--------------------
Approval of Iraq Charter Seems Likely
--------------------
Results from key regions point to approval of the draft constitution, officials say. Analysts warn that a high turnout may not end insurgency.
By Borzou Daragahi
Times Staff Writer
October 17 2005
BAGHDAD; Iraq's controversial draft constitution appeared headed toward approval in a nationwide referendum, according to official comments and unofficial early figures, as ballot counting continued Sunday.
The complete article can be viewed at:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...-home-headlines
Full Version: Iraq News Volume 7 September 14, 2005
Common Ground Common Sense > Issues that Affect Our Lives > Foreign Policy and National Defense > Foreign Policy & National Defense Issues Archive
http://fairuse.1accesshost.com/news2/long-iraq.html
Administration's Tone Signals a Longer, Broader Iraq Conflict
By DAVID E. SANGER
WASHINGTON, Oct. 16
For most of the 30 months since American-led forces ousted Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration has argued that as democracy took hold in Iraq, the insurgency would lose steam, because Al Qaeda and the opponents of the country's interim government had nothing to offer Iraqis or the people of the Middle East.
President Bush has often repeated that argument. Earlier this year, for example, he made the case to troops at Fort Bragg, N.C., that as democratic institutions took root in Iraq and beyond, "the terrorists will lose their sponsors, lose their recruits, and lose their hopes for turning that region into a base for attacks on America and our allies around the world."
On Sunday, as he returned to Washington from Camp David, Md., Mr. Bush celebrated what may be the biggest step yet in his administration's project to rebuild Iraq from the ground up: the holding of a nationwide referendum on a new constitution accompanied by little insurgent activity. But inside the administration, even that seems to provide little solace. Senior officials say the intelligence reports flowing over their desks in recent months argue that even if democratic institutions take hold, the insurgency may strengthen.
Even so, several officials on Sunday repeated their conviction that, sooner or later, the insurgency will collapse. "There is no political base any longer for this insurgency," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on "Fox News Sunday." "The Sunnis are joining the base of this broad political process. That will ultimately undo this insurgency. But of course, they can still pull off violent and spectacular attacks."
In recent weeks, though, Mr. Bush's description of the future, in Iraq and beyond, has undergone a subtle but significant change. In several speeches, he has begun warning that the insurgency is already metastasizing into a far broader struggle to "establish a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia." While he still predicts victory, he appears to be preparing the country for a struggle of cold war proportions.
It is a very different tone than administration officials sounded in the heady days after Saddam Hussein's fall, and then his capture.
After an extensive debate inside the White House, Mr. Bush has begun directly rebutting the arguments laid out in manifestos and missives from Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mr. bin Laden's top aide. He did so again on Saturday, quoting from one of Mr. Zawahiri's purported letters - one whose authenticity is still the subject of some question - predicting that the Iraq war would end like Vietnam did, and that, in Mr. Bush's words, "America can be made to run again." He argued anew that the terrorist leader was "gravely mistaken."
"There's always the question of whether we give these guys more credibility by directly addressing their arguments," one of Mr. Bush's most senior aides said recently. "But the president was concerned that we hadn't described Iraq to the American people for what it is - a struggle of ideologies that isn't going to end with one election, or one constitution, or even a string of elections."
For an administration that has recalibrated and re-explained its strategy in Iraq many times in the past 30 months, that latest turn may be a recognition of changed realities.
A year ago, Mr. Bush interpreted his re-election as a public embrace of his strategy and its willingness to bear the cost in lives and money to get Iraq on its feet. But now, the pressure is building for a pathway out. The passage of the constitution, some of Mr. Bush's political aides say, is bound to fuel those calls.
"All fall, we've been hearing the question, 'When does this begin to end?' " one of Mr. Bush's senior strategists said a few weeks ago, insisting on anonymity because of the delicacy of the issue inside the White House. The White House, he added, was trying to head off what some officials fear could be a broader split in the party over the war come spring, as midterm elections approach and Republicans seeking re-election are tempted to join the call for a timetable for drawing down troop levels.
The change is clear in what Mr. Bush is saying - but also in what he and his aides are no longer saying.
In the prelude to the war and in the early days of the occupation, Mr. Bush and top members of his national security team compared the effort to remake Iraq to the American occupations of Japan and Germany. As the insurgency grew - a feature missing from those two successful occupations - they dropped that comparison. Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state under Colin L. Powell, argued in an interview recently published by an Australian magazine, The Diplomat, that it was a flawed way of thinking from the start.
"Those who argued at the time that the acceptance of democracy in Iraq would be easy, and who drew on our experience with Japan and Germany, were wrong," he said. "First of all, Germany and Japan were homogeneous societies. Iraq is not." He added that the German and Japanese populations were "exhausted and deeply shocked by what had happened," but that Iraqis were "un-shocked and un-awed."
Now administration officials are beginning to describe the insurgency as long-lasting, more akin to Communist insurgencies in Malaysia or the Philippines, but with a broader and more deadly base. Even conservatives who supported Mr. Bush's decision to go to war say the change in tone is welcome.
"I think the president has been consistent," said Eliot A. Cohen, a professor at Johns Hopkins University who has written extensively on the nature of civilian command and is sometimes consulted by the administration. "But they've had people, myself among them, beating them up for happy talk and not making an argument" about the nature of the struggle.
"I do think they are making more of an effort to explain themselves," he added. "But it took pressure from their friends, and political pressure as well, to overcome a reluctance about what they were really doing."
Others take a harsher view. Kenneth Pollack, a former C.I.A. analyst and now a scholar at the Brookings Institution, said Mr. Bush's new tone reflected "the fact that their whole theory about how this is going to work out isn't working, and almost certainly isn't going to work." He added, "The theory that democracy is the antidote to insurgency gets disproven on the ground every day."
The real test may come after parliamentary elections, which, if the constitution is found to have passed this weekend, are scheduled for mid-December. After that time, a senior administration official noted with some dread in his voice, "there are no more democratic landmarks for us to point to - that's when we learn whether the Iraqi state can stay together."
Administration's Tone Signals a Longer, Broader Iraq Conflict
By DAVID E. SANGER
WASHINGTON, Oct. 16
For most of the 30 months since American-led forces ousted Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration has argued that as democracy took hold in Iraq, the insurgency would lose steam, because Al Qaeda and the opponents of the country's interim government had nothing to offer Iraqis or the people of the Middle East.
President Bush has often repeated that argument. Earlier this year, for example, he made the case to troops at Fort Bragg, N.C., that as democratic institutions took root in Iraq and beyond, "the terrorists will lose their sponsors, lose their recruits, and lose their hopes for turning that region into a base for attacks on America and our allies around the world."
On Sunday, as he returned to Washington from Camp David, Md., Mr. Bush celebrated what may be the biggest step yet in his administration's project to rebuild Iraq from the ground up: the holding of a nationwide referendum on a new constitution accompanied by little insurgent activity. But inside the administration, even that seems to provide little solace. Senior officials say the intelligence reports flowing over their desks in recent months argue that even if democratic institutions take hold, the insurgency may strengthen.
Even so, several officials on Sunday repeated their conviction that, sooner or later, the insurgency will collapse. "There is no political base any longer for this insurgency," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on "Fox News Sunday." "The Sunnis are joining the base of this broad political process. That will ultimately undo this insurgency. But of course, they can still pull off violent and spectacular attacks."
In recent weeks, though, Mr. Bush's description of the future, in Iraq and beyond, has undergone a subtle but significant change. In several speeches, he has begun warning that the insurgency is already metastasizing into a far broader struggle to "establish a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia." While he still predicts victory, he appears to be preparing the country for a struggle of cold war proportions.
It is a very different tone than administration officials sounded in the heady days after Saddam Hussein's fall, and then his capture.
After an extensive debate inside the White House, Mr. Bush has begun directly rebutting the arguments laid out in manifestos and missives from Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mr. bin Laden's top aide. He did so again on Saturday, quoting from one of Mr. Zawahiri's purported letters - one whose authenticity is still the subject of some question - predicting that the Iraq war would end like Vietnam did, and that, in Mr. Bush's words, "America can be made to run again." He argued anew that the terrorist leader was "gravely mistaken."
"There's always the question of whether we give these guys more credibility by directly addressing their arguments," one of Mr. Bush's most senior aides said recently. "But the president was concerned that we hadn't described Iraq to the American people for what it is - a struggle of ideologies that isn't going to end with one election, or one constitution, or even a string of elections."
For an administration that has recalibrated and re-explained its strategy in Iraq many times in the past 30 months, that latest turn may be a recognition of changed realities.
A year ago, Mr. Bush interpreted his re-election as a public embrace of his strategy and its willingness to bear the cost in lives and money to get Iraq on its feet. But now, the pressure is building for a pathway out. The passage of the constitution, some of Mr. Bush's political aides say, is bound to fuel those calls.
"All fall, we've been hearing the question, 'When does this begin to end?' " one of Mr. Bush's senior strategists said a few weeks ago, insisting on anonymity because of the delicacy of the issue inside the White House. The White House, he added, was trying to head off what some officials fear could be a broader split in the party over the war come spring, as midterm elections approach and Republicans seeking re-election are tempted to join the call for a timetable for drawing down troop levels.
The change is clear in what Mr. Bush is saying - but also in what he and his aides are no longer saying.
In the prelude to the war and in the early days of the occupation, Mr. Bush and top members of his national security team compared the effort to remake Iraq to the American occupations of Japan and Germany. As the insurgency grew - a feature missing from those two successful occupations - they dropped that comparison. Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state under Colin L. Powell, argued in an interview recently published by an Australian magazine, The Diplomat, that it was a flawed way of thinking from the start.
"Those who argued at the time that the acceptance of democracy in Iraq would be easy, and who drew on our experience with Japan and Germany, were wrong," he said. "First of all, Germany and Japan were homogeneous societies. Iraq is not." He added that the German and Japanese populations were "exhausted and deeply shocked by what had happened," but that Iraqis were "un-shocked and un-awed."
Now administration officials are beginning to describe the insurgency as long-lasting, more akin to Communist insurgencies in Malaysia or the Philippines, but with a broader and more deadly base. Even conservatives who supported Mr. Bush's decision to go to war say the change in tone is welcome.
"I think the president has been consistent," said Eliot A. Cohen, a professor at Johns Hopkins University who has written extensively on the nature of civilian command and is sometimes consulted by the administration. "But they've had people, myself among them, beating them up for happy talk and not making an argument" about the nature of the struggle.
"I do think they are making more of an effort to explain themselves," he added. "But it took pressure from their friends, and political pressure as well, to overcome a reluctance about what they were really doing."
Others take a harsher view. Kenneth Pollack, a former C.I.A. analyst and now a scholar at the Brookings Institution, said Mr. Bush's new tone reflected "the fact that their whole theory about how this is going to work out isn't working, and almost certainly isn't going to work." He added, "The theory that democracy is the antidote to insurgency gets disproven on the ground every day."
The real test may come after parliamentary elections, which, if the constitution is found to have passed this weekend, are scheduled for mid-December. After that time, a senior administration official noted with some dread in his voice, "there are no more democratic landmarks for us to point to - that's when we learn whether the Iraqi state can stay together."
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/...ent_3622477.htm
White House sets up group to market war in Iraq in 2002: article
www.chinaview.cn 2005-10-17 01:19:43
WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 (Xinhuanet) -- The White House set up, without announcement, a group to market a war in Iraq in August 2002, seven months before the March 2003 invasion, according to an article published by the New York Times on Sunday.
Very little has been written about the White House Iraq Group, or WHIG, and only one newspaper article or two have mentioned it in passing reporting that it had been set up by Andrew Card, the White House chief of staff, said the article in the newspaper's opinion page.
The group had eight members, including Karl Rove, the top political adviser to President George W. Bush, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, and then presidential security adviser Condoleezza Rice and others, and itsmission was to market a war in Iraq.
On July 23, 2002, a week or two before the WHIG first convened in earnest, a British official said that the Bush administration was ensuring that "the intelligence and facts" about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction "were being fixed around the policy" of going to war, said the article, written by columnist Frank Rick.
On Sept. 6, 2002, a few weeks after the WHIG first convened, Card alluded to the group's existence that there was a plan afoot to sell a war against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein: "From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August," the article noted.
The official introduction of that product began two day later, the article said. On the Sunday talk shows of Sept. 8, 2002, Rice warned that "we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud," and Cheney, who had already started the nuclear doomsday drumbeat in three August speeches, described Saddam Hussein as "actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons."
Cheney cited as evidence a front-paged article, later debunked,about supposedly nefarious aluminium tubes in that morning's New York Times, the article said.
Throughout those crucial seven months between the creation of the WHIG and the start of the US invasion of Iraq, there were indications that evidence of a Saddam nuclear program was fraudulent or nonexistent. Joseph Wilson's CIA mission to Niger, in which he failed to find any evidence to back up uranium claims,took place nearly a year before the infamously fictional 16 words about "uranium from Africa" in Bush's January 2003 State of the Union address on the eve of the war, the article said. Enditem
White House sets up group to market war in Iraq in 2002: article
www.chinaview.cn 2005-10-17 01:19:43
WASHINGTON, Oct. 16 (Xinhuanet) -- The White House set up, without announcement, a group to market a war in Iraq in August 2002, seven months before the March 2003 invasion, according to an article published by the New York Times on Sunday.
Very little has been written about the White House Iraq Group, or WHIG, and only one newspaper article or two have mentioned it in passing reporting that it had been set up by Andrew Card, the White House chief of staff, said the article in the newspaper's opinion page.
The group had eight members, including Karl Rove, the top political adviser to President George W. Bush, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's chief of staff, and then presidential security adviser Condoleezza Rice and others, and itsmission was to market a war in Iraq.
On July 23, 2002, a week or two before the WHIG first convened in earnest, a British official said that the Bush administration was ensuring that "the intelligence and facts" about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction "were being fixed around the policy" of going to war, said the article, written by columnist Frank Rick.
On Sept. 6, 2002, a few weeks after the WHIG first convened, Card alluded to the group's existence that there was a plan afoot to sell a war against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein: "From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August," the article noted.
The official introduction of that product began two day later, the article said. On the Sunday talk shows of Sept. 8, 2002, Rice warned that "we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud," and Cheney, who had already started the nuclear doomsday drumbeat in three August speeches, described Saddam Hussein as "actively and aggressively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons."
Cheney cited as evidence a front-paged article, later debunked,about supposedly nefarious aluminium tubes in that morning's New York Times, the article said.
Throughout those crucial seven months between the creation of the WHIG and the start of the US invasion of Iraq, there were indications that evidence of a Saddam nuclear program was fraudulent or nonexistent. Joseph Wilson's CIA mission to Niger, in which he failed to find any evidence to back up uranium claims,took place nearly a year before the infamously fictional 16 words about "uranium from Africa" in Bush's January 2003 State of the Union address on the eve of the war, the article said. Enditem
Politics & Policies: Saddam's Judgment Day
http://www.spacewar.com/news/iraq-05zzzzm.html
Washington (UPI) Oct 17, 2005 - The much-anticipated trial of former Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein starts later this week in Baghdad's so-called Green Zone, the heavily fortified enclave where the Iraqi government and U.S. officials live and work.
http://www.spacewar.com/news/iraq-05zzzzm.html
Washington (UPI) Oct 17, 2005 - The much-anticipated trial of former Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein starts later this week in Baghdad's so-called Green Zone, the heavily fortified enclave where the Iraqi government and U.S. officials live and work.
U.S. Reports Calm In Sunni Areas, For Now
http://www.spacewar.com/news/iraq-05zzzzn.html
Commentary: Like It Or Lump It
http://www.spacewar.com/news/iraq-05zzzzo.html
http://www.spacewar.com/news/iraq-05zzzzn.html
Commentary: Like It Or Lump It
http://www.spacewar.com/news/iraq-05zzzzo.html
http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-10-17-voa58.cfm
Analysts: Iraqi Constitution No Guarantee of Peace, Stability
By Meredith Buel
Washington
17 October 2005
Iraqi referendum officials begin the sorting of ballots in Baghdad
Officials in Iraq are continuing to count millions of paper ballots from the referendum on the new Iraqi constitution, with partial results suggesting the document will be approved. However, Middle East analysts warn that, even if the constitution is ratified, there are no guarantees a peaceful and democratic Iraq will emerge any time soon.
Preliminary and unofficial results indicate the constitution, as expected, won approval in northern provinces dominated by Kurds and in mostly Shi'ite Muslim southern Iraq.
Sunni Arabs in the center of the country who opposed the constitution appear to have failed in their efforts to defeat it.
Anthony Cordesman, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, says even if the official results confirm the constitution has been approved, the situation in Iraq is still very unstable.
"Is this a stable democracy? Does it mean, if there is a civil war you won't get a strongman or a division of the country? Could the parties that hold together today split up and become violent, or simply turn to a more authoritarian approach? Of course they can. Nothing is stable here at all, as yet," he noted.
Many Sunni Arabs opposed the draft constitution because it will allow the establishment of regional autonomous states.
Some Sunnis fear this could lead to a breakup of Iraq, with Kurds in the north and Shi'ites in the south controlling the oil-rich areas of the country.
The director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies is Jon Alterman.
Mr. Alterman says Sunnis, who ruled Iraq for decades under Saddam Hussein and make up the backbone of the insurgency, are motivated by their fear of the future.
"Sunnis are feeling very, very strongly that the country they have built is being stolen out from under them," he said. "While most Kurds may actually wish for independence, and few people in the Shi'ite south really seem threatened by a breakup, a lot of people in the center of the country, and especially Sunnis, fear being left in a rump state with no resources and no recourse."
U.S. officials say approval of the constitution is an important step in bringing stability to Iraq and the eventual withdrawal of the 150,000 American troops that are stationed there.
Sunni voters largely boycotted legislative elections last January.
U.S. officials hope a higher Sunni turnout for the constitutional referendum will be an indication of their return to the mainstream political process, and will undercut support for the insurgency.
Middle East analyst Anthony Cordesman says a number of major steps need to be taken soon to improve Iraq's prospects following the vote on the constitution.
"If people can reach a political compromise that allows them to work together, to share the money, if you see gradually a Sunni shift away from the insurgency and you do not see Kurdish or Shi'ite revenge-seeking, this is not going to be a perfect democratic state, and I strongly suspect, a good part of the constitution is going to be largely ignored for at least several years, if not indefinitely. But it will be a much better state than they had under Saddam, or the alternatives of civil war or disintegration," added Mr. Cordesman.
Some prominent Sunni leaders supported the constitution after parliament agreed to last-minute compromises that will allow the document to be amended after new legislative elections scheduled for December.
If the constitution is approved, members of a new parliament will form a permanent government to run the country early next year.
Analysts: Iraqi Constitution No Guarantee of Peace, Stability
By Meredith Buel
Washington
17 October 2005
Iraqi referendum officials begin the sorting of ballots in Baghdad
Officials in Iraq are continuing to count millions of paper ballots from the referendum on the new Iraqi constitution, with partial results suggesting the document will be approved. However, Middle East analysts warn that, even if the constitution is ratified, there are no guarantees a peaceful and democratic Iraq will emerge any time soon.
Preliminary and unofficial results indicate the constitution, as expected, won approval in northern provinces dominated by Kurds and in mostly Shi'ite Muslim southern Iraq.
Sunni Arabs in the center of the country who opposed the constitution appear to have failed in their efforts to defeat it.
Anthony Cordesman, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, says even if the official results confirm the constitution has been approved, the situation in Iraq is still very unstable.
"Is this a stable democracy? Does it mean, if there is a civil war you won't get a strongman or a division of the country? Could the parties that hold together today split up and become violent, or simply turn to a more authoritarian approach? Of course they can. Nothing is stable here at all, as yet," he noted.
Many Sunni Arabs opposed the draft constitution because it will allow the establishment of regional autonomous states.
Some Sunnis fear this could lead to a breakup of Iraq, with Kurds in the north and Shi'ites in the south controlling the oil-rich areas of the country.
The director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies is Jon Alterman.
Mr. Alterman says Sunnis, who ruled Iraq for decades under Saddam Hussein and make up the backbone of the insurgency, are motivated by their fear of the future.
"Sunnis are feeling very, very strongly that the country they have built is being stolen out from under them," he said. "While most Kurds may actually wish for independence, and few people in the Shi'ite south really seem threatened by a breakup, a lot of people in the center of the country, and especially Sunnis, fear being left in a rump state with no resources and no recourse."
U.S. officials say approval of the constitution is an important step in bringing stability to Iraq and the eventual withdrawal of the 150,000 American troops that are stationed there.
Sunni voters largely boycotted legislative elections last January.
U.S. officials hope a higher Sunni turnout for the constitutional referendum will be an indication of their return to the mainstream political process, and will undercut support for the insurgency.
Middle East analyst Anthony Cordesman says a number of major steps need to be taken soon to improve Iraq's prospects following the vote on the constitution.
"If people can reach a political compromise that allows them to work together, to share the money, if you see gradually a Sunni shift away from the insurgency and you do not see Kurdish or Shi'ite revenge-seeking, this is not going to be a perfect democratic state, and I strongly suspect, a good part of the constitution is going to be largely ignored for at least several years, if not indefinitely. But it will be a much better state than they had under Saddam, or the alternatives of civil war or disintegration," added Mr. Cordesman.
Some prominent Sunni leaders supported the constitution after parliament agreed to last-minute compromises that will allow the document to be amended after new legislative elections scheduled for December.
