An examination of Iraqi resistance, terrorism, insurgency and organized crime
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Veterans for Common Sense (VCS) publishes a series of policy briefs on various topics related to national security, civil liberties and human rights, veterans issues and energy policy.
Policy Brief No. 2, Discussion Draft
June 2005
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Executive Summary
The Iraqi insurgency consists of a complex mix of organizations and groups with different methods of operation, motives, and personnel, defying easy classification. Key elements in this mix include Sunni and Iraqi nationalists, former regime elements fighting due to loss of power and prestige, foreign (and local) jihadists who see Iraq as the key battleground between the United States and al-Qaeda, and sectarian militias allied to specific political or religious parties.
The continuing growth of the insurgency is driven by a number of factors, including anger and distrust of U.S. forces, economic devastation and unemployment, extremely slow physical reconstruction, and the inability of either coalition forces or the transitional government to protect the public from increasing levels of violent crime. In particular, the Iraqi public justifiably believes that the emphasis of U.S. forces is more on capturing and killing insurgents than on protecting the public. Consequently, despite having captured or killed some 15,000 insurgents in the last year, the number of insurgents has grown rather than diminished.
The public discussion of the insurgency fails to reflect key realities. Without substantial changes in policy by the United States and the Iraqi Transition Government, there remains a substantial risk of failure in Iraq. Such a failure carries a number of associated risks: a return to some form of dictatorship; long-term sectarian conflict in that country, the creation of a solely religious based government (either Sunni or Shi’a); the separation of the Kurdish north into an independent nation, inviting war with Turkey; or long-term escalation of U.S. forces.
These risks can be avoided, but significant policy changes must be made by the United States and the transition government of Iraq in order to do so. This report makes a number of recommendations both to the United States and Iraq to help avoid the most serious of those risks and increase the likelihood of ending the war in Iraq.
Contents
Introduction
Examining the Insurgency
Major Armed Groups in Iraq
Other Armed Groups in Iraq
Factors Driving the Insurgency
Conclusions
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