United States Marine Corps

Press Release
Division of Public Affairs
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380-1775
Telephone: 703-614-4309 DSN 224-4309 Fax 703-695-7460
Contact: American Forces Press Service

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Release # 0515-03-0536
May 14, 2003

American Generals: Soldiers Only Shoot in Self-Defense

WASHINGTON--By Kathleen T. Rhem
American Forces Press Service

American soldiers will only shoot looters who threaten the soldiers' lives, the Army general in charge of land forces in Iraq said in Baghdad today.

In an internationally televised press conference, Lt. Gen. David McKiernan said that simple looting is not enough to warrant shooting an Iraqi civilian. Soldiers will, however, arrest and hold those caught in criminal acts.

Maj. Gen. Buford Blount, commander of the Army's 3rd infantry Division, joined McKiernan. Both addressed press reports that Iraq's new civil administrator, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, told senior staff in a meeting that U.S. forces were "going to start shooting a few looters" to deter lawlessness in the Iraqi capital.

"We are aggressively targeting looters, but we're not going to go out
and shoot children that are picking up a piece of wood out of a factory and carrying it away or a bag of cement," Blount said, adding that soldiers retained the right of self-defense.

"If a looter's carrying a weapon and the soldier feels threatened, then of course he's going to engage," the general said.

McKiernan said U.S. forces have arrested more than 200 Iraqis for
criminal acts over the past two days. Blount explained that most are
being held for up to three weeks, up from 48 hours at the beginning of
stability operations in Iraq.

McKiernan said much of the lawlessness is due to the lack of
functioning civil governments when the American soldiers entered
Baghdad. "You're kind of starting with a blank sheet of paper," he
said, adding that looting was as effective in destroying police
stations as a 2,000-pound bomb would have been.

He said it would likely take a long while to bring the situation
completely under control. "But it is improving each week," he said.

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Artillery Officer receives Bronze Star for OIF
Submitted by: MCB Quantico
Story Identification #: 2004622172634
Story by Cpl. Justin P. Lago



MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO, Va. (June 14, 2004) -- The commanding general, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Lt. Gen. Edward Hanlon Jr., presented the Bronze Star on Monday to Lt Col. Kirk W. Hymes, head of the operation division’s integration branch at MCCDC.

Hymes was recognized for providing outstanding joint fire support during Operation Iraqi Freedom, as the commanding officer of 3rd Bn. 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division during the time period of March to April, according to his citation.

His service in Kuwait began when he arrived in January and ended in June.

Hymes coordinated activities among the artillery batteries and led Marines into engagements, serving the prime objective, which supported the 7th Marines Regimental Combat Team.

Throughout the tour, Hymes and his Marines made the journey from Kuwait City to Baghdad.

“This award is not for an emerging war hero,” said Hymes. “I wear this medal for my unit.”

Hanlon spoke about Hymes’ accomplishments in OIF and mentioned the privilege in presenting such an award.

“It takes a certain talent to do what you do,” said Hanlon to Hymes. “A talent that is justly observed here today.”

Hymes told his story of the journey with the Marines he served with, describing the altruistic acts of whom, he believed, were the real heroes.

“It is truly about perspective in times like this,” said Hymes. “Perspective includes the ability to deal with the great unknown, and those Marines did that every single day.”

Hymes’s wife Tracey and their three children, Mathew, Ryan and Morgan were present during the award ceremony, as were his parents.

“I am very proud of Kirk,” said Tracey. “The kids are too, and they’re glad that he is home safe.”

Hymes has served in the Marine Corps for 21 years and currently has no plans for retirement.

“As long as I feel that I am making a difference I will stay in,” said Hymes.

Hymes ended his speech stressing the importance of the junior Marines that worked under him.

“I just want to let everyone who is present today know that overseas, the morale is high and contagious, given the situation right now,” said Hymes. “The Marine Corps that I saw every day is going strong.”

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...hlight=2,bronze

OIF Sgt. pins on Bronze Star
Submitted by: MCRD San Diego
Story Identification #: 2004813115157
Story by Lance Cpl. Jess Levens



MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT SAN DIEGO, Calif. (August 13, 2004) -- A sergeant in the Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program received a Bronze Star with Combat "V" device July 30 for courageous acts during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Col. Salvador J. Calleros, depot deputy chief of staff pinned the award on Sgt. Christopher M. Genetti in a formation at Friday Morning Colors at Pendleton Hall.

"I feel honored to receive this award," said Genetti. "But I just did what any Marine would do. The boys that were there with me, they're the real heroes."

Genetti said he isn't very deserving of the award because he only did what was expected of him, but his Marines disagree.

"There is no doubt that he deserves this award," said Keith. "If you look at the criteria for the Bronze Star, it should just show a photo of Sgt. Genetti."

Genetti served as a squad leader for 2nd Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, I Marine Expeditionary Force. According to Genetti's citation, Co. C received enemy contact April 1, 2003, after crossing the Saddam Canal in Iraq. Genetti positioned the other two squads on his flanks and maneuvered his squad into combat. Using one team to suppress the enemy, he maneuvered another team to the objective and captured two Iraqi soldiers. After hearing that another unit was receiving fire from a nearby building, Genetti personally neutralized Iraqi soldiers from a distance of 400 meters.

"Sgt. Genetti is an incredible man," said Cpl. Michael Keith, a Marine who served with Genetti. "His natural leadership ability is uncanny. He just confidently took control of the situation and got us back home alive."

Genetti also acted as platoon commander - normally an officer position - for a brief period, according to Keith.

"We've been back to Iraq since then," said Lance Cpl. Jamil Alkattan, who served in Genetti's platoon. "I wouldn't have made it back home the second time if it wasn't for (Genetti). We took the knowledge he gave us and we came home alive. He definitely earned his Bronze Star. He's a big reason I'm alive today."

After completing MECEP Preparatory School here Aug. 4, Genetti heads to Norwich University, Vt. After earning a degree, he will become an officer candidate.

Authorized Feb. 4, 1944 the Bronze Star medal is awarded to members of all branches of military service and may be awarded either for combat heroism or for meritorious service.

The bronze "V" device identifies the award as resulting from an act of combat heroism, or valor, thus distinguishing it from meritorious achievement awards.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...hlight=2,bronze

22nd MEU wraps up its Certification Exercise
Submitted by: 22nd MEU
Story Identification #: 200510620297
Story by Gunnery Sgt. Keith A. Milks



CAMP LEJEUNE, NC (Oct. 6, 2005) -- Using both land and sea-based forces, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) recently launched raids against ‘terrorist’ strongholds aboard and near Camp Lejeune.

Simultaneous raids were the culminating event of the MEU’s final pre-deployment training exercise, and the last hurdle standing between the MEU and its designation as ‘Special Operations Capable.’

The MEU kicked off its Certification Exercise (CERTEX) on Sept. 21, an evolution the unit’s commanding officer described to a Navy journalist as a graduation exercise for both his Marines and the Sailors manning the ships with which the MEU will deploy.

“This is a great opportunity for us and our Navy partners to bring it all together,” said Col. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. shortly after CERTEX began. “We’ll put the finishing touches on our training and prepare to deploy.

During the exercise’s two-plus weeks, the 2,200 Marines and Sailors of the 22nd MEU executed a series of missions they may be required to undertake during the unit’s upcoming deployment.

Among these tasks were an embassy reinforcement, response to a mass casualty situation, a noncombatant evacuation operation, and helicopter, mechanized, and motorized raids, among other missions.

The MEU’s combat service support element, MEU Service Support Group 22, established a forward operating base (FOB) aboard Camp Lejeune early in CERTEX, and forces were continually pushed ashore to strengthen the MEU’s presence there. Meanwhile, the MEU Command Element and its aviation combat element, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 (Reinforced) remained aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Nassau to use it as a command and control hub and sea-based airfield.

Marines from II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic (EWTGL) were on hand throughout the exercise to evaluate the MEU’s performance and forward their observations on to the II MEF commanding general, Lt. Gen. James F. Amos. It would be up to Amos to determine whether or not the MEU rates the ‘SOC’ designation.

“I’m glad this is our last raid,” said Pfc. Christopher Powell, of Tampa Fla., an infantryman with Alpha Co., Battalion Landing Team 1st Bn., 2nd Marines, the MEU’s ground combat element during the ‘raid’ that drew the exercise to a close. “This will be my first deployment and I’m excited to use the training I’ve received.”

The 22nd MEU is scheduled deploy soon aboard the amphibious assault ships USS Nassau, Carter Hall, and Austin as the landing force for Expeditionary Strike Group 8.

For more information on the 22nd MEU, visit the unit’s web site at http://www.22meu.usmc.mil.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...B9?opendocument

SOI FLEXES MUSCLES FOR FOREIGN OFFICERS
Submitted by: MCB Camp Pendleton
Story Identification #: 2000511192537
Story by Cpl. Kyle J. Walker



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (April 27, 2000) --
Senior officers from 12 nations met at the School of Infantry April 11 to
view a static display of firepower the Marine Corps uses when storming the
beach.

The 18 officers were here as part of the 42nd annual International Senior
Officers Amphibious Planning course at Naval Air Station North Island.

The 11-week course covers concepts and procedures officers need to plan
naval and landing-force expeditionary warfare, said Capt. Chris Steinhilber,
SOI operations.

Course concepts include amphibious warfare introduction and the role and
duties of the maritime prepositioning force; joint logistics; over-the-shore
supply; and expeditionary warfare staff planning.

The foreign officers marveled at the Marine Corps? arsenal
"Most of the Marine Corps' weapons are quite impressive," said Lt. Cmdr.
Iain Jarvie, Australian navy. "The Australian navy is starting to mount
weapons on vehicles, and to see the Marines doing it already is quite
impressive. This will give us ideas on how to mount the weapons."

The School of Infantry displayed the High Mobility Multi Wheeled Vehicle
with mounted M220E4 tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile.

The display included the MK153 shoulder-launched, multipurpose assault
weapon, along with various artillery pieces, machineguns and rifles.

"Being able to compare doctrine and weapons was a great experience," said
Cmdr. Nick Bramwell, Australian navy. "Some of our weapons are similar,
but it is always good to compare. Now we can possibly do business together
and get better weapons."

"It was great to see some of the new weapon systems the Australian Navy
might be getting," said Lt. Arnaud Ng, Australian navy. "I hope to be coming
back again."

The visiting contingent included officers from Korea, Thailand, Egypt and
Brazil.

In addition to expeditionary warfare instruction, the officers are taking
informational trips to various locations, including Washington D.C. and San
Francisco, Steinhilber said. The program intends to present the officers with
a balanced overview of American values, culture and way of life.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,foreign

American and French Forces make history with Commando School
Submitted by: Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa
Story Identification #: 2003127132814
Story by Sgt. Bradly Shaver



Arta Plage, Djibouti (December 07, 2003) -- Personnel supporting the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa made history Nov. 20 when they became the first Americans to graduate from the French Commando School here.

Twenty Army soldiers and five Marines completed the three-week course and were each awarded the French Commando medal and a certificate of completion.

"It was one of the hardest training operations I've faced, but at the same time one of the better schools I've been through," said Lance Cpl. Bryan Napier, who graduated in the top five of his class. "I feel honored to represent the American platoon in the top five. It will definitely be an experience to remember."

Before entering the course, service members were required to take a test ensuring they could meet the physical demands of the commando school. The test involved pushups, sit-ups, pull-ups, squats, an upper-body rope climb and a 200-meter swim with a rifle.

Within the first few days, the original 34-member platoon had dropped to 26 due to either failing the test or injury during training.

"The reason for attending the French Commando School was to better prepare the soldiers and Marines for nautical and mountain warfare challenges in the terrain of Djibouti," Army Master Sgt. Chris Fields said. "These particular challenges trained each soldier and Marine for a hostile situation if one occurred in an area similar to this region."

The American platoon trained alongside a platoon of French Foreign Legionnaires. Both accomplished the same training, but as separate units. The two forces participated in training and exercise that included working with each other's equipment and competed in timed races over different courses.

Under the supervision of French instructors, trainees were graded on a variety of exercises requiring the nine-man squads use teamwork to successfully complete the tasks.

With assault packs and rifles slung across their backs, trainees negotiated obstacles courses that forced them to use every member in their squad to complete the course.

Engaging in obstacles positioned on mountaintops, attached to a rocky cliff face and afloat in the Gulf of Aden, squads were required to complete courses under a set time.

The water and mountain obstacle tracks are eight-part objective courses that must be finished together as a squad. In the mountain obstacle course, squads carefully worked together to accomplish each objective.

Trainees were graded on their ability to complete these obstacles. Combined with the individual track, service members' scores were calculated and used for their final graduation score.

The individual track, called "Hells Way," is built into the side of the mountain with pipes, wires and ropes leading to the eight different objectives. Although some were hesitant at first, expressing fears of height, all trainees were required to complete the course within a set time.

"The commando school immediately jumped into the training and kept us on our toes at all times," said Napier.

Though the training sounds mainly physical, trainees also received classroom instruction prior to conducting tested training missions.

These classes involved land navigation, explosives, squad formations on land and water, Zodiac beach assaults, ambushes, raids, helicopter flights, cargo drops, knot tying for rope bridges and rappelling, hand-to-hand combat and training for prisoners of war.

"Through the course, the French instructors methods of instruction and practical applications were set up very well," said Fields. "As we got physically tired and weary in our upper body, the classes moved to movements and strengthening in the lower body ... in-between were classes based on knowledge. Their instructions and exercises were scheduled evenly throughout the course."

Several times the French and American platoons joined together for live-fire exercises at various ranges and beaches. The two platoons would exchange rifles to become familiar with each other's weapon and its firing capabilities. Some exercises involved mock medical evacuations by American humvee and French helicopter, while the two platoons would provide suppressive fire on the nearby range.

At sundown, when the trainees were not in the field or in the water operating Zodiacs, they were prepping for scheduled night missions.

Marching several miles up and down mountainous terrain, the platoon executed ambushes and raids on specific targets assigned by the instructors.

"Marching though Djibouti is a lot harder than it looks," said Spc. Jon McCoy. "Walking at night over large loose rocks was very stressful for everyone."

Venturing miles into the field for their last three days of school, the two platoons combined for day and night missions including beach assaults, ambushes and raids. The lessons previously learned while getting through obstacle tracks were applied in maneuvering the two platoons over land.

After accomplishing all their missions, the trainees - exhausted and relieved - returned to Arta Plage to graduate and be officially recognized as Commandos.

"Overall, I think everybody did extremely well in the course," commented Fields. "The challenges they faced in this course were some they will never meet again. Later on in these now Commando's lives, whether in the military or as a civilian, if they are faced with troubled times, it will be less of a challenge to them to overcome it."

Fields went on to say the training with the French is essential to the mission in the Horn of Africa of detecting, deterring and defeating transnational terrorists in the region. "It enhances our operations and gives us the ability to see real world situations in an environment we are not as familiar with as the French are. It is imperative that if we are to fight together as allies, we must train together in this war on terrorism."


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,foreign

Reserve ANGLICO Steps It Up
Submitted by: Marine Forces Reserve
Story Identification #: 2002111914813
Story by Capt. Jeff S. Pool



MOUNTAIN WARFARE TRAINING CENTER, Calif. (Nov. 18, 2002) -- Since the Marine Corps disbanded the active duty ANGLICO units in April 1997, Reserve ANGLICO units have seen their operations tempo increase. The high demand for Coalition fire support and fire support training in recent years has ANGLICO Marines working hard in support of several foreign militaries.

Long deployments while working alongside active duty units from around the globe are nothing new to these Reserve Marines.

"It is not uncommon for a 3rd ANGLICO Marine to come on active duty in support of operations and exercises for three to four months at a time," said Maj. Terry R. Thomas, 33, a native of Seattle and the officer in charge of 2nd Brigade Platoon-Supporting Arms Liaison Team, 3rd ANGLICO, who works for his family's business, PNW Equipment, a Seattle-based Maritime Transportation Company. "Our training schedule is really fitted around the units we support."

Because one of ANGLICO's primary missions is attaching to foreign militaries, their training extends beyond the continental United States.

"Just in the past year Reserve Marines from 3rd ANGLICO have deployed to Thailand, Philippines, Egypt and throughout California," said Cpl. Brad W. Price, 30, a Santa Barbara native and forward observer for the team.

Future deployments will find ANGLICO Marines heading to such far off places as Australia, the Ukraine and South Korea.

Plans are underway to bring 1st and 2nd ANGLICO units back to active duty in 2003. Currently, the two ANGLICO companies in Marine Forces Reserve are 3rd based out of Long Beach, Calif. and 4th ANGLICO in West Palm Beach, Fla.

Third ANGLICO is structured to be easily task organized to fit the unit and mission they are supporting.

The 150-man company can deploy en masse to support a division size element or in small four- to seven-man teams designed to provide expert fire support for a reconnaissance or Special Forces team.

"Because our teams are so small it is imperative that every member of our team knows each others job," explained Staff Sgt. Eric C. Everts, Fire Control Team Leader. "Our basic skill sets consist of radio communications, proficiency in call for fire procedures and physical strength."

Marines from ANGLICO routinely provide their expertise to reconnaissance or Special Forces which means they have to be trained to function with these units. Parachute, Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE), Army Pathfinder, and Helicopter Rope Suspension Training (HRST) are just a few of the additional training opportunities available--in addition to their primary Military Occupational Specialty training.

Typically Marines who want to join 3rd ANGLICO have some prior experience in fire support, such as pilots, artillerymen, communicators or infantry, but that is not required.

"If a Marine wants to join our unit we will send them to all the required schools," said Thomas. "We normally ask for a two-year minimum commitment from a Marine because their first year is primarily dedicated to schools and training."

Though the work is demanding and oftentimes dangerous, ANGLICO Marines find the rigors of their profession rewarding.

"The best part of being part of 3rd ANGLICO is that all the Marines are pretty cool and you get to blow a lot of stuff up," said Sgt. Eduardo Espinosa, a Fire Control Team Leader from Sylmare, Calif.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,foreign

Enduring Freedom vet awarded Bronze Star
Submitted by: MCB Camp Lejeune
Story Identification #: 200283092636
Story by Cpl. Allan J. Grdovich



CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. (Aug. 30, 2002) -- A unit commander here received the Bronze Star earlier this month for his stellar achievements in connection with his combat operations in Afghanistan.

Lt. Col. Jerome Lynes, commanding officer, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, received the award during a battalion formation following his unit's 85th birthday celebration.

Maj. Gen. John F. Sattler, commanding general, 2nd Marine Division, honored the commander by pinning the decoration on his uniform.

According to the citation, the Bridgewater, N.J., native received the award for his performance while deployed with 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) from November 2001 to March 2002.

The expeditionary unit was one of the first to reach the shores of Afghanistan during the ongoing Operation Enduring Freedom. Lynes commanded the MEU's ground combat element, Battalion Landing Team 3/6, and helped coordinate many of the ground offensives against Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces.

In the beginning stages, Lynes' Marines and sailors seized the Kandahar Airfield and facilitated a re-supply for forces there. Soon after, BLT 3/6 trekked nearly 300 miles northeast to Kabul, where the Marines secured what was then the former U.S. embassy - allowing it to reopen after 12 years.

Lynes' family accompanied him during the ceremony.

"If I could cut this (award) in 1,200 pieces I would. I didn't win this 'my sons,' you did. I am only wearing this because of your work," said an emotional Lynes to his battalion.

Lynes and the rest of the MEU were credited with setting new standards for expeditionary operations. Lynes said that despite extreme conditions with temperatures sometime reaching nighttime lows in the 20s, the BLT operated just as they trained to do.

"Anyone who thinks kids today aren't tough haven't seen my Marines in the fighting holes at 2 a.m. They were cold but alert," he said.

Lynes explained that his Marines and Sailors ate Meals-Ready-to-Eat for nearly two months with no running water, electricity or bathrooms.

He said his Marines were some of the toughest he's seen, but also credited much of the unit's success on the war on terrorism to its detachments like Kilo Battery, 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines. He also thanked the 26th's West Coast counterpart - the 15th MEU.

The Bronze Star is awarded for heroic or meritorious achievement of service not involving aerial flight in connection with operations against an opposing armed force. It is senior in precedence to the Purple Heart.


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ighlight=2,star

Veterans gather for VJ Day
Submitted by: New York City Public Affairs
Story Identification #: 2005818163012
Story by Cpl. Lameen Witter



NEW YORK (August 18, 2005) -- The Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space Museum, in conjunction with the History Channel, held a ceremony to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the victory in Japan and the end of World War II, known as VJ Day here Sunday.

Civilians, veterans, and service members to include the Marines of 6th Communication Battalion (6th Comm), were in attendance at the Museum’s celebration of America’s WWII victory.

Sgt. Michael Taft, member of the color guard and a satellite communications operator for 6th Comm, said the ceremony was an amazing opportunity for camaraderie with the veterans of WWII, and it gave him the feeling of a torch of duty passing from one generation of Marines to the next.

“A lot of the veterans came up, thanked us for what we were doing, and told us stories about what they did in WWII. It felt great to be a part of their history…so many people were there to celebrate the victories of the past, and we really felt like we belonged among them,” said Taft, a Virginia Beach native.

The United States dropped an atomic bomb on August 6 and again on August 9, 1945, leaving a path of destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan unlike anything known to mankind. The bombing resulted in Japan’s defeat and surrender, ending a war that had gripped the world since the attack of Pearl Harbor.

Denise Downing, director of public relations and event programming for the Intrepid Museum, commented on the impact of the celebration.

“It was amazing, and the turnout was great. It is important for our veterans to be recognized for their sacrifices. This ceremony is just one way to do it,” said Downing.

The History Channel broadcasted the ceremony later that evening.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,veteran

09/10/2005 20:21:54 News from Al-Mendhar - www.almendhar.com

Sunnis gather to discuss Iraq referendum

BAGHDAD - The threat of a unified Sunni Arab boycott of next week's constitutional vote in Iraq receded on Saturday as Sunni leaders failed to agree on how to oppose the U.S.-backed document.



After a meeting in a Baghdad mosque, Sunni leaders said they hoped those voters who do decide to participate will vote "No".

The lack of consensus revealed divisions in the Sunni community, with some groups insisting on a boycott to rob the referendum of legitimacy, and others saying a massive Sunni "No" vote was the only way to properly defeat it.

"We do not ask the Iraqi people to boycott or not," said Harith al-Dhari, the head of the Muslim Clerics' Association, one of the Sunni groups arguing strategy ahead of the Oct. 15 referendum.

"We ask them to do everything they legitimately can to reject the draft of the constitution," he told Reuters, leaving followers to choose whether that is to vote "No", or to stay at home.

The Sunnis' meeting came as U.S. forces announced they had ended a week-long operation in western Iraq to secure the area ahead of the vote, killing some 50 insurgents during the offensive near the Syrian border, the military said.

Iraq has been hit by a stepped-up campaign of insurgent bombings and suicide attacks in the run-up to the referendum.

A suicide car bomber killed at least seven people in an attack on a police patrol in western Baghdad on Saturday, an Interior Ministry source said. The source said the blast killed one policeman and six civilians. It also wounded 16 people.

The interior minister has announced tough security measures, including curfews, for the time around the vote.

Around 15 million Iraqis are registered for the referendum on a constitution proposed by the Shi'ite- and Kurdish-led government, which tailored many of the articles to its requirements.

It will pass if more than half of voters say "Yes" and as long as two thirds of voters in three of Iraq's 18 provinces do not say "No".

Sunni Arabs, who make up about a fifth of Iraq's population, have a majority in at least three provinces and so have a slim chance of defeating the constitution if they can generate a very high Sunni turnout in those areas.

Sunnis oppose the charter because they say it gives too much power to the Shi'ites and Kurds, allowing them to create federal regions in the north and south, where Iraq's oil wealth lies.

If they decide to boycott the vote, as many did elections in January, it could undermine the referendum's legitimacy. It might pass, but at the risk of alienating Sunnis further and fuelling the insurgency.

"BRINK OF CIVIL WAR"

Several hundred monitors, including from the Arab League, are set to oversee the referendum, which will be the largest organisational effort Iraq has undertaken since January's election, when more than eight million people cast ballots.

Iraq's top Shi'ite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has told his closest followers not to run in December elections or support any candidates, aides said, suggesting no party stands to win his backing.

That could spell difficulties for the parties in the already much criticised government coalition, who profited in January's poll from a wide perception that they had Sistani's blessing.

Amr Moussa, the head of the Arab League, told BBC radio on Saturday that the country was close to civil war and said there seemed to be no strategy for bringing rival groups together.

"The situation is so tense ... a civil war could erupt at any moment, although some people would say it is already there."

Iraqi Interior Minister Bayan Jabor announced a series of strict security measures ahead of the referendum, echoing arrangements made in January, saying the country's borders would be sealed for four days and curfews imposed overnight.

Cars will be banned from moving between provinces and no civilians, even those with permits, will be allowed to carry weapons.

Tens of thousands of Iraqi police and soldiers will be on duty to protect more than 6,000 polling sites, with U.S. and other foreign troops backing up if needed.

Reuters

http://www.almendhar.com/english_6802/news.aspx

Military Awarded the National Defense Service Medal
Submitted by: 22nd MEU
Story Identification #: 200251818246
Story by



CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF OPERATIONS (May 19, 2002) -- The Marines and Sailors of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) now have another ribbon or star to add to their award displays in light of a recent Department of Defense directive.

In a statement made May 1, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said the National Defense Service Medal has been awarded to all U.S. service members on active duty on or after Sept. 11, 2001.

"The sacrifice and contributions made by the U.S. Armed Forces in direct response to the terrorist attacks on the United States and to the long-term resolution of terrorism merit special recognition," said Wolfowitz, commenting on the reasons behind the decision.

Also eligible for the award are Reservists ordered to federal active duty in response to the "9-11" attacks. An end date has not yet been established for awardance of the NDSM.

The NDSM dates back to 1953 when it was established by order of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and this marks the fourth time in history the medal has been awarded. Previous occasions include:

* Korean War era - June 27, 1950 to July 27, 1954
* Vietnam War era - Jan. 1, 1960 to Aug. 14, 1974
* Persian Gulf War era - Aug. 2, 1990 to Nov. 30, 1995

The NDSM consists of a bronze circular medal suspended beneath a ribbon with scarlet, white, old glory blue, and golden yellow stripes. On the front of the medal is an eagle standing atop a sword and palm branch. Arched above the eagle are inscribed the words "NATIONAL DEFENSE."

The design on the back of the medal consists of the shield from the Coat of Arms of the United States over an open wreath of oak and laurel leaves.

For Marines, the NDSM is worn after the Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal and before the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, and is classified as a service award.

First time recipients will receive the medal through the supply system, while individuals who have previously been awarded the NDSM will denote this award by attaching a 3/16" bronze star to the ribbon.

For more information on the 22d MEU (SOC), visit the unit's website at www.22meu.usmc.mil.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,medal

Medal of Honor recipient, former commandant dies at 85
Submitted by: Headquarters Marine Corps
Story Identification #: 200562312489
Story by - Headquarters Marine Corps



WASHINGTON (June 23, 2005) -- Louis H. Wilson, 85, Medal of Honor recipient for heroic actions fighting enemy forces at Fonte Hill, Guam, Mariana Islands, in World War II, and 26th Commandant of the Marine Corps, died June 21 at his home in Birmingham, Ala., with his family present.

A hero by any definition, Gen. Wilson was just a young captain and placed in command of Company F, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, 3rd Marine Division, when, although wounded several times, he succeeded in capturing and holding the strategic high ground in his regimental sector against a numerically greater force, which contributed significantly to the ultimate victory on Guam.

Gen. Wilson “repeatedly exposed himself to the merciless hail of shrapnel and bullets, dashing fifty yards into the open on one occasion to rescue a wounded Marine lying helpless beyond the front lines. Fighting fiercely in hand-to-hand encounters, he led his men in furiously waged battle for approximately ten hours,” according to his Medal of Honor citation. Because of the wounds he received in the fierce fighting, then Capt. Wilson was evacuated to U.S. Naval Hospital San Diego where he remained until Oct. 16, 1944.

President Harry S. Truman personally thanked Gen. Wilson by presenting his award in a special ceremony at the White House in Washington.

Besides earning the nation’s highest honor for heroism in combat, Gen. Wilson served in a variety of command and staff positions, which included service in Korea and command of The Basic School at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Va. He graduated from the National War College in June 1962 and after a second tour at Headquarters, he returned to 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, Calif., as the assistant chief of staff, G-3, deploying with the division first to Okinawa, Japan, and then to Vietnam.

This was followed by duty as commanding officer of 6th Marine Corps District in Atlanta.

Gen. Wilson was promoted to brigadier general in November 1966, and was the legislative assistant to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1967 and 1968. This was followed by a tour as chief of staff, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific and commanding general, I Marine Amphibious Force and 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa. Gen. Wilson became director of the Education Center at MCB Quantico in 1971, and in 1972 he assumed command of Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific. He was appointed Commandant of the Marine Corps July 1, 1975. In October of 1978, Gen. Wilson achieved full membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Gen. Wilson retired June 30, 1979, and will always be remembered as skillfully guiding the Marine Corps through the turbulent and challenging post-Vietnam era. During his tenure as commandant, he laid a firm foundation of high standards and demanding training that ensured that the Marine Corps remained a modern, mobile, general purpose, combined arms force with amphibious expertise prepared for low and high intensity combat against a wide-spectrum of potential foes around the globe.

"The entire Marine Corps family is saddened by the passing of Marine General Louis Hugh Wilson, Jr., our 26th Commandant, and we extend our deepest sympathies to his family and friends,” said Gen. Michael W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps.

“General Wilson was a forward-thinker who was ahead of his time. As commandant from 1975-1979, he stressed modernization, readiness, expeditionary capabilities and integrated firepower -- areas that we still concentrate on today. His legacy of valor and leadership will live forever in the Marine Corps."

After his military retirement in June of 1979, Gen. Wilson lived in Mississippi and California, and subsequently moved to be near family in Birmingham. During this time he felt privileged to serve on the boards of Merrill Lynch, Burlington Resources and the Fluor Corporation.

Gen. Wilson’s culminating act of public service occurred in October of 1995, when at age 75 he addressed a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the end of World War II.

Gen. Wilson is survived by his wife, Jane Clark Wilson; daughter, Janet Wilson Taylor; son-in-law Jarred O. Taylor II; and grandsons Jarred O. Taylor III and Louis Wilson Taylor, all of Birmingham, Alabama.

The Wilson family requests that, in lieu of flowers, donations in the general's memory be made to the Marine Corps University Foundation of which he was a long-term trustee (P.O. Box 122 Quantico, VA 22134-0122), or other Marine Corps related organization.

Gen. Wilson’s full biography is available at www.usmc.mil.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,medal

Veterans reunite for busy weekend of memories
Submitted by: MCB Hawaii
Story Identification #: 2000811153046
Story by Lance Cpl. M. Trent Lowry



MCB Hawaii (August 10, 2000) -- They've had the cold steel of rifles and machine guns in their sweaty grips before, the reports of ammunition and grenades ringing in their ears in a time before many of today's Marines were even born.
But most of the Vietnam-era veterans of 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, hadn't seen the likes of the weapons and equipment used by today's leathernecks.
The veterans were visiting Oahu and MCB Hawaii, Kaneohe Bay for the 3/3 Vietnam veterans reunion July 27-30.
"I wish we'd had (the current weapons). We would have had a lot more firepower," said Roy E. Jost of Boise, ID, who served with 3/3 in Da Nang in 1966 and '67.
The Vietnam-era members of "America's Battalion," 3/3, had a full plate of activities scheduled for their reunion, hosted by 3rd Marine Regiment. In addition to static displays and demonstrations on July 27, the more than 80 veterans and their family members attended a wreath-laying service at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (Punchbowl) Friday, a formal dinner Saturday and a memorial service Sunday morning.
"Words cannot capture just how important this relationship is with these folks. It's an honor for us all to have a part in reconnecting with history," said Col. R.B. Peele, commanding officer of 3rd Marines, after the wreath-laying ceremony Friday.
"Just as we should do with professional Marine Corps knowledge, we should also participate in ceremonies like this and learn from the living history before us," Peele added. "It's especially important for the younger Marines, so they understand the requirements they have in carrying on the Marine Corps legacy."
The junior enlisted Marines who participated in the static displays and demonstrations were eager to speak with the veterans, culling motivation from the stories told by the former 3/3 Marines.
"I met one guy whose life was saved by artillery. It gave me chills knowing that people are depending on what we do. It makes me want to train even harder," said Cpl. Ethan E. Forrest, 22, a section chief with Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines.
"They're telling us stuff about what we're preparing for every day. But they've been there, done that," said Lance Cpl. Greg M. Lombardi, 21, an automatic rifleman with Bravo Co., 1/3.
"You look around here and see people with war wounds. You know they're all heroes, but they don't brag. They were just being Marines," Lombardi said.
The good impression the current Marines got from the veteran's was reciprocated by the 3/3 devil dogs, earning kudos from the veterans and their families.
"I give them a 300 percent rating as hosts. They've done a fantastic job," said Doug "Doc" Stone, a former Navy corpsman with 3/3 from 1967 to 1970.
"It's nice to see these young men and women have such a conscientious attitude toward their jobs. I can sleep with ease at night knowing the Marines are on the job," said Edwin Weintraub, who served with India Co., 3/3.
Despite the warm feelings exuded by the modern Marines and veterans alike, the overall mood throughout the reunion was that of solemn deference to the significance of the sacrifices and deeds the veterans were a part of more than a quarter century ago.
"Today, as we honor (the 3/3 veterans) and praise their deeds, we realize that we cannot discharge our solemn obligation to our fallen comrades with words of homage. They did not die for wreaths and words. They died for the right of Americans to enjoy freedom. They died for future generations. "They died for us," said Brig. Gen. R.E. Parker Jr., commanding general, MCB Hawaii, during a speech at the wreath-laying ceremony.
"The sacrifice of these warriors who are being remembered today should never be forgotten, and we are taking the opportunity now as the mantle is passed on to today's Marines to always remember," Brig. Gen. Parker said.
The reunion of the 3/3 veterans was a mutually beneficial endeavor for the participants: the veteran's were able to get a glimpse of today's Marine Corps while revisiting the past, and gaining some closure for their experiences. And the active duty Marines were able to take the veterans' experiences and add them to their arsenal of knowledge.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,vietnam

Cowboys back in the saddle to test new technology
Submitted by: Marine Aircraft Group 41
Story Identification #: 2005918165556
Story by Lance Cpl. Jason D. Laseter



NAVAL AIR STATION-JOINT RESERVE BASE FORT WORTH, Texas (Sept. 18, 2005) -- As U.S. forces fight alongside foreign allies, difficulties sometimes arise due to the diversity of equipment, procedures, weapons and fighting doctrine employed by various nations.

From Sept. 26 through Oct. 6, Fort Worth, Texas based Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 112 of Marine Aircraft Group 41, will be in England taking part in Exercise Urgent Quest, a multinational exercise testing new technology and procedures the unpredictability in operations with foreign coalitions, according to VMFA-112 operations officer and aviator Maj. Dan Dewhirst.

VMFA-112 will be joined by elements from the 2nd Marine Division and the U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Regiment and several other famous air and ground units from eight countries including soldiers from the French Foreign Legion and Scotland’s Black Watch Regiment. Together the coalition will promote standardized operational procedures, including communication, maneuver and fire support between allied nations.

The main focus of the two-week exercise will be air-to-ground and ground missions testing Battlefield Target Identification Devices (BTID), Radio Based Combat Identification (RBCI), Optical Combat Identification System (OCIDS) and Radio Frequency Tags (RF Tags). The new equipment should provide a reliable means of identifying friendly ground forces to allied combat aircraft without revealing themselves to the enemy.

“Ground troop identification is crucial on today’s battlefield,” said Capt. Kevin M. (Peanut) McDonald, an F/A-18A+ pilot with VMFA-112, “and we are just happy to help develop that technology.”

During the exercise, Allied Command Transformation will conduct training with the prototype NATO Combat Identification Training System (CITS) with selected unit representatives who will then conduct training of all personnel in the system.

To take part in the exercise, VMFA-112 is sending four F/A-18A+ Hornets, eight pilots, two forward air controllers, and 35 enlisted Marines to England. The squadron will be housed at Royal Air Force Boscombe Down.

Lead elements from the squadron departed Fort Worth for England on Monday with the rest to follow during this week. The squadron will remain in England until early October. Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 234, also a MAG-41 unit, used their KC-130T Hercules cargo aircraft to assist in transporting equipment and ground personnel overseas.

The deployment is yet another opportunity for the Cowboys to display their skills and utilize the advanced technology for which they’re known.

In 2004 the Cowboys became the first Reserve Marine squadron to deploy on a Western Pacific exercise since the Korean War. Recently the Cowboys deployed to Oerland Main Air Station, Norway, for the multinational exercise Battle Griffin. The Cowboys were also one of the very first Reserve Marine fighter attack squadrons to receive the new AIM-9X Sidewinder (Air Intercept Missile).

“This is a great opportunity to showcase 112’s expertise in digital close air support,” said exercise participant Maj. Chris L. Koelzer, an F/A-18A+ pilot with VMFA-112.

The Coalition Combat Identification Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration, or CCID ACTD, as the exercise is called, will take place in England at the Westdown Camp, Army Training Estate, Salisbury Plain.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,foreign

President of Colombia decorates U.S. Marines
Submitted by: Marine Forces South
Story Identification #: 200489152810
Story by Gunnery Sgt. Mike Dougherty



BOGOTA, Colombia -- (Aug. 9, 2004) -- Two U.S. Marines assigned to the Military Group of the American Embassy in Bogota, Colombia recently received Colombia’s highest award that can be bestowed upon foreign nationals.

Colombian President Alvaro Uribe pinned the Admiral Padilla Medal for Distinguished Service on Maj. Ivan Monclova and Sgt. Juan Jimenez in a ceremony attended by numerous dignitaries. They received the awards while Colombia’s attorney general, former minister of defense, and the heads of its Navy, Marine Corps, Army and Air Force stood in observance of the ceremony.

“The medal is given for a high level of cooperation with the (Colombian Naval and Marine forces) and the government of Colombia,” Jimenez said. Their issuance also celebrates the high level of progress the Colombian forces have achieved as a result of this cooperation, he added.

Jimenez was born in West Palm Beach, Fla., but moved to Colombia where he grew up and became a Colombian Marine. He served nine years, attaining the rank of Captain and commanding a company before returning to the United States and becoming a U.S. Marine rifleman He has served in 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion and 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines’ Scout Sniper Platoon.

The awards ceremony coincided with a larger celebration, for the birthday of Colombia’s Armada Nacional. The Armada is comprised of Colombia’s naval forces, its corps of Marines, and its coast guard.

Monclova and Jimenez are working particularly hard at launching a Mobile Training Group, a team of Colombian Marines that will travel to various riverine units throughout the country. Historically, U.S. Marines from Camp Lejeune have made several annual trips “downrange” to conduct riverine training in Colombia, but the domestic training group is gradually replacing them, Jimenez said. “It’s in its infancy, but we are working hard to make them self-sufficient,” he added.

The two are also working on assisting the Colombian Marine Corps with its reorganization, Jimenez said. With the help of U.S. Marine Corps Forces South, they are helping them with staffing and logistical restructuring in addition to enhancing their operational and training capabilities. The end result will be a more effective force with a stronger individual identity, Jimenez said. It will build upon the momentum they’ve established in their fight against narco-terrorists.

Col. Bruce Gandy, Chief of Staff, U.S. Marine Corps Forces South was among many who took note of the performance of the two Marines and how much they’ve accomplished. “This is an example of two Marines contributing to the Global War on Terror in a little known but very important region,” he said.


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,foreign

09/10/2005 20:44:48 News from Al-Mendhar - www.almendhar.com

To Al Sayyid Abdul Aziz Al Hakim

If blaming is as much as love, then it is allowed for the writer of these lines to blame his friend Al Sayyid Abdul Aziz Al Hakim, head of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and some leaders in the council, with whom we have intimate relations, during the past years.



The source of blame is this severe change of situations regarding the Iranian interference in Iraq and that a number of leaders in the council have turned to mere defenders for Iran in the press, in a violent manner. Sometimes the national loyalties mix with the regional alliances.

Someone like Mr. Bayan Jabr Solagh, interior minister and one of the council leaders, whom we have known as calm and balanced person, during the past years, spoke in an excited and hating tone defending Iran. Instead of verifying the truth, he started to speak in a tone, which alienates Iraq from its Arab surroundings and aggravates its relations with its neighbors and people.

Powerful identities in the council started to appear in front of the Iraqi and Arab public opinion and on satellite channels, as if they were spokesmen for the Islamic Republic in Iran. There is a great difference between sympathizing with the Iranian situation and attempting to provide with facts to prove the noninterference in Iraqi affairs, and speaking in an excited tone that denies all interference and showing Iran as a peaceful lamb and ignoring the reality in Iraqi southern provinces!

Exaggeration and sliding into this situation may harm the political process in Iraq. They may make people disagree on the issues of national interest, which Iraqis should not disagree on. The sensitivity of the Iranian situation should be realized within the social, national and sectarian structure in Iraq.

I am not one of those quoting dead people, which is a common tradition in the Arab press. But only Allah knows the extent of bitterness that I heard from the martyr Al Sayyid Mohamed Baqer Al Hakim, during my interview with him at his office in Tehran, a few years ago. He complained about the Iranian interference in Badr forces. The biggest worry is that such interference would continue and that the Islamic council would alienate itself, in case it turned into a façade for the Iranian policy and that a number of its leaders would turn into lawyers for the Iranian policies. It is not a call for boycotting Tehran, but it is a call for drawing a red line between the national situation and foreign alliances.

Ahmed Al Rabei
Al Sharq Al Awsat

http://www.almendhar.com/english_6800/news_print.aspx

http://www.armed-guard.com/mymems3.html

I failed to mention that during my short time at Treasure Island there was a most
obnoxious Boatswain's Mate 2/C assigned as Master at Arms there. We were never
allowed to sit down at Treasure Island during duty hours. We had to keep walking
and looking busy. One good way was to carry a piece of paper and try to look like
you were a messenger. Occasionally you forgot and leaned against a bulkhead or
Heaven Forbid, just sat down. The Master of Arms always spotted you as he rode
his bicycle down the halls continually. He immediately took you to a closet and
got you a shovel to carry on your shoulder as he added you to his marching
brigade to march around the halls continually. He was a contemptible person.

Well, imagine our surprise and disgust when the Master of Arms was selected as
the gunnery petty officer for the SS Charles M Hall. There was also a Signalman
Third Class, a Radioman Third Class, A Seaman 2/C radio striker and all the rest
of us were lowly Apprentice Seamen.

The Charles M Hall had a five inch fifty bag gun on the stern, a three inch
fifty antiaircraft gun on the bow and eight 20 MM antiaircraft guns. Our Boatswain
had never seen a five inch fifty or any other bag gun and the gunnery officer
had never seen one and none of the gun crew had ever seen one. The Charles M Hall
was a brand new Liberty Ship and this was the maiden voyage. The five inch fifty
looked as though it may have come from the USS Arizona. You could stand at the
end of the barrel and raise the barrel up and down a foot and horizontally two
feet without the Pointer or Trainer moving a hand. All we knew was that there
was a very long rod with a brush on the end and a wash tub laying under the gun.

Later we learned that the projectiles in the magazine had no brass shells attached
to them and that was when we began to suspect that we were supposed to ram the
projectile in and throw in one of the silk bags of powder. After we fired one
round and opened the breech we saw burning remains of the silk bag and decided
we were supposed to put water in the tub and dip the brush in the water before
we rammed in the next projectile. It was on the job training without any one on
the job who had ever done this before.

The ship's cargo holds were finally filled and we thought we were ready to go.
How little we knew. They began to load the decks with trucks, huge boxes, and
even airplanes, all cabled or chained to the deck. They finally announced that
everything was loaded and balanced and we were ready to go, we thought. Then
they loaded a huge crash boat on the forward port deck and we had a definite
list to port, but they said we were ready and we left San Francisco for the
Pacific.

We were assigned watches, four hours on and four hours off and in the four hours
off we cleaned guns, listened to the articles of war, painted, attended survival
at sea lectures, learned the morse code, studied for Gunners Mate, listened to
the ten records we had received with our hand wound record player and even
managed to sleep three and a half hours every night.

The Boatswain's Mate was a pain in the butt, degenerate and evil. He had a set
fee you could pay to get off watches, he had certain people he favored and certain
people he delighted in making miserable.

Our first island was Palmyra and no one had any idea whether it was still in
American hands or belonged to the Japanese. We approached the island and they
seemed to ignore us until the Master started blasting away with the ship's horn
and that got their attention and planes started taking off and began buzzing us.
They decided we were American and we decided the same for them. All the cargo
we had for them was the huge crash boat. The Merchant Bosun began making
preparations to unload the boat but an Army Secone Lieutenant arrived on board
and announced he was an engineer and that he would unload the crash boat. We
knew he was in trouble when he rigged one 20 ton boom for the job and the Bosun
tried to tell him but he waved him off. He did manage to get the crash boat
a couple of feet off the deck before the boom broke but he was holding the
wrong rope and lost a finger on his right hand. The Bosun then rigged the
booms and the crew lifted the boat and got it over the side. The Bosun winked
at the crew member handling the winch and he just let go and the boat splashed
into the water and the Army did not have to bother removing the crating.

We left Palmyra and on to Pago Pago, Samoa. Palmyra had no harbor and Pago Pago
has what might be the most beautiful harbor in the world. We docked there and
had been instructed not to remove our shoes while we were there as the Samoans
would be aboard and many had elephantisis, which was contagious and the ship
would be scrubbed down when we left. We had the deck cargo for them and the top
level of each hold. The planes were set on the dock and we watched as the
natives took them through trees that we knew they would not go through but
somehow did.

We were also amazed as those in charge unloaded their part of hold one and then
began carefully setting everything in the bottom of hold one on the dock. Then
they unbolted the top of the tank under hold one and began unloading case after
case of beer. Then they rebolted the tank top and put everything back in the
bottom of hold one. They had unloaded beer destined for British Samoa, our
next stop.