If the constitution is approved, members of a new parliament will form a permanent government to run the country early next year.
http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-10-18-voa5.cfm
Iraqi Election Commission Checks Referendum Results
By VOA News
18 October 2005
Iraqi election officials checking results from Saturday's constitutional referendum say the audit does not mean there were voting irregularities.
Election officials said Tuesday that it is too soon to say whether unusually high "yes" votes exceeding 90 percent indicate voting fraud in about 12 heavily Shi'ite and Kurdish provinces. Those regions were expected to support the constitution.
Ballots from provinces where there are mixed Sunni Arab, Shi'ite and Kurdish populations could decide the referendum, and those results could indicate whether there were problems with the vote.
At least one predominantly Sunni Arab province, Salaheddin, appeared to have voted against the constitution. At least three provinces are needed to vote against the document for it to fail.
Some Sunni Arab leaders have made allegations of voter fraud. Some television video from polling centers showed Iraqis checking off more than one ballot.
Iraqi Some information for this report provided by AP and Reuters.
Iraqi Election Commission Checks Referendum Results
By VOA News
18 October 2005
Iraqi election officials checking results from Saturday's constitutional referendum say the audit does not mean there were voting irregularities.
Election officials said Tuesday that it is too soon to say whether unusually high "yes" votes exceeding 90 percent indicate voting fraud in about 12 heavily Shi'ite and Kurdish provinces. Those regions were expected to support the constitution.
Ballots from provinces where there are mixed Sunni Arab, Shi'ite and Kurdish populations could decide the referendum, and those results could indicate whether there were problems with the vote.
At least one predominantly Sunni Arab province, Salaheddin, appeared to have voted against the constitution. At least three provinces are needed to vote against the document for it to fail.
Some Sunni Arab leaders have made allegations of voter fraud. Some television video from polling centers showed Iraqis checking off more than one ballot.
Iraqi Some information for this report provided by AP and Reuters.
Saddam Hussein Faces Mass Murder Trial Voice of America
Iraq's long-time dictator Saddam Hussein is to go on trial Wednesday for mass murder, the first of what is expected to be several indictments of the deposed president and senior officials of his regime. The tribunal is seen as fulfilling aspirations for justice of thousands of Iraqis who lost family members under the regime. But it is also causing apprehension among some, who fear that it will only worsen the violence that has been the legacy of the war to depose Saddam.
Saddam Hussein
The trial of Saddam Hussein is being seen by many Iraqis as the long overdue hand of justice after decades of suffering. And some see the event as a possible warning to other authoritarian figures in the region. But many analysts fear that the process will only deepen the divisions in Iraqi society and fuel the violence that has killed thousands of people in recent years. They worry that the trial will especially alienate Sunni Arabs, who dominated government under Saddam, but have since been relegated to a minor role. Sunnis boycotted legislative elections nine months ago, which were won by the Shiite Arab majority and independence-minded Kurds. The head of Amman's Jerusalem Center for Political Studies, Ureib Rantawai, says the trial, coming at this time, will only aggravate the Iraqi crisis. "It will increase the anger," he said. "It will raise the instability in Iraq. It will help the extremists to use this trial in order to justify what they are doing nowadays in Iraq." Saddam Hussein and seven subordinates are to appear Wednesday under tight security before a special tribunal of five Iraqi judges. They are charged with ordering the mass murder of 140 villagers from Dujail, north of Baghdad, after a failed assassination attempt 23 years ago. If convicted, they could face the death penalty. But Saddam's lawyers say they will ask for a postponement in order to better prepare their defense. Legal experts say that the Dujail massacre is one of the lesser atrocities committed by the Saddam regime. They say the former leader could also be tried for the gassing of five thousand Kurds in 1988, the deaths of thousands of Shiites following an uprising in 1991, and hundreds of thousands of deaths during the Iran-Iraq war. They say the Dujail incident is well documented and therefore can help establish a model for subsequent trials. Analysts warn the trial could turn Saddam into a victim in the eyes of some people, especially Arab Sunnis. As a result, they say the proceedings must be well run. "It should be a fair trial. It should be a just trial. It should be an open one. Transparency, I think, is a very, very important issue," added analyst Ureib Rantawi. "Otherwise, it will be identified by part of the Iraqis as part of the conspiracy led by the Americans on [against] their country." But international human-rights organizations have voiced concerns, saying that some of the rules governing the trial do not meet international standards. They say the defense must not be restricted and guilt must be proven beyond any reasonable doubt. Iraqi officials and their international advisors say such measures are in place and the trial will be fair.
Hussein Goes on Trial Tomorrow, and Iraqis See a First Accounting Spiegel Online
Saddam's accusers have their day in court The Age (subscription)
ABC News - Channel 4 News - USA Today - AKI - all 335 related »
Iraq's long-time dictator Saddam Hussein is to go on trial Wednesday for mass murder, the first of what is expected to be several indictments of the deposed president and senior officials of his regime. The tribunal is seen as fulfilling aspirations for justice of thousands of Iraqis who lost family members under the regime. But it is also causing apprehension among some, who fear that it will only worsen the violence that has been the legacy of the war to depose Saddam.
Saddam Hussein
The trial of Saddam Hussein is being seen by many Iraqis as the long overdue hand of justice after decades of suffering. And some see the event as a possible warning to other authoritarian figures in the region. But many analysts fear that the process will only deepen the divisions in Iraqi society and fuel the violence that has killed thousands of people in recent years. They worry that the trial will especially alienate Sunni Arabs, who dominated government under Saddam, but have since been relegated to a minor role. Sunnis boycotted legislative elections nine months ago, which were won by the Shiite Arab majority and independence-minded Kurds. The head of Amman's Jerusalem Center for Political Studies, Ureib Rantawai, says the trial, coming at this time, will only aggravate the Iraqi crisis. "It will increase the anger," he said. "It will raise the instability in Iraq. It will help the extremists to use this trial in order to justify what they are doing nowadays in Iraq." Saddam Hussein and seven subordinates are to appear Wednesday under tight security before a special tribunal of five Iraqi judges. They are charged with ordering the mass murder of 140 villagers from Dujail, north of Baghdad, after a failed assassination attempt 23 years ago. If convicted, they could face the death penalty. But Saddam's lawyers say they will ask for a postponement in order to better prepare their defense. Legal experts say that the Dujail massacre is one of the lesser atrocities committed by the Saddam regime. They say the former leader could also be tried for the gassing of five thousand Kurds in 1988, the deaths of thousands of Shiites following an uprising in 1991, and hundreds of thousands of deaths during the Iran-Iraq war. They say the Dujail incident is well documented and therefore can help establish a model for subsequent trials. Analysts warn the trial could turn Saddam into a victim in the eyes of some people, especially Arab Sunnis. As a result, they say the proceedings must be well run. "It should be a fair trial. It should be a just trial. It should be an open one. Transparency, I think, is a very, very important issue," added analyst Ureib Rantawi. "Otherwise, it will be identified by part of the Iraqis as part of the conspiracy led by the Americans on [against] their country." But international human-rights organizations have voiced concerns, saying that some of the rules governing the trial do not meet international standards. They say the defense must not be restricted and guilt must be proven beyond any reasonable doubt. Iraqi officials and their international advisors say such measures are in place and the trial will be fair.
Hussein Goes on Trial Tomorrow, and Iraqis See a First Accounting Spiegel Online
Saddam's accusers have their day in court The Age (subscription)
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IRAQ: WE ARE FIGHTING FOR AN ISLAMIC STATE, SAYS AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ
Baghdad, 18 Oct. (AKI) - Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the terror group led by Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, has released a new statement in which it explains the reasons for its terror campaign and states that they are not fighting the US occupation of Iraq, but to create "an Islamic state which is part of the caliphate and the Muslim territory."
The message from the terror group appeared on the Internet on Tuesday, just a few days ahead of a visit to Baghdad by the secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa. "The secretary of the Arab League has been tasked with going to Iraq to convince the Sunnis to enter the political game so as to stop the Jihad [holy war] in the Sunni areas. With the excuse of national interest, they are trying to save the Americans," the statement says.
The terror group then goes on to reveal its real objectives, saying: "We are not fighting to chase out the occupier or to save national unity and keep the borders outlined by the infidels intact," the statement continues. "We are fighting because it is a religious duty to do it, just as it is a duty to take the Sharia [Islamic law] to the government and create an Islamic state."
In the last few weeks the Islamic forums on the Internet have regularly broadcast images relating to the possible creation of al-Qaeda's hypothetical Islamic state, which could take shape within Iraq's rebel al-Anbar province.
IRAQ: WE ARE FIGHTING FOR AN ISLAMIC STATE, SAYS AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ
Baghdad, 18 Oct. (AKI) - Al-Qaeda in Iraq, the terror group led by Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, has released a new statement in which it explains the reasons for its terror campaign and states that they are not fighting the US occupation of Iraq, but to create "an Islamic state which is part of the caliphate and the Muslim territory."
The message from the terror group appeared on the Internet on Tuesday, just a few days ahead of a visit to Baghdad by the secretary general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa. "The secretary of the Arab League has been tasked with going to Iraq to convince the Sunnis to enter the political game so as to stop the Jihad [holy war] in the Sunni areas. With the excuse of national interest, they are trying to save the Americans," the statement says.
The terror group then goes on to reveal its real objectives, saying: "We are not fighting to chase out the occupier or to save national unity and keep the borders outlined by the infidels intact," the statement continues. "We are fighting because it is a religious duty to do it, just as it is a duty to take the Sharia [Islamic law] to the government and create an Islamic state."
In the last few weeks the Islamic forums on the Internet have regularly broadcast images relating to the possible creation of al-Qaeda's hypothetical Islamic state, which could take shape within Iraq's rebel al-Anbar province.
Iraqis Say 25 Civilians Killed in U.S. Raids:
Including 18 children: In all, residents and hospital workers said, 39 civilians and at least 13 armed insurgents were killed in a day of U.S. airstrikes in Ramadi.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10662.htm
Including 18 children: In all, residents and hospital workers said, 39 civilians and at least 13 armed insurgents were killed in a day of U.S. airstrikes in Ramadi.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10662.htm
U.S. Air Strikes Kill 20 Iraqi Civilians:
Airstrikes by American jets and helicopters killed at least 20 Iraqi civilians and injured another 15 people during a weekend anti-insurgent military operation in the western city of Ramadi, according to interviews today with local police officers and a doctor who treated the injured.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10650.htm
Airstrikes by American jets and helicopters killed at least 20 Iraqi civilians and injured another 15 people during a weekend anti-insurgent military operation in the western city of Ramadi, according to interviews today with local police officers and a doctor who treated the injured.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10650.htm
Killing With Impunity:
Nine-Second Coverage For Dozens of Dead Iraqi Women and Children
http://www.medialens.org/alerts/
Nine-Second Coverage For Dozens of Dead Iraqi Women and Children
http://www.medialens.org/alerts/
2 U.S. Marines Among 13 Killed In Continuing Violence:
Police said they found the bodies of six members of the Mehdi army, a militia loyal to Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, in a river bed at Balad
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/PAR824030.htm
Police said they found the bodies of six members of the Mehdi army, a militia loyal to Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, in a river bed at Balad
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/PAR824030.htm
Voting Tallies Provoke Investigation :
In six Shiite-majority provinces in the South, 95 percent or more of voters are reported as having cast votes favoring the constitution.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10652.htm
In six Shiite-majority provinces in the South, 95 percent or more of voters are reported as having cast votes favoring the constitution.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10652.htm
Iraq vote result announcement delayed, fraud alleged :
"The fraud was so well-executed it exceeded their wildest expectations," said Mishaan Jabouri.
http://tinyurl.com/7tbsm
"The fraud was so well-executed it exceeded their wildest expectations," said Mishaan Jabouri.
http://tinyurl.com/7tbsm
Dahr Jamail : “Elections” and other Deceptions in Iraq:
The vote had many similarities to the farce which took place on January 30-aside from a repeat of the draconian measures to provide security and quite a large dose of propaganda; we once again have what already appears to be rampant election fraud.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10655.htm
The vote had many similarities to the farce which took place on January 30-aside from a repeat of the draconian measures to provide security and quite a large dose of propaganda; we once again have what already appears to be rampant election fraud.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article10655.htm
The carve-up of Iraq will spawn a redivision of the Middle East :
The adoption of a weak Iraqi federal constitution is likely to unleash an ethnic and sectarian crisis across the region
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,...1594437,00.html
The adoption of a weak Iraqi federal constitution is likely to unleash an ethnic and sectarian crisis across the region
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,...1594437,00.html
Pro-War Votes May Haunt Democrats :
Potential Democratic presidential candidates who voted to give President Bush the authority to use force in Iraq could face a political problem - they supported a war that their party's rank-and-file now strongly view as a mistake.
http://snipurl.com/iob3
Potential Democratic presidential candidates who voted to give President Bush the authority to use force in Iraq could face a political problem - they supported a war that their party's rank-and-file now strongly view as a mistake.
http://snipurl.com/iob3
Can Saddam Hussein get a fair trial?
The first case against the deposed ruler will be under intense scrutiny
when it begins in Baghdad. By Peter Ford
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1019/p01s02-woiq.html?s=hns
The first case against the deposed ruler will be under intense scrutiny
when it begins in Baghdad. By Peter Ford
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1019/p01s02-woiq.html?s=hns
Hussein's lawyer: trial 'illegitimate'
The former Iraq ruler's defense will center on rejecting the whole
legal process. By Jill Carroll and Alan Enwia
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1019/p11s01-woiq.html?s=hns
The former Iraq ruler's defense will center on rejecting the whole
legal process. By Jill Carroll and Alan Enwia
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1019/p11s01-woiq.html?s=hns
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle...ticle320555.ece
As Saddam faces his judges, the nation he ruled for 35 years still fears his power
By Patrick Cockburn in Baghdad
Published: 19 October 2005
"His morale is very, very, very high and he is very optimistic and confident of his innocence, although the court is ... unjust" Even as he stands trial in Baghdad today after almost two years in prison, Saddam Hussein's name still carries a charge of fear for Iraqis.
"The problem was to get judges who were not afraid to prosecute Saddam despite intimidation and threats," Hoshyar Zebari, the Foreign Minister, told The Independent yesterday. Although Saddam was overthrown in April 2003, many people in Baghdad remained fearful of saying his name, the minister said.
Mr Zebari, a Kurd who spent his life fighting Saddam's regime, is eager to get proceedings under way and says it was a serious mistake not to have begun months ago. He believes that Saddam remains an important motivator for Baathists fighting the new government.
"It will really be the trial of the history of his regime over 35 years," Mr Zebari said, referring particularly to the day that the bodies of 500 members of the Barzani tribe, of whom 8,000 were massacred in 1983, were brought back to Kurdistan to be buried.
"Every family can make a case against Saddam," he said. "Even the mountains, the water, the marshes of Iraq can testify against him. We have to bring to an end this dark chapter in Iraqi history."
Personally, Mr Zebari said, he would like a swift trial, but he did not think this would happen. He implied there would be a brief opening session and then the trial would be delayed for several weeks. This would allow the defence lawyers to read the evidence and for arrangements to be made to protect witnesses. "Those who are going to testify against him need security protection."
American and Iraqi officials have also said that there is likely to be a delay of several weeks before the full trial of Saddam Hussein and seven other defendants gets under way.
The charges against Saddam and the seven others in the dock today relate to the killing of 143 men from the village of Dujail, north of Baghdad, after an assassination attempt against Saddam in 1982. This incident, hitherto little publicised, was chosen because there is paper evidence linking the former leader to the murders. Although the number of dead was limited compared to other massacres, the cruel collective punishment was typical of Saddam's secret police approach throughout his 35 years in power.
Other cases being investigated include the killing of at least 185,000 Kurds in the Anfal campaign by the Iraqi army in 1987-88, and the slaughter of thousands of Shia after the crushing of the 1991 uprising. There is also the murder of Shia religious leaders on different occasions and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Some 40 tons of documents are still being examined.
Iran said yesterday it had sent its own charges to the Iraqi court, related to the use of chemical weapons against civilians during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, in which more than 500,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands wounded.
Of the 17 members of the Dawa party who opened fire on Saddam's surprisingly lightly guarded motorcade in Dujail in 1992, eight were killed and nine fled to Iran.
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, now Iraqi Prime Minister, who was a leader of Dawa at the time, says he is puzzled why the case took so long to put together. "Any more delay will bring Iraq, the judiciary and the government into question. It's the right of every Iraqi citizen to ask why it took so long to prepare the Dujail case."
Going by a brief earlier court appearance by Saddam, the fallen leader will seek to dominate the proceedings and use them as a political podium. For this reason the court officials are still equivocating on whether or not to allow live television coverage or delay broadcasts by 20 to 30 minutes so they can be censored.
Mr Zebari said contemptuously that "people are saying that Saddam is going to try the occupation, Saddam is going to try the government, but really we are not afraid of that. I don't think that even the US or Britain are afraid of this."
The trial will take place in a former Baath party headquarters in Baghdad, which has been rebuilt with two modern courtrooms. Although the proceedings are being presented as wholly Iraqi, the US has reportedly spent $138m (£79m) on construction and is paying 50 American, British and Australian lawyers and support staff. The Special Tribunal before which Saddam will be appearing was set up by the American occupation in 2003.
Saddam's defence will be conducted by Khalil al- Dulaimi, who meets his notorious client at Camp Cropper, the US army detention close to Baghdad airport, where he is held. Mr Dulaimi will seek to have the case dismissed on the grounds that the tribunal was set up by the US and is therefore illegal.
He is also expected to seek a dismissal on the grounds that he has not read 800 pages of evidence and been allowed sufficient access to his client. He spent one and a half hours with Saddam yesterday and told reporters afterwards: "His morale is very, very, very high and he is very optimistic and confident of his innocence, although the court is ... unjust."
As for its political and military effects, although the Iraqi resistance to the change in regime, at least in its initial phase, was probably guided by former members of the Iraqi security services and the Baath party, it is not clear that this is still so. The US has sought to portray all the insurgency as being directed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his fanatical Sunni militants.
Many Sunnis will regard the trial as further evidence that they are being persecuted by the Shia-Kurdish majority, who make up 80 per cent of the Iraqi population.
Although only a minority of Sunnis, notably the Tikritis and those related to Saddam, benefited substantially from his rule, many have since come to regard it as a lost era of security and prosperity.
Mr Zebari cited recent Baath party literature as evidence. It says that the trial today should greeted by "firing deadly bullets to kill as many enemy agents as possible".
But as the old regime savagely persecuted the Islamic militants who are now fighting the government and the US occupation. They will presumably not be distressed to see Saddam on trial.
Today is certainly a significant day in Iraqi history. Saddam dominated life for more than a third of a century. His picture, variously dressed in a business suit, Kurdish tunic, Arab robes and military uniform, once decorated every street.
He was never a stupid man, but he came to see himself as a demi-God whose wishes or ideas even his most senior lieutenants found it dangerous to criticise. He identified with historic leaders from Hammurabi to Saladin and pictured himself in heroic mode.
Although never a professional soldier, his vision of himself was as a conqueror. He inherited a country that had great oil wealthy, an effective administration and an increasingly well-educated population and ruined it by launching two disastrous wars, the first against Iran in 1980 and the second against Kuwait in 1990.
Sunnis may still see him as part of their community and most Kurds and Shias will want to see him executed, but all will watch today's trial with fascination.Human rights organisations in the West, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have criticised the structure of the proceedings, saying it could produce a "victors' justice".
They have highlighted such issues as the burden of proof, political influence over the court and the use of the death penalty. "We have grave concerns that the court will not provide the fair trial guarantees required by international law," said Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch.
Mr Jaafari yesterday dismissed such concerns, saying: "This government takes pride in adhering to the rule of law and the separation of powers. As the head of the executive branch [I can say] we have not interfered in any way with the progress of the trial."
Former dictator on trial for his life
THE DEFENDANT
Once the darling of the West, Saddam Hussein held effective power since 1968 and absolute power in Iraq from 1979, when he became President and embarked on the first bloodletting that punctuated his 35-year rule by purging the ruling Baathist party. A year later Iran was attacked at the start of an eight-year war in which Saddam enjoyed the support of the US and Britain against the revolutionary Islamic leaders in Tehran. In 1988, when Iraqi forces used used chemical weapons against the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing some 5,000 civilians, Western governments averted their gaze. But Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 triggered both UN economic sanctions and the first Gulf war, which rolled back the occupation. Then followed a decade of in effect UN trusteeship of Saddam's country, while weapons inspectors scoured Iraq. But the containment policy began to leak and Saddam consolidated his power under the sanctions regime. The Bush administration vowed to rid the world of a dictator accused of concealing banned weapons programmes. After 11 September 2001, the military plans were put in place. Saddam fled as tanks rolled into Baghdad in April 2003 and was captured eight months later, taken from a hole near his home town of Tikrit.
THE COURT
The marble-lined court, below, decorated by chandeliers, is in a building where Saddam used to store gifts. It had not been decided yesterday whether the proceedings will be televised live or with a delay. It was also not known whether the five judges would be named or pictured. Some witnesses are to give evidence from behind a curtain to protect their anonymity, while observers and journalists will be behind bulletproof glass. Saddam and his co-defendants are being tried before an all-Iraqi special tribunal, set up in 2003 by the US-led authorities and now overseen by the elected government. It consists of trial chambers with five judges in each. The judges will hear the case without a jury. The prosecutor and Saddam's defence lawyer may propose questions for the judges to ask. US and British legal experts are on hand as advisers.
