Complete 911 Timeline
Project: Complete 911 Timeline
Open-Content project managed by Paul Thompson
January 3, 2001: Clarke Demoted by Rice and Future 9/11 Commission Executive Director
National Security Adviser Rice decides this day to retain Richard Clarke, counterterrorism “tsar” for the Clinton administration, and his staff. However, she downgrades his official position as National Coordinator for Counterterrorism. While he is still known as the counterterrorism “tsar,” he has less power and now reports to deputy secretaries instead of attending Cabinet-level meetings. He no longer is able to send memos directly to the president, or easily interact with Cabinet-level officials. [Clarke, 2004, pp 227-30; Guardian, 3/25/04] In 2004, Rice will reveal that the person she tasks with considering changes to Clarke and his staff is Philip Zelikow, the future Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission. Zelikow recuses himself from those parts of the 9/11 Commission's investigation directly relating to his role in this and other matters. However, 9/11 victims' relatives are not satisfied. For instance, one relative says, “Zelikow has conflicts. I'm not sure that his recusal is sufficient. His fingerprints are all over that decision [to demote Clarke].” [UPI, 4/10/04]
People and organizations involved: Philip Zelikow, Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice
January 3, 2001: Clarke Briefs Rice on al-Qaeda Threat; Keeps Job but Loses Power
Richard Clarke, counterterrorism “tsar” for the Clinton administration, briefs National Security Adviser Rice and her deputy, Steve Hadley, about al-Qaeda. [Washington Post, 1/20/02] Outgoing National Security Adviser Sandy Berger makes an unusual appearance at the start of the meeting, saying to Rice, “I'm coming to this briefing to underscore how important I think this subject is.” He claims that he tells Rice during the transition between administrations, “I believe that the Bush administration will spend more time on terrorism generally, and on al-Qaeda specifically, than any other subject.” Clarke presents his plan to “roll back” al-Qaeda that he had given to the outgoing Clinton administration a couple of weeks earlier. [Time, 8/4/02] He gets the impression that Rice has never heard the term al-Qaeda before. [Clarke, 2004, pp 227-30; Guardian, 3/25/04]
People and organizations involved: Sandy Berger, Stephen Hadley, al-Qaeda, Bush administration, Richard A. Clarke, Condoleezza Rice
January 4, 2001: FBI, CIA Miss Connection Between USS Cole Bomber and Hijackers
Khallad bin Attash.
The FBI's investigation into the USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000) reveals that al-Qaeda operative Khallad bin Attash was a principal planner of the bombing [Associated Press, 9/21/02 (
] , and that two other participants in the bombing delivered money to bin Attash at the time of the January 2000 al-Qaeda meeting (see January 5-8, 2000) in Malaysia. The FBI shares this information with the CIA. Based on a description of bin Attash from an informant, CIA analysts reexamine pictures from the Malaysian meeting and identify bin Attash with both hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar. CIA Director Tenet later testifies that the presence of bin Attash, a known, important al-Qaeda operative, gives the Malaysian meetings “greater significance.” [9/11 Commission Report, 1/26/04] The CIA has already been informed that Alhazmi has entered the US in March 2000, yet once again they fail to watch list either Alhazmi or Almihdhar. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] CNN later notes that at this point the CIA, at the very least, “could have put Alhazmi and Almihdhar and all others who attended the meeting in Malaysia on a watch list to be kept out of this country. It was not done.” [CNN, 6/4/02] More incredibly, bin Attash is not placed on the watch list at this time, despite being labeled as the principal planner of the Cole bombing. (He is finally placed on the watch list in August 2001.) [Los Angeles Times, 9/22/02] CIA headquarters is told what these CIA analysts have learned, but it appears the FBI is not told. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03] People and organizations involved: Federal Bureau of Investigation, George Tenet, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, Central Intelligence Agency, Tawifiq ("Khallad") bin Attash
January 10, 2001-September 4, 2001: Armed Predator Drone Is Readied, but Unused
A Predator drone.
Even before President Bush's official inauguration, Clinton holdover counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke pushes National Security Adviser Rice and other incoming Bush officials to resume Predator drone flights over Afghanistan (originally carried out in September and October 2000) in an attempt to find and assassinate bin Laden. [Washington Post, 1/20/02; CBS News, 6/25/03] On January 10, Rice is shown a video clip of bin Laden filmed by a Predator drone the year before. [Washington Post, 1/20/02] Clarke learns of an Air Force plan to arm the Predator. The original plan calls for three years of testing, but Clarke pushes so hard that the armed Predator is ready in three months. [New Yorker, 7/28/03] A Hellfire missile is successfully test fired from a Predator on February 16, 2001. [CBS News, 6/25/03] In early June, a duplicate of the brick house where bin Laden is believed to be living in Kandahar, Afghanistan, is built in Nevada, and destroyed by a Predator missile. The test shows that the missile fired from miles away would have killed anyone in the building, and one participant calls this the long sought after “holy grail” that could kill bin Laden within minutes of finding him. [Washington Post, 1/20/02] Clarke repeatedly advocates using the Predator, armed or unarmed. However, bureaucratic infighting between the CIA and the Air Force over who would pay for it and take responsibility delays its use. Clarke later says, “Every time we were ready to use it, the CIA would change its mind.” [New Yorker, 7/28/03] Rice and Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley decide to delay reconnaissance flights until the armed version is ready. In July 2001, Hadley directs the military to have armed Predators ready to deploy no later than September 1. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (D)] The issue comes to a head in early September, but even then, a decision to use the Predator is delayed [New Yorker, 7/28/03]
People and organizations involved: Richard A. Clarke, Central Intelligence Agency, Stephen Hadley, Condoleezza Rice, Osama bin Laden, George W. Bush
January 19, 2001: UN Sanctions on Taliban Do Not Stop Illegal Trade Network
New United Nations sanctions against Afghanistan take effect, adding to those from November 1999. The sanctions limit travel by senior Taliban authorities, freeze bin Laden's and the Taliban's assets, and order the closure of Ariana Airlines offices abroad. The sanctions also impose an arms embargo against the Taliban, but not against Northern Alliance forces battling the Taliban. [Associated Press, 12/19/00] The arms embargo has no visible effect because the sanctions fail to stop Pakistani military assistance. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04] The sanctions also fail to stop the illegal trade network that the Taliban is secretly running through Ariana. Two companies, Air Cess and Flying Dolphin, take over most of Ariana's traffic. Air Cess is owned by the Russian arms dealer Victor Bout, and Flying Dolphin is owned by the United Arab Emirates' former ambassador to the US, who is also an associate of Bout. In late 2000, despite reports linking Flying Dolphin to arms smuggling, the United Nations gives Flying Dolphin permission to take over Ariana's closed routes, which it does until the new sanctions take effect. Bout's operations are still functioning and he has not been arrested. [Los Angeles Times, 1/20/02; Montreal Gazette, 2/5/02] Ariana is essentially destroyed in the October 2001 US bombing of Afghanistan. [Los Angeles Times, 11/18/01]
People and organizations involved: United Nations, Victor Bout, Taliban, Northern Alliance, Flying Dolphin, Air Cess, Osama bin Laden, Ariana Airlines
January 20-September 10, 2001: Bush Briefed on al-Qaeda over 40 Times
National Security Adviser Rice later testifies to the 9/11 Commission that in the first eight months of Bush's presidency before 9/11, “the president receive[s] at these [Presidential Daily Briefings] more than 40 briefing items on al-Qaeda, and 13 of those [are] in response to questions he or his top advisers posed.” [Washington Post, 4/8/04 ©] The content of the warnings in these briefings are unknown. However, CIA Director George Tenet claims that none of the warnings specifically indicates terrorists plan to fly hijacked commercial aircraft into buildings in the US. [New York Times, 4/4/04]
People and organizations involved: Condoleezza Rice, al-Qaeda, George Tenet
January 21, 2001: George W. Bush Inaugurated
George W. Bush is inaugurated as president, replacing President Bill Clinton.