There was little we could do ashore except get in the beer line at the Marine
PX and get two warm beers. There was also a Samoan Marine Corps and one of their
jobs was to watch the beer line. The Samoan Marines had on Marine dress uniforms
but did not wear shoes. We thought we would just get in line again and get two more
beers, but immediately a Samoan Marine recognized us and motioned for us to leave
the line. My buddy, Speedy, was determined he would stay in line and got a little
nick in the butt from a bayonet.

We walked around and found a public shower in the middle of town. It was nothing
but four two by fours and a pipe going up one two by four, then to the middle,
with a shower head. One two by four had a nail for the natives to hang their
clothes on while taking a shower in public. Speedy had to stand there and make
comments about their anatomy for awhile, then hung his clothes on the nail and
took a shower. The Samoan Marines broke that up rather quickly.

I met a US Marine there from my home town and he asked me to call his Father
when we got back to the States and tell him he was okay, and I did. I met
another Marine there from New Bern, North Carolina and he asked me to call his
wife when I got home. I did that, also, and she invited me to spend a few
days with her, and I refused. I never fully understood why.

We left Pago Pago and fumigated all the decks and got back to normal and soon arrived
at British Samoa. There was no harbor there but the unloading crew arrived on
board in great spirits and were heard to say they were sure Pago Pago did not
get their beer this time. They were sadly disappointed as all they found in
the forward tank was a note from Pago Pago thanking them for the beer. All the
cargo had to be unloaded on barges and we were allowed to go ashore. We were
told the natives did laundry and most of us took a load, much to our dismay,
as we later learned that they just put the entire load of laundry on rocks and
beat it with more rocks and I never did get all the blue out of my whites.

We walked around and came to a shallow stream and you could tell by looking it
was only a foot or so deep. I started wading across it and disappeared. I was
told later that it was 65 feet deep, and I cannot swim. Speedy jumped in and
drug me out before I was fully drowned.

All good things must end and we left British Samoa with a load of copra, with
a million copra bugs that found their way into every bunk on the ship. We
eventually arrived in Tocapilla, Chile to unload the copra and take on a load
of nitrate. There was no port and everything had to be done with barges again.
We learned that you cannot burn nitrate with a blow torch but you can just
drop a small piece of smoldering hemp rope in the hold and days later it will
ignite the nitrate and cannot be extinguished with fresh water or sea water.
We had to empty one of our water tanks so they could fill it with stagnant water,
which is all that will put out a nitrate fire. In addition, our merchant crew
had to place the hatch covers on the hatches, with cracks between them so
that the nitrate could be dumped on the covers and sift through the cracks,
and someone had to be assigned to watch for hemp rope.

Tocapilla was neutral but the police there treated us like kings, saluting us
every time they saw us. Tocapilla was also famous for their great silver
artists and their silver items were really great bargains, but few of us had
any money.

Eventually we departed Tocapilla and headed for the Panama Canal. I had not
shaved since we left San Francisco and had a heavy and bright red beard, totally
untrimmed. The gunnery officer said to shave or stay aboard so I shaved. I had
no hair on my head as it was shaved when we crossed the equator. One of our
shipmates was a rather portly lad and was the first to succumb to the liquor
and Speedy insisted on stealing a fork lift to take him back to the ship. We
all got roaring drunk and somehow concocted a plan to stay there and miss the
ship, which was supposed to sail at 0800 the following day. We ended up sleeping
on what we thought was a pile of lumber and about 1000 hours the next day we
strolled back to the dock to express our sorrow at missing the ship. There were
two problems with our plan. The ship did not leave until afternoon and the pile
of lumber we slept on was creosoted and our whites were more blacks than whites.

We found our gunnery officer was in the hospital and Speedy and I went to the
hospital and at his request kidnapped him and took him back to the ship. He had
sat on a porcelain toilet, it broke, and his butt was ripped open.

When we arrived in Brooklyn the gunnery officer was taken to the hospital, the
Boatswain's Mate put the signalman in charge and went to the Port Director
and got orders to return to Treasure Island, the Signalman and Radio Operator
arranged for leave and suddenly we had one Seaman 2nd class and a bunch of
Apprentice Seaman alone on the ship.

We had never received any mail from the time we left San Francisco till our
arrival in Brooklyn, so the Seaman 2/c took charge. He sent one truck to the
Fleet Post Office for mail and one truck to a liquor store for whiskey. When
the trucks got back we put the mail for the gunnery officer, signalman and
radio operator aside and dumped the mail for the Boatswain in the Bay.

We started drinking and reading mail and got very drunk. A group of officers
and a Chief came aboard for an inspection and found us all drunk. They asked who
was in charge and the Seaman 2/c finally made it to his feet and said, "I Ruffin
Lazare Molliere, am in charge." Bless his Cajun heart. The inspection team
said they would be back, but never returned and someone finally came from
the Brooklyn Armed Guard Center and got us.

I had two special friends aboard that ship. One was Grover Cleveland Redding,
who I went through boot camp with. The other, I will just call Speedy. He was
a full blooded Cherokee Indian. He was forever in trouble and forever dragging
me in it with him. He did some crazy things, such as listening to survival at
sea talks and then going to every raft and carving all the oars into spears
so we could spear fish if we were sunk. He also took his only pair of shoes
and cut them into a pair of sandals. The gunnery officer had finally confined
him to his quarters with a guard outside the door. Speedy stripped and coated
himself with a full bottle of hair oil and went through the port hole, while
we were at sea, He ended up on a tiny ledge and yelled and yelled and no one
could hear him and he could not get through the port hole and back inside.
It was a miracle that someone happened to look down and saw him and the Bosun
rigged a rope and went down and got him. When he was on deck, naked, the
gunnery officer screamed at him to stand at attention. Speedy did just that
and then saluted with the wrong part of his body and smiled broadly.

United States Marine Corps

Press Release
Division of Public Affairs
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380-1775
Telephone: 703-614-4309 DSN 224-4309 Fax 703-695-7460
Contact: Naval Institute
Independent Forum on National Defense
Press Release


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Release # 0401-04-0624
March 31, 2004

Marines Back to Iraq, the Real War Heroes, and Assassination and Abduction in Foreign Policy - All in April Proceedings

ANNAPOLIS, Md. --April Proceedings looks at the return of U.S. Marines to war-ravaged Iraq. Now assigned to the difficult Sunni Triangle region, they will face situations that span the spectrum of military operations, from peacekeeping to full-fledged combat. A veteran Iraqi Freedom troop commander reveals his thoughts on what will work for the Marines this go-round. http://www.usni.org/proceedings/articles04/PRO04mundy.htm

Throughout the history of our nation, Americans have been able to recite the names of our battlefield heroes. Today, battlefield heroes do not make headlines unless they - like Jessica Lynch - were victimized. Victims are less violent; victims are less controversial; victims inspire sympathy - but at what cost to our national resolve and to our citizens' desire to serve? http://www.usni.org/proceedings/articles04...04crossland.htm

Special Report: The death last week of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder and spiritual leader radical Islamic group Hamas, raised new questions about state-authorized assassination. Since the 1990s, the statutes and executive orders prohibiting assassinations of high-ranking enemies of the United States have often been ignored with no hew or cry from Congress. Do assassinations and abductions have a place in U.S. foreign policy?

http://www.usni.orgproceedings/articles04/PRO04collins.htm

Also in this issue:

Training Paid Off in Iraqi Freedom
by Navy Commander Andrew L. Lewis

Software and smart weapons are a benefit to successful operations, but for F/A-18 pilots flying missions from the Mediterranean during Iraqi Freedom, training saved the day. http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles04/PRO04lewis.htm

Do Coast Guard Ops Contribute to Homeland Security?
by Coast Guard Lt. J. T. Zawrotny
With forces overextended to support operations overseas, the Coast Guard cannot adequately protect all the strategic points of the U.S. maritime border.




http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,foreign

Soldiers of the State:
Reconsidering American
Civil-Military Relations



RICHARD D. HOOKER, JR.

In American academe today the dominant view of civil-military relations is sternly critical of the military, asserting that civilian control of the military is dangerously eroded.1 Though tension clearly exists in the relationship, the current critique is largely inaccurate and badly overwrought. Far from overstepping its bounds, America’s military operates comfortably within constitutional notions of separated powers, participating appropriately in defense and national security policymaking with due deference to the principle of civilian control. Indeed, an active and vigorous role by the military in the policy process is and always has been essential to the common defense.

A natural starting point for any inquiry into the state of civil-military relations in the US today is to define what is meant by the terms “civil-military relations” and “civilian control.” Broadly defined, “civil-military relations” refers to the relationship between the armed forces of the state and the larger society they serve—how they communicate, how they interact, and how the interface between them is ordered and regulated. Similarly, “civilian control” means simply the degree to which the military’s civilian masters can enforce their authority on the military services.2

Clarifying the vocabulary of civil-military relations sheds an interesting light on the current, highly charged debate. The dominant academic critique takes several forms, charging that the military has become increasingly estranged from the society it serves;3 that it has abandoned political neutrality for partisan politics;4 and that it plays an increasingly dominant and illegitimate role in policymaking.5 This view contrasts the ideal of the nonpartisan, apolitical soldier with a different reality. In this construct, the mili-

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tary operates freely in a charged political environment to “impose its own perspective” in defiance of the principle of civilian control.6 The critique is frequently alarmist, employing terms like “ominous,”7 “alienated,”8 and “out of control.”9 The debate is strikingly one-sided; few civilian or military leaders have publicly challenged the fundamental assumptions of the critics.10 Yet as we shall see, the dominant scholarly view is badly flawed in its particulars, expressing a distorted view of the military at work in a complex political system that distributes power widely.

The Civil-Military Gap

The common assertion that a “gap” exists which divides the military and society in an unhealthy way is a central theme. Unquestionably, the military as an institution embraces and imposes a set of values that more narrowly restricts individual behavior. But the evidence is strong that the public understands the necessity for more circumscribed personal rights and liberties in the military, and accepts the rationale for an organizationally conservative outlook that emphasizes the group over the individual and organizational success over personal validation.

The tension between the conservative requirements of military life and the more liberal outlook of civil society goes far back before the Revolution to the early days of colonial America’s militia experience. Though it has waxed and waned, it has remained central to the national conversation about military service.11 The issue is an important one: the military holds an absolute monopoly on force in society, and how to keep it strong enough to defend the state and subservient enough not to threaten it is the central question in civil-military relations. Most commentators assume that this difference in outlook poses a significant problem—that at best it is a condition to be managed, and at worst a positive danger to the state. As a nation, however, America has historically accepted the necessity for a military more highly ordered and disciplined than civil society.

While important cultural differences exist between the services and even between communities within the services,12 the military in general remains focused on a functional imperative that prizes success in war above all else. Though sometimes degraded during times of lessened threat, this imper-

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ative has remained constant at least since the end of the Civil War and the rise of modern military professionalism. It implies a set of behaviors and values markedly different from those predominant in civil society, particularly in an all-volunteer force less influenced by large numbers of temporary conscripts.

Though the primary function of the military is often described as “the application of organized violence,” the military’s conservative and group-centered bias is based on something even more fundamental. In the combat forces which dominate the services, in ethos if not in numbers, the first-order challenge is not to achieve victory on the battlefield. Rather it is to make the combat soldier face his own mortality. Under combat conditions the existence of risk cannot be separated from the execution of task. The military culture, while broadly conforming to constitutional notions of individual rights and liberties, therefore derives from the functional imperative and by definition values collective over individual good.

The American public intuitively understands this, as evidenced by polling data which demonstrate conclusively that a conservative military ethic has not alienated the military from society.13 On the contrary, public confidence in the military remains consistently high, more than a quarter century after the end of the draft and the drawdown of the 1990s, both of which lessened the incidence and frequency of civilian participation in military affairs. There is even reason to believe that the principal factors cited most often to explain the existence of the “gap”—namely the supposed isolation of the military from civilian communities and the gulf between civilian and military values—have been greatly exaggerated.

The military “presence” in civil society is not confined to serving members of the active-duty military. Rather, it encompasses all who serve or have served, active and reserve. For example, millions of veterans with firsthand knowledge of the military and its value system exist within the population at large. The high incidence of married service members and an increasing trend toward off-base housing mean that hundreds of thousands of military people and their dependents live in the civilian community. Reserve component installations and facilities and the reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who serve there bring the military face to face with society every day in thousands of local communities across the country. Commissioned officers, and increasingly noncommissioned officers (NCOs), regularly participate in civilian educational programs, and officer training programs staffed by active, reserve, and retired military personnel are found on thousands of college and high school campuses. Military recruiting offices are located in every sizable city and town. Many military members even hold second jobs in the private sector. At least among middle-class and working-class Americans, the military is widely represented and a part of everyday life.14

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Just as the military’s isolation from society is often overstated, differences in social attitudes, while clearly present, do not place the military outside the mainstream of American life. The dangers posed by a “values gap” are highly questionable given the wide disparity in political perspectives found between the east and west coasts and the American “heartland”; between urban, suburban, and rural populations; between north and south; between different religious and ethnic communities; and between social and economic classes. It may well be true that civil society is more forgiving than the military for personal failings like personal dishonesty, adultery, indebtedness, assault, or substance abuse. But society as a whole does not condone these behaviors or adopt a neutral view. To the extent that there are differences, they are differences of degree. On fundamental questions about the rule of law, on the equality of persons, on individual rights and liberties, and on civilian control of the military in our constitutional system, there are no sharp disagreements with the larger society. Indeed, there is general agreement about what constitutes right and wrong behavior.15 The difference lies chiefly in how these ideals of “right behavior” are enforced. Driven by the functional imperative of battlefield success, the military as an institution views violations of publicly accepted standards of behavior more seriously because they threaten the unity, cohesion, or survival of the group.16 Seen in this light, the values “gap” assumes a very different character.

To be sure, sweeping events have altered the civil-military compact. The advent of the all-volunteer force, the defeat in Vietnam, the end of the Cold War, the drawdown of the 1990s, the impact of gender and sexual orientation policies, and a host of other factors have influenced civil-military relations in important ways. The polity no longer sees military service as a requirement of citizenship during periods of national crisis, or a large standing military as a wartime anomaly. Despite such fundamental changes, over time public support for the military and its values has remained surprisingly enduring, even as the level of public participation in military affairs has declined.

The “Politicization” of the Military

Of equal or perhaps greater import is the charge that the military has abandoned its tradition of nonpartisan service to the state in favor of partisan politics. Based on apparently credible evidence that the military has embraced conservatism as a political philosophy and affiliated with the Republican Party, this view implies a renunciation of the classical, archetypal soldier who neither voted nor cared about partisan politics. Nevertheless, as with the “values gap,” the charge that the US military has become dangerously politicized does not stand up to closer scrutiny. The tradition of nonpartisanship is alive and well in America’s military.

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One can plausibly speculate on trends which suggest greater Republican affiliation over the past generation or so. Seven of the last ten presidential administrations have been Republican. For those with a propensity to enter the military and even more for those who choose to stay, the Republican Party is generally seen as more supportive of military pay, quality of life, and a strong defense. Since the late 1970s, the percentage of young Americans identifying themselves as Republicans rose significantly across the board.

Still, from 1976 to 1999, the number of high school seniors expecting to enter the military and self-identifying as Republicans never exceeded 40 percent and actually declined significantly from 1991 to 1999. Despite the end of the draft and the more market-inspired and occupational flavor of military service under the all-volunteer concept, new recruits “are predominantly not Republican and are less Republican than their peers who go to college.”17 Increasingly it seems clear that the young enlisted service members who make up a large proportion of the force cannot be characterized as predominantly conservative or Republican.

The figures for senior military officers are quite different; about two thirds self-identify as Republican. To some extent this reflects the attitudes of the socio-economic cohort they are drawn from, generally defined as non-minority, college educated, belonging to mainstream Christian denominations, and above average in income. On the other hand, military elites overwhelmingly shun the “far-right” or “extremely conservative” labels, are far less supportive of fundamentalist religious views, and are significantly more liberal than mainstream society as a whole on social issues.18 It is far more accurate to say that senior military leaders occupy the political center than to portray them as creatures of the right.

If the conservative orientation of the military is less clear-cut than commonly supposed, its actual impact on American electoral politics is highly doubtful. As we have seen, the attitudes and orientation of the enlisted force vary considerably. The commissioned officer corps, comprising perhaps ten percent of the force (roughly 120,000 active-duty members) and only a tiny fraction of the electorate, is not in any sense politically active. It

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does not proselytize among its subordinates, organize politically, contribute financially to campaigns to any significant degree or, apparently, vote in large numbers. There is no real evidence that the military has become increasingly partisan in an electoral sense, or that it plays an important role in election outcomes. As Lance Betros has argued,

The fundamental weakness of this argument is that it ascribes to military voters a level of partisanship that is uncharacteristic of the voting public. The vast majority of people who cast votes for Democrats or Republicans are not partisans, in the sense of actively advancing the party’s interests. Instead, they comprise the “party in the electorate,” a much looser affiliation than the party organization. . . . [T]hese voters do not have more than a casual involvement in the party’s organizational affairs and rarely interact with political leaders and activists. They are, in effect, the consumers, not the purveyors, of the party’s partisan appeals and policies.19

A common criticism is that a growing tendency by retired military elites to publicly campaign for specific candidates signals an alarming move away from the tradition of nonpartisanship. But aside from the fact that this trend can be observed in favor of both parties,20 not just the Republicans, evidence that documents the practical effect of these endorsements is lacking. Except in wartime, most voters cannot even identify the nation’s past or present military leaders. They are unlikely to be swayed by their endorsements. Nor is there any evidence that the political actions of retired generals and admirals unduly influence the electoral or policy preferences of the active-duty military. We are in fact a far cry from the days when senior military leaders actually contended for the presidency while on active duty—a far more serious breach of civilian control.

The Military Role in the Policy Process

More current is the suggestion that party affiliation lends itself to military resistance to civilian control in policy matters, especially during periods of Democratic control. The strongest criticism in this vein is directed at General Colin Powell as a personality and gays in the military as a policy issue, with any number of prominent scholars drawing overarching inferences about civil-military relations from this specific event.21 This tendency to draw broad conclusions from a specific case is prevalent in the field but highly questionable as a matter of scholarship. The record of military deference to civilian control, particularly in the recent past, in fact supports a quite different conclusion.

Time and again in the past decade, military policy preferences on troop deployments, the proliferation of nontraditional missions, the draw-

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down, gender issues, budgeting for modernization, base closure and realignment, and a host of other important issues were overruled or watered down. Some critics, most notably Andrew Bacevich, argue that President Clinton did not control the military so much as he placated it: “The dirty little secret of American civil-military relations, by no means unique to this [Clinton] administration, is that the commander-in-chief does not command the military establishment; he cajoles it, negotiates with it, and, as necessary, appeases it.”22 This conclusion badly overreaches. Under President Clinton, military force structure was cut well below the levels recommended in General Powell’s Base Force recommendations. US troops remained in Bosnia far beyond the limits initially set by the President. Funding for modernization was consistently deferred to pay for contingency operations, many of which were opposed by the Joint Chiefs. In these and many other instances, the civilian leadership enforced its decisions firmly on its military subordinates. On virtually every issue, the military chiefs made their case with conviction, but acquiesced loyally and worked hard to implement the decisions of the political leadership.

As many scholars point out, the election of Bill Clinton in 1992 posed perhaps the most severe test of civil-military relations since the Johnson-McNamara era. Avowedly anti-military in his youth, Clinton came to office with a background and political makeup that invited confrontation with the military. His determination to open the military to gays, announced during the campaign and reiterated during the transition, provoked widespread concerns among senior military leaders. Eminent historians Russell Weigley and Richard Kohn have severely criticized the military’s role in this controversy, and in particular General Powell’s actions. Weigley cites the episode as “a serious breach of the constitutional principle of civilian control” justifying a “grave accusation of improper conduct.” Kohn characterizes it hyperbolically as “the most open manifestation of defiance and resistance by the American military since the publication of the Newburgh address. . . . [N]othing like this had ever occurred in American history.”23

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All this is poor history and even poorer political science. The presidential candidacies of Taylor, Scott, McClellan, Grant, Hancock, Wood, and MacArthur while on active duty suggest far more serious challenges to civilian control. The B36 controversy (the “Revolt of the Admirals”) in 1948 and the overt insubordination leading to the relief of MacArthur in 1952 represented direct challenges to the political survival of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in the first case and President Truman himself in the second. The “gays in the military” dispute was very different and much less significant in overarching national security import. A more balanced critique suggests that the controversy hardly warrants the claims made on its behalf.

The Apolitical Soldier Revisited

The characterization of General Powell as a “politician in uniform” is often contrasted with the ideal of the nonpartisan soldier modeled by Huntington. This rigidly apolitical model, typified by figures like Grant, Sherman, Pershing, and Marshall, colors much of the current debate. The history of civil-military relations in America, however, paints a different picture. Since the Revolution, military figures have played prominent political roles right up to the present day. The ban on partisanship in electoral politics, while real, is a relatively modern phenomenon. But the absence of the military from the politics of policy is, and always has been, largely a myth.

The roster of former general officers who later became President shows a strong intersection between politics and military affairs. The list includes Washington (probably as professional a soldier as it was possible to be in colonial America), Jackson, Harrison, Taylor, Grant, Hays, Garfield, and Eisenhower. (Many others had varying degrees of military service, some highly significant.)24 The list of prominent but unsuccessful presidential aspirants who were also military leaders includes Scott, Fremont, McClellan, Hancock, Leonard Wood, Dewey, and MacArthur. Even in the modern era, many senior military leaders have served in high political office, while many others tried unsuccessfully to enter the political arena.25 Even some of the paladins of the apolitical ideal, such as Grant, Sherman, and Pershing, benefited greatly from political patronage at the highest levels.26

In attempting to reconcile an obvious pattern of military involvement in American political life to the apolitical ideal, historians have sometimes differentiated between “professional” and “nonprofessional” soldiers. The nonprofessionals, so the argument runs, can be excused for their political activity on the grounds that they were at best part-timers whose partisan political behavior did not threaten the professional ethic. Yet many commanded large bodies of troops and simultaneously embodied real political strength

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and power.27 Indeed, for much of American history, the military was not recognizably professional at all. Before the Civil War, American military professionalism as we understand it today did not exist.28 The regular officer corps was so small, so poorly educated, and so rife with partisan politics that in time of war it was often led, not by long-service professionals, but essentially by political figures like Andrew Jackson. Even those few career soldiers who rose to the top in wartime, such as Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott, not infrequently became politicians who contended for the presidency itself—Taylor successfully, and Scott notably not.

America fought the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Civil War using the traditional model of a small professional army and a large volunteer force, mostly led by militia officers or social and political elites with little or no military training—including many politicians (War Department policy kept Regular officers in junior grades with Regular units; few escaped to rise to high command).29 By war’s end, politicians in uniform like Butler, McClernand, and Sickles and politically ambitious generals like McClellan and Fremont had given way to more professionally oriented commanders. In the postwar period the notion of the talented amateur on the battlefield faded while the memory of the “political” generals, often acting in league with the congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War to further their own personal interests, continued to rankle. Until the turn of the century the Army would be run by professional veterans of the Civil War, particularly General Sheridan as Commanding General, and they would attempt to impose a stern ethic of political neutrality.30

That this ethic heavily influenced the professional officer corps cannot be doubted—and yet the tradition of career military figures seeking political office continued.31 Nor did the ethic renounce active participation in the politics of military policy. Even at a time when the military-industrial complex was far less important than today, when the military share of the budget was tiny and the political spoils emanating from the military inconsequential, the military services struggled mightily with and against both the executive and legislative branches in pursuit of their policy goals. In cases too numerous to count, the military services used the linkages of congressional oversight to advance their interests and preserve their equities against perceived executive encroachment. Over time, a strong prohibition on military involvement in electoral politics evolved which remains powerfully in effect today. But the realities of separated powers, as well as the powerful linkages between defense industries, congressional members and staff, and the military services do not—and never have—allowed the military to stand aloof from the bureaucratic and organizational pulling and hauling involved in the politics of policy.

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The Separatist vs. Fusionist Debate

There are essentially two competing views on the subject of the military’s proper role in the politics of policy. The first holds that the military officer is not equipped by background, training, or inclination to fully participate in defense policymaking. In this view, mastering the profession of arms is so demanding and time-consuming, and the military education system so limiting, that an understanding of the policy process is beyond the abilities of the military professional.32

Military officers are ill prepared to contribute to high policy. Normal career patterns do not look towards such a role; rather they are—and should be—designed to prepare officers for the competent command of forces in combat or at least for the performance of the highly complex subsidiary tasks such command requires. . . . [M]ilitary officers should not delude themselves about their capacity to master dissimilar and independently difficult disciplines.33

Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values.34

Aside from the question of competence, this “separatist” critique warns of the tendency toward the militarization of foreign and defense policy should military officers be allowed to fully participate. Critics assert that given the predisposition toward bellicosity and authoritarianism cited by Huntington and others, too much influence by the military might tend to skew the policy process to favor use of force when other, less direct approaches are called for.35

An alternative view, the “fusionist” or “soldier-statesman” view, holds that direct participation by military leaders in defense policy is both necessary and inevitable.

President Kennedy specifically urged—even ordered—the military, from the Joint Chiefs right down to academy cadets, to eschew “narrow” definitions of military competence and responsibilities, take into account political considerations in their military recommendations, and prepare themselves to take active roles in the policy-making process.36

If the assumption of unique expertise is accurate, only the military professional can provide the technical knowledge, informed by insight and experience, needed to support high-quality national security decisionmaking. Given the certainty that military input is both needed and demanded by Congress as well as the executive branch, military advocacy cannot be avoided in recommending and supporting some policy choices over others. This school

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holds that long service in this environment, supplemented by professional schooling in the tools and processes of national security, equips senior military leaders to fulfill what is, after all, an inescapable function.

These two competing perspectives mirror the “realist” and “idealist” theories of politics and reflect the age-old division in political science between those who see reality “as it is” and those who see it “as it ought to be.” As we have seen, the historical record is unequivocal. Military participation in partisan politics has been inversely proportional to the growth of military professionalism, declining as the professional ethic has matured. But the role of the military in defense policymaking has endured from the beginning, increasing as the resources, complexity, and gravity which attend the field of national security have grown. The soldier statesman has not just come into his own. He has always been.

The Nature of Military Involvement
in Defense Policymaking

If this is true, to what extent is such participation dangerous? Does active military involvement in defense policymaking actually threaten civilian control?

Clearly there have been individual instances where military leaders crossed the line and behaved both unprofessionally and illegitimately with respect to proper subordination to civilian authority; the Revolt of the Admirals and the MacArthur-Truman controversy already have been cited. The increasingly common tactic whereby anonymous senior military officials criticize their civilian counterparts and superiors, even to the point of revealing privileged and even classified information, cannot be justified.

Yet civilian control remains very much alive and well. The many direct and indirect instruments of objective and subjective civilian control of the military suggest that the true issue is not control—defined as the government’s ability to enforce its authority over the military—but rather political freedom of action. In virtually every sphere, civilian control over the military apparatus is decisive. All senior military officers serve at the pleasure of the President and can be removed, and indeed retired, without cause. Congress must approve all officer promotions and guards this prerogative jealously; even lateral appointments at the three- and four-star levels must be approved by the President and confirmed by Congress, and no officer at that level may retire in grade without separate approval by both branches of government. Operating budgets, the structure of military organizations, benefits, pay and allowances, and even the minutia of official travel and office furniture are determined by civilians. The reality of civilian control is confirmed not only by the many instances cited earlier where military recommendations were over-

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ruled. Not infrequently, military chiefs have been removed or replaced by the direct and indirect exercise of civilian authority.37

To be sure, the military as an institution enjoys some advantages. Large and well-trained staffs, extended tenure, bureaucratic expertise, cross-cutting relationships with industry, overt and covert relationships with congressional supporters, and stability during lengthy transitions between administrations give it a strong voice. But on the big issues of budget and force structure, social policy, and war and peace, the influence of senior military elites—absent powerful congressional and media support—is more limited than is often recognized.

If this thesis is correct, the instrumentalities and the efficacy of civilian control are not really at issue. As I have suggested, political freedom of action is the nub of the problem. Hampered by constitutionally separated powers which put the military in both the executive and legislative spheres, civilian elites face a dilemma. They can force the military to do their bidding, but they cannot always do so without paying a political price. Because society values the importance of independent, nonpoliticized military counsel, a civilian who publicly discounts that advice in an area presumed to require military expertise runs significant political risks. The opposition party will surely exploit any daylight between civilian and military leaders, particularly in wartime—hence the discernible trend in the modern era away from the Curtis LeMays and Arleigh Burkes of yesteryear who brought powerful heroic personas and public reputations into the civil-military relationship.

It is therefore clear that much of the criticism directed at “political” soldiers is not completely genuine or authentic. Far from wanting politically passive soldiers, political leaders in both the legislative and executive branches consistently seek military affirmation and support for their programs and policies. The proof that truly apolitical soldiers are not really wanted is found in the pressures forced upon military elites to publicly support the policy choices of their civilian masters. A strict adherence to the apolitical model would require civilian superiors to solicit professional military advice when needed, but not to involve the military either in the decision process or in the “marketing” process needed to bring the policy to fruition.

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The practice, however, is altogether different. The military position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service chiefs, and the combatant commanders is always helpful in determining policy outcomes. The pressures visited upon military elites to support, or at least not publicly refute, the policy preferences of their civilian masters, especially in the executive branch, can be severe. Annually as part of the budget process, the service chiefs are called upon to testify to Congress and give their professional opinions about policy decisions affecting their service. Often they are encouraged to publicly differ with civilian policy and program decisions they are known to privately question.38

This quandary, partly a function of the constitutional separation of powers and partly due to party politics, drives the JCS Chairman and the chiefs to middle ground. Not wanting to publicly expose differences with the Administration, yet bound by their confirmation commitments to render unvarnished professional military opinions to Congress, military elites routinely find themselves on the horns of a dilemma. These experiences, the bread and butter of military service at the highest levels, frequently produce exasperation and frustration. The consensus among civilian critics may be that the military dominates the policy process. But the view from the top of the military hierarchy is something quite different.

Conclusion

For military officers working at the politico-military interface, the problem of civil-military relations exists in its most acute form. There is, after all, no real issue between the polity as a whole and the military as an institution. Across the country the armed forces are seen as organizations that work, providing genuine opportunities for minorities, consistent success on the battlefield and in civil support operations here at home, and power and prestige in support of American interests abroad. For most Americans the military’s direct role in the interagency process and in the making of national security policy is not only permissible, it is essential to informed governance and a strong national defense.

The arguments advanced herein attempt to show that the dynamic tension which exists in civil-military relations today, while in many cases sub-optimal and unpleasant, is far from dangerous. Deeply rooted in a uniquely American system of separated powers, regulated by strong traditions of subordination to civilian authority, and enforced by a range of direct and indirect enforcement mechanisms, modern US civil-military relations remain sound, enduring, and stable. The American people need fear no challenge to constitutional norms and institutions from a military which—however aggressive on the battlefield—remains faithful to its oath of service. Not least of the Framer’s achievements is the willing subordination of the soldiers of the state.

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NOTES

1. The foremost proponent of the dominant critique of civil-military relations in America today is historian Richard Kohn. He is joined by Peter Feaver, Andrew Bacevich, Russell Weigley, Michael Wesch, Eliot Cohen, and others. See Richard H. Kohn, “Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil Military Relations,” The National Interest, No. 35 (Spring 1994); “The Forgotten Fundamentals of Civilian Control of the Military in Democratic Government,” John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Project on US Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper No. 13, Harvard University, June 1997; and “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” Naval War College Review, 55 (Summer 2002).

2. In academic parlance, “civilian control” is quite often used to mean much more, often implying unqualified deference to the executive branch. Similarly, “civil-military” relations is commonly used to mean, not the relationship of the military to society, but instead the relationship between civilian and military elites.

3. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control,” p. 10.

4. See Ole R. Holsti, “A Widening Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996,” John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Project on US Post Cold-War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper No. 13, Harvard University, October 1997.

5. See Tom Ricks, “The Widening Gap Between Military and Society,” The Atlantic Monthly, July 1997.

6. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today,” p. 1.

7. See Peter Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), p. 1.

8. Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control,” p. 1.

9. Kohn, “Out of Control,” p. 3.

10. Author and scholar John Hillen is the most prominent critic of the prevailing academic view of civil-military relations, while Don M. Snider charts a somewhat more moderate course; there are few others with dissenting views. See John Hillen, “The Military Ethos,” The World and I, July 1997; “The Military Ethos: Keep It, Defend It, Manage It,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, October 1998; “The Military Culture Wars,” The Weekly Standard, 12 January 1998; “Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?” Orbis, 43 (Winter 1999).

11. The most famous and influential exponent of the military conservative vs. social liberal dichotomy remains Samuel Huntington. See The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957).

12. Don M. Snider, “The Future of American Military Culture: An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture,” Orbis, 43 (Winter 1999), 19.

13. See Paul Gronke and Peter D. Feaver, “Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes About Civil-Military Relations,” paper prepared for the Triangle Institute for Security Studies “Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society,” p. 1.

14. “Overall, the military remains a formidable material presence in American society. . . . [T]here is no reason based on this analysis to say the military is a peripheral or alienated institution.” James Burke, “The Military Presence in American Society, 1950-2000,” in Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 261.

15. See Peter Kilner, “The Alleged Civil-Military Values Gap: Ideals vs. Standards,” paper presented to the Joint Service Conference on Professional Ethics, Washington, D.C., 25-26 January 2001.

16. The consequences of adultery, substance abuse, failure to pay just debts, assault, lying, and so on are readily apparent when seen from the perspective of small combat units, composed principally of well-armed, aggressive young men placed in situations of extreme stress.

17. David R. Segal et al., “Attitudes of Entry-Level Enlisted Personnel: Pro-Military and Politically Mainstreamed,” in Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians, pp. 175-94.

18. James A. Davis, “Attitudes and Opinions Among Senior Military Officers,” in Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 109.

19. Lance Betros, “Political Partisanship and the Professional Military Ethic,” paper submitted to the National War College, 4 May 2000, p. 23.

20. Former JCS Chairman Admiral William Crowe led 22 other retired general and flag officers in endorsing Governor Clinton during the 1992 presidential election and was rewarded with appointment to the Court of St. James as US Ambassador to Great Britain.

21. See Andrew Bacevich, “Tradition Abandoned: America’s Military in a New Era,” The National Interest, No. 48 (Summer 1997), pp. 16-25.

22. Andrew Bacevich, “Discord Still: Clinton and the Military,” The Washington Post, 3 January 1999, p. C1.

23. See Russell Weigley, “The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present,” in Feaver and Kohn, Soldiers and Civilians, p. 243; and Kohn, “The Erosion of Civilian Control,” p. 2.

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24. Harrison commanded an infantry regiment in the Civil War while McKinley served as a major; Arthur served briefly as a state quartermaster general during the Civil War; Theodore Roosevelt won fame with the Rough Riders in Cuba; Truman commanded an artillery battery in the First World War; Kennedy won the Navy Cross as a PT boat skipper in World War II; Johnson, Nixon, and Ford served as naval officers in World War II; Carter was a submarine officer for eight years; Reagan served as a public relations captain in World War II; George H. W. Bush was the youngest pilot in the Navy when he was shot down in the Pacific in World War II; and George W. Bush was an Air National Guard fighter pilot.

25. In the Truman Administration, “Ten military officers served as principal departmental officers or ambassadors” (Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier [New York, The Free Press, 1971], p. 379). A partial list of senior officers who unsuccessfully sought high political office includes General Curtis LeMay and Admiral James Stockdale, failed vice-presidential candidates; General William Westmoreland and Brigadier General Pete Dawkins lost Senate bids. Others were more successful: former Army Chief of Staff George Marshall served as both Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense; Lieutenant General Bedell Smith was the first Director of Central Intelligence; former JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor became Ambassador to South Vietnam; Admiral Stansfield Turner served as Director of Central Intelligence under President Carter; former JCS Chairman Admiral William Crowe was appointed Ambassador to Great Britain; former Commander, Pacific Command, Admiral Joseph Prueher became Ambassador to China; former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James Watkins became Secretary of Energy; Brigadier General Thomas White became Secretary of the Army; and former JCS Chairman General Colin Powell is the current Secretary of State.

26. Future two-term President Ulysses S. Grant resigned his commission in disgrace before the Civil War and owed his general’s commission entirely to Congressman Elihu Washburne of Illinois. William T. Sherman was relieved of command early in the war and sent home; the remonstrations of his brother, Senator John Sherman, both then and later were crucial to his subsequent success. John J. Pershing’s marriage in 1905 to the daughter of Senator Francis E. Warren of Wyoming, the Chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, and the personal sponsorship of President Theodore Roosevelt, was followed by his promotion from captain to brigadier general, ahead of more than 800 officers on the Army list.

27. In 1864 Generals Fremont, Butler, and McClellan all posed active political threats to Lincoln’s reelection. George McClellan still commanded enormous popularity in the Army of the Potomac and was favored to win the presidential election; had Sherman not taken Atlanta, even Lincoln believed that McClellan would likely win and would take the North out of the war. McClellan owed his political position entirely to his status as a senior military officer. See Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, Vol. III (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1939), pp. 219, 222.

28. Russell Weigley “American Military and The Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell,” The Journal of Military History, 57 (October 1993), 37.

29. Because the Northern armies consisted largely of federalized state volunteer units whose state governors were vital to the war effort, and because of the need to dispense patronage to ensure his continued political viability, Lincoln freely, and perhaps unavoidably for the time, commissioned political figures as general officers. A few, notably John Logan, became successful battlefield commanders. Most, however, proved notably unsuccessful and were removed or reassigned to other duties.

30. Huntington, p. 281.

31. Leonard Wood, Dewey, and MacArthur all nursed presidential aspirations and made at least exploratory attempts to frame themselves as candidates. Eisenhower resigned as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to run for and win the presidency in 1952.

32. See Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York: The Free Press, 2002), p. 13.

33. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm, “Introductory Essay,” Ch.8, “The American Military: Professional and Ethical Issues,” in American Defense Policy, ed. John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1982), p. 724.

34. Huntington, p. 71.

35. Reichart and Sturm, p. 723.

36. Jerome Slater, “Military Officers and Politics I,” in Reichart and Sturm, American Defense Policy, p. 750.

37. In the decade of the 1990s one Chief of Naval Operations was retired early following the Tailhook scandal. His successor committed suicide, troubled in part by persistent friction between senior naval officers and civilian defense officials he could not assuage. One Chief of Staff of the Air Force was relieved, and a Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and another Air Force Chief of Staff were retired early.

38. The Army Chief of Staff’s testimony on the Crusader cancellation in 2002 and postwar occupation policy in Iraq in 2003 are examples. See Robert Burns, “Rumsfeld Set to Change Army Leadership,” Associated Press, 26 April 2003.


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Colonel Richard D. Hooker, Jr., graduated from the National War College in 2003 and is currently assigned to the Army Staff. He previously commanded 2/505 Parachute Infantry Regiment in the 82d Airborne Division and has served in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and with the National Security Council. Colonel Hooker holds a Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in international relations and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.


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http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Paramet...nter/hooker.htm

The Moral Limits of Strategic Attack
MICHAEL A. CARLINO

American military operations in the post-Cold War era have been punctuated by a twofold desire for casualty avoidance. The first manifestation is a long-standing feature associated with the conduct of war: the preservation of friendly forces. The success of Operation Desert Storm proved that heavy casualties on one’s own forces are not necessary for military victory, and, not surprisingly, that conflict indirectly promoted force protection as paramount in subsequent operations. The other manifestation of casualty avoidance is the reduction of noncombatant losses. Of course, the term encompasses noncombatants residing in or belonging to the enemy state as well as those in one’s own country. Although the idea of noncombatant immunity has a lengthy history traceable to the earliest warrior codes, the reduction of noncombatant casualties, particularly those of the enemy, has consistently been overshadowed by claims of military necessity. Arguably, the rise of the modern media, virtually omnipresent, might be credited with helping to renew interest in the protection of noncombatants, since no aspect of conflict now escapes international scrutiny.

Complicating matters is the military’s current focus on effects-based targeting and operations, perhaps epitomized in the Air Force’s doctrine regarding strategic attack. Rather than focusing on engaging enemy forces directly, current doctrine holds that strategic attack is used to destroy the enemy’s centers of gravity, “those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”[1] The idea is usually attributed to the initial architect of the Gulf War’s air campaign, Colonel John Warden, who proposed the existence of five rings or centers of gravity, the most important being leadership, followed by organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and finally the actual fighting mechanism, which is portrayed as the least important.[2] This center-of-gravity concept is certainly reminiscent of Sun Tzu’s dictum purporting that the acme of skill is to subdue the enemy without fighting, since capturing forces is preferable to engaging in battle. Hence, attacking the enemy’s strategy, not troops, is ultimately what ensures success.[3] However, the nature of the modern battlefield inherently blurs the distinction between combatants and noncombatants; soldiers and civilians are now inextricably woven together in an amorphous battle space, and so the age of segregated battlefields has all but vanished.

The obvious problem is which notion--force protection or noncombatant immunity--ought to have priority and to what extent. Intuition, as well as the current modus operandi of the military, might suggest that it is more important for the military leader to preserve the lives of his soldiers even at the cost of greatly increasing the risk to noncombatants, especially when the noncombatant lives in question are not US citizens or allies but rather belong to the enemy state. After all, the prevailing view is that American lives are somehow more important. That view, however, is misguided. A military commander is morally obligated to do as much as he can to preserve the lives of all noncombatants, even if significantly increasing the risk to his own soldiers. This does not necessitate fighting a war devoid of noncombatant casualties--that may well be virtually impossible--nor does it mean that winning is unachievable. Wars can still be fought and won; however, the moral import of noncombatant immunity demands a shift in the current conception of force protection.

Force Protection

That commanders have a legal duty to protect and ensure the health and welfare of their subordinates during peacetime as well as wartime is incontrovertible. Whether that duty is a moral one is a slightly more open question. Of interest here is not an evaluation of the many plausible arguments that might support such a claim, but the stringency of the moral requirement given that it does exist. This stringency rests upon the resolution of an apparent tension of what has priority for the commander: his mission or his people. Vacuous aphorisms, such as “mission first, people always,” proffered throughout the military, offer no solid counsel. Instead, the answer lies in the analysis of soldiers and their rights.

Soldiers serve in the military fully knowing their lives can be subject to greater risk than their fellow citizens, which might seem obvious in a time of war. Even in peacetime, training with any semblance of realism can, and unfortunately sometimes does, result in harm for those involved. But with the onset of hostilities, soldiers become combatants and are thus imbued with a fundamentally different moral status than noncombatants. The reason for the difference involves an exchange of rights between combatants--namely the rights to kill and to be killed.

Soldiers on both sides of a war are willing to fight and die for the defense of what they consider essential values worthy of their lives. An immediate objection might be raised, contending that soldiers actually are motivated into action by a whole host of reasons such as pride, vanity, hate, or fellow feeling, but not necessarily the defense of national values. While indeed true, these interests might be considered immediate or first-order. Most combatants, perhaps mercenaries aside, also have a deeper, second-order interest at stake, which corresponds to the defense of values. For US soldiers, these values include those of the liberal democratic tradition, such as life and liberty. When states decide to enter into hostilities in defense of their respective values, service members operate on a good-faith principle regarding their country’s intentions, namely that the intent is the defense of their values. In other words, the moral responsibility of engaging in war is a jus ad bellum issue resting squarely with the political authorities of the state--be they authoritarian or democratic in nature--and not with the soldiers prosecuting it. This is not to advocate a carte blanche appeal to invincible ignorance, but instead to assume that in most cases and especially early on, the state’s actual reasons for war might be inaccessible to the soldier.[4] Hence, soldiers as a general class can be considered in the absence of jus ad bellum concerns.

So though combatants do not choose the wars involving their states, they do fight against what constitutes a legitimate threat to the preservation of their values--the enemy combatants--while fully knowing that the enemy’s actions and beliefs essentially mirror their own. Because they have this shared status, combatants also share the moral responsibility for posing an imminent threat to one another. Assuming that combatants have no other recourse but fighting to protect these values, combatants are not only allowed, but in fact are morally obligated, to use force.[5] Thus, combatants on both sides of a war possess moral equivalency because they share the same moral obligation, the defense of their nation’s values.

It follows that combatants are not considered criminals for fighting in a war even if they are fighting for the “wrong side,” since they are not responsible for the jus ad bellum decision.[6] Soldiers need concern themselves primarily with adherence to the tenets of jus in bello, so that in fighting the good fight, they cannot be considered murderers or morally reprehensible for killing in combat. For instance, assume that Iraq was unjust by instigating the Gulf War. While Saddam Hussein might be considered morally responsible and blameworthy for the conflict as the state’s political leader, Iraqi soldiers, including those who killed US and coalition soldiers, are not automatically guilty of a crime or moral transgression. To consider soldiers fighting for the “wrong side” as murderers would be grossly counterintuitive and ultimately untenable.[7]

It might seem that the discussion of a soldier gaining “combatant rights” (like the right to kill other combatants) speaks past the commander’s moral obligation to protect his force. However, it has immediate relevance because obtaining combatant rights necessitates the commensurate reduction in the stringency of the combatant’s right to life. In other words, the soldier no longer has a stringent claim that he not be killed. After all, combatants have the right to kill their foe, but their foes concurrently have the right to kill them. Thus, these two rights are mutually dependent.

This loss of stringency regarding the combatant’s right to life also entails that a combatant is not safeguarded by an absolute prohibition against a commander’s decision to jeopardize his life for mission accomplishment. It certainly might be the case that training missions or missions in conflicts concerning non-vital national interests are not worth sacrificing soldiers’ lives. However, when the vital interests of a nation are jeopardized and a war is worth engaging in, the mission of preserving these national interests and associated values must logically trump any claim combatants might have regarding their personal safety. Soldiers, especially in the case of a volunteer military, realize this and realize that the sacrifice of their lives might be required--else they would not become soldiers.

