From ICH.

Oh that silly Pentagon, always covering up the real facts. What a huge propaganda machine that Pentagon is.... so much to falsify in so little time.

[Last October, Tedd Weyman of the Toronto-based Uranium Medical Research Centre (UMRC), a non-profit scientific organisation that studies radiation contamination in war zones, led a field investigation to Iraq that found elevated radiation levels, even in the air.

"It was quite unusual because radiation tends to persist for a while in the soil and groundwater, but it usually disperses quickly in the air," he said. ]



http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=23515

Evidence Grows Against Depleted Uranium Weapons
Katherine Stapp

NEW YORK, Apr 28 (IPS) - Washington's insistence that depleted uranium (DU) munitions are not toxic has been undermined by revelations that four U.S. soldiers recently home from Iraq are suffering from radiation poisoning.

A by-product of the uranium enrichment process, DU is prized by the military for its use in ammunition that can punch through walls and armoured tanks. The main problem, experts say, is that DU munitions vaporise on contact, generating dust that is easily inhaled into the lungs.

Several months ago a dozen soldiers from the National Guard's 442nd Military Police Company, stationed south of Baghdad, began suffering from dizziness, diarrhoea, blurred vision and other symptoms. Independent tests carried out by a New York newspaper found that four had high levels of depleted uranium in their systems.

The news does not come as a surprise for doctors working in parts of the world that have been bombarded with DU weaponry, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans.

"If it is true, it will be a great problem for the Pentagon," said Dr Jawad al-Ali, a cancer specialist at the Oncology Centre in Basra, Iraq.

Al-Ali says that the number of cancer patients he treats has increased more than 10-fold since the 1990 Gulf War, and that many of the cases are suggestive of heavy metal poisoning.

"The Iraqi people are the victims of the Pentagon policy," he told IPS. "And clean-up is impossible because they used DU on so many local areas."

Washington admitted to using some 300 tonnes of DU munitions during the 1990 Gulf War, although independent experts estimate that the real number is more like 1,700 tonnes.

In Afghanistan, U.S.-led forces in "Operation Enduring Freedom" likely fired thousands of DU armour-piercing shells, although no hard numbers have been released.

And in the most recent Iraq war, the Pentagon and the United Nations estimate that U.S. and British forces used 1,100 to 2,200 tonnes of DU during attacks in March and April 2003.

[Last October, Tedd Weyman of the Toronto-based Uranium Medical Research Centre (UMRC), a non-profit scientific organisation that studies radiation contamination in war zones, led a field investigation to Iraq that found elevated radiation levels, even in the air.

"It was quite unusual because radiation tends to persist for a while in the soil and groundwater, but it usually disperses quickly in the air," he said. ]

Risks Low for Service Members from Depleted Uranium, DoD Says
By Gerry J. Gilmore
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 3, 2004 – Depleted uranium poses very low health risks to U.S. service members, senior Defense Department officials said here April 29.

Dr. William Winkenwerder Jr., assistant secretary of defense for health affairs, pointed to a 10-year, joint DoD-Veterans Affairs study showing "that low levels of depleted uranium that our troops would be exposed to are neither a radiological or chemical health threat to our service members."

No evidence exists linking depleted uranium to radiation-induced illnesses like leukemia or cancers, Winkenwerder said to reporters during a Pentagon media roundtable.

Depleted uranium is a dense material produced from uranium processing that's used for armor and armor-piercing projectiles. High levels of the substance introduced into the human body, he noted, could cause kidney damage.

However, "there's no medical evidence that links low level of exposure to depleted uranium to any medical symptoms" among service members, Winkenwerder said. Only three of about 1,000 service members returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom duty tested as part of post-deployment health assessments have tested positive for elevated levels of uranium in their urine, Winkenwerder said.

Those service members, two from the Army and one from the Air Force, explained Dr. Michael Kilpatrick, deputy director, Deployment Health Support Directorate, were involved in combat operations in Iraq and have pieces of depleted uranium shrapnel in their bodies. Kilpatrick accompanied Winkenwerder at the roundtable meeting with reporters.

Such shrapnel can usually be removed surgically, Kilpatrick noted, unless doing so would damage surrounding muscle and other important tissue. The three service members continue to be monitored in a medical follow up program, he said.

Medical tests performed on Gulf War vets with depleted uranium shrapnel in their bodies, Kilpatrick noted, show "their kidneys are perfectly normal."

All people have some uranium in their bodies and bones that causes no ill health effects, Kilpatrick said. Urine testing first measures the amount of natural uranium in the system, he added.

"If it's in the normal range, we don't have a concern," he explained. "If the level is at all high, then we do a differentiation between natural and depleted uranium."

A reporter asked about a new report saying members of the 442nd Military Police Company, a New York National Guard unit, had become sick after exposure to depleted uranium in Iraq. Kilpatrick said testing has showed "those people all had normal levels of uranium in their urine."

