Moonlighters recall accomplishments, changes after completing second successful tour in Iraq
Submitted by: 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing
Story Identification #: 20059284242
Story by Cpl. Cullen J. Tiernan



AL ASAD, Iraq (Sept. 28, 2005) -- When duty in Iraq called twice in two years, they were ready and continued their steadfast support of the Iraqi people and their desire to live in freedom.

The Moonlighters of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 764, Marine Aircraft Group 26, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, have recently finished their second deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

HMM-764 is a reserve CH-46E Sea Knight squadron based out of Edwards Air Force Base, Calif. The Moonlighters will be returning to the United States after flying 3,800 mishap-free combat hours, transporting 14,918 passengers and hauling 26,972 pounds of cargo.

“Our primary mission was assault support,” said Lt. Col. Jacques Naviaux, the commanding officer of HMM-764. “Seven days a week, 24 hours a day, we were ready to move Marines, Soldiers and Iraqis throughout the area of operations.”

In a country where the roads are plagued with improvised explosive devices, the Moonlighters provided a much safer mode of transportation, flying Marines over the IED threat.

“We were able to save lives by being here,” said the San Diego native. “Seventy percent of our missions were flown under the cover of darkness. The Marines of HMM-764 thrived in a combat environment.”

Although Marines can sometimes get complacent at Al Asad, Naviaux said that the enemy threat is very real.

“We had a rocket land on the flightline, damaging three of our aircraft,” said Naviaux. “We were able to repair them over here, but it served as a reminder to all the Marines that we are in a combat zone.”

Marines throughout the squadron will go home with war stories, memories of turning wrenches in 120 degree heat, and many different experiences from two deployments into combat zones.

“I remember one time during (Marine Corps Marital Arts Program) training,” said Cpl. Deborah Myatt, an administrative clerk with HMM-764 from Lancaster, Calif. “It was 10 a.m. and we were finished for the day. We all put our hands in for the motivational cheer and boom, (indirect fire) goes off real loud and real close. I found out later it hit a gunnery sergeant in the face and she was later awarded the Purple Heart.”

While deployed, the Moonlighters didn’t let the high operational tempo stop them from training. They earned 60 different higher belts in the MCMAP, attended college courses, fired and carried the M-1014 Joint Service Combat shotgun, trained new crew chiefs and had eight combat meritorious promotions.

“Their maturity, confidence level and the way the Marines carry themselves has been extremely professional,” said Sgt. Maj. Daniel D. Townsend, the sergeant major of HMM-764. “It was a phenomenal task keeping the aircraft constantly flying and every Marine in the squadron attributed to that effort. We had great support from MAG-26 and Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron-26. The entire 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing welcomed us with open arms. It was a total team effort.”

The Columbus, Ohio, native, said the back-to-back deployments were especially hard on the families of reservists who do not live close to a Marine Corps installation. He said the Moonlighters’ Key Volunteer Network was fabulous and the communication from Al Asad to the United States was consistent.

“It was a good, quick seven-month deployment,” said Myatt, who is the current noncommissioned officer of the quarter for HMM-764, MAG-26 and 2nd MAW. “The time went by fast because we were constantly working, training and learning. We lived in a building with a cement roof, so I felt safer sleeping at night.

“While I’ve been here I’ve matured, and thought more about my life and career goals. If I don’t pick up sergeant and make it to the drill field, I know I want to be in the reserves for at least 20 years.”

Some of the Moonlighters said their second deployment wasn’t as exciting as their first, but they all are ready to get back to their families and loved ones.

“You make do with what you have,” said Cpl. Jarred Bolin, an avionics technician with HMM-764. “We have already been through this, under harder conditions. Now at Al Asad, we have running water. Even if the water isn’t clean enough to drink, it’s a luxury. Getting the birds up to fly missions was a fast-paced mission and we transported a lot of troops.”

According to Townsend, the Marines will leave Iraq with an experience level head and shoulders above what it was, as well as a couple pounds sweated out on the flightline in the desert heat.

“I’m a better Marine and I think a better person,” said Myatt. “One day at the (dinning facility) we met some people who spoke broken and had been tortured under the Saddam’s regime. One didn’t have an ear, and another’s brother had his tongue cut out of his mouth. Talking to them, I realized it’s not about (weapons of mass destruction) or fighting, it’s about people. People shouldn’t have to live in fear.

“These people didn’t have the freedom of speech we take for granted in the United States, like the right to protest. They are fighting to have their own country now. I think the Iraqi police are so brave. They put their lives and their family’s lives on the line every day so they might one day live in freedom.”

http://www.marines.mil/marinelink/mcn2000....A5?opendocument

“Black Three” rides again
Submitted by: II Marine Expeditionary Force (FWD)
Story Identification #: 200592944324
Story by Lance Cpl. Josh Cox



CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq (Sept. 29, 2005) -- One team of Marines operating with 2nd Tank Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, bound together after facing the effects of a deadly improvised explosive device here.

While conducting routine operations with the tanks May 1, the gun truck, known as “Black Three,” was hit by an IED. Marines from Headquarters Platoon, Bravo Company, 2nd Tank Bn., 2nd Marine Division affected by the explosion, Lance Cpls. Jamby Perez and Brandon Wells, and Sgt. Brent Sheets, were riding in the vehicle when the blast occurred.

“It went off right beside our truck,” said Sheets, the truck’s vehicle commander. “We really didn’t have any good way to detect that it was there because the side of the roads were covered in trash.”

Perez, who is a motor transport operator with Bravo Company, said when the IED detonated, the boom was so deafening he temporarily lost his hearing, except for intense ringing in his ears.

“All I heard was sirens,” said Perez, describing his ear’s reaction to the blast. “It was like a police car. I didn’t hear the actual IED go off.”

When Perez realized what was going on, he and others rushed to help fellow Marines who were injured.

“I looked to my right and saw my vehicle commander, Sgt. Sheets,” said Perez, who was piloting the armored humvee at the time of the blast. “Sgt. Sheets was able to get out of the vehicle, but he just collapsed. He was bleeding from his nose and he couldn’t move his knee. I saw my gunner (Wells), and he was dripping blood, but I just didn’t know where it was coming from. He was walking around because he was so hyped up.”

Marines of “Black Two,” another humvee operating with Bravo Company, did what they could to calm and aid their injured teammates until they could be evacuated from the scene.

The “Black Three” driver came out of the explosion unscathed.

“I was the only one who didn’t get hurt,” said Perez. “The biggest two pieces of shrapnel that went through the truck missed me by inches. It would have taken half of my leg off. That’s pretty scary.”

After the attack, Perez was able to return to duty within a week, while the other Marines of “Black Three” recuperated from wounds received in the explosion.

“It took me about two weeks,” said Sheets. “I missed one mission.”

According to Sheets, Wells was back in the turret three weeks later.

“We were able to overcome it through each other, giving each other support,” said Perez. “We were kind of scared of going back out there. Somehow we were just able to overcome it.”

Sheets said the incident made him angry, and he was ready to get back into the fight as soon as he could.

“It makes you push a lot harder when you are out in the field to find the bad guys, because you don’t want that stuff to happen to any other Marine,” he said.

There is something special about the bond the “Black Three” Marines created supporting 2nd Tank Bn., in Iraq, and an IED didn’t stop the team from thriving through the rest of the deployment.

“The bond that we have, I never thought it was possible,” said Perez. “Our crew has never been separated.”

Sheets said the Marines who serve as a quick reaction force for the tanks, dubbed “The Rat Pack,” are a close-knit group in the battalion.

“I think honestly out of everyone in Bravo Company, we have a really good bond because we are always the ones going out with the tanks and clearing these buildings, and we depend on each other a lot more,” said Sheets. “When you go clear buildings and you have that man covering you while you are going in, there is a bond that gets a lot thicker.”

“Black Three” has been very instrumental during operations while attached with 2nd Tank Bn.

“If tanks have a certain mission, we will be the ones to clear houses in that area so the tankers don’t have to dismount,” said Sheets. “We get more involved with the ground than they do. If a tank breaks down, we will go out and set up security for the tanks while they are fixing the problem in the field.”

A deadly IED wasn’t enough to break the bond among the Marines of “Black Three,” or enough to stop the mission of Bravo Company in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

EDITOR’S NOTE
Please feel free to publish this story or any of the accompanying photos. If used, please give proper credit to the writer/photographer, and contact us at: cepaowo@cemnf-wiraq.usmc.mil so we can update our records.

http://www.marines.mil/marinelink/mcn2000....55?opendocument

Dallas, Ga., native serves to follow dad’s footsteps
Submitted by: 2nd Marine Division
Story by: Computed Name: Sgt. Jerad W. Alexander

Story Identification #: 20059245029




CAMP AL QA’IM, Iraq(Sept. 24, 2005) -- Dallas, Ga., native Cpl. Richard E. Scarlett III spent his entire life around the Marine Corps, traveling to the various Marine posts around the globe, long before he could even vote, drive, pay taxes, or even wear the uniform of a United States Marine.

Scarlett, now serving with the Motor Transportation Platoon, Headquarters & Service Company, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, traveled the world with his father, Richard E. Scarlett Jr., a now-retired Marine master sergeant.

While growing up, he moved with his family to various Marine Corps postings including Camp Pendleton, Okinawa, Quantico, and Camp Lejeune, according to Scarlett.

“Growing up around the Marine Corps helped me adjust to some of the things I’ve experienced in the Marines,” said Scarlett, who served in Afghanistan before coming to Iraq. “Moving around was pretty easy for me.”

Roughly two years after graduating Quantico High School in Quantico, Va., Scarlett followed his father and enlisted in the Marine Corps in 2003.

“He didn’t push me, but thought it was a good idea,” he said. “I thought the Marine Corps would help me grow up as a person,” Scarlett said. “Before, I was lazy and didn’t do much, now I have a better work ethic.”

He also joined because he wanted to be like his father, he said.

While in the Marine Corps, Scarlett’s father was an ammunition technician. Working with ammunition, however, wasn’t something Scarlett wanted.

“I like to work with my hands, so [motor transportation] was the best thing,” he said.

During his first year in the Marine Corps, if there was anything Scarlett didn’t understand about the Marine Corps, he could simply turn and ask his father, which, according to Scarlett, was a big help.

Currently, Scarlett isn’t sure about what exactly he wants to do in the future but is investigating the possibility of going to school to become a crime scene investigator.


http://www.marines.mil/marinelink/mcn2000....db?OpenDocument

Experiences never forgotten
Lance Cpl. Antonio Rosas


“Once captured, there is no comprehending what goes through your head,” said former Marine and Vietnam prisoner of war, Walter W. Eckes, 59, who spoke at the Camp Pendleton Naval Hospital’s 15th annual Prisoner of War/Missing in Action remembrance ceremony Sept 16.

The first national commemoration for POWs/MIAs was July 18, 1979. Since then, Congress has passed yearly resolutions for the tribute. But in 1996, a presidential proclamation designated the third Friday in September as National POW/MIA Recognition Day.