This discussion assumes that commanders place their soldiers in peril with good intent and that they act out of concern for accomplishment of a mission related to winning the war and ultimately protecting the values at stake. Commanders who wantonly cause the death of their own soldiers with no aim toward mission success are beyond consideration here. Commanders ordinarily ought to do as much as morality permits to reduce risk and prevent their soldiers from dying unnecessarily. However, sometimes soldiers will die. Commanders whose decisions result in the loss of their subordinates’ lives, even excessive loss, are not by rule considered immoral but perhaps only ineffective or unfortunate. Furthermore, combatants ordered to perform missions with the gravest danger are not at liberty to refuse based on concerns of self-preservation. Danger is not a mitigating or exempting circumstance. Such actions are punishable offenses as evidenced by Article 99, “Misbehavior Before the Enemy,” in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States.[8] Thus, the commander’s duty to minimize the harm that comes to his soldiers in combat is of tremendous pragmatic import, but it is not a stringent moral obligation. Ultimately, mission must come first, and the safety of each individual soldier comes second.

Noncombatant Immunity

The argument for noncombatant immunity is grounded upon the idea that people possess certain basic rights stemming from their autonomy and moral agency. Exactly what rights belong to this set is debatable, but certainly life and liberty are among them if they exist at all. The discussion in this article will be limited to the former, which, it might be noted, is not a single claim in itself but is rather a cluster-right containing rights, privileges, certain immunities, and claims to noninterference.[9] As such, the right to life is inalienable only in the sense that “others lack the power to make one cease to have it, and thus . . . one [has] immunity against others in respect of it.”[10]

It follows then that all moral agents possess the inalienable right to life, regardless of whether they are citizens of the United States or an enemy state. This does not mean that a person cannot forfeit the right.[11] As discussed above, voluntary combatants give up at least a part of their right to life--the right not to be killed by other combatants--in order to gain the right to kill. In contrast, noncombatants do not participate in any such exchange, and their right to life remains inalienable and stringent. Given this difference, the noncombatant is not subject to direct attack, being targeted or intentionally harmed by combatants.

Intuition seems to readily support this argument in the consideration of noncombatants considered friendly.[12] US soldiers cannot reasonably believe that they would have the liberty to kill US civilians during a mission, excusing such action as militarily “necessary.” After all, their mission is to protect these people, even when only indirectly. Military personnel realize that this is why they are fighting in the first place, as evidenced by having “selfless service” as one of their core professional values.[13]

Unfortunately, intuition is not as trustworthy with regard to noncombatants perfunctorily considered the enemy. Though these people are not a direct threat to the combatant, their relationship with enemy combatants is seemingly pernicious. However, it is difficult to see how the contingent matter of nationality or geographic location has moral import, and it is untenable to hold that US citizens enjoy moral superiority over foreigners simply because they are American. Any such presumption of moral superiority is groundless. Noncombatants of all nationalities, friendly or enemy, enjoy the same inalienable right to life, which carries the same stringency regarding noninterference.

Hence, a combatant is obligated to respect the rights of all noncombatants. Combatants are morally obligated to respect the stringency of noncombatants’ right to life and must never intend to harm them or use them solely as a means to an end.[14] This obligation is particularly poignant for US soldiers. The values that US soldiers fight for are not simply constrained or applicable to their own citizens but are liberal democratic ideals that apply to all people. The Constitution rests on this very premise. So, any war involving the United States ultimately centers on the advancement of such ideals; any fight for the United States against a state that is not “well-ordered” is a fight for basic rights--including the right to life--for not only its own citizens but those of the enemy state as well.[15] This is why humanitarian interests are overtly included in the National Security Strategy.[16] It follows that it is contradictory to then cause harm to the very people whose right to life the military is obligated to protect.

Some might object to this assertion on the grounds that enemy noncombatants are, after all, the enemy. But such a notion fails to delineate the moral differences between those who prosecute a war and those who only witness it. This is not to say they bear no responsibility for the war, especially if they have the freedom to influence such decisions, as in the case of a democracy. Even so, this hardly constitutes grounds for the cessation of their noncombatant immunity. They are not the threat and cannot be considered legitimate targets.

One should acknowledge that the broad category of noncombatants can and ought to be subdivided, since the picture is not entirely black and white. This discussion so far regarding noncombatants has addressed innocent noncombatants, those with no direct involvement with fighting the war or materially supporting the war effort. There are also “non-innocent noncombatants,” on the other hand: people who, though not engaged in making war, directly support the war effort, the obvious example being workers at munitions or armament factories. In virtue of their activity, non-innocent noncombatants have a less stringent claim not to be killed, though they still cannot be directly targeted. In other words, bombing the munitions factory with the minimal number of workers present is much less controversial than inflicting the same number of casualties on innocents who are not engaged in a war-supporting activity. The non-innocent noncombatants killed increased their own risk by engaging in an enterprise solely designed for the purpose of war.[17] Even so, such fine distinctions are not critical to the thesis of this article. In any modern conflict there will be innocent noncombatants, and it is on them that this article focuses.[18]

In sum, noncombatants enjoy a more stringent right to life than combatants since they themselves have not opted to reduce or degrade it in any way, and no one else has that power. Returning to the initial issue of whether a commander must give priority to force protection or to the safety of noncombatants, the answer should be obvious. The stringency of the latter trumps the former, morally obligating the commander. Ultimately, force protection at the expense of noncombatant safety is immoral and contradictory to the achievement of any legitimate end.

The Doctrine of Double Effect, and Centers of Gravity

The above conclusion hardly resolves the issue. Knowing that noncombatant immunity is more important than force protection does not provide a normative framework for the commander attempting to win while waging a moral war. The unfortunate fact is that in war innocent noncombatants will die, and commanders cannot reasonably prevent all such deaths while still fulfilling their moral obligation to protect national values. For instance, the Normandy invasion would not have been called off, nor should it have been, if a final reconnaissance report minutes before the operation identified a bold Frenchman who, to spite the Germans, decided to go fishing on the beach.

Such casualties or similar collateral damage are usually legitimized by an appeal to the “Doctrine of Double Effect,” which, if satisfied, purports to provide the moral justification of an action that has simultaneous good and bad consequences. There are various formulations of this doctrine, but arguably the strongest and most plausible is by Michael Walzer. He proposes a version of the Doctrine of Double Effect which consists of four necessary conditions:

(1) Legitimacy: the act is good in itself--i.e., it is a legitimate act of war.
(2) Effect: the direct effect is morally acceptable.

(3) Intent: the intention of the actor is good, that is, he aims narrowly at the acceptable effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends, and, aware of the evil involved, he seeks to minimize it, accepting costs to himself.

(4) Proportionality: the good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect.[19]

In the case of our unfortunate Frenchman at Normandy, all tenets are easily satisfied: the attack was a legitimate act of war; it had an acceptable direct effect in that it killed or removed the German combatants from the area; the intent of the Allies was good in that the death of the Frenchman was not used to facilitate mission success; and, finally, the good coming from the invasion far outweighed the evil coming from the Frenchman’s death. Hence, the action, even if it killed the French innocent noncombatant, would be justified.
Since the efficacy of the Doctrine of Double Effect (hereinafter referred to as just “Double Effect”) rests upon the third and fourth tenets, which carry the burden of the argument, let us look at some problems with them before relating the doctrine to the current strategy involving the strategic attack of centers of gravity.[20] Though Double Effect offers progress over less restrictive measures, the third and fourth tenets are problematically vague. The intentions of a commander are not readily known. Furthermore, the requirement to minimize evil and accept costs suffers from the same problem as proportionality, namely subjectivity in the assignment of relative values to military advantage, risk, and noncombatant injury.[21] The issue is much like the “sorites paradox” in logic: “large amounts,” in this case of injuries to noncombatants, are easily recognized, but no line defining what constitutes a “large amount” seems identifiable.

In difficult cases, like those commonly arising from effects-based targeting against centers of gravity, the benefit of the doubt concerning the vagueness rests with the opinion of the reasonable military commander. Consider the case of degrading an enemy command, control, and communications network. In Kosovo, degrading this center of gravity included the strategic bombing and destruction of the “RTS,” the state-run broadcasting corporation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which resulted in the deaths of 10 to 17 civilians (the Serbs claimed 16).[22] Was this justified by Double Effect? Assuming the first two tenets to be satisfied, one must ask whether this met the requirements of intent and proportionality.

With regard to intent, NATO expressed two reasons for the attack. First, the station was alleged to have a dual use, because it supported radio relay for the Yugoslavian military and special police forces. Second, NATO declared that it needed “to strike at the very central nerve system of Milosovic’s regime” and that strikes against targets such as the RTS were “a part of the campaign to dismantle the propaganda machinery which [was] a vital part of President Milosovic’s control mechanism.”[23] Neither reason evidences an overtly evil intent (though the Serbs argued that the act was simply a suppression of free speech and the truth), nor do they suggest that the civilians were used as a means.[24] However, there is some room for debate as to whether risk was minimized because of the possible inadequacy of warnings about the attack. Furthermore, proportionality is also suspect since the broadcasting at the facility “allegedly recommenced within hours of the strike,” obviating any potential gain.[25] NATO responded to these criticisms by arguing that appropriate warnings were given before the attack, and that, regarding proportionality, a command, control, and communications system is a complex web that cannot be disabled by a single strike, and proportionality therefore has to be measured in terms of cumulative effects on the system rather than in terms of each discrete event.[26]

Such an interpretation of Double Effect by a reasonable commander apparently justifies this attack and others like it. This supposed justification is strengthened by a similar decision by the UN’s committee charged with reviewing the NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But consider the following hypothetical scenario: What if the same target had been attacked with the same results, but by a ground combat unit rather than a missile strike? In such a case, Double Effect seems far less permissive in justifying the deaths of ten or more civilians. After all, the commander would have had many options to reduce the risk to the civilians, such as clearing the building of its occupants before destroying the facility. If he had not done so, he would have failed to satisfy the final demand of the third tenet, and ended up with an unacceptable ratio of civilian deaths to gain, failing the fourth tenet as well.

The fact that these moral judgments differ is rather problematic given that both scenarios have identical missions and identical results. It cannot be the case that the use of aerospace power in a strategic attack capacity somehow requires less moral stringency or less moral forethought than the use of force by troops on the ground. Any such notion is wholly untenable. In actuality, the apparent disparity results not from a difference in kind between air power and other force, but from the aforementioned vagueness of Double Effect, which is then exploited by the way we employ the current doctrine mandating effects-based strategic attack of centers of gravity.

From its inception, strategic attack has been a way to degrade the enemy while reducing risk to the overall force. Aerospace power is the primary means for strategic attack, and it has proved effective and efficient. This is not to say that pilots conducting combat missions do not incur significant risk. They do, and they routinely act with valor. However, the aerospace force currently enjoys tremendous advantages because of the absolutely dominating technological sophistication involved. Ground forces, on the other hand, lack such a distinct advantage and hence face greater risks--US actions in Somalia speak to this point. For US forces, fighting the ground portion of a campaign is simply more dangerous and riskier for many more soldiers across the force. It would be ludicrous to believe that a ground invasion of Kosovo would have been casualty-free if the Serbs had offered any resistance whatsoever. While air-centric strategic bombing of centers of gravity is effective in breaking the enemy’s will, it also is the safest way to wage a war, at least with regard to friendly forces.

Though effective and efficient, the use of such strategic attack inevitably involves a moral cost--exposing noncombatants to unnecessary risk and harm. Such an assertion raises an immediate objection, namely that during strategic attack noncombatants are exposed to less overall risk and harm since the use of ground forces would ultimately lead to more casualties, which prevents the latter from being the most moral course. The objection is a consequentialist approach based in the contention that the rightness of an action is dependent upon its ability to maximally obtain the good or end.[27] In the case of war, the good seems to be preserving lives, which then relegates the use of ground forces to a less desirable position as a moral option--assuming it does indeed result in more casualties. Such consequentialist thinking was clearly evident in NATO’s response regarding the issue of proportionality in the RTS bombing.[28]

The consequentialist argument, though, is plagued by a significant problem--it relies on moral luck. In other words, a moral agent’s action is justified only in the cases where the outcome does in fact obtain. However, an agent’s action will always lack sufficiency to actually bring about the desired end. Moral justification for the consequentialist is always contingent upon factors well beyond the actual span of the agent’s control. Admittedly, this oversimplifies consequentialism, which in reality has a rather robust philosophic tradition. However, a thorough exploration is not required here, since none of its variants provides the desired sufficiency regarding action and outcome.

Consider the following example. George sees a man desperately trying to fix a flat tire on his van along the roadside. Feeling helpful, George lends him assistance. The man is soon on his way because of George’s aid, and he thanks George, noting that he will now be able to make it to a very important engagement that evening. George believes that he has done a good deed, one worthy of moral praise. Arguably, he has. The next morning, however, George reads in the paper that a man in a van, in fact the man he helped, set off a car bomb the previous night, killing 40 people at a function attended by the mayor and other city officials. Is George’s action, previously a morally praiseworthy one, now suddenly bad because of how things turned out? No, the goodness of George’s act does not diminish despite how things turned out. The praiseworthiness of an action ought not be contingent upon factors beyond an agent’s control but instead depends solely upon the agent himself.

Returning to the issue at hand, the fact that a ground option might incur more overall casualties than the use of aerospace power says nothing definitive about its rightness or wrongness. Intent has much more relevance to the rightness of an act than how things actually turn out; morality is concerned with how one ought to act rather than actualities such as what one does or might do given impunity from consequences.[29] Thus, what has to be examined in the consideration of the use of strategic bombing to affect centers of gravity as opposed to a ground force option is not simply proportionality but also intent, which is embodied in the third tenet of Double Effect.

Current practice acknowledges that attacking targets affecting centers of gravity requires prior assessments of the possible collateral damage, so as to establish proportionality and hence justification. However, if the resultant collateral damage is to also satisfy the third tenet of Double Effect, then it must be unintended. The exercise has become a rather litigious one as high-ranking commanders find themselves surrounded not only by strategists, tacticians, and intelligence officers, but by legal counsel as well. This occurred with the RTS station attack. In that instance, NATO contended that it was never the intent to kill the workers or use them as a way of achieving the destruction of the station; consequently, the casualties ought to be considered unintended. Assuming the number was not unacceptably high, the act is then deemed proportional, which completes its justification.

Yet such a rationale is actually an equivocation of sorts regarding the notion of unintendedcasualties. Unintended implies accidental, not simply unfortunate. If a casualty is foreseen as a result of an action, it is difficult to consider that casualty unintended. Good intent is much more than a person uttering a reassuring explanation after the fact--that is why integrity is a virtue. Consider the deaths at Hiroshima. It is difficult to say that those deaths were accidental.[30] They were foreseen, at least a large number of them, even though the people involved were not the actual objective but an unfortunate side-effect. Such deaths are often still categorized as unintended by the reasonable commander. However, there is a significant difference, for example, between planning to destroy a vacant bridge but having a car with innocent noncombatants unexpectedly cross it during the attack, and planning to destroy the same bridge with the knowledge that the same car is certain to be on it. Therein lies a problem: foreseen deaths are not in fact unintended, but are knowingly caused and accepted to obtain some end.

An objection might be raised contending that the workers in the RTS were actually non-innocent noncombatants if they were in fact engaged in direct military support. Assuming this to be the case, one would concede that the implications of equivocation in this case are diminished since the deaths of non-innocents can be of the foreseeable variety. After all, they have less stringency in their claim not to be attacked because of their chosen enterprise. Yet the overall criticism remains: air-centric strategic attack of centers of gravity often has foreseeable effects upon innocent noncombatants. For example, suppose the power grid of a city is targeted. The object of the attack, military-related activities powered by the plant, would be crippled, but so would everything else drawing power from the source, including such things as hospitals, refrigeration, water purification processes, and a whole host of other life-sustaining aspects of society. The effects of such an attack are foreseen and cannot then be imagined to be accidental when they do occur.

When such actions have foreseeable negative effects to innocents, the moral burden falls upon the combatant to ensure that he minimizes them at the cost of increasing the risk to himself and his forces. This is in essence what the third tenet of Double Effect requires. However, the “minimization” usually manifests itself in the requirement to use precision-guided munitions with smaller effects as opposed to using more indiscriminate and destructive conventional ones. Such a move is hardly sufficient. If the objective is really valuable to the military campaign and the war is really worth winning, then the achievement of the objective must be worth the loss of soldiers’ lives. This does not mean that soldiers have to or even ought to die. What it does mean is that combatants must be the ones bearing the risk of dying rather than innocent noncombatants--even enemy noncombatants. This cannot be accomplished by simply using precision munitions. Though they may reduce damage in contrast to conventional weapons, they serve only to reduce risk within the discrete categories of noncombatant and combatant; they do nothing to affect the transfer of risk from noncombatant to combatant as morality demands. Such a requirement makes fighting the war much more difficult than the efficient option provided by aerospace power. The lives of combatants, perhaps many, will be lost, yet to give force protection priority is exactly what should not be done.

A final analogy might help to clarify and emphasize the above point. Consider terrorism. Its instances, even beyond al-Qaida, are many--the Algerian resistance to French occupation, the Irish Republican Army’s fight against the British, and the various groups fighting for Palestinian autonomy--and the notoriety of these groups speaks to the effectiveness of their means. However, terrorism is condemned as immoral because of its indiscriminate nature, which causes foreseeable, innocent noncombatant deaths. In other words, terrorism harms innocents as a direct means to effect its end. Even if the terrorists’ cause is considered in some instances to be worthy and good, terrorism, as a means, remains unpalatable, because the terrorist attempts to achieve expediency by placing his goal ahead of his moral responsibility to innocents.

The terrorist’s response would be that his seemingly evil methods, though drastic, are in fact justified, because they are the only ones available in the given situation. Such a claim is unacceptable. Even a good cause does not justify the use of any possible method to achieve it. A murderer is no less a murderer just because he kills what he believes to be evil people in his attempt to improve society. And even if the terrorist is successful, there ought not be any gain in his moral legitimacy. (Anomalies do occur, like Yasser Arafat, who rose from terrorist to Nobel Peace Prize recipient.) The fact is that other means are always available. These alternatives will most likely expose the terrorist to a much greater risk and possibly jeopardize his ability to obtain his end, but they are available; terrorism is not the only recourse, as the terrorist claims. The reality is that the terrorist is unwilling to assume risk and instead transfers it to innocents. Certainly it is easier for the terrorist to destroy a school bus full of children than to attack a military installation.

Interestingly, however, the moral condemnation that applies to the terrorist differs only in degree, not kind, from the position advanced in this article regarding the current practice involving foreseeable deaths. The analogy is loose, as the terrorist’s position is complicated by other factors such as his exploitation of the combatant/noncombatant distinction and failing to meet the jus ad bellum requirements for engaging in hostilities in the first place. However, breaking the will of an enemy through strategic attack has no more moral legitimacy than terrorism if it capitalizes on the innocent.

Implications

Fighting justly does not necessitate the end of aerospace power or the use of air-centric strategic attack--though staunch advocates of Douhet and LeMay might disagree. Aerospace power in itself is not immoral and is in fact essential for success in wars and conflicts of the future, which will not be won without the joint employment and application of forces. If the United States is to fight these future conflicts justly, however, morality requires a shift in our current conception and practices regarding force protection.

Politicians and military leaders alike need to abandon the zero-casualty mentality and de-emphasize force protection at the cost of increased risk to noncombatants. Friendly casualty estimates are important planning factors, but they ought never to drive policy and strategy; national interests should. The current strategy of shaping the international environment and responding to threats involves myriad national interests that must be closely scrutinized to determine which among them are really worth the lives of American soldiers. When a conflict arises over a particular interest that lacks such import, cruise missile strikes, though convenient, are not morally defensible if they will harm the innocent. Such policy ought to give way to nonmilitary instruments of power, even if they are less efficient. Of course, the decision to refrain from military force with respect to a particular issue does not need to be advertised, so as not to degrade US diplomatic leverage.

Those interests worth the aforementioned costs obligate leaders and policymakers to act decisively and at the same time to inform the American people as to the importance of achieving those goals. In this age of asymmetric warfare, enemies will prey upon the ability to break the national will by exploiting American sentiments relating to casualty aversion regarding friendly forces--much like the effect in Somalia after US casualties were taken. Predicating support for military operations on the pretense of casualty-free operations serves only to encourage such a strategy. However, the recognition of a proper military ethic, which demands selflessness and integrity as outlined above, surmounts that threat. Professional soldiers are not afraid to fight when called upon, even when the danger is of the gravest sort. Military setbacks are ruinous to campaign strategy only when the interests are not worth fighting and dying for in the first place. When the interests are sufficiently important, the loss of some soldiers ought to only strengthen US resolve, at home as well as in the theater of operations, rather than weaken it. The general population is not so casualty-averse so as to denounce any operation involving US losses--witness the overwhelming support of the Gulf War despite substantial casualty predictions.

Upon recognizing the disparity of the moral status of innocent noncombatants in contrast to combatants, leaders are also obligated to consider and employ the full array of forces capable of accomplishing a given mission. In doing so, their determination of what forces to use should not rest upon expediency and efficiency but upon balancing those needs with the moral requirement to reduce the risk to innocents. Unfortunately, aerospace power in isolation does not provide the capability to adequately satisfy the claims of morality with regard to reducing risk to innocents, at least not yet. When technology advances to the point that munitions have the same powers of discrimination as a soldier on the ground, aerospace power may well be sufficient. Until that time, policymakers and strategists cannot continue to believe in light of just war theory that aerospace power alone is an appropriate option; rather, jointly packaged forces from all services must be employed even when it entails more risk and associated costs.

Leaders also need to realize that not every center of gravity, critical capability, or critical requirement translates into a strategic target, even if its destruction facilitates the war effort. For those that do, the considerations of targeting and weaponry should extend beyond the realm of aerospace platforms. The use of ground forces and their associated effects must be similarly weighed when considering strategic targets. In essence, the doctrine of strategic attack must become more robust and inclusive of other services, or it will always be in jeopardy of moral inadequacy. Though riskier in the force protection sense than using precision-guided munitions, the use of special operations or air assault forces might present significantly less risk to innocents in certain strategic attack situations with foreseen collateral damage, and hence be the morally preferable choice. In other words, leaders must realize that legal sufficiency does not equate to moral goodness.

It is not clear that philosophers can develop more restrictive or definitive rules and principles than Walzer’s Doctrine of Double Effect regarding conduct in war. Too often, one looks for a prescriptive methodology regarding morality that promises to delineate day from night in the moral twilight. Such efforts are self-defeating; morality is not an exact science. What is required is not more prescriptions, but leaders imbued with the virtues established in the professional military ethic. Properly developed notions of the core values, particularly selfless service and integrity, are what will clarify the gray areas and guide the combatant’s conduct.[31] Integrity demands not the obtaining of an end, but the rightness of the means. Integrity thus precludes foreseeable deaths as accidental and unintended, because it demands right action regardless of the consequences involved. Integrity also entails selflessness in soldiers, since fulfilling their moral obligations inherently shifts risk onto themselves. Such must be the nature of the true military professional. If we cannot prosecute a war justly, then the war should not be fought. To do otherwise is a compromise of integrity and directly contradicts the very reasons for fighting.



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NOTES

1. US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington: Department of Defense, February 1995), p. GL-4.

2. See John Warden, “The Enemy as a System,” Airpower Journal, 3 (Spring 1995).

3. Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Boston: Shambhala Press, 1988), pp. 66-67.

4. See Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994). Christopher embraces invincible ignorance and argues that from it, soldiers always have a professional obligation to fight in war. I believe this is mistaken. Soldiers may have deep moral objections to a war they consider unjust. Morality ought not to force them to act against such convictions, since their professional obligations were most likely undertaken only with the assumption that the goals of the profession were not contradictory with personal beliefs.

5. Since there is no higher authority, the domestic analogy between citizen and state no longer applies. Thus, force is the recourse necessitated.

6. The line does get blurred at the highest echelons where military leaders do influence national policy. For the purposes of this article, I ignore such cases.

7. This counterintuitive position was raised by prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials but subsequently rejected. Thus, ordinary German soldiers were not held responsible for jus ad bellum transgressions committed by Nazi leaders.

8. US Department of Defense, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (Washington: Department of Defense, 1994).

9. See Judith Jarvis Thompson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ., 1990), p. 285.

10. Ibid., p. 283.

11. For an excellent defense of this claim, see Thompson, The Realm of Rights.

12. By friendly noncombatants, I simply mean those citizens belonging to the combatant’s state (or ally). This is in contrast to enemy noncombatants, who are the citizens belonging to the enemy state. The terms do not imply friendly or hostile intentions.

13. Both the US Army and the US Air Force have selfless service as one of their core values. The Navy does not. Its core values include only honor, courage, and commitment. However, the Navy’s conception of courage embodies selfless service, as it requires “making decisions in the best interest of the Navy and the nation, without regard to personal consequences.” For a more complete discussion of the Navy core values, see http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/tradit...ml/corvalu.html.

14. See Immanuel Kant’s “Formula of Humanity” for a discussion of the immorality of people used solely as means, in Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper and Row, 1964).

15. I borrow the term “well-ordered” from John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ., 1971). A well-ordered state is one designed to advance the good of its members and effectively regulate a public conception of justice, which includes and protects basic human rights.

16. See William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington: The White House, 1998).

17. See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 146, for a discussion of this point.

18. Hence, my future unspecified uses of the term noncombatant refer to the innocent rather than non-innocent ones.

19. Walzer, pp. 153-55. Walzer improves the doctrine with the addition of his revised third tenet, which I have incorporated verbatim.

20. Ibid., p. 153. Walzer contends that only the third clause carries the burden.

21. See “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” internet, http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm, p. 13, accessed 20 March 2001, for a discussion concerning relative values.

22. See “Final Report,” pp. 18-21, for a discussion of the incident. The estimate of 10-17 deaths comes from the “Final Report.” For the Serbian claim of 16, see “Official Report of NATO Destruction,” internet, http://www.canadianserbs.com/destruction/list.htm, accessed 20 March 2001.

23. “Final Report,” pp. 18-19.

24. See “Official Report of NATO Destruction,” for the Serbian position.

25. “Final Report,” p. 20.

26. Ibid., p. 21.

27. See Samuel Scheffler, ed., Consequentialism and its Critics (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford Univ., 1988), for a comprehensive discussion of consequentialism.

28. “Final Report,” p. 21.

29. See Plato, The Republic (London: Penguin, 1955), p. 359, for a discussion of the myth of Gyges’ ring and Socrates’ advancement of the argument I present here.

30. See Elizabeth Anscombe, “War and Murder,” in Nuclear Weapons: A Catholic Response, ed. Walter Stein (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1961), for this example.

31. The Navy does not hold integrity as a core value. Rather, honor demands “an uncompromising code of integrity.” See note 13.



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Major Michael A. Carlino is currently assigned as a Battalion Operations Officer in the 1st Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, 1st Armored Division, Baumholder, Germany. He has served in various leadership and staff positions in the 101st Airborne Division, the 75th Ranger Regiment, and the 1st Cavalry Division, as well as duty as an instructor in the Department of English at the US Military Academy. He holds a B.S. in computer science from the Military Academy and an M.A. in philosophy from Tufts University.



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http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Paramet...ing/carlino.htm

Chapter XIII: Into Bataan
By the first week of January 1942 the American and Filipino troops withdrawing from both ends of Luzon had joined at San Fernando and begun the last lap of their journey to Bataan. In ten days they had retired from Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay to Guagua and Porac, on the two roads leading into Bataan. There they had halted and established a line only fifteen miles from the base of the peninsula. The longer they could hold, the more time would be available to prepare the final defenses of Bataan.
The Guagua-Porac Line
Along the ten-mile line from Guagua to Porac, paralleling the road between the two barrios, General Wainwright had placed the 11th and 21st Divisions (PA), as well as armor and cavalry. (Map 9) On the left (west), around Porac, was the 21st Division with the 26th Cavalry (PS) to its rear, in force reserve. On the east was the 11th Division, its right flank covered by almost impenetrable swamps crisscrossed by numerous streams. In support of both divisions was General Weaver's tank group.
The troops along this line, the best in the North Luzon Force, though battle tested and protected by mountains on the west and swamps on the east, felt exposed and insecure. They were convinced that they were opposing the entire Japanese 14th Army, estimated, according to Colonel Mallonée, to number 120,000 men.[1] Actually, Japanese strength on Luzon was about half that size, and only two reinforced regiments with tanks and artillery faced the men on the Guagua-Porac line.

From Cabanatuan, where Homma had moved his headquarters on New Year's Day, 14th Army issued orders to attack the line before Bataan.[2] A force, known as the Takahashi Detachment after its commander, Lt. Col. Katsumi Takahashi, and consisting of the 9th Infantry (less two companies), two batteries of the 22d Field Artillery, and the 8th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (less one battalion), was to strike out from Angeles along Route 74, smash the American line at Porac, and go on to seize Dinalupihan, an important road junction at the entrance to Bataan. To support Takahashi's drive down Route 74, Homma ordered the 9th Independent Field Heavy Artillery Battalion, then approaching Tarlac, to push on to Porac.

A second force, drawn largely from the 48th Division, was organized for the drive down Route 7 through Guagua to Hermosa, a short distance southeast of Dinalupihan. This force, organized at San Fernando and led by Colonel Tanaka, was composed of the 2d Formosa and a battalion of the 47th Infantry supported by a company of tanks and three battalions of


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Map 9 Through Layac Junction

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artillery. Both detachments were to receive support from the 5th Air Group, which was also to strike at targets on Bataan. The attack would begin at 0200 on 2 January.[3]
The Japanese expected to smash the defenses before Bataan easily and to make quick work of the "defeated enemy," who, in General Morioka's striking phrase, was like "a cat entering a sack."[4] General Homma fully intended to draw the strings tight once the Americans were in the sack, thereby bringing the campaign to an early and successful conclusion. He was due for a painful disappointment.

The Left Flank
In the 21st Division sector, just below Porac, two regiments stood on the line. on the west (left), from the mountains to Route 74, was the 21st Infantry, spread thin along the entire front. On the right, behind the Porac-Guagua road, was the 22d Infantry. The 23d Infantry, organized at the start of hostilities, was in reserve about five miles to the rear. The division's artillery regiment was deployed with its 3d Battalion on the left, behind the 21st Infantry, and the 1st Battalion on the right. The 2d Battalion was in general support, but placed immediately behind the 3d Battalion which was short one battery.[5]
Seven miles south of Porac, at San Jose, was the force reserve, the 26th Cavalry, now partly rested and reorganized after its fight in the Lingayen area. Its mission was to cover the left flank of the 21st Division and extend it westward to the Zambales Mountains. Colonel Pierce, the cavalry commander, dispatched Troop G, equipped with pack radio, forward toward Porac, to the left of the 21st Infantry. The rest of the regiment he kept in readiness at San Jose. The 26th Cavalry was not the only unit in San Jose; also there were the 192d Tank Battalion and the headquarters of the 21st Division. The place was so crowded that Colonel Mallonée, who wanted to establish the command post of the 21st Field Artillery there, was force to choose another location because "the town was as full as the county seat during fair week."[6]

The expected attack against the Guagua-Porac line came on the afternoon of 2 January, when an advance detachment from the 9th Infantry coming down Route 74 hit the 21st Infantry near Porac. Although the enemy detachment was small, it was able to force back the weakened and thinly spread defenders about 2,000 yards to the southwest, to the vicinity of Pio. Stiffened by the reserve, the regiment finally halted the Japanese advance just short of the regimental reserve line. Efforts to restore the original line failed, leaving the artillery exposed to the enemy infantry, who were "about as far from the muzzles as outfielders would play for Babe Ruth if there were no fences."[7]

Division headquarters in San Jose immediately made plans for a counterattack using a battalion of the reserve regiment, the


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23d Infantry. But darkness fell before the attack could be mounted and the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, the unit selected for the counterattack, was ordered to move up at dawn and restore the line on the left. When the 2d Battalion moved into the line, the 21st Infantry would regroup to the right, thus shortening its front.
That night the stillness was broken only by fire from the Philippine artillery which had pulled back about 600 yards. When morning came the enemy was gone. Reports from 21st Infantry patrols, which had moved forward unmolested at the first sign of light, encouraged division headquarters to believe that the original main line of resistance could be restored without a fight and orders were issued for a general advance when the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, tied in with the 21st Infantry.

American plans for a counterattack were premature. The evening before, the main force of the Takahashi Detachment had left its assembly area midway between Bamban and Angeles and marched rapidly toward Porac. The 8th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (less one battalion), with its 105-mm. guns, had accompanied the force and by morning was in position to support the infantry attack. Thus, when the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, began to advance it was met first by punishing small-arms fire from the infantry, then by fire from the 105-mm. guns of the 8th Field Artillery. At the same time three Japanese aircraft swung low to strafe the road in support of the enemy attack. The momentum of the advance carried the Japanese below Pio, where they were finally stopped.

When news of the attack reached General Wainwright's headquarters, the most alarming item in the report was the presence of Japanese medium artillery, thought to be heavy guns, on the left of the American line. This artillery represented a serious threat, and the 21st Division was ordered to "hold the line or die where you are."[8] General Capinpin did his best, but he had only two battalions of the 23d Infantry, an unseasoned and untrained unit, left in reserve. One of these battalions was in North Luzon Force reserve and it was now ordered to move to the 11th Division sector near Guagua where a heavy fight was in progress.

Meanwhile, Colonel Takahashi had launched an assault against the 21st Infantry. First the battalion on the left gave way and within an hour the reserve line also began to crumble. By noon the left flank of the 21st Infantry was completely disorganized. The right battalion, though still intact, fell back also lest it be outflanked. This withdrawal exposed the left flank of the 22d Infantry on its right.

Colonel Takahashi lost no time in taking advantage of the gap in the American line. Elements of the 9th Infantry drove in between the two regiments, hitting most heavily the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, on the regimental left. The action which followed was marked by confusion. The noise of artillery fire and the black smoke rising from the burning cane fields reduced the troops to bewildered and frightened men. At one time the 21st Infantry staff was nearly captured when the onrushing enemy broke through to the command post. A group of tanks from the 11th Division sector, ordered to attack the Japanese line in front of the 21st Division, showed a marked disinclination to move into the adjoining sector without orders from the tank group commander. Before the ferocity of the Japanese


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attack the defending infantry line melted away.[9]
Had it not been for the artillery the Japanese attack might well have resulted in a complete rout. Fortunately, the 21st Field Artillery acted in time to halt Takahashi's advance. The 1st Battalion on the right, behind the 22d Infantry, covered the gap between the two regiments and fired directly against the oncoming Japanese at a range of 600-800 yards. The 2d and 3d Battalions delivered direct fire up the draw leading through Pio. Notwithstanding the punishing artillery fire, the 9th Infantry continued to attack. For six hours, until darkness closed in, the left portion of the 21st Division line was held by the guns of the 21st Field Artillery alone, firing at close range across open fields. "As attack after attack came on, broke, and went back," wrote Colonel Mallonée, "I knew what Cushing's artillerymen must have felt with the muzzles of their guns in the front line as the Confederate wave came on and broke on the high water mark at Gettysburg,"[10]

Quiet settled down on the 21st Division front that night. The Takahashi Detachment, its attack halted by the effective fire of the artillery, paused to reorganize and take stock of the damage. The next day, 4 January, there was no action at all on the left and only intermittent pressure on the right. The Japanese did manage to emplace one or two of their 105-mm. guns along the high ground to the west and during the day fired on the rear areas. Fortunately, their marksmanship was poor and although they made life behind the front lines uncomfortable they inflicted no real damage.

On the afternoon of the 4th, as a result of pressure on the 11th Division to the east, General Wainwright ordered the 21st Division to withdraw under cover of darkness to the line of the Gumain River, about eight miles south of Porac. That night the division began to move back after successfully breaking contact with the enemy. Despite the absence of enemy pressure there was considerable confusion during the withdrawal. By daylight of the 5th, however, the troops were across the Gumain where they began to prepare for their next stand. Division headquarters, the 23d Infantry, the division signal company, and other special units were at Dinalupihan, with the 21st Field Artillery located just east of the town.

The Right Flank
Along the east half of the Guagua-Porac line stood the 11th Division (PA). The 11th Infantry was on the left, holding the Guagua-Porac road as far north as Santa Rita. The regiment, in contact with the 21st Division on the left only through occasional patrols, had three battalions on the line. The 2d Battalion was on the left, the 1st in the center, and the 3d on the right. Next to the 11th was the 13th Infantry, which held Guagua and was in position across Route 7. Extending the line southeast from Guagua to Sexmoan were two companies of the 12th Infantry. The 11th Field Artillery, for the firs time since the start of the war, was in support of the

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division. Part of the 194th Tank Battalion and Company A of the 192d provided additional support.[11]
The Japanese attack on the right flank of the Guagua-Porac line came on 3 January. Leaving San Fernando at 0400 the reinforced Tanaka Detachment had advanced cautiously along Route 7. At about 0930 the point of the Japanese column made contact with a platoon of tanks from Company C, 194th, posted about 1,000 yards north of Guagua. Under tank fire and confined to the road because of the marshy terrain on both sides, the Japanese halted to await the arrival of the main force. About noon, when the force in front became too formidable, the American tanks fell back to Guagua. The Japanese continued to advance slowly. Forced by the nature of the terrain into a frontal assault along the main road and slowed down by the numerous villages along the line of advance, the attack, the Japanese admitted, "did not progress as planned."[12] Artillery was brought into support and, late in the afternoon, the 75-mm. guns opened fire, scoring at least one hit on the 11th Infantry command post. The defending infantry were greatly cheered by the sound of their own artillery answering the Japanese guns. Organized after the start of the war and inadequately trained, the men of the 11th Field Artillery, firing from positions at Guagua and Santa Rita, made up in enthusiasm what they lacked in skill.[13]

The Japanese artillery fire continued during the night and increased in intensity the next morning, 4 January, when a battalion of 150-mm. howitzers joined in the fight. In the early afternoon an enemy column spearheaded by tanks of the 78th Tank Regiment broke through the 13th Infantry line along Route 7 and seized the northern portion of Guagua. Another column hit the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, to the left of the 13th, inflicting about 150 casualties. The two units held on long enough, however, for the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 11th Infantry to pull out. They then broke contact and followed the two battalions in good order.[14]

During this action Company A, 192d Tank Battalion, and elements of the 11th Division attempted to counterattack by striking the flank of the Japanese line before Guagua. This move almost ended in disaster. The infantry on the line mistook the tanks for enemy armor and began dropping mortar shells on Company A, and General Weaver, who was in a jeep attempting to co-ordinate the tank-infantry attack, was almost hit. The mistake was discovered in time and no serious damage was done.


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When new of the Japanese breakthrough at Guagua reached General Wainwright on the afternoon of the 4th he decided it was time to fall back again. The next line was to be south of the Gumain River, and orders were issued to the 11th, as well as the 21st Division, to withdraw to me new line that night.
General Brougher's plan of withdrawal called for a retirement along Route 7 through Guagua and Lubao to me new line. The rapid advance of the Tanaka Detachment through Guagua and down Route 7 toward Lubao late that afternoon, however, cut off this route of retreat of the 11th Infantry and other elements of the line. A hasty reconnaissance of the area near the highway failed to disclose any secondary roads or trails suitable for an orderly retirement. To withdraw cross-country was to invite wholesale confusion and a possible rout. The only course remaining to the cutoff units was to traverse a thirty-mile-long, circuitous route through San Jose, in the 21st Division sector, then down Route 74 to Dinalupihan. There the men would turn southeast as far as Layac Junction and then north along Route 7 to a point where they could form a line before the advancing Tanaka Detachment.

That evening, 4 January, the long march began. Those elements of the 11th Division cut off by the Japanese advance, and Company A, 192d Tank Battalion, reached San Jose without interference from the enemy but not without adding to the confusion already existing in the 21st Division area.

Meanwhile at San Jose, General Brougher, the 11th Division commander, had collected all the trucks and buses he could find and sent them forward to carry his men. With this motor transportation, the 11th Infantry was able to take up a position along Route 7, between Santa Cruz and Lubao, by about 0500 of 5 January. This line was about one mile southwest of the Gumain River, the position which the division had originally been ordered to occupy. Troops arriving on this line found themselves under small-arms fire from the Tanaka Detachment, which had entered Lubao the previous evening.

A short distance north of this line, an outpost line had already been established the previous afternoon by General Brougher with those troops who had been able to withdraw down Route 7. The infantry troops on this line were from the 12th Infantry, part of which had pulled back along Route 7. Brougher had rounded up about two hundred men from the regiment, together with the ten guns of the 11th Field Artillery and some 75-mm. SPMs, and formed a line on Route 7 between Lubao and Santa Cruz. For fourteen hours, from the afternoon of 4 January to the morning of 5 January, these troops under the command of Capt. John Primrose formed the only line between the enemy and Layac Junction, the entrance into Bataan. Early on 5 January when the new line was formed by the troops who had withdrawn through San Jose, Primrose and his men pulled back to join the main force of the division.

The withdrawal of the 194th Tank Battalion from Guagua had been accomplished only after a fierce fight. Colonel Miller, the tank commander, had ordered the tanks to pull out on the morning of the 4th. Under constant enemy pressure, the tanks began a slow withdrawal, peeling off one at a time. Guarding their flank was a force consisting of a few tanks of Company C, 194th, and some SPMs from Capt. Gordon H. Peck's provisional battalion posted


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at a block along the Sexmoan-Lubao road. At about 1600 Peck and Miller had observed a large enemy force approaching. This force, estimated as between 500 and 800 men, supported by machine guns, mortars, and artillery, was led by three Filipinos carrying white flags, presumably under duress. The tanks and SPMs opened fire, cutting the Japanese column to pieces. The 194th Tank Battalion then left burning Guagua and Lubao and moved south to positions a mile or two above Santa Cruz. The tanks and SPMs at the block covered its withdrawal.
Some time after midnight, between 0200 and 0300 on 5 January, the covering force was hit again, this time by infantry and artillery of the Tanaka Detachment. Attacking in bright moonlight across an open field and along the road, the enemy came under direct fire from the American guns. Driven back with heavy casualties, he attacked again and again, and only broke off the action about 0500, at the approach of daylight. Later in the day the Tanaka Detachment, seriously depleted by casualties, was relieved by Col. Hifumi Imai's 1st Formosa Infantry (less one battalion) to which were attached Tanaka's tanks and artillery.

By dawn of 5 January, after two days of heavy and confused fighting, the Guagua-Porac line had been abandoned and the American and Filipino troops had pulled back to a new line south and west of the Gumain River. The 21st Division on the west had retired to a position about eight miles below Porac and was digging in along the bank of the river; to the east the 11th Division had fallen back six miles and stood along about a mile south of the river. But the brief stand on the Guagua-Porac line had earned large dividends. The Japanese had paid dearly for the ground gained and had been prevented from reaching their objective, the gateway to Bataan. more important was the time gained by the troops already in Bataan to prepare their positions.

Behind the Gates
The only troops remaining between the enemy and Bataan--the 11th and 21st Division, the 26th Cavalry, and the tank group--were now formed on their final line in front of the peninsula. This line, approximately eight miles in front of the access road to Bataan and generally along the Gumain River, block the approach to Bataan through Dinalupihan and Layac Junction.
Both Dinalupihan and Layac Junction lie along Route 7. This road, the 11th Division's route of withdrawal, extends southwest from San Fernando to Layac where it joins Route 110, the only road leading into Bataan. At Layac, Route 7 turns sharply northwest for 2,000 yards to Dinalupihan, the southern terminus of Route 74 along which the 21st Division was withdrawing. Route 7 then continues west across the base of the peninsula to Olangapo on Subic Bay, then north along the Zambales coast to Lingayen Gulf, a route of advance the Japanese had fortunately neglected in favor of the central plain which led most directly to their objective, Manila.

Layac Junction, where all the roads to Bataan joined, was the key point along the route of withdrawal. Through it and over the single steel bridge across the Culo River just south of the town would have to pass the troops converging along Routes 7 and 74. the successful completion of this move


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would require the most precise timing, and, if the enemy attacked, a high order of road discipline.
Through the Layac Bottleneck
The withdrawal from the Gumain River through Layac Junction, although made without interference from the enemy, was attended by the greatest confusion. On the east, where the 11th Division was in position astride Route 7, there were a few skirmishes between patrols on 5 January but no serious action. General Brougher had received a battalion of the 71st Infantry to strengthen his line but the battalion returned to its parent unit at the end of the day without ever having been engaged with the enemy.[15]
In the 21st Division area to the west there was much milling about and confusion on the 5th. Work on the Gumain River position progressed very slowly during the morning, and the troops showed little inclination to extend the line eastward to make contact with the 11th Division. During the day contradictory or misunderstood orders sent the men forward and then pulled them back, sometimes simultaneously. Shortly before noon General Capinpin, needlessly alarmed about the situation on the 11th Division front and fearful for the safety of his right (east) flank, ordered a withdrawal to a point about a mile above Dinalupihan. The movement was begun but halted early in the afternoon by an order from General Wainwright to hold the Gumain River line until further orders.

By midafternoon the division had once more formed a line south of the river. Thinly manned in one place, congested in another, the position was poorly organized and incapable of withstanding a determined assault. In one section, infantry, artillery, and tanks were mixed together in complete disorder. "Everyone," said Colonel Mallonée, "was in everyone else's lap and the whole thing resembled nothing quite as much as the first stages of an old fashioned southern political mass meeting and free barbecue."[16]

Fortunately for General Capinpin, the Takahashi Detachment on Route 74 did not advance below Pio. This failure to advance was due to an excess of caution on the part of the colonel who, on the 4th, had been placed under the 65th Brigade for operations on Bataan.[17] It is entirely possible that Japanese caution and lack of vigor in pressing home the attack may have been due to a mistaken notion of the strength of the defending forces and a healthy respect for American-led Filipino troops. Had Takahashi chosen this moment to launch a determined attack against the 21st Division he would almost certainly have succeeded in trapping the forces before Bataan.