People who inhale dust laced with depleted uranium, Kilpatrick noted, eventually eliminate the material from their bodies via urination.

"Service members should know that the potential health risks of depleted uranium are extremely, extremely low," Winkenwerder emphasized. "And, we have no evidence that there are health consequences after many years among people who had the highest levels of exposure after the Gulf War."

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/n0..._200405036.html

What is Depleted Uranium?

Uranium is a weakly radioactive element that occurs naturally in the environment. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) for the Department of Health and Human Services estimates there are an average of 4 tons of uranium in the top foot of soil in every square mile of land. A heavy metal similar to tungsten and lead, uranium occurs in soils in typical concentrations of a few parts per million (equivalent to about half a teaspoon of uranium in a typical 8-cubic yard dump truck-load of dirt).

Each of us ingests and inhales natural uranium every day from our air, water, food, and soil. The amount varies depending on the amount found where you live, and where the food you eat and the water you drink are produced. Consequently, each of us has some uranium in our body, and we eliminate some in our urine every day.

Depleted Uranium - This very dense metal (1.7 times as dense as lead) is a by-product of the process by which uranium is enriched to produce reactor fuel and nuclear weapons components. The leftover uranium, 40% less radioactive than natural uranium, is called "depleted uranium," or DU. The Department of Energy (DOE) recently reported that the DU it provided to DoD for manufacturing armor plates and munitions may contain trace levels (a few parts per billion ) of contaminants including neptunium, plutonium, americium, technitium-99 and uranium-236. From a radiological perspective, these contaminants in DU add less than one percent to the radioactivity of DU itself. Medical scientists consider this insignificant.