For the commemoration in 1991, the hospital planted a tree as a living memorial to the 10 Navy corpsmen still missing in action, some since 1963.

“It may only be a statistic for some, but it’s a terrible tragedy to someone who knows that individual (a prisoner of war),” said Navy Capt. James J. Ware, acting commanding officer, Naval Hospital Camp Pendleton.

Today, more than 25 feet tall, the tree serves as a reminder to the families and friends of those still unaccounted for that they are not forgotten. Families, retired servicemembers and current military leaders gathered for the event in order to acknowledge that those still unaccounted for will not be forgotten.

Eckes, one of a few servicemembers to successfully escape from a POW camp during the Vietnam War, described to the crowd of more than 100 teary-eyed people, his experiences at a POW camp.

“Every prisoner was treated differently. Fear is always in your mind. Basically they (the guards) could do anything they wanted to us, and that included torture,” said Eckes.

Although his hair has grown to a considerable length past his shoulders, Eckes continues to maintain the Marine spirit that helped keep him alive as a POW and speaks at colleges across the nation about his experiences.

“If there is something that I took from my experience it is that whatever you take on, don’t quit,” Eckes said.

In 1998, the Defense Auth-orization Act made it a law that the POW/MIA flag be flown on Memorial Day, Armed Forces Day, Flag Day, Veterans Day, Independence Day, and POW and MIA Recognition Day.

http://www.cpp.usmc.mil/scout/articles/sept%2029/xp.asp

General Predicts Victory Through Iraqi People's Determination
By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA
American Forces Press Service


WASHINGTON, Sept. 29, 2005 – The determination of the Iraqi people to resist terrorists and to advance the cause of democracy in their country is what will win the war there, a military official in Baghdad said today.
The Iraqi people have already shown a great will and determination to establish a free country, and progress is made continually, Army Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, a Multinational Force Iraq spokesman, said at a news briefing.

"The people of Iraq are uniting to kick the terrorists and foreign fighters out of their country," he said. "We're seeing more of that every day."

Iraqi citizens routinely supply Iraqi security forces and coalition forces with information about terrorists and their activities, which often leads to successful operations, he said. Also, Iraqi security forces continue training and are increasing in size and effectiveness, he said.

"There is great progress with the Iraqi security forces, not just on numbers," he said. "We are seeing increased capabilities on the part of the Iraqi security forces throughout Iraq on a daily basis. It's amazing progress."

There are now more than 195,000 trained and equipped security forces, and they will be ready to provide security for the constitutional referendum in October, Lynch said. Coalition forces will still be in Iraq to provide support, he added.

"There will be a safe and secure referendum in October," he said.

A surge in violence undoubtedly will occur around the referendum, but Iraqi and coalition forces are prepared to fight the terrorists, Lynch said. Effectiveness of terrorist attacks has not increased, even though the number has, he said, and the violence is isolated to four provinces.

As the Muslim holy month of Ramadan approaches, the Iraqi government, in conjunction with coalition forces, is releasing about 1,000 detainees, Lynch said. Already, 500 have been released, and 500 more will be by the end of this week, he said. These detainees were chosen for release by a special release board consisting of Iraqi and coalition officials, he explained.

When the detainees are released, they are given new clothing, a copy of the Koran and $25 to help start their new life, Lynch said. Iraq's deputy prime minister speaks to them and urges them to go back to their families and be productive members of society, he added.

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2005/20050929_2880.html

'As Iraqis Stand Up, We Will Stand Down,' Bush Tells Nation
By John D. Banusiewicz
American Forces Press Service


WASHINGTON, June 28, 2005 – On the one-year anniversary of the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq to a transitional Iraqi government, President Bush tonight promised that U.S. forces would remain in Iraq until the job is complete, "but not one day longer."

President Bush told troops at Fort Bragg, N.C., June 28 that the terrorists in Iraq will fail. He said "terrorists do not understand America. The American people do not falter under threat. And we will not allow our future to be determined by car bombers and assassins." White House photo by Eric Draper

In a nationally televised speech at Fort Bragg, N.C., the president cited progress in Iraq and emphasized that the best way to complete the mission is to help the Iraqi people build a free nation they can govern and defend themselves.

"The principal task of our military is to find and defeat the terrorists," he said. "And that is why we are on the offense. And as we pursue the terrorists, our military is helping to train Iraqi security forces so that they can defend their people and fight the enemy on their own. Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down."

More than 160,000 Iraqi security forces are now trained and equipped, Bush said. Some, he said, are capable of operating independently, and others now are experienced enough to plan and execute anti-terrorist operations with coalition support. Some units still are forming, the president said, and the task of training them continues with three new approaches.

"First, we are partnering coalition units with Iraqi units," he explained. "These coalition-Iraqi teams are conducting operations together in the field. These combined operations are giving Iraqis a chance to experience how the most professional armed forces in the world operate in combat."

The second approach has coalition transition teams living, working and fighting together with their Iraqi comrades, Bush said. "Under U.S. command, they're providing battlefield advice and assistance to Iraqi forces during combat operations. Between battles, they are assisting the Iraqis with important skills, such as urban combat and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance techniques."

The third approach involves working with the Iraqi ministries of interior and defense to improve their capabilities to coordinate anti-terrorist operations. "We're helping them develop command-and-control structures," Bush said. "We're also providing them with civilian and military leadership training, so Iraq's new leaders can effectively manage their forces in the fight against terror."

Some 2,000 Iraqi security forces have died in the line of duty, the president pointed out. "Iraqi forces have fought bravely, helping to capture terrorists and insurgents in Najaf and Samarra, Fallujah and Mosul," he said. "And in the past month, Iraqi forces have led a major anti-terrorist campaign in Baghdad called Operation Lightning, which has led to the capture of hundreds of suspected insurgents. Like free people everywhere, Iraqis want to be defended by their own countrymen. And we are helping Iraqis assume those duties.

"The progress in the past year has been significant," he said, "and we have a clear path forward."

Acknowledging that the mission in Iraq is "difficult and dangerous," Bush said the mission also is clear. "We're hunting down the terrorists. We're helping Iraqis build a free nation that is an ally in the war on terror. We're advancing freedom in the broader Middle East. We are removing a source of violence and instability, and laying the foundation of peace for our children and our grandchildren."

Bush said that like all Americans, he sees "horrifying" images of the war. "And the suffering is real," he said.

"Some of the violence you see in Iraq is being carried out by ruthless killers who are converging on Iraq to fight the advance of peace and freedom," the president said. "Our military reports that we have killed or captured hundreds of foreign fighters in Iraq who have come from Saudi Arabia, and Syria, Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, and others. They are making common cause with criminal elements, Iraqi insurgents and remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime who want to restore the old order."

And the enemy, he said, is brutal.

"We see the nature of the enemy in terrorists who exploded car bombs along a busy shopping street in Baghdad, including one outside a mosque," he said. "We see the nature of the enemy in terrorists who sent a suicide bomber to a teaching hospital in Mosul. We see the nature of the enemy in terrorists who behead civilian hostages and broadcast their atrocities for the world to see."

But "savage acts of violence," Bush noted, have not brought the terrorists any closer to achieving their strategic objectives.

"The terrorists, both foreign and Iraqi, failed to stop the transfer of sovereignty," he said. "They failed to break our coalition and force a mass withdrawal by our allies. They failed to incite an Iraqi civil war. They failed to prevent free elections. They failed to stop the formation of a democratic Iraqi government that represents all of Iraq's diverse population, and they failed to stop Iraqis from signing up in large number with the police forces and the army to defend their new democracy."

Bush noted that Libya has abandoned its designs on nuclear and chemical weapons, and that steps toward freedom and democracy are taking place in the Middle East. "Our strategy to defend ourselves and spread freedom is working," he said. "The rise of freedom in this vital region will eliminate the conditions that feed radicalism and ideologies of murder, and make our nation safer."

Though much has been accomplished, much remains to be done, Bush said.

"We have more work to do, and there will be tough moments that test America's resolve," he said. "We're fighting against men with blind hatred and armed with lethal weapons, who are capable of any atrocity. They wear no uniform. They respect no laws of warfare or morality. They take innocent lives to create chaos for the cameras. They are trying to shake our will in Iraq, just as they tried to shake our will on Sept. 11, 2001.

"They will fail," he continued. "The terrorists do not understand America. The American people do not falter under threat. And we will not allow our future to be determined by car bombers and assassins."

http://www.dod.mil/news/Jun2005/20050628_1894.html

From left to right, Staff Sgt. Josie E. Harshe, flight engineer; Capt. Anita T. Mack, navigator; 1st Lt. Siobhan Couturier, pilot; Capt. Carol J. Mitchell, aircraft commander; and loadmasters Tech. Sgt. Sigrid M. Carrero-Perez and Senior Airman Ci Ci Alonzo, pause in the cargo bay of their C-130 for a group photo following their historic flight. U.S. Air Force photo


First All-female Crew Flies Combat Mission
A crew of six Airmen at a forward deployed location climbed aboard a
C-130 Hercules together recently for the first time

By U.S. Air Force Capt. Michael G. Johnson
386th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs
SOUTHWEST ASIA, Sept. 27, 2005 — A crew of six Airmen at a forward deployed location climbed aboard a C-130 Hercules together recently for the first time in their careers. But something distinguished this mission from others they had flown --it was the first time an all-female C-130 crew flew a combat mission.
Capt. Carol Mitchell, aircraft commander; 1st Lt. Siobhan Couturier, pilot; Capt. Anita T. Mack, navigator; Staff Sgt. Josie E. Harshe, flight engineer; and loadmasters Tech. Sgt. Sigrid M. Carrero-Perez and Senior Airman Ci Ci Alonzo are all permanently assigned to the 43rd Airlift Wing at Pope Air Force Base, N.C., and currently are deployed to the 737th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron flying cargo and troops in and out of Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.

" “It was a great experience not many females can say they’ve had, however I don’t believe the Air Force should seek out all-female crews -- instead, we should focus on experience."

U.S. Air Force Senior Airman Ci Ci Alonzo

While some would call their mission “historic,” they feel this mission should be recognized like every other flight -- a successful combat mission.

“I enjoyed flying with this crew, but I don’t think we should go out of our way to have all-female crews,” said Captain Mitchell. “It took a long time for women to become accepted as aircrew members, and now that we are, we would be taking a step back by singling ourselves out rather than blending in with the rest of the Air Force.”

Airman Alonzo agrees. “It was a great experience not many females can say they’ve had,” she said. However I don’t believe the Air Force should seek out all-female crews -- instead, we should focus on experience.

“(The Air Force) should have the best crews they can put together. Nothing other than qualification and ability should be considered,” said Captain Mack.

Not only did this all female crew fly together for the first time, 6,800 miles from home-station, but they flew the mission on a Vietnam-era airplane -- a significance the crew did not miss.



“Our (aircraft) was a 1962 model. (It) came off the line when women weren’t accepted as C-130 aircrew, let alone in combat,” said Sergeant Harshe.

After the excitement of this all-female C-130 crew flying the first combat mission together wore off, they focused on what really mattered.