The troops had hardly taken up their positions behind the Gumain River when General Wainwright issued orders for the withdrawal into Bataan through Layac Junction, to begin at dark. First to cross the bridge over the Culo River below Layac would be the 11th Division, followed closely by the 21st. To cover the withdrawal of the 11th, one battalion of the 21st Division was to sideslip over in front of the 11th Division, while the 26th Cavalry would protect the left flank of the 21st during its withdrawal.[18]


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The execution of such a maneuver seemed impossible under the conditions existing along the front. The 23d Infantry, in division reserve, was already at Dinalupihan and Colonel O'Day, senior American instructor in the 21st Division, proposed instead to place a battalion of this regiment astride Route 7 behind the 11th Division. General Brougher's troops could then fall back through the covering battalion. This proposal was accepted, and after considerable difficulty "the equivalent of a battalion" was placed in position by dark.[19]
When night fell the 11th Division withdrew from its positions and moved southwest along Route 7 toward Layac Junction and the road to Bataan. Soon the town was crowded with men and vehicles and as the withdrawal continued became a scene of "terrible congestion," of marching men, trucks, buses, artillery, tanks, horses, and large numbers of staff and command cars. "It looked," remarked one observer, "like the parking lot of the Yale bowl."[20]

At about 2030 Col. John Moran, chief of staff of the 11th Division, reported that his division had cleared Layac and was across the Culo bridge. The 21st Division was now ordered across. Observing the passage of men, Colonel O'Day wrote: "It was a painful and tragic sight--our soldiers trudging along, carrying inordinate loads of equipment and personal effects. Many had their loads slung on bamboo poles, a pole between two men. They had been marching almost since dark the night before, and much of the daylight hours had been spent in backing and filling. . . "[21]

By about midnight of the 5th, the last guns of the 21st Field Artillery had cleared the bridge, and within the next hour all of the foot troops, closely shepherded by the Scouts of the 26th Cavalry, were across. Last to cross were the tanks, which cleared the bridge shortly before 0200 of the 6th. General Wainwright then ordered Capt. A.P. Chanco, commanding the 91st Engineer Battalion, to blow the bridge. The charges were immediately detonated and the span demolished. All of the troops were now on Bataan, and the last gate slammed shut. The Japanese had lost their opportunity again to cut off the retreat. Colonel Imai was still at Santa Cruz and Takahashi still hung back at Porac.[22]

Holding Action Below Layac Junction
Already formed below Layac Junction when the Culo bridge was blown was another line designed to delay the enemy and gain more time for the Bataan Defense Force. The idea for a delaying action at Layac Junction was contained in WPO-3, the plan that went into effect on 23 December, and General Parker, commander of the Bataan Defense Force, had sent the 31st Infantry (US) there on the 28th to cover the junction.
The importance of this position was stressed by Col. Hugh J. Casey, MacArthur's engineer officer, who, on 2 January, pointed out to General Sutherland that the defense lines then being established on Bataan left to the enemy control of Route 110 which led south from Layac into the peninsula. This road, he felt, should be


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denied the Japanese as long as possible. he recommended to General Sutherland, therefore, that a strong delaying action, or, failing that, "definite reference to preparing strong delaying positions . . . should be made."[23]
These recommendations were apparently accepted, for the same day General MacArthur ordered Wainwright to organize a delaying position south of Layac Junction along Route 110. On completion of this position, control would pass to General Parker, who was to hold until forced to withdraw by a co-ordinated enemy attack.[24]

Responsibility for the establishment of the Layac Junction line was given to General Selleck who had just reached Bataan with his disorganized 71st Division (PA). The troops assigned were the 71st and 72d Infantry from Selleck's 71st Division, totaling approximately 2,500 men; the 26th Cavalry, now numbering 657 men; and the 31st Infantry (US) of the Philippine Division, the only infantry regiment in the Philippines composed entirely of Americans. of this force, the 31st was the only unit which had not yet been in action. Artillery support consisted of the 71st Field Artillery with two 75-mm. gun batteries and four 2.95-inch guns; the 1st Battalion of the 23d Field Artillery (PS) with about ten 75s; and the 1st Battalion, 88th Field Artillery (PS) with two batteries of 75s. The tank group and two SPM battalions were also in support.

On 3 and 4 January the 71st Division elements and the 31st Infantry moved into position and began stringing wire and digging in. General Selleck had been denied the use of the 71st Engineers by North Luzon Force, with the result that the construction of defenses progressed slowly. When Colonel Skerry inspected the line on the 4th and 5th he found that the tired and disorganized 71st and 72d Infantry had made little progress in the organization of the ground and that their morale was low. in the 31st Infantry (US) sector, however, he found morale high and the organization of the ground much more effective.

At that time Selleck's forces were spread thin along a line south of Layac Junction across Route 110, which ran southeast and east between Layac and Hermosa. on the right was the 71st Infantry, holding a front along the south bank of Culis Creek--not to be confused with the Culo River immediately to the north. This line, parallel to and just north of Route 110, extended from Almacen, northeast of Hermosa, to a point northeast of Culis, where Culis Creek turned south to cross Route 110. The eastern


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extremity of the 71st Infantry sector was protected by swamps and a wide river; on the west was the 72d Infantry, straddling Route 110. Its sector was about 1,000 yards below Layac Junction and faced north and east.
Next to the 72d Infantry was the 31st Infantry, with the 1st and 2d Battalions extending the line to the southwest, about 3,000 yards from the nearest hill mass. This exposed left flank was to be covered by the 26th Cavalry, then pulling back through Layac Junction with the 11th and 21st Divisions. In reserve was the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, about 1,000 yards to the rear. Supporting the 31st was the 1st Battalion, 88th Field Artillery, on the west, and the 1st Battalion, 23d Field Artillery, to its right, west of Route 110. The 71st Division infantry regiments each had a battalion of the 71st Field Artillery in support.

At approximately 0330 of the 6th of January the 26th Cavalry reached the new line south of Layac Junction and fell in on the left of the 31st Infantry, to the foothills of the Zambales Mountains. It was followed across the bridge by the tanks, which took up supporting positions southwest of Hermosa--the 194th Battalion of the left (west) and the 192d on the right. The 75-mm. SPMs, which withdrew with the tanks, were placed along the line to cover possible routes of advance of hostile tanks.

The line when formed seemed a strong one. In Colonel Collier's opinion, it had "a fair sized force to hold it," and General Parker declared, referring probably to the 31st Infantry sector, that it "lent itself to a good defense . . . was on high ground and had good fields of fire."[25]

General Selleck did not share this optimism about the strength of his position. To him the front occupied by his troops seemed excessive, with the result that "all units except the 26th Cavalry were over-extended."[26] Colonel Skerry's inspection on the 5th had led him to the conclusion that the length of the line held by the disorganized 71st and 72d Infantry was too extended for these units. Selleck thought that his line had another, even more serious weakness, in that part of the right portion faced northeast and the left portion northwest, thus exposing the first to enfilade from the north and the second to enfilade from the east.

Admittedly the position chosen had weaknesses, but no more than a delaying action was ever contemplated along this line. As in the withdrawal of the North Luzon Force from Lingayen Gulf, all that was expected was that the enemy, faced by an organized line, would halt, wait for artillery and other supporting weapons, and plan an organized co-ordinated attack, By that time the objective--delay--would have been gained, and the line could pull back.

At 0600, 6 January, when all the troops were on the line, Wainwright released General Selleck from his command to Parker's control. After notifying MacArthur of his action he withdrew to Bataan, stopping briefly at Culis where Selleck had his command post. North Luzon Force had completed its mission. Like the South Luzon Force it was now in position behind the first line on Bataan. only the covering force at Layac Junction denied the enemy free access to Bataan.

Action along the Layac line began on the morning of 6 January with an artillery


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barrage. At about 1000 forward observers reported that Japanese infantry and artillery were advancing down Route 7 toward Layac Junction. This column was part of the Imai Detachment which consisted of the 1st Formosa Infantry, one company of the 7th Tank Regiment, two battalions of the 48th Mountain Artillery armed with 75-mm. guns, and one battalion of the 1st Field Heavy Artillery Regiment with eight 150-mm. howitzers. By 1030 the Japanese column was within artillery range of the defenders and the 1st Battalions of the 23d and 88th Field Artillery Regiments opened fire. The first salvo by the Philippine Scout gunners was directed on the target. Switching immediately to rapid volley fire, the two battalions, joined by the 71st Field Artillery, searched the road from front to rear, forcing the enemy to deploy about 4,200 yards northeast of Layac.[27]
The Japanese now moved their own artillery into position. The 75s of the 48th Mountain Artillery and the 150-mm. howitzers of the 1st Field Artillery, directed by unmolested observation planes, began to drop concentrated and effective fire on the Americans and Filipinos. It was during this bombardment that Jose Calugas, the mess sergeant of Battery B, 88th Field Artillery, won the Medal of Honor.

General Selleck, without antiaircraft protection, was unable to prevent aerial reconnaissance, with the result that the Japanese 150s, out of range of the American guns, were able to place accurate and punishing fire upon the infantry positions and upon the artillery. Around noon, therefore, Selleck ordered his artillery to new positions, but the observation planes, flying as low as 2,000 feet, reported the changed positions, and the Japanese artillery shifted fire. It enfiladed the 31st Infantry and inflicted great damage on the 71st Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 23d Field Artillery, destroying all but one of the latter's guns. The 88th Field Artillery, in a more protected position, did not suffer as great a loss. That day General MacArthur informed the War Department that the enemy was using his "complete command of the air . . . to full effect against our artillery."[28]

The intense Japanese artillery barrage was the prelude to an advance by the infantry. MacArthur had warned that the Japanese were "apparently setting up a prepared attack in great strength," and, except for his estimate of the strength of the enemy, his analysis was correct.[29] At about 1400 a Japanese force of several battalions of infantry crossed the Culo River below Layac Junction and pushed forward the American line. Another force turned north at Layac and moved toward Dinalupihan, entering that undefended town at 1500. An hour later the Japanese who had continued south on reaching Layac hit Selleck's line between the 31st Infantry and the 72d Infantry. Company B, on the right of the 31st line, had been badly shaken by the artillery barrage and fell back in disorder to higher ground about 800 yards to the rear, leaving a gap between Company C on its left and the 72d Infantry on the right. Japanese troops promptly infiltrated. Attempts by the rest of the 1st Battalion, 31st Infantry, to fill the gap failed and Col. Charles L. Steel, the regimental commander, secured his 3d Battalion from Selleck's reserve and ordered it into the line.


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The Japanese, supported by artillery fire, continued to push into the gap, hitting the right of Company C, 31st Infantry, and Company A of the 72d on the left. Lt. Col. Jasper E. Brady, Jr., the 3d Battalion commander, ordered Companies I and L, 31st Infantry, into the sector previously held by Company B. As Company I moved forward, it was caught in the enemy's artillery fire, badly disorganized, and forced back to the rear. Company L, however, continued to press forward. Within thirty minutes from the time it had jumped off to the attack, it had succeeded in restoring the line.[30]
Outwardly the situation seemed well in hand. But General Selleck was in serious trouble. His overextended line had been partially penetrated, his reserves had been committed, and his artillery was practically out of action. The Japanese were continuing to press south across the Culo River. Should they attack successfully through the 72d Infantry line, they would gain control of the road and cut off Selleck's route of escape. Colonel Steel recommended withdrawal and General Selleck informed Parker that he would not be able to hold out without artillery and infantry reinforcements and that a daylight withdrawal might prove disastrous. At 2200 of the 6th, General Parker ordered a withdrawal under cover of darkness.

Although both the American and Japanese commanders had tanks at their disposal, neither had employed them that day. Possibly the Japanese had failed to use armor because there were no bridges over the Culo River. Some of the American tanks had been hit by Japanese artillery, but not seriously enough to prevent their use. They had not been used to support the attack by the 3d Battalion, 31st Infantry, General Selleck noted caustically, because "the terrain was not considered suitable by the tank commander."[31] At about 1830, when it appeared that the Japanese might cut off the route of escape, Colonel Miller, senior tank commander in the area, had moved the tanks toward the highway. They arrived there about 2100, and were met by General Weaver's executive with orders for a further withdrawal southward into Bataan.[32]

The tanks were already well on their way when the units on the line received orders to pull back. The 71st Division elements experienced no difficulty in withdrawing down the road. The 31st Infantry, leaving three companies on the line as a covering shell, pulled out about 0130 on the morning of the 7th. An hour later, as the shell began to move out, the Japanese launched an attack against Hermosa, cutting off Company E and almost destroying it. The Japanese reached their objective by 0500, but the survivors of Company E


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did not rejoin the regiment until a few days later.[33]
The 26th Cavalry, which had not been under attack that day, had lost contact with the 31st Infantry on its right. Radio communication proved inadequate; messages were garbled and, in some cases, indecipherable. The code had been changed during the night and no one had informed the 26th Cavalry. Consequently the Scout regiment was not aware of the order to withdraw during the night. It was not until the approach of daylight that the 26th learned of the withdrawal. It began to pull back at 0700 of the 7th. By this time the Japanese controlled the road as far south as Hermosa and the Scouts were compelled to move overland across the mountainous jungle to reach the American line. With the departure of the 26th Cavalry the Layac line disappeared.

At Layac Junction the American and Philippine troops had paid dearly to secure one day of grace for the forces preparing to defend Bataan. Against the longer range Japanese guns the Americans had been defenseless. The line had been penetrated at the first blow, only to be restored and then abandoned. The Japanese had once more failed in their attempt to follow up their advantage.

The withdrawal into Bataan was now complete. Under desperate circumstances and under constant pressure from the enemy, General MacArthur had brought his forces from the north and south to San Fernando and Calumpit. There, in a most difficult maneuver, he had joined the two forces and brought them safely into Bataan, fighting a delaying action all the way. All this had been accomplished in two weeks, during which time positions had been prepared on Bataan and supplies shipped there from Manila and elsewhere. Not a single major unit had been cut off or lost during the withdrawal, and only once, at Cabanatuan, had the American line failed to hold long enough to permit an orderly withdrawal. The success of this complicated and difficult movement, made with ill-equipped and inadequately trained Filipino troops, is a tribute to the generalship of MacArthur, Wainwright, and Jones and to American leadership on the field of battle.

The withdrawal had been a costly one on both sides. General Wainwright's North Luzon Force of 28,000 men had been reduced to about 16,000 largely by the desertion of Filipino soldiers who returned to their homes. Only a small portion of the 12,000 men lost were battle casualties or captured by the enemy. General Jones' South Luzon Force fared much better. Of the 15,000 men in his force originally, General Jones had 14,000 left when he reached Bataan.[34] The Japanese suffered close to 2,000 casualties during the period since the first landing. This number included 627 killed, 1,282 wounded, and 7 missing.[35]

The men who reached Bataan were tired


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and hungry. Before the fight began again they were accorded a brief rest while the enemy reorganized. To Colonel Collier this interlude seemed but an intermission between the acts of a great tragedy entitled "Defense of the Philippines." But before the curtain could go up on the second act, certain off-stage arrangements had to be completed. While these did not directly affect the action on-stage ,they exerted a powerful influence on the outcome of the drama.

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Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (12) * Next Chapter (14)


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Footnotes
[1] Mallonée, Bataan Diary, I, 113. This estimate came from G-3 USAFFE.
[2] 14th Army Opns, I, 66.

[3] Ibis., 64, 71-72, 85; 5th Air Gp Opns, p. 41.

[4] Interrog of Lt Gen Susumu Morioka, 24 Apr 47, Interrogations of Former Japanese Officers, Mil Hist Div, GHQ FEC, I, 71.

[5] The account of action on the left flank is based upon NLF nad I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 14-15; O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 15-20; Mallonée, Bataan Diary, I, 114-20, 123-25; Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) Battles to Gory," Part 2, Armored Cavalry Journal (May-June 1947), pp. 12-13; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 15; Brief Hist of 22d Inf (PA), p. 4; Richards, Steps to a POW Camp, pp. 9-12; 14th Army Opns, I, 73, 85.

[6] Mallonée, Bataan Diary, I, 115.

[7] Ibid., 116.

[8] O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 16.

[9] Lt Grover C. Richards, 21st Infantry (PA), states that he was sent to bring the tanks in and finally had to walk in front of the lead tank in order to get it to advance. Richards, Steps to a POW Camp, pp. 9-10. See also Weaver, Comments on Darft MS, Comment 22, OCMH.

[10] Mallonée, Bataan Diary, I, 120.

[11] The account of the action around Guagua is based on Townsend, Defense of Phil, p. 13; 2d Lt James, 11th Inf (PA), p. 8, and Liles, 12th Inf (PA), p. 13, both in Chunn Notebooks; 11th Inf (PA), Beach Defense and Delaying Action, pp. 22-23; Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 124-32; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, pp. 15-16; Dooley, The First U.S. Tank Action in World War II, p. 13; Mallonée, Battan Diary, I, 124-25.

[12] 14th Army Opns, I, 85.

[13] 11th Inf (PA), Beach Defense and Delaying Action, pp. 22-23; Townsend, Defense of Phil, p. 13.

[14] The account of this action and those that follow are reconstructed from a large number of records which present at best a confusing picture. The main sources used in this reconstruction are: NLF and I Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 14-15; Prov Tank Gp Rpt, p. 15-16; Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 126-32; Rpts of S-2 and S-3, 194th Tank Bn in Diary of Col Miller, copy in OCMH; 14th Army Opns, I, 86; Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, Comments 22-25, OCMH.

[15] 11th Inf (PA), Beach Defense and Delaying Action, p. 24; ltr, Selleck to Board of Officers, 1 Feb 46, sub: Statement for Reinstatement of Rank, p. 10, OCMH.

[16] Mallonée, Bataan Diary, I, 131. See also pp. 127-30, and O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 19.

[17] See below, Ch. XV, p. 261.

[18]O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 20.

[19] Ibid., pp. 18, 20.

[20] Mallonée, Bataan Diary, I, 138, See also O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 20; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, p. 16; 11th Inf (PA), Beach Defense and Delaying Action, p. 24.

[21] O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 20.

[22] 14th Army Opns, I, 73, 86; O'Day, 21st Div (PA), II, 21; Skerry, Comments on Engineer History, No. 9, p., 11; Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) Battles to Glory," Part 2, Armored Cavalry Journal (May-June 1947), p. 13.

[23] Memo, Casey for CofS USAFFE, 2 Jan 42, sub: Defense of Bataan, AG 381, Phil Rcds; ltr, Parker to Ward, 16 Jan 52, OCMH; ltr, Col Olson to author, 10 Jan 52, OCMH. Colonel Maher, Wainwright's chief of staff, states that the Layac Junction position would have been occupied "as a matter of course," and that Colonel Casey had nothing to do with its use. Ltr, Maher to War, 24 Dec 51, OCMH.

[24] Except where otherwise indicated this section is based upon; ltr, Selleck to CG II Corps, 3 Feb 43, sub: Action at Layac Junction, in Selleck, Notes on the 71st Div (PA), pp. 20-22. Attached to mis letter are accounts of the 331st Infantry (US) by Col Charles L. Steel and of the 26th Cavalry (PS) at Layac Junction by Lt Col Lee C. Vance, and a memo, Weaver for Selleck, 1 Feb 43, sub: Action Prov Tank Gp in Connection with Layac Delaying Position; ltr, Selleck to Board of Officers, 1 Feb 46, sub: Statement for Reinstatement of Rank, OCMH; USAFFE-USFIP Rpt of Opns, pp. 41-42; SLF nad II Corps Rpt of Opns, pp. 22-27; and Chandler, "26th Cavalry (PS) Battles to Glory," Part 2, Armored Cavalry Journal (May-June 1947), pp. 13-14; Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, Comments 29 and 30, OCMH; ltr, Miller to Ward, 31 Dec 51, OCMH; Skerry, Comments on Draft MS, Comment C, OCMH.

Japanese source for this action are scanty and the author had to rely on 14th Army Opns, I, 86, and the American sources cited.

[25] Collier, Notebooks, III, 11; SLF and II Corps Rpt of Opns, p. 25; ltr, Parker to War, 16 Jan 52, OCMH.

[26] Ltr, Selleck to CG II Corps, 3 Feb 43, Action at Layac Junction, in Selleck, Notes on 71st Div (PA), p. 25.

[27] Collier, Notebooks, II, 12-14; ltr, Fowler to author, 30 Apr 49, OCMH.

[28] Rad, MacArthur to TAG, No. 14, 6 Jan 42, AG 381 (11-27-41 Sec 1) Far East.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Maj Donal G. Thompson, Opns of Co L, 31st Inf (US) in Battle of Layac Junction (paper prepared for Advanced Infantry Officers Course, 1948-48, the Infantry School), pp. 10-14. Major Thompson commanded L Company during this action.

[31] Ltr, Sellec to Board of Officers, 1 Feb 46, sub: Statement for Reinstatement of Rank, p. 11, OCMH. General Weaver does not mention this matter in his memo to Selleck, cited above, or in his report. Colonel Miller speak of the impossibility of tank action in this area in Bataan Uncensored, p. 139. In his comments on a draft of this manuscript, General Weaver states that no request for tanks was ever made to him. Comment 29, OCMH.

[32] Miller, Bataan Uncensored, pp. 140-41; Prov Tank Gp Rpt of Opns, pp. 16-17; ltr, Miller to Ward, 31 Dec 51, OCMH; Weaver, Comments on Draft MS, Comments 29 and 30, OCMH.

[33] Thompson, Opns of Co L, 31st Infantry (US), p. 15; Maj Eugene B. Conrad, Opns of 31st Inf (*S), pp. 10-11, and Maj Everett V. Mead, S-4 of 31st Inf (US), Opns and Mvmts of 31st Inf (US), p. 15. Both papers prepared for Advanced Officers Course in 1947-47 and 1947-48, respectively, at The Infantry School.

[34] Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story,, pp. 45, 48; interv, Falk with Jones, 2 Dec 49. The strengths as given are rough approximations at best. No official figures are available for the campaign or any part of it.

[35] Comments of Former Japanese Officers Regarding The Fall of the Philippines, pp. 50, 124; USA vs. Homma, Defense Exhibit Y. See also the testimony of Colonel Nakajima, who said at the trial of General Homma that there were 4,500 casualties, including 1,300 wounded and 2,700 sick, in the 14th Army thus far. USA vs. Homma, p. 2573, testimony of Najajima.

http://www.the-vu.com/Pattaya.htm

Killer Pattaya Prostitutes
By Leonard Calcagno

A half-drunk and drugged big blonde Dane wakes up relived of $500 US. Last thing he remembers is that this beautiful Thai prostitute gave him a pill with her tongue, telling him it was an aphrodisiac. He was a lucky bastard; last week two Germans were found naked and dead in their hotel room. Their personal effects were never found by the police. Not even the hotel owner remembers if they came in with somebody.

Most of the tourists in Pattaya, Thailand come for the same thing: sex for cheap. But cases of prostitutes stealing everything from their drunk clients were not uncommon. This time, something about the case didn’t wash. The coroner determined that both men died of heart attacks at approximately the same time in the same room.

These deaths, and a number that followed, began making international headlines, and the sex tourist industry shrank. The stories were becoming common: some beautiful Thai slipped in an "aphrodisiac" or asks the client to lick her breasts. And that’s pretty much the last thing anyone remembers. Usually they would be relieved of wallet and watch. But now, johns were being killed off instead.

Police in Pattaya were convinced that the local mafia was using prostitutes to lure, rob tourist and kill them. Working with INTERPOL, local police began combing the areas that the tourists were found dead or unconscious. The south of Pattaya is where the most of the prostitute bars are. European [re: white] agents began visiting these bars undercover. It's not the first time that Thai and European police have worked together. A porno cartel dealing pedophilia was busted by Dutch and Scandinavian police a couple of years ago.

South Pattaya is where every bar has girls waiting in the door, bringing customers for cheap sex and beer. In every bar, naked girls are trained to be bait for sex tourists. Most of the "beer bars" are decorated in a cheap Christmas version of a high school beach party -- but with a hundred horny drunken tourists looking and touching underage smiling merchandise. The message parlors are filled with who girls specialize in everything for the right price: $5 US; And for a little extra, they’ll go to your hotel, too.

The Marine

The biggest beer bar is The Marine: two big dance floors and a dozen live show booths, each with a couple of girls scrammed in waiting for customers. In this ocean of horny tourists, police waited for 3 weeks before a Thai prostitute with mafia connections came in contact with one of them.

In a corner of the bar, there’s a drunken German tourist with 10 girls, talking loudly and paying for drinks without a care in the world. He's tall, blue-eyed and full of golden jewelry, just waiting to be robbed. In the other corner policemen have spotted a group of Thais looking him over and sending girls over to him. They let the drunken German leave with the girls, and the next day the police get a report from him saying that he was drugged and robbed.

For two months the police go to The Marine and always hear the same story. Nobody is killed though; the police follow the stupid tourists for it's safety after they leave the bar, but they needed proof for a murder rap. Finally, an undercover officer flush with cash gets surrounded by The Marine bar girls until mafia thugs send their two most beautiful girls to suggest a sex-crazed night in a local hotel. Accepting the invitation, the cop directs the other police officers to the hotel.

As the trio get to the room and the two prostitutes get naked, they ask the cop to take the so-called "aphrodisiac." The police bust into the room and arrest the two prostitutes, confiscating the pill. They also arrest the four people waiting in the car and the gang in The Marine waiting for other suckers.

One the prostitutes, a 16-year-old girl, confessed about the killing going around Pattaya and how she and her cohorts drug tourists, rob them and the gang kills them. They confess using different methods to drug the johns. After he has consumed the pill, powder or liquid, it takes 10 to 20 minutes slip into a heavy coma-like sleep. Many johns end up dying of heart attacks.

About 75 to 100 tourists are found dead every year in Pattaya, some from an overdose, heart attack, fights and some still in bizarre circumstance. I guess it’s the price to pay for cheap sex in a land where sexual exploitation is the main product to sell.



Leonardo Calcagno, well know writer in Montreal Canada. He's been writing for local Canadian, Americano and European e-zines and zines in French, Spanish and English for almost 5 years. More known to get hate letters from right-wing housewives and to get into fights with promoters who don't let him interview bands! You will mostly see him eating tofu dogs and drinking Guinness with his laptop in Montreal writing another article about politics, music and sex. Graduated with a bachelor degree in International Politics with a minor on international law... his parents are still wondering why he took on a life of sex writer! Tattooed with Che, Husker Du and ARA! Played chino-Hispanic punk on Les Kalisses D'immigrant, Trash Blues on Les Tetes Reduites and now stoner rock on Your Sister ! He contributes on Freezerbox.com, Kerozen, Indymedia.org, Stooky.com, Eroticandy.com, Biotech Montreal Action, QuebecTel, Zona de Obra and other zines!

For more of Leonardo's work, please visit www.montrealnightguide.com and www.montrealconfidential.com

United States Marine Corps

Press Release
Division of Public Affairs
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380-1775
Telephone: 703-614-4309 DSN 224-4309 Fax 703-695-7460
Contact: American Forces Press Service

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Release # 0418-03-0640
Apr. 16, 2003

Many Diehard Fighters in Iraq Aren't Iraqis, Myers Says

WASHINGTON--By Gerry J. Gilmore
American Forces Press Service

Many snipers, suicide bombers
and other diehards attacking U.S. and coalition troops in
Iraq are non-Iraqis waging holy war, the U.S. military's
senior officer said April 15.

"A large portion ... they're actually foreigners," Air Force
Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, said on CNN's "Larry King Live."

"They're some of the so-called jihadists that have
infiltrated into Iraq" to fight for Saddam Hussein's now-
defunct regime, Myers remarked to the television talk show
host.

The four-star general told King that although major combat
is over in Iraq, there's still military work to be done, as
U.S. and coalition troops conduct presence patrols and
assist humanitarian relief efforts.

However, there are "some pockets of resistance that we
still need to deal with that can be very deadly," Myers
pointed out. He said he was sure there are U.S. and
coalition troops in Iraq "dodging bullets, that are worried
about suicide bombers coming up to the checkpoints."

Much of that resistance, he noted, seems to be composed of
fanatical foreigners devoted to jihad, or holy war, against
perceived enemies of Islam.

A lot of the Saddam-regime diehards still battling U.S. and
coalition troops in Iraq are not Iraqis, Myers pointed out,
"but they've come there for jihad, and are fighting for
that."

But where could the jihadists be coming from? Pentagon and
State Department officials have commented on the actions by
the Syrian government during Operation Iraqi Freedom,
noting war supplies like night-vision goggles were being
sent from Syria to Iraqi forces.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell noted yesterday that
coalition officials have been watchful of cross-border
goods -- and people -- traffic between Iraq and Syria.

"Some of those individuals went from Syria into Iraq to
oppose coalition forces," Powell said. He added that the
United States is also concerned about Syria's weapons of
mass destruction programs and its continuing support of
terrorist groups.

U.S. officials have also warned the Syrian government
against harboring any Saddam-regime escapees, criminals or
terrorists.

There's also the oil pipeline between Iraq and Syria that
was operating in violation of U.N. sanctions. U.S. Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said April 15 that U.S. forces
in Iraq had shut it down.

Myers also told King that U.S. and coalition troops must
still round up the remnants of Saddam's Special Republican
Guard and violent Baathist Party operatives.

And "we still have a lot of work to do in finding and
securing weapons of mass destruction sites, and making sure
that those biological and chemical weapons don't fall into
the hands of terrorists," the Joint Chiefs chairman said.

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Expanding NATO:
The Case for Slovenia



RYAN C. HENDRICKSON

Since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization first formally raised the issue of expanding its membership in 1994, most of Central and Eastern Europe’s new democracies have lobbied extensively for invitations into Europe’s preeminent security alliance. In 1997 at the Madrid Summit, only three states—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—were offered invitations to join. They became full members in 1999. In 2000, nine states known as the “Vilnius Nine” came together in Vilnius, Lithuania, to promote their joint membership appeal. These states included Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Since that time the momentum for expansion has grown as Croatia has joined in the call for membership in NATO.

Although US President George W. Bush’s Administration was quiet on the question of NATO’s expansion in its first months in office, upon his first presidential trip to Europe in June 2001, Bush called for NATO’s enlargement “from the Baltic to Black Sea.”1 Such robust appeals for expansion increased after the 11 September 2001 terrorist strikes on the United States.

Among all applicant states, Slovenia has been viewed by both politicians and analysts as the most likely candidate to be invited at NATO’s forthcoming summit in Prague in November 2002. On 21 June 2000, US Senator Joe Biden remarked that Slovenia was “eminently qualified for NATO membership” and a “shoo-in in Prague.”2 On 31 May 2002, Senator George Voinovich similarly stated, “I do not know of any of the aspirants that are interested in NATO that [is] more qualified than Slovenia.”3 Thomas S. Szayna also argued in a recent study that Slovenia was the best prepared of all applicants for membership.4 Such beliefs were echoed at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, in the summer of 2001.5

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While Slovenia is known to many defense specialists and military experts, most Americans know little about this small European state, which has a land mass similar in size to New Jersey and a population of only two million people. This article attempts to bridge that gap by providing a political and military assessment of Slovenia’s potential contributions to the alliance as a formal member-state. Such questions will become increasingly important to the parliaments of the NATO allies, and especially to the US Senate, once the eventual invitees undergo NATO’s domestic ratification processes. Excellent research has already been conducted on the applicant states, but no widely available analysis on Slovenia includes the political changes that came with the 9/11 terrorist strikes, or the military adaptations that have continued in this aspiring NATO state in 2001 and 2002.6

In this article, the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement will be used to assess Slovenia’s ability to meet the alliance’s political and military goals. These benchmarks for the applicants were refined in 1999 at the Washington Summit, but in no way guarantee an applicant’s automatic acceptance into NATO if it meets the ostensible criteria.7 These expectations, though, will undoubtedly be used by NATO and its constituents’ legislatures to assess which states are ready for membership. This article also includes analysis of Slovenia’s cooperation in the war on terrorism, a security challenge for NATO that became increasingly important after 9/11, and likely a crucial political variable to the US Senate in the ratification process. These findings suggest that Slovenia’s membership in NATO serves the alliance’s interest, especially due to its geographic location and its implemented military reforms. Recent domestic political developments in Slovenia, however, raise some concerns regarding public support for NATO and the alliance’s broader mission in European security.

Slovenia voted for its independence from Yugoslavia on 13 December 1990. In a ten-day war that began on 25 June 1991, Slovenia fought and gained that independence from Yugoslavia and its dictator, Slobodan Milosevic. The United States recognized Slovenia as an independent state on 7 April 1992, and Slovenia was seated at the United Nations in May 1992.

Through a vote in its National Assembly, Slovenia formally requested membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace on 30 March 1994, and since that time the country has actively campaigned for an invitation into the alliance.8 At the Madrid Summit in 1997, Slovenia and Romania were favored for membership by Canada, Germany, France, and Italy, but the United States was unwilling to expand

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the alliance beyond its three favored candidates. Although Slovenia and Romania lost their battle to gain membership at that time, NATO promised to keep its doors open to all worthy applicants.9 At the Washington Summit in 1999, while in the midst of NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo, the allies announced that they would again consider expansion at the Prague Summit in November 2002. With the likelihood of Slovenia’s membership in NATO being so high, and given the ensuing questions that will likely come during the domestic ratification processes, it is time to assess Slovenia’s potential contributions to the alliance.10

NATO’s Political Expectations

In the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, the alliance established two sets of expectations for applicant states. The first set addressed NATO’s “political” goals for potential members. In short, NATO expected that the applicants would be fully-functioning democracies, with civilian control of their military forces. The applicants should have all border disputes resolved, as well as resolutions to any remaining problems regarding minority rights. The applicants, more broadly, must also share the alliance’s values, meaning that the applicants must accept the principle of consensus decisionmaking and believe in the alliance’s overall strategic objectives.11

Since Slovenia gained its independence from Yugoslavia, its democratic transition has been viewed favorably by independent analysts, nongovernmental organizations, and governments alike.12 National elections for the presidency (five-year terms) took place in 1992 and 1997, and are on schedule for 2002. Its legislative branch, consisting of two houses, has also undergone peaceful democratic elections. Both houses, the National Assembly (90 seats) and the National Council (40 seats), have multi-party representation. Human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Freedom House, have found little to criticize regarding Slovenia’s protection of civil and political rights.13 The US State Department’s 2001 Annual Report on Human Rights provides generally positive views of Slovenia’s transition to and practice of democracy, including its treatment of minority populations.14

Slovenia also scores well in its civilian control of the military. After its short military battle for independence and initial democratic elections in 1992, it began its military restructuring program. While under the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), each of Yugoslavia’s six provinces contributed troops to the federal military force, which was supplemented by Territorial Defense forces in each province. The Territorial Defense forces were intended to serve as a backup to the JNA in the event of an attack from an outside aggressor. After independence and a new constitution, the Territorial Defense forces were placed under the formal control of the Slovenian government, with the President as commander in chief. In reality, however, the legislative branch and the Minister of Defense have the largest voices in military matters. Slovenian military expert Anton J. Bebler notes that after independence, the military “was placed under strict civilian con-

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trol,” and that the parliament is in full control of defense appropriations.15 He also notes that a “civilianization” of the Defense Ministry took place, along with greater transparency of all military issues to the public. According to Bebler, a “participatory management style” now characterizes the Slovenian military.16 Slovenian military professionals are barred from belonging to a political party, which also depoliticizes the military.

Perhaps the only notable problem in the area of civil-military relations has been the temptation of personal aggrandizement of civilian leaders in the Ministry of Defense, especially in the first years of Slovenia’s independence. Such problems initially involved former Defense Minister Janez Jansa, who used his office to appoint political supporters to military leadership posts, created his own special operations forces, and used his office to criticize the President. Before his removal from office, Jansa used his position for his own political gain, and on many occasions acted with minimal or no consultation with the President, effectively placing himself above the President in the military chain of command. While personal competition seems inherent in bureaucratic arrangements, Jansa’s ability to dominate defense affairs was of some concern to analysts.17 At the same time, the most recent analysis done by NATO’s Membership Action Plan on Slovenia in 2002 gives no attention to past problems in the Defense Ministry, tacitly acknowledging that such problems no longer remain.18 Jelena Trifunovic notes that problems remain regarding the absence of women as military professionals.19 Under the current leadership of Defense Minister Anton Grizold, however, Slovenia has an excellent record of civilian and military cooperation that meets the intent of the Study on NATO Enlargement.

Another element of the Study on NATO Enlargement addressed the importance of resolving any remaining border disputes. In this area Slovenia again should be judged a success. It has resolved all remaining border claims with Italy, Hungary, and Austria. The one border state of some concern has been Croatia. Political differences remain over the ownership of the Krsko nuclear plant, Croatia’s claims over Ljubljanska Bank’s debts claimed by Croatian citizens, and, most important, differences over fishing and drilling rights in Piran Bay. These diplomatic differences are real and remain problematic.20 At the same time, the chances that such problems could become militarily threatening are remote. Petar Stipetic, Cro-

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atian Army Chief of General Staff, asserted in May 2002, “Slovene-Croatian military relations are the best in the region.”21 Although the Croatian border issues represent a lingering source of diplomatic concern, all other border issues are resolved, ostensibly, to NATO’s expectations for new members.

It is in the last political measurement of Slovenia that more serious concerns surface: NATO applicants are required to share alliance values. Such an ambiguous benchmark allows for different interpretations over NATO’s intent. When examining the government’s support of NATO and membership in the alliance, no doubt exists regarding Slovenia’s interest and willingness to support the alliance. Support also exists among Slovenia’s religious elite, the Slovene Bishops, who have also voted in favor of NATO membership. The vast majority of Slovenia’s people identify themselves as Catholic, and the Bishops have noted that NATO shares democratic and moral values worth promoting in Europe.22

At the same time, however, since NATO’s 1997 rejection of Slovenia, a noticeable decrease in public support for NATO membership has developed. In 1997, prior to the Madrid conference, the public’s approval for membership in NATO was at its peak. The Defence Studies Research Centre of the Social Studies Institute at the University of Ljubljana found that 60 percent of the public approved of membership prior to Madrid. These approval numbers dropped to 56 percent in 1999 and to 48.3 percent in 2002. The number of those polled who “do not know” if they support Slovenia’s membership in NATO has also grown over time. These poll numbers should raise some concern from the allies.23 The approval numbers are still larger than those who oppose membership, but the polling does raise questions about the current political mood among the wider Slovene population.

The growing opposition seems to be based on a variety of issues. Some Slovenes opposed the National Assembly’s 2001 decision to allow its waters to be used by nuclear-powered submarines and submarines with nuclear strike capabilities. The parliament approved the decision in part to allow NATO to conduct training operations in Slovenia’s Port of Koper.24 Other concerns stem from the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The argument advanced by some Slovenes, especially the United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD), a party with representation in the National Assembly, is that by allying with NATO, Slovenia decreases its own security and becomes a more likely terrorist target.25 This opposition movement grew in 2002 and the ZLSD was also able to gather 8,000 signatures against NATO membership.26

Such expressions of disapproval are disquieting. When NATO’s 1999 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was in progress, one of NATO’s new allies, the Czech Republic, provided only lukewarm support to the bombing campaign. With the mission in progress, Czech parliamentary leaders expressed direct opposition to NATO’s objectives in Kosovo. Although Czech President Vaclav Havel eventually became an outspoken supporter of Allied Force, many in the republic’s parliament and nearly half its public continued to oppose NATO’s

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actions. Such opposition, especially from a new ally, was not welcomed by then-NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, and was an embarrassment for the alliance.27 Thus, Slovenia’s growing minority factions who oppose NATO membership are troubling.

To deal with the growing domestic opposition, the Slovene government took the important step of disseminating information to its citizens about the benefits of joining NATO by creating a toll-free telephone hotline to answer questions about membership.28 It also has developed a website in conjunction with NATO in an effort to address specific concerns about NATO.29 These steps are important for building support for the alliance, and to alleviate fears about membership. Based on the polling data noted earlier, some of the opposition appears to stem from NATO’s 1997 rejection of Slovenia in Madrid. These remaining hard feelings among some in the minority will likely dissipate with a membership invitation. Yet the government and especially the Defense Minister should continue in their domestic lobbying efforts to convince as many Slovenes as possible of the benefits of alliance membership.

Finally, another political concern apart from NATO’s 1995 study, but a factor that may hold some sway in the American Senate, is the remaining property claims from Americans who lost land or businesses in Slovenia under former Yugoslav President Tito’s leadership. Upon his 2001 appointment as US Ambassador to Slovenia, Johnny Young noted explicitly that these claims would have to be resolved before Slovenia is granted membership into NATO.30 These concerns are being addressed and resolved, which is an important political step for Slovenia as it moves toward full membership in the alliance, but full compliance with American demands would be helpful in eliminating potential problems among US Senators.

In sum, Slovenia generally meets all the political expectations set forth by NATO’s enlargement study. Where political problems remain—i.e. its border relations with Croatia and its growing opposition voices to NATO membership—its government is taking the necessary diplomatic and political steps to address these issues. Moreover, the concerns noted above do not override Slovenia’s important progress in meeting the vast majority of NATO’s political expectations, or the government’s outspoken backing for NATO and its strategic objectives in the post-Cold War era.

NATO’s Military Expectations

The 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement also established a set of military expectations for applicant states. These benchmarks include the applicant’s ability to contribute to the alliance’s security. This vague expectation can be measured in different ways, but generally implies that the applicant has a military that is able to add to the alliance’s defense, and implies that the applicant has the financial capability to afford military improvements. The applicant also must have a record of participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, which consists of military

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cooperation and training missions between the applicants and current NATO allies. Likewise, the applicant should have experience in peacekeeping operations. The alliance also expects the applicants to meet a “minimal level of inter-operability,” which is based on the idea that the alliance is multinational and requires the capability to work jointly in promoting NATO’s defense.31

Since gaining independence, Slovenia’s military has undergone considerable transformation, generally along the lines that NATO has suggested. Historically relying on conscription, Slovenia currently has a force size of 7,600 active troops, including approximately 3,500 professionals and 4,100 conscripts, who serve seven-month terms.32 On 14 May 2002 the Slovenian parliament voted to phase out the nation’s conscription policy, which would end in 2007. Moreover, Defence Minister Grizold has expressed his support for a phased elimination of conscription.33 By doing so, Slovenia takes an important step in simultaneously downsizing and professionalizing its military force, which is an important policy direction that all Vilnius nine states have been encouraged to implement.

In terms of new military equipment, Slovenia has taken modernization steps to improve its rapid reaction and mobilization capabilities. One major program has been the upgrading of approximately 30 T-55 tanks, older armored systems that remained with Slovenia from the Yugoslav government. These tanks now have improved firing and night-vision capabilities and faster mobility. Slovenia also has purchased 28 new armored personnel carriers. The improved T-55s and the new personnel carriers help Slovenia make the case that it does add militarily to the alliance in the event of a future regional political crisis, which is important considering the potentially volatile political conditions in nearby Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania. Moreover, these recent improvements unquestionably add to Slovenia’s own defenses, which insulate the country from the argument that it will be a security “free rider.”

In addition to these improvements, Slovenia has taken steps to improve its aircraft and air defense capabilities in order to meet interoperability requirements with other NATO states. Slovenia has upgraded 12 Pilatus PC-9m jet aircraft, which now contain supersonic fighter aviation equipment and allow for training with advanced aircraft technology.34 It also has recently purchased a

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short-ranged air-defense missile system from Germany, which also allows Slovenes to learn and better coordinate with NATO missile defense systems.35

Like the other NATO aspirants, Slovenia suffers from serious force-projection limitations. This problem was especially apparent for Slovenia during the US-led war on the Taliban in Afghanistan. Yet Slovenia has focused on areas where it potentially can contribute to the alliance meaningfully. Its recent upgrades and purchases move Slovenia in the appropriate direction given its notable limitations.

Besides these quantifiable military measurements, Slovenian membership also brings strategic geographic benefits to the alliance, and thus contributes in other important ways to the alliance’s defense. Through its membership, Slovenia would provide a land connection between current NATO allies Italy and Hungary, thus eliminating two “islands” within NATO. It is perhaps not surprising that both states have campaigned actively for Slovenian membership.36 Slovenia’s location in southern Europe offers the alliance another important military staging point, if needed, for future operations in the Balkans. Recall that in 1995, the Italian government refused NATO’s request to allow the deployment of additional F-117 aircraft to Italy during Operation Deliberate Force, NATO’s two-week bombing campaign on the Bosnian Serbs.37 Similarly, Hungary faced political pressures during Operation Allied Force, NATO’s bombing campaign against Slobodan Milosevic in 1999, as approximately 300,000 ethnic Hungarians were at risk in northern Yugoslavia, which understandably limited Hungary’s ability to act aggressively against Milosevic. Thus, besides the positive result of eliminating two islands within NATO, by admitting Slovenia the alliance would benefit by gaining another supportive and stable ally in the volatile Balkan region.

Slovenia’s record in NATO’s Partnership for Peace operations also is noteworthy. Slovenia has not only served as a host site for these training programs, but has been an active participate in the program since its inception.38 Slovenia also cooperates in the Multinational Light Land Force with Italy and Hungary in an effort to enhance military interoperability, and in a joint effort to cooperate militarily in the harsh terrain in the region.39 It also provided small troop contributions to the NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as to the peacekeeping efforts in Albania, Cyprus, and the Middle East.40

Slovenia’s 10-day war for independence also merits some attention. Its ability to defeat the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in 1991, in actions which cost the lives of only 13 Slovenes and 39 JNA personnel, is best explained as an interplay of political and military factors. Before Slovenia’s first democratic elections in 1990, a small number of senior military officials put into place a secret command structure for its Territorial Defense forces. Senior military and political leaders in Slovenia expected that the Yugoslav Federal Republic would assert control over the Territorial Defense forces as Slovenia moved toward independence. The JNA behaved as Slovenian officials anticipated, and the secret

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command structure proved crucial, surprising the JNA when Yugoslavia mobilized and attempted to control Slovenia in 1991.41

Slovenia also benefitted from excellent intelligence on the JNA’s military strategy. Slovenes who served in the JNA gave sensitive information to senior Slovene military and political leaders. The information allowed the Territorial Defense forces to wage surprise guerrilla attacks against the JNA. Slovenia also demonstrated excellent coordination between its military and political-media staff. It successfully portrayed itself as the victim of a massive attack by the JNA. The Territorial Defense forces purposely attacked helicopters and tanks in an effort to show the JNA as thrusting its superior weaponry against the under-armed Slovenes. These attacks galvanized the world media and centered attention on Slovenia’s resistance. At the same time, Slovenian political leaders cultivated diplomatic ties with key European allies, notably Germany and Austria, who spoke out against the JNA’s moves.42 Overall, the short war illustrated a well-planned military operation by the Territorial Defense forces, coupled with a highly effective political and diplomatic strategy.

