That isn't true. If you go to The Washington Post's Faces of the Fallen website, you can see plenty of fallen soldiers that have died in German hospitals.

May all of the fallen soldiers rest in peace.

Sorry for taking so long to get back to you Dave, the boat's back and I've been really busy.

NCOs do NOT brainwash anyone, but we do train our guys and make sure they understand what they're doing and why they're doing it.

As to shooting just anyone, it is quite the opposite. We have Rules of Engagement (ROE) which spell out who we can shoot and when. Generally these rules are very restrictive and we tolerate a lot more hostility than we probably should before using deadly force. We have had our own guys killed/wounded because they hesitated because of ROE restrictions. We're not a bunch of trigger-happy psychos.

So, you're saying anyone who kills someone has no morals?!? Since it's an all-volunteer force, I think it's safe to presume that the guys resolved that internal conflict before they joined. The military isn't a social club.

BTW, it looks like we still need 78 subscribers to make CGCS self-sustaining. If you're not a subscriber please subscribe, if you are, THANK YOU, and try to let your friends know about this site.

The ones with morals are the ones who do not like to kill anything that moves. The rest are mostly afraid for their lives in not knowing who to kill. Of course there are the people who really enjoy killing. They are another story. I see no fire disipline in Iraq. ROE is a joke.

Progress Continues in Iraq; Officials Note June Milestones
American Forces Press Service


BAGHDAD, Iraq, July 4, 2005 – Daily accomplishments, both large and small - in governance, security and reconstruction - marked progress toward Iraqi self-reliance as the country marked a year of sovereignty June 28. Multinational Force Iraq officials here have compiled a list of notable accomplishments during June:

On June 1, in the first move of its kind, coalition forces officially transferred full responsibility for security at a base in Dibbis to the Iraqi army. Two hundred dignitaries and civilians attended the flag-raising and ribbon-cutting ceremony, where the Iraqi army took full control of base and security operations in the area.
Also on June 1, Iraqi army soldiers, working with coalition aviation assets, conducted their first air assault. About 35 soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, were inserted into a landing zone near several small towns and villages outside Baghdad to conduct raids and door-to-door searches for bomb-making materials and specific persons of interest.
Reconstruction gained momentum in the Nissan district of eastern Baghdad, where major sewer and water projects broke ground in Kamaliya and Oubaidi. After completing a site survey, workers began on the project that ultimately will create a sewer network serving 8,870 homes in Kamaliya. The area has never had underground sewage lines and relies on slit trenches, which leads to sewage pooling in the streets. The project will cost about $27 million and will employ 600 local workers at peak construction times. As the sewer project takes shape, an existing water distribution system will be rehabilitated. About 5,435 homes are slated to receive connections to the water main.
On June 4, Basrah airport began civilian flights, opening the gate for business growth in the region. A week later, regular flights began between Hawler International Airport in Irbil and Baghdad. The flights now run three times per week and open a new avenue to encourage foreign capital investment by improving accessibility to Iraq's capital.
The $100 million Al-Ameen electrical substation, which distributes electricity to other substations around Baghdad, was completed on June 5, after about 10 months of work. Local workers made up 99 percent of the work force.
The Iraqi Navy's Predator Patrol Boats commenced interoperability training with an amphibious transport ship on June 7. The training is teaching the Iraqi navy about ship handling, force protection and weapons handling.
With some help from Iraqi security forces, the Iraqi National Soccer League resumed play June 12. More than 10,000 fans showed up for the first game, held in the Baghdad soccer stadium, and watched Basra beat Dahouk 1-0. Iraqi police officers, Iraqi army soldiers and coalition forces guarded the stadium, which can hold 45,000 fans. The same team of security forces will provide security for future games, which are scheduled through the end of August.
More than 110 soccer uniforms were distributed to local coaches in a ceremony June 15 in Sadr City. Following the ceremony, each coach was presented with 11 complete sets of uniforms to fully outfit their teams.
Iraqi army soldiers rescued Australian hostage Douglas Wood from his captors June 15. Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 1st Iraqi Army Brigade, discovered Wood and an Iraqi hostage in the northwestern Baghdad neighborhood of Al Adel while conducting a planned cordon-and-search operation for a weapons cache. Three individuals were detained during the operation. The soldiers also discovered a weapons cache that included four AK-47 assault rifles and a sniper rifle.
In mid-June, construction started on a $1.25 million school project in the Fallujah district of Anbar province. Out of 13 school projects programmed for construction in Fallujah, four are under construction and nine are complete. Some 840 school projects are programmed throughout Iraq; 102 are under construction, and 628 are complete.
On June 19, Iraqi workers finished construction on railroad stations in Balad and Baiji. These facilities will connect Salah al-Din with destinations throughout the provinces, bringing goods to customers and citizens in distant cities. Two important rail projects have already been completed in Kirkuk: the Kirkuk and al-Maraej stations have been rehabilitated. Throughout the rest of the nation, the Ministry of Transportation has more than 100 rail projects scheduled; 28 are currently being built, while 45 have been completed and are serving the people.
During the same week, the U.S. Marine Corps' 5th Civil Affairs Group and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers kicked off the Property Lease Program in Fallujah. Local residents whose homes were or are currently occupied by coalition forces had leases drawn up. Lump-sum payments were made to eligible homeowners for the total time their houses were being used. The payment will include the amount of rent owed through Sept. 30, 2005.
Iraq joined 80 nations in Brussels for a historic conference on June 21 and 22, focusing on Iraq's reconstruction and paving the way for other nations to develop political ties with Iraq. Iraq's foreign minister also opened the door for further diplomatic ties between Iraq and other Arab nations. Canada announced its ambassador to Jordan also would serve in Iraq, and Jordan said it would send an ambassador to Iraq soon.
On June 22, one of 167 medical clinic projects planned for the country got under way. A $656,000 clinic in the Khanaqin district of Diyala province, in which Baghdad is located, is one of two programmed for construction in the district. Both are now under construction.
Soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Iraqi Army Brigade, graduated from the first organized Iraqi Army Leadership Training Course at Forward Operating Base Justice.
As the month drew to a close, Iraqi marines prepared to take over security of the Basrah and Khawr Al Amaya oil terminals. The Iraqi marines had been supported by coalition forces since April 2004, but now planned to take over security of the oil platforms completely.
On June 27, a water treatment project was finished in Kirkuk, which will provide 5,000 people from four villages with clean, potable water, while another began in the northwestern Ninewah province. Eight water projects are programmed for construction in Mosul, and 34 water projects are programmed nationwide. Seven of those are under way, and 18 are complete.
Also on June 27, the Iraqi Navy signed the Iraqi Navy Transition Roadmap aboard the Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Normandy. The roadmap outlines the plan for the Iraqi navy to achieve the capability to fully defend Iraqi coastal waters, integrating sea operations, shore support, boarding-and-search and point-defense of oil terminals with an overall command and sustainment program.
U.S. soldiers from Task Force 1-128 and the Iraqi army took a day off from their normal security patrols June 28 and handed out school supplies, clothes and shoes in a few small villages during a combat patrol. The soldiers distributed more than 60 boxes of goods containing more than 100 pairs of shoes, assorted clothes and hundreds of pounds of school supplies such as pens, pencils, notebooks and paper to children and families in the villages of Albouhaswa, Ahmed Hajam and Jaafaral Jalaby.
(Courtesy of Multinational Force Iraq.)