People and organizations involved: George W. Bush
January 21-September 10, 2001: Transportation Secretary Says Bush Administration Does Nothing to Fight Terrorism
In 2003, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta will be asked by the 9/11 Commission, “Did this higher level of [terrorist] chatter [before 9/11] ... result in any action across the government? I take it your answer is no.” He replies, “That's correct.” [Associated Press, 5/23/03 ©]
People and organizations involved: Norman Mineta, 9/11 Commission
January 21, 2001: Bush Administration Takes Over; Many Have Oil Industry Connections
The Chevron oil tanker named after National Security Advisor Rice.
George W. Bush is inaugurated as the 43rd US President, replacing Bill Clinton. The only Cabinet-level figure to remain permanently in office is CIA Director Tenet, appointed in 1997 and reputedly a long-time friend of George H. W. Bush. FBI Director Louis Freeh stays on until June 2001. Numerous figures in Bush's administration have been directly employed in the oil industry, including Bush, Vice President Cheney, and National Security Adviser Rice. Rice had been on Chevron's Board of Directors since 1991, and even had a Chevron oil tanker named after her. [Salon, 11/19/01] It is later revealed that Cheney is still being paid up to $1 million a year in “deferred payments” from Halliburton, the oil company he headed. [Guardian, 3/12/03] Enron's ties also reach deep into the administration. [Washington Post, 1/18/02]
People and organizations involved: Condoleezza Rice, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton, Louis J. Freeh, George W. Bush, Enron, George Tenet
January 24, 2001: Italians Hear of Brothers Going to US for Very, Very Secret Plan, Other Clues
On this day, Italian intelligence hears an interesting wiretapped conversation eerily similar to the one from August 12, 2000 (see August 12, 2000). This one occurs between al-Qaeda operatives Mahmoud Es Sayed and Ben Soltane Adel, two members of al-Qaeda's Milan cell. Adel asks, in reference to fake documents, “Will these work for the brothers who are going to the United States?” Sayed responds angrily, saying “don't ever say those words again, not even joking! ... If it's necessary ... whatever place we may be, come up and talk in my ear, because these are very important things. You must know ... that this plan is very, very secret, as if you were protecting the security of the state.” This is only one of many clues found from the Italian wiretaps and passed on to US intelligence in March 2001. However, they apparently are not properly understood until after 9/11. Adel is later arrested and convicted of belonging to a terrorist cell, and Es Sayed flees to Afghanistan in July 2001. [Guardian, 5/30/02]
People and organizations involved: Mahmoud Es Sayed, Ben Soltane Adel, al-Qaeda
January 25, 2001: Clarke Presents Plan to Roll Back al-Qaeda, but Response Is Delayed
Richard Clarke.