Slovenia’s military victory should not be exaggerated: Slobodan Milosevic was not wholly committed to a military operation to prevent Slovenia’s independence, and the JNA suffered from low motivation after the initial strikes from the Slovenes.43 Moreover, by its own account, Slovenia could not have held out much longer had the JNA decided to push forward aggressively.44 Yet in the end the far superior military forces of the JNA retreated in defeat. This short war demonstrated that Slovenia is able to mobilize quickly, use sensitive intelligence effectively, and coordinate its political, military, and diplomatic tactics to generate widespread support for its cause. The possibility of another military invasion of Slovenia is remote, but Slovenia’s actions in 1991 do address those who emphasize the importance of military self-defense among NATO applicants.

Slovenia’s defense spending levels have remained consistent, although they still fall below NATO’s request of 2.0 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as an appropriate goal for all NATO applicants. Since 1998, Slovenia has maintained a steady spending level of 1.4 to 1.5 percent of GDP on military expenditures, with a stated goal of coming closer to 2.0 percent by 2007-08.45 If one measures spending per troop, however, Slovenia far surpasses other applicants— which points to Slovenia’s small size, but also to the higher degree of military professionalization possible in Slovenia vis-à-vis other applicant states.46

In sum, Slovenian membership in NATO would add to the alliance’s military security. NATO’s military expectations for its applicants are met or are very close to being met by Slovenia in 2002. Its spending levels could be higher, but this is a problem common to other NATO applicants as well as current member states.47 The strategic geographic benefits, Slovenia’s regional military cooperation, and the recent military upgrades and movements toward force restructuring make Slovenia an attractive NATO member-state. As indicated

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earlier, however, its force-projection limitations are notable, which has been highlighted in the current war on terrorism.

Slovenia and the War on Terrorism

In the days following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, for the first time in its history NATO formally invoked Article V of its Charter. Terrorism was a recognized threat in previous alliance ministerial statements, but due to the gravity of the events and new threats present after 9/11, terrorism’s saliency among security challenges was more prominent than ever. As the enlargement process unfolded after the strikes, American relations with Russia improved considerably, which to some degree opened the door for wider enlargement.48 The war against terrorism, however, may become a new measuring stick, especially in the United States’ case, in determining how well NATO’s applicants will assist the alliance. Questions of this nature will certainly surface during the ratification process in the US Senate. Some analysts have suggested that military reforms to address terrorist threats should be a critical element in determining who is invited into the alliance.49 At NATO’s June 2002 Defense Ministerial Meetings, it was also noted explicitly in NATO’s Final Communique that current allies must continue to adapt and reform their militaries in order to meet future terrorist challenges.50 US Ambassador Young also made this point in a speech before the Slovenian parliament.51 Thus, although fighting terrorism is not a formal component of the 1995 study on enlargement, it may become a prominent variable as NATO’s expansion unfolds.

After the terrorist attacks, Slovenia was quick to state that it would provide the United States unconditional support for the war on terrorism. It promised to share intelligence with the United States and to reform its banking laws in order to better track terrorists’ monetary flows.52 It also offered cooperation with the United States on its relatively lax travel regulations, which did not require a visa in order to travel from Slovenia to the United States.53

Slovenia also noted, however, that it would not be able to provide troops to support the war on terrorism in Afghanistan because of its poor transport capabilities.54 Slovenia did support the war by providing monetary and humanitarian assistance to Afghan civilians. In a January 2002 address, Ambassador Young did not express disappointment with the degree of assistance given.55 With little beyond its regional rapid reaction forces, it is not surprising that Slovenia was unable to contribute troops to the conflict. Given its equipment limitations, Slovenia should not be expected to have global reach capabilities. Slovenia’s decision not to send ground forces to Afghanistan may also reflect a political decision by its government. If it had experienced any casualties in Afghanistan, public support for membership in NATO could have been damaged considerably.

At the same time, Slovenia’s unwillingness to cooperate by providing some military forces is of some concern. While Slovenia’s diplomatic statements square firmly with what is expected of applicant states, and its cooperation in other

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political fronts is commendable, Slovenia lost an important opportunity to assist the alliance and the United States. Had the real desire existed, Slovenia could have found ways to get troops to the region. Perhaps as a member, when the opposition minority factions may no longer be a threat to Slovenia’s membership chances, Slovenia will be a better ally, yet with this first test, the results raise some questions, especially considering the active support that came from other NATO applicants, namely Bulgaria and Romania.56 Because of its own domestic political conditions and its aircraft limitations, its decision is understandable. Moreover, given its otherwise extensive bilateral and diplomatic cooperation with the United States and NATO on the war on terrorism, it has done what is necessary of an applicant state. A troop contribution to Afghanistan, however, would have done much to alleviate any lingering doubts about its commitment to fight terrorism.

Conclusion

In its November 2002 Summit in Prague, NATO faces important questions about new members and the future of the alliance. Among the applicants, Slovenia would be a useful addition to the alliance. Slovenia certainly passes NATO’s test of a fully functional democracy with civilian control of its military. Its government has expressed unwavering support for NATO’s broader strategic mission in Europe and in membership itself. It has also taken the necessary steps to reform its military, especially in the area of regional rapid reaction forces and equipment. Other steps have been taken toward NATO’s interoperability requirements. Perhaps most important, Slovenia’s geographic location would help the alliance by eliminating two “islands” in Europe, and could provide specific benefits as the need for Balkan stability remains ever-present. In some respects, Slovenia can be compared to current NATO allies Iceland and Luxembourg. Iceland has no military of its own, and Luxembourg offers little to the alliance in terms of military equipment and force-projection capabilities. But they both provide key strategic locations in the Atlantic Ocean and in the heart of Europe, and they are valued members of the alliance.

Some areas of concern still exist: the recent growth in public opposition within Slovenia to membership, and its limited force projection capabilities— especially regarding the war on terrorism—give Slovenia’s critics legitimate issues to raise. Yet these problems can be overcome as the government works to improve Slovenes’ understanding of NATO. Moreover, given Slovenia’s relative small size, the allies’ expectations for substantial troop contributions and global troop deployments have to be tempered with realistic assessments. Slovenia also should take steps to resolve its nonthreatening but nonetheless troublesome border differences with Croatia. Slovenia also needs to continue to move toward the 2.0 percent defense spending level requested by NATO. In sum, however, these concerns do not negate the important contributions Slovenia can make to the alliance. NATO will make a wise decision if it extends a membership invitation to Slovenia at the Prague Summit.

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NOTES

1. George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President in Address to Faculty and Students of Warsaw University,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 15 June 2001.

2. Congressional Record (21 June 2001), p. S6595.

3. Quoted in “Slovenia is Best Qualified NATO Aspirant, Believes US Senator Voinovich,” 31 May 2002, internet, http://nato.gov.si/eng/digest/7/90/, accessed 12 September 2002.

4. Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015 (Washington: RAND, 2000).

5. Author’s interviews at NATO Headquarters, June 2001.

6. See Szayna; also, Kent R. Meyer, “US Support for Baltic Membership in NATO: What Ends, What Risks?” Parameters, 30 (Winter 2000-2001), 67-82.

7. The Study on NATO Enlargement, ch. 1, para. 7 notes: “There is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new member states to join the alliance.” Available on the internet, www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm, accessed 12 September 2002.

8. James Gow and Cathie Carmichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes: A Small State and New Europe (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2000), p. 195. See also Zlatko Sabic and Charles Bukowski, eds. Small States in the Post Cold War World: NATO and Slovenia (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002) for more on Slovenia’s effort to gain membership in NATO in 1997.

9. Elizabeth Shogren, “Clinton Backs Limited NATO Expansion,” Los Angeles Times, 13 June 1997, p. A1.

10. For a description of the constitutional ratification processes of other NATO member states, with the exception of the newest members, see Sean Kay and Hans Binnendijk, “After the Madrid Summit: Parliamentary Ratification of NATO Enlargement,” Strategic Forum, 107 (March 1997).

11. See Study on NATO Enlargement, ch. 5, paras. 70, 72, 73.

12. For analysis from independent scholars, see Sabrina P. Ramet, The Slovenian Success Story,” Current History, 97 (March 1998), 113; Charles Bukowski, “Slovenia’s Transition to Democracy: Theory and Practice,” East European Quarterly, 33 (March 1999), 69.

13. Human Rights Watch notes Slovenia’s effort to eliminate land mines within Slovenia as an especially positive development, internet, www.humanrightswatch.org/europe/slovenia.php, accessed 12 September 2002.

14. The report did note some problems with infrequent cases of police brutality and trafficking in women for prostitution. Otherwise, the report was wholly positive. See US Department of State, “Slovenia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” 4 March 2002, internet, www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8341.htm, accessed 12 September 2002.

15. Anton A. Bebler, “Civil Military Relations in Slovenia,” in Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), p. 202.

16. Ibid., p. 201.

17. Ibid., pp. 206-10; and Anton Grizold, “Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia,” in Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States, ed. Anton A. Bebler (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), pp. 107-08.

18. See NATO, “Slovenia–NATO–MAP 2001-2002,” internet, http://nato.gov.si/eng/publications/slovenija-nato/, accessed 12 September 2002.

19. See Jelena Trifunovic, “Women in the Slovenian Armed Forces,” Minerva: Quarterly Report on Women and the Military, 17 (Fall-Winter 1999), 41.

20. BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Croatian-Slovene Border Dispute Likely to Go to International Arbitration,” 30 May 2002, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

21. BBC Monitoring Europe, “Slovene-Croatian Military Relations Best in Region—Army Chiefs,” 23 May 2002, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

22. NATO, “Slovene Church Supports EU and NATO Membership,” internet, http://nato.gov.si/eng/digest/9/101/, accessed 12 September 2002.

23. See NATO, “Comparative Data Related to Slovene Public Opinion on NATO (1999 and 2001),” internet, http://nato/gov.si/eng/public-opinion/public-opinion-data/; and BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Daily Looks at Pros and Cons for Slovenia’s NATO Membership,” 20 March 2002, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

24. BBC Monitoring Europe-Political, “Slovene National Party against US Army Logistics Base in Port of Koper,” 22 August 2001, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

25. BBC Monitoring International Reports, “ZLSD Party Youth, Women Forums Against Slovenia Joining NATO,” 16 January 2002, in lexis-nexis world news file, Europe.

26. NATO, “8,000 Signatures Collected Against Slovenia’s NATO Membership,” internet, http://nato.gov.si/eng/digest/9/102/, accessed 12 September 2002.

75/76

27. Ryan C. Hendrickson, “NATO’s Visegrad Allies in Kosovo: The First Test in Kosovo,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 13 (No. 2, 2000), 25-38.

28. Financial Times Information, “Slovenia: Government Shores Up Support for NATO,” 6 May 2002, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

29. BBC Monitoring Europe, “Slovenia Lobbying for NATO Accession in the United States,” 20 November 2001, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

30. BBC Monitoring Europe-Political, “Slovene Foreign Ministry Answers US Ambassador’s Concerns,” 8 August 2001, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

31. Study on NATO Enlargement, ch. 5, paras. 73-77. For the exact quote, para. 78.

32. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2001-2002 (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), p. 98; see also Slovenia’s United Nations website at www.un.int/slovenia/defense.html, accessed 12 September 2002.

33. NATO, “Parliament Sets Foundations for Decrease in Number of Reserve Forces,” 14 May 2002, internet, http://nato.gov.si/eng/digest/6/77/, accessed 12 September 2002.

34. The Military Balance, 2001-2002, p. 98.

35. Journal of Electronic Defense, “Slovene News Sources Reported that the Slovene Army has Taken Delivery of MBDA Roland II Short-Range Air-Defense Missile Systems from the German Navy,” 24 (December 2001), 42, in lexis-nexis, world news library, Europe.

36. BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Hungary Says NATO Made Mistake to Reject Slovenia’s Membership in 1997,” 19 March 2002, in lexis-nexis, world news library, Europe; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Italy to Support Slovenia Joining EU, NATO,” 1 June 2002, in lexis-nexis, world news library, Europe.

37. Richard L. Sargent, “Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force,” in Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, ed. Robert C. Owen (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 2000), p. 245.

38. For example, see Yevgeny Grigoriev, “Almost ‘Total’ Mobilization’ in Europe,” Defense and Security, 1 March 2002, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

39. See “International Military Cooperation,” at Slovenia’s UN website, http://www.un.int/slovenia/defense.html, accessed 12 September 2002.

40. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Slovene Army Units Take Part in International Peacekeeping Missions,” 1 October 2001, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

41. Gow and Carmichael, pp. 174-84.

42. Ibid., pp. 181-83.

43. Louis Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 2002), p. 145.

44. Gow and Carmichael, p. 178.

45. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook, 2001(Oxford, Eng.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001), p. 250; see also BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Foreign Minister Comments on US Stance Regarding Slovenia’s NATO Accession,” 14 May 2002, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

46. Szayna, p. 57.

47. John E. Peters, et al., European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation (Arlington, Va.: RAND, 2001).

48. Philip Gordon, “NATO After September 11,” Survival, 43 (Winter 2001-2002), 1-18.

49. Sean Kay, “Going Nowhere?” International Herald Tribune, 10 May 2002.

50. NATO Defense Ministers Final Communique, Press Release (2002) 072, 6 June 2002, internet, www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-072e.htm, accessed 12 September 2002; see also NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, “Tackling Terror: NATO’s New Mission,” American Enterprise Institute’s New Atlantic Initiative, 20 June 2002, internet, http://www.expandnato.org/lordjune20.html, accessed 12 September 2002.

51. Ambassador Johnny Young, “NATO and Global Security Challenges after September 11, 2001,” Presentation to the Atlantic Council, Ljubljana, Slovenia, 17 January 2002, internet, http://www.usembassy.si/Ambassador/ambNATO.htm, accessed 12 September 2002.

52. Agence France Presse, “Slovenia to Offer US Assistance on Terrorist Clampdown,” 23 September 2001, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe; James Morrison, “NATO and Terrorism,” Washington Times, 15 November 2001, p. A15.

53. Matthew Lee, “US Inspection Teams Head to Portugal, Slovenia for Visa Program Review,” Agence France Presse, 2 November 2001, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

54. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Slovene Army Lacks Logistics for Military Actions Against Terrorism– Minister,” 26 September 2001, in lexis-nexis world news library, Europe.

55. Ambassador Johnny Young, “NATO and Global Security Challenges after September 11, 2001.”

56. Peter Finn, “War Boosts NATO Hopes of 2 Nations; Romania, Bulgaria Gain New Relevance,” The Washington Post, 26 March 2002, p. A1.


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Dr. Ryan C. Hendrickson is an Assistant Professor of political science at Eastern Illinois University. He earned his Ph.D. at the University of Nebraska and is the author of The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers (Vanderbilt University Press, 2002).


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http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Paramet...er/hendrick.htm

http://www.imjinscout.com/Scout_Story.html


KOREAN NEW YEAR 1966
by Stuart Jamison

ACTA graduated its first class in time for Christmas, 1965. We took the holiday off, then reworked the curriculum to incorporate lessons learned in our first run. Class II kicked-off the second week of January, 1966, and concluded towards the end of the month. We had four days off until the scheduled start of Class III.

The cadre celebrated Class II's graduation with a drunken party in the mess tent. Tomorrow would be pay day, and everyone was looking forward to a few days of serious drinking after that.

Despite our seeming disregard for discipline, ACTA scrupulously maintained Army traditions. We lived by bugle calls, for example, some hauntingly beautiful (and unheard by soldiers who spend 30 years in the Green Machine). The following day, already several drinks into the mission, we fell out (to "Pay Call" and "Assembly") in our sharpest Class A's for pay. We all had allotments going home; no one drew more than $100.00 cash. What the hell? What would we do with it? We wandered back to the messhall.

SGT Fred Leak was a mountain boy from North Carolina. He was 5'5", and frequently complained that the streets of Changpa'ri were built so close to his ass, that, every time he farted, he blew dust into his shoes. Fred was also the self-appointed keeper of SSG Johnny Pierpoint, a 6'2" big-bellied, 225 lb, blond, crew cut, pugnosed and pugnacious Eastern Tennessee mountaineer who loved to get drunk and start fights. He reminded me of an albino boar with attitude. Leak approached me in the mess hall.

"Sir? Johnny wants to go over to Munsan'i and drive a train. He's going. I'm afraid he's gonna get in bad trouble. Will you come with us?"

1


What the hell? Why not?

Somewhere along the way to Munsan'i, we acquired 3 fifths of Johnny Walker Red (@$1.25/fifth) and changed our money into Won. We felt like Daddy Warbucks.

Once we reached our destination (the Munsan'i train station), Pierpoint announced he would handle negotiations. He went to the ticket window, flashed his wad of Won, and demanded three tickets, "to as far as this train goes." I assumed that would probably be Seoul.

The tickets were for Third Class. In Seoul, the conductor told us they were good for a long way to come; there was no need to worry about getting off any time soon. There would be conductors at every stop who would check tickets and let us know when we needed to do anything. We settled back to enjoy the trip.

It was the start of the Lunar New Year. Everyone was going home for the holidays. The car filled up, and then overfilled. We were the only Americans on board. The Koreans brought everything except their farm animals, and I think there were a few of those.

We gave our seats to little old ladies and ended up sitting on the floor in a rear corner of the car. SGT Leak had brought a pocket chess set, and as we played, we drew a crowd. Word passed up and down the train. Koreans jammed in from other cars to see the Americans. No one spoke English; the GIs were definitely Korean-challenged. So we sang to one another. We knew Arirang (the Kim sisters were big on the Ed Sullivan Show). All Koreans, it seems, knew Red River Valley (why?). This went on for quite some time

2


We acquired a military escort. Three ROK Marine 2LTs joined us. They knew no English. Then we were joined by a ROK Army 1LT who had been an attache' in the Korean embassy in Bonn and spoke German. I was just drunk enough by now to think I could, too. And damned if it didn't work!

We thought we had been drinking seriously until an old civilian redefined the concept for us. He stopped by the group and offered us a small, Coke-sized bottle of some rice liquor. To return the gesture, we passed him one of our Scotch bottles - which he promptly uncorked, chugged empty, and tossed out the window! We were expected to reciprocate in kind.

The rest the trip is a little blurry. There were a number of stops after Seoul, but I hadn't noticed what they were. Soon, however, our ROK officers detrained. We tried to get off with them, but my German-speaking friend said we had one more stop to go.

"Wo sind wir?" I asked. He said something that sounded suspiciously like "Taegu;" but that surely couldn't be right.

Both NCOs (but especially Johnny Pierpoint) were model representatives of our country and Army. I didn't do the image of the US Officer Corps any particular favors.

We detrained in unfamiliar territory. We walked up and down strange streets in what was, obviously, a large city. Pierpoint, with the nose of a bird dog, sniffed out a couple of friendly bars, but I was no longer up to it. As we were crossing the street to yet another Pierpoint-friendly bar, I stopped him.

"Johnny," I plead, "I can't handle this any more. I've got to go to bed, or I'm going to pass out here in the middle of this street and you and Leak are going to have to carry me."

3


"Fred, stay here with the Lieutenant. I'll be back in 10 minutes."

He was back in three - it seems bars weren't the only thing Johnny Pierpoint could sniff out. His performance was awesome. Wherever we were, it was no GI ville; we were the only round-eyes in the neighborhood. Pierpoint was getting all his intelligence from locals.

We walked about three blocks, to a nice 6 or 7 story building with a nicely appointed lobby. Our arrival was, because of Pierpoint, anticipated, so I was a little confused when the nice lady at the desk informed me, in English, that I could choose what I wanted for the night.

"I just want a bed."

She looked at me with amused disbelief. "This is not a hotel, Rieutenant."

I let her make the choice on condition I be allowed a ten minute headstart to the room. By the time my hostess arrived, I was whole worlds away in LaLa Land. * * * * *

I awoke in the half-light of dawn. My bed was shared by a silken-skinned damsel whose perfume delicately hinted of eau d' kimchi. We were both stark naked. I conducted a recon of the windowless room and discovered that, more than naked, I was bare - everything I owned was gone. In panic, I wakened my companion to find, predictably, I suppose, she knew no English. I somehow communicated my need to find the two Americans I had come in with.

We wrapped ourselves in sheets and walked up and down the hall, knocking on doors. My new friend would ask a few questions at each door, then lead me to the next clue. We hit paydirt on our third try. A voice answered our discrete knock in English: "Come in!" It was Leak.

Fred was engaged in a leisurely act of passion, and asked us to have a seat until he finished, which was only a minute or two. We exchanged good morning pleasantries, whereupon I rudely cut to the chase:

4


"Do you know where your uniform is?" No.

"Do you know where Pierpoint is?" No.

"Does your girl speak English?" It had never occurred to him to ask. The answer was no.

The four of us, wrapped in sheets, began the quest for Pierpoint. By now, the word was around the establishment that the strange Americans needed help, and girls were out in the hall offering directions. We found him within seconds.

Johnny Pierpoint was sitting up in bed with a lovely creature named, we found, Lilly. They were eating eggs (sunny-side up), bacon, toast and hashbrowns. Lilly (who spoke excellent English) had anticipated our arrival, and four more breakfasts were on the way. Johnny and Lilly were as naked as the rest of us.

"Where are our clothes?" Lilly picked up a phone (Leak and I hadn't had one in our rooms), asked a couple of questions, and said, "Ten minutes."

Lilly not only had a phone; she had a window. I looked out over a large, busy harbor. The morning sun was rising out of the sea. I mentally reviewed my knowledge of Korean geography and astronomy: large port = Inchon (?). Sun rises in the east over large port = (oh, God, say it isn't so) Pusan.

Lilly cheerully confirmed my fears. Oh, well, at least we now knew how far the train would go. And that Koreans could sing "Red River Valley" from Seoul to Osan to Taejon to Taegu to Pusan.. Great. Naked in Pusan. Didn't Aldous Huxley write that?

A knock on the door. Our uniforms. Dry cleaned, brass polished and correctly placed, shirts laundered and starched, ties, underwear and handkerchiefs (!) pressed, shoes spitshined. Attached to each cleaning bag was a small sack containing personal effects, and, most important, our wallets. Leak and I counted our money. Not a penny was missing.

We were treated to steam baths and massages, the world's greatest cure for hangovers. Lilly gave me directions to the nearest U.S. Class VI store, where I replenished our supply of Scotch.

5


We spent the next couple of days in this paradise. The breakfast-in-bed, spiffy-clean uniform ritual was repeated every morning. We took the girls out to eat and to a movie (Hitchcock's "The Birds," dubbed into Korean). Wherever there were prices to be negotiated, Lilly had us kept from sight while she completed the transaction at Korean rates.

Our time and money ran out. Our girls accompanied us to the train station, where Lilly insisted on getting the tickets. We were alone for a few minutes.

"How much money do we have?" We had had drycleaning, breakfasts, and three nights with the girls, all without paying a cent. We inventoried our funds. Pierpoint had $20 in Won; Leak and I had $10 each. We cooked up a plan, of which we were deeply ashamed:

"First, we'll get the tickets. Then, we've got to drag out the tearful farewells until the train starts moving. When it does, give your girl whatever you've got and run like hell."

And so it came to pass, exactly as planned, with one astonishing twist: as we left the girls in tears, Lilly counted her money - and gave chase! She caught up with Pierpoint just as he was swinging aboard the moving train, and gave him $10 change!

* * * * *

The trip home wasn't entirely uneventful. Somewhere north of Taejon, Johnny decided to drive the train. There was carload of GIs just behind the engine, and with them was a Sergeant of Military Police who arrested Pierpoint for conduct unbecoming. Johnny somehow convinced the man to at least inform me of the arrest, so I was surprised when a soldier I'd never seen before popped up at my seat to inform me that an MP NCO wished to see me in the forward car. I went with him.

6


Pierpoint was in tears; the cop was a self-righteous prick. I demanded Pierpoint be released into my custody. The MP refused. Nastily pulling rank, I told him it wasn't a request. The sergeant had no choice but to acquiesce - but told me not to leave the train at Seoul. He was obviously going to call for reinforcements and bust me, too.

The Three Stooges jumped ship from the wrong side of the train as soon as it pulled into Seoul. The MPs were scanning arriving passengers as they detrained on the opposite side of the car. We got away clean, and managed to hitchhike back to Changpari. As we strolled towards the Courtesy Patrol station, where we knew we could arrange a ride to Sitman, Johnny Pierpoint, who had been meek ever since I had saved him from the MP, suddenly yelled, "Bowling ball!!" and ran towards the door of a nearby bar, where, converting himself into a bowling ball, he rolled across the floor, knocking down about a dozen people and starting one hell of a fight. Leak shrugged and pitched in after him. I continued to the CP station alone.

* * * * *

Pierpoint and Lilly corresponded. Three months later, she showed up at one of our cycle break parties. I had often mused on our delightful trip to Pusan, and couldn't get over the many kindnesses shown us. I asked Lilly if there were any particular reason, or were all GIs treated so well in Pusan. Her answer startled me:

They had done it because we were north of the river risking our lives for their freedom. They did it because we were Imjin Scouts.

Taking care of Marines
Submitted by: MCRD San Diego
Story Identification #: 20021115111710
Story by Cpl. Ryan Smith



MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT SAN DIEGO, Calif. (Novmeber 15, 2002) -- Mission accomplishment and troop welfare are the basic principles of leadership. According to one Company B drill instructor, the first comes easier by using the second.

Staff Sgt. Gregory J. Ambuehl, drill instructor, Platoon 1115, Company B, works hard to look out for his recruits' needs and steer them forward for graduation.

"If you take care of the recruits, they will show more discipline when it comes down to game time," said Ambuehl, a Granite City, Ill., native. "They respect you then not only because you are their leader but because you show a little concern about the problems they face.

"In turn they will put out the maximum amount of effort in their training to show you they appreciate what you are trying to do for them."

During a typical training cycle, recruits can often come out of a day's training sick or hurt, Ambuehl tries hard to make sure his recruits are prepared for the day's training evolutions.

"To prevent problems with recruits I make sure they are hydrated, ensure they have had their chow and proper amounts of sleep," said Ambuehl. "It's the basic little things like ensuring they have the proper gear and uniforms that cause them to put out 100 percent each day."

Capt. Trent M. Marecz, assistant series commander, Series 1113, Company B said, "the measure by which he takes care of his troops is almost immeasurable. He is always on top of hygiene inspections and notices little things recruits can take care of before the little things become big problems."

Ambuehl also takes time to remediate classes for recruits who are having difficulty with certain levels of training.

"Drill and prac. (the practical application test), neither of these things are worth losing a recruit over," said Ambuehl.

"If a recruit really can't understand the subject matter, I will work with that recruit until he becomes confident in his abilities to perform the task at hand," he said.

Due to his performance as a drill instructor, Ambuehl was selected as Drill Instructor of the Quarter for 1st Bn.

"He has done a phenomenal job and has put in lots of hours training recruits," said Marecz "His presence just has a very profound effect on recruits and other (drill instructors) who work with him."

Marecz added Ambuehl is usually the first one with the recruits every morning and the last one to leave every night.

"I work hard and put in a lot of long hours with the recruits," said Ambuehl. "We only have three months to teach these recruits how to be Marines. We have to use every minute of the day and sometimes night to successfully train them."

Ambuehl believes the effort he puts forth on the drill field is worth it, considering the end product; a United States Marine.

"Being a drill instructor is something I love to do," said Ambuehl. "With what other job can you make a difference in peoples lives in particular the Marines who in the future may be in my position to change lives.

"I enjoy watching the recruits as they progress through training," said Ambuehl.

"It is an awesome transformation you help to make happen - civilian to Marine. I enjoy watching them progress in maturity as they move through training," he added.

Ambuehl said training isn't always what it takes. It takes individual effort and motivation as well.

"You always have that one or two who don't want to be helped along," said Ambuehl, "but the others appreciate being pushed to the limit beyond what they can do.

"Motivating them along helps the recruits to find themselves and learn about what they can accomplish with a little bit of encouragement," he said.

After Ambuehl leaves the drill field he expects to head back to his military occupational specialty as a CH-53 airframe mechanic continuing on with his mission of taking care of his Marines and accomplishing the mission.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ht=2,recruiting

On the Border of Madness

Is it really a war against drugs?
Or is it an Inquisition dressed in modern clothing?

by Claire Wolfe

© 2000 by Claire Wolfe Artwork © 2000 by Nick Bougas

When, at the first large town, soldiers asked how they could distinguish between heretics and orthodox, the Cistercian [Abbot of Citeaux, leading the 13th Century crusade against the Albigensians] thundered: “Kill them all, God will know his own”1…

Seventy-five percent of the people in the Texas border town of Redford are narco-traffickers. It's a known fact. The town is hostile. If you see anyone there with a gun, he's probably a drug runner or a scout for drug runners.

At least, that's what the Marines were told.

So when four soldiers on a drug-interdiction patrol spotted 18-year-old goatherder, Esequiel Hernandez, one afternoon in 1997, they assumed the worst. When young Zeke -- an honor student and classic good boy -- raised his WWI-vintage .22 rifle and fired into the brush, they knew he was shooting at them. Never mind that they were 200 yards away, camouflaged by shaggy ghillie suits. Never mind that country boys herding goats shoot guns for many reasons, from playful plinking to varmint control. They knew. Zeke was a drug runner, a gunman. The Enemy.

The Marines never considered yelling, “Hey, kid! Cut it out, there are people out here!” They never considered shouting, “Drop your gun or we'll shoot!” They claimed the wind would have made it impossible to hear. Never mind that no one else noticed any wind that afternoon.

Marine Corporal Clemente Banuelos radioed that he was going to “take him” next time Zeke raised his rifle in their direction. He got a roger. And - after following Zeke for 20 more minutes as the boy moved away from the Marines hidden in the brush - they “took him.”

At least, that's what they said. The autopsy on Esequiel Hernandez indicated that he was facing away from the man they said he was aiming at. But never mind that - and never mind all the other discrepancies in the Marines' accounts of the shooting. A Congressional report2 found “mistakes” and “inadequacies in training.” Small matters like a wound on the wrong side of a body troubled them somewhat, but didn't seem obvious evidence of criminality. A grand jury found “no bill” against the shooter.

Oh, yes, the Justice Department and the Pentagon (whose joint operation it was) quickly paid the family of Esequiel Hernandez more than a million dollars. But no individual government agent paid any price for the shooting. The Drug War went on.

And so did the intimidation.

In the months after Zeke's killing, children weren't allowed out to play for fear of soldiers hidden in the gullies. Unmarked helicopters continued to buzz homes and herds. Nearly three years later, Father Mel LaFollette, retired Episcopal priest and neighbor of the Hernandez family, says, “I don't think anybody's hiding in their house…but there's still a great bitterness and suspicion. The military people have said they don't go on patrols anymore, but no one really believes that.

“Washington sent a new boss for the Marfa sector of the Border Patrol who is a public relations expert. He has at least made things a little smoother for the residents. They haven't been subject to the harassment they used to be - stopping the same person four or five times during a routine trip to Presidio for shopping - 16 miles away. Someone who might decide to walk a mile or two might be questioned over and over again. That has lessened, but I wouldn't say it doesn't happen any more. The word is out not to harass the natives too much. But a stranger comes through here at his own peril.”

He concludes: “We're kind of a lab experiment here on the border [for forces who want control], and if they succeed with us we'll live in a real police state instead of this partial police state.”3

“Police state,” however, is simply a modern term for an ancient form of terror. What's happening today in the name of a War on Drugs has happened before - an exercise of raw power and putrid corruption in the name of a “righteous” cause.

We can see through the ancient lies. Why is it so much harder to see through the lies that are brutalizing us today?

In the beginning it was a war against heretics
Pope Lucius II in 1184… laid down the penalties as exile, confiscation, and infamy (loss of civil rights):… Then came Innocent III, who…completed the foundations of the Inquisition by reaffirming, with heavier emphasis, that the bishops were not to wait for charges of heresy, but were to seek out heresy, or make an inquisitio. They were to have special officials, or “inquisitors,” for this purpose….Its birth is variously put by historians in 1229, 1231, and 1232. By the latter year, at all events, the Inquisition was established, and the hounds of the Lord felt the bloody rag at their nostrils.

In the late twelfth century - with its crusades against the Eastern Infidel losing their appeal and profitability - the world's superpower, the Catholic Church - turned upon its own. Beginning with the crusade against the Albigensians of Southern France and continuing with the Inquisition, the Church began to root out, imprison, slaughter and seize property from “heretics” within its midst.

Indeed, the Church had a very real “heretic problem.” Millions secretly or openly held anti-Roman views, disgusted by Church corruption. This was insupportable to an institution whose power lay in its ability to dictate what people should think.

In the late twentieth century - with the Cold War losing its appeal and profitability (and its chief villain, the USSR) - the world's superpower, the United States government - turned upon its own. The federal government began to compete with the states to root out, imprison, slaughter and seize property from recreational drug users and sellers within its midst.

The government had a real “drug problem.” Millions were using recreational chemicals, as if what they put into their bodies was their own business. This was insupportable to an institution whose power increasingly lay in its ability to dictate how people should live.

Of course, in order to bring a violent anti-drug crusade into our living rooms without arousing alarm, the modern Inquisitors had to do exactly as their ancestors did. They first had to persuade us that:

Druggies are bad people who must be crushed at all cost
And the meanest thing of all is that [Catholic scholar] Canon Vacandard, and most of your modern…apologists, raise over the bones of those hundreds of thousands of murdered men, women, and children the smug and lying inscription that they were “dangerous to society.”

The best estimates say that some 70 million Americans have smoked marijuana, that at least 18 million have smoked it in the last year.4 Millions have used other illegal recreational drugs. Perfectly ordinary people, the vast majority of them. Do some lead high-risk lives? Sure; so do mountain climbers and adulterers. Are some violent criminals? Sure; that's what happens when you legislate black markets.

Which is more dangerous? The drug or the war against it?

In a country where alcohol kills 150,000 per year and doctors kill hundreds of thousands - and where cocaine and heroin kill fewer than 5,000 combined and marijuana has never killed a single soul,5 we casually justify travesties like the one that hit Preston Mays on March 1, 1995, saying such people get what they deserve. Bust them all; God will know his own.

On that day, Mays, a poultry farmer with a ninth-grade education and a minor criminal history, was sitting in the living room of the home he rented to a woman acquaintance. The woman had called him to fix a broken sink at the property.

The renter left to run an errand, saying she would be right back. Hours passed, but she didn't return. Suddenly, he says:
[At] about 10:30 the police ripped through the unlocked door with a huge battering ram. About 20 helmeted, jackbooted, armor-plated, machine-gun wielding monsters came running, yelling, “Hands over your heads mother-"expletive deleted"ers, just twitch and we'll blow your "expletive deleted"ing brains out!” I felt like my heart had stopped. I had no idea who I'd killed, I must have - right? That is all that came to my mind - what did I do? What did I do?

They searched the house and found a pound of marijuana and two-and-a-half pounds of meth in a file cabinet after ripping it open… My tenant had been arrested shortly after leaving the house and told them her “boyfriend” (meaning me) “was still at the house and if there were any drugs there, they must be his because I have all mine with me.”
The police later found six more pounds in the woman's truck. The federal government charged Mays with eight different counts. They offered him a deal with “only” 13½ years in prison if he'd plead guilty. But, “I wasn't guilty so I refused.” Refusing to cooperate - as you will see - is the worst confirmation of heresy.

“None of my clothing was in the house,” Mays recounts. “Nor did I have keys to the doors… proved beyond a reasonable doubt that I had not shared that home. The lady I did live with at my farm 43 miles away testified too, so did my farm neighbor who belongs to the Highway Patrol… My prints weren't on anything, but still the good citizens of California that sat on that jury said I was guilty. Guilty because someone said that I was.”

He is now serving 24 years for possession with intent to distribute, 24 years for conspiracy and 10 years on charges related to guns found in the home. The woman with the drugs got 5½ years with a year off for treatment, rewarded for informing on this evil drug kingpin.6

Creating a society of informers
If he was denounced, he was guilty. Impossible, you say…But it is a truism. Listen to…Canon [Vacandard]: “If two witnesses, considered of good repute by the Inquisitors, agreed in accusing the prisoner his fate was at once sealed; whether he confessed or not, he was at once declared a heretic.” Trial by the Inquisition did not mean an examination to find out if a man was a heretic. If two secret witnesses said that he was, he was…

As with the vague charge of “heresy” - which meant virtually anything persecutors and accusers wanted it to mean - it is unnecessary to have any actual evidence to get a drug conviction. Just create a society of informers.

On July 27, 1990, tractor-trailer driver Anibal Almanzar-Reyes was stopped by the DEA. He was hauling a truckload of onions. Just onions. No drugs. However, the friend who hired him to haul the load had told a DEA informant there would be drugs in the truck that day. The men were arrested on drug charges. Facing a long prison term, Almanzar-Reyes' friend turned on him, claimed the truck driver had knowledge of the drug-deal-that-didn't-happen, and offered to testify against him. An attorney, knowing his client had a previous drug conviction, advised making a plea-bargain - and Almanzar-Reyes got 14 years for driving a truckload of onions, while the friend who set him up earned a five year sentence for his cooperation.

Debbie Vineyard took a phone call from her husband's friend Rick, asking about a pair of cowboy boots. Debbie said they'd send the boots. “I had no idea,” she said later, “that this person Rick had just been arrested for drugs that he claimed to have received from my husband. Our phone conversation was recorded by the federal government…Rick evidently told the DEA that these cowboy boots were being sent with speed and heroin in them. After I was picked up, they searched my home and found the cowboy boots. They were stuffed full...of the daily newspaper. But, none of this mattered. I was still charged with Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine (speed) and Aiding and Abetting.” Her 10-year federal sentence was later reduced to a “mere” five.

It seems that, today, a witness doesn't even have to be “of good repute” for his unsupported testimony to be considered evidence enough to send someone to prison. He must simply be unprincipled - or desperate - enough to rat out either the innocent or the guilty.

And what makes a man so desperate? Why, fear of the Inquisitors, of course - who hold the power to take his life or give a portion of it back, if he “cooperates.”

Using fear of punishment to get people to inform
Unless, therefore, a man had in him the rare stuff of a real martyr, he meekly acknowledged that he was a heretic, and he abjured the heresy. He was then required to denounce others, or “name his accomplices.” If he thus confessed his heresy and named a few others, he merely got a heavy penance… If he persisted in denying that he was a heretic, or refused to name others, he was taken into the next room.

Zulima Buitrago, a single mother of two young children, was convicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. A friend's husband asked to use her garage to repair his truck. While there, he conducted a drug deal. Facing a life sentence unless he could implicate someone else, the man told police Buitrago had been present at the deal, where 350 kilos of cocaine had changed hands. Buitrago received a 24-year sentence, though there was not a shred of evidence - neither drugs nor money - to support the man's claim that Buitrago had been involved in a drug sale.

For some informants, of course, the motive is gold, not terror.

Using rewards to encourage informing
To all who would “take up arms,” as [Pope Alexander III] said, against [heretics] he promised two years' remission of penance and even greater privileges.

Oscar Moncoda is serving 12½ years on drug charges, with the sole evidence against him being the testimony of an informant who was paid $80,000 for his testimony. He is not alone.

Traditionally, either fear of punishment or small payoffs have been used to get cooperation. But with law enforcement agencies becoming as rich as the Medieval Church with forfeiture money, they are now paying stunning sums. The street crook who still settles for $100 for selling his friends is a fool. And what would you do if you were a marginal type, always broke, who could “earn” several years' income in one swoop, simply by lying about someone you didn't care about or didn't even know?

But why on earth would a jury of 12 sensible people convict on such an absence of evidence?

Juries convicting on next to no evidence
Meantime the Inquisitors…had to choose an advisory council of “good and experienced men”…and come to a decision only in conjunction with these.

A most beneficent provision, says the Jesuit! Actually the beginning of the jury-system in Europe, says the Canon! But who were these men, and what did they do? They were, as a rule, mostly priests and monks, with a few very orthodox laymen. In a few places quite a number of local pious lawyers - the decree stipulated that they must be “zealous for the faith”… The “jury” never hampered the Inquisitors.

Kevin B. Zeese, President, Common Sense for Drug Policy,7 writes of the aftermath of the Esequiel Hernandez shooting:

A grand jury was convened [to explore charges against the Marines], but this made the injustice worse. The grand jury was at best a mockery. It included the Assistant Sector Chief of the Border Patrol who was part of the administration that asked the Marines to come to the border and one of the people responsible for their supervision.

It also included the wife of a Border Patrol officer, a Border Patrol retiree, and two Customs Officers. The judge found no conflict of interest and District Attorney Valadez said it was good to have people on the jury who “knew how to get things done.”

Jeffrey Steinborn, a Seattle attorney who has been called “The Public's Defender,” commented on why juries are willing to convict in drug cases when the only evidence is the word of an informant, whose integrity may be completely compromised.

The people who make it on a jury are the ones who lie and conceal their real agendas. They're lying because they're just dying to pass judgment on people - and usually it's that minority - that "epithet deleted", that spic, however they think of it….

We've been made to fear the black man and his drugs or the Mexican and his drugs, the poor woman who smokes crack and ignores her child. Once you put them in that moral category, where they don't get the same treatment as your brother, the government can do anything to them.8

“On the rare occasion we win a case,” says Steinborn, “[The informant with something to gain] is what the juries seem to choke on. But the prosecutor says, 'Well, you know you're not going to get choir boys infiltrating this scum, you're not going to get priests infiltrating this scum.'” As another attorney, Terrance Geoghegan of Ventura, California, puts it, “We joke that the police wouldn't have arrested someone if he weren't guilty. But around here, people actually believe that.”

Of course in any Inquisition - conducted by the powerful for the interests of the powerful - there is a different standard for the sons of the powerful.

The privileged get off lightly
There were two kinds of prisons, strict and less strict. Rich heretics generally got the latter, and money will buy comforts and privileges in most places. But [even] they have, for a “heresy” which they have abjured, if it ever existed, lost all their property, seen wife and children reduced to beggary, and been imprisoned for life.

Lonnie Lundy is serving life in prison without possibility of parole. He was never found with drugs, drug money, drug paraphernalia or anything else. His sentence is based on the word of one man (an employee he had fired years earlier), who later bitterly recanted, saying his testimony was concocted by the prosecution team.

Lundy's father contacted his U.S. Senator, Richard Shelby (R-Alabama), seeking help, but the Senator responded, “I'm sorry that your family has to go through this ordeal… But, any person who is caught with drugs [sic] should spend the rest of their life in prison. I have no sympathy for them.”

A few months later, in July 1998, Senator Shelby's son Claude landed at Atlanta's Hartfield Airport from London carrying 13.8 grams of hashish. Claude Shelby was also arrested. He received a misdemeanor possession charge and a $500 administrative fine. Senator Shelby later refused to respond to letters from Lonnie Lundy's father.

And do we even need to mention the sanctimonious Bush family, whose scion, George W., dismisses his own “youthful indiscretions” while (as governor of Texas) increasing minimum sentences for the “indiscretions” of less monied, less connected young people?

Money is more than a means of buying exemptions from punishment. Money is, at bottom, what keeps Inquisitions and crusades rampaging, long after their moral depravity has been exposed.

Forfeiture
[Pope Innocent III] was plainly sickened by the slaughter and the vile passions of his instruments, but he made vast material profit for the Papacy out of the monumental crime…In fine, these “confiscations” which Innocent III had recommended were becoming a very profitable source of revenue, and the Papacy wanted its share. The sordid scramble for gold amongst the bones of the dead had already begun.

In the now-famous 1992 case of Donald Scott, Los Angeles County deputy sheriff Gary Spencer was unable to verify an informant's claim that Scott, a 61-year-old rancher, was growing marijuana on his Ventura County estate. However, Spencer did take the time to have the property appraised before conducting a raid. When he and his force of 30 (including agents from the U.S. Forest Service, the National Park Service, the DEA, the National Guard and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory) came crashing in to seize the 200-acre ranch, Scott - just awakened, naked and possibly drunk - came out of his bedroom with a gun. Spencer and another deputy shot Scott to death. There was no marijuana. The L.A. County sheriff and California Attorney General Dan Lungren both issued reports saying Spencer and his raiders had done nothing wrong. The Ventura County D.A. also found that the shooting was self-defense, but resoundingly declared that the prime motive for the raid was the law enforcers' desire to profit from Scott's ranch.9

Bringing suit against possessions
[According to Vacandard] torture was not regarded as a mode of punishment, but purely as a means of eliciting the truth.

Torture is so vulgar, so passé. No one uses it any more in America - except, of course, for the occasional broomstick up the butt, or flick of a button on an electronic stun belt to make an uncooperative prisoner writhe on the floor screaming.10 Law enforcement agents now have a more sophisticated method for gaining the cowed cooperation of innocent and guilty alike. Civil forfeiture.

Under federal law the government can seize property based solely upon probable cause to believe that the property was used unlawfully. This probable cause standard for seizure allows the government to dispossess property owners based only upon hearsay or innuendo - “evidence” of insufficient reliability to be admissible in a court of law. The probable cause standard relieves the government of the burden of proving anyone's criminal guilt to obtain a forfeiture judgment over his property.

…When asked to justify the extraordinary powers granted to them by such laws, law enforcement officials find themselves invoking peculiar legal fictions that date back to feudal times or earlier, wherein inanimate objects are given life and then forfeited to the government for “their” criminal misconduct.11

Thus, rational people are asked to accept - without laughing or crying -- such legal cases as United States v. 9844 South Titan Court and United States v. $405,089.23 in U. S. Currency.

The motive for such uncivil treatment? As defense attorney Jeffrey Steinborn bluntly puts it:

Criminal forfeiture statutes allow the government to simply combine the forfeiture and the criminal prosecution in the same case. But civil forfeitures are preferred by the government, because the property owner is presumed guilty, and, therefore, can seldom prevail, and because they have the added benefit of impoverishing the property owner as he or she faces a criminal prosecution.12

And of course, the agencies making the seizures get part of the take.