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/20050704_1941.html

Iraqi Forces to Provide Bulk of Election Security
By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA
American Forces Press Service


WASHINGTON, Sept. 2, 2005 – Iraqi security forces will provide the primary security for the Oct. 15 constitutional referendum and the December elections, a U.S. commander in Baghdad, Iraq, said today.
In a news briefing, Army Lt. Gen. John Vines, commander of Multinational Corps Iraq, said that because Iraqis will be mainly responsible for security, U.S. forces in the area will be increased only by about 2,000 troops for the referendum and elections.

Vines said he expects insurgents to increase attacks as the referendum approaches, but coalition and Iraqi forces will be prepared to defend the Iraqis' democratic process.

"Unfortunately, there are those who want to deprive them of the opportunity to determine their own destiny, and they'll use violence to do it," he said. "We'll do everything we can to create the conditions so Iraqis have the opportunity to be heard and make their own decisions."

Iraqi security forces continue to make progress in their training, Vines said, and they are closely partnered with coalition units in all aspects of their operations.

"They work together, they plan together, and, in some cases, they fight together," he said.

On an average day, more than 30 combined operations are conducted throughout Iraq, and coalition and Iraqi forces are making progress against the insurgents, Vines said. Ultimately, though, the freedom of Iraq is not going to be won by force, he said.

"The success of our endeavor here, in large measure, is not a military solution," he said. "It is a political solution, and it is one that must be achieved by the Iraqi people, the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government. We'll do everything we can to help create those conditions so they can and will succeed."

When considering the validity of the cause in Iraq, people need to remember how much progress has been made since U.S. forces have been there, Vines said. Iraq now has a sovereign government, a transitional assembly, a draft constitution and ministries of defense, electricity, oil, water and interior, he said. These accomplishments point to great success, he added, but do not mean the threat has diminished.

"We've been successful enough that some may think there's no longer a threat," he said. "I can assure you, there is. There are some evil people that wish to attack us."

The work of U.S. forces in Iraq and other parts of the world against those who wish to spread terror has increased the safety and defended the freedoms of all Americans, Vines said.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/20050902_2598.html

David those are just two of the stories of progress in Iraq. The insurgency lacks popular support, Iraqis are turning jihadist in on a regular basis, and the project to establish democracy in Iraq is succeeding.

Well as of today's US dead count by the DoD, they claim it's only 1895. I think that once the Dod's count bumps over the 2000 mark, American's will step it's anger up a notch towards BushCo. If they only knew of the real death counts, they'd really be steamed.

http://www.icasualties.org/oif/

There's Progress in Iraq

By Kofi Annan

Tuesday, June 21, 2005; Page A21

Today I am traveling to Brussels to join representatives of more than 80 governments and institutions in sending a loud and clear message of support for the political transition in Iraq.

A year ago, in Resolution 1546, the U.N. Security Council set out the timetable that Iraq, with the assistance of the United Nations and the international community, was expected to fulfill. The Brussels conference is a chance to reassure the Iraqi people that the international community stands with them in their brave efforts to rebuild their country, and that we recognize how much progress has been made in the face of daunting challenges.


Elections were held in January, on schedule. Three months later the Transitional National Assembly endorsed the transitional government. The dominant parties have begun inclusive negotiations, in which outreach to Sunni Arabs is a major theme. A large number of Sunni groups and parties are now working to make sure that their voices are fully heard in the process of drafting a new constitution, and that they participate fully in the referendum to approve it and the elections slated for December.

Indeed, just last week an agreement was achieved to expand the committee drafting the constitution to ensure full participation by the Sunni Arab community. This agreement, which the United Nations helped to facilitate, should encourage all Iraqis to press ahead with the drafting of the constitution by the Aug. 15 deadline.

As the process moves forward, there will no doubt be frustrating delays and difficult setbacks. But let us not lose sight of the fact that all over Iraq today, Iraqis are debating nearly every aspect of their political future.

The United Nations has been strongly urged by a wide spectrum of Iraqis to help them maintain momentum, as we did with January's elections. They have sought our support in constitution-making, in preparing for the October referendum and the December elections, and in coordinating donor assistance for the political transition as well as reconstruction and development.

Our response has been prompt and resolute. We have set up a donor coordination mechanism in Baghdad, deployed a Constitutional Support Unit, and established an active and collaborative relationship with the assembly's constitutional committee. Today more than 800 U.N. personnel -- both local and international, including security staff -- are serving in Iraq in the U.N. assistance mission.

