Quds Golden Division, an organization of trusted loyalists fueling the insurgency with mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, sniper rifles, machine guns and other small arms.
In the months before Mowhoush's detention, military intelligence officials across Iraq had been discussing interrogation tactics, expressing a desire to ramp things up and expand their allowed techniques to include more severe methods, such as beatings that did not leave permanent damage, and exploiting detainees' fear of dogs and snakes, according to documents released by the Army.
Officials in Baghdad wrote an e-mail to interrogators in the field on Aug. 14, 2003, stating that the "gloves are coming off" and asking them to develop "wish lists" of tactics they would like to use.
An interrogator with the 66th Military Intelligence Company, who was assigned to work on Mowhoush, wrote back with suggestions in August, including the use of "close confinement quarters," sleep deprivation and using the fear of dogs, adding: "I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off."
Another e-mail exchange from interrogators with the 4th Infantry Division based in Tikrit also suggested "close quarter confinement" in extremely claustrophobic situations, because "discomfort induces compliance and cooperation."
Taking the Gloves Off
A week into Mowhoush's detainment, according to classified investigative documents, interrogators were getting fed up with the prisoner. In a "current situation summary" PowerPoint presentation dated Nov. 18, Army officials wrote about his intransigence, using his first name (spelled "Abid" in Army documents):
"Previous interrogations were non-threatening; Abid was being treated very well. Not anymore," the document reads. "The interrogation session lasted several hours and I took the gloves off because Abid refused to play ball."
But the harsher tactics backfired.
In an interrogation that could be witnessed by the entire detainee population, Mowhoush was put into an undescribed "stress position" that caused the other detainees to stand "with heads bowed and solemn looks on their faces," said the document.
"I asked Abid if he was strong enough a leader to put an end to the attacks that I believed he was behind," the document said, quoting an unidentified interrogator. "He did not deny he was behind the attacks as he had denied previously, he simply said because I had humiliated him, he would not be able to stop the attacks. I take this as an admission of guilt."
Three days later, on Nov. 21, 2003, Mowhoush was moved from the border base at Qaim to a makeshift detention facility about six miles away in the Iraqi desert, a prison fashioned out of an old train depot, according to court testimony and investigative documents. Soldiers with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 101st Airborne Division were running a series of massive raids called Operation Rifles Blitz, and the temporary holding facility, nicknamed Blacksmith Hotel, was designed to hold the quarry.
U.S. troops searched more than 8,000 homes in three cities, netting 350 detainees, according to court testimony. Even though Mowhoush was not arrested during the raids, he was moved to Blacksmith Hotel, where teams of Army Special Forces soldiers and the CIA were conducting interrogations.
At Blacksmith, according to military sources, there was a tiered system of interrogations. Army interrogators were the first level.
When Army efforts produced nothing useful, detainees would be handed over to members of Operational Detachment Alpha 531, soldiers with the 5th Special Forces Group, the CIA or a combination of the three. "The personnel were dressed in civilian clothes and wore balaclavas to hide their identity," according to a Jan. 18, 2004, report for the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division.
If they did not get what they wanted, the interrogators would deliver the detainees to a small team of the CIA-sponsored Iraqi paramilitary squads, code-named Scorpions, according to a military source familiar with the operation. The Jan. 18 memo indicates that it was "likely that indigenous personnel in the employ of the CIA interrogated MG Mowhoush."
Sometimes, soldiers and intelligence officers used the mere existence of the paramilitary unit as a threat to induce detainees to talk, one Army soldier said in an interview. "Detainees knew that if they went to those people, bad things would happen," the soldier said. "It was used as a motivator to get them to talk. They didn't want to go with the masked men."
The Scorpions went by nicknames such as Alligator and Cobra. They were set up by the CIA before the war to conduct light sabotage. After the fall of Baghdad, they worked with their CIA handlers to infiltrate the insurgency and as interpreters, according to military investigative documents, defense officials, and former and current intelligence officials.
Soon after Mowhoush's detention began, soldiers in charge of him "reached a collective decision that they would try using the [redacted] who would, you know, obviously spoke the local, native Iraqi Arabic as a means of trying to shake Mowhoush up, and that the other thing that they were going to try to do was put a bunch of people in the room, a tactic that Mr. [redacted] called 'fear up,' " Army Special Agent Curtis Ryan, who investigated the case, testified, according to a transcript.
Classified e-mail messages and reports show that "Brian," a Special Forces retiree, worked as a CIA operative with the Scorpions.
On Nov. 24, the CIA and one of its four-man Scorpion units interrogated Mowhoush, according to investigative records.
"OGA Brian and the four indig were interrogating an unknown detainee," according to a classified memo, using the slang "Other Government Agency" for the CIA and "indig" for indigenous Iraqis.
"When he didn't answer or provided an answer that they didn't like, at first [redacted] would slap Mowhoush, and then after a few slaps, it turned into punches," Ryan testified. "And then from punches, it turned into [redacted] using a piece of hose."
"The indig were hitting the detainee with fists, a club and a length of rubber hose," according to classified investigative records.
Soldiers heard Mowhoush "being beaten with a hard object" and heard him "screaming" from down the hall, according to the Jan. 18, 2004, provost marshal's report. The report said four Army guards had to carry Mowhoush back to his cell.
Two days later, at 8 a.m., Nov. 26, Mowhoush -- prisoner No. 76 -- was brought, moaning and breathing hard, to Interrogation Room 6, according to court testimony.
Chief Warrant Officer Lewis E. Welshofer Jr. did a first round of interrogations for 30 minutes, taking a 15-minute break and resuming at 8:45. According to court testimony, Welshofer and Spec. Jerry L. Loper, a mechanic assuming the role of guard, put Mowhoush into the sleeping bag and wrapped the bag in electrical wire.
Wels