No, the Drug War inquisitors rarely use torture. But now they don't even bother to wait for a guilty verdict before seizing everything the drug heretic owns. For many years 80 percent of all forfeitures have been done against people who are never even charged with any crime, let alone convicted.13 And make no mistake, this scramble for gold among the dead, the imprisoned and the merely terrified is highly lucrative. According to forfeiture expert, Leon Felkins:

It is estimated that the Federal government now confiscates nearly a billion dollars per year (1996 is last year for which an accounting has been released) with states and cities likely confiscating as much or more. Estimates are difficult because government agencies are real shy about making such accounting readily available to the public, but the totals are roughly comparable to the “victim costs” from “Crimes of Violence and Robbery” as reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.14

Forfeiture is just one of several forms by which police agencies are being increasingly corrupted.

Militarization and corruption of police
Imagine the president of the United States informing the gunmen of Chicago - Christian knights in those days had no higher ethic - that he permitted them to invade and sack Los Angeles, Hollywood, and Pasadena, and you have something of a parallel.

Dinuba, California (population 15,000) had just 12 cops. But, thanks to gifts of surplus submachine guns and combat gear - all courtesy of the federal government - half those cops got to play at being members of a Special Enforcement Team - their version of a SWAT squad. Not much going on in Dinuba, though. So they found something to occupy themselves. In 1997, hearing that a sawed-off shotgun used in an attempted murder might be in a certain home, they crashed through the door in the middle of the night, wearing black masks and cammies. Terrified, the 64-year-old farm worker who lived there grabbed a folding knife. Dinuba's finest machine-gunned him to death. The weapon they were seeking (which reportedly belonged to the man's son) was not in the house.15

The Dinuba debacle wasn't a drug case. But what happened there was a direct result of the federal Drug War. Not long ago, a quest for evidence would have brought a pair of uniformed policemen to the front door in broad daylight, knocking, explaining their mission, warrant in hand. No more.

In his New York Times article, “Crack's Legacy: Soldiers of the Drug War Remain on Duty,”16 Timothy Egan explains:

…what started as a response to the violent front of the war on drugs has evolved, here and in cities across the nation, into a new world of policing.

Special Weapons and Tactics squads, once used exclusively for the rare urban terrorist incident or shootout, transformed themselves through the crack years into everyday parts of city life….

Encouraged by federal grants, surplus equipment handed out by the military and seizure laws that allow police departments to keep much of what their special units take in raids, the Kevlar-helmeted brigades have grown dramatically, even in the face of plummeting crime figures.

“It is the militarization of Mayberry,” said Dr. Peter Kraska, a professor of criminal justice at Eastern Kentucky University, who surveyed police departments nationwide and found that their deployment of paramilitary units had grown tenfold since the early 1980s. “This is unprecedented in American policing and you have to ask yourself: What are the unintended consequences?”

Not only are police acting like soldiers, but thanks to Reagan and Bush, who weakened the Posse Comitatus law (that for more than a century had forbidden the military any role in U.S. law enforcement), soldiers are now entering police work - as they did in Redford, Texas.

In 1994, a survey of 300 U.S. Marines17 raised alarms with its finding that 26.34 percent of the respondents would unhesitatingly fire upon U.S. citizens if ordered to do so. But what's the problem? Presumably 100 percent of civilian police are willing to fire upon criminal American citizens. It's part of their job.

The problem isn't only who's doing the enforcing. It's attitude. Remember the old police motto, “Protect and Serve?” It's a far cry from the soldiers' “Kill 'em all; let God sort 'em out.” While “protect and serve” has always been, to some degree, a myth - ask anybody from Harlem, or any poor white trash boy - it's nevertheless been a guiding vision. Police have seen - and should see - themselves as part of the community. Not like this:

Members of the NYPD's Street Crime Unit are known as “the commandos of the NYPD.” In existence since 1971, the unit has undergone a 300 percent build-up since 1997. Former NYC Police Commissioner William Bratton encouraged the men to “become far more aggressive.” Currently made up of roughly 400 mostly white officers, this unit, along with the 7,000 strong Narcotics Unit, represent the front line in Mayor Giuliani's “quality of life” crackdown on - and criminalization of - people of color, especially young, poor, and homeless people. They wear (and peddle) tee shirts that say: “Certainly There Is No Hunting Like the Hunting of Men.” And their slogan is, “We own the night.”18

Of course, that's New York. Surely, the Dinuba, California's of the world are wising up? In fact, Dinuba did wise up. It had to. The family of the grandfather that Dinuba's play-SWAT boys killed won a $12.5 million federal judgment against the city - a figure more than twice the town's annual budget. Dinuba decided it didn't really need a military SWAT team after all.

But although some small cities have dumped their SWAT teams in the wake of lawsuits, others aren't getting the message. According to an AP report, October 10, 1999:

Police in this Snohomish County city [Mill Creek, Washington], population 10,600, aren't taking any chances. The department has bought surplus military gear for its 17 officers, including plastic riot shields for $18 apiece, gas masks for $50 and helmets for about $8. The city has stockpiled military rations and canvas tents. Mill Creek police are also considering a $1,200 tear-gas gun that can shoot canisters through windows or into crowds.

All this for a city whose only violent crime last year was a robbery.

And yes, the U.S. military - in the name of the War on Drugs - continues to hand local police helicopters, machine guns and training. In the wake of the Cold War, Congress, the White House and the Pentagon are also casting about for new duties for the United States' standing army.

What next?
The fearful massacres of the Albigensians…had by no means extinguished the rebellion. In 1241 and 1242, especially, the Inquisitors provoked such anger by their conduct that one of them was assassinated. The Pope compelled the Count of Toulouse to lead his troops against them, and the war or “crusade” was resumed.

Every year or so, Congressman James Traficant (D-Ohio) proposes legislation that would station 10,000 U.S. soldiers on the Mexican border to keep out drugs and illegal aliens. In February 1999, he introduced HR 628, granting soldiers the authority to “prevent entry into the U.S.” by illegal aliens, drug traffickers and terrorists. The bill would also have authorized the military to inspect all vehicles and cargo entering the U.S. So far, Traficant's wishes have not made it intact into law, though they've found strong support in the House and have begun to creep piecemeal into Defense Department appropriations bills.

The Defense Department has done an analysis of what it would take to close the U.S./Mexico border. Their conclusion:

* 96 infantry battalions (48,000-96,000 soldiers)

* 53 helicopter companies (800-1600 aircraft, approximately 21,000 soldiers)

* 210 patrol ships

* 110 surveillance aircraft

And this doesn't count logistical support. In a brilliant article, “War on Drugs: Military Perspectives and Problems,”19 analyst Joseph Miranda estimates that it would take nearly 500,000 soldiers simply to fulfill the Defense Department's own estimates. Then he goes on to show why those estimates are far, far too low.

Miranda's arguments are too complex to quote in detail here. His article is well worth reading by anyone concerned about the potential for Police State U.S.A. But in the end, Miranda concludes that a serious effort to close the border to drug trafficking would at least double the size of the current U.S. military and require maintaining that large a presence along the border, and in drug-supplying nations, in perpetuity. And that's without accounting for the extra force needed to fight the guerrilla warriors that would arise in rage against so crushing an occupying force.

Of course, no politician would dare propose that force today. No, you propose 10,000 to score political points today. And when 10,000 prove inadequate, you propose 100,000. And when 100,000 prove inadequate…

Unfortunately, it worked
If in those centuries there had been the same freedom as we enjoy, Roman Catholicism would…have shrunk long ago into a sect.

The Inquisition is an indelible disgrace to the religion which created it;… in its procedure this holy court, presided over by the holiest of men, under the direct control of their holinesses the Popes, was the most infamous instrument of injustice and the worst fomenter of murderous cupidity that the world has ever seen.

Across the country, increasingly the public, church groups, think tanks and strong-minded officials (such as former San Jose police chief Joseph McNamara and New Mexico governor Gary Johnson) are waking up. They're speaking against the terror created in the War on Drugs. Some are crying for an emphasis on treatment instead of arrest. Some want limited legalization. Some say, hell, just decriminalize the stuff and get out of our way.

Yet the prison population continues to soar, as do arrests for the most harmless of drugs. According to the New York Times, someone in America is arrested every 20 seconds for a drug violation, and a new jail or prison is opened each week.20 In 1998, the FBI reported an all-time high number of marijuana busts - 682,885 nationwide.21 Eight-eight percent of those were for mere possession, not sale or cultivation. That's more than the number of arrests for murder, rape, robbery and aggravated assault, combined.

Is there any sign that anyone in the federal government is listening?

On October 7, 1999, at the order of Congress, a new military command was born in Norfolk, Virginia. Its purpose: to expand the use of the military in domestic law enforcement even beyond the Drug War. Thanks to the latest exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, the military will now have a toehold in such broadly defined areas of domestic law enforcement as “terrorism,” “chemical weapons” and “cybercrime.”

Of course, the military's initial role is only “advisory” - just as we merely had military “advisors” in Vietnam, Waco and Redford, Texas.

Defense Secretary William Cohen told reporters, “The American people should not be concerned about [soldiers enforcing laws in their cities]. They should welcome it.”

But in an article by Jon E. Dougherty in WorldNetDaily, October 13, 1999,22 Gregory Nojeim, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union in Washington, D.C., put it more succinctly and accurately, “When the crisis hits, those with the biggest guns will be subordinate to no one.”

Oh, yes. The federal government is listening. To the Divine Will to Power - a force that echoes through the centuries with an ominous familiarity.

Notes

1. Quotes about the Inquisition and the Albigensian Crusade are from: The Story of Religious Controversy, Chapter XXIII, by Joseph McCabe (1867-1955). www.infidels.org/library/historical/joseph_mccabe/reglious_controversy/chapter_23.

2. www.house.gov/judiciary/docs105.

3. Interview with author for this story.

4. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services figures.

5. Most numbers were provided by Bob Newland, chairman of the Mt. Rushmore State Chapter of NORML; they are from various sources, but are in general agreement with those of the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

6. Stories of Drug War prisoners, unless other sources are specified, are from “The Wall,” maintained by the November Coalition, www.november.org.

7. “Where Does the Slippery Slope of Militarization Lead?” www.mapinc.org/DPFT/hernandez/slippery_slope

8. Interview with author for this story.

9. Ventura County District Attorney's report on the Scott case, found at www.illusions.com/opf/Scott; also a variety of news sources.

10. Amnesty International report on the increasing use of electronic stun weapons: www.amnestyusa.org/rightsforall/stun/summary

11. Cato Policy Analysis No. 179; September 29, 1992, American Forfeiture Law: Property Owners Meet The Prosecutor, by Terrance G. Reed, found at www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-179es.

12. “U.S. Supreme Court to Review $405K” by Jeffrey Steinborn, found at www.fear.org/405k32.

13. For the complete story on civil forfeiture, see www.fear.org.

14. “No One Wins When the Government Can Freely Loot Private Property,” by Leon Felkins; www.curleyworlf.net/F_Leon_NoOneWins. 1. The Bureau of Justice Statistics he cites can be found at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/coctv.txt.

15. Sacramento Bee, April 9, 1999.

16. www.pubdef.state.mn.us/homepages/statepd/war_on_drugs_2.

17. Information on the survey can be found at www.ccnet.com/~suntzu75/q-46.

18. “The Militarization of the Police,” by Frank Morales; Covert Action Quarterly, Spring-Summer 1999.

19. www.drcnet.org/military/.

20. www.pubdef.state.mn.us/homepages/statepd/war_on_drugs_1.

21. www.drcnet.org/wol/113/html#drugarrests

22. “New Military Unit for Domestic Deployment;” www.worldnetdaily.com/bluesky_dougherty/19991013_xnjdo_new_militia.

http://www.loompanics.com/Articles/OnTheBorder.html

Marines keep cargo carrier flying
Submitted by: MCB Camp Pendleton
Story Identification #: 2005105173211
Story by Lance Cpl. Alec Kleinsmith



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (Oct. 6, 2005) -- The CH-46 D/E Sea Knight helicopter is one of the Marine Corps’ most valuable assets, providing expedient transportation of critical cargo loads as well as providing troop transportation.

Because of the valuables these high-powered machines carry, as well as their importance in military efforts such as the Global War on Terrorism, inspections must be conducted continuously to ensure the safety of the passengers and crew. The Marines who conduct these inspections are called non-destructive inspections technicians. Their job is to perform non-destructive testing of various metals in aircraft structures and aircraft/engine components.

“There are five tests that we do regularly to check for discrepancies in the different helicopter parts,” said Staff Sgt. Tanner P. Morath, from Tucson, Ariz., the staff noncommissioned officer in charge for the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 39 non-destructive inspections team. “The tests we perform are liquid penetrant, magnetic particle, eddy current, ultrasound and radiation (X-ray) testing.”

The Marines perform anywhere from 25 to 50 tests per day on various aircraft and components.

The most common test performed is liquid penetrant, which is done by using a fluorescent dye on various helicopter parts to detect surface-breaking flaws such as cracks, laps or folds.

Once the dye is applied to the part, a blacklight is used to locate where discrepancies, if any, are located.

X-ray testing, though accurate, is used as little as possible due to the high levels of radiation it creates.

“The X-rays we use are extremely powerful, more so than normal X-ray machines because we’re going through metal whereas the other kinds only penetrate flesh and bone,” said Morath.

According to Morath, the most important test his Marines perform is the ultrasound, because it reveals internal discrepancies that cannot be discovered with the other tests.

Using an ultrasonic inspection machine, Marines can determine where certain problem areas may be by studying sound waves that bounce off any internal defects.

With two deployments to Iraq already under his belt, Morath takes pride in the work he and his fellow Marines do every day.

“My favorite part of the job is knowing that I can contribute something to the Marine Corps that not everyone can do,” said Morath.




http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...CE?opendocument

New Marine finds refuge in Corps after years of mourning lost sister
Submitted by: MCRD San Diego
Story Identification #: 20051071370
Story by Pvt. Charlie Chavez



MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT SAN DIEGO, Calif. (Oct. 7, 2005) -- Disturbed by the loss of his sister, her boyfriend and his family at the age of 15, a Company G recruit lived through the traumatizing experience of a grieving loss at a young age, which ultimately compelled him to join the Marine Corps.

Pvt. Adam Boss, Platoon 2113, was impacted in several ways after his sister was murdered in one of several killings in their hometown, Muskegon Mich., Nov. 30, 1998.

The 21-year old spoke of the day vividly: "It was Thanksgiving weekend, and she went to eat another Thanksgiving dinner at her boyfriend's house," said Boss. "That's when it all went wrong."

Authorities in Muskegon said that the shootings began before 1:30 p.m., and the murderer, Seth Privacky's motive was that his father had threatened to kick him out of their home, according to "The Michigan Daily."

Privacky murdered his entire family, then he shot April Boss in the kitchen after she had come inside and witnessed the bodies on the floor.

Privacky then contacted a friend, who came to help him move the bodies to make it look like a robbery. Boss' parents, concerned for their daughter, drove to the Privacky home later that evening and found someone standing over the father Stephen Privacky's body, so they called the authorities immediately.

Authorities apprehended Steven Wallace, who was still at the crime scene, and Seth Privacky the next day after a thirteen-hour pursuit, according to the local paper.

"After my sister passed away, it was really hard for me to focus on school and my extra-curricular activities," said Boss. "We were really close."

Boss was in line for a football scholarship, but he started seeing his grades decline after his sisters passing.

"Things that seemed important before just lost their meaning to me. I just didn't care anymore," said Boss. "The way I treated people changed because I masked my emotions."

After losing his scholarship to players with better grades, Boss worked several jobs after high school. Not going to college took its toll on Boss, who went directly into the work force.

Originally, Boss had an idea to go to the Marine Corps out of high school, but his girlfriend didn't want him to go.

"My girlfriend is two-years younger than me. She didn't want me to leave, so I stayed around, despite my problems," said Boss.

Boss' girlfriend ended up joining the Marine Corps when she graduated high school.

"She and I decided that our life where we were was not going the way we wanted it to. We needed to get out of our town, so we did just that," said Boss.

Boss's father Gary backed up his son's decision to join the Marine Corps and supported him.

"I was hoping he would go to college, but instead he worked four or five different jobs," said Gary Boss. "He loves to work with his hands. That's probably why he wanted to become a combat engineer."

Working in a local body shop introduced and helped entertain the idea in his mind, according to Boss.

"I was just getting tired of working so much, I felt like I needed to do something else," said Boss. "I got this job working in a body shop and my boss, Hugh White, was a retired master sergeant. He influenced me."

Having had reoccurring feelings about joining the Marine Corps since high school, Boss said the respect he had for White went deeper than just respecting his authority.

"He told me that the man he is today is different from who he was before, and it was because of the Marine Corps," said Boss. "That made me think even more about what I wanted."

After attempting to join the Marines, Boss was held up due to medical problems.

"My teeth needed to be fixed," said Boss. "So it delayed me. My girlfriend left without me. I was supposed to go to Parris Island for boot camp, which didn't work out."

Despite the obstacles that Boss encountered, his determination brought him to San Diego where he has worked to earn the title Marine.

"He is an average recruit. He does what he has to," said Gunnery Sgt. Abel T. Leal, drill instructor, Platoon 2113. "He is an enforcer though. He makes other recruits get things done when they have to, and he has made it through."

Although still hurt by his experiences, his thoughts on what transpired on that particular weekend have helped him to work his way through boot camp.

"I get mad at what happened sometimes," said Boss. "I think that joining the Marines made me 10 times the man than the person who took my sister from me."

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...78?opendocument

Iraqi soldiers' sacrifice in Marine zone saves lives of 250
Submitted by: 1st Marine Division
Story Identification #: 20047264282
Story by Cpl. Shawn C. Rhodes



IRAQI NATIONAL GUARD COMPOUND MAHMUDIYAH, Iraq (July 20, 2004) -- The quick reaction of two Iraqi National Guard soldiers cost them their own lives, but saved those of 250 recently.

"The people who did this are against the advancement of Iraq. They are only trying to start violence and cause a nuisance," said Sgt. Ali Al-Hamdani, a spokesman for the Mahmudiyah ING. "These soldiers were very good at their duties. Their sacrifice is necessary for the security of Iraq."

More than 250 Iraqi men had gathered outside the front gates of the compound here during the morning of July 17. Many were interested in joining the newly formed Iraqi National Guard and working to rebuild their country. One terrorist saw this as the best time to strike.

A taxi approached the front gates at 7:45 a.m., according to witnesses. One of the Iraqi soldiers on duty at the gate that morning was Adil Abed, a young man who was planning to be married next week. He would never see his ceremony or his bride-to-be again.

Abed attempted to stop the suspicious taxi. When the driver failed to respond, Abed fired his AK-47 and the driver returned fire with a pistol, hitting Abed.

The soldier's comrade Sadaam Obeeid rushed forward to help his friend when the taxi, packed with explosives, detonated. The blast sent shrapnel and debris a hundred meters in every direction killing the two soldiers, the driver and injuring many of the civilians standing near the gate. The engine block of the taxi landed 80 meters away from the blast. It landed on top of a parked car.

When the confusion caused by the attack died down, the soldiers took time to reflect on what they'd lost a few days later.

"We are very sad. They were our friends and now we've lost them. They were good men," said Deputy Sgt. Thaid Hadiph, an ING soldier from Mahmudiyah. "The sacrifice they made for Iraq will not be forgotten."

The Iraqi solders' actions weren't surprising for the Marines dedicated to training them to take a greater role in security and rooting out terrorism. Lt. Col. Rick Jackson is a 46-year-old from Allendale, N.J. Marine serving as the deputy director of Iraqi Security Forces for 1st Marine Division. He said the actions, while tragic, are telling of the dedication of Iraqis sworn to protect their nation.

"These guys are out training with us every day," Jackson explained. "We do joint patrols together. To hear they stood their ground and acted the way they did isn't that surprising at all."

Jackson refuted rumors that ING soldiers were unwilling or unable to perform their missions. He compared their training to that of Marines.

"If you enlisted a Marine in February, when these guys stood up, he wouldn't be to his first unit by now," he said. "Now, they're not Marines, but if you look at the amount of formalized training and the threat, they're doing a pretty good job."

The soldiers of the ING here showed some sadness when they talked about their friends killed in the explosion. However, through the loss, they also found new resolve to continue protecting the people of Iraq.

"They are holy victims of the war on terrorism," said Iraqi Sgt. Haair Ahamy, an ING soldier. "They stood up and were brave, protecting their people. They were cowards, the terrorists who attacked us."

Ahamy said the attacks were a blatant attempt by anti-Iraqi forces to derail progress being made to stabilize Iraqi under the new sovereign government. The terrorist's target, he explained, was a group willing to serve their nation's interests. That flow of eager men hasn't slowed.

Every hour, men approach the gate to join the ING. One recruit said he did not like the deaths of the soldiers but he was not afraid of it.

"The terrorists were trying to discourage people from joining the ING with their attack," Ahamy said. "In the days following it we have had many, many men come to us wanting to join. They see the attack as proof they are needed. Terrorists will not win here."

The soldiers gathered the remains of their fallen and draped them with an Iraqi flag. A ceremony was held on the compound before turning the fallen over to their families. Iraqi officers visited the families of the two men during the funeral ceremonies to offer their condolences.

"Their death makes a vibration that is felt in the town. The people want the violence to stop," Haair said. "We all know we must work hard and be responsible for that to happen. We support the soldiers' sacrifice by continuing their holy duty to make that happen."

For the Marines' part, the sacrifice of the two Iraqi soldiers is indicative of the resolve of their comrades.

"I had confidence before this incident," Jackson said. "I've seen what these guys are trying to do. We need to invest time in them and work with them and get them their gear."

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,soldier

Iraqi soldiers decorated by Marines for bravery in firefight
Submitted by: 1st Marine Division
Story Identification #: 200461633050
Story by Sgt. Jose E. Guillen



CAMP INDIA, Iraq (June 11, 2004) -- Five Iraqi Civil Defense Corps soldiers were decorated by Marines for bravery under fire during a ceremony June 11.

Col. John R. Toolan, commander for Regimental Combat Team 1 awarded two Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medals and three Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medals to the Iraqi soldiers. The soldiers were cited for braving enemy fire to aid Marines in a May 30 clash. The awards included "V" devices for valor.

Marine infantrymen and their Iraqi counterparts jointly walked the beat at Kharma May 30, where ICDC soldiers battled back the enemy while protecting a Marine from further gunshot wounds.

"I was walking beside the Marine, then we heard gunfire, and I saw that the American Marine was shot," explained Iraqi Pvt. Imad Abizaid Jasiam through an interpreter.

"Then I realized it was just me and him, so I quickly started shooting at the enemy," added the 26-year-old from Nassir Wa Al Salaam, about the Marine who was wounded in the leg by enemy fire.

Jasiam and Iraqi Pvt., Kather Nazar Abbas, pulled the downed Marine behind an elementary school for cover. The whole time, they continued to exchange fire and ducked rocket-propelled grenades.

"While the Marine was being moved for cover, three other ICDC soldiers jumped in front of the firefight and provided some pretty accurate level of suppressive fire on the enemy," said 2nd Lt. Charles Anklin III, the platoon commander for Combined Actions Platoon, Company C, 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment.

"They got engaged from the rear by an unknown enemy-size force, and they were accurately trying to target them," added Anklin, a 28-year-old from Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

Jasiam said more ICDC soldiers soon made their way toward the schoolhouse, where he instructed them to form a circle around the wounded Marine and provide suppressive fire.

Jasaim, Abbas and Iraqi Sgt. Abdullah Sadoon Isa, Cpl. Eiub Muhamad Hussane, and Pvt. Ahmad Lazim Garib were all credited with saving the Marine. They all repelled the enemy assault.

"We had to protect him until the doctor (corpsman) began giving him medical attention," Jasiam said.

Gradually dislodging the enemy, Anklin said the soldiers began reconstituting and quickly forming an attack.

"The ICDC ultimately assaulted through the enemy's position and pushed them out," Anklin said.

"You've witnessed the bravery of these soldiers from India Company, (who) were willing to shed blood with Marines to make sure we get a free Iraq," said Toolan, shortly after the ceremony. "The important aspect is that the Coalition and Iraqi forces have worked together, and the bond you see between the ICDC soldiers and Marines has become rock-tight."

Jasiam said that since the skirmish, a new relationship was formed between ICDC soldiers and Marines.

"I feel very, very bad the Marines was shot because they are like my brothers now, but I'm ready to go out again," Jasiam said. "I am always ready."

Local village sheiks and Iraqi military leaders attended the rite, which was followed by a secondary ceremony.

Iraqi soldiers - some 162 of them - graduated a seven-day training camp held at Camp India.

The Marines under RCT-1 built-up the training facility and opened its door a week ago, which is designed to enhance military customs and infantry tactics within the ICDC.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,soldier

http://www.stevenzeeland.com/zeeland/marboy/marboy.htm

From the June 1997 issue of Attitude (UK)

'They have everything for a young
man to enjoy | You can hang out with all the boy-oys!’

The last time I saw Steve Zeeland my American military-chaser buddy was in an Enlisted Men’s Club at Camp Pendleton, home of the US Marine Corps in Southern California. Neither of us were enlisted men ourselves, but we were surrounded by hundreds of fit, sunburnt young men just in from the field and still in their camouflage gear (but already cheerfully pissed) who certainly were.

A familiar record was being played very loud: ‘Young man! Young man!/There’s no need to feel down/I said Young man!/Get yourself off the ground...’ Altogether now: ‘It’s fun to stay at the YMCA!/It’s fun to stay at the YMCA-Ay!...’ The Marines sang along in their hoo-rah! voices and spelt out the letters with their clumsy, square-set bodies.

One Devil Dog slapped me on the shoulder: ‘Having a good time buddy?’ ‘Oh yes,’ I replied. ‘Never better.’ If only all gay discos were like this.

My enjoyment of this epiphany was only slightly spoilt by Steven producing a camcorder from nowhere and videoing the whole proceedings. This, I thought, was pushing it. Amazingly, no one asked us what we were doing or rearranged our facial features. But then, at the Marine Rodeo we attended earlier in the day, none of the painfully beautiful boys poured into Wrangler jeans, T-shirts and cowboy boots seemed to object to Steve’s SureShot attentions. As he observes in his latest book, "The Masculine Marine: Homoeroticism in the US Marine Corps", ‘Marines like to be looked at.’

The many interviews with young Marines the book contains make it clear that being looked at isn’t the only passive position that many Marines are capable of enjoying. Jarheads, the toughest representatives of the US Armed Forces, have a reputation amongst US gays for disappointing in the bedroom, i.e. failing to live up to the gay fantasy of the ‘straight top’ and selfishly ‘bottoming out.’ Hence the joke: Q: ‘What’s the difference between a butch Marine and a nelly Marine?’ A: ‘A butch Marine holds his own goddamn legs in the air!’

As Steve puts it in his introduction, ‘what could be more incongruous than the picture of the most macho of American fighting men; indeed the most potent surviving icon of masculinity (think of John Wayne in The Sands of Iwo Jima, or Clint Eastwood in Heartbreak Ridge) - wanting to take it like a woman?’

Or as Corporal Jones might have put it: ‘They do like it up ‘em, Captain Mainwaring!’

By now you may be wondering what the difference is between Marines and gay men, seeing as they both wear camouflage trousers and dog-tags, both have short hair, both work out, both dance to the Village People, both like to have their photograph taken, and both have itchy prostates and chips on their shoulders. I’m tempted to answer that the difference is that Marines are friendly, fun, faithful, loving and great in bed and that gay men are none of these things. But then, that would just be me being bitter, wouldn’t it?

In fact, Marines represent not just an alternative to the gay world but the original model of homosociality that is also homoerotic. A cult of masculinity, if you like, but one that pays you wages instead of taking them off you in exchange for yet another PA by Gina G. Steve notes ‘the strong undercurrent rippling among men who exalt the masculine over the feminine and live and work in a Spartan environment’ and points out that dismissing this as ‘mere situational homosexuality devoid of deeper emotional meaning’ misses the point that all sexuality is to some extent situational and that ‘Marines famously, risk and sacrifice their lives for the love of their brother Marines.’

Hence the reputation for anal receptivity of Marines is not something which should be seized upon as evidence that Marine masculinity is just a sham; after all it is continually proved in so many other splendid ways (including, of course, killing people), but rather as a reminder of how absurd it is to try and base sexual identity, let alone gender identity, on what you do in bed. The Marine bottom whose ‘sexuality’ is best expressed in the line ‘Oh boy, was I drunk last night!’, is actually showing great valour, if not pig-headedness, in the face of the late-twentieth century sex pedantry.

And so does Steve, who followed his first GI boyfriend Brent (and his wife) across the Atlantic to Germany before falling out with him and in with the rest of the US Army. Initially, Steve the vegetarian bookish socialist pacifist found military men ‘coarse’ and ‘ugly’ and wanted Brent ‘divorced and discharged’. But one day, working at an on-base athletic goods store, ‘kneeling before an MP in battle dress uniform, I looked up at him and understood that (swoon) I had eroticised the lost love-object-as-soldier. Brent was gone, which only made me want him all the more. But now I had a few thousand Brents.’.

Steve admits that ‘central to the pursuit of Marineness is an ‘eroticisation of the purposively elusive’, which could equally apply to masculinity as a whole. Making his project somewhat ambivalent in its objectives. "The Masculine Marine" is his third book of interviews with military men. ‘Each man kills the thing he loves’, writes Oscar Wilde in "The Ballad of Reading Gaol". And while some do it with a sword or a kiss, Steve does it with a tape recorder.

By a synchronous coincidence, the publication of "The Masculine Marine" coincides with the reissue of a classic novel originally published in 1948 about a young man who joins the Navy to pursue his ‘purposively elusive’ boyhood jock ‘twin’ and bum-chum across the oceans and the Second World War, remaining true to him and rejecting the gay world he encounters along the way. When he is finally reunited with his now married ‘twin’ he is inevitably rebuffed and because this is a Gore Vidal novel rapes him. (‘The brave man with a sword.’)

The book is, of course, "The City and the Pillar" written by a man famous for his suspicion of sexual labels and chasing ‘straight’ men. Even more interestingly, Mr. Vidal’s recent autobiography Palimpsest revealed how autobiographical "The City and the Pillar" was itself by telling how the one love of his life, his ‘twin’, was a school footballer called Jimmy Trimble who died in the War taking Iwo Jima shortly before he was due to be married. Like a character from one of Tennessee Williams’ more melodramatic plays, Gore keeps a life-size portrait in oils of Jimmy by his bed.

But who can blame him? Jimmy was, after all, a Marine.

'They have everything for a young
man to enjoy | You can hang out with all the boy-oys!’

"The Masculine Marine" by Steven Zeeland (Harrington Park)
"The City and the Pillar" by Gore Vidal (LittleBrown)

Mark Simpson is the author of "Saint Morrisey" (Little Brown), "Male Impersonators: Men Performing Masculinity" (Routledge), "Anti-Gay" (Cassell), and "It's a Queer World: Deviant Adventures in Pop Culture" (Haworth).

Marine welders example of Corps’ diversity, versatility
Submitted by: MCB Camp Butler
Story Identification #: 20051072754
Story by Pfc. Terence L. Yancey



CAMP KINSER, OKINAWA, Japan (Oct. 7, 2005) -- Every Marine is a trained rifleman, something the Corps takes a lot of pride in. However, in order to accomplish the Marine Corps’ mission, there are countless jobs that require Marines trained in many different military occupational specialties. A Marine Corps welder is one unique example.

Welders from General Support Maintenance Company, 3rd Materiel Readiness Battalion, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, flex their creative muscles for the Corps using skills learned in their formal MOS school and ingenuity that can only be learned on the job.

These welders can repair damaged Marine Corps gear such as vehicle parts as well as fabricate completely new parts, many of which can’t be purchased, at a fraction of what it would cost the Corps to purchase them through the civilian market.

“We can create or repair pretty much anything made of metal,” said Lance
Cpl. Alejandro Echevarria, a welder with GSM company, and an Austin, Texas, native.

Marine Corps welders attend the Basic Metal Workers Course at the Army Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md., There, students with exceptional talent can receive a certification from the American Welding Society. Once in the Fleet Marine Force, the welders can use their on-the-job training to apply for additional certification.

According to Sgt. Travis R. Nichols, the non-commissioned officer-in-charge of the weld shop and native of Hemet, Calif., a welder is like an artist. The skill level and patience needed for both professions is very similar.

Welders must be prepared to think outside of the box when jobs come in to optimize the capabilities of the Okinawa-based units they support.

According to Staff Sgt. Anthony L. Lashley, machine and weld shop staff noncommissioned officer in charge, one recent example that highlighted the type of fabrication work the welder Marines can perform saved the Corps thousands of dollars. A communications unit needed lids for cases to protect their equipment. The lids, available through order, were expensive and made of plastic. The weld shop fabricated metal lids for less than half the cost.

Welders must also have a vast knowledge of the materials they work with. They must know the best materials and procedures for making objects based on their structure and intended use.

“We have to be able to identify different types of metal and know what temperatures they fuse at by just looking at them,” Echevarria said.

The Marines of the weld shop take pride in their job and satisfaction from their work.

“It’s amazing when you make something out of nothing,” Echevarria said. “Seeing the finished product as something that was created by hand while saving the Marine Corps money is very rewarding.”

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...B4?opendocument

22nd MEU wraps up its Certification Exercise
Submitted by: 22nd MEU
Story Identification #: 200510620297
Story by Gunnery Sgt. Keith A. Milks



CAMP LEJEUNE, NC (Oct. 6, 2005) -- Using both land and sea-based forces, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) recently launched raids against ‘terrorist’ strongholds aboard and near Camp Lejeune.

Simultaneous raids were the culminating event of the MEU’s final pre-deployment training exercise, and the last hurdle standing between the MEU and its designation as ‘Special Operations Capable.’

The MEU kicked off its Certification Exercise (CERTEX) on Sept. 21, an evolution the unit’s commanding officer described to a Navy journalist as a graduation exercise for both his Marines and the Sailors manning the ships with which the MEU will deploy.

“This is a great opportunity for us and our Navy partners to bring it all together,” said Col. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. shortly after CERTEX began. “We’ll put the finishing touches on our training and prepare to deploy.

During the exercise’s two-plus weeks, the 2,200 Marines and Sailors of the 22nd MEU executed a series of missions they may be required to undertake during the unit’s upcoming deployment.

Among these tasks were an embassy reinforcement, response to a mass casualty situation, a noncombatant evacuation operation, and helicopter, mechanized, and motorized raids, among other missions.

The MEU’s combat service support element, MEU Service Support Group 22, established a forward operating base (FOB) aboard Camp Lejeune early in CERTEX, and forces were continually pushed ashore to strengthen the MEU’s presence there. Meanwhile, the MEU Command Element and its aviation combat element, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 (Reinforced) remained aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Nassau to use it as a command and control hub and sea-based airfield.

Marines from II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic (EWTGL) were on hand throughout the exercise to evaluate the MEU’s performance and forward their observations on to the II MEF commanding general, Lt. Gen. James F. Amos. It would be up to Amos to determine whether or not the MEU rates the ‘SOC’ designation.

“I’m glad this is our last raid,” said Pfc. Christopher Powell, of Tampa Fla., an infantryman with Alpha Co., Battalion Landing Team 1st Bn., 2nd Marines, the MEU’s ground combat element during the ‘raid’ that drew the exercise to a close. “This will be my first deployment and I’m excited to use the training I’ve received.”

The 22nd MEU is scheduled deploy soon aboard the amphibious assault ships USS Nassau, Carter Hall, and Austin as the landing force for Expeditionary Strike Group 8.

For more information on the 22nd MEU, visit the unit’s web site at http://www.22meu.usmc.mil.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...B9?opendocument

VA Secretary: Agency to maintain services as demand increases
Submitted by: American Forces Press Service
Story Identification #: 200572582414
Story by Ms. Donna Miles



WASHINGTON (July 22, 2005) -- The United States offers the most extensive services and benefits for veterans of any other nation in the world, and will maintain that standard even with the recent surge in clientele due to the war on terror, according to the Veterans Affairs secretary.

R. James Nicholson spoke with the American Forces Press Service at VA headquarters July 21, his department's 75th anniversary.

The entrance to the headquarters bears the words President Abraham Lincoln spoke during his second inaugural speech and that Nicholson said serve as a daily reminder of the VA's mission: "To care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan."

When he was first named to lead the VA, Nicholson was serving as U.S. ambassador to the Holy See in Rome, where he said his nomination drew a lot of interest. "There was great curiosity that this was a full Cabinet-level department," he said, noting that no other country gives its veterans such high visibility within its government.

Similarly, he said, no other country "offers remotely the kinds of services and benefits that we provide veterans."

Over its history, the United States has created the world's most comprehensive system of assistance for veterans, providing educational opportunities, pensions and disability compensation, home loan guarantees, life insurance and more, Nicholson said.

But the crown jewel of the system is its medical system, which Nicholson said delivers "world-class, cutting edge medical care with competence, compassion and dignity."

He insisted that the VA will continue to meet that standard, despite the surge in demand for healthcare services due to an influx of veterans from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom into the system.

"Since we have a surge in demand, we also need to have more capacity, and that costs more money," Nicholson said. "So we have gone to Congress and requested additional funding to get through (fiscal year) '05 and a considerable increase in the budget for '06."

Nicholson announced July 14 that President Bush submitted to Congress an amendment to the proposed 2006 budget requesting $2 billion for higher-than-expected healthcare needs and to ensure that veterans continue to receive timely and high-quality health care, VA officials said.
In addition, the administration recently requested $975 million more in healthcare funds for fiscal 2005.
Nicholson said he's confident the American people will maintain their history of support for veterans.

"The American people hold veterans on a very high plain," Nicholson said. "There is no other country in the world that has anything remotely like what our Department of Veterans Affairs or that does anything close to what we do for our veterans.

"And they do that," working through the VA, "because they are so appreciative of those people who answer the call, who put on the uniform, and go where they are asked and do what they are asked in spite of the risks and the hardships and the deprivation," he said.

Providing services and benefits to these men and women is an honor for the VA's employees, who Nicholson said "have devoted their careers to serving veterans and their families."

"As General Washington said, it is a sacred honor and a debt to those who fight for our freedom," he said.


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,VETERAN

New York celebrates Veterans Day--Marine Corps Style
Submitted by: New York City Public Affairs
Story Identification #: 20021113134828
Story by GySgt. Tim McGough



NEW YORK (November 13, 2002) -- Veterans Day in New York City was celebrated in style -- Marine Corps style.

The city hosted Marines from around the country to take part in ceremonies, celebrations and performances. Veteran organizations from around New York and New Jersey proudly marched up Fifth Avenue in the annual Veterans Day Parade.
Although Veterans Day is for all American vets it seemed like the Corps "cornered the market" from the Bronx to the Battery. It was an all out Marine blitz on the Big Apple and the city knew it.

The city and the nation were entertained by the precision rifle moves of the Silent Drill Team on the Today Show. They then gave two more performances at Rockefeller Center. Marine Gen. Peter Pace, Vice Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff opened The New York Stock Exchange, which paused at 11 a.m. for two minutes of silence to remember veterans from the revolutionary war to today. The "President's Own" The Marine Band gave a standing room only performance at Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts.

Everywhere a Marine was in the city, he or she was thanked. Rounds of applause and praise were given to every rank from private to general. Old veterans asked and asked again where they could sign up for another hitch.
One special stop Gen. Pace made was at Ground Zero. He was escorted to the 10th floor of 2 World Financial Center where he and his wife over looked the hallowed ground.

As the entourage was leaving the general went back one more time to honor the fallen, injured and all the rescue and recovery workers with a moment of silence.

He then traveled up town to meet his son Capt Peter Pace to watch his Marines drill with perfect precision, wowing everyone in the crowd with fixed bayonets. Speeches were made, telling tales of battles won, friends lost and how they have kept America free for 227 years.
It will be a day not long forgotten. Why? Because every year on November 11th all Americans take time to remember Veterans Day. If they do not, a vet usually reminds.


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,VETERAN

United States Marine Corps
Press Release
Public Affairs Office
Department of Defense Korean War
Commemoration Committee


PH: (703) 602-5295 FAX: (703) 604-0833

Contact:

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Release # 0726-02-1316
Joint Chiefs Chairman to Host Concert
July 25, 2002

Washington -- WASHINGTON, D.C. ? Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will host the free concert ?A Musical Tribute to Korean War Veterans? at the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) Constitution Hall on July 27 at 7 p.m., said a spokesman for the Department of Defense 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee today.

?We are pleased that Gen. Myers will host the event and help us thank and honor all Korean War veterans,? said Col. Anita Minniefield, the Commemoration Committee?s Director of Support. ?This concert is a great opportunity for our country to thank and honor all Korean War veterans and their families, on the 49th Anniversary of the end of hostilities.?

The Korean War ended on July 27, 1953 when United Nations and Communist forces signed an Armistice at Panmunjom, Korea.

?There are still over 300 tickets available for the concert,? she said. ?Because this concert is open to the public, anyone can order tickets by calling (703) 604-3414. The tickets will be available for pick up after 5 p.m., at DAR Constitution Hall the night of the concert.?

Myers joins Korean War veteran and TV celebrity, Ed McMahon who will emcee the free show, highlighted by the president's official military band, The United States Marine Band, ?President?s Own,? and award winning singer Rita Coolidge. The concert is part of the official U.S. commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Korean War, which started June 25, 2000 and ends Nov. 11, 2003. The concert also features Korean War Medal of Honor recipient retired Army Col. Lewis L. Millett.

Besides commemorating the Korean War the concert will be a special night for veterans.

?It is not everyday that Korean War Veterans will be able to see a top-notch musical program with major celebrities, so it will be an even sweeter ?thank you? to them,? said retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Nels Running, executive director of the Commemoration Committee.

For general information on the Korean War Commemoration visit www.korea50.mil on the Internet, or call toll-free (866) Korea50.



http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,VETERAN

United States Marine Corps

Press Release
Division of Public Affairs
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380-1775
Telephone: 703-614-4309 DSN 224-4309 Fax 703-695-7460
Contact: Leslie Huselton
Weber Shandwick for American Airline
(972) 830-2251
lhuselton@webershandwick.com

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Release # 0610-05-1015
June 9, 2005

CEO Gerard Arpey on advisory council of Operation Homecoming

ST. LOUIS--American Airlines has joined dozens of other organizations in support of the upcoming Operation Homecoming USA in Branson, Mo.

The "Welcome Home ... America's Tribute to Vietnam Veterans" celebration will be held June 13-19, with several thousand people expected to attend.

"American Airlines is proud to support this long-overdue recognition of the personal sacrifices made by the men and women who served in the armed forces during the war in Vietnam," said American's Vice President of Corporate Communications and Advertising, Roger Frizzell. "These patriots truly deserve the respect and admiration of our nation."

American's Chairman and CEO Gerard Arpey serves on the Advisory Council for the event. Other advisory members include H. Ross Perot, a Navy veteran who founded Electronic Data Systems; James H. Amos, a Marine veteran of two combat tours in Vietnam and Chairman Emeritus of MBE-UPS Stores and Chairman and CEO of Sona Med Spa; retired Air Force Brig. Gen. Robert F. McDermott, a World War II combat pilot, who is recognized as the "Father of Modern Military Education" and is Chairman Emeritus, USAA; Rear Adm. Patrick D. Moneymaker, U.S. Navy Retired, a decorated Navy Top Gun flier and former commander of the Blue Angels; retired Army Gen. Hugh Shelton, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander-in-Chief of United States Special Operations; and Kenneth D. Walker, President and CEO of Meineke Car Care Centers.

Festivities begin on Monday, June 13, with military demonstrations and displays and the Dignity Memorial Wall opening ceremony. During the week, there will be helicopter rides, a golf event, a National Vietnam War Museum presentation, the Clydesdales Across America show, an air show, a fishing tournament, a parade and the American Spirit Awards.

The Grand Finale on Saturday, June 18, will include a concert featuring the Beach Boys, The 5th Dimension, Creedence Clearwater Revival, the Doobie Brothers, Ann-Margret, the Oak Ridge Boys, Tony Orlando, and the Supremes with Mary Wilson. A closing ceremony will be held at noon on Sunday, June 19.

For more information about Operation Homecoming USA, visit the Web site at <http://www.operationhomecomingusa.com


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,vietnam

Ex-refugees, veterans gather
at 'tent city'

Submitted by: MCB Camp Pendleton
Story Identification #: 20005101585
Story by LCpl. Brian J. Griffin



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. (May 4, 2000) -- A quarter-century after the fall of Saigon, Vietnamese refugees and American veterans of the Vietnam War came together at the Hand of Hope Memorial Sunday at Camp San Mateo.
The ceremony served several purposes, said retired Maj. William Mimiaga, who oversaw Marines helping erect a massive 'tent city' that housed tens of thousands of refugees on base after the fall.
"First, it recognized the 25th anniversary of the fall of Saigon, which resulted in the creation of Operation New Arrival, the welcoming and the resettlement of the Vietnamese refugees to our country," he said about the ceremony.
Second, it recognized the positive contribution to our country and communities resettled refugees have made, Mimiaga continued. "We have schoolteachers, doctors, lawyers, politicians, political appointees and, yes, even Marines who are of Vietnamese origin."
Third, it recognized the Vietnamese armed forces that were our allies in the fight against communism, Mimiaga said. "War brought us together as allies in a just cause, and peace, once again, brought us together in a day of remembrance for all those lost."
The ceremony brought together, shoulder to shoulder, the Vietnamese and American veterans who fought gallantly throughout the struggle in Southeast Asia, said retired BGen. Nhut Tran, a South Vietnamese general.
Many of the veterans who attended the ceremony, both American and Vietnamese, came together for the first time since the war, Mimiaga said.
"They immediately felt the old friendships and closeness, as comrades-in-arms and former allies. A lot of healing was accomplished this day and old friendships renewed," he added. "It was a heartfelt moment for us that only warriors and soldiers can understand and appreciate."
The refugees of 25 years ago came to commemorate their arrival in this country and to show their children where they lived before they were sponsored, Mimiaga said. "It also allowed the returning refugees, once again, to say thank you to the United States and especially to the men of the United States Marine Corps for welcoming them and taking care of them," Mimiaga said.
Saigon fell April 30, 1975. Refugees were already being transported to the United States by then, and work began April 28 to hastily erect the tent city.
"I was a Warrant Officer ..." Mimiaga recalled, "serving with the 11th Marines when the refugees arrived. I had a working party of 82 Marines helping to set up the tent camps.
"Having served two tours in Vietnam, I felt a tremendous personal sadness when Saigon fell. I welcomed the refugees with mixed emotions. Sadness for them losing their country and also for the tremendous loss that we paid with American lives."
"The Vietnam experience has left a scar on the United States and everyone involved. The ceremony here helped to continue the healing process," said Brian H. Ward, a Vietnam War veteran and former prisoner of war. "The healing process will go on for sometime, it is something you never forget."
Twenty-five years after the end of the war in Vietnam, a group of American and South Vietnamese war veterans and citizens formed a committee to build the world's first memorial commemorating the alliance between Vietnamese and American people during the war.
The memorial -- to be built on city property in Westminster, home of one of the largest populations of Vietnamese refugees in the United States -- will represent the sacrifice of 58,000 Americans and 300,000 South Vietnamese soldiers who died in the Vietnam conflict, Mimiaga said.
"It is a symbolic memorial for all warriors who (answered) their country's call."
For more information on the memorial, visit www.vnwarmemorial.com.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...light=2,vietnam

March/April 1995

Vol. 23, no. 4

Women in the Armed Services


Since the earliest days of our nation women have served in its armed forces. Deborah Sampson, Lucy Brewer, Rosetta Wakeman, Lillian Budd, Mary Virginia Harris, Diane Orlowski, Peggy Black, Darlene Iskra - these are the names of some of the women who have served in the U.S. military, whether behind the lines or actually in combat. Some served under their own names while others took on the persona of men in order to serve on the battlefield.