THE CHARGES
The first case to be brought against Saddam, 68, concerns the 1982 massacre of 143 Shias in the village of Dujail. Saddam is accused of crimes against humanity for the killings, which took place after an assassination attempt by a Shia party trying to revenge the murder of a party founder. The prosecution hopes that Saddam's direct responsibility can be shown more easily in Dujail than in bigger crimes, such as the Halabja attacks or the 1991 suppression of Kurdish and Shia uprisings, which could form the basis of later trials. Saddam is on trial with seven other co-defendants, including his half brother.
THE PROSECUTION
The 800-page indictment against Saddam, drawn up by the chief investigative judge, Raad Jouhi, has not been made public. The case against Saddam will be presented by the chief prosecutor of the tribunal, who heads a team of 20 prosecutors. The accused can be convicted on the "satisfaction" of the judges. Guilt does not have to be shown "beyond reasonable doubt".
THE DEFENCE
Saddam is not expected to enter a plea today, and his lawyer will ask for a three-month delay. He is being defended by a small team of lawyers led by Khalil Dulaimi, an Iraqi picked by Saddam's eldest daughter, Raghad, who now lives in Jordan. But Mr Dulaimi has little experience of such cases. The British barrister Anthony Scrivener QC has been approached to lead the defence, but will not be in Baghdad for the trial opening. The defence is expected to challenge the legitimacy of the court. As President, Saddam was immune from prosecution under the constitution.
THE OUTCOME
Saddam faces death by hanging or life imprisonment over the Dujail case, but can appeal against the sentence, which must be agreed by three of the five judges. He could be executed while the other cases are still pending.
Anne Penketh
"His morale is very, very, very high and he is very optimistic and confident of his innocence, although the court is ... unjust"
Even as he stands trial in Baghdad today after almost two years in prison, Saddam Hussein's name still carries a charge of fear for Iraqis.
"The problem was to get judges who were not afraid to prosecute Saddam despite intimidation and threats," Hoshyar Zebari, the Foreign Minister, told The Independent yesterday. Although Saddam was overthrown in April 2003, many people in Baghdad remained fearful of saying his name, the minister said.
Mr Zebari, a Kurd who spent his life fighting Saddam's regime, is eager to get proceedings under way and says it was a serious mistake not to have begun months ago. He believes that Saddam remains an important motivator for Baathists fighting the new government.
"It will really be the trial of the history of his regime over 35 years," Mr Zebari said, referring particularly to the day that the bodies of 500 members of the Barzani tribe, of whom 8,000 were massacred in 1983, were brought back to Kurdistan to be buried.
"Every family can make a case against Saddam," he said. "Even the mountains, the water, the marshes of Iraq can testify against him. We have to bring to an end this dark chapter in Iraqi history."
Personally, Mr Zebari said, he would like a swift trial, but he did not think this would happen. He implied there would be a brief opening session and then the trial would be delayed for several weeks. This would allow the defence lawyers to read the evidence and for arrangements to be made to protect witnesses. "Those who are going to testify against him need security protection."
American and Iraqi officials have also said that there is likely to be a delay of several weeks before the full trial of Saddam Hussein and seven other defendants gets under way.
The charges against Saddam and the seven others in the dock today relate to the killing of 143 men from the village of Dujail, north of Baghdad, after an assassination attempt against Saddam in 1982. This incident, hitherto little publicised, was chosen because there is paper evidence linking the former leader to the murders. Although the number of dead was limited compared to other massacres, the cruel collective punishment was typical of Saddam's secret police approach throughout his 35 years in power.
Other cases being investigated include the killing of at least 185,000 Kurds in the Anfal campaign by the Iraqi army in 1987-88, and the slaughter of thousands of Shia after the crushing of the 1991 uprising. There is also the murder of Shia religious leaders on different occasions and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Some 40 tons of documents are still being examined.
Iran said yesterday it had sent its own charges to the Iraqi court, related to the use of chemical weapons against civilians during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, in which more than 500,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands wounded.
Of the 17 members of the Dawa party who opened fire on Saddam's surprisingly lightly guarded motorcade in Dujail in 1992, eight were killed and nine fled to Iran.
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, now Iraqi Prime Minister, who was a leader of Dawa at the time, says he is puzzled why the case took so long to put together. "Any more delay will bring Iraq, the judiciary and the government into question. It's the right of every Iraqi citizen to ask why it took so long to prepare the Dujail case."
Going by a brief earlier court appearance by Saddam, the fallen leader will seek to dominate the proceedings and use them as a political podium. For this reason the court officials are still equivocating on whether or not to allow live television coverage or delay broadcasts by 20 to 30 minutes so they can be censored.
Mr Zebari said contemptuously that "people are saying that Saddam is going to try the occupation, Saddam is going to try the government, but really we are not afraid of that. I don't think that even the US or Britain are afraid of this."
The trial will take place in a former Baath party headquarters in Baghdad, which has been rebuilt with two modern courtrooms. Although the proceedings are being presented as wholly Iraqi, the US has reportedly spent $138m (£79m) on construction and is paying 50 American, British and Australian lawyers and support staff. The Special Tribunal before which Saddam will be appearing was set up by the American occupation in 2003.
Saddam's defence will be conducted by Khalil al- Dulaimi, who meets his notorious client at Camp Cropper, the US army detention close to Baghdad airport, where he is held. Mr Dulaimi will seek to have the case dismissed on the grounds that the tribunal was set up by the US and is therefore illegal.
He is also expected to seek a dismissal on the grounds that he has not read 800 pages of evidence and been allowed sufficient access to his client. He spent one and a half hours with Saddam yesterday and told reporters afterwards: "His morale is very, very, very high and he is very optimistic and confident of his innocence, although the court is ... unjust."
As for its political and military effects, although the Iraqi resistance to the change in regime, at least in its initial phase, was probably guided by former members of the Iraqi security services and the Baath party, it is not clear that this is still so. The US has sought to portray all the insurgency as being directed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his fanatical Sunni militants.
Many Sunnis will regard the trial as further evidence that they are being persecuted by the Shia-Kurdish majority, who make up 80 per cent of the Iraqi population.
Although only a minority of Sunnis, notably the Tikritis and those related to Saddam, benefited substantially from his rule, many have since come to regard it as a lost era of security and prosperity.
Mr Zebari cited recent Baath party literature as evidence. It says that the trial today should greeted by "firing deadly bullets to kill as many enemy agents as possible".
But as the old regime savagely persecuted the Islamic militants who are now fighting the government and the US occupation. They will presumably not be distressed to see Saddam on trial.
Today is certainly a significant day in Iraqi history. Saddam dominated life for more than a third of a century. His picture, variously dressed in a business suit, Kurdish tunic, Arab robes and military uniform, once decorated every street.
He was never a stupid man, but he came to see himself as a demi-God whose wishes or ideas even his most senior lieutenants found it dangerous to criticise. He identified with historic leaders from Hammurabi to Saladin and pictured himself in heroic mode.
Although never a professional soldier, his vision of himself was as a conqueror. He inherited a country that had great oil wealthy, an effective administration and an increasingly well-educated population and ruined it by launching two disastrous wars, the first against Iran in 1980 and the second against Kuwait in 1990.
Sunnis may still see him as part of their community and most Kurds and Shias will want to see him executed, but all will watch today's trial with fascination.Human rights organisations in the West, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have criticised the structure of the proceedings, saying it could produce a "victors' justice".
They have highlighted such issues as the burden of proof, political influence over the court and the use of the death penalty. "We have grave concerns that the court will not provide the fair trial guarantees required by international law," said Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch.
Mr Jaafari yesterday dismissed such concerns, saying: "This government takes pride in adhering to the rule of law and the separation of powers. As the head of the executive branch [I can say] we have not interfered in any way with the progress of the trial."
Former dictator on trial for his life
THE DEFENDANT
Once the darling of the West, Saddam Hussein held effective power since 1968 and absolute power in Iraq from 1979, when he became President and embarked on the first bloodletting that punctuated his 35-year rule by purging the ruling Baathist party. A year later Iran was attacked at the start of an eight-year war in which Saddam enjoyed the support of the US and Britain against the revolutionary Islamic leaders in Tehran. In 1988, when Iraqi forces used used chemical weapons against the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing some 5,000 civilians, Western governments averted their gaze. But Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 triggered both UN economic sanctions and the first Gulf war, which rolled back the occupation. Then followed a decade of in effect UN trusteeship of Saddam's country, while weapons inspectors scoured Iraq. But the containment policy began to leak and Saddam consolidated his power under the sanctions regime. The Bush administration vowed to rid the world of a dictator accused of concealing banned weapons programmes. After 11 September 2001, the military plans were put in place. Saddam fled as tanks rolled into Baghdad in April 2003 and was captured eight months later, taken from a hole near his home town of Tikrit.
THE COURT
The marble-lined court, below, decorated by chandeliers, is in a building where Saddam used to store gifts. It had not been decided yesterday whether the proceedings will be televised live or with a delay. It was also not known whether the five judges would be named or pictured. Some witnesses are to give evidence from behind a curtain to protect their anonymity, while observers and journalists will be behind bulletproof glass. Saddam and his co-defendants are being tried before an all-Iraqi special tribunal, set up in 2003 by the US-led authorities and now overseen by the elected government. It consists of trial chambers with five judges in each. The judges will hear the case without a jury. The prosecutor and Saddam's defence lawyer may propose questions for the judges to ask. US and British legal experts are on hand as advisers.
THE CHARGES
The first case to be brought against Saddam, 68, concerns the 1982 massacre of 143 Shias in the village of Dujail. Saddam is accused of crimes against humanity for the killings, which took place after an assassination attempt by a Shia party trying to revenge the murder of a party founder. The prosecution hopes that Saddam's direct responsibility can be shown more easily in Dujail than in bigger crimes, such as the Halabja attacks or the 1991 suppression of Kurdish and Shia uprisings, which could form the basis of later trials. Saddam is on trial with seven other co-defendants, including his half brother.
THE PROSECUTION
The 800-page indictment against Saddam, drawn up by the chief investigative judge, Raad Jouhi, has not been made public. The case against Saddam will be presented by the chief prosecutor of the tribunal, who heads a team of 20 prosecutors. The accused can be convicted on the "satisfaction" of the judges. Guilt does not have to be shown "beyond reasonable doubt".
THE DEFENCE
Saddam is not expected to enter a plea today, and his lawyer will ask for a three-month delay. He is being defended by a small team of lawyers led by Khalil Dulaimi, an Iraqi picked by Saddam's eldest daughter, Raghad, who now lives in Jordan. But Mr Dulaimi has little experience of such cases. The British barrister Anthony Scrivener QC has been approached to lead the defence, but will not be in Baghdad for the trial opening. The defence is expected to challenge the legitimacy of the court. As President, Saddam was immune from prosecution under the constitution.
THE OUTCOME
Saddam faces death by hanging or life imprisonment over the Dujail case, but can appeal against the sentence, which must be agreed by three of the five judges. He could be executed while the other cases are still pending.
Anne Penketh
As Saddam faces his judges, the nation he ruled for 35 years still fears his power
By Patrick Cockburn in Baghdad
Published: 19 October 2005
"His morale is very, very, very high and he is very optimistic and confident of his innocence, although the court is ... unjust" Even as he stands trial in Baghdad today after almost two years in prison, Saddam Hussein's name still carries a charge of fear for Iraqis.
"The problem was to get judges who were not afraid to prosecute Saddam despite intimidation and threats," Hoshyar Zebari, the Foreign Minister, told The Independent yesterday. Although Saddam was overthrown in April 2003, many people in Baghdad remained fearful of saying his name, the minister said.
Mr Zebari, a Kurd who spent his life fighting Saddam's regime, is eager to get proceedings under way and says it was a serious mistake not to have begun months ago. He believes that Saddam remains an important motivator for Baathists fighting the new government.
"It will really be the trial of the history of his regime over 35 years," Mr Zebari said, referring particularly to the day that the bodies of 500 members of the Barzani tribe, of whom 8,000 were massacred in 1983, were brought back to Kurdistan to be buried.
"Every family can make a case against Saddam," he said. "Even the mountains, the water, the marshes of Iraq can testify against him. We have to bring to an end this dark chapter in Iraqi history."
Personally, Mr Zebari said, he would like a swift trial, but he did not think this would happen. He implied there would be a brief opening session and then the trial would be delayed for several weeks. This would allow the defence lawyers to read the evidence and for arrangements to be made to protect witnesses. "Those who are going to testify against him need security protection."
American and Iraqi officials have also said that there is likely to be a delay of several weeks before the full trial of Saddam Hussein and seven other defendants gets under way.
The charges against Saddam and the seven others in the dock today relate to the killing of 143 men from the village of Dujail, north of Baghdad, after an assassination attempt against Saddam in 1982. This incident, hitherto little publicised, was chosen because there is paper evidence linking the former leader to the murders. Although the number of dead was limited compared to other massacres, the cruel collective punishment was typical of Saddam's secret police approach throughout his 35 years in power.
Other cases being investigated include the killing of at least 185,000 Kurds in the Anfal campaign by the Iraqi army in 1987-88, and the slaughter of thousands of Shia after the crushing of the 1991 uprising. There is also the murder of Shia religious leaders on different occasions and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Some 40 tons of documents are still being examined.
Iran said yesterday it had sent its own charges to the Iraqi court, related to the use of chemical weapons against civilians during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, in which more than 500,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands wounded.
Of the 17 members of the Dawa party who opened fire on Saddam's surprisingly lightly guarded motorcade in Dujail in 1992, eight were killed and nine fled to Iran.
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, now Iraqi Prime Minister, who was a leader of Dawa at the time, says he is puzzled why the case took so long to put together. "Any more delay will bring Iraq, the judiciary and the government into question. It's the right of every Iraqi citizen to ask why it took so long to prepare the Dujail case."
Going by a brief earlier court appearance by Saddam, the fallen leader will seek to dominate the proceedings and use them as a political podium. For this reason the court officials are still equivocating on whether or not to allow live television coverage or delay broadcasts by 20 to 30 minutes so they can be censored.
Mr Zebari said contemptuously that "people are saying that Saddam is going to try the occupation, Saddam is going to try the government, but really we are not afraid of that. I don't think that even the US or Britain are afraid of this."
The trial will take place in a former Baath party headquarters in Baghdad, which has been rebuilt with two modern courtrooms. Although the proceedings are being presented as wholly Iraqi, the US has reportedly spent $138m (£79m) on construction and is paying 50 American, British and Australian lawyers and support staff. The Special Tribunal before which Saddam will be appearing was set up by the American occupation in 2003.
Saddam's defence will be conducted by Khalil al- Dulaimi, who meets his notorious client at Camp Cropper, the US army detention close to Baghdad airport, where he is held. Mr Dulaimi will seek to have the case dismissed on the grounds that the tribunal was set up by the US and is therefore illegal.
He is also expected to seek a dismissal on the grounds that he has not read 800 pages of evidence and been allowed sufficient access to his client. He spent one and a half hours with Saddam yesterday and told reporters afterwards: "His morale is very, very, very high and he is very optimistic and confident of his innocence, although the court is ... unjust."
As for its political and military effects, although the Iraqi resistance to the change in regime, at least in its initial phase, was probably guided by former members of the Iraqi security services and the Baath party, it is not clear that this is still so. The US has sought to portray all the insurgency as being directed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his fanatical Sunni militants.
Many Sunnis will regard the trial as further evidence that they are being persecuted by the Shia-Kurdish majority, who make up 80 per cent of the Iraqi population.
Although only a minority of Sunnis, notably the Tikritis and those related to Saddam, benefited substantially from his rule, many have since come to regard it as a lost era of security and prosperity.
Mr Zebari cited recent Baath party literature as evidence. It says that the trial today should greeted by "firing deadly bullets to kill as many enemy agents as possible".
But as the old regime savagely persecuted the Islamic militants who are now fighting the government and the US occupation. They will presumably not be distressed to see Saddam on trial.
Today is certainly a significant day in Iraqi history. Saddam dominated life for more than a third of a century. His picture, variously dressed in a business suit, Kurdish tunic, Arab robes and military uniform, once decorated every street.
He was never a stupid man, but he came to see himself as a demi-God whose wishes or ideas even his most senior lieutenants found it dangerous to criticise. He identified with historic leaders from Hammurabi to Saladin and pictured himself in heroic mode.
Although never a professional soldier, his vision of himself was as a conqueror. He inherited a country that had great oil wealthy, an effective administration and an increasingly well-educated population and ruined it by launching two disastrous wars, the first against Iran in 1980 and the second against Kuwait in 1990.
Sunnis may still see him as part of their community and most Kurds and Shias will want to see him executed, but all will watch today's trial with fascination.Human rights organisations in the West, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have criticised the structure of the proceedings, saying it could produce a "victors' justice".
They have highlighted such issues as the burden of proof, political influence over the court and the use of the death penalty. "We have grave concerns that the court will not provide the fair trial guarantees required by international law," said Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch.
Mr Jaafari yesterday dismissed such concerns, saying: "This government takes pride in adhering to the rule of law and the separation of powers. As the head of the executive branch [I can say] we have not interfered in any way with the progress of the trial."
Former dictator on trial for his life
THE DEFENDANT
Once the darling of the West, Saddam Hussein held effective power since 1968 and absolute power in Iraq from 1979, when he became President and embarked on the first bloodletting that punctuated his 35-year rule by purging the ruling Baathist party. A year later Iran was attacked at the start of an eight-year war in which Saddam enjoyed the support of the US and Britain against the revolutionary Islamic leaders in Tehran. In 1988, when Iraqi forces used used chemical weapons against the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing some 5,000 civilians, Western governments averted their gaze. But Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 triggered both UN economic sanctions and the first Gulf war, which rolled back the occupation. Then followed a decade of in effect UN trusteeship of Saddam's country, while weapons inspectors scoured Iraq. But the containment policy began to leak and Saddam consolidated his power under the sanctions regime. The Bush administration vowed to rid the world of a dictator accused of concealing banned weapons programmes. After 11 September 2001, the military plans were put in place. Saddam fled as tanks rolled into Baghdad in April 2003 and was captured eight months later, taken from a hole near his home town of Tikrit.
THE COURT
The marble-lined court, below, decorated by chandeliers, is in a building where Saddam used to store gifts. It had not been decided yesterday whether the proceedings will be televised live or with a delay. It was also not known whether the five judges would be named or pictured. Some witnesses are to give evidence from behind a curtain to protect their anonymity, while observers and journalists will be behind bulletproof glass. Saddam and his co-defendants are being tried before an all-Iraqi special tribunal, set up in 2003 by the US-led authorities and now overseen by the elected government. It consists of trial chambers with five judges in each. The judges will hear the case without a jury. The prosecutor and Saddam's defence lawyer may propose questions for the judges to ask. US and British legal experts are on hand as advisers.
THE CHARGES
The first case to be brought against Saddam, 68, concerns the 1982 massacre of 143 Shias in the village of Dujail. Saddam is accused of crimes against humanity for the killings, which took place after an assassination attempt by a Shia party trying to revenge the murder of a party founder. The prosecution hopes that Saddam's direct responsibility can be shown more easily in Dujail than in bigger crimes, such as the Halabja attacks or the 1991 suppression of Kurdish and Shia uprisings, which could form the basis of later trials. Saddam is on trial with seven other co-defendants, including his half brother.
THE PROSECUTION
The 800-page indictment against Saddam, drawn up by the chief investigative judge, Raad Jouhi, has not been made public. The case against Saddam will be presented by the chief prosecutor of the tribunal, who heads a team of 20 prosecutors. The accused can be convicted on the "satisfaction" of the judges. Guilt does not have to be shown "beyond reasonable doubt".
THE DEFENCE
Saddam is not expected to enter a plea today, and his lawyer will ask for a three-month delay. He is being defended by a small team of lawyers led by Khalil Dulaimi, an Iraqi picked by Saddam's eldest daughter, Raghad, who now lives in Jordan. But Mr Dulaimi has little experience of such cases. The British barrister Anthony Scrivener QC has been approached to lead the defence, but will not be in Baghdad for the trial opening. The defence is expected to challenge the legitimacy of the court. As President, Saddam was immune from prosecution under the constitution.
THE OUTCOME
Saddam faces death by hanging or life imprisonment over the Dujail case, but can appeal against the sentence, which must be agreed by three of the five judges. He could be executed while the other cases are still pending.
Anne Penketh
"His morale is very, very, very high and he is very optimistic and confident of his innocence, although the court is ... unjust"
Even as he stands trial in Baghdad today after almost two years in prison, Saddam Hussein's name still carries a charge of fear for Iraqis.
"The problem was to get judges who were not afraid to prosecute Saddam despite intimidation and threats," Hoshyar Zebari, the Foreign Minister, told The Independent yesterday. Although Saddam was overthrown in April 2003, many people in Baghdad remained fearful of saying his name, the minister said.
Mr Zebari, a Kurd who spent his life fighting Saddam's regime, is eager to get proceedings under way and says it was a serious mistake not to have begun months ago. He believes that Saddam remains an important motivator for Baathists fighting the new government.
"It will really be the trial of the history of his regime over 35 years," Mr Zebari said, referring particularly to the day that the bodies of 500 members of the Barzani tribe, of whom 8,000 were massacred in 1983, were brought back to Kurdistan to be buried.