“(What matters is) knowing we’re making a difference and seeing it with every mission we fly,“ said Airman Alonzo. "(It's also) moving troops into the theater where they’re needed, seeing the excitement and relief on the faces of the guys and gals we take out of theater who have been there for six months to a year and are on their way home to their loved ones."

During the mission, the crew transported 151 Marines and their equipment.

Another thing they all agreed upon, the mission was a true experience.

“It was a fun thing to be able to say you did, if only once. Not that it is better, this was just different, and probably won’t happen for us again anytime soon just because of the sheer numbers,” said Sergeant Harshe.

Captain Mitchell said one additional benefit of this all female flight was gaining a different perspective.

“One way to avoid (complacency) is to mix the crews up a little, fly with some different people to get a different perspective,” she said. “And what better way to mix the crews up than by putting all the girls on the same crew?”

While the all-female crew did accomplish a unique milestone together, they point out that the significance of their mission success is that every crewmember achieved personal goals to get there.

“I encourage any girl or woman to do what she wants. Too often I hear people say they can’t do something (but it is) because they don’t realize they have the opportunity,” Captain Mack said. “I would tell any person flying is an attainable goal for anyone who wants to work for it. As they say, you are only limited in what you can do by what you can dream.”



http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/sep2...a092705wm3.html

Two Afghan National Army engineer soldiers demonstrate their new skills as one operates an Italian-made bulldozer and the other gives hand signals. The demonstration was a part of the Afghan National Army engineer training course graduation ceremony. Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Victoria Meyer

Afghan Army Builds on Engineering Skills
The training covered heavy engineer machinery operation, force
protection, and natural disaster and relief operations.

By Army Capt. Cenethea Harraway
Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan
KABUL, Afghanistan, Sept. 29, 2005 — The Afghan National Army recently graduated 26 engineers from a six-week training course that built upon their engineering skills at Camp Invictia, on the outskirts of Kabul.
This was the second graduation of Afghan National Army engineers from the course and highlights the ongoing partnership between the International Security Assistance Force and the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan to increase the capabilities of the Afghan Army.

The Multinational Engineer Group of International Security Assistance Force's Kabul Multinational Brigade conducted the training course which consisted of realistic, hands-on training and timely examinations to ensure course objectives were met.

"I have a very good feeling about my profession as an engineer. We can destroy the enemy's bunkers and clear paths for friendly forces. I will go back to my unit and train my soldiers and fellow noncommissioned officers."

Afghan National Army Sgt. Gulrahman

Afghan National Army Brig. Gen. Mohammad Amin Wardak, chief of Education for the Ministry of Defense, told the graduates the training was important to the Afghan Army's success. "This training is vital to sustaining the [Afghan National Army]," he said. "Take the skills learned here from our international friends and use them in your daily tasks.

"The [Ministry of Defense] is committed to providing the necessary machinery to equip all support units," Wardak said.

Italian and Greek instructors presented most of the course instruction, and the students enjoyed the opportunity to train on equipment from three nations -Italy, Greece and the United States.

Training was conducted in phases, starting with learning the basics of operating heavy engineer machinery like excavators and bulldozers.

The following phase covered force protection, with students applying their new skills and using engineer equipment to erect various force protection defenses at the new Afghan National Army compound at the Pol-e-Charkhi range. The intent was to teach the engineers how to operate in a working area and train to defend a forward operating base.

The final training phases focused on horizontal construction and natural disaster and relief operations, using their previous training in a field environment.


An Afghan National Army engineer from the 4th Kandak (Battalion) explains to his commander, Afghan National Army Lt. Col. Aminjan (second from right), the process of building a force protection barrier with concertina wire. Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Victoria Meyer



An Afghan National Army engineer renders a salute to Afghan National Army Brig. Gen. Mohammad Amin Wardak, the chief of Education for the Ministry of Defense, as he is presented his graduation certificate. Italian Army Capt. Umberto Cuvzio (right), the chief of Operations for the Multinational Engineer Group, assists as other senior officials from the Afghan National Army and coalition forces look on. Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan photo by U.S. Army Sgt. Mason Lowery


"I have a very good feeling about my profession as an engineer. We can destroy the enemy's bunkers and clear paths for friendly forces," said Afghan National Army Sgt. Gulrahman, a platoon sergeant from the 3rd Brigade, 201st Corps' 4th Kandak (Battalion). "I will go back to my unit and train my soldiers and fellow noncommissioned officers."

Afghan National Army Capt. Abdul Mobin demonstrates his new engineering skills as he operates an Italian-made tracked excavator. The demonstration was part of the Afghan National Army engineer training course graduation ceremony. Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Victoria Meyer


Afghan National Army Lt. Col. Aminjan, the kandak commander, echoed the sentiments of his noncommissioned officer. "I feel good about the progress of the [Afghan National Army] and we should be able to support the [Afghan National Army] units any time in combat and during deployments," he said.

"We have been trained by [International Security Assistance Force] and coalition forces to clear and destroy the landmines, to work with heavy machinery like bulldozers and excavators, and we know how to build ranges, dig trenches and prepare defensive positions for tanks and other artillery," said Aminjan. "Now, we have the skills to support our units!"

"The engineering course was difficult, but the involvement of coalition forces, trainers and trainees produced good results," said Italian Army Lt. Col. Walter Corvaglia, the MNEG commander. Corvaglia said that due to the successful coalition partnership, the training will be repeated in October for the next class of Afghan National Army engineers.

U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. Colin Flynn and Marine Gunnery Sgt. David Harris check the fit of a camouflage utility blouse on a Georgian soldier at Krtsanisi, Georgia, Sept. 9, 2005. The gear has been permanently issued as a donation to the 22nd Light Infantry Battalion as part of the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program mission, which is to assist and enhance Georgia's military capability to sustain its contribution to the allied effort in Iraq. Defense Dept. photo by U.S. Marine Corps Staff Sgt. Jonathan Moor


Marines Issue Equipment to Georgian Soldiers
The gear will assist and enhance Georgia's military capability to sustain its
contribution to the allied effort in Iraq.

By U.S. Marine Corps Staff Sgt. Jonathan Moor
U.S. Marine Forces, Europe
KRTSANISI, Georgia, Sept. 28, 2005 — U.S. Marines here have been issuing the Republic of Georgia's 22nd Light Infantry Battalion 275 types of equipment ranging from weapons, vehicles and uniforms to pencils, folding chairs and mess kits.
Part of U.S. European Command's Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program, the ongoing gear issue at the Krtsanisi National Training Area here, which began Aug. 17, is almost complete, said U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. Marcelino Hsie, program logistics officer.

Hsie said the gear has been permanently issued as a donation to the 22nd Battalion under parameters the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program mission, which is to assist and enhance Georgia's military capability to sustain its contribution to the allied effort in Iraq.

Georgia's program-trained troops form part of the dedicated force called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 to protect U.N. forces in Iraq.

"[The Georgian soldiers] take nothing we give them for granted. They're very appreciative, and they take extremely good care of their things."

U.S. Marine Corps Gunnery Sgt. David Harris

Georgia needs the assistance, due to the Georgian military's limited resources.

"These guys came to us with pretty much nothing except a set of cammies and their [weapons]," Hsie said. "We're just trying to properly equip them."

The gear issue covers all aspects of equipment needed to professionalize a battalion. The individual soldiers have already received the majority of their individual issue.

"We gave them the full issue that a military soldier would need just to do his job and do it properly," said U.S. Marine Gunnery Sgt. David Harris, program logistics chief. "It's extremely important due to the fact that they will be properly equipped to fight the battle, and it gives them the morale of looking like soldiers and having the equipment to do the job."

The United States and several other nations donated the supplies to Georgia as part of European Command's Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program. Hungary donated weapons. The Czech Republic and Romania contributed ammunition.

Hsie said each of the 558 members of the 22nd Battalion received about $4,000 in gear in addition to equipment issued to the unit such as trucks and general-purpose tents.


U.S. Marine Corps Gunnery Sgt. David Harris issues a camouflage utility blouse to a Republic of Georgia 22nd Light Infantry Battalion soldier at Krtsanisi, Georgia, Sept. 9, 2005. Defense Dept. photo by U.S. Marine Corps Staff Sgt. Jonathan Moor



U.S. Marine Corps 1st Lt. Marcelino Hsie fits a Kevlar helmet for one of Georgia's 22nd Light Infantry Battalion soldiers at Krtsanisi, Georgia, Aug. 24, 2005, during the initial issue of gear purchased by donor nations. Defense Dept. photo by U.S. Army Spc. David Brown


We gave them three [Russian] five-ton Ural 4320 cargo trucks, six British Land Rovers, three hard top and three soft top, and one Land Rover ambulance purchased from a vendor in Turkey," Hsie said, highlighting some of the more costly items.

Other categories of equipment issued to the 22nd Battalion were administrative supplies such as paper, dry-erase boards, markers and cleaning supplies such as brooms and disinfectant.

"We gave them all their training supplies too: all their targets, ear plugs, pasties and other equipment required to run a [firing] range," Hsie explained.

The battalion was also received office furniture and standard-of-living amenities like kerosene heaters for use in the winter.

One of the challenges that arose during the issue process was with the first-aid kits when they arrived: they were not adequate for the Iraq mission.

"The first aid kits were really small. Our medical personnel determined that they would be insufficient for their mission, so they're ordering ones like our IFAKs (Improved First Aid Kits)," Hsie explained. The kits that arrived in the initial order will be issued to non-deploying units.

Harris said something that stood out in his mind was the Georgian soldiers' appreciation for the gear they were given.

"The majority of it is just the attitude, saying 'thank you,'" Harris said. "You can see it in their eyes as their going through the line. They're happy to be getting the equipment we're giving them.

"Because they've never had anything, everything they get they take great care of," Harris explained. "They don't like getting their uniforms dirty or anything like that because they only have two or three sets."

The Georgian soldiers' appreciation for the new gear extends beyond their personal equipment to the unit items issued to the 22nd Battalion. While the Land Rovers are currently being used for daily battalion functions, the original shipping plastic can still be seen covering the seats in an effort to preserve the quality of the vehicles as long as possible.

Harris concluded, "They take nothing we give them for granted. They're very appreciative, and they take extremely good care of their things."






http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/sep2...a092805pj1.html

America Supports You: Country Star Tritt Honors Special Ops
American Forces Press Service


TAMPA, Fla., March 22, 2005 – Country music star Travis Tritt will join the Special Operations Warrior Foundation at an April 24 dinner honoring the special operations servicemembers killed 25 years ago during an ill-fated secret mission planned to rescue American hostages being held in Iran.

Country music star Travis Tritt will perform at the Eagle Claw 25th Anniversary Dinner in Fort Walton Beach, Fla., April 24 to support the Special Operations Warrior Foundation. The foundation provides scholarships to the children of special operations personnel killed in training or on operational missions. The dinner marks the 25th anniversary of a failed attempt to rescue 53 Americans held hostage by Iranian militants. Courtesy photo (Click photo for screen-resolution image);high-resolution image available.