6.0 Putting the Results into Perspective The Capstone test series (Parkhurst et al. 2004, Attachments 1 and 2) was designed to support a human health risk assessment by characterizing depleted uranium (DU) aerosols resulting from perforating armored vehicles. The DU Aerosol Human Health Risk Assessment (HHRA) (Guilmette et al. 2004, Attachment 3) was designed to provide: • Veterans of the 1991 Gulf War and other personnel who were exposed to DU aerosols (from combat, personnel and equipment recovery, or cleanup actions) with an understanding of the general magnitude of exposure to and the health risks from DU aerosols. • Military planners, medical personnel, and field commanders with information to incorporate DU into risk assessment and risk mitigation decisions for all operational environments. • Estimates of risk that can be used to modify U.S. DoD policies, doctrine and training for exposure mitigation, exposure monitoring and documentation, and hazard awareness training. Depleted uranium and the DU oxide powder formed from impacting armor are not innocuous nor are they a “deadly poison.” The health risks of DU oxides are comparable to many other common materials found on the battlefield and inside vehicles struck by any munitions. Because DU is a heavy metal and weakly radioactive (although less radioactive than natural uranium), it has received considerable attention, much of which has focused on potential adverse health effects. As with most materials, it is the quantity taken into the body and the route of entry that determine whether it will cause an adverse health effect. Natural uranium is ubiquitous in earth’s soils and is found naturally in our food and water supplies. No adverse health effects have been traced to these natural levels of uranium. Uranium has been widely studied, and it is known that at sufficiently high doses, it can cause kidney damage. There is no definitive evidence that DU causes cancer. Epidemiological studies of humans exposed to natural uranium, which has a greater radioactivity than DU, indicate that cancer may result from exposure to radioactive decay products of uranium such as radium and radon, but not from exposure to the uranium itself or with its immediate progeny. Nevertheless, because DU is radioactive, the development of cancer is theoretically possible. The most relevant medical study to date of health effects from DU exposure is the study conducted by Department of Veteran’s Affairs. In the medical surveillance follow-up of personnel with embedded DU fragments (who would also have inhaled DU aerosols), thus far there is no clinical evidence of adverse effects from their uranium exposure (McDiarmid et al. 2004). 6.1 Level I Exposures The objective of the Capstone DU Aerosol Characterization and Risk Assessment Program was to characterize the DU internalized by the most highly exposed personnel—the Level I personnel. Level I personnel are composed of two subpopulations: those who were in, on, or near an armored vehicle when the vehicle was perforated by a large-caliber DU munition, and first responders who entered the struck vehicle to render aid. The aerosol characterization tests were designed to be as realistic as possible. Where compromises were required with field measurements, they tended to be conservative, creating conditions that would
6.1
overestimate DU aerosol concentrations. For example, for logistical reasons ballistic hulls and turrets without ventilation systems were used as target vehicles in three of the four test series. Because of the lack of ventilation and the fewer surfaces available for deposition, which removes aerosols from the breathing zone, DU aerosol concentrations were higher in the turrets in these test series than they would be in a fully functional operating vehicle. In the fourth test series, the environmental control/nuclear, biological, chemical (EC/NBC) ventilation systems in an Abrams tank operated and significantly reduced DU concentrations. Again for logistical reasons, a Halon fire-suppression system, which would also reduce aerosol concentrations, was neither present nor activated in any of the tests. For the HHRA, predictions of health effects to Level I personnel are based on the chemical and radiological data from the Capstone study and from the current understanding of chemical and radiological doses and risks. The analysis was intended to be as realistic as possible, but some conservative assumptions were used, especially relating to radiological risks so the values calculated may overestimate the doses and risks. 6.1.1 Crewmember Exposure Incidents A review of Operation Desert Storm (ODS) experience (Deployment Health Support Directorate 2004) shows that the Capstone experimental conditions approximated the upper bound of what actually occurred in ODS. During ODS six Abrams tanks were involved in friendly fire incidents, and in three of those six cases, a crew compartment was perforated. Most of the surviving crew exited quickly (within two minutes) or were outside at the time of the incident. The ventilation system was operating in at least one of the three cases, the Halon fire-suppression system activated in these three tanks, and hatches were opened to allow exit. This information suggests that up to 10 surviving Soldiers were exposed to DU aerosol conditions similar to, but less severe than those simulated during the Capstone Phase I field tests, in which a large-caliber DU munition perforated an Abrams tank through conventional armor. Similarly, fifteen Bradley Fighting Vehicles (Bradley vehicles) were perforated through crew compartments by large-caliber DU munitions. Bradley crewmembers were inside 14 of the 15 perforated vehicles. Fewer details are available about the exiting times and activation of ventilation in these incidents. Some of these vehicles were hit more than once, and the Halon fire-suppression system was activated in some of these incidents. 