Within the last twenty years the accepted role of women in the armed services has changed and expanded. In 1978 women began to be assigned to duty aboard ships. By 1991 women were assigned to combat aircraft in both the Air Force and Navy. In 1994 Congress repealed the last ban, the ban on women on combat ships, and Secretary of Defense Aspin announced that the risk rule would be lifted in October.

Women have finally become an integral part of the U.S. Armed Forces. With full integration there arise numerous questions: What alterations will need to be made to ships to accommodate
women? What provisions will be made for motherhood? Will national security be jeopardized because women are not as strong or aggressive as men? Will women be afforded equal opportunities for advancement?

This bibliography updates "Women in the Military", Library Notes Vol 16, no. 8, April 1988. All materials listed are available in the Eccles Library.



BOOKS AND DOCUMENTS

An Analysis of the Effects of Varying Male and Female Force
Levels. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985. 6v.
(UB 323 U395 1985)

*Anderson, Barbara G. A Pilot Report on Women's Assessment of
Their Military Careers. Research Triangle Park, NC: Army
Research Office, 1988. 21pp. (IP COLL 7424)

Barkalow, Carol. In the Men's House: an Inside Account of Life
in the Army by One of West Point's First Female Graduates.
New York: Poseidon Press, 1990. 283pp.
(U 410 M1 B372 1990)

Bellafaire, Judith A. The Women's Army Corps: a Commemoration
of World War II Service. Washington: U.S. Army Center of
Military History, 1993. 28pp. (UA 565 W6 B45 1993)

Blacksmith, E.A., ed. Women in the Military. New York: Wilson,
1992. 162pp. (H 31 R4 v.64, no. 5)

Brown, Nancy E. Women in Combat in Tomorrow's Navy. Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993. 29pp.
(UB 418 W65 B76 1993a)

Burgess, Lauren C., ed. An Uncommon Soldier: the Civil War
Letters of Sarah Rosetta Wakeman, Alias Private Lyons
Wakeman. Pasadena, MD: The Minerva Center, 1994. 110pp.
(E 628 W35 1994)

Cecil, Thomas H. Women in Combat: Pros and Cons. Maxwell Air
Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1988. 18pp.
(UB 418 W65 C435 1988)

Cole, Jean H. Women Pilots of World War II. Salt Lake City, UT:
University of Utah Press, 1992. 165pp. (D 790 C62 1992)

Collier, Ellen C. Women in the Armed Forces. Washington:
Congressional Research Service, 1994. 15pp.
(vertical file: Women)

Culbertson, Amy L. Sexual Harassment in the Active-Duty Navy:
Findings from the 1991 Navy-Wide Survey. San Diego, CA:
Navy Personnel and Development Center, 1993. 65pp.
(HD 6060.5 C85 1993)

Devilbiss, M.C. Women and Military Service: a History, Analysis
and Overview of Key Issues. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL:
Air University Press, 1990. 86pp. (UB 418 W65 D485 1990)

Dorn, Edwin, ed. Who Defends America? Race, Sex and Class in
the Armed Forces. Washington: Joint Center for Political
Studies Press, 1989. 164pp. (UB 418 A47 W48 1989)

Dugan, Kathleen M. Tailhook Part III: the Present Aftermath.
Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1994. 24pp.
(VB 324 W65 D84 1994)

Ebbert, Jean and Hall, Marie-Beth. Crossed Currents: Navy Women
from WWI to Tailhook. New York: Brassey's, 1993. 321pp.
(VB 324 W65 E23 1993)

*Ernst, Robert W. Gender Bias in the Navy. Monterey, CA: Naval
Postgraduate School, 1993. 118pp. (IP COLL 500010)

*Gerrard, Meg. Antecedents of Pregnancy and Pregnancy Attrition
in First-Term Women Marines. Final Report ONR-89-1. Ames,
IA: Iowa State University, 1989. 1v. (IP COLL 4925)

Greebler, Carol S. Men and Women in Ships: Preconceptions of
the Crews. San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel Research and
Development Center, 1983. lv. v.p. (VB 324 W65 G74 1983)

Hall, Richard. Patriots in Disguise: Women Warriors of the
Civil War. New York: Paragon House, 1993. 224pp.
(E 628 H35 1993)

Hart, Roxine C. Women in Combat. Patrick Air Force Base, FL:
Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, 1991. 23pp.
(UB 418 W65 W66 1991)

*Hay, Mary Sue. Women in Combat: an Overview of the
Implications for Recruiting. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,
1990. 99pp. (IP COLL 5295)

Hayes, Jean. Women in the Navy, 1942-1948. Clear Lake, TX:
University of Houston, 1988. 102pp. (VA 390 H38 1988a)

Holm, Jeanne. Women in the Military: an Unfinished Revolution.
Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992. 544pp.
(UB 418 W65 H64 1992)

Hosek, James R. Serving Her Country: an Analysis of Women's
Enlistment. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1990. 67pp.
(AS 36 R281 no. 3853)

Hovis, Bobbi. Station Hospital Saigon: a Navy Nurse in Vietnam,
1963-1964. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.
167pp. (DS 559.44 H68 1991)

Howes, Ruth H., ed. Women and the Use of Military Force.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993. 247pp.
(U 21.75 W665 1993)

Keil, Sally. Those Wonderful Women in their Flying Machines:
the Unknown Heroines of World War II. New York: Rawson,
Wade Publishers, 1979. 334pp. (D 810 W7 K43 1979)

Kirk, Kathleen F. Women in Combat? San Diego, CA: San Diego
State University, 1988. 83pp. (UB 418 W65 K57 1988a)

Kochendoerfer, Violet A. One Woman's World War II. Lexington,
KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1994. 211pp.
(D 811.5 K5944 1994)

*LeBoeuf, Maureen K. Effectiveness of the Physical Education
Curriculum at the United States Military Academy in
Preparing its Women Graduates. Athens, GA: University of
Georgia, 1994. 242pp. (IP COLL 502029)

Lett, David K. Equal Rights and the U.S. Combat Exclusion Policy
for Women: a Congressional Lobby Confrontation. Maxwell
Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, 1988. 63pp.
(U 104 R3 L48 1988)

*Lossius, Robert L. Women in Combat Arms: a Combat Multiplier?
Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992.
27pp. (IP COLL 102580)

Lyons, Terrence J. Women in the Military Cockpit. Brooks Air
Force Base, TX: Air Force Systems Command, 1991. 43pp.
(UB 418 W65 L96 1991a)

McDonald, Richard A. Women in Combat: When the Best Man for
the Job Is a Woman. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War
College, 1991. 29pp. (UB 418 W65 M33 1991)

*McMillian, Willie. Women in the Military: Sexual Harassment.
Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993. 37pp.
(IP COLL 103239)

Military Women in the Department of Defense. Washington: Office
of the Secretary of Defense, 1983-. 1v. (UB 418 W65 M53)

Mitchell, Brian. Weak Link: the Feminization of the American
Military. Washington: Regnery Gateway, 1989. 232pp.
(UB 418 W65 M57 1989)

Morden, Bettie. The Women's Army Corps, 1945-1978. Washington:
U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1990. 543pp.
(UA 565 W6 M67 1990)

Myles, Bruce. Night Witches: the Untold Story of Soviet Women
in Combat. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981. 278pp.
(D 792 S65 M94)

Navy Women, 1908-1988: a Pictorial History. California: WAVES
National, 1990. 2v. (REF VA 390 W3 N3)

Oelke, Marion E. Women in Combat Roles: Past and Future.
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, 1988. 120pp.
(UB 418 W65 O34 1988)

Peterson, Donna. Dress Gray: a Woman at West Point. Austin,
TX: Eakin Press, 1990. 254pp. (U 410 M1 P47 1990)

Peterson, Teresa. USAF Women Pilots: the Combat Issue. Maxwell
Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1988. 50pp.
(UB 418 W65 P484 1988)

Quester, Aline. Enlisted Women in the Marine Corps: First-Term
Attrition and Long-Term Retention. Alexandria, VA: Center
for Naval Analyses, 1990. 1v. (V 21 C43 no. 90-71)

Regis, Elizabeth. How Female Officers' Performance in Non-
Traditional U.S. Navy Shipboard Jobs Compares to Male
Officers' Performance. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate
School, 1988. 39pp. (VB 324 W65 R435 1988a)

*Roy, Thomas. The Combat Exclusion Policy: Myth or Reality for
Women in Today's Army? Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army
War College, 1991. 29pp. (IP COLL 11458)

*Saimons, Vickie J. Women in Combat: Are the Risks to Combat
Effectiveness Too Great? Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 1991. 48pp.
(IP COLL 101641)

Seeley, Charlotte P., ed. American Women and the U.S. Armed
Forces: a Guide to the Records of Military Agencies in the
National Archives Relating to American Women. Washington:
National Archives and Records Administration, 1992. 355pp.
(REF U 21.75 S44 1992)

Stanley, Sandra. Women in the Military. New York: J. Messner,
1993. 138pp. (UB 418 W65 S73 1993)

Stiehm, Judith. Arms and the Enlisted Woman. Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University, 1989. 331pp. (UB 418 W65 S75 1989)

Stremlow, Mary. A History of the Women Marines, 1946-1977.
Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1986. 250pp.
(VE 23.4 S77 1986)

Thomas, Marie D. Utilization of Pregnant Enlisted Women
Transferred Off Ships. San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel
Research and Development Center, 1994. 33pp.
(UB 418 W65 T46 1994)

Thomas, Patricia J. Gender Differences in the Evaluations of
Narratives in Officer Performance Ratings. San Diego, CA:
Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, 1983.
29pp. (VB 324 W65 T46 1983)

_____________. Impact of Pregnant Women and Single Parents upon Navy
Personnel Systems. San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel Research
and Development Center, 1992. 29pp.
(VB 324 W65 T465 1992a)

_____________. Incidence of Pregnancy and Single Parenthood among
Enlisted Personnel in the Navy. San Diego, CA: Navy
Personnel Research and Development Center, 1989. 34pp.
(VB 324 W65 T47 1989)

______________. Men and Women in Ships: Attitudes of Crews after One
to Two Years of Integration. San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel
Research and Development Center, 1983. 53pp.
(VB 324 W65 T47 1983)

_____________. Navy Women in Traditional and Non-Traditional Jobs: a
Comparison of Satisfaction, Attrition and Reenlistment. San
Diego, CA: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center,
1982. 46pp. (UB 418 W65 T43 1982)

_____________. Women in the Military: Gender Integration at Sea.
San Diego, CA: Navy Personnel Research and Development
Center, 1981. 22pp. (VB 324 W65 T49 1981a)

*Turner, Robbie. Minority Women Officers in the Navy: Past,
Present and Future Prospects. Monterey, CA: Naval
Postgraduate School, 1991. 79pp. (IP COLL 11397)

**U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Sexual
Harassment of Military Women and Improving the Military
Complaint System. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1994. 276pp. (Y4. Ar5/2a: 993-94/44)

**______________________________. Military Forces and Personnel
Subcommittee. Assignment of Army and Marine Corps Women
under the New Definition of Ground Support. Washington:
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1995. 107pp.
(Y4. Ar5/2a: 993-94/50)

**______________________________. Women in Combat.
Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994. 180pp.
(Y4. Ar5/2a: 993-94/20)

*U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Military
Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee. Gender
Discrimination in the Military. Washington: U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1992. 128pp. (Y4. Ar5/2a: 991-92/60)

*________________________________. Implementation of
the Repeal of the Combat Exclusion on Female Aviators.
Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1992. 40pp.
(Y4. Ar5/2a: 991-92/38)

*_________________________________. Parenting Issues of
Operation Desert Storm. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1991. 151pp. (Y4. Ar5/2a: 991-92/5)

*_________________________________. Women in the
Military. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1988.
224pp. (Y4. Ar5/2a: 987-88/52)

*__________________________________. Women in the
Military. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1990.
93pp. (Y4. Ar5/2a: 989-90/63)

*___________________________________. Military Personnel and
Compensation Subcommittee. Defense Policy Panel. Women in
the Military: the Tailhook Affair and the Problem of Sexual
Harassment. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1992.
121pp. (Y4. Ar5/2: W84)

____________________________________. Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs. Commemorative Coin Legislation and Related Issues
in the 103rd Congress. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1994. 74pp. (Micro F/C4: 1994-H241-83) (microfiche)
H.R. 1697, the Women in the Military Service for America
Memorial Commemorative Coin Act.

__________. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Honor Systems
and Sexual Harassment at the Service Academies. Washington:
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994. pp. 116-172.
(Micro F/C4: 1994-S201-15) (microfiche)

____________________. Energy and Natural Resources Committee.
Commemorative Works Act Amendments. Washington: U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1994. 11pp. (Micro F/C4: 1994-S313-9)
Concerns the Women in Military Service for America Memorial
in Washington, D.C.

*U.S. Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services. 1991
Spring Conference. Washington: DACOWITS, 1992. 219pp.
(D 1.2: W84/2/991)

*U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Force Management:
Occupation, Distribution, and Composition. Washington:
1992. 45pp. (GA 1.13: NSIAD-92-85)

*________________________________. Naval Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities.
Washington: 1993. 68pp. (GA 1.13: NSIAD-93-54)

*________________________________. Operation Desert Storm: Race and Gender Comparison
of Deployed Forces with All Active Duty Forces. Washington:
1992. 62pp. (GA 1.13: NSIAD-92-111)

*________________________________. Women in the Military: Air Force Revises Job
Availability but Entry Screening Needs Review. Washington:
1991. 10pp. (GA 1.13: NSIAD-91-199)

*_________________________________. Women in the Military: Attrition and Retention.
Washington: 1990. 145pp. (GA 1.13: NSIAD-90-87BR)

*_________________________________. Women in the Military: Career Progression Not a
Current Problem but Concerns Remain. Washington: 1989.
36pp. (GA 1.13: NSIAD-89-210BR)

*_________________________________. Women in the Military: Deployment in the Persian
Gulf War. Washington: 1993. 58pp.
(GA 1.13: NSIAD-93-93)

*_________________________________. Women in the Military: More Military Jobs Can Be
Opened under Current Statutes. Washington: 1988. 56pp.
(GA 1.13: NSIAD-88-222)

U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. "An Act to Establish the Women's Army
Corps in the Regular Army, to Authorize the Enlistment and
Appointment of Women in the Regular Air Force, Regular Navy
and Marine Corps, and in the Reserve Components of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and for Other Purposes,"
United States Statutes at Large. Public Law 80-625, 80th
Congress, 2d Sess. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1948: v. 62, pt. 1. pp. 356-375. (JK 418 1948)

_________________________. "Gender-Neutral Occupational Performance Standards,"
United States Statutes at Large. Public Law 103-160, 103d
Congress. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993.
Sec. 543. (JK 418 No. 103-160)

_________________________. "Notice to Congress of Proposed Changes in Combat
Assignments to Which Female Members May Be Assigned," United
States Statutes at Large. Public Law 103-160, 103d
Congress. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993.
Sec. 543. (JK 418 No. 103-160)

U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. "Repeal of Statutory Limitations on
Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces to Combat Aircraft,"
United States Statutes at Large. Public Law 102-190, 102d
Congress, 1st sess. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1991. Sec. 531. (JK 418 1991 pt. 2)

________________________. "Repeal of the Statutory Restriction on the Assignment
of Women in the Navy and Marine Corps," United States
Statutes at Large. Public Law 103-160, 103d Congress.
Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993. Sec. 541.
(JK 418 No. 103-160)

U.S. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Navy Women's Study
Group. An Update Report on the Progress of Women in the
Navy. Washington: Chief of Naval Operations, 1991. 1v.
(VR 324 W65 U58 1991)

U.S. Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the
Armed Forces. The Presidential Commission on the Assignment
of Women in the Armed Forces: Report to the President
November 15, 1992. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1992. v.p. (UB 418 W65 U58 1992)

Wekesser, Carol, ed. Women in the Military. San Diego, CA:
Greenhaven Press, 1991. 192pp. (UB 418 W65 W67 1991)

Williams, Vera S. WASPS: Women Airforce Service Pilots of World
War II. Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International, 1994.
156pp. (D 790 W493 1994)

Wings, Josette D. Mother Was a Gunner's Mate: World War II in
the Waves. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994.
234pp. (D 769.597 W568 1994)

Women in Combat. Patrick Air Force Base, FL: Defense Equal
Opportunity Management Institute, 1991. 23pp.
(UB 418 W65 W66 1991)

PERIODICAL ARTICLES

Adelsberger, Bernard. "As Job Restrictions Ease, Female
Recruiting Prospers." Army Times, 8 August 1994. p. 14.
(microfilm)

"Army and Air Force Women in Action in Panama." Minerva's
Bulletin Board, Spring 1990, pp. 3-5.

"Aspin Opens Billets to Women." Congressional Quarterly Weekly
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Bahnsen, John C. "Do We Need a Few Good Men?" U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, August 1994, pp. 59-61.

Baldwin, Sherman. "Creating the Ultimate Meritocracy." U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1993. pp. 33-36.

Bird, Julie. "Facing a New Challenge: 5 Women Pilots Take Aim
at Seats in Fighter Cockpits." Air Force Times,
8 November 1993, p. 24. (microfilm)

__________. "For 1st AF Selectees, Little Notice."
Air Force Times, 10 May 1993, pp. 4, 8. (microfilm)

__________. "Most Support Change if Implemented Fairly."
Air Force Times, 10 May 1993, p. 8. (microfilm)

__________. "Pioneers: the Fight Isn't Over for Women Who Want
To Fly in Combat Planes." Air Force Times, 21 March 1994,
pp. 12-14. (microfilm)

__________. "Women in Combat: All Aircraft Opened to Female
Fliers." Air Force Times, 10 May 1993, pp. 3-4.
(microfilm)

Blaney, Janie C. "Women Veterans, Their Blood Ran No Less Red."
Citizen Airman, June 1993, pp. 20-21.

Bolebruch, Lori. "Women in Combat: and the Walls Come Tumblin'
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pp. 42-44.

Booker, Alice A. "American Military Women as Prisoners of War."
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"Breaking the Combat Barrier." Airman, October 1993, pp. 20-41.

Brennan, Terrence P. "Putting Politics before Military
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Brickman, Jane. "Cruising Forward--Women Underway 1994."
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Brown, Patricia R. "Women in Combat: Change the Paradigm
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Bryant, Rosemary. "Soldier Is a Soldier." Joint Force
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Cadenhead, Julia T. "Pregnancy on Active Duty: Making the Tough
Decisions." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1995,
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Callander, Bruce D. "New Concepts for the Force Mix."
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Campbell, D'Ann. "Combatting the Gender Gulf." Minerva,
Fall/Winter 1992, pp. 13-41.

Carlson, Margaret. "One Woman's Fight to Fly." Time,
15 August 1994, p. 37.

Collins, Eileen. "Two of a Kind...Astronauts." Airman,
April 1994, pp. 44-48.

"Combatant Assignments for Women Begin." All Hands, May 1994,
pp. 8-9.

Compart, Andrew. "AF Reserve Major General Is DoD's Highest-
Ranking Woman." Air Force Times, 28 June 1993, p. 24.
(microfilm)

_______________. "Women Prepare To Fight." Air Force Times,
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Creveld, Martin van. "Why Israel Doesn't Send Women into
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Cushman, John H. "Top Admiral Backs Full Combat Roles for Women
in Navy." The New York Times, 5 April 1993, p. A1:2, A18:4.
(microfilm)

D'Agostino, Janet. "Air Force Women Cheer Vote To Remove
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Davis, William J. "Keeping a Cohesive--and Gender-Integrated--
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DiLucente, A. "Women in Combat: Equality, a Step Backward."
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Donnelly, Elaine. "From a Commissioner (on Women in Combat)."
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________________. "Pilots Need the Right Stuff." Time,
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Downing, T.M. "Women in Combat: Just Say No!!" U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, February 1992, pp. 45-46.

Enloe, Cynthia. "The Politics of Constructing the American Woman
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"Equal Opportunity for Women on Upswing in DoD." Defense Issues,
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Evans, David. "Clear and Present Diapers: the Pentagon's Costly
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Fairfield, John S. "Women in the Air Force: Completing the
Evolution." Airman, October 1994, pp. 34-39.

Finch, Mimi. "Women in Combat: One Commissioner Reports."
Minerva, Spring 1994, pp. 1-12.

Firestone, Juanita M. "Sexual Harassment in the U.S. Military:
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"First Woman to Pilot Shuttle Is Set for a Mission on Thursday."
The New York Times, 1 February 1995, p. A22:2-6.
(microfilm)

"Five Pregnant Sailors Leave Carrier Crew." Los Angeles Times,
28 January 1995, p. A17:1. (microfilm)

Fletcher, Jean W. "Tradition, Technology and the Changing Roles
of Women in the Navy." Minerva, Fall-Winter 1993,
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Garrison, Becky. "One Size Jet Doesn't Fit All: Modifications
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"A Gender-Neutral Tragedy." The New York Times, 2 March 1995,
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Gilbert, Michael H. "Women in Combat: Who Should Make the
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Gingrich, Newt. "Now Hear This." Fortune, 20 February 1995,
p. 24. (microfilm)
Comments on why he thinks women are not fit for traditional
military combat.

Gordon, Michael R. "Panel Opposes Allowing Women To Choose
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p. A15:1-2. (microfilm)

Graham, Bradley. "Navy Pursues a Gentle Course in Response to
Service Pregnancies." The Washington Post, 7 February 1995,
p. A4:1-5. (microfilm)

Griffin, Rodman D. "Women in the Military: What Role Should
Women Play in the Shrinking Military?" CQ Researcher,
25 September 1992, pp. 833-856.

Gross, Jane. "Needs of Family and Country: Missions on a
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Hackworth, David H. "War and the Second Sex." Newsweek,
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Halberstadt, Hans. "Tailhook: the Morning After." U.S. Naval
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Harris, Beverly C. "Why Promotable Female Officers Leave the
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Hasenauer, Heike. "Marching Toward Equality." Soldiers,
March 1994, pp. 45-47.

________________. "More Positions Open for Women." Soldiers,
September 1994, pp. 21-22.

Herbert, Melissa S. "From Crinoline to Camouflage: Initial
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Hudson, Neff. "Advisers Delay Push for More Combat Billets for
Women." Air Force Times, 7 November 1994, p. 37.
(microfilm)

____________. "Combat Jobs To Open for Women." Air Force Times,
24 January 1994, p. 6. (microfilm)

____________. "How Are Women Faring in the Drawdown?"
Air Force Times, 9 May 1994, p. 10.

____________. "Percentage of Women Enlisting Rises."
Air Force Times, 28 February 1994, p. 3. (microfilm)

____________. "Sinking of the Risk Rule." Navy Times,
24 January 1994, p. 4. (microfilm)
Includes table of Marine Corps military occupational
specialties opened to women.

____________. "Time Wears Down Tradition: All-Male Academies Fall
Out of Step with Today's Military." Army Times,
26 September 1994, pp. 14-16. (microfilm)

____________. "Wanted: More Women in Army and Marine Corps."
Air Force Times, 17 October 1994, p. 8. (microfilm)

Hudson, Neff. "Will There Be More Assignments for Women?"
Army Times, 4 July 1994, p. 8. (microfilm)

____________. "Women Advance Some, but Reality Still Doesn't Match
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(microfilm)

_____________. "Women Have Larger Role in Newest Mission."
Air Force Times, 9 May 1994, p. 17. (microfilm)

_____________. "Year of Progress." Air Force Times,
5 December 1994, p. 6. (microfilm)

"Hultgreen Was Ranked with the Best." Navy Times,
5 December 1994, p. 8. (microfilm)

"Hundreds of Women to Serve on Warships." The New York Times,
3 December 1993, p. A25:1. (microfilm)

"Initial Cadre: the First Selected as Combat Candidates."
Airman, October 1993, pp. 30-31.

Jones, E.G. "Women in Combat--Historical Quirk or the Future
Cutting Edge." RUSI Journal, August 1993, pp. 34-40.

Kane, Pamela. "National Guard Women Break Barriers in Aviation."
National Guard, November 1993, pp. 14-18.

Kaufman, Leslie. "Women Come Aboard." Government Executive,
July 1994, pp. 40-43. (microfilm)

Kelly, James F. "Less Punishment and More Patience." U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, January 1994, pp. 27-30.

Kitfield, James. "Defense Beat: of Piglets and Giraffes."
Government Executive, March 1995, p. 54.

_______________. "Women Warriors." Government Executive, March 1994,
pp. 22-29. (microfilm)

Kohn, Richard H. "Women in Combat, Homosexuals in Uniform: the
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Korb, Lawrence J. "A Woman's Place Is in the Pentagon."
The New York Times, 9 August 1993, p. A15:2. (microfilm)

Larson, C. Kay. "Bonny Yank and Ginny Reb Revisited." Minerva,
Summer 1992, pp. 35-61.

Lawrence. William P. "Commission (on Women in Combat)."
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Lawson, Chris. "Corps Phases Women into New Jobs." Navy Times,
11 July 1994, p. 8. (microfilm)

Luddy, John F. "On Women in Combat." Marine Corps Gazette,
December 1994, pp. 55-57.

______________. "Two Wrongs Don't Make It Right." U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, November 1992, pp. 68-70.

Mack, Alistair R. "Women in Combat: the British and American
Experience in the Gulf War 1991." RUSI Journal,
October 1993, pp. 33-37.

Mariner, Rosemary B. "Soldier Is a Soldier." Joint Force
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Matthews, William. "Women in Combat: McPeak, 'A...Chance I Was
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(microfilm)

Maubert, Paul H. "Women, the Military and Political
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Maze, Rick. "Aspin: Women To Be Allowed To Fly Combat
Aircraft." Air Force Times, 12 April 1993, p. 7.
(microfilm)

__________. "Combat Jobs for Women Closer." Air Force Times,
20 May 1991, pp. 3, 18. (microfilm)

__________. "Services Grapple with Women's Health Issues."
Air Force Times, 16 May 1994, p. 9. (microfilm)

McIntire, Katherine. "Army Women Applaud the Demise of the 'Risk
Rule'." Army Times, 31 January 1994, p. 8. (microfilm)

____________. "Female Faces to Grace Old Guard." Army Times,
9 May 1994, p. 10. (microfilm)

____________. "Guard Assigns First Woman Combat Pilot." Army Times,
15 November 1993, p. 22. (microfilm)

____________. "Survey: Draft Women, Let them Volunteer."
Army Times, 30 May 1994, p. 8. (microfilm)

____________. "Women in the Army." Army Times, 18 April 1994,
pp. 12-16. (microfilm)

Morganthau, Tom. "The Military Fights the Gender Wars."
Newsweek, 14 November 1994, pp. 35-37.

Musall, Bettina. "Fewer and Prouder: Women Marines."
World Press Review, July 1994, pp. 36-37.

"Navy Records Highly Rated Woman Pilot Who Crashed." The New
York Times, 21 November 1994, p. A16:1. (microfilm)

"Navy Women Are First To Fly Combat Missions." Minerva's
Bulletin Board, Fall/Winter 1994, p. 1.

Naylor, Sean D. "Army Makes New Rules for Women." Army Times,
8 August 1994, pp. 3, 13. (microfilm)

Nelson, Soraya. "Women in Navy Seek More Care than Men."
Air Force Times, 28 November 1994, p. 23. (microfilm)

"New Ground Combat Definition Opens Jobs to Women." Army,
March 1994, p. 9.

"New Ground Combat Rules for Women. News Briefing by Defense
Secretary Les Aspin, and Edwin Dorn, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Pentagon, 13 January
1994." Defense Issues, vol. 9, no. 1, 1994, entire issue.

Nolan, Mary I. "Right Time and Place: (USS) Eisenhower's
Historic Mixed-Gender Deployment." Sea Power, October 1994,
p. 41-42.

Norris, Robert E. "Trust Us." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
November 1994, pp. 58-59.

Norton, Douglas M. "Women in Combat: It's Time." U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, February 1992, pp. 48-50.

Oliveri, Frank. "DoD Opens More Jobs to Women."
Air Force Magazine, October 1994, pp. 13-14.

Owens, Mackubin T. "Women in Combat--Equal Opportunity or
Military Effectiveness?" Marine Corps Gazette,
November 1992, pp. 32-36.

Palmer, Elizabeth. "Women in the Military: Harassment Tales
Raise Doubt about Pentagon Reforms." Congressional
Quarterly Weekly Report, 12 March 1994, p. 614.

Palmer, Laura. "Only Now Are They Healing Themselves." The New
York Times Magazine, 7 November 1993, pp. 37-44, 68, 72-73.
(microfilm)

Parks, W. Hays. "Tailhook: What Happened, Why and What's To Be
Learned." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1994,
pp. 89-103.

Peach, Lucinda. "Women at War: the Ethics of Women in Combat."
Minerva, Winter 1994, pp. 1-64.

"People: Kara Hultgreen...First Woman Qualified for Combat in an
F-14 Fighter...Died." U.S. News and World Report,
7 November 1994, p. 21.

Perry, Tony. "Engine Failure Blamed in Woman's Fatal Jet Crash."
Los Angeles Times, 1 March 1995, p. A3:1-3, A10:1-3.
(microfilm)

Pexton, Patrick. "17 Women Aviators to Fly Combat." Navy Times,
27 September 1993, p. 8. (microfilm)

______________. "63 Women Get Carrier Orders." Navy Times,
21 March 1994, p. 4. (microfilm)

______________. "All Aboard: In Fleet, Women and Men Make Working
Together Smooth Sailing." Navy Times, 7 March 1994,
pp. 12-14. (microfilm)

______________. "Five Women Aviators Fly Right." Navy Times,
27 June 1994, p. 4. (microfilm)

______________. "A Gender-Neutral Navy in 5 Years." Navy Times,
26 April 1993, p. 4. (microfilm)

______________. "New Captains Have Flown Against Tradition."
Navy Times, 5 April 1993, p. 4. (microfilm)

______________. "Sad, but Inevitable First: Woman F-14 Pilot Dies in
Crash." Navy Times, 7 November 1994, p. 3. (microfilm)

______________. "Women Jet Pilots Struck by Budget Ax, as Squadrons
Are Cut." Navy Times, 12 April 1993, p. 17. (microfilm)

______________. "Women on the Ike: So Far, So Good." Navy Times,
14 November 1994, pp. 18, 20. (microfilm)

______________. "Women on Warships: a Step Closer." Navy Times,
22 November 1993, p. 4. (microfilm)

Pine, Art. "Marine Corps, Navy Assure Women Jobs Won't Suffer
Over Pregnancy." Los Angeles Times, 8 February 1995,
p. A5:2. (microfilm)

Poindexter, G.W. "Step Back for Women: Risk Rule Used To Deny
Access to Helicopters." Air Force Times, 15 August 1994,
p. 8. (microfilm)

Pratt, Henry J. "Heroines of Healing." Army Reserve Magazine,
Winter 1993/94, pp. 10-12.

Priest, Dana. "Female Pilot's Crash Blamed on Engine Stall."
The Washington Post, 1 March 1995, p. A7:5. (microfilm)

_____________. "Navy Punishes Two for Sex Aboard Ship."
The Washington Post, 19 March 1995, p. A13:1. (microfilm)

"The Right To Fight." Newsweek, 5 August 1991, pp. 22-23.

Ripley, John W. "Women in Combat? A Marine Veteran Says,
Simply, No." Marine Corps Gazette, November 1992,
pp. 36-37.

Rogers, Deborah L. "The Force Drawdown and Its Impact on Women
in the Military." Minerva, Spring 1992, pp. 1-13.

Rohter, Larry. "Era of Female Combat Pilots Opens with Shrugs
and Glee." The New York Times, 29 April 1993,
p. A1:5-6, B11. (microfilm)

"Role for Women in Combat Expands." Marine Corps Gazette,
February 1994, p. 5.

Sadler, Georgia. "Polling Data (on Women in Combat)."
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1993, pp. 51-54.

_______________. "Rock the Cradle, Rock the Boat?" U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, April 1995, pp. 51-56.

"Sailing into Motherhood." The New York Times, 11 February 1995,
p. A18:1-2. (microfilm)

Schmitt, Eric. "Army Will Allow Women in 32,000 Combat Posts."
The New York Times, 28 July 1994, p. A1:5. (microfilm)

_____________. "Aspin Moves To Open Many Military Jobs to Women."
The New York Times, 14 January 1994, p. A22:1. (microfilm)

_____________. "Female Fighter Pilot Killed in Crash Off California."
The New York Times, 27 October 1994, p. A18:4-6.
(microfilm)

_____________. "Female Navy Pilots on Edge of History." The New York
Times, 23 April 1993, p. A14:1-3. (microfilm)

_____________. "Generals Oppose Combat by Women." The New York
Times, 17 June 1994, pp. A1:5, A18:1-2. (microfilm)

_____________. "Navy Acts Against 10 Male Instructors in Sex
Harassment Case." The New York Times, 16 December 1994,
p. A27:1-6. (microfilm)

Schmitt, Eric. "Navy Women Bringing New Era on Carriers."
The New York Times, 21 February 1994, pp. A1:2-4, A14:1-5.
(microfilm)

_____________. "Navy's First Female Combat Pilot Loses Sea Duty."
The New York Times, 23 January 1995, p. A10:4-6.
(microfilm)

_____________. "New Top Admiral To Push Wider Combat Role for Women."
The New York Times, 4 May 1994, p. A20:1. (microfilm)

_____________. "Pentagon Plans To Allow Combat Flights by Women;
Seeks To Drop Warship Ban." The New York Times,
28 April 1993, pp. A1:4-6, A14. (microfilm)

_____________. "Pilot's Death Renews Debate over Women in Combat
Role." The New York Times, 30 October 1994, p. A31:1.
(microfilm)

_____________. "Senate Votes To Remove Ban on Women as Combat
Pilots." The New York Times, 1 August 1991, p. A1:4-5.
(microfilm)

_____________. "Women in Senate and Military Chiefs Meet."
The New York Times, 20 May 1994, p. A16:4. (microfilm)

Schoby, Terri E. "When the Bough Breaks: Pregnancy and the
Marine Corps." Marine Corps Gazette, December 1994,
pp. 53-54.

Sciolino, Elaine. "Women in War: Ex-Captive Tells of Ordeal."
The New York Times, 29 June 1992, pp. A1:3-5, A13:1.
(microfilm)

"SecNav Announces Pregnancy Policy." U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, April 1995, p. 56.

"Second Thoughts: Amid the Advances, Some Are Backing Away."
Air Force Times, 21 March 1994, p. 13. (microfilm)

"Second Woman To Qualify as F-14 Pilot Dies in Crash." Minerva's
Bulletin Board, Fall/Winter 1994, pp. 2-4.

Seelye, Katharine Q. "Gingrich's 'Piggies' Poked." The New York
Times, 19 January 1995, p. A20:1-2. (microfilm)

"A Shipmate To Be Proud of." The Washington Post, 21 March 1995,
p. A16:1-2. (microfilm)

Skelton, Clifford A. "Welcoming Aboard Female Aviators."
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1994, pp. 68-70.

Slavin, Barbara. "Harassment Issue Won't Go Away for the Navy."
Los Angeles Times, 1 March 1995, pp. E1:1, E2:1-4.
(microfilm)

Spelts, Doreen. "Women Casualties of the Persian Gulf
Operations: a Bibliography." Minerva, Spring 1992,
pp. 56-62.

Steele, Dennis. "Women Aviators Get Clearance for Combat Flight
Assignments." Army, June 1993, p. 13. (microfilm)

Stoddard, Ellwyn R. "Female Participation in the U.S. Military:
Gender Trends by Branch, Rank and Racial Categories."
Minerva, Spring 1993, pp. 23-40.

_________________. "Married Female Officers in a Combat Branch:
Occupation-Family Stress and Future Career Choices."
Minerva, Summer 1994, pp. 1-14.

Terry, Don. "Scud's Lethal Hit Takes First 2 Female Soldiers."
The New York Times, 28 February 1991, p. A13:1-2.
(microfilm)

Thomas, Patricia J. "Impact of Pregnant Women and Single Parents
Upon Navy Personnel Systems." Minerva, Fall/Winter 1992,
pp. 41-75.

Tice, Jim. "Army Opens 18,000 Jobs to Women." Army Times,
24 January 1994, p. 3. (microfilm)
Includes list of positions opening to women.

__________. "Minorities, Women Gain in Downsizing Active Force."
Army Times, 21 November 1994, p. 8. (microfilm)

__________. "Women Gain Jobs, Face More Combat." Army Times,
8 August 1994, p. 12. (microfilm)

Timmons, Tracy. "'We're Looking for a Few Good Men': the Impact
of Gender Stereotypes on Women in the Military." Minerva,
Summer 1992, pp. 20-33.

Tomblin, Barbara B. "Beyond Paradise: the U.S. Navy Nurse Corps
in the Pacific in World War II." Minerva, Summer 1993,
pp. 33-53.

Towell, Pat. "Aspin's Order May Be Felt First by Air Force, Navy
Women." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1 May 1993,
p. 1095.

Walker, Paulette V. "Maneuvering over Women in Combat."
Army Times, 27 June 1994, p. 6. (microfilm)

Walker, Paulette V. "Women Move Closer to the Battlefield."
Army Times, 20 June 1994, pp. 3-4. (microfilm)

Waller, Douglas. "Navy: Getting Used to Coed Carriers."
Newsweek, 4 July 1994, p. 48.

"War Puts U.S. Servicewomen Closer Than Ever to Combat."
The New York Times, 22 January 1991, pp. A1:5-6, A12:1-4.
(microfilm)

West, Joe. "Women Still Training for Combat Cockpits."
Air Force Times, 8 February 1993, pp. 14-15. (microfilm)

Widnall, Sheila E. "Women in Aerospace: Dawn of Duality."
Officer, November 1993, pp. 19-22. (microfilm)

Willis, Grant. "Changing DoD Attitude on Women Highlighted at
Conference." Air Force Times, 3 May 1993, p. 16.

_____________. "Fighting Women in Combat." Navy Times,
1 November 1993, pp, 12-13. (microfilm)

Wilson, George C. "Navy Orders Female Pilot off Carrier."
The Washington Post, 21 January 1995, p. A12:1. (microfilm)

Zimmerman, Jean. "Breaking the Barrier." The New York Times,
2 November 1994, pp. A23:2. (microfilm)


Compiled by: Barbara R. Donnelly


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Twilight of the Citizen-Soldier
ELIOT A. COHEN


What is the citizen-soldier? The question demands something beyond the obvious answer, any soldier who is also a citizen. Judged by that criterion, the citizen-soldier is alive and well in the United States and, for that matter, most other countries. Soldiers, more than ever before, vote: in the United States, base commanders are evaluated on the basis of their success in generating large turnouts for national elections. Free speech is most certainly alive and well. Service men and women write, call, or email their representatives in Congress, who duly probe into accusations of mistreatment, malfeasance, or abuse. There are newspapers for each of the services, and overseas (Stars and Stripes)that delight in ripping into the high command, and local papers are filled with letters from uniformed members of the armed forces, openly identifying themselves as such. A military legal system operates that gives the accused rights which are comparable to, and in some cases superior to, those of the civilian legal system.

And yet, I think, most of us would agree that the American military is not, in fact, a citizen-soldier force. It is somehow qualitatively different from the armies that fought the Civil War and the World Wars (Korea and Vietnam are already, I suspect, transitional wars). The term seems archaic, even quaint--except, perhaps, as applied to reservists. Why? How is a military composed of soldiers who are certainly citizens somehow not composed of citizen-soldiers?

Viewed legally, we have an army of citizen-soldiers; viewed historically and philosophically, we do not. The true citizen-soldier is distinguished from his professional or semi-professional counterpart in three ways, all of which suggest that military service follows from true citizenship. The first is his motivation for military service. In the case of the true citizen-soldier, military service is either an obligation imposed by the state or the result of mobilization for some pressing cause. Democratic states generally impose only two kinds of forced labor upon their citizens--jury duty and military service. The former serves the administration of justice; the latter serves the purpose of defense. These two high and essential objects of government ennoble coerced service--and this is the reason why obligatory schemes of nonmilitary service, which have much weaker justification, will find it hard ever to succeed in countries like the United States. In the absence of conscription, mobilization for a particular struggle is the other way in which citizenship elicits military service. The state is embarked upon some great crusade or adventure, and in the spirit of ancient Athens, citizens make the highest contribution to it by offering their service as soldiers. For the normal volunteer of today, neither motivation applies. Patriotism, a desire for personal challenge, monetary or career incentives--all mold the young man or woman who joins today. But in all cases (except perhaps that of patriotism), the link between citizenship and service is thin.

The true army of citizen-soldiers represents the state. Rich and poor, black and white, Christian and Jew serve alongside one another in similarly Spartan surroundings--at least in theory. The idea of military service as the great leveler is part of its charm in a democratic age, one of whose bedrock principles is surely the formal equality of all citizens. The voluntary military, by way of contrast, is very rarely representative. To be sure, in the contemporary United States recruiters attempt to maintain some rough balance among ethnic groups, although even here it is clear that minority groups are overrepresented. Recruiters pay no heed, however, to socioeconomic, religious, or other kinds of ethnic diversity in the ranks. That the children of millionaires almost never serve or that a bare handful of Ivy League graduates don a uniform is not even a matter for comment.

Third, and perhaps most important, the true citizen-soldier's identityisfundamentally civilian. However much he may yield to the exigencies of military life, however much he may even come to enjoy it and become proficient in military skills, he is always, in the core of his being, a member of civil society. His participation in military life is temporary and provisional. For the volunteer, and certainly for the multiterm soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, the military identity coexists with that of the citizen. The issue is one of identity, and not solely length of service. There are reservists who are, in fact, merely part-time professionals, and in the great wars of the last century there were those who served for five years and remained civilians at heart. The term citizen-soldier acts as a useful replacement for an oxymoron, the "civilian-soldier."

Using the admittedly rough and ready criteria described above--motivation, representativeness, and identity--one can still conceive of a variety of military systems built around the citizen-soldier. Militia systems, for example, such as that of the Swiss, exemplify one kind of citizen-soldier military; the mass volunteer armies of the early Civil War represent another; and the scientifically selected and mobilized hordes of World War II, yet another. In each case, the citizen-soldier appeared not only in the ranks, as draftee or volunteer, but also as officer and leader. Indeed, the figure of Cincinnatus, the Roman peasant general, exemplifies a kind of citizen-soldier familiar throughout history from Nathanael Greene or Daniel Morgan in the American Revolution, to John Logan or Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain in the Civil War, and even to the colonels and naval captains of my parents' generation, who provided virtually all of the junior and much of the mid-level leadership of World War II.

The Disappearance of the Citizen-Soldier

Since ancient times, armies of citizen-soldiers have contended with counterparts of various types--professional volunteers, mercenaries, or hybrid systems. In the 19th century and through the end of the last, they dominated warfare. The age of mass--in education, industrial production, and logistics--made numbers the dominant fact in war, and armies of citizen-soldiers are large. But since World War II the citizen-soldier has been on the wane, for a variety of reasons. Technology certainly played a large role: nuclear weapons at one end of the spectrum, and expensive, sophisticated conventional weapons at the other made the mass concept if not obsolete, then questionable. Sheer numbers played a role as well. As military organizations shrank in size, it became more difficult to sustain conscription on a universal basis, even for countries in straits as dire as those in which Israel finds itself. When most young men do not serve in the military, those who do are not fulfilling a common obligation of citizenship, but are merely unlucky. And, as sex differentiation retreated in the workplace, the inevitably male-oriented world of military service (particularly in ground combat organizations) made an identity between citizenship and military service difficult to sustain.

Armies of citizen-soldiers are best suited to desperate struggles and wars of mass mobilization. To the extent that the late 20th century was a time of limited war, the citizen-soldier system was maladapted to the strategic challenges of risks run for ambiguous or second-order purposes. Not surprisingly, by 2000 most European powers had abandoned conscription or were on the verge of doing so, replacing their short-service conscript and volunteer forces with those of long-service professionals.

In 2001 the American military is, like its counterparts around the world, largely a professional force. And yet the myth of the citizen-soldier is alive and well. Consider, for example, Hollywood. Steven Spielberg's smashingly successful movie Saving Private Ryan depicted the quintessential citizen-soldiers commemorated in historian Steven Ambrose's book Citizen Soldiers. Captain John Miller's men, like Miller himself, are present as a result of obligation; they are in for the duration, but only the duration of the war; they represent much of the ethnic richness of American life; above all, they are civilians at heart, dreaming of wives and sweethearts left behind.