The mission, nicknamed Eagle Claw, attempted to rescue the 53 Americans being held hostage in a heavily guarded embassy compound by Iranian militants. But a collision between an MH-53 helicopter and an Air Force C-130 resulted in eight servicemembers being killed and several others injured in an Iranian desert. The eight dead servicemembers left behind 12 children. The accident led to the founding of the Special Operations Warrior Foundation.

The dinner will be held in Fort Walton Beach, Fla.

Tritt, who has been called “one of country music’s most soulful and versatile vocalists” by Billboard magazine, will perform at the commemorative dinner.

A nonprofit organization, the foundation provides college educations to the children of special operations personnel killed in a training accident or operational mission. Today, the Warrior Foundation has 540 children in its program and 92 students enrolled in colleges and universities across the country, officials said.

Joining Tritt will be up-and-coming country artist Keni Thomas. Thomas, a former Army Ranger who fought in the now-famous battle depicted in the book and movie, “Black Hawk Down,” has a new country CD, “Flags of Our Fathers,” which is climbing the country charts. Proceeds from the sales of “Flags of Our Fathers” are benefiting the Warrior Foundation and its scholarship program.

The Eagle Claw 25th Anniversary Commemorative Dinner is open to the public and will be attended by many participants in the hostage rescue attempt as well as family members of those who were killed in the aircraft accident, event planners said.

“The Special Operations Warrior Foundation is honored to have the support and generosity of both Travis Tritt and Keni Thomas,” said John T. Carney Jr., the foundation’s president and chief executive officer. “Not only does their participation in this event help raise funds to provide the opportunity for a college education for some very deserving children, but it also serves as a reminder to our deployed troops that they, and their families, are not forgotten.”

(From a Special Operations Warrior Foundation news release.)

Two Years in Iraq: Coalition Requires Work, Commitment
By Donna Miles
American Forces Press Service


BAGHDAD, March 23, 2005 – Keeping the coalition here strong and working together is a lot like maintaining a marriage, the chief of staff for Multinational Force Iraq told the American Forces Press Service.
“A good marriage isn’t easy. You have to work at it every day, and there has to be give and take on both sides,” said Marine Maj. Gen. Joseph F. Weber.

“And that is what dealing with the coalition over here is,” said Weber. “It’s been a selfless give and take on both sides, by all the countries involved.”

Working as a coalition introduces challenges to the mission, with coalition members bringing to the table different languages, cultures, skill levels, types of equipment and philosophies about the way they plan and strategize, Weber said. “It makes things very interesting and very challenging,” he said.

But despite the challenges, Weber said, Operation Iraqi Freedom is stronger for the many capabilities coalition members contribute.

Regardless of their troop strength in Iraq, Weber said all coalition members are important contributors to the operation. “I don’t care if it’s a country that has 12 soldiers over here or a country like Korea that has 3,700 soldiers over here. All the coalition partners’ contributions over here are significant,” he said.

The coalition in Iraq remains strong, Weber said, and most members have committed their forces here through the end of the year. However, he said, that does not mean that they may not phase in their troop reductions before that. “I think the coalition forces are approaching their drawdown exactly the way we probably want them to, and they have been very cooperative in working with us,” he said.

Multinational Force Iraq is developing goals and objectives for the end of 2005 and beyond, but Weber said deadlines won’t be the driving force in those plans, invoking the words of Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr., Multinational Force Iraq commander, on the subject of reducing troop strength in Iraq.

“General Casey says we are not going to tie ourselves to any specific timelines or numbers,” Weber said. “It is going to be condition-based.”

http://www.dod.mil/news/Mar2005/20050323_289.html

Veterans News

VDBC Holds Third Meeting
On Friday, July 22, the Veterans Disability Benefits Commission (VDBC) held it’s third public meeting in Washington. It was well attended by the public and members of many veterans and military associations. NAUS Military & Veterans Benefits Advisor Mike Plumer attended. His report follows:

The latest meeting of the VDBC was kicked off by the Chairman, General Scott, who first welcomed the newest Commissioner Ken Jordan. He also mentioned that the White House was working on the final nominee and expected that person to be appointed no later than September but hopefully by sometime in August.

General Scott then went on to state that the VDBC, in order to assure that all the commissioners were working from the same knowledge base, was conducting a lengthy information gathering process. He emphasized that this third meeting was probably only the mid-point in the process.

Of special interest, General Scott stated that in the future the Commission will be voting on specific issues that they will consider and report on, based upon the charter given to them by Congress. Some of the data and information being collected will not actually be part of their final report or recommendations.

General Scott also indicated that there would be “outside” hearings in parts of the country where there are large concentrations of veterans and military retirees. Although there are none scheduled yet, as soon as we know where and when, we will pass on the information so all concerned will be able to attend and make their opinions known.

The three sub-committees of the Commission reported out for the first time. Following are highlights of their report:

Compensation Sub-Committee: Subcommittee Chairman Grady reported that they are working on several definitions, bearing in mind the charter under which the commission was set up. The main questions they are working on are:

What are the appropriate levels of compensation and benefits under current law?
How well is the Congressional intent of replacing earning capacity being met?
To what extent do current levels lead to an improved quality of life?
If there were no restraints in law, what could be appropriate compensation?
What principle should be used as a guide to set levels of compensation?
What changes might make the levels more appropriate?
Would individual factors such as age, employability or rank be a consideration?
Line of duty/Service Connection Sub-Committee: Subcommittee Chairman McGinn reported that they were very much still in the knowledge gathering process and that they had received briefings from various members of Congressional staffs, VA and DoD.

Transition Coordination and Readjustment Sub-Committee: Subcommittee Chairman Livingston reported that they had received information from DoD and VA on the “Seamless Transition” process, Transition Assistance Programs and streamlining of all transitions. He was recommending that the full committee study these programs.

Of special interest was the testimony by Admiral Daniel Cooper, Under Secretary for Benefits, Department of Veterans Affairs. He stated that one of his many goals was to improve the claims process for all those separating from service to the extent that 75% of all initial claims would be originated by the Benefits Delivery at Discharge (BDD) process. He also said that 75,000 PTSD and IU claims for the past 6-7 years would be reviewed for appropriateness of awards.

Of several recommendations he made was one which he stated, because of current US law on age discrimination he could do nothing about. He said that maybe the practice of awarding Individual Unemployability (IU) to retirees and veterans who were already of advanced age and out of the workforce should be looked at closely. He cited a case where a retiree of age 84 had died and who had only made his initial application for IU one week before his death. Admiral Cooper offered his opinion that maybe cases like this should be studied more closely for cause and whether the IU was appropriate.

NAUS will continue to attend the meetings of the VDBC and report on any further developments.

President's Message

Major General William M. Matz, US Army (Ret)

09/21/2005

Support Our Troops

We all have weathered the dog days of summer (high temperatures and thunderstorms) and now look forward to the cooler beauty of autumn with less heat and humidity. Besides daily news of summer’s severe weather, we continue to watch on TV and read in the newspapers, the media’s version of the War on Terror, mostly reporting the bad news, not bothering to mention the many positive aspects of the US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – the schools being rebuilt and opened, the reconstruction of the infrastructure, the good rapport that is being built between our military members and the citizens of these two war torn nations. Whether or not you approve of our involvement in these two operations, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the fact remains – our troops are there. They are fighting and dying protecting our way of life, and they need our wholehearted support.

We at NAUS support the effort. And we are supporting legislation that benefits those now serving and their families, such as an increase in the death gratuity; increased amounts of SGLI (Serviceman’s Group Life Insurance); health care coverage for all Reserve Component/National Guard personnel and families; postal benefit to families and charitable organizations to lessen the burden of mailing letters and packages to those in the combat zones; tax breaks to employers of Guard/Reservists who continue to pay salaries to activated personnel; and a bill to continue the combat pay and other allowances to injured service members as they recuperate in a military treatment facility.

But never fear, NAUS is also continuing its strong support and lobbying efforts for our military retiree/veteran, spouse, and survivor members! When we state our Primary Purpose is to support a strong national defense, we take very seriously our promise to promote and protect the interests and earned benefits of those who have served in the past. This contributes to the overall effort by assisting the Active, Reserve and Guard in their retention and recruitment programs. A military retiree/veteran can be a great recruiter if they can report to prospective enlistees or a first-termer who is contemplating a military career, that our country keeps its promises to those willing to serve our great Nation in the Armed Forces.

Still, further programs of support by NAUS include local NAUS chapters adopting Reserve/Guard units to provide support to family members left behind, providing items to the troops in the combat area, and sponsoring a proper welcome home ceremony when the units return as was done by NAUS Chapter VA-5 in Fredericksburg, Virginia, for the 229th Engineer Battalion upon their return from Iraq.

Also, NAUS will mail its 2006 Calendar to many of our troops serving overseas to remind them that they have the support of our Association. So now is the time for all of us to “rally behind the troops.” We never have had to remind our members to be patriotic! That is a given. Just as those who stayed behind over 60 years ago to support our Nation’s fighting forces during World War II, our members will again do their part to support our troops in the War on Terror.

God Bless you all and God Bless our brave troops!

http://www.naus.org/Presmessage.htm

Welcome to the GI Bill Web Site.

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Dept. of Veterans Affairs Hurricane Information
(For Education Benefits- See Below)
School Officials - See our VA-ONCE link for important information concerning school officials.

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Important Information on Replacing your Vital Documents
Available at FirstGov website.

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Information for Recipients of VA Education Benefits -
NOTE: This information is subject to change.

(1) If your school is temporarily closed this term due to Hurricane Katrina or Rita, we will continue to pay any "Hurricane Katrina or Rita" students currently receiving VA Education Benefits through the end of Fall term. (See exception for permanent school closure in #2 below.)

If you receive active-duty or reserve GI Bill benefits (CH30 or 1606) you should verify your enrollment until further notice as if your school did not close. Your payment will not be affected. That can be accomplished by going to the WAVE website or by calling 1-877-823-2378.

If you currently receive benefit payments from the Department of Veterans Affairs via electronic funds transfer (electronic deposit), payment will be made to your financial institution as usual. For information on mail delivery in affected areas please visit the U.S. Postal Service website for important information.

(2) If the school you were attending is permanently closed due to Hurricane Katrina or Rita and the State Approving Agency has withdrawn approval, your benefits will end effective the "date last paid" once we are notified of the permanent closure. .

(3) If you were attending a school that has closed and you transfer or have transferred to another school approved for veterans, your benefits will continue. Our requirement for a letter from your parent school telling us they will accept your training at the current school is being waived. If you are making a permanent transfer to a new school, we are waiving the requirement that your new school provide us with the number of hours they are accepting as prior credit. The enrollment certification we receive from your new school must be clearly identified as "Hurricane Katrina Student".

(4) Under the law, OJT, Apprenticeship and flight students are not covered by the continuation of benefits provisions in items #1 and 2 above. If you could not work or fly due to Hurricane Katrina or Rita, we cannot continue to pay education benefits. Do not certify hours, if you did not work or receive flight training.

