Anthony Cordesman of CSIS acts in some ways as the weather vane of 'uncommitted' opinion about Iraq. In this article in today's Financial Times he analyses the way ahead. The key variable may be the assessment of the insurgency. The US military view, which Cordesman reflects, is that this has stopped growing. If true, this would be an important development. A new slogan has been making the rounds recently. Rather than 'cut and run' we now hear 'cut and walk.' Perhaps this is what the US options come down to.
America has two choices in Iraq: exit or success
By Anthony Cordesman
Published: August 4 2005 21:20 | Last updated: August 4 2005 21:20
No one can question the fact that the months since the Iraqi election have been grim. Whatever US politicians may say, US intelligence experts see no decline in the insurgency in Iraq. Insurgent tactics have changed to focus increasingly on Iraqi officials and military, security and police personnel. Bloody suicide bombings of Shias, Kurds and Sunnis supporting the government have been combined with more ambushes, kidnappings and assassinations of Americans, Britons, Iraqis and any other target that could help push the country towards civil war, paralyse the political process and drive foreigners out. There are bad days and good ones, and a single improvised bomb can kill 14 US troops, as we saw this week.
The political process remains highly uncertain. No one knows whether a constitution will be drafted on time and, if so, whether it will resolve any critical issues, and whether enough provinces will vote to support it. The prospect of yet another government and election is equally uncertain. Tensions between Arab Sunni and Shia are growing, alongside Kurdish demands for federalism and control of oil revenue. The role of religion in the state is a significant issue. Basra risks becoming a Shia fundamentalist enclave, and tensions in Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk are high.
Economic success seems equally distant. Regardless of US-led efforts to put a spin on current developments, far too much of the aid process is a failure. Once wartime profiteering is subtracted, most areas of the economy are in decline and unemployment is at the crisis level – particularly in the Sunni areas that are the source of most insurgency. Electricity, water and other services are barely creeping back to prewar levels, and crime is a big economic and personal problem – one with more impact on the lives of many Iraqis than the insurgency.
Yet, the odds are still far too close to call in Iraq. The insurgents have no sanctuaries and do not seem to be increasing in number. They win no battles. The number of trained Iraqi forces has expanded from about 96,000 in 2004 to more than 173,000, and is rapidly growing towards a target of 270,000. The number of Iraqi combat battalions available has gone from just one in July 2004 to more than 100 today. More than 40 per cent of these battalions can play a useful role in security efforts and a handful can stand alone in demanding missions. If Coalition and Iraqi government plans succeed, they will reach serious numbers of deployable battalions by year-end and by 2006, will be a major force of military, security and police units.
Despite Iraq’s considerable problems, the country’s new leaders have sought to be inclusive and have resisted ethnic and religious purges and confrontations. The political process has moved forward. Despite economic problems, Iraqis largely remain optimistic about their future. The situation is fragile but certainly not hopeless.
This is the context in which all the conflicting media reports about looming US withdrawals should be kept. No one can guarantee that a “success strategy” will work, but the Bush administration and senior commanders in Iraq still see continuing commitment as a better option than any form of “exit strategy”. Anyone who talks seriously to the policymakers and military planners involved knows they are not trying to rush US forces out before the political process stabilises and before Iraqi forces can take over a large part of the mission.
Even then, US planners are talking only of phased reductions. The Bush administration would like to reduce US forces from about 130,000 to well below 100,000 no later than the summer of 2006, and by early 2006 if possible. It would like to reduce the profile of Coalition forces in dealing with Iraqis by the end of 2006, if possible. “Possible”, however, means reacting to the pace of Iraqi success – not some fixed timetable for reductions. It also means leaving strong elements of US forces as long as they are needed, and sustaining US military and economic aid for five to 10 years. Furthermore, senior administration officials know too well how the Bush legacy from the kind of exit that meant defeat would be viewed, and how a move towards such failure would affect the mid-term election in November 2006. In short, the Bush administration is still pursuing a success strategy rather than an exit strategy. It could fail, as could the effort to create a modern and more democratic Iraq. But it also could succeed.
The writer, chair of strategy at the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, is author of Iraqi Force Development, (CSIS/Praeger) to be published in November