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke submits a proposal to National Security Adviser Rice and “urgently” asks for a Cabinet-level meeting on the al-Qaeda threat. [Clarke, 2004, pp 230-31] He forwards his December 2000 strategy paper and a copy of his 1998 “Delenda Plan” (see August 27, 1998). He lays out a proposed agenda for urgent action:
Approve covert assistance to Ahmed Shah Massoud's Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (D)]
Significantly increase funding for CIA counterterrorism activity. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (D)]
Respond to the USS Cole bombing with an attack on al-Qaeda. (The link between al-Qaeda and that bombing had been assumed for months and is confirmed in the media two days later.) According to the Washington Post, “Clarke argue[s] that the camps [are] can't-miss targets, and they [matter]. The facilities [amount] to conveyor belts for al-Qaeda's human capital, with raw recruits arriving and trained fighters departing either for front lines against the Northern Alliance, the Afghan rebel coalition, or against American interests somewhere else. The US government had whole libraries of images filmed over Tarnak Qila and its sister camp, Garmabat Ghar, 19 miles farther west. Why watch al-Qaeda train several thousand men a year and then chase them around the world when they left?” No retaliation is taken on these camps until after 9/11. [Washington Post, 1/20/02]
Go forward with new Predator drone reconnaissance missions in the spring and use an armed version when it is ready. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (D)]
Step up the fight against terrorist fundraising. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (D)]
Be aware that al-Qaeda sleeper cells in the US are not just a potential threat, but are a “major threat in being.” Additionally, more attacks have almost certainly been set in motion. [PBS Frontline, 10/3/02; Washington Post, 1/20/02] Rice's response to Clarke's proposal is that the Cabinet will not address the issue until it has been “framed” at the deputy secretary level. However, this initial deputy meeting is not given high priority and it does not take place until April 2001. [Clarke, 2004, pp 230-31] Henry Shelton, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman until 9/11, says, “The squeaky wheel was Dick Clarke, but he wasn't at the top of their priority list, so the lights went out for a few months. Dick did a pretty good job because he's abrasive as hell, but given the [bureaucratic] level he was at” there was no progress. [Los Angeles Times, 3/30/04; Benjamin and Simon, 2002, pp 335-36] Some counterterrorism officials think the new administration responds slowly simply because Clarke's proposal originally came from the Clinton administration. [Time, 8/4/02] For instance, Thomas Maertenson, on the National Security Council in both the Clinton and Bush administrations, says, “They really believed their campaign rhetoric about the Clinton administration. So anything [that administration] did was bad, and the Bushies were not going to repeat it.” [New York Times, 3/24/04; Minneapolis Star-Tribune, 3/25/04]
People and organizations involved: Bush administration, Central Intelligence Agency, al-Qaeda, Northern Alliance, Thomas Maertenson, Henry H. Shelton, Condoleezza Rice, Clinton administration, Richard A. Clarke, Taliban, Ahmed Shah Massoud
January 27, 2001: Al-Qaeda's Role in USS Cole Bombing Triggers No Immediate Response
The Washington Post reports that the US has confirmed the link between al-Qaeda and the October 2000 USS Cole bombing (see October 12, 2000). [Washington Post, 1/27/01] This conclusion is stated without hedge in a February 9 briefing for Vice President Cheney. [Washington Post, 1/20/02] In the wake of that bombing, Bush stated on the campaign trail, “I hope that we can gather enough intelligence to figure out who did the act and take the necessary action. ... There must be a consequence.” [Washington Post, 1/20/02] Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz later complains that by the time the new administration is in place, the Cole bombing was “stale.” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld concurs, stating that too much time had passed to respond. [9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (
] The new Bush administration fails to resume the covert deployment of cruise missile submarines and gunships on six-hour alert near Afghanistan's borders that had begun under President Clinton. The standby force gave Clinton the option of an immediate strike against targets in Afghanistan harboring al-Qaeda's top leadership. This failure makes a possible assassination of bin Laden much more difficult. [Washington Post, 1/20/02] People and organizations involved: Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Bush administration, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden
(January 30, 2001): First National Security Council Meeting Focuses on Iraq, Not Terrorism
The Bush White House holds its first National Security Council meeting. The lead discussion centers on the need to remove Saddam Hussein from power. US Secretary of Treasury Paul O'Neill, later recalling: “From the very beginning, there was a conviction, that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go ... From the very first instance, it was about Iraq. It was about what we can do to change this regime. Day one, these things were laid and sealed.” O'Neill will say officials never questioned the logic behind this policy. No one ever asked, “Why Saddam?” and “Why now?” Instead, the issue that needed to be resolved was how this could be accomplished. “It was all about finding a way to do it,” O'Neill will explain. “That was the tone of it. The president saying ‘Go find me a way to do this.’ ” [CBS News, 1/10/04; New York Times, 1/12/04; Guardian, 1/12/04; Vanity Fair, 5/04, pg 234 Sources: Paul O'Neill] Another official who attends the meeting will later say that the tone of the meeting implied a policy much more aggressive than that of the previous administration. “The president told his Pentagon officials to explore the military options, including use of ground forces,” the official will tell ABC News. “That went beyond the Clinton administration's halfhearted attempts to overthrow Hussein without force.” [ABC News, 1/13/04 Sources: Unnamed senior official of the Bush administration] The council does more than just discuss Iraq. It makes a decision to allow the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an Iraqi opposition group, to use $4 million to fund efforts inside Iraq to compile information relating to Baghdad's war crimes, military operations, and other internal developments. The money had been authorized by Congress in late 2004. The US has not directly funded Iraqi opposition activities inside Iraq itself since 1996. [Guardian, 2/3/2005] After Paul O'Neill first provides his account of this meeting in 2004, the White House will attempt to downplay its significance. “... The stated policy of my administration toward Saddam Hussein was very clear,” Bush will tell reporters during a visit to Mexico In January 2004. “Like the previous administration, we were for regime change. ... And in the initial stages of the administration, as you might remember, we were dealing with desert badger or fly-overs and fly-betweens and looks, and so we were fashioning policy along those lines.” [New York Times, 1/12/04]
People and organizations involved: Richard B. Myers, Condoleezza Rice, Iraqi National Congress, Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush, Colin Powell, Paul O'Neill, George Tenet
January 30, 2001: Hijacker Questioned at Request of CIA, Then Released
Ziad Jarrah flying in Florida in 2000.
Hijacker Ziad Jarrah is questioned for several hours at the Dubai International Airport, United Arab Emirates, at the request of the CIA for “suspected involvement in terrorist activities,” then let go. This is according to United Arab Emirates, US, and European officials, but the CIA denies the story. The CIA notified local officials that he would be arriving from Pakistan on his way back to Europe, and they wanted to know where he had been in Afghanistan and how long he had been there. US officials were informed of the results of the interrogation before Jarrah left the airport. Jarrah had already been in the US for six months learning to fly. “UAE and European intelligence sources told CNN that the questioning of Jarrah fits a pattern of a CIA operation begun in 1999 to track suspected al-Qaeda operatives who were traveling through the United Arab Emirates.” He was then permitted to leave, eventually going to the US. [CNN, 8/1/02; Chicago Tribune, 12/13/01] Some accounts place this in January 2000.