(5) If you receive benefits under the Dependents Educational Assistance (CH35) program, and were due a payment 9/1/05, it was issued as scheduled. If you are unable to access your funds, please call 1-888-GIBILL1 (1-888-442-4551) for important information and assistance.


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Ten-Year Extension of Delimiting Period for Chapter 35 Surviving Spouses of Members who Die on Active Duty

Section 105 of Public Law 108-454, The Veterans Benefits Improvement Act of 2004, which was enacted into law on December 10, 2004 states that a surviving spouse of a person who dies on active duty will have 20 years to use his/her chapter 35 educational assistance benefits. This provision applies to deaths that occurred before the date of enactment. However, payment of benefits may not be made before December 10, 2004 for anyone whose former 10-year period had expired before that date.


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IMPORTANT- New education benefit for Activated Reservists -- H.R 4200 authorizing the creation of a new education benefit was signed into law on October 28, 2004. The new benefit, Chapter 1607, makes certain individuals who were activated after September 11, 2001 either eligible for education benefits or eligible for increased benefits. The Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and VA are working on an implementation plan for this new benefit and at this time we are unable to provide more than general information about chapter 1607. Please be patient as we work with DOD and DHS to get this program implemented. Text of H.R. 4200

We added new questions and answers to our "Ask a Question and Find Answers" section and will continue to add more questions to this section as additional information becomes available. If you don't see your question listed we probably DO NOT have an answer at this time.

If you want to be notified when new questions on chapter 1607 are added to the site, you can either-

Click this link to view our general chapter 1607 question and use the "Notify Me by E-mail if this Answer is Updated" button to register for updates to this question. We will update this question whenever we ADD questions.
This link will open in a new window.
Click here to view all Questions and Answers on the new Chapter 1607 Benefit. Use the "Notify Me by E-mail if this Answer is Updated" button to register for updates to the questions you have a specific interest in.
This link will open in a new window.

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Visit our "Ask a Question and Find Answers" section to see new questions and answers on the military "Call Up" or activation. Use the "Search" feature to see all questions and answers or click on the following links to view benefit specific questions.

Montgomery GI Bill - Active Duty (Ch 30)
Montgomery GI Bill - Selected Reserve (Ch 1606)
Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP) (Chapter 32)
Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance Program (DEA) (Ch 35)

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Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom Web Site. This is the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) web site for returning Active Duty, National Guard and Reserve service members. Click the following link to visit that site:
http://www.vba.va.gov/EFIF/

Education Fact Sheet for Guard and Reserve Members - A short fact sheet for Guard and Reserve members called to active duty. Also available in Adobe Acrobat PDF format.

LEGAL ADVICE FOR RESERVISTS -- The American Bar Association offers information to those mobilized to active duty in the Reserves and National Guard on the Web at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/helpreservists/home.html. The Web site informs legal professionals and lay persons, alike, about steps to take to prepare and protect Reserve and Guard members’ families, property and jobs during their active duty.


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Useful Department of Veterans Affairs
Sites and Telephone numbers:

Education Benefits (Not Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment. See below.) 1-888-GIBILL-1 (1-888-442-4551)
Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment If you have a service connected disability, you may be eligible for this benefit.
1-800-827-1000
Home Loans Information for the home buying veteran.
1-800-827-1000
Compensation and Pension Information on Service Connected Disability Compensation, Survivors' Benefits, Non-Service Connected Disability Compensation.
1-800-827-1000
Life Insurance Information on VA Life Insurance.
1-800-669-8477
Burial Benefits Information on the VA's National Cemetery System. (National Cemetery Administration)
1-800-827-1000
Hospital and Medical Benefits Information on VA Medical Benefits.
1-877-222-8387
VA's Debt Management Center Information on resolving debts resulting from participation in the following VA programs: Montgomery GI Bill - Active Duty, Montgomery GI Bill - Selected Reserve, Survivors’ and Dependents’ Educational Assistance, Compensation and Pension and Loan Guaranty (home loans).
1-800-827-0648
Veterans Benefits Administration Home Page The home of the Department of Veterans Affairs Veterans Benefits Administration.


GI Bill toll-free number:
1-888-GIBILL-1 (1-888-442-4551)



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SECTION 508 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT WEB ACCESSIBILITY
The DVA Education Service is committed to making its Web site accessible to all customers, including those who are working with slower computers, browsers, and modems.. The entire Web site is undergoing redesign to provide maximum accessibility and to meet or exceed the requirements of Section 508 of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998. Thank you very much for your patience through this redesign process. If you have any comments or suggestions to improve accessibility, please contact the Webmaster.




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Comments concerning the technical aspects of this page may be e-mailed to the Webmaster: wasco223c@vba.va.gov
Please do not leave benefits questions in this mail box.
This is an official web site of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, D.C.


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VA Home Page / Disclaimer / Privacy & Security Statement
Freedom of Information Act

DoD Kicks Off 2005 Combined Federal Campaign
Story Number: NNS050929-03
Release Date: 9/29/2005 11:27:00 AM



By Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Acting Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England kicked off the 2005 Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) here Sept. 28 by thanking Defense Department employees for their generosity in supporting hurricane-relief efforts and encouraging them to continue that same level of support for other important causes.

England acknowledged that this year's CFC goal of $12.8 million might be challenging in light of the more than $1 billion department employees and other U.S. citizens have donated to hurricane-related charities.

This year's CFC campaign includes several hurricane-related causes, along with hundreds of others whose needs "did not go away because [Hurricane] Katrina happened," England said.

"Many people are in need of help from Hurricane Katrina and Rita," the deputy secretary told a group of service and DoD agency leaders and CFC key workers. "But we must not forget that there are also regional and national and international charities that need our support."

Speaking in a room decorated with red, white and blue balloons and a banner urging, "Please Give," England encouraged department members to continue their long history of generous support to the CFC campaign and to support this year's theme, "Be An Everyday Hero."

England praised the "uniquely American" spirit in which DoD workers open their hearts and their wallets to others in need, in most cases, to people they've never met and never will.

"You don't know the lives you've changed and the effect you've had," he said, noting that CFC donations cause a "ripple effect" throughout local communities and the nation as a whole.

England referred to a famous Winston Churchill quote in urging department members to give during this year's CFC campaign. "You make a living by what you get," he said. "You make a life by what you give."

The goals for the Navy and Marine Corps during this year's campaign total $3.45 million.

For more news from the Department of Defense, visit www.defenselink.mil.

For more news from around the fleet, visit www.navy.mil.

http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=20362

Security force sets sights on range
Submitted by: Marine Forces Pacific
Story Identification #: 200592823831
Story by Lance Cpl. R. Drew Hendricks



U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES PACIFIC, CAMP H. M. SMITH, Hawaii (Sept. 28, 2005) -- The U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, Security Augmentation Force conducted their first quarterly training exercise at the combat pistol course, Puuloa range, Sep. 23.

The SAF Marines are specially trained to assist security forces already attached to the base in any emergency situation, or if the base goes to a higher threat condition.

“We need the SAF just in case anything threatens the base or if something like 9/11 happens again,” said Sgt. Matthew E. Nale, the noncommissioned officer in charge of training the SAF.

This specific course is meant to go beyond the scope of annual training and re-qualification to give the Marines a more combat-oriented experience.

Training like this is used to help Marines hone their skills to prepare them for activation, according to Nale.

During the course, Marines shot 6,000 9mm rounds from several different positions, distances and courses of fire.

They also had to become especially proficient in failure and exposure drills.

“Failure drills are, simply, where the shooter puts two rounds to the chest and one to the head. It is the most effective way to bring down a target,” said Cpl. Daniel Rosales, a member of the SAF and a supply clerk here.

Exposure drills are used to simulate an assault on a building. The Marine walks the line with his weapon at the alert. The targets, which are lined up along side of the firing line, will randomly turn. The Marine will then face and engage the target with a failure drill.

This drill forces the Marine to keep a level head while at the same time maintaining speed and accuracy.

“The purpose of this is to get the Marines out of the qualifying mindset and allow them to get a glimpse of what it might be like in combat,” said Nale. “In combat, there are no rules and no one is going to be there to tell you how to put rounds on target; it has to be instinct.”

Each course deals with a different aspect of shooting. One requires the Marines to shoot on the move, another at close range, and the most challenging involves the Marines firing from their backs.

“Being on your back in combat is never a situation you want to find yourself in,” said Sgt. Shane D. Oltman, a member of the SAF and a supply clerk here. “Even so, it’s good to train for it so you know what to do if it does happen.”

The MARFORPAC training office wants to do as much combat-oriented training as possible. They’re calling on Marines who are willing to put in a little hard work and have some fun while doing it.

“This was definitely motivating training. We didn’t just step up to the line and shoot, we were able to do some things that actually resembled combat,” said Cpl. Jonathan E. Knight, an administrative clerk and a SAF member here.

According to Nale, this training is focused on preparing the Marines to react quickly and without hesitation when the time arises for them to use their pistols. This requires them to be completely comfortable with their weapon.

“The reason I think this is so important is because I have been in combat with Marines from a variety of non-combat-arms jobs who are put into life or death situations and they have no clue how to react,” said Nale, referring to the many occasions where he provided security for non-infantry Marines.

No matter what the Marine’s job is, he has to be prepared for combat. The SAF can provide quality training to anyone willing to volunteer. Any Marine interested in joining their ranks must first send the request up their chain of command.

“Butcher, baker or candlestick maker, it doesn’t matter who you are, you need training like this,” said Nale. “Iraq is not going anywhere and neither is Afghanistan, you have to be ready and to do that you need to train hard like these Marines did today.”

http://www.marines.mil/marinelink/mcn2000....B2?opendocument

Exit Strategy Delusions
JEFFREY RECORD


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During the past decade of US military interventions in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Balkans, there has been a rising clamor on Capitol Hill and within the Pentagon for "clear exit strategies" before resorting to force overseas. It is believed that road maps for post-intervention military extrication can and must be crafted in advance of military action, and that such maps can and must be followed throughout the course of intervention. The United States remains stuck in the Balkans, and came close to being sucked into a Vietnam-like quagmire in Somalia, some argue, because the Clinton Administration allowed the missions there to expand without inquiring into the likely consequences. The Clinton Administration failed to follow the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine--the military's professional take on the lessons of the Vietnam War, which demands both clear objectives and the use of overwhelming force to achieve those objectives swiftly and conclusively.

Obviously, it is foolish to undertake military action without having clear ideas on political purpose and the connection between that purpose and the military means selected to achieve it. Strategy is a plan of military action to accomplish a political object. A resort to force motivated by simple frustration and without contemplation of the enemy's probable response does not pass for strategy, as the Clinton Administration did indeed learn when it launched its initially feeble air "war" against Serbia in the spring of 1999. Strategy requires formulation of a desired political end-state and the appropriate application of sufficient force to achieve that end-state. Getting into a war without a reasonable idea of how to get out of it--i.e., without a concept of success--doomed US military intervention in Vietnam.