"Every family can make a case against Saddam," he said. "Even the mountains, the water, the marshes of Iraq can testify against him. We have to bring to an end this dark chapter in Iraqi history."
Personally, Mr Zebari said, he would like a swift trial, but he did not think this would happen. He implied there would be a brief opening session and then the trial would be delayed for several weeks. This would allow the defence lawyers to read the evidence and for arrangements to be made to protect witnesses. "Those who are going to testify against him need security protection."
American and Iraqi officials have also said that there is likely to be a delay of several weeks before the full trial of Saddam Hussein and seven other defendants gets under way.
The charges against Saddam and the seven others in the dock today relate to the killing of 143 men from the village of Dujail, north of Baghdad, after an assassination attempt against Saddam in 1982. This incident, hitherto little publicised, was chosen because there is paper evidence linking the former leader to the murders. Although the number of dead was limited compared to other massacres, the cruel collective punishment was typical of Saddam's secret police approach throughout his 35 years in power.
Other cases being investigated include the killing of at least 185,000 Kurds in the Anfal campaign by the Iraqi army in 1987-88, and the slaughter of thousands of Shia after the crushing of the 1991 uprising. There is also the murder of Shia religious leaders on different occasions and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Some 40 tons of documents are still being examined.
Iran said yesterday it had sent its own charges to the Iraqi court, related to the use of chemical weapons against civilians during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, in which more than 500,000 people were killed and hundreds of thousands wounded.
Of the 17 members of the Dawa party who opened fire on Saddam's surprisingly lightly guarded motorcade in Dujail in 1992, eight were killed and nine fled to Iran.
Ibrahim al-Jaafari, now Iraqi Prime Minister, who was a leader of Dawa at the time, says he is puzzled why the case took so long to put together. "Any more delay will bring Iraq, the judiciary and the government into question. It's the right of every Iraqi citizen to ask why it took so long to prepare the Dujail case."
Going by a brief earlier court appearance by Saddam, the fallen leader will seek to dominate the proceedings and use them as a political podium. For this reason the court officials are still equivocating on whether or not to allow live television coverage or delay broadcasts by 20 to 30 minutes so they can be censored.
Mr Zebari said contemptuously that "people are saying that Saddam is going to try the occupation, Saddam is going to try the government, but really we are not afraid of that. I don't think that even the US or Britain are afraid of this."
The trial will take place in a former Baath party headquarters in Baghdad, which has been rebuilt with two modern courtrooms. Although the proceedings are being presented as wholly Iraqi, the US has reportedly spent $138m (£79m) on construction and is paying 50 American, British and Australian lawyers and support staff. The Special Tribunal before which Saddam will be appearing was set up by the American occupation in 2003.
Saddam's defence will be conducted by Khalil al- Dulaimi, who meets his notorious client at Camp Cropper, the US army detention close to Baghdad airport, where he is held. Mr Dulaimi will seek to have the case dismissed on the grounds that the tribunal was set up by the US and is therefore illegal.
He is also expected to seek a dismissal on the grounds that he has not read 800 pages of evidence and been allowed sufficient access to his client. He spent one and a half hours with Saddam yesterday and told reporters afterwards: "His morale is very, very, very high and he is very optimistic and confident of his innocence, although the court is ... unjust."
As for its political and military effects, although the Iraqi resistance to the change in regime, at least in its initial phase, was probably guided by former members of the Iraqi security services and the Baath party, it is not clear that this is still so. The US has sought to portray all the insurgency as being directed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his fanatical Sunni militants.
Many Sunnis will regard the trial as further evidence that they are being persecuted by the Shia-Kurdish majority, who make up 80 per cent of the Iraqi population.
Although only a minority of Sunnis, notably the Tikritis and those related to Saddam, benefited substantially from his rule, many have since come to regard it as a lost era of security and prosperity.
Mr Zebari cited recent Baath party literature as evidence. It says that the trial today should greeted by "firing deadly bullets to kill as many enemy agents as possible".
But as the old regime savagely persecuted the Islamic militants who are now fighting the government and the US occupation. They will presumably not be distressed to see Saddam on trial.
Today is certainly a significant day in Iraqi history. Saddam dominated life for more than a third of a century. His picture, variously dressed in a business suit, Kurdish tunic, Arab robes and military uniform, once decorated every street.
He was never a stupid man, but he came to see himself as a demi-God whose wishes or ideas even his most senior lieutenants found it dangerous to criticise. He identified with historic leaders from Hammurabi to Saladin and pictured himself in heroic mode.
Although never a professional soldier, his vision of himself was as a conqueror. He inherited a country that had great oil wealthy, an effective administration and an increasingly well-educated population and ruined it by launching two disastrous wars, the first against Iran in 1980 and the second against Kuwait in 1990.
Sunnis may still see him as part of their community and most Kurds and Shias will want to see him executed, but all will watch today's trial with fascination.Human rights organisations in the West, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have criticised the structure of the proceedings, saying it could produce a "victors' justice".
They have highlighted such issues as the burden of proof, political influence over the court and the use of the death penalty. "We have grave concerns that the court will not provide the fair trial guarantees required by international law," said Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch.
Mr Jaafari yesterday dismissed such concerns, saying: "This government takes pride in adhering to the rule of law and the separation of powers. As the head of the executive branch [I can say] we have not interfered in any way with the progress of the trial."
Former dictator on trial for his life
THE DEFENDANT
Once the darling of the West, Saddam Hussein held effective power since 1968 and absolute power in Iraq from 1979, when he became President and embarked on the first bloodletting that punctuated his 35-year rule by purging the ruling Baathist party. A year later Iran was attacked at the start of an eight-year war in which Saddam enjoyed the support of the US and Britain against the revolutionary Islamic leaders in Tehran. In 1988, when Iraqi forces used used chemical weapons against the Kurdish town of Halabja, killing some 5,000 civilians, Western governments averted their gaze. But Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 triggered both UN economic sanctions and the first Gulf war, which rolled back the occupation. Then followed a decade of in effect UN trusteeship of Saddam's country, while weapons inspectors scoured Iraq. But the containment policy began to leak and Saddam consolidated his power under the sanctions regime. The Bush administration vowed to rid the world of a dictator accused of concealing banned weapons programmes. After 11 September 2001, the military plans were put in place. Saddam fled as tanks rolled into Baghdad in April 2003 and was captured eight months later, taken from a hole near his home town of Tikrit.
THE COURT
The marble-lined court, below, decorated by chandeliers, is in a building where Saddam used to store gifts. It had not been decided yesterday whether the proceedings will be televised live or with a delay. It was also not known whether the five judges would be named or pictured. Some witnesses are to give evidence from behind a curtain to protect their anonymity, while observers and journalists will be behind bulletproof glass. Saddam and his co-defendants are being tried before an all-Iraqi special tribunal, set up in 2003 by the US-led authorities and now overseen by the elected government. It consists of trial chambers with five judges in each. The judges will hear the case without a jury. The prosecutor and Saddam's defence lawyer may propose questions for the judges to ask. US and British legal experts are on hand as advisers.
THE CHARGES
The first case to be brought against Saddam, 68, concerns the 1982 massacre of 143 Shias in the village of Dujail. Saddam is accused of crimes against humanity for the killings, which took place after an assassination attempt by a Shia party trying to revenge the murder of a party founder. The prosecution hopes that Saddam's direct responsibility can be shown more easily in Dujail than in bigger crimes, such as the Halabja attacks or the 1991 suppression of Kurdish and Shia uprisings, which could form the basis of later trials. Saddam is on trial with seven other co-defendants, including his half brother.
THE PROSECUTION
The 800-page indictment against Saddam, drawn up by the chief investigative judge, Raad Jouhi, has not been made public. The case against Saddam will be presented by the chief prosecutor of the tribunal, who heads a team of 20 prosecutors. The accused can be convicted on the "satisfaction" of the judges. Guilt does not have to be shown "beyond reasonable doubt".
THE DEFENCE
Saddam is not expected to enter a plea today, and his lawyer will ask for a three-month delay. He is being defended by a small team of lawyers led by Khalil Dulaimi, an Iraqi picked by Saddam's eldest daughter, Raghad, who now lives in Jordan. But Mr Dulaimi has little experience of such cases. The British barrister Anthony Scrivener QC has been approached to lead the defence, but will not be in Baghdad for the trial opening. The defence is expected to challenge the legitimacy of the court. As President, Saddam was immune from prosecution under the constitution.
THE OUTCOME
Saddam faces death by hanging or life imprisonment over the Dujail case, but can appeal against the sentence, which must be agreed by three of the five judges. He could be executed while the other cases are still pending.
Anne Penketh
http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?Stor...17-032524-4348r
Commentary: Iraq's geopolitical train wreck
By Arnaud de Borchgrave
UPI Editor at Large
Published October 17, 2005
WASHINGTON -- President Bush's national security adviser spelled out precisely why Iraq is now on course for a geopolitical train wreck. In an op-ed published coast-to-coast last weekend, Stephen Hadley makes unmistakably clear Iraq's new constitution is federal with provisions for regional governments that will not be allowed to intrude on the powers of the federal government.
Out of the window is any notion of Iraq as a unitary state, which it has been since its birth in 1920, through five previous constitutional iterations. Now, if the Baghdad federal government objects to "intrusions" in its prerogatives, it will simply be told to mind its own beeswax.
National elections for a new parliament and federal government are scheduled for Dec. 15, and horse-trading over Cabinet posts, which took two to three months for previous provisional authorities, will continue well in to the new year. Then new ministers will begin to staff up their departments, which will take several more weeks.
Meanwhile, Shiite Iraq and Kurdish Iraq are already running their own affairs. The new constitution then becomes a license for both to set up their respective governments and widen their independence vis-à-vis Baghdad. And if Baghdad doesn't like it, it will be told to lump it. Shiite Iraq has its own army with two well-trained and equipped militias, funded by Iran, and the Kurds their fierce Peshmerga fighters.
The constitutional referendum left 34 important issues in abeyance. Fifty of the constitution's 130 clauses are incomplete. They are to be determined later when laws are passed to implement the federal architecture. Baghdad's power to tax is up in the air, state religion is still uncertain, human rights, at least for women, are unclear, the role of the police is unspecified, and the militias are to be disbanded, but the document doesn't say by whom. In the event of a full-fledged civil war, which some knowledgeable observers say is already under way subrosa, federal zones are tailor-made for ethnic cleansing.
There is much media speculation about Arab countries playing a role in countering Iranian influence in Iraq. The United States is encouraging an Arab League-sponsored conference of national reconciliation in the next few weeks. The Bush administration sought to marginalize Iraq's Arab neighbors in the months following the 2003 defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime. Now, both Washington and the Arab League share concern about Iran's growing influence in Iraq, especially among Iraqi Shiites who make up 60 percent of the population.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari blames Arab reluctance to get involved for Iran's unimpeded progress. The United States was betting on the success of the democratic experiment in Iraq to defuse Iranian meddling. But Tehran's shadow keeps growing longer.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's jihadis are the only ones who have taken on Iran indirectly by declaring war on the Shiites. Neither Washington nor Arab capitals relish the idea of finding themselves aligned with al-Qaida's geopolitical objectives. Hence, the attraction of getting Iraq's Arab neighbors to take a more active role to prop up Baghdad. But long-time observers of the Iraqi scene seem to agree only a strongman can keep Iraq together. And that general is yet to emerge from the new Iraqi army. Such a figure would ensure that Iraq's three component parts stick together during a long transitory period.
As several countries have demonstrated over the past 50 years, there is no such thing as instant democratic capitalism. Since World War II, Spain, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Chile went through long periods of authoritarian rule before they were ready for democratic government.
As The Economist noted this week, it is hard to avoid "the conclusion that the campaign to make Iraq a better place has been one of the worst planned and executed in American history."
The uncertainty of Iraq's future, and its destabilizing impact on the Middle East, has already gotten several regional players to think of a nuclear future for themselves. A British intelligence report says both Egypt and Syria have sought to obtain dual-use capabilities from Western countries to advance their nascent, drawing-board nuclear programs. The same intelligence sources say nuclear Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have frequently discussed a nuclear future for the Wahhabi kingdom; both nations have denied this at high levels.
The United States has now failed to persuade Russia and China to allow the U.N. Security Council to take up a resolution that would impose sanctions on Iran for its failure to open all its nuclear installations to IAEA inspection. For the past 18 years, Iran, with the assistance of Pakistan's Dr. "Strangelove" A.Q. Khan, the transnational nuclear black marketer and father of his country's nuclear arsenal, has been working on a secret nuclear weapons program.
With the prospect of a Palestinian state fading once again in the chaos that followed Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, the Middle East is living up to its reputation as the world's most dangerous neighborhood.
Commentary: Iraq's geopolitical train wreck
By Arnaud de Borchgrave
UPI Editor at Large
Published October 17, 2005
WASHINGTON -- President Bush's national security adviser spelled out precisely why Iraq is now on course for a geopolitical train wreck. In an op-ed published coast-to-coast last weekend, Stephen Hadley makes unmistakably clear Iraq's new constitution is federal with provisions for regional governments that will not be allowed to intrude on the powers of the federal government.
Out of the window is any notion of Iraq as a unitary state, which it has been since its birth in 1920, through five previous constitutional iterations. Now, if the Baghdad federal government objects to "intrusions" in its prerogatives, it will simply be told to mind its own beeswax.
National elections for a new parliament and federal government are scheduled for Dec. 15, and horse-trading over Cabinet posts, which took two to three months for previous provisional authorities, will continue well in to the new year. Then new ministers will begin to staff up their departments, which will take several more weeks.
Meanwhile, Shiite Iraq and Kurdish Iraq are already running their own affairs. The new constitution then becomes a license for both to set up their respective governments and widen their independence vis-à-vis Baghdad. And if Baghdad doesn't like it, it will be told to lump it. Shiite Iraq has its own army with two well-trained and equipped militias, funded by Iran, and the Kurds their fierce Peshmerga fighters.
The constitutional referendum left 34 important issues in abeyance. Fifty of the constitution's 130 clauses are incomplete. They are to be determined later when laws are passed to implement the federal architecture. Baghdad's power to tax is up in the air, state religion is still uncertain, human rights, at least for women, are unclear, the role of the police is unspecified, and the militias are to be disbanded, but the document doesn't say by whom. In the event of a full-fledged civil war, which some knowledgeable observers say is already under way subrosa, federal zones are tailor-made for ethnic cleansing.
There is much media speculation about Arab countries playing a role in countering Iranian influence in Iraq. The United States is encouraging an Arab League-sponsored conference of national reconciliation in the next few weeks. The Bush administration sought to marginalize Iraq's Arab neighbors in the months following the 2003 defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime. Now, both Washington and the Arab League share concern about Iran's growing influence in Iraq, especially among Iraqi Shiites who make up 60 percent of the population.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari blames Arab reluctance to get involved for Iran's unimpeded progress. The United States was betting on the success of the democratic experiment in Iraq to defuse Iranian meddling. But Tehran's shadow keeps growing longer.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's jihadis are the only ones who have taken on Iran indirectly by declaring war on the Shiites. Neither Washington nor Arab capitals relish the idea of finding themselves aligned with al-Qaida's geopolitical objectives. Hence, the attraction of getting Iraq's Arab neighbors to take a more active role to prop up Baghdad. But long-time observers of the Iraqi scene seem to agree only a strongman can keep Iraq together. And that general is yet to emerge from the new Iraqi army. Such a figure would ensure that Iraq's three component parts stick together during a long transitory period.
As several countries have demonstrated over the past 50 years, there is no such thing as instant democratic capitalism. Since World War II, Spain, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Chile went through long periods of authoritarian rule before they were ready for democratic government.
As The Economist noted this week, it is hard to avoid "the conclusion that the campaign to make Iraq a better place has been one of the worst planned and executed in American history."
The uncertainty of Iraq's future, and its destabilizing impact on the Middle East, has already gotten several regional players to think of a nuclear future for themselves. A British intelligence report says both Egypt and Syria have sought to obtain dual-use capabilities from Western countries to advance their nascent, drawing-board nuclear programs. The same intelligence sources say nuclear Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have frequently discussed a nuclear future for the Wahhabi kingdom; both nations have denied this at high levels.
The United States has now failed to persuade Russia and China to allow the U.N. Security Council to take up a resolution that would impose sanctions on Iran for its failure to open all its nuclear installations to IAEA inspection. For the past 18 years, Iran, with the assistance of Pakistan's Dr. "Strangelove" A.Q. Khan, the transnational nuclear black marketer and father of his country's nuclear arsenal, has been working on a secret nuclear weapons program.
With the prospect of a Palestinian state fading once again in the chaos that followed Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, the Middle East is living up to its reputation as the world's most dangerous neighborhood.
http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?Stor...18-022829-9767r
Outside view: The challenges to Iraq after the vote
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Outside View Commentator
Published October 18, 2005
WASHINGTON -- The referendum on Iraq's constitution is only the beginning of a political process to resolve the issues dividing Iraqis along ethnic and sectarian lines.
Iraq's factions must now turn their attention to the election to take place on Dec. 15. There is little time to thoroughly explain and debate issues, and this election is likely to be one where most Iraqis vote along ethnic and sectarian lines, with only a small fraction voting for secular and national parties.
The new government cannot formally take office until Jan. 1, and could take weeks -- or months -- longer to organize. New ministers must then come in, and only then will the key issues that were the focus of the constitution become the subject of real-world political battles.
Much will depend on how many of the Sunnis who voted against the constitution will now attempt to participate in the political process. Polls in June 2005 showed deep divisions among Sunnis as to whether boycotting the Jan. 30 elections was a bad idea. For example, 83 percent in Baghdad thought it was a bad idea, but only 40 percent in Ramadi.
In the months that followed, however, more and more Sunnis favored participation in the constitutional referendum. A poll in September 2005 showed that 84 percent of all Iraqis in the Baghdad area favored registering and voting while only 7 percent opposed it. The percentages were: 75 percent pro- and 5 percent anti- in the Mosul area, 78 percent pro- and 7 percent anti- in the Tikrit/Baquba area.
These percentages were not radically different in the Kurdish area: 79 percent pro- and 6 percent anti-, and the Shiite areas in the south: 87 percent pro- and 2 percent anti-.
The turnout was good, particularly given the fact that serious problems existed in distributing ballots and/or knowing which voters should go to which polling places -- especially in the less secure Sunni areas. The turnout was 63 percent to 64 percent of registered voters versus 58 percent in the January election. This reflected a major increase in Sunni voters, since Shiite turnout in the south was lower than in January.
The Sunni vote did not reflect a solid bloc, in part due to deep internal divisions in the Sunni community. One Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Bloc, did support the constitution after obtaining some changes to the test, and agreement that it could be amended by the new parliament. Some strongly opposed it, and hard-line insurgents opposed registering and voting.
The results of the vote are still unclear, but reflect the predictable favorable outcome in Shiite and Kurdish areas. However, this does not mean agreement on how the constitution is to be completed, interpreted, and enforced. The Kurds want Kirkuk, oil areas, and secure revenues. The Shiites still have to work out the power balance between factions, the role of figures like al-Sadr, and issues such as the role of religion versus secular practices.
The Sunni vote was strongly "anti-" in purely Sunni areas, with "no" votes ranging around 85 percent to 95 percent. (97 percent in al Anbar). It may have been more favorable in mixed areas. However, problems existed in the Sunni turnout in many areas, including Mosul and Nineveh province, because of insurgent threats -- which may explain why 78 percent of the voters supported the constitution. Similarly, 70 percent were favorable in Diyala.
It should be noted that an agreement was reached before the referendum that the new parliament would have the right to amend the constitution. Moreover, many provisions are vague or partially contradictory, and 50 out of 130 clauses were not completed before the referendum.
These key issues are:
-- Defining federalism, the relative power of the federal regions versus the national government, and demarcating any ethnic and sectarian zones with "fracture" lines in areas like Kirkuk, Basra and Mosul.
-- Allocating oil revenues for existing and future fields, and deciding on the future of oil development.
-- Deciding who has the power to tax.
-- Defining the power of the national government relative to provincial and
local government.
-- Deciding on the role of religion in the state.
-- Deciding on the relative balance of religious and secular law and the power of national versus local courts and law enforcement.
-- Deciding who really has power over the police, whether the security forces will become national, and whether the prohibition of militias will actually be enforced.
-- Interpreting the meaning of the human rights provisions of the constitution.
Some further compromises may be possible before the election, but it seems unlikely that most of these key issues can really be resolved before mid-2006. Throughout this period, insurgents will continue to try to block the political process and cause a civil war. Sunnis will have to decide whether and how to participate in the political process, and pre-referendum polls showed sharp divisions over whether to participate by town and governorate.
The Shiite majority will have to resolve its own issues about the relative role of religion in the state, and Shiite militias. The Kurds will have to settle their future role in government, and deal with issues like the future of Kirkuk. Inevitably, there will be debates about who controls the military, security forces, and police, and the role of the Coalition.
--
(Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.)
--
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of World Peace Herald or United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
Outside view: The challenges to Iraq after the vote
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Outside View Commentator
Published October 18, 2005
WASHINGTON -- The referendum on Iraq's constitution is only the beginning of a political process to resolve the issues dividing Iraqis along ethnic and sectarian lines.
Iraq's factions must now turn their attention to the election to take place on Dec. 15. There is little time to thoroughly explain and debate issues, and this election is likely to be one where most Iraqis vote along ethnic and sectarian lines, with only a small fraction voting for secular and national parties.