In a media-hungry age, visibility is often regarded as proof of success. But this does not necessarily hold true in Iraq. Even when, as with last week's agreement, the results of our efforts are easily seen by all, the efforts themselves must be undertaken quietly and away from the cameras.

Whether U.N. assistance proves effective will depend largely on the Iraqis. Only they can write a constitution that is inclusive and fair. The United Nations cannot and will not draft it for them. Nor do we need to, because Iraqis are more than capable of doing it themselves. They would welcome advice, but they will decide which advice is worth taking.

As important as particular constitutional provisions is the underlying accommodation between Iraq's diverse communities. My special representative, Ashraf Qazi, is encouraging and facilitating the delicate task of political outreach to all Iraqi communities to promote a truly inclusive transition. His work, too, is necessarily carried out away from the media glare, as he seeks to build the trust and confidence among the various constituencies that will be the key to the successful transition envisaged by Security Council Resolution 1546.

There are, of course, those who wish to exacerbate communal tensions and prevent the emergence of a democratic, pluralist, stable Iraq. They seek to capitalize on the serious difficulties faced by ordinary people, and to exploit popular anger and resentment to promote hatred and violence. Their work is seen on the streets of Iraq every day.

I do not believe that security measures alone can provide a sufficient response to this situation. For such measures to be successful, they must be part of a broad-based and inclusive strategy that embraces the political transition, development, human rights and institution-building, so that all of Iraq's communities see that they stand to be winners in the new Iraq. These efforts must be underpinned by steps to deal with Iraq's tortured past -- a past that still exacts revenge and will, if not addressed, blight future generations. This is difficult for any society in transition, let alone one as dangerous as some areas of Iraq are today.

In aid of the transition, the United Nations is at work, both inside and outside the country, to support donor coordination, capacity-building of Iraqi ministries and civil society organizations, and delivery of basic services. Reconstruction of schools, water-treatment and waste-treatment plants, power plants and transmission lines, food assistance to children, mine clearing and aid to hundreds of thousands of returning refugees and internally displaced persons -- all of these activities occur every day in Iraq under U.N. leadership.

The Iraqi people continue to endure a painful and difficult transition, and they still have a long and tough road ahead. The United Nations is privileged and determined to walk it with them. In doing so, we serve not only the people of Iraq, but the peoples of all nations.

The writer is secretary general of the United Nations.

you are right..... there is progress in Iraq... for the Neocon and BushCon profiteers!! Is this worth all the dead on both sides in order for these already fat rich cats to become even more rich?

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?con...8&articleId=700

Where has all the money gone? following the auditors into Iraq

by Ed Harriman

July 18, 2005
London Review of Books, Vol. 27 No. 13, 7 July 2005

On 12 April 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority in Erbil in northern Iraq handed over $1.5 billion in cash to a local courier. The money, fresh $100 bills shrink-wrapped on pallets, which filled three Blackhawk helicopters, came from oil sales under the UN’s Oil for Food Programme, and had been entrusted by the UN Security Council to the Americans to be spent on behalf of the Iraqi people. The CPA didn’t properly check out the courier before handing over the cash, and, as a result, according to an audit report by the CPA’s inspector general, ‘there was an increased risk of the loss or theft of the cash.’ Paul Bremer, the American pro-consul in Baghdad until June last year, kept a slush fund of nearly $600 million cash for which there is no paperwork: $200 million of this was kept in a room in one of Saddam’s former palaces, and the US soldier in charge used to keep the key to the room in his backpack, which he left on his desk when he popped out for lunch. Again, this is Iraqi money, not US funds.

The ‘reconstruction’ of Iraq is the largest American-led occupation programme since the Marshall Plan. But there is a difference: the US government funded the Marshall Plan whereas Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Bremer have made sure that the reconstruction of Iraq is paid for by the ‘liberated’ country, by the Iraqis themselves. There was $6 billion left over from the UN Oil for Food Programme, as well as sequestered and frozen assets, and revenue from resumed oil exports (at least $10 billion in the year following the invasion). Under Security Council Resolution 1483, passed on 22 May 2003, all of these funds were transferred into a new account held at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York, called the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI), so that they might be spent by the CPA ‘in a transparent manner . . . for the benefit of the Iraqi people’. Congress, it’s true, voted to spend $18.4 billion of US taxpayers’ money on the redevelopment of Iraq. But by 28 June last year, when Bremer left Baghdad two days early to avoid possible attack on the way to the airport, his CPA had spent up to $20 billion of Iraqi money, compared to $300 million of US funds.

The ‘financial irregularities’ described in audit reports carried out by agencies of the American government and auditors working for the international community collectively give a detailed insight into the mentality of the American occupation authorities and the way they operated, handing out truckloads of dollars for which neither they nor the recipients felt any need to be accountable. The auditors have so far referred more than a hundred contracts, involving billions of dollars paid to American personnel and corporations, for investigation and possible criminal prosecution. They have also discovered that $8.8 billion that passed through the new Iraqi government ministries in Baghdad while Bremer was in charge is unaccounted for, with little prospect of finding out where it went. A further $3.4 billion earmarked by Congress for Iraqi development has since been siphoned off to finance ‘security’.

That audit reports were commissioned at all owes a lot to Henry Waxman, a Democrat and ranking minority member of the House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform. Waxman voted in favour of the invasion of Iraq. But since the war he’s been demanding that the Bush administration account for its cost. Within six months of the invasion, Waxman’s committee had evidence that the Texas-based Halliburton corporation was being grossly overpaid by the American occupation authorities for the petrol it was importing into Iraq from Kuwait, at a profit of more than $150 million. Waxman and his assistants found that Halliburton was charging $2.64 a gallon for petrol for Iraqi civilians, while American forces were importing the same fuel for $1.57 a gallon.