That said, the idea of a sure-fire, pre-hostilities road map to post-hostilities military extrication is a delusion. Having a concept of success is always good, but having a healthy appreciation of the difficulties of maintaining it in the face of war's vicissitudes is even better.

The Unfortunate Intrusion of Reality

Obstacles to arriving at the intended destination abound. First of all, states that are the objects rather than the subjects of military intervention, and especially of surprise attack, can hardly be expected to devise exit strategies in advance. Did Franklin Roosevelt, on the night before Pearl Harbor, have an exit strategy for waging war against Japan? Was he not much more worried about the consequences of Nazi aggression in Europe than Japanese depredations in East Asia, and had he not already decided that, in the event of war with both Germany and Japan, the United States would pursue a Germany-first strategy?

Second, exit strategies are hostage to military performance. Defeat or stalemate on the battlefield forces reduction of political objectives, whereas military success encourages their expansion. Initial war aims, especially in long wars, rarely survive intact, and new war aims, unanticipated at the start of hostilities, emerge during the course of hostilities. Thus, the road map may remain the same, but the destination changes. The United States entered the Vietnam War in 1965 with the objective of preserving an independent, noncommunist South Vietnam, an objective which subsequent military stalemate reduced to extrication without humiliation.

In the case of democratic governments, war aims are subject to the influence of public opinion as well as events on the battlefield. The United States could not be militarily defeated in Vietnam, but its political will to continue fighting declined after the Tet Offensive. President Nixon clearly would have preferred a conclusive victory in Indochina, but he understood that the political traffic back home would not bear its costs. There are also cases where leaders are driven by public opinion into expanded war aims and peace settlement terms they believe to be unwise. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George would have settled for a less punitive Treaty of Versailles had he not been imprisoned by British public and parliamentary opinion.

States fighting in alliance or coalition also may be compelled to restrict their war aims to whatever the common political traffic will bear, even at the expense of military effectiveness. This was certainly the case in NATO's war against Serbia. As with domestic political coalitions, international political coalitions involve compromise. A foreign policy of unilateralism appeals to many Americans today because it frees the United States from having to conciliate allies on matters of political objective and military strategy. Unfortunately for unilateralists, however, the United States rarely goes to war or into peace enforcement operations in the absence of allies. Robust allies have been a hallmark of American superpowerdom, and were perhaps the key strategic factor in the Soviet Union's defeat in the Cold War. Allies confer political legitimacy, provide bases and overflight rights, and can offer "boots on the ground" to an American political and military leadership that seems increasingly petrified by the risks of land warfare.

In short, mission change--by creep, contraction, substitution, or dilution--is almost impossible to avoid in any prolonged military intervention, and not just because of changes in military fortunes. Aside from the influence of military performance and perceived domestic and coalition political imperatives, fundamental considerations of ideology, fear, and reputation can intrude nastily upon wartime decisionmaking, forcing states to fighter harder and longer irrespective of the scope of their war aims. Sometimes fighting becomes an end in itself. From 1941 to 1945 Japanese war aims deflated from the conquest of East Asia to the retention of the Emperor in a post-surrender Japan. Yet the Japanese fought even more ferociously in 1945 than they did in 1941.

Exit strategists, like Jominians everywhere, tend to discount the degree to which non-scientific, especially irrational, factors continue to influence the conduct of war, including postulation of war aims. The very notion that the course of a military intervention can be crafted in advance--like drawing up blueprints for a construction project--betrays a conviction that war is, or can be, a science. Strategy is informed by more than reason; it is also informed by fear, honor, and ideology, and failure to grasp this fundamental fact impedes an understanding of war itself. Reason would have instructed Churchill, in the wake of Dunkirk, to cut a deal with Hitler (as Stalin had the year before); yet Churchill fought on out of hatred for Hitler and everything Nazi Germany stood for.

Third, there is no such thing as a politically immaculate use of force, especially for a superpower like the United States. A major military intervention imposes post-hostilities political responsibilities that often require continued military presence, or at least the credible threat of a military return. Precisely because war is a continuation of politics by other means, simply stopping the shooting does not permit immediate military evacuation. This is especially true of wars that do not resolve the underlying political conflict that occasioned hostilities in the first place. Thus US ground combat forces remain in Bosnia and Kosovo. Even in those rare cases of conclusive military victories that completely extirpate the enemy's government and capacity for armed resistance, a residual military presence is necessary to restore and maintain order and to provide a shield for political reconstruction. The demand for unconditional surrender implies an inescapable and open-ended military occupation and rule of the defeated side; this was as true of the Confederacy in 1865 as it was for Germany and Japan 80 years later. It is politically difficult--indeed, irresponsible--to walk away from a major use of force, and doing so suggests either insufficient grounds for using force in the first instance or an unwillingness to deal with sources as opposed to symptoms of enemy behavior (as was the case in the Gulf War and NATO's war against Serbia).

If military extrication becomes the paramount aim of a prospective military intervention, then the entire enterprise becomes suspect. As in the case of what has become a fetishism over force protection, once the safety of the military instrument becomes more important than the political objective on behalf of which it is being risked, then the military instrument should not be risked in the first place. And make no bones about it, the chatter about the need for clear exit strategies is loudest among those who believe that the military should not be exposed to the risks of peace enforcement operations and other small-scale contingencies.

The Example of Korea

The difficulties of crafting and sticking with exit strategies are exemplified by the Korean War. On 25 June 1950, the day the North Koreans invaded South Korea, the Truman Administration had no exit strategy for Korea because it had never imagined that it would fight for South Korea. Indeed, both General Douglas MacArthur and Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly excluded South Korea from America's defense perimeter in Asia. Truman's decision to fight was abrupt and unexpected, and at the time it was made there was no exit strategy other than resistance to North Korean aggression. There was certainly no timetable for a conclusion of hostilities of the kind that present-day exit strategists like to attach to their intervention blueprints.

The quick establishment of the restoration of South Korea's territorial integrity as the US war aim (and that of the United Nations, which authorized resistance) flowed directly from the Administration's decision to fight. Even that objective, however, appeared to be in grave jeopardy as rapidly advancing North Korean forces began corralling US and South Korean forces into the Pusan perimeter. The immediate objective became avoidance of being forcibly ejected from the Korean Peninsula altogether.

Then came MacArthur's Inchon landing and the swift and almost complete reversal of North Korea's military fortunes. The defeat of the communists and the victorious advance of UN forces into North Korea opened the door for a dramatically inflated war aim: the reunification of the entire peninsula under Western auspices. Then, of course, came China's massive counter-intervention, which produced almost three years of military stalemate and a consequent reduction of the US/UN war aim to the status quo ante. On this basis, and once Beijing realized that it could not defeat US forces in Korea, a settlement of the war should have been possible no later than the spring of 1952.

But by then, a new war aim had arisen that no one could have anticipated back in 1950: the voluntary repatriation of communist prisoners of war. Both China and the United States, if not their respective Korean clients, were prepared to enter an armistice that left Korea divided with minor adjustments to the pre-war line of the 38th Parallel. China insisted, however, that all of its soldiers in UN hands be repatriated, including those who had no wish to return to life in communist China. This the Truman Administration refused to do, and thus the war continued on until mid-1953, when China dropped its insistence on forcible repatriation.

Nor was there any chance of US military extrication from Korea once the shooting had stopped. What was signed at Panmunjom in 1953 was an armistice, not a peace treaty. As such, the Korean War failed to resolve the political struggle which occasioned it, and it was this failure that in turn mandated a residual US military presence in South Korea that continues to this day. Far from offering an exit from Korea, the Truman Administration's decision to fight imposed political obligations toward South Korea that the United States has not been able to satisfy without threatened force on the ground in Korea.

The Korean War exhibits the difficulties in anticipating when and how a war will start, how it will unfold, and how it will end. Having an exit strategy on the shelf at the beginning of hostilities and sticking to it until the end assumes away the potent influence of military performance on war aims as well as the law of unintended political consequences that attends any major military intervention. Even if possessed of overwhelming force, military action may still fail to achieve its intended political consequences because of self-imposed restraint, the demands of coalition politics, and unexpected enemy responses. The Clinton Administration thought that NATO could bully Serbia out of Kosovo with the mere threat of a token air campaign, only to discover, to the alliance's great embarrassment, that Milosevic was not only prepared to fight--for 78 days--but also to accelerate the very ethnic cleansing of Kosovo that NATO sought to halt.

World War II also shows that political responsibilities do not end when the shooting stops. US military forces remain in Germany and Japan almost 60 years after the war that brought them there ended. Though they accomplished their mission of defeating and occupying the two countries, they could not be withdrawn because the resulting vacuum of power would have been filled by that of another totalitarian state. Even after the Soviet Union's disappearance, those forces continue to provide stability and reassurance in Europe and Northeast Asia. Indeed, it was America's political and military exit from Europe after World War I that made it necessary to fight another world war and to stick around after it was over. Similarly, US (and other UN-authorized forces) remain in Bosnia six years after the Dayton Accords, and they remain in Kosovo two years after the conclusion of Operation Allied Force.

Mission Creep in Today's Environment

Mission escalation is well-nigh irresistible in military interventions aimed at countering the humanitarian consequences of foreign civil wars. Stopping the fighting in Bosnia and Kosovo mandated a post-hostilities military presence that would permit attempted political reconstruction that ultimately in turn would permit military withdrawal. It was impossible to impose arbitrary departure deadlines without undercutting the rationale for intervention in the first place and inviting a resumption of hostilities. Does anyone doubt that the absence of war in Bosnia and Kosovo would persist in the absence of external peace enforcement? The point is not that intervention in the former Yugoslavia was wise or unwise; rather, it is that, as in Korea, the employment of force inevitably saddled the United States with post-hostilities political obligations that required a continuing military presence.

Mission creep was no less inevitable in Somalia. Especially for an administration so skilled in foreign policy as that of the first President Bush, it was naïve to believe that the United States could simply dart into the Somali anarchy, pass out some food, and then leave without at least attempting to deal with the primary source of hunger--which was political, not meteorological or logistical. Withdrawal without some attempt at political reconstruction would simply have invited the return of mass starvation and exposed military intervention as a sham. In Somalia, the Clinton Administration inherited a military intervention that was intended to be politically immaculate but in the end could never be so.

The Gulf War is cited by exit-strategy proponents as proof that control of a war's purpose and duration is possible. US objectives, some argue, were clear, feasible, and sustained without alteration throughout the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. The US exit strategy was a model of simplicity: (1) mass sufficient force in Saudi Arabia; (2) kick the Iraqis out of Kuwait; (3) go home. Yet the declared objective of "restoring peace and stability to the Gulf" was sufficiently vague to raise the question of whether it was code for overthrowing Saddam Hussein. It obviously meant something more than simply liberating Kuwait, which was a separately declared objective. Certainly it encompassed the intended destruction of Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capacity and offensive conventional military power--especially the Republican Guard. But did "restoring peace and stability to the Gulf" also mean getting rid of Saddam? President Bush publicly compared the Iraqi dictator to Hitler on several occasions, authorized air attacks on his known residences and workplaces, and broadcast appeals for the Iraqi people to get rid of their leader. General Schwarzkopf was directed to pay special attention to wiping out the Republican Guard, a key prop of Saddam's regime. Thus, if Saddam's removal was not a declared objective, it was certainly an undeclared one whose lack of fulfillment clearly disappointed President Bush.