The new government cannot formally take office until Jan. 1, and could take weeks -- or months -- longer to organize. New ministers must then come in, and only then will the key issues that were the focus of the constitution become the subject of real-world political battles.
Much will depend on how many of the Sunnis who voted against the constitution will now attempt to participate in the political process. Polls in June 2005 showed deep divisions among Sunnis as to whether boycotting the Jan. 30 elections was a bad idea. For example, 83 percent in Baghdad thought it was a bad idea, but only 40 percent in Ramadi.
In the months that followed, however, more and more Sunnis favored participation in the constitutional referendum. A poll in September 2005 showed that 84 percent of all Iraqis in the Baghdad area favored registering and voting while only 7 percent opposed it. The percentages were: 75 percent pro- and 5 percent anti- in the Mosul area, 78 percent pro- and 7 percent anti- in the Tikrit/Baquba area.
These percentages were not radically different in the Kurdish area: 79 percent pro- and 6 percent anti-, and the Shiite areas in the south: 87 percent pro- and 2 percent anti-.
The turnout was good, particularly given the fact that serious problems existed in distributing ballots and/or knowing which voters should go to which polling places -- especially in the less secure Sunni areas. The turnout was 63 percent to 64 percent of registered voters versus 58 percent in the January election. This reflected a major increase in Sunni voters, since Shiite turnout in the south was lower than in January.
The Sunni vote did not reflect a solid bloc, in part due to deep internal divisions in the Sunni community. One Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Bloc, did support the constitution after obtaining some changes to the test, and agreement that it could be amended by the new parliament. Some strongly opposed it, and hard-line insurgents opposed registering and voting.
The results of the vote are still unclear, but reflect the predictable favorable outcome in Shiite and Kurdish areas. However, this does not mean agreement on how the constitution is to be completed, interpreted, and enforced. The Kurds want Kirkuk, oil areas, and secure revenues. The Shiites still have to work out the power balance between factions, the role of figures like al-Sadr, and issues such as the role of religion versus secular practices.
The Sunni vote was strongly "anti-" in purely Sunni areas, with "no" votes ranging around 85 percent to 95 percent. (97 percent in al Anbar). It may have been more favorable in mixed areas. However, problems existed in the Sunni turnout in many areas, including Mosul and Nineveh province, because of insurgent threats -- which may explain why 78 percent of the voters supported the constitution. Similarly, 70 percent were favorable in Diyala.
It should be noted that an agreement was reached before the referendum that the new parliament would have the right to amend the constitution. Moreover, many provisions are vague or partially contradictory, and 50 out of 130 clauses were not completed before the referendum.
These key issues are:
-- Defining federalism, the relative power of the federal regions versus the national government, and demarcating any ethnic and sectarian zones with "fracture" lines in areas like Kirkuk, Basra and Mosul.
-- Allocating oil revenues for existing and future fields, and deciding on the future of oil development.
-- Deciding who has the power to tax.
-- Defining the power of the national government relative to provincial and
local government.
-- Deciding on the role of religion in the state.
-- Deciding on the relative balance of religious and secular law and the power of national versus local courts and law enforcement.
-- Deciding who really has power over the police, whether the security forces will become national, and whether the prohibition of militias will actually be enforced.
-- Interpreting the meaning of the human rights provisions of the constitution.
Some further compromises may be possible before the election, but it seems unlikely that most of these key issues can really be resolved before mid-2006. Throughout this period, insurgents will continue to try to block the political process and cause a civil war. Sunnis will have to decide whether and how to participate in the political process, and pre-referendum polls showed sharp divisions over whether to participate by town and governorate.
The Shiite majority will have to resolve its own issues about the relative role of religion in the state, and Shiite militias. The Kurds will have to settle their future role in government, and deal with issues like the future of Kirkuk. Inevitably, there will be debates about who controls the military, security forces, and police, and the role of the Coalition.
--
(Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank.)
--
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of World Peace Herald or United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GJ15Ak02.html
THE ROVING EYE
How to constitute a civil war
By Pepe Escobar
Iraqis desperately need security, electricity, water, food rations, health care, education, jobs. Instead they get a referendum on a constitution few of Iraq's theoretical 15.7 million voters have debated and fewer still have even seen. Why? Because the occupying power said so. So forget about the real priorities needed to make life liveable. No constitution will be able to rule over a battlefield.
The US logic rules that the referendum is a crucial step in Iraq's democratic transition. But as Iraq is for the moment a vassal
regime, the occupiers basically redacted the draft "constitution", which is based on the November 2003 "made in the USA" interim constitution known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). TAL's supervisor was L Paul Bremer, the former American proconsul in Baghdad.
The new supervisor is Zalmay Khalilzad, the White House's former Afghan and current ambassador in Baghdad. During the redaction of the constitution, Khalilzad was described by Reuters as a "ubiquitous presence". Just in case, Khalilzad and his team of American Embassy officials even volunteered their own constitution text to the Iraqis.
At a minimum, according to the Washington Post, they "helped type up the draft and translate changes from English to Arabic". Khalilzad constantly tampered with the redaction. Then he used any trick in the "divide and rule" notebook to try to mollify the Shi'ite parties and "include" Sunnis in a kind of reconciled, centralized Iraq - to no avail. For this purpose, he used the services of the former US intelligence asset and former interim prime minister (for six months), Iyad Allawi.
Under a deal partly brokered by Khalilzad, Iraq's ruling Shi'ites and Kurds have agreed to make changes to the text of the charter that voters will consider on Saturday. The accord calls for a panel that could propose new revisions next year.
Sunnis can reject the draft constitution by recording two-thirds majorities in three of Iraq's 18 provinces. If the constitution is passed, elections will be held in December to elect a government. If it fails, the elections will install another interim administration to draft a new charter.
But whatever the outcome of the referendum, one result is certain: the birth of a sort of "Shi'iteistan" in central and southern Iraq, virtually autonomous, sitting on the bulk of Iraq's fabulous oil wealth, and with privileged cultural/diplomatic ties with Tehran. This certainly was not what Khalilzad's masters in Washington had dreamed of.
Iraq's Shi'ites, on the historical brink of their "intellectual and political emancipation", as the Shi'ite-based Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) put it, have clearly seen through Khalilzad's meddling game.
Ali al-Adad, a member of the central committee of the SCIRI, described it in al-Hayat newspaper as "an attempt to reshuffle the cards, with the aim to embarrass Shi'ite negotiators under the pretext of reinforcing national unity".
The creation of Shi'iteistan is non-negotiable, as for Shi'ites it means direct control over oil. Al-Adad added, "The adoption of a set of measures putting limitations on the creation of federal provinces ... would make it difficult for the Shi'ites to set up a province in the center and south in the future."
The SCIRI, already in power alongside the Dawa Party, is getting the constitution it wanted. From Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has already stated this is what he wanted too and urged the Shi'ite masses to vote "yes".
But there are fissures even among Shi'ites. Sheikh Jawad al-Khalessi, the imam of the Kazimiya mosque in Baghdad, said that the constitution "answers to American objectives, but not the aspirations of Iraqis". He personally called for a boycott, "but I know that George W Bush is already preparing his declaration on the success of the constitution". Kalessi has a counter-proposal: a timetable for the end of the military occupation; UN supervision of Iraqi affairs; and UN-supervised elections.
What the whole constitutional show has achieved so far is to intensify Sunni Arab resistance. But Sunnis, as well as Shi'ites, also have nuanced takes on the matter. They may see through the "divide and rule" tactics inherent in any colonial project. But some, like the Iraq Islamic Party, finally decided to support - or at least not to boycott - the constitution vote because of the compromise on how the document can be amended.
For Sheikh Harith al-Dhari, secretary general of the powerful Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), support for this constitution could only come after a set of conditions were met: a timetable for the end of military occupation; a definition of terrorism; full recognition of the Iraqi resistance; and full reinstatement of the Iraqi army.
Last Saturday, 21 Sunni Arab organizations, including the AMS, rejected the constitution, saying it "bears in it the germs of Iraq's division, the loss of its Arab identity and the plundering of its national wealth".
Sheikh Zakaria Tamimi, leader of the Sunni High Committee for Dawa, Irshad and Fatwa (Call, Guidance and Religious Decree) also voted "no". The majority of Sunni Arab organizations encouraged their supporters to register en masse - and that's what they did. But the aim is to defeat the constitution by the two-thirds of "no" votes in the three predominantly Sunni Arab provinces.
Tampering with a ghost
Many people in Iraq have not even seen a copy of the draft constitution. And it went through so many published drafts no one really knows what still stands. The "official", UN-printed final draft - 5 million copies of which started to be distributed less than two weeks before the vote - is already history. Not to mention that a mid-September UN internal confidential report suggests the constitution is a recipe for the breakup of Iraq.
So caught between resistance crossfire and yet one more US-imposed deadline, Iraqis are essentially voting for a ghost few have seen, and even if they have, it is not the genuine article: it will certainly be amended after a new parliament is elected on December 15. Moreover, whenever "lawmaker" Khalilzad is not happy, he will veto. Most of Iraq's extremely intractable issues will have to be debated later.
To compound the mess, the UN had to convince the current Iraqi parliament to reverse its decision to allow a majority of "potential", not actual, voters to decide the outcome of the referendum. Shi'ites and Kurds just wanted to make absolutely sure that Sunnis would not reject the constitution in three provinces - Anbar, Salah al-Din and Nineveh - of Iraq's 18. At least the original rules are again prevailing, according to which Sunnis can veto the constitution by getting a two-thirds "no" vote in three provinces, even if it is approved by a national majority.
After three decades of no possibility of political expression under Saddam and two-and-a-half years of occupation, no wonder voters are confused. There's the impression that if this ghost can be tampered with, even days before the vote, and so few have even seen the original, anything goes. Even more disturbing is that most Shi'ites and Sunnis will vote - "yes" or "no" - based not on a democratic exercise of their personal political beliefs, but on a fatwa from Sistani or a proclamation by the AMS.
Disappearing acts
Modern constitutions take years to be debated and written. The TAL ordered that Iraqis should form a government and write a constitution in six months. No wonder the rush job will be infinitely amended - not to mention the explosive risk of being implemented over the refusal of one of the country's key communities, the Sunni Arabs. Any constitution is supposed to avoid this kind of problem, not provoke it.
The definitive recipe for the breakup of Iraq is Article 115. It states:
Every province or more has the right to establish a region based on a request for a referendum to be submitted in one of the following ways:
1) A request from one-third of the members in each of the provincial councils in the provinces that wish to establish a region.
2) A request from one-tenth of the voters in each of the provinces that wish to establish a region.
In practice, this means that any two provinces can decide to become a "region" - with different laws from other regions (that's exactly what Kurds and Shi'ites want). Obviously, a region with its own laws, government and army is practically an independent country. The SCIRI, which controls nine of Iraq's 18 provinces, is already operating in this manner.
Another key article disappeared from the final (ie, today's) draft. It used to be Article 16, according to which:
1) It is forbidden for Iraq to be used as a base or corridor for foreign troops.
2) It is forbidden to have foreign military bases in Iraq.
3) The National Assembly can, when necessary, and with a majority of two thirds of its members, allow what is mentioned in 1 and 2 of this article.
The blatant contradiction speaks for itself. In the final draft, there's no reference to the crucial issue of occupation troops or occupation military bases - which raises the question: is Iraq set up to be under permanent US military occupation?
And it's one, two, three, what are we fighting for
Of Iraq's 18 provinces, seven - Baghdad, Babil, Anbar, Salah al-Din, Nineveh, Kirkuk and Diyala - are in the center-north. Apart from the Sunni-majority Anbar, Salah al-Din and Nineveh, both Baghdad and Diyala are at least half Sunni. These are all important provinces, holding 13 million people, roughly half of Iraq's population - and that includes the 6 million people living in the capital, Baghdad.
The resistance is very active in all of these provinces - and not only in four, as the Pentagon maintains. As things stand, with or without a constitution, the resistance and the guerrillas can continue to cause havoc in these seven provinces on a daily basis for a long time.
If the constitution is rejected this Saturday, nothing will change, as far as Iraqis are concerned. The Bremer-approved TAL remains in place. There will still be parliamentary elections in December, and a new interim parliament will have to start all over again. Shi'ites will be furious. But for them it's not the end of the game. The new parliament will once again be dominated by Shi'ites and a modified version of this tampered constitution will resurface.
If the constitution is rejected, the different strands of the Sunni Arab resistance movement - as well as al-Qaeda in Iraq - will be encouraged, because, for them, although with nuances, this is the occupiers' piece of paper. But even if the constitution is approved, the same thing will happen. Sunni Arabs will concentrate on the fact that they have been excluded, they are out of the game and have nothing left to lose. The resistance will become even bloodier. There couldn't have been a more constitutional way to civil war.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing .)
THE ROVING EYE
How to constitute a civil war
By Pepe Escobar
Iraqis desperately need security, electricity, water, food rations, health care, education, jobs. Instead they get a referendum on a constitution few of Iraq's theoretical 15.7 million voters have debated and fewer still have even seen. Why? Because the occupying power said so. So forget about the real priorities needed to make life liveable. No constitution will be able to rule over a battlefield.
The US logic rules that the referendum is a crucial step in Iraq's democratic transition. But as Iraq is for the moment a vassal
regime, the occupiers basically redacted the draft "constitution", which is based on the November 2003 "made in the USA" interim constitution known as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). TAL's supervisor was L Paul Bremer, the former American proconsul in Baghdad.
The new supervisor is Zalmay Khalilzad, the White House's former Afghan and current ambassador in Baghdad. During the redaction of the constitution, Khalilzad was described by Reuters as a "ubiquitous presence". Just in case, Khalilzad and his team of American Embassy officials even volunteered their own constitution text to the Iraqis.
At a minimum, according to the Washington Post, they "helped type up the draft and translate changes from English to Arabic". Khalilzad constantly tampered with the redaction. Then he used any trick in the "divide and rule" notebook to try to mollify the Shi'ite parties and "include" Sunnis in a kind of reconciled, centralized Iraq - to no avail. For this purpose, he used the services of the former US intelligence asset and former interim prime minister (for six months), Iyad Allawi.
Under a deal partly brokered by Khalilzad, Iraq's ruling Shi'ites and Kurds have agreed to make changes to the text of the charter that voters will consider on Saturday. The accord calls for a panel that could propose new revisions next year.
Sunnis can reject the draft constitution by recording two-thirds majorities in three of Iraq's 18 provinces. If the constitution is passed, elections will be held in December to elect a government. If it fails, the elections will install another interim administration to draft a new charter.
But whatever the outcome of the referendum, one result is certain: the birth of a sort of "Shi'iteistan" in central and southern Iraq, virtually autonomous, sitting on the bulk of Iraq's fabulous oil wealth, and with privileged cultural/diplomatic ties with Tehran. This certainly was not what Khalilzad's masters in Washington had dreamed of.
Iraq's Shi'ites, on the historical brink of their "intellectual and political emancipation", as the Shi'ite-based Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) put it, have clearly seen through Khalilzad's meddling game.
Ali al-Adad, a member of the central committee of the SCIRI, described it in al-Hayat newspaper as "an attempt to reshuffle the cards, with the aim to embarrass Shi'ite negotiators under the pretext of reinforcing national unity".
The creation of Shi'iteistan is non-negotiable, as for Shi'ites it means direct control over oil. Al-Adad added, "The adoption of a set of measures putting limitations on the creation of federal provinces ... would make it difficult for the Shi'ites to set up a province in the center and south in the future."
The SCIRI, already in power alongside the Dawa Party, is getting the constitution it wanted. From Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has already stated this is what he wanted too and urged the Shi'ite masses to vote "yes".
But there are fissures even among Shi'ites. Sheikh Jawad al-Khalessi, the imam of the Kazimiya mosque in Baghdad, said that the constitution "answers to American objectives, but not the aspirations of Iraqis". He personally called for a boycott, "but I know that George W Bush is already preparing his declaration on the success of the constitution". Kalessi has a counter-proposal: a timetable for the end of the military occupation; UN supervision of Iraqi affairs; and UN-supervised elections.
What the whole constitutional show has achieved so far is to intensify Sunni Arab resistance. But Sunnis, as well as Shi'ites, also have nuanced takes on the matter. They may see through the "divide and rule" tactics inherent in any colonial project. But some, like the Iraq Islamic Party, finally decided to support - or at least not to boycott - the constitution vote because of the compromise on how the document can be amended.
For Sheikh Harith al-Dhari, secretary general of the powerful Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), support for this constitution could only come after a set of conditions were met: a timetable for the end of military occupation; a definition of terrorism; full recognition of the Iraqi resistance; and full reinstatement of the Iraqi army.
Last Saturday, 21 Sunni Arab organizations, including the AMS, rejected the constitution, saying it "bears in it the germs of Iraq's division, the loss of its Arab identity and the plundering of its national wealth".
Sheikh Zakaria Tamimi, leader of the Sunni High Committee for Dawa, Irshad and Fatwa (Call, Guidance and Religious Decree) also voted "no". The majority of Sunni Arab organizations encouraged their supporters to register en masse - and that's what they did. But the aim is to defeat the constitution by the two-thirds of "no" votes in the three predominantly Sunni Arab provinces.
Tampering with a ghost
Many people in Iraq have not even seen a copy of the draft constitution. And it went through so many published drafts no one really knows what still stands. The "official", UN-printed final draft - 5 million copies of which started to be distributed less than two weeks before the vote - is already history. Not to mention that a mid-September UN internal confidential report suggests the constitution is a recipe for the breakup of Iraq.
So caught between resistance crossfire and yet one more US-imposed deadline, Iraqis are essentially voting for a ghost few have seen, and even if they have, it is not the genuine article: it will certainly be amended after a new parliament is elected on December 15. Moreover, whenever "lawmaker" Khalilzad is not happy, he will veto. Most of Iraq's extremely intractable issues will have to be debated later.
To compound the mess, the UN had to convince the current Iraqi parliament to reverse its decision to allow a majority of "potential", not actual, voters to decide the outcome of the referendum. Shi'ites and Kurds just wanted to make absolutely sure that Sunnis would not reject the constitution in three provinces - Anbar, Salah al-Din and Nineveh - of Iraq's 18. At least the original rules are again prevailing, according to which Sunnis can veto the constitution by getting a two-thirds "no" vote in three provinces, even if it is approved by a national majority.
After three decades of no possibility of political expression under Saddam and two-and-a-half years of occupation, no wonder voters are confused. There's the impression that if this ghost can be tampered with, even days before the vote, and so few have even seen the original, anything goes. Even more disturbing is that most Shi'ites and Sunnis will vote - "yes" or "no" - based not on a democratic exercise of their personal political beliefs, but on a fatwa from Sistani or a proclamation by the AMS.
Disappearing acts
Modern constitutions take years to be debated and written. The TAL ordered that Iraqis should form a government and write a constitution in six months. No wonder the rush job will be infinitely amended - not to mention the explosive risk of being implemented over the refusal of one of the country's key communities, the Sunni Arabs. Any constitution is supposed to avoid this kind of problem, not provoke it.
The definitive recipe for the breakup of Iraq is Article 115. It states:
Every province or more has the right to establish a region based on a request for a referendum to be submitted in one of the following ways:
1) A request from one-third of the members in each of the provincial councils in the provinces that wish to establish a region.
2) A request from one-tenth of the voters in each of the provinces that wish to establish a region.
In practice, this means that any two provinces can decide to become a "region" - with different laws from other regions (that's exactly what Kurds and Shi'ites want). Obviously, a region with its own laws, government and army is practically an independent country. The SCIRI, which controls nine of Iraq's 18 provinces, is already operating in this manner.
Another key article disappeared from the final (ie, today's) draft. It used to be Article 16, according to which:
1) It is forbidden for Iraq to be used as a base or corridor for foreign troops.
2) It is forbidden to have foreign military bases in Iraq.
3) The National Assembly can, when necessary, and with a majority of two thirds of its members, allow what is mentioned in 1 and 2 of this article.
The blatant contradiction speaks for itself. In the final draft, there's no reference to the crucial issue of occupation troops or occupation military bases - which raises the question: is Iraq set up to be under permanent US military occupation?
And it's one, two, three, what are we fighting for
Of Iraq's 18 provinces, seven - Baghdad, Babil, Anbar, Salah al-Din, Nineveh, Kirkuk and Diyala - are in the center-north. Apart from the Sunni-majority Anbar, Salah al-Din and Nineveh, both Baghdad and Diyala are at least half Sunni. These are all important provinces, holding 13 million people, roughly half of Iraq's population - and that includes the 6 million people living in the capital, Baghdad.
The resistance is very active in all of these provinces - and not only in four, as the Pentagon maintains. As things stand, with or without a constitution, the resistance and the guerrillas can continue to cause havoc in these seven provinces on a daily basis for a long time.
If the constitution is rejected this Saturday, nothing will change, as far as Iraqis are concerned. The Bremer-approved TAL remains in place. There will still be parliamentary elections in December, and a new interim parliament will have to start all over again. Shi'ites will be furious. But for them it's not the end of the game. The new parliament will once again be dominated by Shi'ites and a modified version of this tampered constitution will resurface.
If the constitution is rejected, the different strands of the Sunni Arab resistance movement - as well as al-Qaeda in Iraq - will be encouraged, because, for them, although with nuances, this is the occupiers' piece of paper. But even if the constitution is approved, the same thing will happen. Sunni Arabs will concentrate on the fact that they have been excluded, they are out of the game and have nothing left to lose. The resistance will become even bloodier. There couldn't have been a more constitutional way to civil war.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing .)
