In response to Ivan Eland's piece about options in Iraq, I have received commentaries from Gareth Porter and Carl Coon (please see below). For what it is worth, my sense is that we need to get away from thinking that there are autonomous "options" or "settlements" or "negotiations" available that can be staffed through in Washington as though the US is the ultimate arbiter of developments on the ground. The notion that Iraq's future depends exclusively on whether the best and brightest in Washington can come up with a "plan" may in time be seen as the underlying flaw in the President's speech on Tuesday. The most discouraging aspect is the weak performance of the Iraqi government. But therein lies the dilemma of democracy.
Further comments most welcome.
I am wrestling with the linkage between political and military elements of a comprehensive settlement right now for my piece for Middle East Policy. I agree with Ivan that U.S. talks with the insurgents is not going to be enough and that brokering a compromise that shades into confederation to keep Sunni and Shiite (and Kurdish) paramilitaries away from the political operatives and civilians of the other communities is probably going to be part of that solution. But that isn't enough either. In the Baghdad area as well as elsewhere (e.g., Mosul, Kirkuk), you can't separate Sunni from Shiite or Kurdish from Arab and Turkmen populations, so there has to be arrangements that provide assurances to both sides against the use of secret police/paramiliary repression as part of any settlement.
And of course the main missing ingredient in whatever talks have been held so far is the U.S. willingness to agree that even a timetable for withdrawal would be part of a settlement and to use the U.S. troop presence as leverage on all sides to negotiate seriously.
Gareth
I think Ivan is basically on target. It is consistent with my view that we need a lot of quiet behind-the-scenes diplomacy, with all the principal actors, and with neighboring players like the Turks and adjacent Arab states. On the public side we need to assure all concerned that we will get out pretty soon and that we shall not seek any permanent military base rights. Furthermore, we should state, and back up with deeds, that we intend to leave Iraqi oil in Iraqi hands. And finally, it would make a big difference if Bush would put his money where his mouth is on the Palestine issue.
Since I see little evidence that any of the foregoing is likely to happen, except perhaps for the quiet diplomacy, I consider Ivan's pessimism justified. Quiet diplomacy could, however, help a lot if if left unencumbered by policy statements from our bully pulpit in Washington. I have observed in the past that our professional diplomats are pretty good at salvaging a situation that the "political level" messed up, if left to their own devices.
A de facto partition, with the parts tied in a federalist arrangement, is possible; in that I agree with Ivan. The Kurds will have to give some on Kirkuk, perhaps with some special status for the local Turkomans as well as oil-sharing arrangements. Ankara might move, otherwise, since the prospects for the EU anschluss are dimmed lately. The Iranian factor will remain complex, but let's remember that Iraqi Shias are Arabs, and language and ethnicity count for as much as religion.
If Washington leaves it all to the pros, we can use our carrots and sticks to good advantage to bring about some such federal solution. And we still have quite a few. One of them is our ability to work with the regimes in the neighborhood in ways that encourage them to help bring about the kind of outcome we decide we want. But that's been the problem all along. We knew we wanted Saddam out but beyond that our objectives were pretty fancifully defined insofar as we bothered to define them at all. Ivan has made a useful stab at defining a feasible outcome.
Carl Coon
Here is what Ivan says. Do you agree?
WHAT SHOULD DONALD RUMSFELD NEGOTIATE?
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently confirmed that the United States is negotiating with key insurgent leaders in Iraq to help bring peace and stability to that war-torn country.
"Unfortunately, the ongoing talks are unlikely to succeed," writes Ivan Eland, director and senior fellow of the Independent Institute's Center on Peace & Liberty, in his latest op-ed. The Sunni Arabs, Eland explains, "fear that the Shi'a and Kurds -- who control the U.S.-backed Iraqi regime -- will use the central government's power to pay them back for their past oppressive rule of Iraq. The Sunnis, with some justification, fear that democracy in Iraq could result in a 'tyranny of the majority.'"
Given the Sunni suspicions, what should Rumsfeld attempt to negotiate? Or, more broadly, what kind of political arrangement has the best chance of bringing stability to Iraq and avoiding a prolonged and bloody civil war? The best hope, according to Eland, may be in assuring the Kurds, Shi'a, and Sunni that the new central government is too weak to pose a threat to the security of each. In this case, decentralized governance -- a confederation or a partition -- would seem to have the greatest chance of success.
"Even potential reactions by Iraq's neighbors to a controlled weakening of the central government have probably been overstated," writes Eland. "The Turks would likely be constrained from reckless military action by their overwhelming desire to get into the European Union, and the export of Persian Iran's failed theocratic rule to Iraq's Arab Shi'a would probably have at most limited success.
"Decentralized governance is not a panacea. The administration is so far in the hole that civil war remains a distinct possibility. And the issues of oil revenue sharing, the status of Kirkuk, and the boundaries for areas of self-rule would have to be settled. Despite these challenges, however, a negotiated U.S. withdrawal and agreement among Iraqi groups for a decentralized solution are the best hope for salvaging Iraq. Because the U.S. public will eventually demand a U.S. withdrawal, a controlled decentralization of Iraq is better than one arrived at later in chaos or civil war."
See "Negotiations with Iraqi Rebels Are a Good Start But Not Enough," by Ivan Eland (6/27/05)
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1527 "The Way Out of Iraq: Decentralizing the Iraqi Government," by Ivan Eland
http://www.independent.org/publications/po...type=full&id=16