6.1.2 Predicted DU Concentrations and Doses for Crewmembers and First Responders The HHRA used four scenarios to model crew exposures and a fifth scenario for first responders. Scenarios A and B for personnel who exited within 1 min and 5 min, respectively, represent most likely times of exposure. Scenarios C and D apply to personnel who were exposed for up to 1 h and 2 h, respectively. These longer exposure times reflect upper bound estimates, which are listed in Chapter 3. Scenario E was developed for first responders and is based on an entrance time of 5 min after vehicle perforation and an exit up to 10 min later. The scenarios assumed that crewmembers would take no action to clear the air in the vehicle, such as activating the ventilation system or opening hatches for the duration of the stay-time. The peak kidney uranium concentrations, radiological doses, and radiological risk of developing lung cancer as a result of a single shot exposure for the most likely scenarios for Level I personnel are summarized in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. The risk estimates in these tables are limited to the risks
6.2
of lung cancer from DU aerosol inhalation. The results in Table 6.1 show that the majority (over 60%) of the intake is received during the first 5 min. Although higher intakes are associated with longer stays, the effect is not linear because of the relatively rapid settling of the aerosols inside the vehicle. The rate of aerosol clearance within the vehicle is significantly increased if ventilation systems are turned on or the hatches are opened. The Capstone data analysis was used to predict DU peak kidney uranium concentrations, committed effective doses, and committed equivalent doses, all of which vary by duration of exposure, vehicle configuration, and operation of ventilation systems. Each of the median results from Scenario A and E type exposures are within annual occupational exposure guidelines or limits. Some of the Scenario B results exceed the de facto occupational guideline of 3 µg U/g kidney (and the 5 min Abrams/non-DU armor exposure is at the upper boundary of the “not likely to become ill” category), but the concentrations are below levels of concern. The theoretical risk of lifetime cancer mortality from DU inhalation at these levels is predicted to range from 0.005 to 0.32% for crewmembers and 0.023 to 0.10% for first responders. To put these risks in perspective, the natural incidence of fatal cancers in a lifetime for males is approximately 24%. This means that for the largest dose in Table 6.1 or 6.2 (see column titled “Abrams Tank, DU Armor, No Ventilation”), the risk would increase from 24% to 24.3%. No illness from chemical toxicity is predicted, and no radiological effects are expected from any of these levels. Table 6.1. Predicted Median DU Concentrations, Doses, and Risks to Vehicle Crewmembers Crewmembers (Most Likely Scenarios) Abrams Tank: Conventional Armor, No Ventilation Abrams Tank: DU Armor, No VentilationAbrams Tank: DU Armor, EC/NBC Operating Bradley Vehicle: Conventional Armor, No Ventilation Effect 1 min 5 min 1 min 5 min1 min 5 min 1 min 5 min Peak Kidney U Conc. (µg U/g kidney) 3.0 6.4 1.1 2.6 0.05 0.23 1.0 2.9 Committed Effective Dose E(50) (rem) 2.0 3.7 2.2 6.0 0.09 0.44 0.59 1.7 Committed Equivalent Dose HLung(50) (rem) 14 32 18 44 0.66 3.3 5.2 14 Increase in Lifetime Cancer Risk 0.11% 0.20% 0.12%0.32%0.005% 0.025% 0.034% 0.098% The DU concentration and dose levels predicted by this risk assessment suggest that most of the exposures to personnel meeting the Level I criteria are not high enough to lead to adverse health effects. In many cases the levels are within peacetime occupational exposure standards. However, they are high enough to require biomonitoring to quantify dose. The Capstone study showed that activating the vehicle’s EC/NBC or other ventilation system can significantly reduce exposures to DU aerosols. By extension, this would also reduce exposures to the other materials generated when a tank is perforated by any munition. For cases in which the crew compartment is perforated twice, the kidney uranium concentrations and radiation doses can be roughly approximated by multiplying by two. The possibility of becoming ill (from transient or protracted kidney effects) increases, depending on the number of perforations and the vehicle configuration.
6.3
Table 6.2. Predicted Median DU Concentrations, Doses, and Risks to Vehicle First Responders First Responder (entry at 5 min, exit at 15 min post perforation) Effect Abrams Tank: Conventional Armor, No Ventilation Abrams Tank: DU Armor, No Ventilation Abrams Tank: DU Armor, EC/NBC Operating Bradley Vehicle: Conventional Armor, No Ventilation Peak Kidney U Conc. (µg U/g kidney) 1.5 0.67 0.14 1.4 Committed Effective Dose, E(50) (rem) 0.92 1.9 0.41 0.89 Committed Equivalent Dose, HLung(50) (rem) 8.8 14 3.1 6.7 Increase in Lifetime Cancer Risk 0.050% 0.10% 0.024% 0.052% Care should be exercised in applying additional “safety factors” in conjunction with this assessment because of the conservative assumptions already built into the assessment. Similarly, these estimates should not be used to quantify or assign doses to individuals. Instead, biomonitoring, primarily by urine bioassay, should be used to assign individual dose. The delay between exposure and biomonitoring should be minimized to ensure that significant intakes of DU can be detected. 