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1017/p03s01-usfp.html?s=t5
Military strategy in Iraq: What is it?
Congress presses Bush and the Pentagon for a clearer articulation of their vision.
By Mark Sappenfield | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
WASHINGTON – In refocusing the nation's attention on the war on terror in past weeks, both the president and his critics in Congress are increasingly turning to a fundamental yet frequently overlooked aspect of the Iraq conflict: whether the United States has a clear military strategy to defeat the insurgency.
Time and again, the Bush administration has stated that the way to ultimately break the insurgency is to create a strong and democratic Iraq. But that's the political path to victory, measured in mileposts such as last weekend's constitutional referendum. How to assess the military's progress in subduing - or at least managing - an enemy that refuses to stand and fight is a question that only now is getting asked.
This conflict is the sort that the armed forces have avoided since Vietnam, where the Pentagon never found adequate answers to similar strategic questions. But America's more aggressive post-Sept. 11 stance suggests that this is the warfare of the future - and the military must learn how to cope with it.
Now, pressed by Congress and an impatient public, President Bush and Pentagon leaders have begun to articulate the vision behind their current course - casting Iraq as a battle of wills in which American forces will help an improving Iraqi Army hunt down and destroy terrorists. But after 2-1/2 years of halting progress, doubts are growing among military analysts and a more combative Congress that this is a winning strategy - or even a strategy at all.
"Strategy is about connecting means to ends," says Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments here. "It's not quite clear what the strategy is."
On several occasions recently, the president has sought to refute these critics. "Our strategy is clear in Iraq," he declared in the Rose Garden Sept. 28, citing how coalition forces had killed the second-highest ranking member of Al Qaeda in Iraq and were training Iraqi forces. As more Iraqi forces reach readiness, he added, coalition forces would strike more terrorist enclaves and hold them, tightening the noose on the insurgency.
Two days later, the top commander in Iraq, Gen. George Casey, went so far as to say that "we need to defeat [Al Qaeda in Iraq] in the next six to 12 months, restore Iraqi control over the borders, keep them from bringing in the suicide bombers and the foreign fighters, so that after these elections the Iraqis have the opportunity to deal with the [remaining militant Saddam Hussein loyalists]."
Congressional doubts
Yet after staying largely silent on the issue throughout much of the Iraq war, Congress is now questioning whether the ongoing military operations in Iraq are guided by any unified strategy to secure the country. In a Sept. 29 congressional hearing, Rep. Ike Skelton (D) of Missouri asked General Casey: "What are we seeking to achieve? Are we fighting a counterinsurgency mission, or is our mission simply to train and equip the Iraqis?"
Two weeks ago, Sen. Jack Reed (D) of Rhode Island proclaimed that "what the administration is talking about is not really a strategy to succeed, but simply a strategy to leave."
Not coincidentally, the most critical voices have been Democrats. Sensing a president wounded by Katrina and buffeted by the growing unpopularity of the Iraq war, some lawmakers have seized the strategy issue as a new and politically palatable way to criticize the administration without overtly opposing the war.
But the concerns go beyond politics. They strike at the very character and capacity of the modern military. The grand lesson of Vietnam was that America's armed forces were peerless on the field of battle, but ill-suited for protracted conflicts against unconventional armies.
"The consensus among the military was that we don't want any more of these wars because we don't like them and we're not good at them," says Dr. Krepinevich.
From that experience emerged the so-called Powell Doctrine - named for retired Gen. Colin Powell's insistence that the US military go to war only when it had a clear mission, overwhelming force, and an obvious exit strategy. Sept. 11, however, drew America into the sorts of conflicts it had specifically avoided, involving the untidy and time-consuming prospect of toppling nations and rebuilding them.
In Iraq, the toppling was practically flawless, but the military is still coming to grips with how to wage war against the embers of anger - an unseen enemy that doesn't align itself in battalions, divisions, or corps. Army leaders recognize that something more than a rifle and a helmet is required.
"You need a strategy, not just a military strategy," says Brig. Gen. Volney Warner of the Army Command and General Staff College, noting that political and economic progress are necessary to turn citizens against an insurgency. "The military's general role is to ensure security and stability."
Scrutiny of raids
How to provide that security, however, has so far proved elusive in the four most violent provinces. The large, periodic raids against scattered insurgent strongholds - such as the recent Operations Iron Fist and River Gate - have accomplished little, critics say, and have had more to do with short-term election-day security than a long-term plan for victory. Although it is the kind of mission for which the Army is best suited, there's little evidence that they have significantly dulled the insurgents' capacity. "What we've had are operations that go out and try to find terrorists and kill them in situations where we haven't got the underlying intelligence [from informants]," says Krepinevich.
So he suggests what he calls the ink-spot strategy: consolidating security in the 14 relatively nonviolent provinces and then slowly moving out to areas of the other provinces. The military would hold these areas with overwhelming force for a period of six months or a year before moving on - spreading like an ink spot on a tablecloth.
By creating a sense of security, the coalition can create and gradually expand the number of areas where residents feel comfortable passing along tips about insurgents without fear of reprisals. After all, coalition forces are estimated to outnumber insurgents 20 to 1, Krepinevich says: "If we knew who [the] insurgents were and where they were, the insurgency would be over."
Military strategy in Iraq: What is it?
Congress presses Bush and the Pentagon for a clearer articulation of their vision.
By Mark Sappenfield | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
WASHINGTON – In refocusing the nation's attention on the war on terror in past weeks, both the president and his critics in Congress are increasingly turning to a fundamental yet frequently overlooked aspect of the Iraq conflict: whether the United States has a clear military strategy to defeat the insurgency.
Time and again, the Bush administration has stated that the way to ultimately break the insurgency is to create a strong and democratic Iraq. But that's the political path to victory, measured in mileposts such as last weekend's constitutional referendum. How to assess the military's progress in subduing - or at least managing - an enemy that refuses to stand and fight is a question that only now is getting asked.
This conflict is the sort that the armed forces have avoided since Vietnam, where the Pentagon never found adequate answers to similar strategic questions. But America's more aggressive post-Sept. 11 stance suggests that this is the warfare of the future - and the military must learn how to cope with it.
Now, pressed by Congress and an impatient public, President Bush and Pentagon leaders have begun to articulate the vision behind their current course - casting Iraq as a battle of wills in which American forces will help an improving Iraqi Army hunt down and destroy terrorists. But after 2-1/2 years of halting progress, doubts are growing among military analysts and a more combative Congress that this is a winning strategy - or even a strategy at all.
"Strategy is about connecting means to ends," says Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments here. "It's not quite clear what the strategy is."
On several occasions recently, the president has sought to refute these critics. "Our strategy is clear in Iraq," he declared in the Rose Garden Sept. 28, citing how coalition forces had killed the second-highest ranking member of Al Qaeda in Iraq and were training Iraqi forces. As more Iraqi forces reach readiness, he added, coalition forces would strike more terrorist enclaves and hold them, tightening the noose on the insurgency.
Two days later, the top commander in Iraq, Gen. George Casey, went so far as to say that "we need to defeat [Al Qaeda in Iraq] in the next six to 12 months, restore Iraqi control over the borders, keep them from bringing in the suicide bombers and the foreign fighters, so that after these elections the Iraqis have the opportunity to deal with the [remaining militant Saddam Hussein loyalists]."
Congressional doubts
Yet after staying largely silent on the issue throughout much of the Iraq war, Congress is now questioning whether the ongoing military operations in Iraq are guided by any unified strategy to secure the country. In a Sept. 29 congressional hearing, Rep. Ike Skelton (D) of Missouri asked General Casey: "What are we seeking to achieve? Are we fighting a counterinsurgency mission, or is our mission simply to train and equip the Iraqis?"
Two weeks ago, Sen. Jack Reed (D) of Rhode Island proclaimed that "what the administration is talking about is not really a strategy to succeed, but simply a strategy to leave."
Not coincidentally, the most critical voices have been Democrats. Sensing a president wounded by Katrina and buffeted by the growing unpopularity of the Iraq war, some lawmakers have seized the strategy issue as a new and politically palatable way to criticize the administration without overtly opposing the war.
But the concerns go beyond politics. They strike at the very character and capacity of the modern military. The grand lesson of Vietnam was that America's armed forces were peerless on the field of battle, but ill-suited for protracted conflicts against unconventional armies.
"The consensus among the military was that we don't want any more of these wars because we don't like them and we're not good at them," says Dr. Krepinevich.
From that experience emerged the so-called Powell Doctrine - named for retired Gen. Colin Powell's insistence that the US military go to war only when it had a clear mission, overwhelming force, and an obvious exit strategy. Sept. 11, however, drew America into the sorts of conflicts it had specifically avoided, involving the untidy and time-consuming prospect of toppling nations and rebuilding them.
In Iraq, the toppling was practically flawless, but the military is still coming to grips with how to wage war against the embers of anger - an unseen enemy that doesn't align itself in battalions, divisions, or corps. Army leaders recognize that something more than a rifle and a helmet is required.
"You need a strategy, not just a military strategy," says Brig. Gen. Volney Warner of the Army Command and General Staff College, noting that political and economic progress are necessary to turn citizens against an insurgency. "The military's general role is to ensure security and stability."
Scrutiny of raids
How to provide that security, however, has so far proved elusive in the four most violent provinces. The large, periodic raids against scattered insurgent strongholds - such as the recent Operations Iron Fist and River Gate - have accomplished little, critics say, and have had more to do with short-term election-day security than a long-term plan for victory. Although it is the kind of mission for which the Army is best suited, there's little evidence that they have significantly dulled the insurgents' capacity. "What we've had are operations that go out and try to find terrorists and kill them in situations where we haven't got the underlying intelligence [from informants]," says Krepinevich.
So he suggests what he calls the ink-spot strategy: consolidating security in the 14 relatively nonviolent provinces and then slowly moving out to areas of the other provinces. The military would hold these areas with overwhelming force for a period of six months or a year before moving on - spreading like an ink spot on a tablecloth.
By creating a sense of security, the coalition can create and gradually expand the number of areas where residents feel comfortable passing along tips about insurgents without fear of reprisals. After all, coalition forces are estimated to outnumber insurgents 20 to 1, Krepinevich says: "If we knew who [the] insurgents were and where they were, the insurgency would be over."
http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/earlywarni...ls_secret_.html
William M. Arkin on National and Homeland Security
Israel's Secret Hand in Iraq Inspections
(First of a two-part series)
On October 8, 1994, weapons inspector and former Marine Corps intelligence officer Scott Ritter arrived in Tel Aviv, setting in motion a nine year odyssey that ultimately led to the current Iraq war.
Ritter, who left the United Nations in 1998 convinced that the United States government was undermining inspections, and later became a vociferous war opponent arguing that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, has now written a tell-all book Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein (Nation Books).
"Intelligence" in the title is an entity -- the CIA -- and Ritter's claim is that "it" destroyed the United National Special Commission (UNSCOM) in its 1990's pursuit of "regime change."
Scott Ritter destroyed UNSCOM.
He didn't do it alone. And he did not necessarily do it intentionally. But like so many covert operators, Ritter became entangled in a covert scheme that sought to penetrate Saddam Hussein's inner circle, a scheme that became more about itself than any foreign policy goal that might result.
To be clear, it was Iraq that developed WMD illegally. Saddam Hussein's inner circle volunteered nothing to the U.N., and retained as much as they could. Iraq chose not to disclose the full extent of its WMD program, only doling out "compliance" with Security Council resolutions when it was trapped or caught lying.
But Iraq Confidential helps to explain how the United States also contributed to an intractable stand-off with Baghdad. But most important, the service that Scott Ritter really provides is to inadvertently explain how the Bush administration later came to believe that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.
A bit of full disclosure: In 1998, I was hired by the office of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to
look into allegations that UNSCOM was being used to collect information for the United States above and beyond that needed by weapons inspectors to catch the Iraqis in their deceits. UNSCOM was being used, and had set up a variety of surveillance programs designed to support the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
The "close in" eavesdropping scheme was able to monitor short-range radio and telephone calls in Baghdad and thus "map" Saddam Hussein's inner circle and guard force. (For targeting purposes, the quality of the intelligence was so good that after Iraq ejected UNSCOM from the country in November 1998, the Clinton administration just couldn't resist undertaking Operation Desert Fox, the now infamous "wag the dog" attack whose real purpose -- perhaps not so far fetched -- was to kill Saddam Hussein or at least to sow enough confusion and disruption in his guard force to open the way for a coup.)
Scott Ritter fills in a lot of detail I wasn't aware of as to how UNSCOM aided U.S. covert efforts, but his bombshell is about Israel. Starting in about 1994, Israel very quietly shared its own sensitive intelligence about Saddam's infrastructure and security apparatus with the United Nations, working with Ritter to develop a new approach to inspections, and identifying prospective "targets" for the U.N. team to inspect. What is most interesting about the Israeli assistance is how distant the sharing was from the United States: Israel assisted the U.N. on the basis of own interests -- weakening Iraq.
What the Israelis got in return, courtesy of Ritter's maneuvers, were U-2 reconnaissance images of Iraq taken by U.S. Air Force aircraft for UNSCOM, and later even raw intercept tapes that Israeli linguists and analysts were able to exploit. If there is anything that secret producers hate, it is losing control of their information. Though Ritter doesn't know why, clearly at some point Washington snapped and the U.S. government tried to stop, or at least control, the exchange. Ritter interprets the U.S. pressure as part of THE conspiracy.
Here is Scott Ritter: international inspector working for the United Nations, making repeated trips to Israel, going through contortions to hide Israeli assistance from even most of his inspector colleagues, conducting secret meetings, involved in intra-governmental intrigues, privy to compartmented operations, working with the CIA and "Delta force," using special code names. Ritter describes in page after page how he is at the center of secret operations made secret in order to protect intelligence sources and methods and preserve operational security and allow governments to cooperate without political recriminations. He is more than happy to play secret agent as long as he is at the center of it all and getting what he wants.
Yet when Washington questions UNSCOM's inspections methods, and when U.S. intelligence desires to preserve its own sources and methods by controlling what secret information UNSCOM shares with the Israelis, it is THE conspiracy.
Ritter disparages the CIA's need to be in control and criticizes Washington for calling into question "the integrity" of UNSCOM. What was really going on in Washington though, is that the entire UNSCOM-Israel enterprise, the program of inspections focusing on Saddam's security agencies, and Ritter's propensity for confrontation -- particularly his wilingness to step way outside normal channels -- was increasingly seen as undermining U.S. foreign policy.
To Ritter, that policy was "regime change," pure and simple. Ritter's case for conspiracy is that the United States from day one was never interested in disarmament, that even when Security Council Resolution 687 was crafted in the first Bush administration soon after Operation Desert Storm "American diplomats had destabilizing and undermining Saddam Hussein at the front of their minds."
To Ritter, who eventually became a vocal critic of the U.S. decision to abandon weapons inspections and go to war, Washington never had any intentions to let sanctions be lifted. To Ritter, since Washington never wanted to lift sanctions, it never wanted the U.N. to be successful. But on this score, Ritter is just dead wrong.
The weakness of Resolution 687, if one could call it a weakness, was that it was crafted by Cold War arms control experts who were completely focused on weapons of mass destruction, stung at the time by the failure of the International Atomic Energy Agency to curtail Iraq's gigantic nuclear weapons program, and embarrassed by the extent of U.S. ignorance about Saddam's various illegal weapons efforts.
Iraq was required to give up all of its biological, chemical, nuclear, and long-range missile programs along the Cold War model. Ignored were Iraq's conventional forces that were responsible for invading Iran and Kuwait in the first place. But most important, what the Resolution did was ignore Saddam Hussein and his regime. It wasn't until the mid-1990's that the human right aesthetic justified international action against such war criminals. In 1991, when Resolution 687 was passed, the conspiracy was that the United States was willing, as was the rest of the international community, to keep Saddam Hussein in power for grandiose geo-political reasons.
The U.S. approach to Iraq thus wasn't some conspiracy. It was a poorly conceived strategy followed by completely new territory. Sure over time (pretty quickly indeed) it became clear that Iraq would never voluntarily comply with the U.N.; over time all parties evolved to understand how difficult it would be to achieve disarmament with a non-cooperative party (the inspection regime was to have lasted a few months, at most a couple of years); and over time, the Clinton administration came to the conclusion that the only way Iraq would ever cease being a threat to the region would be if Saddam Hussein was gone.
Conspiracy theorists want to believe that some hidden hand understood and was maneuvering all of this from the beginning. I don't think that is true and Ritter doesn't produce the goods to prove his case.
From the very beginning, though, Scott Ritter had already reached his own conclusion, and it is one that in hindsight seems so prescient and so right, who could question his story.
Scott Ritter was convinced that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction.
By William M. Arkin | October 18, 2005; 03:34 PM ET | Category: Intelligence
Previous: Iraq: Time to Get Out | Main Index
William M. Arkin on National and Homeland Security
Israel's Secret Hand in Iraq Inspections
(First of a two-part series)
On October 8, 1994, weapons inspector and former Marine Corps intelligence officer Scott Ritter arrived in Tel Aviv, setting in motion a nine year odyssey that ultimately led to the current Iraq war.
Ritter, who left the United Nations in 1998 convinced that the United States government was undermining inspections, and later became a vociferous war opponent arguing that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, has now written a tell-all book Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein (Nation Books).
"Intelligence" in the title is an entity -- the CIA -- and Ritter's claim is that "it" destroyed the United National Special Commission (UNSCOM) in its 1990's pursuit of "regime change."
Scott Ritter destroyed UNSCOM.
He didn't do it alone. And he did not necessarily do it intentionally. But like so many covert operators, Ritter became entangled in a covert scheme that sought to penetrate Saddam Hussein's inner circle, a scheme that became more about itself than any foreign policy goal that might result.
To be clear, it was Iraq that developed WMD illegally. Saddam Hussein's inner circle volunteered nothing to the U.N., and retained as much as they could. Iraq chose not to disclose the full extent of its WMD program, only doling out "compliance" with Security Council resolutions when it was trapped or caught lying.
But Iraq Confidential helps to explain how the United States also contributed to an intractable stand-off with Baghdad. But most important, the service that Scott Ritter really provides is to inadvertently explain how the Bush administration later came to believe that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction.
A bit of full disclosure: In 1998, I was hired by the office of Secretary-General Kofi Annan to
look into allegations that UNSCOM was being used to collect information for the United States above and beyond that needed by weapons inspectors to catch the Iraqis in their deceits. UNSCOM was being used, and had set up a variety of surveillance programs designed to support the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
The "close in" eavesdropping scheme was able to monitor short-range radio and telephone calls in Baghdad and thus "map" Saddam Hussein's inner circle and guard force. (For targeting purposes, the quality of the intelligence was so good that after Iraq ejected UNSCOM from the country in November 1998, the Clinton administration just couldn't resist undertaking Operation Desert Fox, the now infamous "wag the dog" attack whose real purpose -- perhaps not so far fetched -- was to kill Saddam Hussein or at least to sow enough confusion and disruption in his guard force to open the way for a coup.)
Scott Ritter fills in a lot of detail I wasn't aware of as to how UNSCOM aided U.S. covert efforts, but his bombshell is about Israel. Starting in about 1994, Israel very quietly shared its own sensitive intelligence about Saddam's infrastructure and security apparatus with the United Nations, working with Ritter to develop a new approach to inspections, and identifying prospective "targets" for the U.N. team to inspect. What is most interesting about the Israeli assistance is how distant the sharing was from the United States: Israel assisted the U.N. on the basis of own interests -- weakening Iraq.
What the Israelis got in return, courtesy of Ritter's maneuvers, were U-2 reconnaissance images of Iraq taken by U.S. Air Force aircraft for UNSCOM, and later even raw intercept tapes that Israeli linguists and analysts were able to exploit. If there is anything that secret producers hate, it is losing control of their information. Though Ritter doesn't know why, clearly at some point Washington snapped and the U.S. government tried to stop, or at least control, the exchange. Ritter interprets the U.S. pressure as part of THE conspiracy.
Here is Scott Ritter: international inspector working for the United Nations, making repeated trips to Israel, going through contortions to hide Israeli assistance from even most of his inspector colleagues, conducting secret meetings, involved in intra-governmental intrigues, privy to compartmented operations, working with the CIA and "Delta force," using special code names. Ritter describes in page after page how he is at the center of secret operations made secret in order to protect intelligence sources and methods and preserve operational security and allow governments to cooperate without political recriminations. He is more than happy to play secret agent as long as he is at the center of it all and getting what he wants.
Yet when Washington questions UNSCOM's inspections methods, and when U.S. intelligence desires to preserve its own sources and methods by controlling what secret information UNSCOM shares with the Israelis, it is THE conspiracy.
Ritter disparages the CIA's need to be in control and criticizes Washington for calling into question "the integrity" of UNSCOM. What was really going on in Washington though, is that the entire UNSCOM-Israel enterprise, the program of inspections focusing on Saddam's security agencies, and Ritter's propensity for confrontation -- particularly his wilingness to step way outside normal channels -- was increasingly seen as undermining U.S. foreign policy.
To Ritter, that policy was "regime change," pure and simple. Ritter's case for conspiracy is that the United States from day one was never interested in disarmament, that even when Security Council Resolution 687 was crafted in the first Bush administration soon after Operation Desert Storm "American diplomats had destabilizing and undermining Saddam Hussein at the front of their minds."