Halliburton’s chairman, David Lesar, who took over from Dick Cheney in July 2000, robustly defended his firm. But Waxman raised another question: if Halliburton was being allowed to rip off the Iraqi people, was the Bush administration allowing it to milk the US government as well? Waxman’s committee instructed Congress’s General Accountability Office to look into Halliburton’s biggest contract in Iraq: providing virtually all back-up facilities – from meals to laundry soap – to American forces. LOGCAP (Logistics Civil Augmentation Programme) contracts like this one are a product of the new ‘slimmed down’ American military, the quartermaster’s equivalent of Rumsfeld’s ‘invasion lite’. Rather than have uniformed troops peel potatoes and scrub floors, base support services have been privatised and contracted out so that, the idea goes, soldiers can get on with the fighting. The contracts are paid on a cost-plus basis, which allows the contractor to charge for what it has spent, then add on a profit. LOGCAP contracts have not been put out to tender, but rather awarded to a few US firms, the largest being Halliburton and its subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root.

The GAO report of July 2004 found that in the first nine months of the occupation, KBR was allowed a free hand in Iraq: a free hand, for example, to bill the Pentagon without worrying about spending limits or management oversight or paperwork. Millions of dollars’ worth of new equipment disappeared. KBR charged $73 million for motor caravans to house the 101st Airborne Division, twice as much as the army said it would cost to build barracks itself; KBR charged $88 million for three million meals for US troops that were never served. The GAO calculated that the army could have saved $31 million a year simply by doing business directly with the catering firms that KBR hired. In June 2004, the GAO continued, ‘by eliminating the use of LOGCAP and making the LOGCAP subcontractor the prime contractor, the command reduced meal costs by 43 per cent without a loss of service or quality.’

The GAO report makes clear that the Americans had given little thought as to how they might prevent looting and rebuild Iraqi society. They hadn’t even planned how they were going to provision the US forces staying on in Iraq: ‘the Army Central Command did not develop plans to use the [KBR] contract to support its military forces in Iraq until May 2003’ – a month after Saddam fell. Even then, this contract – with an estimated value of $3.894 billion – did not adequately provide for dining facilities, pest control, laundry services, morale, welfare and recreation, troop transportation or combat support services at the American bases hastily being built across Iraq. Stung by Waxman’s revelations about Halliburton’s petrol profiteering, and realising that KBR’s costs were spiralling out of control (LOGCAP costs in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan rose from a projected yearly total of $5.8 billion in September 2003 to $8.6 billion in January 2004), the army vice chief of staff ‘asked units to control costs and look for alternatives to the LOGCAP contract’. This was the first admission that the Pentagon could not afford the occupation on top of the war.

These are some of the latest KIA and wounded figures coming out of Iraq dated Sept 14, 2005 in that one day. Now one would wonder just how many actual US/ Coalition dead may be included in these released reports. It would be strange if 0 or something like 2 American dead is all that comes from this in just this one day's attacks.

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=100...=top_world_news

Baghdad Hit by Bombings; at Least 75 Iraqis Killed (Correct)

Sept. 14 (Bloomberg) -- Six car bombs exploded today across Baghdad, with the worst of the attacks killing at least 75 Iraqi civilians and injuring more than 130, the U.S. military said.

The first blast, which caused the most harm, went off at 7:25 a.m. local time in Urba Square, in the northwestern Zahra district, the military said in an e-mailed statement from the capital. Reuters said the blast left 114 dead and 156 hurt. Al- Jazeera television said there were eight bombings, killing 140.

Victims of the first blast were taken to al-Shulla Hospital, where at 9:50 a.m. another bomb detonated, causing more casualties, the military said without giving details. Al-Jazeera said at least four civilians were killed there and 22 others were injured. Minutes earlier, a bombing in western Baghdad wounded several Iraqis and another in the east of the city injured two U.S. soldiers in a convoy, the military said.

Algerian War, 1954 - 1962
By Tom Cooper (with additional details by Marc Coelich and others)

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The conflict in Algeria erupted almost exactly 50 years ago. It was an ugly war that – regardless how hard it might sound in our times – dominated European media to almost the same extent as Vietnam War would only ten years later, or the war in Iraq does today. The Algerian War had many unusual features. It was a three- and eventually four-cornered contest between the French government, the European colonists and the Algerian nationalists, as well as General Charles de Gaulle, all pursuing different aims. It left Algeria and France deeply scarred, and the French Army at the breaking point: it destroyed the Fourth Republic and hundreds of thousands of lives and careers, and it brought the French military to the verge of coup d’etat.

Ever since the French troops landed at Sidi Ferruch, in 1830, Algeria was by all purposes a colony: the majority of population were native Moslems, mainly Arabs and Berbers, but they were dominated by slightly over one million European settlers, known as “colons” or – more graphically – “pied noirs”, mainly of Spanish, Italian, Corsican, and Alsatian stock. Only a tiny minority of the Moslem population held French citizenship rights or significant property: some 75% of Moslems were illiterate, they suffered from chronic unemployment, poor health, and hunger. The colons farmed the best land, enjoyed a virtual monopoly of political power and imposed their own educational, economic and administrative structures upon the domestic population. Nevertheless, Algeria was not even a French protectorate: in 1848 it was outright absorbed into metropolitan France, and thereafter regarded as an integral part of the parent state. This decision was to create enormous problems for all involved parties, then, constitutionally, there was no room for Algeria to gain independence from France.


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Algerian nationalism before 1950s was fragmented: dissatisfied Moslems had a variety of parties from which to choose – including the Algerian Communist Party, the religious and pan-Islamic Association des Ulemas, the nationalistic Mouvement pur le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), or the liberal Islamist Union Démocratique du Manifesto Algéria (UDMA) – none of which was offering policies with universal appeal. In 1949 the MTLD split when Ben Bella created the more militant Organisation Spéciale (OS), a party dedicated to the use of violence. This did not attract widespread support either: although most of these parties attempted to participate in French political life, blatant electoral frauds by the colons prevented Moslem representation at all levels of government. The majority of pieds noirs, namely, were nothing less volatile, headstrong, violent and unforgiving than Moslems: they considered themselves as builders of Algeria and were fiercely determined to cling to what they had. Most of them considered any kind of compromise with Moslems as betrayal.