6.2 Level II and Level III Exposures Level I exposures, by definition, occur in combat where the operational risks are extreme. In contrast, Level II and Level III exposures occur throughout the spectrum of military operations and encompass a range of operational risks that vary from the extreme risks commensurate with Level I exposures to the minimal risks associated with garrison-type operations. The level of acceptable risk from DU and the precautions taken should make sense when compared with operational risks. This report uses the analysis conducted by USACHPPM (2000) and some of the data generated during the Capstone to project to provide estimates of the Level II and Level III exposures. The most important factor for dose to personnel who meet the criterion for either Level II or Level III exposure is the time spent inside uncleaned vehicles with DU residue. When operational risks allow, precautions should be taken to minimize exposure, such as wearing protective outer garments, using respiratory protection, good hygiene (to avoid ingestion), and cleaning the vehicle. Personnel exposed at Level II have the potential for exceeding the dose levels that may require biomonitoring and training specific to their occupations. Level III personnel (as defined in this report) do not. Special attention should be given to the training and the precautions recommended for explosive ordnance personnel because of the extreme risks they sometimes face when clearing a damaged vehicle. 6.3 Summary This analysis has categorized exposures to DU aerosols similar to (but typically more severe than) circumstances encountered during ODS and has quantified the chemical concentrations and radiological doses for personnel in these categories. No attempt was made to quantify the exposures and associated doses that specifically apply to any individual. More appropriate methods exist for retrospective dose assessment including the use of personal monitoring methods. Urine biomonitoring is the most easily performed, although time limits apply, particularly for quantifying small intakes.
6.4
The doses and risks to human health from inhaling DU aerosols in a perforated vehicle are relatively low when compared with many other combat risks. In addition to the possibility of combat injuries, hazardous materials including different heavy metals, chemicals, and other agents may be released onto the battlefield and into the environment. The most important factors for reducing exposure are 1) the use of onboard vehicle ventilation or 2) exiting quickly if circumstances allow. Even though the risks from inhaled DU based on the Capstone data are low, ventilation systems operating during or turned on as soon as possible after a DU perforation can further significantly reduce the risks to the crewmembers. As seen in Table 6.1, the reduction in risk can be greater than one order of magnitude when the EC/NBC ventilation system is activated. The Bottom Line After more than a decade of medical surveillance of veterans from ODS who have or had DU embedded fragments, no adverse chemical or radiological health effects related to the presence of DU have been identified. In addition to their uptake of DU through fragment wounds, these veterans would also have inhaled DU oxides and may have ingested incidental quantities of DU oxides at the time they were wounded. The levels of DU intake predicted by the HHRA are not likely to cause adverse health effects. However, DU metal fragments and oxide powder need to be respected to avoid or minimize inhalation of resuspended aerosols and ingestion of deposited material. At sufficiently high levels, DU intake can cause adverse health effects, especially to the kidney. Except for extreme exposure conditions in which treatment may be indicated, any kidney effects would be expected to be temporary. Although chemical and radiation risks are predicted to be low, training needs to be provided to those with a potential to be exposed to help reduce risks and keep them in perspective. Counseling of affected personnel and their family members is suggested because of the perceived radiological and chemical toxicity risks associated with exposure to DU. Because of differences in individual exposure for a given crew in a perforated vehicle, DU biomonitoring is needed to estimate doses to individuals. The results of the HHRA suggest using the following general guidance for personnel inside an armored vehicle perforated by a suspected DU munition or inside a tank perforated through DU armor: • If a penetrator perforates the vehicle while the EC/NBC ventilation system is off, the most effective action is to turn the system or systems on. • If conditions outside the vehicle are safe, exit the vehicle as soon as possible and avoid immediate reentry. • If it is unsafe to exit the vehicle (i.e., a threat exists of being fired upon during a firefight), remain in the vehicle.
6.5
6.6
6.4 References Deployment Health Support Directorate (formerly OSAGWI), US Department of Defense. 2004. Letter from COL D. Sulka, Director, Force Health Protection, to LTC MA Melanson, US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, April 22, 2004. McDiarmid MA, S Engelhardt, M Oliver, P Gucer, PD Wilson, R Kane, M Kabat, B Kaup, L Anderson, D Hoover, L Brown, B Handwerger, R Albertini, D Jacobson-Kram, C Thorne, and K Squibb. 2004. “Health Effects of Depleted Uranium on Exposed Gulf War Veterans: A 10-Year Follow-Up.” J. Toxicol. and Environ. Health, 67:277-296. US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM). 2000. Depleted Uranium—Human Exposure Assessment and Health Risk Characterization in Support of the Environmental Exposure Report “Depleted Uranium in the Gulf” of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness and Military Deployments (OSAGWI), OSAGWI Levels I, II and III Scenarios, 15 September 2000. Health Risk Assessment Consultation No. 26-MF-7555-00D, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Online report available at URL: www.gulflink.osd.mil in the Environmental Exposure Reports Section.