Saddam Hussein remains in power because the United States was not prepared to assume any responsibility for Iraq's postwar political reconstruction. The Bush Administration was so intent on wrapping up its easy, albeit dramatic, military win in Kuwait and vacating the premises that it even declared a unilateral cease-fire in the absence of any Iraqi request for terms. To be sure, America militarily exited the war in the Gulf, but it was a politically inconclusive departure.

Moreover, once US forces had been assembled in Saudi Arabia, Iraq was in no position to significantly influence the course of hostilities. This guaranteed a successful American military performance, which in turn guaranteed the stability of US war aims. Because Iraq and its military remained virtually inert in the face of Coalition attacks (the Scud missile strikes were of no military significance, although an Israeli response to them could have damaged the Coalition), the Gulf War was not a large-scale duel as Clausewitz likened war to be but rather more of a shooting gallery for the reformed and re-equipped post-Vietnam War US military. It was essentially the administration of massive firepower against a large but helpless foe whose defeat was certain from the beginning of hostilities. In no other major war before or since has the United States faced so inanimate an enemy. There was never any possibility of Iraqi military performance adversely affecting declared US war aims. Thus a pre-hostilities exit strategy was sustainable.

The Gulf War was exceptional. Against qualified adversaries--those capable of sustaining resistance and even inflicting considerable damage--the maintenance of war aims becomes problematical. Even in its war against Serbia, NATO was compelled by unexpectedly prolonged Serbian resistance and the need for Russian diplomatic support to weaken the original terms it offered the Serbs at Rambouillet before Operation Allied Force was launched. There, it insisted on an exclusively NATO occupation force for Kosovo, NATO military access on demand to the rest of Serbia, and an eventual plebiscite to determine Kosovo's political future. These demands were dropped in the end in order to facilitate termination of a war whose duration came as a surprise to NATO and for which levels of enthusiasm varied widely within the alliance. Though Serbia lost the war, NATO only tangentially engaged Serbian military forces because it was unwilling to engage in ground combat or low-altitude air combat and because Serbia's fielded forces were well concealed. Thus Serbia retained a latent military threat that permitted it to hold out for war settlement terms significantly less harsh than it might otherwise have been compelled to accept.

In sum, the United States is free to choose most of its overseas military interventions, but it is not free to select their duration and outcome. Once the shooting begins, war's innate dynamism takes center stage, and policy becomes hostage to military performance and changing domestic and international political circumstances. In the dangerous and unpredictable arena of using force, an exit strategy, like any other plan, may not be sustainable. This means that having an exit strategy in mind is not the same thing as being able to stick to it. A preconceived exit strategy is sustainable only if it can be militarily forced down the enemy's throat and remains politically acceptable at home.


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Jeffrey Record is Professor of International Security Studies at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, and author of the forthcoming Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo. He is a frequent contributor to Parameters.

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Paramet...nter/record.htm

A Clash of Systems:
An Analytical Framework to
Demystify the
Radical Islamist Threat


ANDREW HARVEY, IAN SULLIVAN,
and RALPH GROVES

In the Winter 2004-05 issue of Parameters, Philip Seib makes a laudable effort to establish the imperative for journalists, policymakers, and the American public to “undertake a more sophisticated analysis of how the world works.”1 This is critical because the analytical framework adopted by the media and policymakers has a direct effect on how they approach news coverage and frame discussions regarding the threat posed by radical Islamist extremists. This in turn directly affects public opinion in the United States and the world, which in the context of a war of ideas is directly related to the success or failure of both sides. Professor Seib also pointed out the fact that the “clash of civilizations” theory espoused by Samuel Huntington has been widely criticized, and this article rejects it as an appropriate analytical framework. Our purpose is to provide an alternative framework that portrays the current global conflict as a clash of systems, not civilizations.

The central danger of accepting Huntington’s model as a basis for analysis is that it is the chosen model of radical Islamists, who in turn use it to mobilize support. If a clash of civilizations is accepted in the West—or worse, accepted by the populations in Muslim states—then the forces attempting to overturn the global system could eventually succeed. Success, however, is not battalions of extremist Islamists marching down Pennsylvania Avenue; rather, it is the replacement of “apostate” regimes with an Islamic Caliphate, which can occur only once the current US-led global system is destroyed. Therefore, it is imperative that the wider global war on terror focus on the systemic impli-

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cations of the struggle, which provides a credible methodology to address and mitigate the root causes that fuel the ideology of extremist Islamism.

Many authors have identified the imminent threat posed to the United States by radical Islamists in the ongoing Global War on Terrorism, and a number of them have described it as a war of ideas. What is lacking in the ongoing discourse, however, is a conceptual framework necessary for an in-depth analysis of the basic conflict. The current threat environment is based on a clash of systems between the US-led global system, in which the phenomenon of globalization has created unprecedented connectivity and prosperity in the developed world, and those who oppose this system and wish to replace it with another paradigm. The ideology seeking to overthrow the global system is extremist Islamism.2 It is put into action by transnational Islamist terrorists as well as regional and indigenous extremists, who wish to replace the secular, US-led global system with an Islamist world order. States along the periphery of the US-led system, where Western liberal democratic ideology and values underlying globalization directly clash with radical Islamism, constitute the main battleground. This is where the primary objective of US national power should be aimed: at convincing the undecided multitudes that becoming part of the global system is a better option than fighting against it. In order to prevent states and populations in this periphery from accepting integration into the global system, radical Islamists attempt to frame the ongoing conflict as a clash of civilizations.

Clash of Systems Framework

The first part of this framework is to establish that there is an international system made up of states and non-state actors. Though there is no world government, rules that guide interactions among these actors on the world

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stage do exist.3 These are formed either by consensus (norms of international law and commerce) or are imposed by a major power such as the United Kingdom in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th.4 This system includes not only norms of interaction, international law, and treaties, but also institutions. The most important aspects of the post-World War II world system are the West’s multinational organizations. They owe their origins to the 1941 Atlantic Charter of liberal principles established to guide the postwar world, and the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference on monetary order (both American initiatives). These gave birth to various organizations, including the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). These organizations and the world order of open economies and dispute management were intended to prevent problems among Western industrial capitalist states—not to fight Soviet communism, which was a separate system—and they continue to endure despite the end of the Cold War.5 Therefore, the underlying Western-inspired world order remains intact and is even expanding as China, Russia, and other states of the former Soviet Union join Western organizations. This demonstrates the ongoing vigor of Western values and principles in an international and multinational context. This system is still in place and forms the framework that enables “globalization” to occur, which is in many ways an acceleration of the speed of interactions within the system, and an indicator of their scope. The Islamists understand this relationship, which explains why these institutions are targets for al Qaeda.

Thomas Friedman has described “globalization” as a system, and as operating within the “liberal rules of economics . . . the software being the rule of law, courts, regulatory institutions, oversight bodies, free press, and democracy.”6 He also observes that globalization is happening in a power structure that isn’t driven just by electrons and stock options. It’s a power structure maintained and preserved by the US military. The US military is the hidden fist that keeps the hidden hand operating—“Ain’t no McDonald’s without McDonnell Douglas, and without America on Duty there’s no America Online.”7 This article agrees with Friedman’s view of globalization as a system that promotes this increased mobility and the speed of exchange of these elements.

This global system established and maintained by the United States provides the background on which an analytical framework can be built. As the world’s sole superpower, the United States will continue to dominate and influence all aspects of the global system for the foreseeable future. Although hegemonies are uncertain, there currently are no powers that accept the global system (this includes most of the world’s major states) which are capable of overturning this hegemony without damaging the system itself. In this regard,

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the greatest threat to US hegemony is not competition within the system, but is instead composed of elements that seek a complete overthrow of the global system. The United States owes this tremendous position of power to its ability to leverage its influence and leadership in the global system, which provides considerable benefit (economically, politically, and militarily) in return. Furthermore, in order to maintain this position as global hegemon, the United States is a status quo power within the global system that must protect and conserve it. In its relations with states that have not accepted the global system, the United States must be an agent for change in order to expand, if possible, the global system from which it derives such benefit.

Thomas Barnett describes the world in terms of a “Functioning Core” of states that have embraced the Western world system of “globalization.” These states have stable governments, rising standards of living, liberal media, and are included in one or more systems of collective security. There are also states that have only begun to integrate or have not yet fully integrated into the world system, and are described as “Seam States” on the boundary of the “Functioning Core.” Barnett calls other areas (which do not accept “globalization” or the global system) the “Non-Integrating Gap.” It is no accident that these areas are trouble spots, and are where the United States is most likely to intervene militarily.8 This three-level construct of globalization indicates the global Western system has limits that affect how it functions. These constraints are, interestingly enough, connected to liberal Western concepts such as the rule of law and individual rights, reflecting an important point regarding this global framework. It is built on ideas and values that stand in direct opposition to those of the extremist Islamists.

In return for setting the rules for international interactions (which benefit the rule-maker), the United States provides security to maintain the system. Other actors or powers will support the United States if they receive more benefit from the system’s continuation than from its demise. At the same time they may also jockey for position within the system. On the other hand, if they do not feel that the system provides appropriate benefits, then they will challenge the system and attempt to overthrow or change it through conflict.9 While many observers of the international system believe that states which clearly are part of the global system may seek to form partnerships and coalitions as a means of mitigating the dominating influence of US power structures, there will be times when members of the system jockey for its leadership. No state is currently seeking to replicate our capabilities across all instruments of power. There is no “near peer competitor” with a desire to replace the current system. In fact, the major world powers—the United States, the European Union, China, Japan, and Russia—are in fact part of the system, or are attempting to integrate further into it (e.g., China and the WTO).

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Though no state is attempting to overthrow the Western global system, there are states that are not fully integrated into it, and despite the intactness and growing inclusiveness of the system, there are still outsiders who believe the system is unjust and are unable to share its benefits. It is these latter areas, which are part of the seam, or the non-integrating gap, where the most critical battles in the wider clash of systems will occur.

The Islamist Challenge

Political Islam (Islamism), in various forms, is the most rapidly growing and persuasive ideology among Muslims today. Islamism is a socio-political ideology which strives to institute governments under Allah’s authority, not man-made constitutions, and administration of society according to sharia (Islamic law), not Western law.10 The ideology of Islamism is the cutting edge of Islamic militants’ exertions against the West and its global system. As an ideology, Islamism is distinct from the religion of Islam, although it draws strength from zealous members of the Islamic resurgence. The Islamic resurgence does not protest against Islamic institutions, but, rather, protests against secular governments and social innovations modeled on the West. Understanding the Islamists’ critique of modern life provides some clarity to these distinctions. Most Islamists (except for retrograde Salafists) are not against modern instrumentalities produced by industries (telephones, cars, airplanes, computers, etc.). Rather, Islamists are opposed to modernism, a sequel to industrialization and modernization, which is the ideology of social innovation in a secular environment completely unhinged from traditional and religious norms.