The MTLD was one of the first nationalist Algerian organizations that became active. During the WWII, when the French were searching for volunteers between the Algerian population to help fight against Germans, many Algerian nationalists were given the promise that, if they would help in the war Algeria would be given independence in return. When the war ended, on 8 May 1945, and the Algerians understood that the French were not about to keep their word, the MTLD organized demonstrations in Setif, Batna Sedrata and Souk Ahras. Shoots fell and the situation then escalated, ending in riots during which 103 colons were killed. The reaction of the French authorities, but also the pied noirs, was fierce: in the ensuing revenge several thousands of Moslems were killed. Settlements inaccessible to the French Army – including some 40 different villages - were bombed by French Air Force SBD-5 Dauntless dive-bombers of 3F, flying from Algiers-Maison Blance.

There was relative peace in the following years – but only on surface. Few French were aware of the hardships suffered by the indigenous population, about unemployment, rudimentary education (if at all), and poor medical facilities. To most of French people in Algeria it was fine to have Algerian Arabs working as menials on the farms or in the factories at wages none of them would consider on the mainland, or as domestic servants. But, any notion of integration on any other basis was not to be considered. In 1951, UDMA, MTLD, PCA, and Ulema leaders formed a common front, which was short-lived. In 1954 the MTLD-leader, Messali Hadj, formed the Mouvement Nationaliste Algérien (MNA): it was this organization that caused OS militants to create a force dedicated to armed revolt.


Map of Algeria at the time of the war, with approximate borders of all six Wilayas, as well as most important French airfields. (Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003 software)



Outbreak of Insurgency

The war in Algeria erupted on the early morning of 1 November 1954, when armed bands of Algerian Moslems crept out of the night to attack a variety of targets throughout the country, including local gendarmeries, administrative buildings and public utilities. It was the even of the Christian festival of All Saints’ Day, and most of the devout French colonial pied noirs, it was assumed by the nationalist leaders, would be off their guard: after all, the settlers themselves assumed that the Moslems would surely respect the sanctity of a religious holiday. They did not.

The attack on the barracks at Batna went off roughly as planned, but not without problems: the occupants were alerted in time even if two of the guards were moved down because peace-time regimental orders required that their rifles should be un-loaded and their ammunition sewn up in their pouches. These were the first French military personnel to be killed in the war. The first French officer was killed by machine-gun fire as he emerged from his quarters in the small garrison at Khenchela: he was a Spahi, Lieutenant Gerard Darneau. Other attacks took place at the Ichmoul lead mine, where guerrillas intended to seize a quantity of explosives. Their plan failed. The attack at the gendarmerie post at T’kout and in the Tighanimine Gorge too.

There were five targets in Algiers as well: the radio station, a fuel depot, the telephone exchange, the gasworks and a warehouse belonging to a prominent French politician. All attacks were frustrated, largely because the attackers were ill-trained and badly equipped. Elsewhere, in Oran, none of the groups fulfilled their objectives: one of the attacks was launched prematurely while the authorities were on their guard and eight insurgents were killed.

These attacks were carried out by guerrilla groups of the Front de Libération Nationale (“National Liberation Front” – or FLN). FLN was created by nine Moslem nationalists, Hocine Ait Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella (former Sous-Officer of the French Army, who fought at Monte Cassino, in Italy), Mostafa Ben Boulaid, Larbi Ben M’hidi, Rabah Bitat, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mourad Didouche, Mohamed Khider, and Belkacem Krim. Most of FLN leadership was based inside Algeria, but Mohamed Khider, Ben Bella, Hocine Air Ahmed and some others were based in Cairo, and – later on – in Tunisia, as FLN-representants outside the country. Despite a French Army belief that this party was a Moscow-oriented communist organization, fighting the West as part of a world-wide strategy, the FLN was first and foremost firmly nationalistic. Surely enough, Ben Bella was to organize the coming war along the lines Ho Chi Minh organized the North Vietnamese resistance against the French; but, none of the FLN-leaders was ever a slavish follower of communist revolutionary theory. In fact, the organization and tactics of the Algerian guerrilla groups owed more to the French Resistance of the WWII, than to anything or anybody else.

According to official Algerian documents, the net results of these attacks were as follows:

- in Aurès, Commander Ben Boulaid’s forces of 400 fighters mounted 43 attacks, killing six and injuring six French soldiers and gendarmes;
- in the coastal sector, Commander Didouche Mourad’s forces of 150 launched two attacks, killing one French soldier;
- in Kabylie, Commander Krim Belkacem’s forces of 350 fighters mounted 14 attacks, killing one and injuring two French, and robbing 2 million of French Francs in cash;
- in central Algeria, Commander Rabah Bitat’s forces of 150 launched seven attacks, killing 12 French and robbing 25 million French Francs;
- finally, in West Oran, Commander Larbi Ben M’hidi’s forces of 150 launched 14 attacks, killing three and injuring two French.

Already that early into this conflict, the FLN leaders divided Algeria into six “autonomous zones”, the so-called “Wilayas”, each of which was responsible for mounting autonomous operations. The organization of Wilayas in 1954 was as follows:
- Wilaya 1: Aurès area, commander Mustapha Ben Boulaid

- Wilaya 2: North Constantine area, commander Rabah Bitat

- Wilaya 3: Kabylie area, commander Krim Belkacem

- Wilaya 4: City of Algiers and Algerois area, commander Didouche Mourad

- Wilaya 5: Oranie area, commander Larbi Ben M’hidi

- Wilaya 6: southern Algeria, without permanent commander

Sometimes later Didouche took place of Bitat (and vice versa), until the later was arrested in Algiers, in March 1955. In turn, Didouche was killed near Constantine, in February 1955.