http://www.deploymentlink.osd.mil/du_libra...VR%20Ch%206.pdf

Marine,

DoD lies every time they open their mouth, so what's with all this DoD BS? Damn, you should be able to remember what they said about Agent Orange, and I have too many loadmaster friends who flew Herkybirds over the jungles spraying that crap to know what DoD said was pure bushit.

There are too many other INDEPENDENT studies that show DU has some real problems. If you're gonna post all this DoD crap, then I guess I'll have to match you tit-for-tat with other links.

WS

7.0 Conclusions The Capstone DU Aerosol Study was designed to develop a source of aerosol information specific to DU aerosols created by the perforation of armored combat vehicles by DU munitions. This study focused on the collection and analyses of aerosols and particles inside and, to a lesser extent, outside selected vehicles struck by large-caliber (LC), kinetic-energy DU penetrators. The firing tests used to generate aerosol replicated, as closely as circumstances permitted, retrospective scenarios from firing incidences in the Gulf War/ODS and probable prospective scenarios that could occur in future actions. An extensive database of aerosol concentrations, particle size distributions, and surface contamination has been generated over the course of the Capstone tests. These data were analyzed, and their results were grouped by scenario for use as input to exposure assessments. Scientists and engineers will use this information to assess human health risk associated with probable or projected exposure levels to U.S. DoD personnel potentially exposed to DU particulate matter during combat or recovery activities. The information resulting from the study will be used to determine if health risks to personnel are high enough to warrant changes in the medical policy, medical treatment and monitoring practices, and in personnel protective measures for DoD personnel potentially exposed to DU 1) in, on, or near an armored vehicle, at the time the crew compartment is perforated by DU munitions; 2) by entering (without protective clothing) a perforated armored vehicle immediately after the perforation; or 3) by entering (without protective clothing) an armored vehicle well after the vehicle is perforated by DU munitions. 7.1 Field Testing, Equipment, and Observations The field portion of the study was conducted in four phases at the Army’s Superbox facility at the Aberdeen Test Center (ATC). Vehicle configurations and shot lines were varied in the four phases, which included: • Phase I (PI) in which seven shots were fired at an Abrams tank ballistic hull and turret (BHT) equipped with conventional, non-DU armor. No ventilation systems were present in the BHTs. • Phase II (PII) in which three shots were fired at a Bradley vehicle BHT. No ventilation systems were present in the BHTs. • Phase III (PIII) in which two shots were fired directly into the DU-armor package of an Abrams BHT. No ventilation systems were present in the BHTs. • Phase IV in which four shots were fired at an operational M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tank. The Phase-IV samples were collected as part another study known as the Abrams Live-Fire tests. The scope of the Live-Fire tests was different from that of the Capstone study, and space restrictions allowed only a minimum of aerosol sampling. A second and very important difference with the Phase-IV series was that the target tank’s environmental control/nuclear, biological, chemical (EC/NBC) ventilation system was operating during and after the shots. Generalizations of results from the field portion of the four test phases include the following:
7.1
During the Phase-I through -III field tests, LC-DU munitions were successfully fired at an Abrams BHT (through conventional and DU armor) and at a Bradley BHT, and DU aerosols were generated. These BHTs were not equipped with ventilation systems. Test conditions were imposed to simulate Gulf War/ODS incidents in which armored vehicles were perforated. Shots also were fired to simulate possible future incidents in which higher aerosol concentrations in crew compartments would be expected. • During the Phase-IV Live-Fire tests, a LC-DU cartridge was successfully fired at a fully operational Abrams tank, in which its ventilation system was operating. The LC-DU cartridge was loaded to perforate the vehicle’s DU armor. This test simulates a possible future incident in which aerosols may be generated from the DU munition and from the DU armor. • Instrumentation selected to collect aerosols inside the target vehicles was essentially off-the-shelf equipment chosen for its sensitivity, ruggedness, and availability. Sampling arrays that paired filter cassettes with cascade impactors (CIs) for eight separate sampling times were an effective means of containing and operating the samplers. Quick-disconnect stems facilitated sampler insertion and removal. The cyclone collected aerosols over a longer time period in sufficient quantities for physical and chemical characterization and for qualitative size partitioning. In general, the samplers performed well under the adverse conditions in the tests. • The sampling strategy, particularly regarding sampling duration, evolved over the course of the shots. Sampling durations and the starting and stopping times were evaluated after each shot and were changed as appropriate to collect sufficient samples without overloading the filters. Initially, one set of samplers was operating during the entire 2-h, post shot sampling period. For later shots, the sampler starting times relative to the shot time were similar, but the samplers ran for shorter durations. • The moving filter (MVF) successfully collected aerosols immediately after impact on several of the shots before the other samplers could be operated. Use of the MVF provided a way of estimating the initial aerosol concentration immediately after impact and provided sufficient sample material for physical and chemical characterization for the shots during which it operated successfully. Various difficulties were encountered with using the MVF, including inadequate shielding of the sampler intake, that precluded obtaining samples for all shots. • Sampler shielding evolved during the course of the program and generally was successful in protecting samplers from the violence and after-effects of each shot. A change in IOM filter cassette medium from Supor to Zefluor in the filter cassettes improved filter survivability. • The use of the LabVIEW software package to program sampling times and monitor the air sampler pressure drops provided real-time indications of sampler operation and second-to-second flow rates (after establishing the correlation between pressure drop and flow rate). • The Army’s Superbox facility allowed target vehicles to be configured for aerosol sampling and sample recovery, so the facility was well suited for this type of test. • Visual observation of the interior of the turret via high-speed videotape consistently showed that, immediately after perforation, the interior was illuminated by “fireflies” as the uranium particulate