People and organizations involved: United Arab Emirates, Ziad Jarrah, Central Intelligence Agency
Late January 2001: US Intelligence Told to Back Off from bin Laden and Saudis
The BBC later reports, “After the elections, [US intelligence] agencies [are] told to ‘back off’ investigating the bin Ladens and Saudi royals, and that anger[s] agents.” This follows previous orders to abandon an investigation of bin Laden relatives in 1996 (see September 11, 1996), and difficulties in investigating Saudi royalty. [BBC, 11/6/01] An unnamed “top-level CIA operative” says there is a “major policy shift” at the National Security Agency at this time. Bin Laden could still be investigated, but agents could not look too closely at how he got his money. One specific CIA investigation hampered by this new policy is an investigation in Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan and his Khan Laboratories. Khan is considered the “father” of Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability. But since the funding for this nuclear program gets traced back to Saudi Arabia, restrictions are placed on the inquiry. [Palast, 2002, pp 99-100] Presumably another investigation canceled is an investigation by the Chicago FBI into ties between Saudi multimillionaire Yassin al-Qadi and the US embassy bombings in August 1998 (see October 1998), because during this month an FBI agent is told that the case is being closed and that “it's just better to let sleeping dogs lie.” Reporter Greg Palast notes that President Clinton was already hindering investigations by protecting Saudi interests. However, as he puts it, “Where Clinton said, ‘Go slow,’ Bush policymakers said, ‘No go.’ The difference is between closing one eye and closing them both.” [Palast, 2002, pp 102]
People and organizations involved: Yassin al-Qadi, Bin Laden Family, Osama bin Laden, William Jefferson ("Bill") Clinton, Abdul Qadeer Khan, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation
January 31, 2001: Bipartisan Commission Issues Final Report on Terrorism, but Conclusions Are Ignored
Gary Hart (left) and Warren Rudman (right) testify before a Senate committee in 2002.
The final report of the US Commission on National Security/21st Century, co-chaired by former Senators Gary Hart (D) and Warren Rudman ® is issued. The bipartisan report was put together in 1998 by then-President Bill Clinton and then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich. Hart and Rudman personally brief National Security Adviser Rice, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Powell on their findings. The report has 50 recommendations on how to combat terrorism in the US, but all of them are ignored by the Bush administration. According to Senator Hart, Congress begins to take the commission's suggestions seriously in March and April, and legislation is introduced to implement some of the recommendations. Then, “Frankly, the White House shut it down... The president said ‘Please wait, We're going to turn this over to the vice president’ ... and so Congress moved on to other things, like tax cuts and the issue of the day.” The White House announces in May that it will have Vice President Cheney study the potential problem of domestic terrorism despite the fact that this commission had just studied the issue for 2 1/2 years. Interestingly, both this commission and the Bush administration were already assuming a new cabinet level National Homeland Security Agency would be enacted eventually, even as the public remained unaware of the term and the concept. [Salon, 9/12/01; Salon, 4/2/04] Hart is incredulous that neither he nor any of the other members of this commission are ever asked to testify before the 9/11 Commission. [Salon, 4/6/04]
People and organizations involved: Warren Rudman, Gary Hart, US Congress, Colin Powell, Commission on National Security/21st Century, Bush administration, Newt Gingrich, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, 9/11 Commission
February-July 2001: Trial Presents FBI with Information About Pilot Training Scheme
A trial is held in New York City for four defendants charged with involvement in the 1998 US African embassy bombings. All are ultimately convicted. Testimony reveals that two bin Laden operatives had received pilot training in Texas and Oklahoma and another had been asked to take lessons. One bin Laden aide becomes a government witness and gives the FBI detailed information about a pilot training scheme. This new information does not lead to any new FBI investigations into the matter. [Washington Post, 9/23/01]
People and organizations involved: Osama bin Laden, Federal Bureau of Investigation, al-Qaeda
February 2001: Two Hijackers Seen Living in San Antonio with Swapped Identities
At least six people with no connections to one another later claim they recognize hijackers Satam Al Suqami and Salem Alhazmi living in San Antonio, Texas, until this month. The management of an apartment building says the two men abandoned their leases at about this time, and some apartment residents recognize them. However, all the witnesses say that Suqami was going by Alhazmi's name, and vice versa! [KENS 5 Eyewitness News, 10/1/01] One pilot shop employee recognizes Alhazmi as a frequent visitor to the store and interested in a 757 or 767 handbook, though he also says Alhazmi used Suqami's name. [KENS 5 Eyewitness News, 10/3/01] The apartment-leasing agent also recalls a Ziad Jarrah who once lived there in June 2001 and looked the same as the hijacker. [San Antonio Express-News, 9/22/01; Associated Press, 9/22/01 (
] Local FBI confirm that a Salem Alhazmi attended the nearby Alpha Tango Flight School and lived in that apartment building, but they say he is a different Salem Alhazmi who is still alive and living in Saudi Arabia. [KENS 5 Eyewitness News, 10/4/01] However, that “Salem Alhazmi” says he has never been to the US and has proven to the authorities that he did not leave Saudi Arabia in the two years prior to 9/11. [Washington Post, 9/20/01] The FBI does not explain Satam Al Suqami's presence. Neither hijacker is supposed to have arrived in the US before April 2001. People and organizations involved: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Salem Alhazmi, Satam Al Suqami, Ziad Jarrah, Alpha Tango Flight School
February 2001: Bin Laden's Sisters Seen Handing Money to al-Qaeda Member
A former CIA anti-terrorism expert later claims that an allied intelligence agency sees “two of Osama's sisters apparently taking cash to an airport in Abu Dhabi [United Arab Emirates], where they are suspected of handing it to a member of bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization.” This is cited as one of many incidents showing an “interconnectedness” between bin Laden and the rest of his family. [New Yorker, 11/5/01]
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Bin Laden Family
February 2001: US Fails to Back Plan to Overthrow Taliban
Abdul Haq, a famous Afghan leader of the mujahedeen, convinces Robert McFarlane, National Security Adviser under President Ronald Reagan, that Haq and about 50 fellow commanders could lead a force to start a revolt against the Taliban in Southern Afghanistan. However, Haq wants to do this under the authority of Zahir Shah, the popular former king of Afghanistan, whom the US does not support. The CIA fails to give any support to Haq. Says one CIA official to McFarlane a few months later, “We don't yet have our marching orders concerning US policy; it may be that we will end up dealing with the Taliban.” Haq goes ahead with his plans without US support, and is killed in October (see October 25, 2001). [Los Angeles Times, 10/28/01 (
; Wall Street Journal, 11/2/01] People and organizations involved: Zahir Shah, Central Intelligence Agency, Robert C. McFarlane, Taliban, Abdul Haq
February 2001: Bush Administration Abandons Global Crackdown on Terrorist Funding