Preference in manpower, equipment and operations was given to the Wilaya 1, in the Aurès mountains of eastern Algeria, ideal for creation of “safe bases”. These initial attacks, considered as “banditry” by colons, were not particularly successful and led to traditional “search and cordon” operations of the French military. Simultaneously with fighting French, the FLN also fought a merciless war against the rival MNA, while there was also fighting between various Moslem groups, and Moslems and Berbers.


Belkacem Krim (left) and Ait Hamouda Amirouche (right), two important ALN commanders. Krim led Willaya 3, while Amirouche was a chief of the ALN and - although officially an Algerian national hero until today - a very cruel person. In Algeria, Amirouche is known to have probably killed more Algerians than French. He especially despised intellectuals, or anyone having any kind of educational level, which is the reaons why some compare him with Pol Pot. In fact, he became a victim of what the French called "bleuite" - an attempt of causing the ALN-fighters to turn against each other out of mistrust. Amirouch was killed on 28 March 1959 near Bou Saada, while underway to Tunisia where he should have joined the "Army of Border". (via M.A.)


At the time the French had relatively few assets deployed in Algeria, which was France’s 10th Military Region, under command by General C. de Cherriere. Originally, the French had only 55.000 troops stationed in the country: only 4.000 of these were “usable combat troops” in the words of Cherriere himself. Even after the Army and Navy bases were reinforced, in early 1955, there were only some 74.000 soldiers stationed in Algeria. By July, however, the number jumped to 105.000: about 60.000 reservists were recalled from summer of the same year, and by 1956 there were 200.000 French soldiers, airmen and sailors stationed in the country.

The Army had three Corps commands, each of which was divided into operational zones, themselves organized into one or more light divisions. As of mid-1956 these were:
- Corps d’A d’Oran: 12e, 13e and 29 Infantry Divisions, 5 Armoured Division
- Corps d’A d’Alger: 9e, 20e, and 27 Infantry Divisions
- Corps d’A de Constantine: 2e Motorized Division, 14e and 19e Infantry Divisions, and the 25e Airborne Division
As reserve, the Army had the 7e Motorized Division and the 10th Airborne Division. Later on these units were to be reinforced by the 4e Motorized Division, while the 10e Division became a full Parachute Division. Majority of French troops in Algeria were conscripts: only 15% were career soldiers. There were only very few Moslem soldiers: only some 20.000 – most of them career regulars – served in “Tirailleur” infantry regiments and autonomous battalions; some other in Spahi mechanised cavalry regiments. Such units bore the suffix “Algérien” until 1958.

The Armée de l’Air, the French Air Force, also had few assets in situ. At earlier times some Bell P-63 Aircobras and Mistrals of the EC.6 were based at Oran; C-47s of the GT (later ET) 1.62 were in Blida, and at Lartigue there was a flight of Lockheed P2V-6 Neptunes of 22F. The Mistrals were supplemented by those of the EC.7 in Tunisia, and EC.8 in Morocco.

Also important to mention is a significant number of Piper Cubs, initially used for observation, but later as Forward Air Controllers (FAC) as well. Early during the war the reliable Pipers were equipped with different radios than ground troops, which made communication with ground troops extremely difficult: a former French Piper Cub pilot who flew in Algeria recalled a case where a French Army officer attempted to communicate with him by hand-signs, while in his back several privates were making other kinds of – not entirely “politically correct” – signs to the pilot and observer!

The Aéronavale – French Naval Aviation - also had land-based F4U-7 Corsairs from 12F in Algeria, subsequently reinforced by some PB4Y-2s, deployed also in Tunis. The Mistrals were used for flying some combat operations against the insurgents, but proved not very suitable: they were too fast, not sufficiently manoeuvrable, and delicate to operate.


French SIPA 111A shot down early during the war. The crew apparently survived. The SIPA 111A was a French-built Arado 396, and was differently known as the S.10, S.11, S.111 or even S.12 in French service. Three squadrons saw service in Algeria during the mid-1950s. (via M.A.)


While the FLN’s attacks were not overly successful, they drew a strong French military response, which almost destroyed the nationalist organization. The initial reaction was predictable: not so much because of pied noir mentality, but because the French administration was actually caught with its paints down, and reacted out of a habit under such circumstances. There followed mass indiscriminate round-ups of suspects - most of them innocent but converted into ardent militants by the fact of their imprisonment. Some settlers demanded the immediate execution of all captured members of the FLN: in the “Depeche Quotidienne”, a local senator demanded that, “the evil be pursued where it be found and the ringleaders rooted out…”.

The fierce and brutal response of Paris paid dividends: between 2 November 1954 and early February 1955, not a single pied noir was killed by insurgents. Terrorist attacks against the Algerian population continued unabated, nevertheless. In a typical pattern of coercion by violence the FLN made it perfectly clear to the Algerian people that any kind of association with French authority would result in brutal consequences. All Moslems were ordered to give up smoking and alcohol, on pain of mutilation and death. In response, the French institutionalised a policy of “collective responsibility” against the Moslems, with predictable results. Nevertheless, their initial ground operations were at least sufficiently successful: by February 1955 Didouche was dead, Boulaid and Bitat were imprisoned and the whole guerrilla network in ruin. The FLN was not completely destroyed, however: despite subsequent French attempts to integrate Moslem and European population (something colons viewed with immense mistrust), there were enough recruits to join the movement. Guerrilla gangs were gradually rebuilt and the war continued.

In fact, Ben Boulaid managed to get out of the jail within the shortest possible time. Being a hobby technician he met a sinister fate. In March 1956, the ALN guerrilla captured a package dropped from one of AdA transports for French troops in the Aurès area. The package contained a radio station: this was immediatley brought to Boulaid and he attempted to take it into service. As soon as Boulaid opened the set it exploded and killed him.