Islamism is ideological because it employs Islam for the socio-political goal of establishing governments under Allah’s sovereignty with societies based on sharia. Islamism “fuses religion and politics, din wa dawla, in a way incompatible with Western analytical categories.”11 Establishing such governments and societies is meant to preserve Islamic religion and culture and to reverse Western domination. Culturally, many Islamic traditionalists feel eclipsed by the Western way of life in the globalized economy. Islamism is ascendant in its competition against secular Western political models within large segments of the Muslim world. In predominantly Islamic countries, Islamism has absorbed much of nationalist parties’ ideologies, leaving nationalists weak. Generally in such countries, the left is marginal and in disarray and liberal democrats are few. Islamists heed the Koran’s specific direction: “Fight in the cause of God against those who fight you.”12

The Islamists’ slogan, “Islam is the solution” (popularized by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb), will continue to inspire political exertions against Western-type governments in Islamic countries, until or unless the West con-

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vinces the Islamic world that it can have an equitable stake in globalization. Islamists will resist cultural and political influences of the West’s global system, even if they acquiesce to economic interaction and trade. Their resistance to the West is not to imply mainly overt clashes. Most clashes for the proximate future will occur within the Islamic world itself, just as industrial countries of the West’s global system will have their own internal (especially social) problems.

There are significant elements of Western culture that make the West less than entirely appealing to many in the Islamic world, both Muslims and Islamists. Though many appreciate the material benefits and technological advances that the West has to offer, Islamists tend to believe the West diluted the basis of its classical Christian civilization due to the Renaissance and Scientific Revolution, followed by the Philosophical Revolution (based on natural law) and its empiricism, rationalism, and positivism. Even though this enabled technological innovation and industrialization, the removal of religion from its previous position as the basis for all knowledge meant that Christianity lost its centrality over the course of several centuries as the arbiter of how society should function. Today, religion in the West is compartmentalized due to increased secularization since the 1970s. Because of this, the overt manifestation of the West is characterized by its industrial order, which gives it overwhelming material superiority over agricultural or other resource-exporting countries,13 but not moral superiority because secularization has eroded traditional morality.14 Social relativism has become the norm, which Muslims and Islamists regard as unacceptable for emulation. In contrast, traditional societies still harboring tenets of their classical civilizations value spirituality (rather than consumerism), a God-centered view of the world (rather than a human-centered one), prescribed patterns of behavior (rather than innovative ones), extended families (rather than individualism and nuclear families), and a belief in absolutes (rather than relativism).

While the industrial West has emphasized secular rationalism, it also has engendered a certain degree of dissatisfaction with materialism as the primary focus of life. Westerners are likely to seek spirituality in their “flight from the meaninglessness of the secular world,”15 reviving various sects of Christianity or importing other religions (such as Bahai’ism) or creating new synergetic ones (such as Scientology). The fear of “importing” a similar spiritual void is one of the reasons why Islamists reject Western modernism. The West’s insistence on democratic government and the rule of law is a function of industrial and commercial efficacy, not high-minded principles from Western classical civilization.16 In any case, these features are integrated into industrial societies of the global system, and may make it awkward for countries outside the system to join. For Islamic countries, democracy is more about access than

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process, and Islamic law is based on sharia, which is very different from Western law. Also, the West’s secularity presents serious cultural problems for Islam, creating tension alongside the potential economic benefits of joining the West’s global system.

Despite US or Euro-centric views (such as Francis Fukuyama’s End of History), the West’s industrial order and global system do not have universal appeal. However, the West’s industrial order claims a universal applicability of its global system. This puts it in direct conflict with Islamists, who also proclaim the universality of their system. Radical Islamists will accept only our unconditional surrender.

Our current conflict of ideologies is centered on the answer to the question of what constitutes “a good life.” In the West, the answer is found in the individual rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. For the radical Islamists, the answer is in one’s submission to the will of God through the imposition of their interpretation of sharia throughout the Muslim world.

A Clash of Systems in the Middle East

To Huntington’s disciples, al Qaeda’s strike on the economic and military power base of the United States clearly represents an attack by the Islamic civilization against that of the United States and the West. Such an argument is persuasive, particularly when one looks at the undercurrents of recent events in the Middle East: the ubiquitous Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the vicious campaign being conducted by foreign jihadists against US forces in Iraq, a resurgence of the Islamist ideology across Barnett’s non-integrating gap,17 enhanced violent activity perpetrated by radical Islamist groups across the region, the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the region, and cooperation between regional states and militant groups. Yet Huntington’s thesis fails to capture the true nature of the conflict that currently grips the Middle East. It is not simply a result of irreconcilable differences between Western and Islamic civilizations; it is instead a deeper clash of international systems of order—globalization vs. Islamism.

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Under the current system of US-led globalization, a given state has two options—beating the system or joining it. In the Middle East, this debate is raging in an emotional and often violent manner, and it is fast becoming a battle for the soul of the Islamic world. This conflict pits two sides against each other: those who embrace the system—i.e., moderates who seek to reconcile the Islamic culture, religion, and worldview with the benefits of modernization and globalization—against those who would seek to destroy it, personified by Osama bin Laden and other extremists of his ilk, and who wish to replace it with an alternative system, in this case a world guided by the ideology of Islamism.

For Islamists, there are two main targets in their effort to bring about an Islamist system. The United States and its Western allies constitute one target. The other, perhaps more important, is the governments and elites of the states across the Middle East, who walk a narrow tightrope between accepting the dramatic benefits of the global system and heeding the wishes of the majority of the populace who receive little in the way of benefits from their own governments, let alone from the wider global system.

As a result, Islamists are fighting a two-pronged conflict. On the one hand, they have initiated a wide-reaching war against US interests and allies which includes not only direct combat against US military forces, but also attacks like those of 9/11 that target Americans and other Western civilians. Second, in the Middle East the Islamists view the acceptance of a corrupt, godless, immoral system by the civilian populace as being responsible for the Western system’s spread. Consequently Islamists are engaged in a comprehensive battle for hearts and minds.

Their strategic objective to replace the Western system with one inspired by the divine hinges entirely upon successfully converting the populace to Islamist ideology. Islamists point to the hopelessness endemic throughout much of the region, where a handful of leaders and business elites reap economic rewards from collaborating with the US-led system while the vast majority live in a pitiful squalor, where daily life is a challenge. Instead of cooperating with a system where a few get rich, Islamists insist upon a strict interpretation of the Koran and look to the glory days of a bygone era when the Muslim world dominated the international system. Instead of buying into a system that is “corrupt” and accepting a culture that is “immoral,” Islamists seek to create an alternative system similar to the one that once held a position of dominance. Islamists ask Muslims to accept the concept that “Islam is the solution,” popularized by Qutb as early as 1952. Qutb argued that a philosophical break was required with modernism if a Muslim was to be true to his faith. This break is not a starting point for the intellectual study of the impact of modernism on the Islamic world, but instead becomes a manifesto demanding a

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radical change, inspired by the divine truths espoused in the Koran.18 In essence, Qutb’s philosophy, which has been adopted by a long string of Islamist radicals culminating in bin Laden, espouses a clash of civilizations between the wider Islamic umma (community of believers) and the West.

For the West, and particularly the United States, it becomes imperative to prevent the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) from becoming such a clash of civilizations, thereby devolving into exactly the kind of conflict that will be to the Islamists’ advantage. Instead, the United States also should follow a two-pronged strategy, whereby it selectively confronts Islamists, not simply to crush them, but to demonstrate to the Muslim world the long-term futility of such a conflict. The current focus of this active conflict is on Iraq and Afghanistan. In the words of Friedman, “America’s opponents know just what’s at stake in the postwar struggle for Iraq, which is why they flock there: beat America in Iraq and you beat them out of the whole region; lose to America there, lose everywhere.”19 Friedman notes the Islamists understand the fight is not about oil, but is instead about “ideas and values and governance.”20 So for the United States, the active stratagem guiding the Global War on Terrorism is unlike anything it has attempted before; instead of concrete, military success, the GWOT is about reinforcing ideas and values (i.e. those that underpin the US-led system), while at the same time demonstrating the inability of Islamists to advance their ideas and values to the wider Islamic community.

This in part explains the frustrating experience the US military is encountering in its nation-building operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the enemies of the global system, each successful tactical operation against the US-led Coalition becomes a strategic victory. Each successful attack against US military targets, Coalition partners, or international relief workers is a ringing endorsement for those who oppose the system and seek its replacement. Successful attacks offer “proof” to the undecided masses that the United States will not be able to establish the system in the contested areas of Iraq and Afghanistan, and they help to sway opinion toward alternative systemic constructs. From a US perspective, tactical victories are relevant only insofar as they help to buy time for the global system to take root. As a result, there is no classic definition of military “victory.” Military operations in these circumstances should be aimed at implementing security and stability in order for the other elements of national power (e.g., economic and social) to bring concrete improvements to the wider society, which in turn will eventually lead the masses to decide that the US-led global system is worth joining. Providing security and stability are the absolutely necessary preconditions that will allow this systemic acceptance to occur, and that should be the primary focus of US military operations in areas of the non-integrating gap where societies are split between joining the global system or choosing the Islamist alternative.

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According to Daniel Pipes, the central task of the United States is to reinforce moderate Islam as a counterbalance to Islamism. Pipes postulates the central conflict in the GWOT is the one waged between militant and moderate Islam. While Washington can help in this struggle by providing assistance to the moderates and working to establish reforms in areas locked in a self-defeating bargain with the militants (such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan), the actual battle will be won or lost within the Islamic world itself.21 As a result, the second task implicit in a successful resolution to the GWOT is in supporting those elements in the Middle East that already accept the US-led system, and, most critically, facilitating pro-Western change in those states that straddle the fence.

The issue that makes the Global War on Terrorism so fundamentally different from other ideological conflicts in history is that it pits the US-led global system against non-state actors who transcend political boundaries. These non-state actors are striving to appeal to religion, culture, and even pan-Arab nationalism to forge a decentralized core of ideologically motivated insurgents fighting to overthrow the US-led global system and replace it with one based on their radical interpretations of sharia. This conflict is completely asymmetrical, where the enemy realizes it lacks the military capability to directly challenge the US-led system on a global scale. Instead, it relies on the strategy and tactics of the insurgent to selectively engage US and Coalition forces (Khobar Towers, the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the USS Cole attack, 9/11) while striking in other venues to make political gains (the Madrid bombing, Bali bombing, kidnappings and murder of foreign nationals in Iraq, the 7/7 bombings in London) to erode Coalition cohesion. Unlike other insurgencies, the GWOT is unique because of its scale. It is, in effect, a pansurgency.22

Strategic Conflict of Perceptions

Islamist militants understand their desired strategic objectives. Although they are incapable of militarily defeating the US and Coalition forces on the battlefield, their success is determined by the achievement of their desired strategic political end state—the withdrawal of US forces and the creation of sharia-based governments. This type of conflict