According to Time magazine, “The US was all set to join a global crackdown on criminal and terrorist money havens [in early 2001]. Thirty industrial nations were ready to tighten the screws on offshore financial centers like Liechtenstein and Antigua, whose banks have the potential to hide and often help launder billions of dollars for drug cartels, global crime syndicates—and groups like Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization. Then the Bush administration took office.” [Time, 10/15/01] After pressure from the powerful banking lobby, the Treasury Department under Paul O'Neill halts US cooperation with these international efforts begun in 2000 by the Clinton administration. Clinton had created a National Terrorist Asset Tracking Center in his last budget, but under O'Neill no funding for the center is provided and the tracking of terrorist financing slows down. [Foreign Affairs, 7/01; Time, 10/15/01]
People and organizations involved: Bush administration, Clinton administration, Paul O'Neill
February 1, 2001: Rumsfeld Envisions Post-Saddam Iraq
The Bush White House holds its second National Security Council meeting. Like the first meeting (see (January 30, 2001)), the issue of regime change in Iraq is a central topic. [CBS News, 1/10/04; New York Times, 1/12/04] Officials discuss a memo titled “Plan for post-Saddam Iraq,” which talks about troop requirements, establishing war crimes tribunals, and divvying up Iraq's oil wealth. [Sources: Paul O'Neill] Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld argues that by removing Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration would “demonstrate what US policy is all about.” It would also help transform the Middle East, he claims. According to Paul O'Neill, Rumsfeld talks at the meeting “in general terms about post-Saddam Iraq, dealing with the Kurds in the north, the oil fields, the reconstruction of the country's economy, and the ‘freeing of the Iraqi people.’ ” [New York Times, 1/12/04 Sources: Paul O'Neill] Other people, in addition to O'Neill, Bush, and Rumsfeld, who are likely in attendance include Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers. [Sources: National Security Presidential Directives—NSPD-1, 2/13/01]]
People and organizations involved: Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Paul O'Neill, George Tenet, Richard B. Myers, George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld
Early February 2001: Clarke Urges Cheney to Take Action Against al-Qaeda
Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke briefs Vice President Cheney about the al-Qaeda threat. He urges decisive and quick action against al-Qaeda. Cheney soon visits CIA headquarters for more information about al-Qaeda. However, at later high-level meetings Cheney fails to bring up al-Qaeda as a priority issue. [Clarke, 2004, pp 227-30; Time, 8/4/02]
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda, Richard ("Dick") Cheney, Richard A. Clarke, Central Intelligence Agency
February 7, 2001: Tenet Warns Congress About bin Laden
CIA Director Tenet warns Congress in open testimony that the “threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving.” He says bin Laden and his global network remains “the most immediate and serious threat” to US interests. “Since 1998 bin Laden has declared that all US citizens are legitimate targets,” he says, adding that bin Laden “is capable of planning multiple attacks with little or no warning.” [Associated Press, 2/7/01; Sunday Herald, 9/23/01]
People and organizations involved: Osama bin Laden, US Congress, al-Qaeda, George Tenet
February 9, 2001: Bin Laden's Financial Network Laid Bare
US officials claim significant progress in defeating bin Laden's financial network, despite significant difficulties. It is claimed that “bin Laden's financial and operational networks has been ‘completely mapped’ in secret documents shared by the State Department, CIA, and Treasury Department, with much of the mapping completed in detail by mid-1997.” [UPI, 2/9/01] Reporter Greg Palast later notes that when the US freezes the assets of terrorist organizations in late September 2001, US investigators likely knew much about the finances of those organizations but took no action before 9/11. [Santa Fe New Mexican, 3/20/03]
People and organizations involved: US Department of the Treasury, Greg Palast, Central Intelligence Agency, Osama bin Laden
February 13, 2001: NSA Breaks al-Qaeda's Secret Codes
UPI, while covering a trial of bin Laden's al-Qaeda followers, reports that the NSA has broken bin Laden's encrypted communications. US officials confirm “codes were broken.” Presumably, this happened some time earlier and the codes have been changed by this time. [UPI, 2/13/01]
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda, National Security Agency
February 23-June 2001: Moussaoui Takes Lessons at Flight School Previously Used by al-Qaeda
Zacarias Moussaoui flies to the US. Three days later, he starts flight training at the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma. (Other Islamic extremists had previously trained at the same flight school or other schools in the area (see September 1999)). He trains there until May, but does not do well and drops out before getting a pilot's license. His visa expires on May 22, but he does not attempt to renew it or get another one. He stays in Norman, arranging to change flight schools, and frequently exercising in a gym. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 10/17/02; MSNBC, 12/11/01] According to US investigators, would-be hijacker Ramzi Bin al-Shibh later says he meets Moussaoui in Karachi (Pakistan) in June 2001. [Washington Post, 11/20/02]
People and organizations involved: Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Zacarias Moussaoui, Airman Flight School
February 26, 2001: Osama Attends Son's Wedding with Other bin Laden Family Members
Mohammed bin Laden (center), the son of Osama bin Laden (right), marries the daughter of Mohammed Atef (left).
Bin Laden attends the wedding of his son Mohammed in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Although bin Laden is supposedly long estranged from his family, bin Laden's stepmother, two brothers, and sister are also said to attend, according to the only journalist who was invited. [Reuters, 3/1/01; Sunday Herald, 10/7/01]
People and organizations involved: Al-Khalifa bin Laden, Osama bin Laden, Mohammed bin Laden
February 26, 2001: Paul Bremer: Bush Administration Paying No Attention to Terrorism
Paul Bremer, who will be appointed the US administrator of Iraq in 2003, says in a speech that the Bush administration is “paying no attention” to terrorism. “What they will do is stagger along until there's a major incident and then suddenly say, ‘Oh my God, shouldn't we be organized to deal with this.’ ” Bremer speaks shortly after chairing the National Commission on Terrorism, a bipartisan body formed during the Clinton administration. [Associated Press, 4/29/04]
People and organizations involved: National Commission on Terrorism, Paul Bremer, Bush administration, Clinton administration
Late February 2001: Enron Influences Cheney's Energy Task Force to Help Troubled Dabhol Plant
Vice President Cheney is holding a series of secret energy task force meetings to determine the Bush administration's future energy policy. Starting at this time, Enron leader Ken Lay and other Enron officials take part in a least half a dozen of these secret meetings. After one such meeting, Cheney's energy task force changes a draft energy proposal to include a provision boosting oil and natural gas production in India. The amendment is so narrow that it apparently is targeted to only help Enron's troubled Dabhol power plant in India. [Washington Post, 1/19/02]
People and organizations involved: Enron, Bush administration, Kenneth Lay, Richard ("Dick") Cheney
March 2001: Hijackers Pledge Martyrdom in Videos
A still of Ahmed Alhaznawi from the Al Jazeera video. The WTC was digitally inserted in the video background later.