To Ritter, who eventually became a vocal critic of the U.S. decision to abandon weapons inspections and go to war, Washington never had any intentions to let sanctions be lifted. To Ritter, since Washington never wanted to lift sanctions, it never wanted the U.N. to be successful. But on this score, Ritter is just dead wrong.
The weakness of Resolution 687, if one could call it a weakness, was that it was crafted by Cold War arms control experts who were completely focused on weapons of mass destruction, stung at the time by the failure of the International Atomic Energy Agency to curtail Iraq's gigantic nuclear weapons program, and embarrassed by the extent of U.S. ignorance about Saddam's various illegal weapons efforts.
Iraq was required to give up all of its biological, chemical, nuclear, and long-range missile programs along the Cold War model. Ignored were Iraq's conventional forces that were responsible for invading Iran and Kuwait in the first place. But most important, what the Resolution did was ignore Saddam Hussein and his regime. It wasn't until the mid-1990's that the human right aesthetic justified international action against such war criminals. In 1991, when Resolution 687 was passed, the conspiracy was that the United States was willing, as was the rest of the international community, to keep Saddam Hussein in power for grandiose geo-political reasons.
The U.S. approach to Iraq thus wasn't some conspiracy. It was a poorly conceived strategy followed by completely new territory. Sure over time (pretty quickly indeed) it became clear that Iraq would never voluntarily comply with the U.N.; over time all parties evolved to understand how difficult it would be to achieve disarmament with a non-cooperative party (the inspection regime was to have lasted a few months, at most a couple of years); and over time, the Clinton administration came to the conclusion that the only way Iraq would ever cease being a threat to the region would be if Saddam Hussein was gone.
Conspiracy theorists want to believe that some hidden hand understood and was maneuvering all of this from the beginning. I don't think that is true and Ritter doesn't produce the goods to prove his case.
From the very beginning, though, Scott Ritter had already reached his own conclusion, and it is one that in hindsight seems so prescient and so right, who could question his story.
Scott Ritter was convinced that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction.
By William M. Arkin | October 18, 2005; 03:34 PM ET | Category: Intelligence
Previous: Iraq: Time to Get Out | Main Index
Hussein Faces Tribunal Today In First Trial for Actions in Iraq
By Jackie Spinner
SULAYMANIYAH, Iraq, Oct. 18 -- Almost two years after U.S. forces captured a disheveled Saddam Hussein hiding in a hole in the ground on a farm near his home town of Tikrit, the former Iraqi president will appear Wednesday before a five-member panel of his countrymen in the first criminal case brought against him and seven Baath Party associates.
Iraqis blame Hussein for the deaths and torture of hundreds of thousands of citizens during nearly three decades in power. But he will face charges concerning a single incident, the execution of 143 men and boys from the predominantly Shiite Muslim town of Dujail, 35 miles north of the capital.
Prosecutors allege that Hussein ordered the killings as retaliation after gunmen fired on his motorcade in the town on July 8, 1982, in an attempt to assassinate him.
In addition to the executions, which occurred three years later at Abu Ghraib prison, more than 1,500 townspeople were arrested, prosecutors allege. Many were banished to desert prisons where families were crowded together in windowless cells for years. Bulldozers plowed over the fertile groves of orange and date palm trees that provided the primary livelihood for Dujail's residents.
Unlike Balkan leaders who have faced war crimes charges in a U.N. court in The Hague, Hussein will appear before the Iraqi Special Tribunal, a body established in December 2003 by U.S.-led occupation authorities. It will use a mixture of international law and Iraqi criminal law in conducting the trial.
The transitional Iraqi parliament, elected in January, has put its stamp on the court process. It approved minor revisions to the law that created the tribunal, but those changes will not go into effect until they are published in an official paper of record.
In a rare telephone interview on Tuesday, Hussein's sole attorney, Khalil Dulaimi, said his client would not get a "fair or honest trial at all." He questioned the legitimacy of the court.
Dulaimi said he was informed of the trial's start date only on Sept. 25. "I need at least three more months to be prepared for the trial," he said. Speeding up the trial was intended "to confuse the defense and deprive it from full preparations," he added.
"Psychologically, I am prepared and will go with full confidence," he said. But "it will be a show trial only."
In a report issued two days ago, Human Rights Watch raised concerns that the tribunal was not being impartial and independent. The report noted that the U.S. government had spent $128 million on investigations and prosecutions of members of Hussein's government.
The first trials before the tribunal will be "a litmus test for whether it is up to the task of delivering justice," the report stated. "Fair trials are not only the entitlement of defendants. They are also a prerequisite for acknowledging the experiences of hundreds of thousands of victims of the former regime in an open, transparent and publicly accessible way," it said.
Jaafar Mousawi, the tribunal's chief prosecutor in Hussein's trial, said the lawyers and judges intend to reply on Wednesday to accusations that the tribunal does not have proper jurisdiction because it was formed by the U.S. occupation authority.
"They have the right to say what they want," Mousawi said of the critics, "and we have the right and the power to reply. We are confident of what we have in this case, the evidences with the defendants' statements and documents with their signatures."
Asked what was going through his mind on the eve of the trial's start, Mousawi said he was "excited to achieve justice."
The other defendants in the case are Barzan Ibrahim, Hussein's half brother and the head of Iraq's intelligence service until 2003; Taha Yassin Ramadan, Iraq's vice president until 2003; Awad Haman Bander Sadun, former chief of Hussein's Revolutionary Court, which sentenced many of the Dujail men to death; Abdullah Kadhim Ruweid, a senior Baath Party official in Dujail who is accused of rounding up the local residents after the assassination attempt; Mizher Abdullah Ruweid, his son; and two other senior Baath Party officials in Dujail, Ali Daeem Ali and Mohammed Azawi Ali.
If convicted, all could face death by hanging. Under one of the revisions approved by the Iraqi parliament but not yet formally implemented, any sentence would be carried out within 30 days of a final appeal decision. That means Hussein might never be tried for other crimes of which he has been accused, including the campaign against the Kurds that killed at least 180,000, the deadly suppression of Shiite uprisings in southern Iraq following the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the invasion of Kuwait.
Sources close to the tribunal have said that the proceedings that begin Wednesday will probably last only a day or two while the tribunal addresses motions and technicalities. Hussein's defense is likely to request a recess to provide more time to prepare, the sources said, and the tribunal will probably grant it. The sources expect the recess to last several weeks, perhaps until the first of the year.
When the trial resumes, the prosecution would begin outlining its case, calling witnesses and presenting evidence. That phase could last several months, the same sources said. But few expect it to drag out for years.
The trial will be held in the fortified Green Zone in a courtroom built specifically for these proceedings within Hussein's former Republican Palace compound. The marble-lined, chandelier-hung courtroom has a screen to protect the anonymity of some witnesses, according to the Reuters news service. Hussein and his seven co-defendants will face the five judges, though it is not clear if the judges' identities will be revealed. The tribunal will allow televised coverage.
U.S. and Iraqi security forces are on high alert for the trial, which some people anticipate will encourage renewed violence following Saturday's relatively quiet constitutional referendum.
Asked if he thought the Hussein trial would spur insurgent attacks, Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari said: "Iraqis in general are not sympathetic to him. I don't think they will shed any tears."
Luai Baldawi, editor in chief of al-Mutamar newspaper in Baghdad, said most Iraqis were eager for the trial to begin. "Hussein represented all Iraq; that is why Iraqis put all the responsibilities to what happened to Iraq on Hussein," Baldawi said. Nonetheless, Iraqis seem split over the fairness of the process, he said.
In the Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad on Tuesday, residents reflected that sentiment. "There should be an Iraqi court to try Hussein," said Muhanned Abbas, 30, who was buying gasoline from a black-market vendor. "The special tribunal is formed by the Americans and will not try Hussein as the Iraqis want but as America wants."
Mohammed Othman, 45, a pharmacist, said that no matter what the outcome, the trial would not change anything. "Hussein is gone," he said. "There would be no difference if he is tried or not. We should focus on how to build our country and how to be united. We should forget about the past and focus on the future."
Correspondent Ellen Knickmeyer and special correspondents Omar Fekeiki, Bassam Sebti and Naseer Nouri in Baghdad and Salih Saif Aldin in Dujail contributed to this report.
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By Jackie Spinner
SULAYMANIYAH, Iraq, Oct. 18 -- Almost two years after U.S. forces captured a disheveled Saddam Hussein hiding in a hole in the ground on a farm near his home town of Tikrit, the former Iraqi president will appear Wednesday before a five-member panel of his countrymen in the first criminal case brought against him and seven Baath Party associates.
Iraqis blame Hussein for the deaths and torture of hundreds of thousands of citizens during nearly three decades in power. But he will face charges concerning a single incident, the execution of 143 men and boys from the predominantly Shiite Muslim town of Dujail, 35 miles north of the capital.
Prosecutors allege that Hussein ordered the killings as retaliation after gunmen fired on his motorcade in the town on July 8, 1982, in an attempt to assassinate him.
In addition to the executions, which occurred three years later at Abu Ghraib prison, more than 1,500 townspeople were arrested, prosecutors allege. Many were banished to desert prisons where families were crowded together in windowless cells for years. Bulldozers plowed over the fertile groves of orange and date palm trees that provided the primary livelihood for Dujail's residents.
Unlike Balkan leaders who have faced war crimes charges in a U.N. court in The Hague, Hussein will appear before the Iraqi Special Tribunal, a body established in December 2003 by U.S.-led occupation authorities. It will use a mixture of international law and Iraqi criminal law in conducting the trial.
The transitional Iraqi parliament, elected in January, has put its stamp on the court process. It approved minor revisions to the law that created the tribunal, but those changes will not go into effect until they are published in an official paper of record.
In a rare telephone interview on Tuesday, Hussein's sole attorney, Khalil Dulaimi, said his client would not get a "fair or honest trial at all." He questioned the legitimacy of the court.
Dulaimi said he was informed of the trial's start date only on Sept. 25. "I need at least three more months to be prepared for the trial," he said. Speeding up the trial was intended "to confuse the defense and deprive it from full preparations," he added.
"Psychologically, I am prepared and will go with full confidence," he said. But "it will be a show trial only."
In a report issued two days ago, Human Rights Watch raised concerns that the tribunal was not being impartial and independent. The report noted that the U.S. government had spent $128 million on investigations and prosecutions of members of Hussein's government.
The first trials before the tribunal will be "a litmus test for whether it is up to the task of delivering justice," the report stated. "Fair trials are not only the entitlement of defendants. They are also a prerequisite for acknowledging the experiences of hundreds of thousands of victims of the former regime in an open, transparent and publicly accessible way," it said.
Jaafar Mousawi, the tribunal's chief prosecutor in Hussein's trial, said the lawyers and judges intend to reply on Wednesday to accusations that the tribunal does not have proper jurisdiction because it was formed by the U.S. occupation authority.
"They have the right to say what they want," Mousawi said of the critics, "and we have the right and the power to reply. We are confident of what we have in this case, the evidences with the defendants' statements and documents with their signatures."
Asked what was going through his mind on the eve of the trial's start, Mousawi said he was "excited to achieve justice."
The other defendants in the case are Barzan Ibrahim, Hussein's half brother and the head of Iraq's intelligence service until 2003; Taha Yassin Ramadan, Iraq's vice president until 2003; Awad Haman Bander Sadun, former chief of Hussein's Revolutionary Court, which sentenced many of the Dujail men to death; Abdullah Kadhim Ruweid, a senior Baath Party official in Dujail who is accused of rounding up the local residents after the assassination attempt; Mizher Abdullah Ruweid, his son; and two other senior Baath Party officials in Dujail, Ali Daeem Ali and Mohammed Azawi Ali.
If convicted, all could face death by hanging. Under one of the revisions approved by the Iraqi parliament but not yet formally implemented, any sentence would be carried out within 30 days of a final appeal decision. That means Hussein might never be tried for other crimes of which he has been accused, including the campaign against the Kurds that killed at least 180,000, the deadly suppression of Shiite uprisings in southern Iraq following the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the invasion of Kuwait.
Sources close to the tribunal have said that the proceedings that begin Wednesday will probably last only a day or two while the tribunal addresses motions and technicalities. Hussein's defense is likely to request a recess to provide more time to prepare, the sources said, and the tribunal will probably grant it. The sources expect the recess to last several weeks, perhaps until the first of the year.
When the trial resumes, the prosecution would begin outlining its case, calling witnesses and presenting evidence. That phase could last several months, the same sources said. But few expect it to drag out for years.
The trial will be held in the fortified Green Zone in a courtroom built specifically for these proceedings within Hussein's former Republican Palace compound. The marble-lined, chandelier-hung courtroom has a screen to protect the anonymity of some witnesses, according to the Reuters news service. Hussein and his seven co-defendants will face the five judges, though it is not clear if the judges' identities will be revealed. The tribunal will allow televised coverage.
U.S. and Iraqi security forces are on high alert for the trial, which some people anticipate will encourage renewed violence following Saturday's relatively quiet constitutional referendum.
Asked if he thought the Hussein trial would spur insurgent attacks, Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari said: "Iraqis in general are not sympathetic to him. I don't think they will shed any tears."
Luai Baldawi, editor in chief of al-Mutamar newspaper in Baghdad, said most Iraqis were eager for the trial to begin. "Hussein represented all Iraq; that is why Iraqis put all the responsibilities to what happened to Iraq on Hussein," Baldawi said. Nonetheless, Iraqis seem split over the fairness of the process, he said.
In the Mansour neighborhood of Baghdad on Tuesday, residents reflected that sentiment. "There should be an Iraqi court to try Hussein," said Muhanned Abbas, 30, who was buying gasoline from a black-market vendor. "The special tribunal is formed by the Americans and will not try Hussein as the Iraqis want but as America wants."
Mohammed Othman, 45, a pharmacist, said that no matter what the outcome, the trial would not change anything. "Hussein is gone," he said. "There would be no difference if he is tried or not. We should focus on how to build our country and how to be united. We should forget about the past and focus on the future."
Correspondent Ellen Knickmeyer and special correspondents Omar Fekeiki, Bassam Sebti and Naseer Nouri in Baghdad and Salih Saif Aldin in Dujail contributed to this report.
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Key figures in the Hussein trial, a primer on the trial's proceedings and timeline.
Plus, see an interactive map showing the sites of major insurgent attacks, a tally of U.S. military deaths and complete coverage of the situation in Iraq.
Judgment Day
Hussein's Lawyers
Aim to Focus Trial
On U.S. Occupation
Defense for an Ex-Dictator:
Compare 1982 Mass Killing
To Offensive in Fallujah
'There Will Be Stunts' in Court
By FARNAZ FASSIHI
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
October 19, 2005; Page A1
BAGHDAD, Iraq -- When Saddam Hussein stands trial here today with his life on the line, his lawyers intend to pursue a bold strategy: shift the focus from Mr. Hussein to U.S. actions in Iraq.
His lawyers say their goal is to politicize the trial by turning attention from the killings Mr. Hussein stands accused of to the death and destruction wrought by American troops. They even intend to accuse the U.S., as onetime supporter of Iraq, of complicity in some of Mr. Hussein's alleged crimes.
The proceeding is the first of a planned series of trials in which the ousted Iraqi president will be charged with crimes against humanity, genocide and many other offenses. An Iraqi tribunal will begin today by trying Mr. Hussein and seven former close associates on charges of ordering the destruction of the town of Dujail and the murder of about 150 residents after an assassination attempt on him during a 1982 presidential visit. The Dujail incident was chosen as the first case because it is well-documented and there are eyewitnesses.
The trial marks an extraordinary moment in the history of Iraq and the wider Arab world. It is the first time in recent memory that a powerful and widely feared Arab leader is being publicly put on trial. The proceeding is likely to become a tense struggle to shape perceptions in Iraq, the Middle East and the wider world. Public perception is crucial to the Bush administration's plan to continue pushing democracy throughout the Middle East in the face of widespread skepticism about U.S. actions in Iraq. For the Bush administration, it is critical that the trial seem fair, and the evidence against Mr. Hussein appear solid.
Western officials say privately they are concerned that Mr. Hussein and his lawyers may attempt to fuel anti-American sentiments. "There will be stunts during the trial," says an American official close to the tribunal process. "The important thing is the trial should be credible and fair and tell the story of what went on during the former regime."
The tribunal has been designed to limit such opportunities for Mr. Hussein. Rules will restrict his occasions to speak out, for example, and judges will have the power to censor television coverage of outbursts.
The U.S. was instrumental in setting up this judicial process. A panel of Iraqi judges trained by international legal experts will serve as prosecutor as well as render a verdict.
For many Iraqis, especially the families of Dujail victims, the case promises to deliver long-overdue justice for a mass killing they blame on Mr. Hussein and his advisers. Later cases will accuse Mr. Hussein and other members of his regime of such atrocities as killing 5,000 ethnic Kurds with chemical gas in 1988, and the mass murder of marsh Arabs in the south after a revolt in 1991. Kuwait and Iran, two countries Mr. Hussein invaded, plan to bring separate charges against him.
Mr. Hussein's lawyers are expected today to request a delay in the proceeding, saying they haven't had time to prepare.
His defense has attracted legal and advisory assistance from around the globe. Supporters include ex-U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and hundreds of lawyers from places as disparate as Japan, Yemen and Belgium.
His advocates are motivated, it appears, by anger over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and American foreign policy in general. They view the trials as an opportunity to be heard. Nearly all complain that the Iraqi court was set up by the U.S. occupation to do its own bidding, and needs to be stopped. "This trial will further damage America's credibility," says Mr. Clark, the U.S. attorney general under Lyndon Johnson, who serves as an outside adviser to Mr. Hussein's defense team. "It's illegal and it's outrageous."
Abdul Haq Alani, a British-trained lawyer and spokesman for Mr. Hussein's defense team, said in a telephone interview from London: "We are going to put America on trial." When Mr. Hussein is accused of leveling Dujail, for example, his lawyers plan to argue that he was only doing what was necessary to maintain civil order in the wake of the assassination attempt, and to compare his actions to U.S. military offensives in cities like Fallujah. That city suffered heavy damage during an American assault on insurgents last year.
"Americans and the Iraqi officials who came with them on tanks want to blame Saddam for the mass graves and killing Kurds," said Khalil al-Dulaimi, Mr. Hussein's lead lawyer, in a telephone interview. "But they forget that they supported Saddam back then. We will remind them of the crimes committed by American troops when they wiped Fallujah off the face of earth."
U.S. and Iraqi government officials call such comparisons absurd, saying they made efforts to minimize property damage and tried to kill only those who attacked them. They are well aware of the defense strategy, and attempted to structure the tribunal to prevent Mr. Hussein and his supporters from shifting focus from Mr. Hussein's alleged crimes.
Using the Trial
"These are lawyers who are very upset with American foreign policy. They want to use the trial as a way to expose what they see as illegitimate," says law professor Michael Scharf, director of the international law center at Case Western Reserve University in Ohio, who helped train judges for the tribunals.
VIDEO REPORT
Watch an Associated Press report on Saddam Hussein's upcoming trial.
Windows Media:
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HIGH | LOW (Player required)Mr. Scharf also trained judges for the international tribunals that scrutinized atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. He said a major concern in Iraq, and the focus of much of the judicial training, is that Mr. Hussein will use the televised proceedings to address Iraqis directly in an effort to rally support or cast himself as a martyr to the broader Arab world. Last year, when Mr. Hussein appeared in court for the first time, he identified himself as the president of Iraq and challenged the court's authority to try him.
During the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of Yugoslavia boosted his popularity among Serbs by defending himself and turning the trial into a stage for nationalistic lectures and self-promotion. "This cannot happen in Iraq," says Mr. Scharf. "The stakes are too high."
With the televised courtroom antics of Mr. Milosevic in mind, the judges recently changed the tribunal's statutes to deny Mr. Hussein, a trained lawyer, the right to represent himself at trial. He's required to have another lawyer do that. Judges will have some leverage over defense lawyers, who can be punished, fined or dismissed if they step out of line in the courtroom.
Mr. Scharf, who trained Iraqi judges on two occasions in England, said the judges were put through a mock trial to teach them to use those rules to stop Mr. Hussein and his attorneys from shifting the trial's focus to U.S. foreign policy in Iraq.
The latest plans call for the trial to be televised, on a 20-minute time delay, which would allow the tribunal to censor any outbursts in the courtroom. Mr. Hussein will be required to sit with his back to the press gallery. Bulletproof glass will be used to protect defendants, lawyers and judges from assassination attempts.
One of the tribunal judges said U.S. trainers instructed judges not to allow Mr. Hussein or his defense team to make broad political statements.
"We have been trained to deal with the politics," the judge said. "We are not going to allow them to talk about anything except facts relating to the Dujail case."
The Iraqi Special Tribunal was established in December 2003 by the Iraqi Governing Council, whose members were handpicked by the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority under former U.S. viceroy Paul Bremer. The U.S. funded the effort with $75 million, and set up a tribunal liaison office to help train judges and investigators, track down witnesses and translate a mountain of documentation left behind by Mr. Hussein's regime.
The tribunal has three trial chambers, each consisting of five Iraqi judges trained abroad by experts in international war-crimes law. There is also a nine-person Appeals Chamber. The tribunal's rules of conduct were modeled after United Nations war-crimes trials concerning events in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. But unlike the U.N. tribunals, the Iraqi tribunal was not set up under the auspices of the international community, nor does it follow a formal treaty of surrender by any government, as did tribunals for German and Japanese leaders after World War II.