7.2
matter created by erosion of the DU penetrator underwent spontaneous oxidation (burning). This phenomenon lasted about 1 sec. The atmosphere inside the vehicle was visually very dusty and cleared gradually. • Recorded instantaneous pressure peaks inside the turret reached a maximum of 22 psig and lasted for milliseconds. This pressure pulse caused one or more secured vehicle hatches to open during all but one test shot. Open hatches and other smaller vehicle openings allowed aerosols to vent, thereby dispersing the turret aerosol to the atmosphere outside the vehicle. • Ventilation measurements of the BHTs and operational vehicles under several conditions will enable risk assessors to scale the results to exposures scenarios. 7.2 Analysis of Samples Uranium sample masses were derived from radioactivity measurements of the collected samples. Many samples underwent further chemical and physical characterization. Generalizations about sample analyses are provided below. • All samples conducive to proportional counting were analyzed for alpha and beta activity by this technique. These samples included IOM filters, media and bottom filters from the CI samplers, MVF tape, diffusion battery filters, and wipe test samples. Samples that were too large or unwieldy for proportional counting were evaluated using gamma spectrometry. Sample types analyzed by gamma spectrometry included the cyclone residues, external Andersen CIs, gloves, and deposition tray debris. The radioanalytical data were used to determine the uranium content of the samples. • Beta activity and gamma spectrometry measurements detect radiations from immediate short-lived progeny of uranium. An underlying assumption in these analyses is that uranium is in equilibrium with its immediate short-lived progeny. This assumption was tested and found to be incorrect for most sample types and particle sizes. Therefore, to ensure that the uranium in these aerosols was not underestimated, an analysis was undertaken to identify appropriate adjustment factors to relate the radioactivity measurements to the uranium mass. Samples that were analyzed by both radiological and chemical analytical techniques were used in the analysis to determine appropriate adjustment factors. The adjustment factors were then applied to the data sets. • The particle size distributions from CI samples of interior and exterior aerosols were evaluated using SigmaPlot software and unimodal and bimodal activity median aerodynamic diameter (AMAD) models to characterize the distributions and variability. • The residues from one cyclone for each scenario were characterized using physical and chemical methods. These analyses quantified its uranium content, its oxide composition, and in vitro solubility; examined the aerosol particle morphology; and provided a semi-quantitative evaluation of the non-DU metal composition.
7.3
Data for the parameters most critical to human health risk assessment were collected and analyzed as a part of this study. Additional data that may be useful to risk assessors were collected and reported. 7.3 Test Results Aerosol concentrations, deposition, and particle size distributions for Phases I through IV were characterized and compared. Aerosol residues were analyzed for metals composition, oxidation phase, in vitro dissolution, and particle morphology. 7.3.1 DU Aerosol Concentrations Aerosol concentrations inside the vehicles as a function of time were analyzed using samples collected immediately after perforation and at time intervals varying up to 2 h post shot. DU concentrations varied with shot and with crew position within the vehicle. Deposition occurred as particles settled on vehicle surfaces and some dispersed through open hatches or other structures. These mechanisms served to reduce the vehicle’s internal aerosol concentration as demonstrated by the graphs of concentration versus time (presented in Section 5.1). A summary of the mean DU concentrations (time-standardized) as measured by the IOM filter cassettes (in grams per cubic meter [g/m3]) by scenario are listed to two significant figures in Table 7.1. The IOM filter cassettes measured aerosol concentrations beginning 5 sec post shot and sampled periodically, typically in eight sequential time intervals. Table 7.1. Mean DU Aerosol Concentrations Over Time Mean DU Concentration (g/m3) Shot Description 10 sec 30 sec 1 min 30 min 1 h 2 h Retrospective Abrams—crossing hull (through turret) (PI-7; no ventilation) 11 9.0 6.0 0.11 0.057 0.047 Bradley—turret and passenger comp’t (PII-1, 2, and 3; no ventilation) 3.0 2.7 2.2 0.13 0.049 0.024 Prospective Abrams—crossing turret (PI-1, 2, 3, and 4; no ventilation) 8.8 7.9 5.7 0.15 0.064 --(a)Abrams—crossing turret into breech (PI-5 and 6; no ventilation) 16 12 6.4 0.020(0.029 0.019 Abrams—into DU armor (PIII-1 and 2; no ventilation) 10 7.9 4.2 0.049 0.017 0.013 Abrams—into DU armor (PIV-4; with ventilation) 0.092 0.14 0.22 0.011 --(a)--(a)(a) Averages not extrapolated past last sample. ( Samplers for both shots showed similar pattern in large reduction from 1 min; most 30 min DU concentrations were lower than at 1 h. Some generalizations about the mean DU aerosol concentrations include the following: • The highest DU aerosol concentrations occurred in the BHTs during the first sampling interval, which ranged from 10 to 30 sec. The highest mean concentrations representative of the retrospective scenarios were 11 g/m3 for the Abrams BHT hull shot and 3.0 g/m3 for the Bradley BHT shot. The Abrams level dropped by a factor of nearly 2 within 1 min, and the Bradley level dropped by a factor
7.4