Supposedly, all 13 of the “muscle” hijackers record a farewell video before leaving training in Kandahar, Afghanistan, around this time. [CBS News, 10/9/02] Several have been released. A video of Ahmed Alhaznawi is shown by the Al Jazeera television network in April 2002. In it, he pledges to give his life to “martyrdom” and swears to send a “bloodied message” to Americans by attacking them in their “heartland.” [Guardian, 4/16/02] In September 2002, Al Jazeera shows a similar farewell video of Abdulaziz Alomari made around the same time. [Associated Press, 9/9/02] Alomari states, “I am writing this with my full conscience and I am writing this in expectation of the end, which is near ... God praise everybody who trained and helped me, namely the leader Sheik Osama bin Laden.” [Washington Post, 9/11/02] Al Jazeera also shows Ahmed Alnami, Hamza Alghamdi, Saeed Alghamdi, and Wail Alshehri in Kandahar studying maps and flight manuals. [Financial Times, 9/11/02]
People and organizations involved: Mohand Alshehri, Ahmed Alghamdi, Hamza Alghamdi, Ahmed Alnami, Wail Alshehri, Majed Moqed, Ahmed Alhaznawi, Fayez Ahmed Banihammad, Waleed M. Alshehri, Osama bin Laden, Satam Al Suqami, Saeed Alghamdi, Abdulaziz Alomari, Salem Alhazmi
March 1, 2001: Taliban Blow Up Giant Buddha Statues, Disregard International Opinion
The Taliban begins blowing up two giant stone Buddhas of Bamiyan (ancient statues carved into an Afghan mountainside, which are considered priceless treasures). They face great international condemnation in response, but no longer seem to be courting international recognition. Apparently, even ISI efforts to dissuade them fail. [Time, 8/4/02; Time, 8/4/02]
People and organizations involved: Taliban
Spring 2001: Ashcroft Doesn't Want FBI Director to Talk About Terrorism
Attorney General John Ashcroft talks with FBI Director Louis Freeh before an annual meeting of special agents. Ashcroft lays out his priorities, which according to one participant is “basically violent crime and drugs.” Freeh bluntly replies that those are not his priorities and he talks about counterterrorism. “Ashcroft does not want to hear about it,” says one witness. [Newsweek, 5/27/02]
People and organizations involved: Louis J. Freeh, John Ashcroft
Spring 2001: US Customs Investigate Two Hijackers Before 9/11
A US Customs Service investigation finds evidence that Nabil al-Marabh has funneled money to hijackers Ahmed Alghamdi and Satam Al Suqami. [Cox News Service, 10/16/01; ABC News, 1/31/02] By summer, Customs also uncovers a series of financial transactions between al-Marabh and al-Qaeda agent Raed Hijazi. [New York Times, 9/21/01; Associated Press, 11/17/01] An individual matching al-Marabh's description is even mentioned in a prominent New York Times story about al-Qaeda in January 2001. The article states, “In early 1997, [Raed] Hijazi moved to Boston, where he had a friend from his years in Afghanistan.” [New York Times, 1/15/01]
People and organizations involved: Ahmed Alghamdi, Nabil al-Marabh, Raed Hijazi, US Customs Service, Satam Al Suqami
March-May 2001: FAA Briefs Airports on Security; They Cite, Then Dismiss Possibility of Planes as Weapons
A series of top-secret security briefings are given to airport officials at the top 19 airports in the US. The airports warned include those at Boston, Washington, and Newark, which are eventually used by the hijackers. A 9/11 Commission Report on this later notes, “The briefings highlight the threat posed by terrorists in general and bin Laden in particular, including his threats against aviation. The renewed interest in hijacking by terrorist groups [is] also covered.” The briefings note that if “the intent of the hijacker is not to exchange hostages for prisoners, but to commit suicide in a spectacular explosion, a domestic hijacking would probably be preferable.” But they also note that such a hijacking would be harder to carry out. Around the same time, the FAA distributes an unclassified CD-ROM presentation to airlines and airports. “The presentation cite[s] the possibility that terrorists might conduct suicide hijackings but state[s]: ‘Fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction.’ ” This briefing and presentation doesn't lead to any upgrade in security or improved passenger screening at the airports. Apparently, the information isn't widely shared with pilots, flight attendants, passenger screeners, and the like, and it doesn't lead to any specific FAA advisories or actions. [New York Times, 2/10/05; Newsday, 2/11/05; New Jersey Star-Ledger, 2/11/05] For instance, Dave Machett, a pilot who is president of the grassroots organization Airline Pilots Security Alliance, says that “Not one word” reached the pilots. “The flight crews were kept completely in the dark about this growing threat.” [Newsday, 2/11/05] 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer comments, “The FAA deserves to be raked over the coals for ignoring the warnings and being more concerned about reducing air traffic congestion than dealing with possible terrorist attacks.” [New Jersey Star-Ledger, 2/11/05]
People and organizations involved: Tim Roemer, 9/11 Commission Report, Osama bin Laden, Federal Aviation Administration, Dave Machett
March 2001: Cheney's Energy Task Force Eyes Iraq's Oil Reserves
Cheney's Energy Task Force authors a variety of documents relating to the oil industries of Iraq, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. [Judicial Watch, 7/17/03; CBS News, 1/10/04; New York Times, 1/12/04]
Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts - This document, dated March 5, 2001, includes a table listing 30 countries which have interests in Iraq's oil industry. The document also includes the names of companies that have interests, the oil fields with which those interests are associated, as well as the statuses of those interests. [Sources: Iraq Oil Foreign Suitors, page 1, Iraq Oil Foreign Suitors, page 2]
Map of Iraq's oil fields - The map includes markings for “supergiant” oil fields of 5 billion barrels or more, other oilfields, fields “earmarked for production sharing,” oil pipelines, operational refineries, and tanker terminals. [Sources: Iraq Oil Map]
Other documents - Other documents include oil field maps and project tables for both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates [Sources: UAE Oil Project Table, Saudia Arabia Oil Map, Saudi Arabia Oil Project Table, UAE Oil Map]
People and organizations involved: Richard ("Dick") Cheney
March 2001: Bin Laden Targets Passenger Planes at Chicago Airport
9/11 Commissioner Bob Kerrey mentions in a public hearing, “In March 2001, another CSG [Counterterrorism Security Group] item on the agenda mentions the possibility of alleged bin Laden interests in ‘targeting US passenger planes at the Chicago airport,’ end of quote.” [9/11 Commission, 3/24/04] No newspaper has ever mentioned this warning, which presumably remained classified aside from this one accidental mention by Kerrey.