This Sud-Est S.E.535 Mistral of the Escadre de Chasse 6 was used for air defence and close air support in Algeria until the unit was withdrawn, in December 1960. The Mistral was French-built DeHavilland Vampire VB.Mk.5, equipped with DeHavilland Goblin 2 turbojet engine. The SNCASE actually first built some 138 Mistrals that were a direct copy of the Vampire VB.Mk.5, and then developed two own versions, the S.E.532 (which lacked an ejection seat), and the S.E.535 (equipped with ejection seat). A total of 250 of the later were built.



Appearance of Helicopters

During 1955 the French realised that to defeat the FLN they would have to improve the reaction capability of their forces by means of better intelligence, mobility and firepower. Obviously, air power could make the largest contribution to reduction of reaction times.

In June 1955 the first four Escadrilles d’Aviation Légère d’Appui (EALA) were formed, equipped with Moraine-Salunier MS.500s and MS.733 Alcyon. At the time, air units were operated within three Groupes Aériennes Tactiques (GATAC): GATAC 1 Constantine, covering Wilayas 1 and 2; GATAC 2 Oran, covering Wilaya 5; and GATAC 3 Algiers, covering Wilayas 3, 4 and 6.

Aside from aircraft the French also operated a few Bell 47Gs, bought in Italy, and Sikorsky H-19s (S-55s), borrowed from US forces in West Germany. On 1 April 1955 these were organized in the Escadrille d’Hélicoptères Légers 57 (57 Light Flight) of the French Air Force, consisting of ten 47Gs and eight H-19s. On the same day the ALAT followed the suit, establishing the Groupe d’Hélicoptères No 2 (Helicopter Group 2), with a flight of 47Gs and another of H-19s. On 22 June the first H-19s of the Aéronavale arrived in Algeria as well. H-19s were soon in action. On 4 May 1955 two helicopters deployed a handful of legionnaires on the summit of the Jebel Chélia, in the Aurès massif: a manoeuvre that would otherwise taken perhaps two days by conventional transportation means, was thus accomplished in 20 minutes.

The French were swift in recognizing the potentials of the “ventilos” (an abbreviation of ventilateur, fan) – as helicopters became known in their military parlance – for their purposes, especially their ability to transport troops and provide fire support. Consequently, the development of the helicopter units pursued on quite a high pace. On 1 August 1955 the EH.57 was re-designated Groupe Mixte d’Hélicoptèrs 57 (GMH.57). The GMH.57 was deployed in combat only days later, as already on 20 August 1955 the FLN attacked villages around the town of Philippeville (now called Skikda), deliberately massacring colon families. 123 settlers died under terrible circumstances. The French immediately dropped ideas about political reform, replacing these with revenge: while the colons retaliated with a ferocity that shocked the public opinion, killing over 12.000 Moslems, the Army ruthlessly restored order in the Philippeville area, driving an ever deeper wedge between the Moslems and colons.


French Flexibility

It was not before 1956 that the French realized the seriousness of the situation in Algeria. In January the Governor-Geneeral Soustelle was recalled as colon riots forced Premier Mollet to rescind unpopular appointment of General Catroux. Early in the same year France started acquiring a large number – some 700 – of North American T-6G Texan trainers, no less but 300 of which were to be deployed in Algeria over the time. Many Texans were rushed to a number of additional EALA units were organized – now under control of a single Groupe d’Aviation Légère d’Appui (GALA), 70. The Texan proved a robust aircraft, capable of carrying two 7.5mm rocket-pods, a 100-litre napalm tank, four 10kg bombs, or six T.10 rockets. They were the mainstay of French operations until replaced in the early 1970. The GALA 70 was later split into three GALAS, one within each GATAC. Besides through T-6Gs, the Air Force was further strengthened by the addition of B-26 Invader light bombers, operated by EB.91, as well as F-47Ds of the EC.20.

The EC.20 was originally created in Algeria, specifically in Oran on 1 April 1956. It included two escadrons, the EC.1/20 Aurès-Nementha and EC.2/20 Ourasénis, each equipped with 18 F-47D Thunderbolts. Due to their age the Thunderbolts proved increasingly problematic to service, and in September 1957 the surviving 24 airframes were consolidated into Escadron 2/20, while 1/20 received 16 newly-built SNCASE Mistrals. The mission of the EC 20 was two-fold: air support for policing operations (the French stubbornly attempted to avoid the use of the word “war” in connection with Algeria), and operational training for young pilots, freshly graduated from Meknès Flying School, in Morocco.


An F-47D Thunderbolt of the EC.20. The type was the heaviest fighter-bomber in French arsenal in the early stages of the Algerian War. The type was used for close-support duties until replaced by Skyraiders. (via M.A.)


The helicopter arm continued growing and remained successful as ever greater demands were placed for carriage of commanders, transport of troops, re-supply of remote outposts and evacuation of the wounded. Their tactical benefits were demonstrated time and again. On 14 January 1956 a plan was drawn up to surprise an important meeting of guerrilla commanders in M’Doukal, some 30km south of Barika. Two H-19s – one from the Aéronavale and another from ALAT – were used to deploy commandos. These took the insurgents by surprise and captured six leaders. As the French force was dispersing an order was received to concentrate at Rhoufi where a rebel band had been reported by the pilot of a light observation aircraft. Having been refuelled, the two H-19s flew 120 commandos in a quick shuttle, deploying them in ambush positions despite some ground fire. This swift action resulted in 43 rebels killed or captured, and a large quantity of arms being recovered for the loss of four dead and eight wounded.

Especially Lt.Col. Marcel Bigeard, commanding officer of the 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment learned to appreciate what the helicopter could do for his men. In the first action that saw his unit being supported by helicopters, undertaken on 22 February 1956, 43 FLN members were killed, 96 arrested and another large cache of weapons captured. Such operations were possible foremost due to highly flexible organization. A considerable number of air command posts were established, all equipped with radios in order to be able to communicate between the ground units and aircraft, and thus bring air power to bear on short notice.