The magic of Saving Private Ryan lies not only in the movie's intrinsic power--and no movie about the all-volunteer force comes close to it in dramatic force--but in the American military's reaction to it. The director received a gala celebration and decoration from the United States Army; troops in Korea interviewed by reporter Tom Ricks insisted that they too were like Miller's band of reluctant warriors. But the US Army is no longer composed of Millers, Ryans, and Horvaths; it no longer faces the kind of desperate struggles that characterized Omaha beach; and its men (and now, women) no longer worry about overcoming an enemy in order to return to their normal lives--military service is their life.

The charm, if that is the right word, of the citizen-soldier does not end here, however. The astounding popularity of General--now Secretary of State--Colin Powell, a general who self-consciously titled his memoir My American Journey, reflects a yearning for the Cincinnatus type--paternal but folksy, sturdily reassuring, and easily imagined in a variety of civilian settings, including the Oval Office. General Powell's own writings reinforce the sentimentalized view of the citizen-soldier reflected in Saving Private Ryan. In an essay for Time magazine on the G.I. as the "person of the century" he wrote as follows:

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I referred to the men and women of the armed forces as "G.I.s." It got me in trouble with some of my colleagues at the time. . . . I persisted in using G.I.s and found I was in good company. Newspapers and television shows used it all the time. The most famous and successful government education program was known as the G.I. Bill, and it still uses that title for a newer generation of veterans. When you added one of the most common boy's names to it, you got G.I. Joe, and the name of the most popular boy's toy ever, the G.I. Joe action figure. And let's not forget G.I. Jane. G.I. is a World War II term that two generations later continues to conjure up the warmest and proudest memories of a noble war that pitted pure good against pure evil and good triumphed.
The victors in that war were the American G.I.s, the Willies and Joes, the farmer from Iowa and the steelworker from Pittsburgh who stepped off a landing craft into the hell of Omaha Beach. . . . They were America. They reflected our diverse origins. They were the embodiment of the American spirit of courage and dedication. They were truly a "people's army," going forth on a crusade to save democracy and freedom, to defeat tyrants, to save oppressed peoples, and to make their families proud of them.
The volunteer G.I.s of today stand watch in Korea, the Persian Gulf, Europe, and the dangerous terrain of the Balkans. We must never see them as mere hirelings, off in a corner of our society. They are our best, and we owe them our full support and our sincerest thanks.[1]
Powell's characterization of the G.I.--the citizen-soldier of World War II--is roughly right, if sentimentalized; what is remarkable, however, is his insistence on retaining the appellation "G.I." for young men and women who, however admirable, are fighting no crusades, who have enlisted rather than been drafted, and who are far from being a cross section of American society. But the myth of the citizen-soldier persists.
The Consequences: The Unremarked Demise and the Unnerving Rebirth of the Citizen-Soldier

There are various possible explanations for the persistence of the ideal of the citizen-soldier years after his disappearance as a real phenomenon. We may have here the lag inevitable as a generation that grew up with one powerful and evocative reality is unwilling to set it aside. It is possible that the notion of the citizen-soldier is somehow rooted deeply in the nature of democracy itself. Conceivably, as well, Americans may be unwilling to confront in a direct way the consequences of having a large and powerful military--the military, after all, that polices the world--which is not composed of citizen-soldiers. But the disjunction between perception and reality has real consequences for America's role in the world, two of which stand out.

The first is America's perceived, and real, reluctance to take casualties in any large number in conflict, a reluctance often ascribed to a tender regard for the life of American citizens. In recent years it is clear that this has become a real constraint on the ability of the United States to exercise power, to the point that military commanders have gone into the field with the injunction that "the first mission is force protection" ringing in their ears.

Recognition of the plain fact that ours is no longer an army of citizen-soldiers should make us question this explanation of American casualty sensitivity. The truth is that armies of citizen-soldiers have been far more likely to suffer deaths and wounds in vast numbers than smaller, professional forces. The army of citizen-soldiers fighting a war for great causes has proven itself far more willing to bleed profusely than the army of highly trained, expensive professionals fighting for ambiguous goals. There is indeed good evidence that casualty sensitivity stems not from social pressure to care for the life of citizens but from the military's own changing scales of human values.

A more recent, deeper, and perhaps more worrisome trend is very different. It is an assertion of all the rights of citizenship by professional soldiers, most notably in the open participation of recently retired general officers in electoral politics by endorsing presidential candidates, but also in the rash of partisan commentary by officers shortly after the election of President Bill Clinton. The defense of such behavior is that soldiers in uniform are, after all, citizens, and so long as they obey orders they retain all the rights of expression of their counterparts in the civilian world--and most certainly so the moment they doff the uniform.

This is a remarkable inversion of the citizen-soldier concept; instead of subjecting the individualism of civilian life to the discipline of military life to serve the larger ends of society, it becomes a means of softening the rigors of military tradition in order to allow free expression to serve the preferences of individuals. Thus, even as the citizen-soldier--Colin Powell's G.I.--has indeed disappeared into the twilight, a new kind of citizen-soldier has emerged: the politically engaged professional officer, who abates none of his rights to freedom of expression despite military discipline.

The dangers here are, or should be, obvious. They stem not from the demise of the citizen-soldier, however, but from an unwillingness to examine closely his replacement: the volunteer professional, thinking afresh about his rights and responsibilities, and the constraints of law and custom put upon those who wear a uniform. In this enterprise nostalgia for the Minutemen, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, Sergeant York, or Captain John Miller, understandable though it may be, will serve only to confuse an issue that is complicated enough.



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NOTE

1. Colin Powell, "The American G.I.," Time, Special Issue, "Time 100," 14 June 1999, internet, http://www.time.com/time100/heroes/profile/gi01.html, accessed 27 March 2001.



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Dr. Eliot A. Cohen is professor of strategic studies with the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.



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We Have Not Correctly
Framed the Debate
on Intelligence Reform



SAXBY CHAMBLISS


Over the last decade, our intelligence community has failed us. It wasn’t able to penetrate the al Qaeda terrorist organization, and we paid a high price for that failure. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 were the first significant foreign attacks on the US mainland since the War of 1812. In the weeks and months leading up to 9/11, we failed to interpret, analyze, and share information gathered. Subsequently the intelligence community failed the President by presenting an inaccurate analysis of the quantities and capabilities of Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While there should be no doubt whatsoever that Saddam’s intentions were to reconstitute his WMD programs and become a supplier of these weapons to the radical Islamist terrorists who are bent on the destruction of democratic and secular Western societies, the fact remains that the CIA did not have a single agent inside Iraq to verify the true state of these programs before coalition forces, led by the United States, attacked Iraq in 2003.

Today, the intelligence community is struggling to stay ahead of a host of threats to our security—the insurgency in Iraq that is taking American lives daily, the continuing war on terrorism, and the nuclear threat posed by Iran and North Korea, to name but a few. And there is an intelligence breakdown every time an improvised explosive device is detonated in Iraq killing American soldiers and marines.

We have had huge, glaring intelligence failures, and the Administration and the Congress are working assiduously to improve our intelligence community as quickly as possible to better protect our people and our allies. On 17 December 2004, President Bush signed into law the most sweeping intelligence reform legislation since the National Security Act of 1947.

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The centerpiece of this intelligence legislation—articulated by the 9/11 Commission in its report,1 embraced by the President, and endorsed by the Congress—is the creation of a new position to lead our intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI will not head any single agency, as was the case when the 1947 National Security Act created the Central Intelligence Agency and dual-hatted the Director as the chief intelligence officer of the United States as well as running the CIA. Another positive aspect of the legislation is the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which will conduct strategic operational planning for joint counterintelligence operations.

Our country is in the midst of a national debate on intelligence reform. In any endeavor of this type, the end result is largely dependent upon how the debate is framed, and we have not done a good or complete job of framing the debate on this issue of vital importance to the American people. Creating the DNI is an extremely important decision, and it forms the very foundation that is necessary to continue building intelligence capabilities. However, it is the beginning of a long process, not the end.

Human Intelligence

Last year’s debate on intelligence reform should have centered on espionage, which we call human intelligence, or HUMINT, or spying. As we reframe the intelligence debate this year, we need to make sure HUMINT gets the right emphasis.

Americans like technology and we are good at it. Our ability to monitor certain activities via satellites, signals intelligence, or other technical means, while not perfect, is pretty good. Our weak point is HUMINT, which has atrophied to the point that it must be rebuilt. Human intelligence, relative to the other intelligence disciplines, can tell us what the enemy is thinking. The strength of good HUMINT is that it can answer this key question: What are the enemy’s intentions about when, where, and how to strike?

In July 2002, as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security in the House of Representatives, it was my responsibility, along with Ranking Member, Representative Jane Harman, to submit the first detailed report to Congress on intelligence deficiencies that existed prior to 11 September 2001. We identified several systemic problems in the CIA, and

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we also noted that there were significant problems in sharing intelligence within the intelligence community, especially between the CIA and the FBI.

We pointed out that the CIA had lost its focus on HUMINT missions and needed to put more collectors on the streets, rely less on other foreign intelligence agencies, and find ways to penetrate terrorist cells. I am particularly pleased that immediately following the release of our report, the CIA rescinded the so called “Deutch guidelines” that were implemented in 1995. Those guidelines prohibited the expenditure of tax money being paid to individuals providing us intelligence if they had a criminal record or any kind of disparaging record in their past.

Having met personally with CIA agents in countries with known terrorist activities, I heard firsthand how these guidelines, while relaxed after 9/11, were still a major hindrance for our agents to collect and gather intelligence. Terrorist networks like al Qaeda are comprised of the meanest, nastiest killers in the world, and it simply was not smart for us to limit the operatives our intelligence agents could recruit to infiltrate terrorist groups. For us, this was a small but important victory with respect to improving human intelligence.

HUMINT is a dirty business, a dangerous profession, and we must be prepared to accept the risks associated with spying on those who seek to harm us, whether they be a small terrorist cell, a larger international terrorist organization, or a rogue nation-state. North Korea, for example, is developing the means to deliver nuclear weapons to close and important allies, like Japan, or to our own state of Hawaii and our Pacific Coast—we cannot afford to let down our guard or relax our intelligence awareness.

The “risk-avoidance” culture that had infected the CIA and prevented us from getting into the inner circles of al Qaeda or the regime in Iraq before the 2003 war must be changed, and new CIA Director Porter Goss is working hard to do just that. However, it will take time and a team dedicated to a new way of thinking.

All of our intelligence capabilities need improvement, but it is important to stress that HUMINT is where we need to put our priority of effort. Not all intelligence collection disciplines are of equal importance for every threat we face. And it is clear that human intelligence offers us the best chance to protect ourselves and successfully win the war on terrorism.

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That brings us to this vital question: How does the new intelligence reform legislation measure up relative to human intelligence? During the national debate on intelligence reform last year, there was general acknowledgment that HUMINT needed to be improved; however, it was not afforded the primacy in the legislation that I believe it deserved. In fact, HUMINT is not mentioned even once in the 26-page summary of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 prepared by the Congressional Research Service. The reason al Qaeda was able to attack us was because we didn’t have spies to infiltrate their organization. It had nothing to do with intelligence budget execution or the reprogramming of funds.

The intelligence community is undoubtedly entering a period of turmoil caused by the intelligence reform legislation. During the coming implementation of that legislation, the Congress must make certain the primacy of HUMINT is emphasized and the morale of our intelligence officers, especially those serving in dangerous undercover positions, is protected. In this regard, it is my hope that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will introduce a subcommittee structure and that one of the subcommittees will be devoted to human intelligence.

Engaging the Full Spectrum

Contemporary definitions of national and tactical intelligence are now archaic and do not reflect the sophistication of 21st-century collection, analysis, and distribution methods of intelligence. Nor does the “end-user” of intelligence have the same meaning in today’s environment. The real shortcoming of the framework being used in our debate on intelligence reform is that it is too narrowly focused on what is referred to as the “national level.” Too many so-called “intelligence experts” want the Director of National Intelligence to have control of national intelligence assets and are content to leave the military with the tactical intelligence assets.

This type of thinking is fallacious and dangerous. Intelligence reform is a lot more complicated than creating a DNI and giving him or her stronger control over “national” intelligence systems.

Real intelligence reform must look beyond the definitions of “national” and “tactical.” It must address the intelligence needs of the President in the White House, but it must also address the needs of the US Army private in Baghdad or the US Marine lance corporal in Fallujah. We cannot send American military forces into battle without the full spectrum of support from the entire intelligence community.

If we do not succeed in stabilizing the security situation in Iraq, which can be achieved only with accurate and timely intelligence to the troops on the ground, the United States and its coalition partners will suffer an

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enormous strategic setback in the war on terrorism and in promoting a lasting peace in the greater Middle East. Islamist terrorists will become more emboldened to strike us again here at home if they perceive us as weak and incapable of providing security in Iraq.

Finding out who an insurgent is in a town in Iraq may fit someone’s definition of tactical intelligence, but the nature of our mission in Iraq makes almost everything we do there of vital importance at the national level. People who perpetuate the distinction between “national” and “tactical” intelligence during our debate on intelligence reform simply do not understand the sophistication of our intelligence and communication systems.

The series of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) now in use and under development is a case in point. Early UAV versions probably fit the definition of “tactical intelligence systems” because of their limited range and capabilities, but not anymore. The Predator B, for example, is a long-endurance, high-altitude, unmanned aircraft system for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting missions. It also can be used as a weapons platform carrying air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles. In fact, an earlier version of the Predator tracked a vehicle in Yemen in 2002 carrying terrorists and destroyed it with a Hellfire missile.

These advanced UAVs collect their surveillance imagery from synthetic aperture radar, video cameras, and a forward-looking infra-red (FLIR) system, which can be distributed in real time to the front-line soldier, to the operational commander, and simultaneously to national intelligence agencies in near-real time via military satellite communication links. If a UAV like the Predator B is giving intelligence to a soldier in Iraq and to an analyst at the CIA at virtually the same time, then how can one define it as purely a “tactical” or a “national” system? The answer is, one can’t, and we need to get beyond this kind of limiting terminology and thinking.

As a current member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I was involved with the report released on 7 July 2004 by Senators Pat Roberts and Jay Rockefeller dealing with the intelligence community’s prewar assessments on Iraq.2 This 511-page report is another that’s highly critical of our intelligence analysis and collection capabilities. Like the House

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report mentioned earlier, it also singles out human intelligence as the weakest link in our intelligence chain.

It is important to note that in the Senate’s review of the intelligence relating to Iraq’s WMD programs, it became abundantly clear that our intelligence problems were not the result of the quality of our personnel. In fact, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was singularly impressed with the dedication and professionalism of the hard-working men and women in our intelligence community. What we need to do is give these people a new national intelligence structure that will be worthy of their efforts.

It is abundantly clear that we don’t have enough spies on the ground, and that we need to make this an issue of the highest priority. Yet somehow during the debates in Congress and among the political pundits in the media on intelligence reform, the focus shifted from fixing our HUMINT capabilities and further improving information-sharing within and among all relevant agencies of the government to discussing why there is such a large percentage of the total US intelligence budget in the Defense Department.

Improving—Not Degrading—Military Intelligence

As some see it, the military’s share of the overall intelligence budget, estimated at about 80 percent, is too large, and if a portion of this were transferred to the DNI our intelligence capabilities would somehow improve. The apportionment of the intelligence budget is a legitimate issue to discuss, but we should not allow it to divert our focus away from the pressing problems that need fixing, such as human intelligence and information-sharing.

HUMINT is a relatively inexpensive intelligence discipline compared to the high-technology systems and platforms used by the military. When we put a military intelligence satellite into orbit, the intelligence budget needs to pay for its research and development, its production, the launch vehicle, ground stations, support personnel, and communication links. And the military collects intelligence from a great variety of platforms. In addition to satellites, the military services use ships, submarines, aircraft, UAVs, ground vehicles, and small sensors used by individual soldiers on the ground. In order to move the resulting vast amounts of intelligence worldwide, securely and in near-real time, the military has built information networks that are the best in the world and continually improves them with new technologies. Consequently, it is not at all surprising that the military’s share of the intelligence budget is so large.

Last October, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, Chief of Intelligence for the Army, discussed the fusion of intelligence and communication networks. He noted that “the [communications] network must provide tactical teams with timely intelligence in minutes, not hours or days, which

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the Army calls ‘actionable’ intelligence. That’s what we have to get to. Additionally, such a network must eventually connect from a soldier on patrol through national-level agencies to truly leverage intelligence capabilities.” He also, correctly in my opinion, elevated the importance of HUMINT when he said, “Today’s threat is people embedded in the population, bent on changing governments to the way they believe those governments should be—a global insurgency. Thus, the intelligence emphasis has changed from one focused on signals and imagery intelligence to human intelligence and counterintelligence.”3

Another element that needs to be added to our national debate on intelligence reform is how the Director of National Intelligence will interact with the military and vice-versa. The DNI will inherit an intelligence community made up of 15 separate members, eight of which are in the Department of Defense. Collectively, these eight members are huge, comprising tens of thousands of uniformed military and civilian personnel, and multibillion-dollar budgets. How someone outside the military, like the DNI, could adequately and efficiently manage these vast intelligence capabilities by dealing with eight separate Department of Defense members is beyond me. This is a major issue, and it must be addressed; otherwise the DNI may have an unrealistically large span of control.

That is why I, in conjunction with my Democrat colleague from Nebraska, Senator Ben Nelson, plan to reintroduce legislation in the 109th Congress to create a unified combatant command for military intelligence, to be called INTCOM. This command would, for the first time, bring the majority of the intelligence capabilities in the Department of Defense under a single commander.

INTCOM would be the single point of contact for the DNI in dealing with military intelligence. The INTCOM Commander would have the dual responsibility of being the one source for informing the DNI of military intelligence requirements requiring support from the entire intelligence community, and being the one source for assigning military intelligence capabilities to assist in fulfilling the DNI’s broader intelligence responsibilities.

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One of the US Army’s nine Principles of War is Unity of Command. When this principle is properly used, there is a common focus on reduction of duplication and wasted efforts, vastly improved coordination, and—above all—accountability. The military already applies this principle very successfully to several functional areas, and has created unified combatant commands for transportation, joint forces, and special operations. The latter one, by the way, was established by legislation over the objections of the then-Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There is no objection today, however, to our Special Operations Command, or to any other unified command. The fact is, whenever the military has created either a functional or a geographic unified command, we have seen a better resulting focus on the mission, better support from the military services, and improved capabilities. A unified command for intelligence will have the same benefits.

One of the major responsibilities of the DNI will be to better integrate the current 15 members of the US intelligence community. The DNI’s task will be far easier to accomplish if there is an INTCOM Commander to coordinate the disparate eight Department of Defense members into one, thus reducing the total number of intelligence community members from 15 to eight.

Sharing Data

Another issue not yet addressed in our national debate on intelligence reform is the outdated intelligence cycle model that ends with a final intelligence product that very much reflects the bias of whatever organization “produced” the intelligence. Lest anyone have any doubts about the dangers associated with this type of intelligence cycle, reading the report prepared by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence dealing with WMD in Iraq will dispel them.

What the DNI will need to do is change the entire intelligence information management structure. The notion of “data ownership” must be eliminated if we are ever to have real “all-source” analysis. The minute one element of the intelligence community withholds some information from the rest of the community, then “all-source” loses its meaning.

Intelligence is not an end in itself, but it is an essential ingredient to formulating good policy and protecting our nation’s interests. The key is to harness all the information we have and put it into a form that is manageable and useful. Integral to this process is the ability to share the information with those who need it and to continually update it.

Consider a commercial travel website such as Expedia.com or Travelocity.com. When you want to travel on a certain date, you access the database, and the program gives you all possible flights, connections, times, prices, and will also help you make your hotel and rental-car reservations. In

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short, every bit of information about traveling to your destination is at your fingertips for you to make your decision. We need the equivalent of an Expedia.com or Travelocity.com for intelligence. Our analysts and policymakers should be able to access common databases where information is constantly being posted as it comes in so they can get the most complete and current picture possible.

The Road Ahead

The process of intelligence reform is just beginning, and there is a lot of important work ahead to make sure we get it right. We have made an important decision in creating a Director of National Intelligence who is not beholden to the CIA, the Department of Defense, or any other agency. It is a good step, but it is just the first step in a long process of intelligence reform.

If the new intelligence reform legislation does not allow us to “connect the dots” and provide more “dots to connect” to prevent further attacks on the United States and US interests, then we have failed in our effort to reform the intelligence community.

No one knows at this point if the new legislation will work or not. But it has a better chance to succeed it we keep focused on these points:

• Recognize the problems with HUMINT and take the necessary steps to fix it, including accepting the risks associated with it, so we can actually infiltrate organizations bent on our destruction.

• Improve the quality of congressional oversight of the intelligence community by instituting a subcommittee structure in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

• Organize military intelligence by bringing unity of command to the enormous defense intelligence community to better help the DNI succeed in bringing unity of effort to the broader intelligence community.

• Devise ways to improve information-sharing, and the management of enormous amounts of intelligence. In this regard, we could take some lessons from our commercial databases.

In the final analysis, we need to frame our debate on intelligence reform so it includes getting the right information, at the right time, to the right person, from the US President to the newest US Army private in harm’s way.


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NOTES

1. The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States by the 9/11 Commission (Washington: GPO, 22 July 2004).

2. US Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (Washington: GPO, 7 July 2004), http://intelligence.senate.gov/iraqreport2.pdf.

3. Remarks by Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, G-2 of the Army, at the Defense Writers Group breakfast, 14 October 2004.


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United States Senator Saxby Chambliss, a Republican representing Georgia, serves on the Senate Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committees. In the Congress, Senator Chambliss has been a strong voice on issues regarding national security, intelligence, and homeland security matters.


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The Trouble with History



ANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II


The distinguished historian Sir Michael Howard once admitted that the past, which he aptly referred to as an “inexhaustible storehouse of events,” could be used to “prove anything or its contrary.”1 Howard’s admission exposes an underlying problem with history that most historians prefer not to acknowledge. The past has indeed served many masters and conflicting purposes over time; its storehouse of events has been used to validate or discredit practically every major theory, precept, or principle. While historians are aware of this, few of them have actually taken the pains to examine what it is about history that permits the past to be used in such contradictory ways.

Their reluctance stems, at least in part, from a fundamental concern that the rigorous scrutiny necessary to arrive at the root of the problem might, at the same time, reveal the limits of history—limits that might in turn undermine the purported value that history and, thus, historians bring to education, especially military education. After all, professional military education, more than other forms, strives to impart a certain level of understanding across a broad array of topics in a relatively short period of time.

Accordingly, history faces stiff competition for curriculum space from other disciplines—the political and behavioral sciences, for instance—all of which claim (more or less dubiously) to be more relevant to the task of preparing military leaders to address contemporary challenges. The issue of relevance, for instance, while a favorite criterion of curriculum developers, is often overplayed. As a general rule, the greater the relevance of any particular knowledge, the shorter its shelf-life. Moreover, the problems that plague history and allow it to be abused are essentially epistemological in nature, and thus afflict the political and behavioral sciences as well.2 Therefore, while this article focuses on the troubles underlying history, it should not be construed as an argument for replacing history with another equally troubled discipline. On the contrary, despite the faults that will be discussed here, history has much to offer. But not in the way traditionally thought.

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The traditional argument in favor of including history in military education is that the vicarious experience it offers is the “most effective means of teaching war during peace.”3 That argument, however, is untenable. There is no reliable way to determine whether such experience is rooted in a close approximation of the past, or in a historian’s own imagination. Military professionals would benefit much more by engaging in a critical study of the past than by absorbing the anecdotal incidents of history. Accordingly, institutions responsible for educating military professionals should include a brief course in historiography designed to teach students what history is—a body of knowledge that is incomplete, deeply flawed in places, and essentially and inescapably dynamic. Moreover, emphasizing that students must view the past analytically, rather than vicariously, facilitates the development of their critical thinking skills—skills that have an enduring quality and will serve military officers well into the future.

History and the Past

History, contrary to popular assumption, is not the past. The terms are commonly, but incorrectly, used interchangeably. The past, simply put, is what happened. History, in contrast, is the historian’s interpretation of what happened. As Michael Howard stressed, history is merely what “historians write.”4 Carl Becker, the renowned American historian of the early 20th century, put it somewhat differently when he noted that history is little more than the collective “memory of things said and done.”5 Thus, history is just like human memory—fallible and prone to selective recall. As such, it is also highly idiosyncratic, and inevitably imperfect.6 Hence, as E. H. Carr, a British historian of considerable note, warned, one must “study the historian before studying the facts.”7

The rub for historians is that the available evidence concerning the past is rarely sufficient, or is too abundant, to permit of only one interpretation. (Of course, one could say the same of the present.) Indeed, historians sometimes resort to educated guesses to fill the gaps left by insufficient evi-

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dence. Natalie Zemon Davis, a respected historian at Princeton University and author of the widely acclaimed historical work Return of Martin Guerre, used her “historical imagination” to compensate for a lack of evidence about the feelings and motives of her central character, Martin Guerre’s wife.8 Davis essentially invented what Guerre’s wife said and did based on her assessment of the attitudes of other women of that period; Davis remains convinced that her historical imagination, cultivated by extensive immersion in the available sources, led her to a correct interpretation. However, the lack of hard evidence to support her view means that other interpretations are certainly possible. Thus, while historians may be certain of the correctness of their interpretations, those views are not necessarily universal and would not necessarily hold up under cross-examination.

The fundamental problem for historians is that, aside from being able to refer to such demonstrable facts as do exist, they have no objective references for determining (beyond a reasonable doubt) to what extent the histories they write either capture or deviate from the past. Put differently, they have nothing resembling the scientific method to aid them in determining whether what they have written is somewhat right, mostly right, or altogether wrong about the past. Quantitative history, intellectual history, “history from below,” and oral history, for example, each employ different methods. Yet none of those procedures can lay claim to the reliability of the scientific method—that is, developing a question or a hypothesis, conducting experiments to test it, revising the original hypothesis, then conducting further experiments to confirm the revised hypothesis, and finally reaching a conclusion.

Although historians may begin their research with a question or hypothesis, they cannot conduct the various experiments necessary to determine whether the main conclusions they have drawn about what happened are in fact valid.9 They cannot duplicate Pickett’s charge at the battle of Gettysburg with all the variables exactly as they were, for instance, and then change a few of them to determine whether the Confederate assault might have succeeded under different circumstances: earlier or later in the day, perhaps, or further to the left, or more to the right.10 Nor can they isolate the variables in a past event for closer study in the same way scientists—chemists, for example—can separate the key elements in a compound. Removing all the elements surrounding Pickett’s charge does not make the charge any easier to understand. In fact, without the historical context, the past is likely to remain essentially mute, unable to tell us much about itself. We might not be able to recognize Pickett’s charge itself as a charge.

To be sure, historians do have recourse to certain subjective measures—such as their abundant reviews of each other’s books and access to the advice of other, perhaps more accomplished, historians—to aid them in cap-

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turing the past. However, subjective measures tend merely to reinforce a veritable Cartesian circle of interpretation: historians write what they do based in part on the fragments of the past, but how they see those fragments is largely influenced by knowledge they have gained in the present, including the works of other historians who may indeed only be offering their best guesses as to what those fragments mean. This proved to be the case with historical interpretations of military thinking before the First World War; historians tended to view that era’s military theory and doctrine through a “lens colored red by the seemingly prolonged and futile slaughter of 1914-18,” and thus reinforced one another in a series of misunderstandings.11 In addition, the impact of recent events or experiences sometimes causes historians to focus on factors and values that are quite different from what the historical actors had in mind—perhaps giving those factors and values an artificial existence. Hence, the present, as historian Christopher Bassford once noted, serves as “prologue” to the past.12 As Carl Becker explained, “Left to themselves, the facts do not speak. . . . [F]or all practical purposes there is no fact until someone affirms it.”13 And affirming a fact, of course, shapes how it is understood. Thus, historians tend to see in the past what they have been trained to see, or—for those inclined to buck convention (which requires a certain training of its own)—what they want to see. Neither tendency is necessarily wrong. Yet neither is necessarily right, either.14

The problem is not so much that history is a “fable agreed upon,” as Napoleon reportedly said, but that, except for those accounts that blatantly contradict or disregard the available facts, the reader cannot determine objectively which history is more accurate than another. Ultimately, historical truth, like beauty, remains in the eye of the beholder.

History and Historical Truth

For their part, historians have long struggled to overcome the lack of objective references or methodologies in their craft. German historians of the 19th century thought they could arrive at a more “complete Truth” by insinuating the historian’s own intellect or spirit (Geist) into historical writing.15 Leopold von Ranke, considered by some to be the father of modern history, said that the historian’s spirit needed to become one with the historical spirit that “dwells within the sources.”16 Historians of the German General Staff took this approach to a self-serving extreme, claiming that their professional training gave them a special insight, an intuitive feel or sense (Takt) for the past.17 Unfortunately, they sometimes used that insight to rewrite history in ways that supported their own doctrinal predilections. More recently, a historian by the name of Terence Zuber, who has had experience in the Bundeswehr, has resorted to a similar claim of special insight as a product of his military experi-

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ence to support his reinterpretation of the Schlieffen plan. Other modern-day historians, such as Natalie Zemon Davis, call it using the historian’s imagination, which at root differs little from Ranke’s approach. Ironically, then, the historian’s claim of historical truth often rests on no firmer a foundation than his or her imagination. While imagination may play an important role in human understanding, it can be difficult to distinguish from mere wishful thinking.

Another school of thought goes so far as to claim that historians can overcome the ineluctable shortcomings of subjective interpretation by wholly embracing subjectivism itself. Its central assumption is that by arriving at “the sum total of all possible subjectivities,” historians can achieve an objective interpretation of the past.18 However, this approach overlooks the reality that an infinite number of subjective interpretations of the past are possible; we would need an eternity to accumulate all of them, and another eternity to read and understand them. Moreover, this view implies that we must know everything before we can know anything, which—in an epistemological sense—is patently absurd.19 Even if we could amass all subjective interpretations of the past, our subsequent interpretation of those interpretations would ultimately—and quite paradoxically—be a subjective one.

Another approach, suggested by historian Peter Novick, author of That Noble Dream, recommends that historians abandon the idea of historical truth, or objectivity, altogether and turn instead to plausibility.20 This view resembles one recently put forward by John Gaddis, namely, that historical interpretation should try to reach “a consensus of rational opinion over the widest possible field.”21 Plausibility is a prerequisite to achieving consensus. However, these comparable solutions merely put history on par with historical fiction. Fiction writers, especially authors of historical fiction, such as Michael Shaara who wrote Killer Angels and other novels about the Civil War, can also lay claim to plausibility. Shaara’s depiction of Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg is at least plausible, and it is largely based on the existing historical literature—the prevailing scholarly consensus—about Lee. Thus, without an objective standard of some sort, plausibility hardly separates history from popular fiction.

Even if historians could find a way to write objective history, the history they would be able to write would still be incomplete. Their ability to write about the past depends on what is or can be known about the past, and that changes as access to the past changes and as our ways of understanding change. Newly opened archives permit historians to rewrite history with a more informed perspective. However, that perspective is not necessarily more complete, because new evidence tends to raise new questions, new doubts. Also, the history considered true or credible by one generation is sometimes completely overturned or rewritten by a later one equipped with different frames of

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reference or ways of understanding. Military history once focused almost exclusively on military factors, overlooking the roles of culture, politics, and economics, for instance. Now, however, a new generation of historians has made military history more comprehensive, including the influence of such cultural factors as race and gender. Thus, history—being what historians write—is dynamic rather than static; it changes as our knowledge of the past changes, and it changes as our ways of understanding change.22

Yet these changes do not necessarily move history forward. History is not inherently self-corrective, because, as every author knows, revisions do not always make a thing better. Practically everything of significance that Azar Gat’s book The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz offers as new or original concerning Clausewitz’s thinking was already said by Peter Paret in his work Clausewitz and the State, though one actually has to read Paret’s book to know that.23 Moreover, history is often revised for the sake of fame, if not fortune, or even for the sake of some rather more sinister motives: the “Holocaust-denial” literature comes to mind as perhaps the most egregious example.24 Finally, so-called “corrected” history may arrive, like the proverbial Owl of Minerva, too late to prevent major harm to those who desire—or are required—to learn from the past. The claim that history will eventually “get it right” is thus of little comfort, for it is nigh impossible to tell when the “right” history has come, and the “wrong” has left.

While some historians have made substantial, even ground-breaking, contributions to our knowledge of the past, none of those contributions has ever been complete enough, or so free of error, as to amount to the final word on a subject, despite many a publisher’s claim to the contrary. For instance, a number of historical controversies, some centuries old, still remain unresolved. As Howard reminds us, such controversies usually end because “the participants are tired of them rather than because a consensus has been reached on which all can agree and which provides a firm platform for the proclamation of reliable conclusions.”25 As a case in point, historian Terence Zuber, mentioned earlier, recently cast some doubt on a number of long-held beliefs about Germany’s so-called Schlieffen plan of 1914.26 Zuber maintains that the Schlieffen plan was never intended as an actual war plan, and that it was merely a ruse to dupe the German parliament into increasing the budget for the Kaiser’s army.27 While Zuber exposes some of the flaws in Gerhard Ritter’s critique of the Schlieffen plan, which has long stood as the accepted view, there is simply no compelling evidence to support Zuber’s own contention.28 Zuber recklessly extends his argument too far and, when called out by other historians to present his evidence, generally resorts to the “special insight” his military training has given him, as if that were all the evidence needed. To be sure, our understanding of the Schlieffen plan, particularly as it is currently taught in the

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major institutions responsible for military education, requires revision. Nonetheless, we should not fully accept Zuber’s view, unless he produces some compelling evidence.

Unfortunately, the lack of objective measures for historians means that the body of literature known as history only grows larger, with good and bad contributions often sitting side-by-side on library bookshelves.29 So, caveat lector (let the reader beware).

Implications for Military Professionals

Traditionally, history’s importance to professional military education rested on the assumption that it could “exercise and develop” the “professional judgment” of officers through the analysis and critique of campaigns and battles of the past.30 Since soldiers have few means of practicing their craft during peacetime, so the reasoning went, the reading of history offered them a way to acquire experience of war during times of peace.31 It was also largely assumed that this experience, though vicarious, could teach the military professional the “lessons” of the past. The military theorist Sir Basil Liddell Hart held this view, explaining that history could show the “right direction” to take, even if it could not give “detailed information about the road conditions.”32 More recently, some institutions responsible for educating military professionals have added the goal of “historical consciousness” or “historical mindedness”—meaning an awareness of how change takes place over time and an appreciation for the ways in which political, social, and economic forces influence people and events.

The passage below, drawn from an essay by General John Galvin, reveals the importance attributed to vicarious experience in the education of military professionals:

The reader swelters with Lawrence in the burning Arabian sands and learns the brutality and fluidity of guerrilla warfare. He gasps at Chandler’s description of the genius Napoleon arising at midnight to dictate his orders through the night to set the stage for the battle. He hammers at Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia with Grant’s memoirs; overcomes the terror of the Burmese jungle and turns defeat into victory with Slim; unravels the conceptual threads of battle and maneuver with Delbrück; relates war to nuclear weapons to politics with Brodie; freezes in Korea with Marshall at the river and the gauntlet; and cries out with MacDonald at the inanities of the Kall trail before Schmidt.

In the end he emerges as a veteran—more inured to the shock of the unexpected, better prepared to weigh the consequences of critical decisions, and imbued with the human drama breaking upon leaders and led in their march to destiny. He knows the fine line between foolhardiness and courage, between abstinence and conviction, between disgrace and glory. He has had a conversa-

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tion with the soldiers of all time and has shared their lives and thoughts. His judgment is sharpened, and he is better prepared to lead.33

What is often overlooked by such claims is that this vicarious experience, already highly dependent upon one’s imaginative powers, derives not from the past itself, but from a historian’s idiosyncratic and imperfect interpretation of the past—a dubious foundation, indeed. Although historian David Chandler was an acclaimed expert on Napoleon, his portrayal of Bonaparte’s purported genius in The Campaigns of Napoleon is only one of many.34 Any reader would at least want to consider the views of Owen Connelly, Geoffrey Ellis, and Russell Weigley as well.35 S. L. A. Marshall’s reports of combat actions in Korea were not based on his own eyewitness accounts, but derived mostly from selective interviews conducted after the fact; moreover, they were written not with accuracy in mind, but for the express purpose of creating a dramatic effect.36 Hans Delbrück’s dichotomy of battle and maneuver proved a false one. He actually made more significant contributions in the area of historical criticism, by emphasizing rigorous fact and source checking (Sachkritik and Wortkritik)—an emphasis that helped sweep away the “underbrush of legend” that generally surrounded the history of his day.37 The memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant and Sir William Slim, though remarkably captivating, are ultimately no more reliable than human memory; both make use of facts, be they letters, dispatches, or something else.38 Yet, in the reconstruction—the narrative of events—memory fills in the gaps, and the gaps may be quite significant indeed. Hence, the vicarious experience, lessons, and historical consciousness that history is believed to provide may be based more on fiction than fact.

Even if history were less idiosyncratic and more objective, drawing lessons or insights from the past or building a historical consciousness would still remain potentially dangerous enterprises. Each event in the past’s “inexhaustible storehouse of events” was caused by a set of unique circumstances that are never exactly replicated, and that historians can never fully capture. The lessons and awareness drawn from those circumstances would not necessarily prove valid in other situations. Consequently, the only lessons that history can provide are the kind that do not rise above the level of common sense: things sometimes happen that are unforeseen, be alert, be careful, and choose wisely. Similarly, the historical consciousness it offers may be more false than true.

History, Historians, and Military Professionals

Does all this mean that there is no role for history or historians in professional military education? Quite the contrary. History’s saving grace is the saving grace of the humanities in general. Which is to say it can help students understand that beyond the well-balanced world of simple mathematics—

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where both sides of an equation remain equal—definitive answers are not always possible. Some answers must await more information, whenever it may come, and some answers may never be known. In the world of the humanities, as with most of the practical world, it is often necessary to make decisions based on incomplete information, with the understanding that the answer is tentative and may be completely wrong. This realization is an important one for those on the path to higher education.

The role that history should serve in professional military education is not that of a foundation for experiencing war vicariously, but as a way to develop higher-level critical thinking skills. The objective of professional military education should not be to recreate or relive past battles (for that is simply to indulge in fantasizing), but to move students along a progression from simple knowledge of facts to higher levels if comprehension. One model of such progression is the taxonomy of cognitive outcomes developed nearly 50 years ago by Benjamin Bloom and others, shown at Figure 1.39 The model is not without its shortcomings, regarded as too scientific by some and not scientific enough by others. Yet, the point is that it is a model, and models help give expression to potential outcomes or goals by providing a conceptual structure.

It is worth noting that under Bloom’s model, the final two stages— which some experts consider of equal difficulty—force the student to employ the very different but complementary skills of creative and critical thinking. The last, in particular, requires the ability to acknowledge when something cannot be fully known, and why. The goal of progressing through the taxonomy is to build an appreciation for the limits of rational thought. Because it furthers that appreciation, history—like the other branches of the humanities—offers something of truly incontrovertible and, indeed, lasting value, especially for military professionals learning about the complexities of strategy.

Like any model, however, Bloom’s taxonomy should not be allowed to become the new orthodoxy, the institutional straitjacket into which all methods of teaching must fit. Indeed, in order to permit progress toward the very goals it articulates, Bloom’s taxonomy must also be subjected to rigorous critical analysis. Research into, and examination of, other models must therefore be supported.

Historians thus perform a valuable service in education in general, and professional military education in particular, by facilitating the development of critical and creative thinking skills, that is, by equipping students to examine historical interpretations rigorously and then by holding them to a high standard when developing their own, all the while stressing that definitive answers may forever remain out of reach. Taking the historian out of history amounts to taking interpretation out of the past, leaving the reader with little more than sterile chronicles of names, dates, and events—a solution that would

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Level
Definition
Sample Verbs
Sample Behaviors


Knowledge
Student recalls or
recognizes information, ideas, and principles
in the approximate form in which they were learned.
Write
List
Label
Name
State
Define
The student will define
the six levels of Bloom’s
taxonomy of the
cognitive domain.


Comprehension
Student translates,
comprehends, or
interprets information
based on prior learning.
Explain
Summarize
Paraphrase
Describe
Illustrate
The student will explain
the purpose of Bloom’s
taxonomy of the
cognitive domain.


Application
Student selects, transfers, and uses data and
principles to complete a problem or task with a minimum of direction.
Use
Compute
Solve
Demonstrate
Apply
Construct
The student will write
an instructional objective
for each level of
Bloom’s taxonomy.


Analysis
Student distinguishes, classifies, and relates the assumptions, hypotheses, evidence, or structure of a statement or question.
Analyze
Categorize
Compare
Contrast
Separate
The student will compare and contrast the cognitive and affective domains.


Synthesis
Student originates,
integrates, and combines ideas into a product, plan,
or proposal that is new to him or her.
Create
Design
Hypothesize
Invent
Develop
The student will design a classification scheme for writing educational
objectives that combines the cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains.


Evaluation
Student appraises,
assesses, or critiques on a basis of specific
standards and criteria.
Judge
Recommend
Critique
Justify
The student will judge the effectiveness of writing
objectives using
Bloom’s taxonomy.


Figure 1. Bloom’s Taxonomy of Cognitive Outcomes.


likely please neither the person who chronicles the events nor the person who must read about them. For their part, historians are after what Jack Hexter, one of the more famous and controversial of historians, once called that “elusive entity—the Truth.”40 They want to understand what really happened, whether or not it is actually possible to do so, and then to explain why it happened. Institutions of higher learning need professionals possessed of just such a “determination to find things out,” whether they succeed or not.41 Thus, the most valuable contribution that history and historians can make—and why they should remain integral to higher education—is that they attempt to understand things that lie outside the realm of certainty. Their answers may be flawed, but it would be unsatisfactory for the human species to limit itself to knowing only those things that can be verified by the scientific method.

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Similarly, professional military education must equip students to understand the difference between historical reality (which, like the reality of the present, we may never fully know) and attempts to describe it. It must refrain from reinforcing the tendency among military students to regard history as, in Liddell Hart’s term, a “sentimental treasure.”42 Military professionals are better served by learning to be critical of the history that historians write, by building a habit of rigorously scrutinizing facts and sources, and of detecting biases and specious arguments, and by developing an eye for penetrating the myths that surround the past. They should regard the history they read, as Gaddis advises, as something between art and science.43 They must learn that a prerequisite to building a strong argument is the ability to recognize a weak one.

To be sure, military professionals will find this difficult to do because throughout their careers they have been searching for commonalities— parallels and patterns—that permit them to accumulate knowledge and arrange it in a way that makes it available for application later. They have not necessarily been looking for formulae, but their emphasis has been on accumulating and distilling knowledge rather than analyzing and evaluating it. They have been sorting through vast amounts of data seeking objective truths—or signposts that point out the “right direction,” as Liddell Hart mentioned—that they can trust to guide them in the future. However, they need to remember that the signposts they extract from history may be valid only for a landscape that differs significantly from their own in terms of time, space, and local inhabitants.

As military professionals begin to move through Bloom’s taxonomy, they will eventually come to understand the limits of history. As they do so, history will fall from the pedestal on which they had once placed it. After all, they once thought history and the past were the same. Yet, in the long run, the value of history as a means to help them move toward more sophisticated levels of understanding will grow. With a little patience and persistence, they may even write a history of their own.


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NOTES

1. Michael Howard, “‘The Lessons of History’: An Inaugural Lecture given in the University of Oxford, March 1981,” in The Lessons of History (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1991), p. 11.

2. The same can also be said of the political and social sciences. Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d ed.; Chicago: Univ. Press of Chicago, 1970) reveals how rarely the sciences act like sciences.

3. Attributed to Count Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891), http://cbnet/orgs/dnss/history/core.htm.

4. Howard, “Lessons,” p. 11.

5. Carl L. Becker, “What is Evidence? The Relativist View—‘Everyman His Own Historian,’” in The Historian as Detective: Essays on Evidence, ed. Robin W. Winks (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 7.

6. Even Sir Michael Howard and Peter Paret, esteemed historians both, committed errors regarding one of the centerpieces of their work together, Carl von Clausewitz. They got Clausewitz’s middle name wrong. Howard had it as “Maria”—which was similar to the name of Clausewitz’s wife, Marie; see Michael Howard, Clausewitz (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1983), p. 6. Paret came closer; he had it as Philipp Gottlieb, an error also repeated by Azar Gat, who recorded it as Philip Gottlieb. See Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,

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1976), p. 14; and Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 171. However, on Clausewitz’s tombstone, which presumably is based on his birth records, the name appears as Philipp Gottfried. See http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/FAQs.html#Name. On the other hand, the tombstone might be wrong, which only reinforces the point about history’s fallibility.

7. E. H. Carr, What is History? (2d ed.; London: Palgrave, 1987), p. 30.

8. Natalie Zemon Davis, The Return of Martin Guerre (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1983). Robert Finlay, “The Refashioning of Martin Guerre,” American Historical Review, 93 (June 1988), 553-71, criticizes Natalie Davis for making the people of the past say and do things that are not supported by the sources. Davis responds in, “On the Lame,” American Historical Review, 93 (June 1988), 572-603. For another example of historical invention, see Robert Darnton’s The Great Cat Massacre (New York: Basic Books, 1983), which assigns historical significance to an event—a massacre of cats—for which no evidence actually exists. Harold Mah, “Suppressing the Text: The Metaphysics of Ethnographic History in Darnton’s Great Cat Massacre,” History Workshop Journal, 31 (Spring 1991), 1-20, critiques Darnton. Richard J. Evans, In Defense of History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), pp. 212-14, discusses the works of both Davis and Darnton.

9. Siegfried Kracauer, History: The Last Things before the Last (Princeton, N.J.: Marcus Wiener, 1994), pp. 47-48, discusses the differences between the scientific method and the method of the historian.

10. Carol Reardon, Pickett’s Charge in History and Memory (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina, 1997).

11. Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers before the Great War (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2001), pp. 7-8.

12. Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994), p. 7.

13. Becker, “What is Evidence?” p. 19.

14. Although dissimilar in many regards, the post-structuralist theories of Michel Foucault, the deconstructionist notions of Jacques Derrida, and Dominick LaCapra’s techniques of literary criticism all have one thing in common—they