Inside Iraq, some critics of U.S. policy will be troubled by the proceedings because the Iraqi statute that set up the tribunal dates to the months of formal American occupation, and is perceived to have been orchestrated by the Americans. Others will approve of the effort to hold Mr. Hussein accountable for what they view as decades of abuses of power.
Some international legal observers, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have criticized the tribunal for falling short of standards established in previous international war-crimes trials. In a sharply critical report earlier this week, Human Rights Watch questioned whether the legal procedures would be perceived around the world as fair. The rights group contends Iraqi judges lack the necessary experience and expertise in international law, and the proceedings would benefit if modeled after the Sierra Leone trials, where the prosecuting team included local and international judges.
American officials respond that it was Iraqis who decided to make the trial an Iraqi endeavor, and that under international law they are entitled to do that.
Outside Iraq, the case is expected to be followed closely. That became clear nearly two years ago, in the hours after a bedraggled Mr. Hussein was brought into custody by U.S. forces. Across the border in Amman, the Jordanian bar association held an emergency meeting calling for volunteers to help defend Mr. Hussein. More than 1,000 lawyers submitted their names, many citing a sense of civic duty and Arab pride. A legal support committee formed in Jordan reached out to other bar associations around the Arab world.
Stream of Letters
As word spread, committee officials say, they received a stream of letters from lawyers declaring solidarity. When the group held a conference in Amman last year, lawyers from as far away as Belgium and England showed up. In Arab countries such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Sudan, legal support committees sprouted up. These groups hosted conferences and researched international tribunals to help Mr. Hussein's defense team. A group of Japanese lawyers invited Jordanian lawyer Ziyad al-Khasawinah to lecture to dozens of sympathetic lawyers in Tokyo, Hiroshima and Osaka. In September, Muammar Ghaddafi's daughter Ayesha hosted a two-day conference for the support committee.
Isaam Ghazzawi, a Jordanian, is a part of Mr. Hussein's core legal team. A U.S.-trained criminal defense lawyer, he says he became interested in Mr. Hussein's case as a "matter of Arab pride and defending our dignity." He says the support groups have been helpful in providing research on everything from the Geneva Conventions to previous war-crimes trials.
The defense team plans to try to undermine the legitimacy of the tribunal by noting its dependence on the U.S. for support, training and direction. The Geneva Conventions prohibit occupying powers from changing a nation's laws or setting up their own courts to try citizens under occupation. American officials say the court is legitimate because "the democratically elected national assembly of Iraq endorsed the tribunal's statute," says an American official in Baghdad.
Mr. Hussein's defenders note that the U.N. did not authorize the invasion of Iraq before the Americans attacked, although a resolution was passed afterward authorizing the occupation. They also plan to note that the clearest mandate from an Iraqi authority for the tribunal -- a recently passed resolution by the National Assembly -- has yet to officially become law.
Finally, because the U.S. supported Iraq at various times during the 1980s, Mr. Hussein's lawyers intend to accuse the U.S. of complicity in some of the crimes Mr. Hussein is being tried for, his lawyers say. They say they plan to ask senior U.S. officials such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to testify. A U.S. official said it would be up to Iraqi judges to decide which witnesses are relevant to the case.
Mr. Dulaimi, who will represent Mr. Hussein in court today, says his client is preparing for trial by reading the Geneva Conventions and studying international and Iraqi law. "He has a right to defend himself and has the right to say whatever he wants to clarify public opinion and talk to the Iraqi people," says Mr. Dulaimi.
Write to Farnaz Fassihi at farnaz.fassihi@wsj.com
Key figures in the Hussein trial, a primer on the trial's proceedings and timeline.
Plus, see an interactive map showing the sites of major insurgent attacks, a tally of U.S. military deaths and complete coverage of the situation in Iraq.
Judgment Day
Hussein's Lawyers
Aim to Focus Trial
On U.S. Occupation
Defense for an Ex-Dictator:
Compare 1982 Mass Killing
To Offensive in Fallujah
'There Will Be Stunts' in Court
By FARNAZ FASSIHI
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
October 19, 2005; Page A1
BAGHDAD, Iraq -- When Saddam Hussein stands trial here today with his life on the line, his lawyers intend to pursue a bold strategy: shift the focus from Mr. Hussein to U.S. actions in Iraq.
His lawyers say their goal is to politicize the trial by turning attention from the killings Mr. Hussein stands accused of to the death and destruction wrought by American troops. They even intend to accuse the U.S., as onetime supporter of Iraq, of complicity in some of Mr. Hussein's alleged crimes.
The proceeding is the first of a planned series of trials in which the ousted Iraqi president will be charged with crimes against humanity, genocide and many other offenses. An Iraqi tribunal will begin today by trying Mr. Hussein and seven former close associates on charges of ordering the destruction of the town of Dujail and the murder of about 150 residents after an assassination attempt on him during a 1982 presidential visit. The Dujail incident was chosen as the first case because it is well-documented and there are eyewitnesses.
The trial marks an extraordinary moment in the history of Iraq and the wider Arab world. It is the first time in recent memory that a powerful and widely feared Arab leader is being publicly put on trial. The proceeding is likely to become a tense struggle to shape perceptions in Iraq, the Middle East and the wider world. Public perception is crucial to the Bush administration's plan to continue pushing democracy throughout the Middle East in the face of widespread skepticism about U.S. actions in Iraq. For the Bush administration, it is critical that the trial seem fair, and the evidence against Mr. Hussein appear solid.
Western officials say privately they are concerned that Mr. Hussein and his lawyers may attempt to fuel anti-American sentiments. "There will be stunts during the trial," says an American official close to the tribunal process. "The important thing is the trial should be credible and fair and tell the story of what went on during the former regime."
The tribunal has been designed to limit such opportunities for Mr. Hussein. Rules will restrict his occasions to speak out, for example, and judges will have the power to censor television coverage of outbursts.
The U.S. was instrumental in setting up this judicial process. A panel of Iraqi judges trained by international legal experts will serve as prosecutor as well as render a verdict.
For many Iraqis, especially the families of Dujail victims, the case promises to deliver long-overdue justice for a mass killing they blame on Mr. Hussein and his advisers. Later cases will accuse Mr. Hussein and other members of his regime of such atrocities as killing 5,000 ethnic Kurds with chemical gas in 1988, and the mass murder of marsh Arabs in the south after a revolt in 1991. Kuwait and Iran, two countries Mr. Hussein invaded, plan to bring separate charges against him.
Mr. Hussein's lawyers are expected today to request a delay in the proceeding, saying they haven't had time to prepare.
His defense has attracted legal and advisory assistance from around the globe. Supporters include ex-U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and hundreds of lawyers from places as disparate as Japan, Yemen and Belgium.
His advocates are motivated, it appears, by anger over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and American foreign policy in general. They view the trials as an opportunity to be heard. Nearly all complain that the Iraqi court was set up by the U.S. occupation to do its own bidding, and needs to be stopped. "This trial will further damage America's credibility," says Mr. Clark, the U.S. attorney general under Lyndon Johnson, who serves as an outside adviser to Mr. Hussein's defense team. "It's illegal and it's outrageous."
Abdul Haq Alani, a British-trained lawyer and spokesman for Mr. Hussein's defense team, said in a telephone interview from London: "We are going to put America on trial." When Mr. Hussein is accused of leveling Dujail, for example, his lawyers plan to argue that he was only doing what was necessary to maintain civil order in the wake of the assassination attempt, and to compare his actions to U.S. military offensives in cities like Fallujah. That city suffered heavy damage during an American assault on insurgents last year.
"Americans and the Iraqi officials who came with them on tanks want to blame Saddam for the mass graves and killing Kurds," said Khalil al-Dulaimi, Mr. Hussein's lead lawyer, in a telephone interview. "But they forget that they supported Saddam back then. We will remind them of the crimes committed by American troops when they wiped Fallujah off the face of earth."
U.S. and Iraqi government officials call such comparisons absurd, saying they made efforts to minimize property damage and tried to kill only those who attacked them. They are well aware of the defense strategy, and attempted to structure the tribunal to prevent Mr. Hussein and his supporters from shifting focus from Mr. Hussein's alleged crimes.
Using the Trial
"These are lawyers who are very upset with American foreign policy. They want to use the trial as a way to expose what they see as illegitimate," says law professor Michael Scharf, director of the international law center at Case Western Reserve University in Ohio, who helped train judges for the tribunals.
VIDEO REPORT
Watch an Associated Press report on Saddam Hussein's upcoming trial.
Windows Media:
HIGH | LOW (Player required)
RealPlayer:
HIGH | LOW (Player required)Mr. Scharf also trained judges for the international tribunals that scrutinized atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. He said a major concern in Iraq, and the focus of much of the judicial training, is that Mr. Hussein will use the televised proceedings to address Iraqis directly in an effort to rally support or cast himself as a martyr to the broader Arab world. Last year, when Mr. Hussein appeared in court for the first time, he identified himself as the president of Iraq and challenged the court's authority to try him.
During the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of Yugoslavia boosted his popularity among Serbs by defending himself and turning the trial into a stage for nationalistic lectures and self-promotion. "This cannot happen in Iraq," says Mr. Scharf. "The stakes are too high."
With the televised courtroom antics of Mr. Milosevic in mind, the judges recently changed the tribunal's statutes to deny Mr. Hussein, a trained lawyer, the right to represent himself at trial. He's required to have another lawyer do that. Judges will have some leverage over defense lawyers, who can be punished, fined or dismissed if they step out of line in the courtroom.
Mr. Scharf, who trained Iraqi judges on two occasions in England, said the judges were put through a mock trial to teach them to use those rules to stop Mr. Hussein and his attorneys from shifting the trial's focus to U.S. foreign policy in Iraq.
The latest plans call for the trial to be televised, on a 20-minute time delay, which would allow the tribunal to censor any outbursts in the courtroom. Mr. Hussein will be required to sit with his back to the press gallery. Bulletproof glass will be used to protect defendants, lawyers and judges from assassination attempts.
One of the tribunal judges said U.S. trainers instructed judges not to allow Mr. Hussein or his defense team to make broad political statements.
"We have been trained to deal with the politics," the judge said. "We are not going to allow them to talk about anything except facts relating to the Dujail case."
The Iraqi Special Tribunal was established in December 2003 by the Iraqi Governing Council, whose members were handpicked by the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority under former U.S. viceroy Paul Bremer. The U.S. funded the effort with $75 million, and set up a tribunal liaison office to help train judges and investigators, track down witnesses and translate a mountain of documentation left behind by Mr. Hussein's regime.
The tribunal has three trial chambers, each consisting of five Iraqi judges trained abroad by experts in international war-crimes law. There is also a nine-person Appeals Chamber. The tribunal's rules of conduct were modeled after United Nations war-crimes trials concerning events in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. But unlike the U.N. tribunals, the Iraqi tribunal was not set up under the auspices of the international community, nor does it follow a formal treaty of surrender by any government, as did tribunals for German and Japanese leaders after World War II.
Inside Iraq, some critics of U.S. policy will be troubled by the proceedings because the Iraqi statute that set up the tribunal dates to the months of formal American occupation, and is perceived to have been orchestrated by the Americans. Others will approve of the effort to hold Mr. Hussein accountable for what they view as decades of abuses of power.
Some international legal observers, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have criticized the tribunal for falling short of standards established in previous international war-crimes trials. In a sharply critical report earlier this week, Human Rights Watch questioned whether the legal procedures would be perceived around the world as fair. The rights group contends Iraqi judges lack the necessary experience and expertise in international law, and the proceedings would benefit if modeled after the Sierra Leone trials, where the prosecuting team included local and international judges.
American officials respond that it was Iraqis who decided to make the trial an Iraqi endeavor, and that under international law they are entitled to do that.
Outside Iraq, the case is expected to be followed closely. That became clear nearly two years ago, in the hours after a bedraggled Mr. Hussein was brought into custody by U.S. forces. Across the border in Amman, the Jordanian bar association held an emergency meeting calling for volunteers to help defend Mr. Hussein. More than 1,000 lawyers submitted their names, many citing a sense of civic duty and Arab pride. A legal support committee formed in Jordan reached out to other bar associations around the Arab world.
Stream of Letters
As word spread, committee officials say, they received a stream of letters from lawyers declaring solidarity. When the group held a conference in Amman last year, lawyers from as far away as Belgium and England showed up. In Arab countries such as Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Sudan, legal support committees sprouted up. These groups hosted conferences and researched international tribunals to help Mr. Hussein's defense team. A group of Japanese lawyers invited Jordanian lawyer Ziyad al-Khasawinah to lecture to dozens of sympathetic lawyers in Tokyo, Hiroshima and Osaka. In September, Muammar Ghaddafi's daughter Ayesha hosted a two-day conference for the support committee.
Isaam Ghazzawi, a Jordanian, is a part of Mr. Hussein's core legal team. A U.S.-trained criminal defense lawyer, he says he became interested in Mr. Hussein's case as a "matter of Arab pride and defending our dignity." He says the support groups have been helpful in providing research on everything from the Geneva Conventions to previous war-crimes trials.
The defense team plans to try to undermine the legitimacy of the tribunal by noting its dependence on the U.S. for support, training and direction. The Geneva Conventions prohibit occupying powers from changing a nation's laws or setting up their own courts to try citizens under occupation. American officials say the court is legitimate because "the democratically elected national assembly of Iraq endorsed the tribunal's statute," says an American official in Baghdad.
Mr. Hussein's defenders note that the U.N. did not authorize the invasion of Iraq before the Americans attacked, although a resolution was passed afterward authorizing the occupation. They also plan to note that the clearest mandate from an Iraqi authority for the tribunal -- a recently passed resolution by the National Assembly -- has yet to officially become law.
Finally, because the U.S. supported Iraq at various times during the 1980s, Mr. Hussein's lawyers intend to accuse the U.S. of complicity in some of the crimes Mr. Hussein is being tried for, his lawyers say. They say they plan to ask senior U.S. officials such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to testify. A U.S. official said it would be up to Iraqi judges to decide which witnesses are relevant to the case.
Mr. Dulaimi, who will represent Mr. Hussein in court today, says his client is preparing for trial by reading the Geneva Conventions and studying international and Iraqi law. "He has a right to defend himself and has the right to say whatever he wants to clarify public opinion and talk to the Iraqi people," says Mr. Dulaimi.
Write to Farnaz Fassihi at farnaz.fassihi@wsj.com
Little known about judge in Saddam trial Seattle Post Intelligencer
The judge who read out murder and torture charges against former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein on Wednesday is a Kurd, virtually unknown outside his home region. Rizgar Mohammed Amin, the presiding judge of a five-judge tribunal overseeing the Saddam case, is believed to be from the town of Sulaimaniyah, about 160 miles north of Baghdad. The silver-haired judge, wearing a black robe with a white collar, was asked by Saddam as the trial began: "Who are you? I want to know who you are." Amin tried to get Saddam to formally identify himself, but the former dictator refused and finally sat. Amin read his name for him, calling him the "former president of Iraq." Later, Amin read Saddam and his seven co-defendants their rights and then read out the charges of murder and torture against them. The panel of judges will hear the case and render a verdict in what could be the first of several trials against Saddam. The names of the other four judges have not been released, and Iraqi court officials did not allow television cameras taping the hearing to show the other four judges' faces. Amin's name was released publicly shortly before the trial began. During Saddam's earlier court hearings, a different judge was seen presiding over the case. That judge, Raid Juhi, was the top investigating judge in the case. Thus, his role was more like that of a prosecutor in a U.S. court, seeking a grand jury indictment.
Hussein Stands Trial for Crimes Against Humanity Bloomberg
Hussein Goes on Trial for Crimes Against Humanity New York Times
Globe and Mail - CNN - Guardian Unlimited - Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (subscription) - all 866 related »
The judge who read out murder and torture charges against former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein on Wednesday is a Kurd, virtually unknown outside his home region. Rizgar Mohammed Amin, the presiding judge of a five-judge tribunal overseeing the Saddam case, is believed to be from the town of Sulaimaniyah, about 160 miles north of Baghdad. The silver-haired judge, wearing a black robe with a white collar, was asked by Saddam as the trial began: "Who are you? I want to know who you are." Amin tried to get Saddam to formally identify himself, but the former dictator refused and finally sat. Amin read his name for him, calling him the "former president of Iraq." Later, Amin read Saddam and his seven co-defendants their rights and then read out the charges of murder and torture against them. The panel of judges will hear the case and render a verdict in what could be the first of several trials against Saddam. The names of the other four judges have not been released, and Iraqi court officials did not allow television cameras taping the hearing to show the other four judges' faces. Amin's name was released publicly shortly before the trial began. During Saddam's earlier court hearings, a different judge was seen presiding over the case. That judge, Raid Juhi, was the top investigating judge in the case. Thus, his role was more like that of a prosecutor in a U.S. court, seeking a grand jury indictment.
Hussein Stands Trial for Crimes Against Humanity Bloomberg
Hussein Goes on Trial for Crimes Against Humanity New York Times
Globe and Mail - CNN - Guardian Unlimited - Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (subscription) - all 866 related »
http://www.suntimes.com/output/iraq/riceiraq19.html
War in Iraq
Rice won't rule out U.S. troops in Iraq in 10 years
October 19, 2005
BY LIZ SIDOTI ASSOCIATED PRESS Advertisement
WASHINGTON-- Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Wednesday refused to rule out U.S. troops still being in Iraq in 10 years or the possibility that the United States could use military force against neighboring Syria and Iran.
Rice deferred to the decisions of President Bush and military commanders as Republicans and Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pressed her for more specifics on the U.S. strategy in Iraq.
Asked specifically whether the United States would have troops in Iraq in five or 10 years, Rice said: "I think that even to try and speculate on how many years from now there will be a certain number of American forces is not appropriate."
Lawmakers also pressed her on strategy for dealing with Iran and Syria. U.S. officials have accused Syria of allowing foreign fighters to flow across its borders into Iraq and Iran of supporting the insurgency.
Rice said the United States was using diplomatic means to urge a change in the behavior of both countries-- but she stopped short of ruling out military force. "I'm not going to get into what the president's options might be," Rice said. "I don't think the president ever takes any of his options off the table concerning anything to do with military force."
Testifying before the committee for the first time since February, Rice sought to reassure jittery members of Congress that the Bush administration had a plan for success: helping Iraqis clear out insurgents and build durable, national institutions.
She told lawmakers the United States will follow a model that was successful in Afghanistan. Starting next month, she said, joint diplomatic-military groups-- Provincial Reconstruction Teams-- will work alongside Iraqis as they train police, set up courts, and help local governments establish essential services.
But even as Rice tried to crystalize the plan, Republicans and Democrats asked her pointed questions they say Americans need to know.
"I'm not looking for a date to get out of Iraq," Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, the top Democrat on the panel, said. "But at what point, assuming the strategy works, do you think we'll be able to see some sign of bringing some American forces home?"
Rice declined to answer directly, choosing to leave an estimate to military commanders. "I don't want to hazard what I think would be a guess, even if it were an assessment, of when that might be possible," Rice said.
Later, Sen. Paul Sarbanes, D-Md., told Rice that her response to questions about U.S. troop withdrawal "leads me to draw the conclusion that you're leaving open the possibility that 10 years from now we will still have military forces in Iraq."
"Senator, I don't
War in Iraq
Rice won't rule out U.S. troops in Iraq in 10 years
October 19, 2005
BY LIZ SIDOTI ASSOCIATED PRESS Advertisement
WASHINGTON-- Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Wednesday refused to rule out U.S. troops still being in Iraq in 10 years or the possibility that the United States could use military force against neighboring Syria and Iran.
Rice deferred to the decisions of President Bush and military commanders as Republicans and Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pressed her for more specifics on the U.S. strategy in Iraq.
Asked specifically whether the United States would have troops in Iraq in five or 10 years, Rice said: "I think that even to try and speculate on how many years from now there will be a certain number of American forces is not appropriate."
Lawmakers also pressed her on strategy for dealing with Iran and Syria. U.S. officials have accused Syria of allowing foreign fighters to flow across its borders into Iraq and Iran of supporting the insurgency.
Rice said the United States was using diplomatic means to urge a change in the behavior of both countries-- but she stopped short of ruling out military force. "I'm not going to get into what the president's options might be," Rice said. "I don't think the president ever takes any of his options off the table concerning anything to do with military force."
Testifying before the committee for the first time since February, Rice sought to reassure jittery members of Congress that the Bush administration had a plan for success: helping Iraqis clear out insurgents and build durable, national institutions.
She told lawmakers the United States will follow a model that was successful in Afghanistan. Starting next month, she said, joint diplomatic-military groups-- Provincial Reconstruction Teams-- will work alongside Iraqis as they train police, set up courts, and help local governments establish essential services.
But even as Rice tried to crystalize the plan, Republicans and Democrats asked her pointed questions they say Americans need to know.
"I'm not looking for a date to get out of Iraq," Sen. Joseph Biden of Delaware, the top Democrat on the panel, said. "But at what point, assuming the strategy works, do you think we'll be able to see some sign of bringing some American forces home?"
Rice declined to answer directly, choosing to leave an estimate to military commanders. "I don't want to hazard what I think would be a guess, even if it were an assessment, of when that might be possible," Rice said.
Later, Sen. Paul Sarbanes, D-Md., told Rice that her response to questions about U.S. troop withdrawal "leads me to draw the conclusion that you're leaving open the possibility that 10 years from now we will still have military forces in Iraq."
"Senator, I don't