Through 1956, however, the development of the French helicopter units was actually going through a phase of testing. There was a lack of agreement as to which helicopter type was the most suitable for prevailing combat conditions. At the time the French helicopter industry was not able to meet the demands of the armed services. Eventually, a decision was taken to send Capt. Santini, a veteran from Indo-China, to the USA to carry out an investigation into available helicopters. Santini recommended two types: the Sikorsky S-58 (better known in US Army and USAF service as H-34), and the Vertol H-21. The former was selected by Armée de l’Air, and the later by ALAT and the Aéronavale. The disagreement over this decision was still present, and consequently another analysis was undertaken through July 1956, resulting in conclusion that the H-34 was considerably better suited to the demands of the war in Algeria.

Before this, however, considerable numbers of H-21 and H-34 were already ordered: the first three Aéronavale H-21s and two Air Force H-34s arrived in Algeria already in June 1956, with ALAT H-21s following in August. By the time an Escadron d’Hélicoptères Lourdes 1/57 (Heavy Helicopter Squadron) was established and attached to GMH.57. The H-21s for Aéronavale were attached to 31F, while the ALAT established the Helicopter Group 2 with its H-21s.

With an increased number of aircraft and helicopters available, the ALAT began forming aviation troops, adding fixed-wing aircraft to some, and helicopters to other Army units. At the end of 1956 the French Army Aviation possessed 19 light helicopters of three different types, 13 H-19s, seven Whirlwinds and 29 H-21s (no less but 108 H-21s were delivered to ALAT during the whole war). An additional order for H-21s and H-34s was issued despite funding difficulties and inter-service disagreements. Eventually, each French division in Algeria has got a troop of up to 12 aircraft and/or helicopters. If the flexibility of these units was one of the keys to the French military success in Algeria. Brutality of their operations was characteristic, however: dozens of villages in areas of FLN activity were flattened by bombardments – after their inhabitants were warned to leave.


From 1956 onwards, the AdA began acquiring a large number of North American T-6G Texan training aircraft. Most of these were used for COIN operations in Algeria, organized in so-called "Escadrilles d'Aviation Légère d'Appui" (EALA). Most of these squadrons were "sponsored" by "regular" AdA units, flying fighter jets and other heavier aircraft. All of them developed very flamboyant insignia, as can be seen on this T-6G of the EALA 14-72, displaying "Pluto riding a machine-gun". EALAs were very flexible outfits, moved around the Algeria as required by current combat operations.



Kidnapping of FLN Leaders

In March 1956 Morocco and Tunisia were granted independence, opening sanctuary areas for the FLN to west and east of Algeria, while forcing the French to divert their troops and efforts to border protection. The new situation enabled the FLN to create the "Army of Border" - a standing and well-equipped force (at least better equipped than the ALN-guerrilla inside Algeria) of 20.000, which was to become the backbone of the future Algerian Army. The "Army of Border" was initially led by Col. Houari Boumediène, and his two deputies, Commandant Manjli, and Commandant Slimane, but his real "man of trust" was Capitaine Abdelazziz Bouteflika. Both, Boumediène and Bouteflika, later became presidents of Algeria.

Before that time the FLN had been forced to create its “safe bases” within Algeria, but now its leaders fled over new borders and were soon joined by thousands of refugees, recruits and defeated guerrillas who formed the potential for a new army. At first neither Kind Mohammed V of Morocco nor President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia gave his full support to Algerians. Both were heavily dependent upon French economic aid. But, on 22 October 1956 Ben Bella and three other FLN leaders were kidnapped by the French while flying from Rabat to Tunis.

Namely, on 20 and 21 October 1956 a meeting was expected to take place in Morocco, between Ben Bella, Khider, Ait Ahmed, Boudiaf, and the Sultan of Morocco. This was to be followed by a meeting in Tunis. The FLN leaders were to be brought there by a Douglas DC-3 of AirMaroc. The French learned about this and the Chief of staff in Algiers, Gen. Lorillot, considered the situation a good opportunity to exercise "decapitation" of the FLN. The DC-3 took off at 12:14hr, and was initially underway to Palma de Majorca. Together with four FLN leaders on board were also Mostapha Lacheraf (teacher of history at the secondary school Lousi Legrand, who wanted to make a trip to Tunis with FLN leaders), Christine Darbar (journalist of the Moroccan newspaper Al Istiqlal), Eve Dechamps (journalsit of the French Observateur), Tom Brady (from New York Times), René Lery and six other journalists and photographers from Morocco.

Already before the aircraft started for Tunis, at 17:15hr, its pilot, Commandant Gellier, received an order to land in Algiers. At first he hesitated, but the French reminded him that while his aircraft was Moroccan property, its serial number was French, his registration was French and that the military authority has the right to force him to land and search the aircraft. Regardless how "right" or "wrong" these reasons were, Gellier - former Armée de l'Air officer - felt compelled to follow these orders. Without explaining anything to his passengers, he flew to Algiers, while one of the flight attendants drew attention of the passengers in order to prevent them from what is happening. The French Army and Gendarmerie immediately took the aircraft in their custody, and arrested the FLN leadership without any resistance.

In an attempt to avenge the capture of FLN leaders, but also show that the war would go on without them as well, on 23 October 1956 Si Azedine, the deputy commander of Wilaya 4, set up an ambush for a French convoy near Oum Zoubia, near Tablat. Their attack was successful and the French convoy decimated, the guerrilla capturing a considerable amount of weapons in the process.

The French reaction was swift - even if not lethal: the ALN fighters did not even manage to pull out from the scene of the battle when the first two T-6Gs appeared over them to strafe. The Texans missed their target, but the AdA then avenged on the nearest village: Diour was heavily hit from the air by numerous French aircraft and many civilians killed. As a result of this attack, the surviving young men from this village - previously hostile to the ALN - decided to join it. Learning about this, as well as bout the man behind the successful ambush, the French put Azedine as the "#1" on their "black list" of ALN commanders.

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