People and organizations involved: Osama bin Laden, Bob Kerrey
March 2001: Al-Qaeda to Attack Inside the US in April
An intelligence source claims that a group of al-Qaeda operatives is planning to conduct an unspecified attack inside the US in April. One of the operatives allegedly resides in the US. There are also reports of planned attacks in California and New York State for the same month, though whether this is reference to the same plot is unclear. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda
March 2001: Hijackers Continue to Associate with Suspicious Imam
Dar al Hijrah mosque.
After living together in Phoenix since December 2000, hijackers Hani Hanjour and Nawaf Alhazmi move to Falls Church, Virginia. [9/11 Commission Report, 1/26/04; Washington Post, 9/10/02 (
] They live only a few blocks from where two nephews of bin Laden with ties to terrorism go to work. They continue to live there off and on until around August. They begin attending the Dar al Hijrah mosque. [Washington Post, 9/10/02 (] When they and Khalid Almihdhar lived in San Diego in early 2000, they attended a mosque there led by the imam Anwar Al Aulaqi. This imam moved to Falls Church in January 2001, and now the hijackers attend his sermons at the Dar al Hijrah mosque. Some later suspect that Aulaqi is part of the 9/11 plot because of their similar moves, and other reasons: The FBI says Aulaqi had closed door meetings with hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar in 2000 while all three of them were living in San Diego. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
Police later find the phone number of Aulaqi's mosque when they search “would-be twentieth hijacker” Ramzi Bin al-Shibh's apartment in Germany. [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03]
The FBI was investigating Aulaqi for ties to Islamic militant groups in early 2000.
A neighbor of Aulaqi later claims that, in the first week of August 2001, Aulaqi knocks on his door and tells him he is leaving for Kuwait: “He came over before he left and told me that something very big was going to happen, and that he had to be out of the country when it happened.” [Newsweek, 7/28/03]
Aulaqi is apparently in the country in late September 2001, and claims not to recognize any of the hijackers. [Copley News, 10/1/01]
A week after 9/11, Aulaqi says the hijackers were framed, and suggests Israel was behind 9/11. [Washington Post, 7/23/03]
Aulaqi leaves the US in early 2002. [Time, 8/11/03]
In December 2002, Aulaqi briefly returns and is temporarily detained as part of the Green Quest money laundering investigation. However, he is let go. [World Net Daily, 8/16/03] By late 2003, the US is looking for him in Yemen. [New Republic, 8/21/03] The FBI appears to be divided about him, with some thinking he is part of the 9/11 plot and some disagreeing [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 7/24/03; Time, 8/11/03] The 9/11 Commission later reports that Aulaqi gave substantial help to the two hijackers, that his relationship with them is “suspicious,” and it cannot be discounted that he knew of the plot in advance. [Associated Press, 6/27/04]
People and organizations involved: 9/11 Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, Anwar Al Aulaqi, William Safire, 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Germany, Nawaf Alhazmi, Khalid Almihdhar, Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, Osama bin Laden
March 2001: US and Taliban Discuss Handing over bin Laden
Taliban envoy Rahmatullah Hashimi meets with reporters, middle-ranking State Department bureaucrats, and private Afghanistan experts in Washington. He carries a gift carpet and a letter from Afghan leader Mullah Omar for President Bush. He discusses turning bin Laden over, but the US wants to be handed bin Laden and the Taliban want to turn him over to some third country. A CIA official later says, “We never heard what they were trying to say. We had no common language. Ours was, ‘Give up bin Laden.’ They were saying, ‘Do something to help us give him up.’ ... I have no doubts they wanted to get rid of him. He was a pain in the neck.” Others claim the Taliban were never sincere. About 20 more meetings on giving up bin Laden take place up until 9/11, all fruitless. [Washington Post, 10/29/01] Allegedly, Hashimi also proposes that the Taliban would hold bin Laden in one location long enough for the US to locate and kill him. However, this offer is refused. This report, however, comes from Laila Helms, daughter of former CIA director Richard Helms. While it's interesting that this information came out before 9/11, one must be skeptical, since Helms' job was public relations for the Taliban. [Village Voice, 6/6/01]
People and organizations involved: Rahmatullah Hashimi, George W. Bush, Laila Helms, Mullah Omar, Taliban, Osama bin Laden
March 2001: Italians Advise US About al-Qaeda Wiretaps
The Italian government gives the US information about possible attacks based on apartment wiretaps in the Italian city of Milan. [Fox News, 5/17/02] Presumably, the information includes a discussion between two al-Qaeda agents talking about a “very, very secret” plan to forge documents “for the brothers who are going to the United States” (see August 12, 2000). The warning may also have mentioned a wiretap the previous August involving one of the same people that discussed a massive strike against the enemies of Islam involving aircraft (see January 24, 2001). Two months later, wiretaps of the same Milan cell will also reveal a plot to attack a summit of world leaders.
People and organizations involved: al-Qaeda
March 4, 2001: Television Show Eerily Envisions 9/11 Attacks
An advertisement for the Lone Gunman show.
Contradicting the later claim that no one could have envisioned the 9/11 attacks, a short-lived Fox television program called The Lone Gunmen airs a pilot episode in which militants try to fly an airplane into the WTC. The heroes save the day and the airplane narrowly misses the building. There are no hijackers on board the aircraft; they use remote control technology to steer the plane. Ratings are good for the show, yet the eerie coincidence is barely mentioned after 9/11. Says one media columnist, “This seems to be collective amnesia of the highest order.” [TV Guide, 6/21/02] In the show, the heroes also determine: “The terrorist group responsible was actually a faction of our own government. These malefactors were seeking to stimulate arms manufacturing in the lean years following the end of the Cold War by bringing down a plane in New York City and fomenting fears of terrorism.” [Myers Report, 6/20/02]
People and organizations involved: World Trade Center
March 7, 2001: Plan to Fight al-Qaeda Considered, but with Little Urgency
Deputy National Security Adviser Steve Hadley chairs an informal meeting of some counterparts from other agencies to discuss al-Qaeda. They begin a broad review of the government's approach to al-Qaeda and Afghanistan. According to the New York Times, the approach is “two-pronged and included a crisis warning effort to deal with immediate threats and longer-range planning by senior officials to put into place a comprehensive strategy to eradicate al-Qaeda.” Counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke again pushes for immediate decisions on assisting Ahmed Shah Massoud and his Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Hadley suggests dealing with this as part of the broad review. Clarke supports a larger program, but he warns that delay risks the Alliance's defeat. Clarke also advocates using the armed Predator drone. However, despite an increasing number of alarming warnings following this meeting, there is little follow-up. “By June, a draft of a presidential directive authorizing an ambitious covert action plan is circulating through the upper echelons of the administration, but there seem[s] little urgency about putting the plan into effect.” [New York Times, 4/4/04; New York Times, 3/24/04 (D); 9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04; 9/11 Commission Report, 3/24/04 (D)]
People and organizations involved: Stephen Hadley, Richard A. Clarke, Ahmed Shah Massoud, al-Qaeda, Northern Alliance
March 7, 2001: Russia Submits Report on bin Laden to UN Security Council, US Fails to Act
The Russian Permanent Mission at the United Nations secretly submits “an unprecedentedly detailed report” to the UN Security Council about bin Laden, his whereabouts, details of his al-Qaeda network, Afghan drug running, and Taliban connections in Pakistan. The report provides “a listing of all bin Laden's bases, his government contacts and foreign advisers,” and enough information to potentially locate and kill him. The US fails to act. Alex Standish, the editor of the highly respected Jane's Intelligence Review, concludes that the attacks of 9/11 were less of an American intelligence failure than the result of “a political decision not to act against bin Laden.” [Jane's Intelligence Review, 10/5/01]
People and organizations involved: Osama bin Laden, United Nations, Russia, al-Qaeda
March 8, 2001: US Declines to Freeze al-Qaeda's Assets Despite Call from UN and EU
The United Nations and the European Union direct their members to freeze the assets of some al-Qaeda leaders, including Sa'd Al-Sharif, bin Laden's brother-in-law and the head of his finances, but the US does not do so until after 9/11. [Guardian, 10/13/01 (
] For a time, the US claims that Sa'd Al-Sharif helped fund the 9/11 attacks, but the situation is highly confused and his role is doubtful (see September 24, 2001-December 26, 2002). People and organizations involved: European Union, United Nations, Sa'd Al-Sharif
Mid-March 2001: Hijackers Meet with ID Forger
Hijackers Ahmed Alghamdi, Majed Moqed, Hani Hanjour, and Nawaf Alhazmi stay for four days in the Fairfield Motor Inn, Fairfield, Connecticut. They meet with Eyad M. Alrababah, a Jordanian living in Bridgeport, who has been charged with providing false identification to at least 50 illegal aliens. This meeting takes place about six weeks before the FBI says Moqed and Alghamdi enter the US. [Associated Press, 3/6/02; 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/26/02]
People and organizations involved: Eyad M. Alrababah, Nawaf Alhazmi, Ahmed Alghamdi, William Safire, Majed Moqed
March 15, 2001: India, Iran, Russia, and US Work in Concert to Remove Taliban
Jane's Intelligence Review reports that the US is working with India, Iran, and Russia “in a concerted front against Afghanistan's Taliban regime.” India is supplying the Northern Alliance with military equipment, advisers, and helicopter technicians and both India and Russia are using bases in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for their operation. [Jane's Intelligence Review, 3/15/01]
People and organizations involved: Iran, Uzbekistan, India, Northern Alliance, Tajikistan, Russia, Taliban
March 23, 2001: DEA Issues Alert to Look Out for Israeli Spies
The Office of National Drug Control Policy issues a National Security Alert describing “apparent attempts by Israeli nationals to learn about government personnel and office layouts.” This later becomes known through a leaked DEA document called “Suspicious Activities Involving Israeli Art Students at DEA Facilities.” A crackdown ensues and by June, around 120 Israelis are apprehended. More are apprehended later. [DEA report, 6/01]
People and organizations involved: Office of National Drug Control Policy, "Israeli art students"
March 26, 2001: CIA Benefits from Major Software Improvements
The Washington Post reports on major improvements of the CIA's intelligence gathering capability “in recent years.” A new program called Oasis uses “automated speech recognition” technology to turn audio feeds into formatted, searchable text. It can distinguish one voice from another and differentiates “speaker 1” from “speaker 2” in transcripts. Software called Fluent performs “cross lingual” searches, translates difficult languages like Chinese and Japanese (apparently such software is much better than similar publicly available software), and even automatically assesses the contextual importance. Other new software can turn a suspect's “life story into a three-dimensional diagram of linked phone calls, bank deposits and plane trips,” while still other software can efficiently and quickly process vast amounts of video, audio, and written data. [Washington Post, 3/26/01] However, the government will later report that a number of messages about the 9/11 attacks, such as one stating “tomorrow is the zero hour,” are not translated until after 9/11 because analysts were “too swamped.” [ABC News, 6/7/02]
People and organizations involved: Fluent, Oasis, Central Intelligence Agency