of about 1.4 in 1 min. Within 30 min, these aerosol concentrations were reduced to 0.11 and 0.13 g/m3, respectively. These relatively rapid initial drops in concentration reflect the high settling velocities corresponding to the large initial particles sizes present in the interior atmospheres of the Bradley and Abrams vehicles. • Of the prospective scenarios, all of which involved Abrams BHTs, the highest mean DU aerosol concentration during the first sampling interval was 16 g/m3, resulting from perforation of the Abrams through non-DU armor and through the breech. Within 1 min, the aerosol concentration had dropped by a factor of 2.5, and at 30 min, this aerosol concentration was reduced to <0.1 g/m3. The other unventilated Abrams BHTs followed a similar pattern. • The ventilated Abrams tank showed a different pattern in which there was an increase from 0.092 to 0.22 g/m3 in concentration between the 10 sec sample and the 1 min sample, which then fell to about 0.011 g/m3 within 30 min. The cause of this difference in behavior is probably due to a slower dispersion of aerosol into the driver’s position where the surviving samplers were located. • Sampling in conjunction with sample recovery activities was conducted after shots PI-6 (Abrams/breech) and PI-7 (Abrams/hull). The baseline DU aerosol concentration measured in the PI-6 at 2.5 h post shot before recovery activities began was 0.0030 g/m3. The maximum concentration measured during recovery activities was 0.029 g/m3. The baseline from PI-7 was 1.2E+03 g/m3. Data from the two samples taken during recovery activities were lower than the baseline concentration for reasons that were not determined. The MVF sampler measured aerosol during the first five seconds post shot and covered the time gap before the other samplers began operating. The sampler ran during PI-1, PI-3, PII-3, PIII-1, and PIII-2. A summary of the peak DU concentrations collected on the MVF within the first 10 sec is listed in Table 7.2. The similarity in the measured DU masses between the MVF and the filter cassette results suggests that the results in Table 7.1 for the first sampling interval are reasonable. Table 7.2. MVF Peak DU Concentrations Shot Description MVP Peak U Concentration (g/m3) • Bradley—turret shot (PII-3) 1.1 at 7 sec • Abrams—crossing turret (PI-1) 2.3 (total over 1st 5 sec) • Abrams—crossing turret (PI-3) 6.0 at 13 sec • Abrams—into DU armor (PIII-1) 8.2 at 7 sec • Abrams—into DU armor (PIII-2) 9.1 at 1.4 sec The highest uranium concentration measured by the MVF in the perforated Bradley BHT was 1.1 g/m3 (1.1E+06 µg/ m3), which occurred 7 sec post shot. The highest concentrations in a perforated Abrams BHT ranged from 2.3 to 6.0 g/m3 in a vehicle without DU armor and 8.2 to 9.1 g/m3 in a vehicle with DU armor. In each case for which MVF data were collected, the peak occurred within the first 13 sec post shot. Of the samples collected, the Bradley (PII-3) BHT shot had the lowest peak DU aerosol concentration, and the shots that perforated the Abrams with DU armor had the highest peak DU aerosol
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concentration. The highest concentration measured in a Bradley BHT was a factor of eight lower than the highest concentration measured in an Abrams BHT with DU armor. 7.3.2 Particle Size Distributions Interior and external particle size distributions were evaluated from aerosols collected using CIs. Aerosols inside the vehicle and their change over time beginning 5 sec post shot were collected using Marple CIs, and the resulting data were evaluated using unimodal and bimodal AMAD models. Particle size distributions varied with shot and with crew position within the vehicle. Andersen CI data were used to model aerosols collected outside the vehicle. Some generalizations about particle size distributions are provided below. • As the larger particles deposited mostly by settling on vehicle surfaces, the AMAD values decreased with time. This is the expected behavior of aerosols for which a significant mass fraction is present initially as particles >10 µm AD. Some data were somewhat inconsistent, making generalizations difficult. More intensive data analysis is needed, although the results may simply reflect the complex physics and chemistry of the aerosols created. It is recommended that this analysis be performed during the updated human health risk assessment project. The data are summarized in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. • Unimodal AMAD values were seldom adequate to describe the particle size distributions. Most often, the bimodal AMAD model appeared to better fit the data. However, there were other cases for which neither model provided adequate fits, mainly because most of the sample mass was measured within the largest size fraction, and very little mass was in the smaller particle fractions. In other cases, the particle size distribution was uniform (i.e., without mode). • Exterior aerosols were collected beginning with PI-5 (Abrams/breech shot), and these samples were also evaluated using unimodal and bimodal AMAD models (Table 5.6). The unimodal AMAD values ranged from 1 to 9 µm. The bimodal first peak AMAD values ranged from 0.16 to 1.97 µm, and the second peak values ranged from 2.9 to 30 µm. Time-related changes in concentration and particle size could not be conducted because of equipment limitations. However, because the measured concentrations were substantially less than those measured within the armored vehicles, the data obtained should be amenable to conventional atmospheric dispersion modeling, so that exposures to DoD personnel outside the vehicles can be estimated. • Particle size distributions were calculated from three PIV-4 CIs, and good fits from both the unimodal and bimodal models were obtained for the sample collected 1 min post shot. The unimodal AMAD was 0.62 µm, and the bimodal AMAD peaks occurred at 0.53 µm and 0.76 µm, suggesting that the aerosol particle size at the point was relatively small. The bimodal distribution for the 5-min time interval was a good fit, and the bimodal AMADs were 0.50 µm and 1.84 µm, respectively. Neither model fit the 25-min size distribution. 7.3.3 Surface-Deposited Material Wipe surveys and deposition trays were used to evaluate removable contamination and deposited material, and cotton gloves worn over protective clothing by sampler recovery personnel were used to
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develop a database that could be used in the evaluation of the levels of DU potentially available for hand-to-mouth transfer. The uranium collected on these media were quantified and summarized by phase and similar shot lines. Some generalizations about the data are the following: • Wipes from the interior surfaces averaged by shot or similar shots ranged from a low of 0.53 mg/100 cm2 for the Bradley BHT turret shot to a high of 8.6 mg/100 cm2 for the Abrams BHT (with no ventilation) perforated through DU armor. • Wipes from the exterior surfaces averaged by shot or similar shots ranged from a low of 0.35 mg/100 cm2 in the Abrams tank (with ventilation) perforated through DU armor to 3.8 mg/100 cm2. • Deposition trays placed in the Bradley BHT collected between 4.3 and 45 mg/tray for the single and double shots. Trays placed in the Abrams BHT ranged from 3.8 to 3460 mg/tray and showed little uniformity. • The uranium mass collected on the gloves (analyzed for the Abrams BHT/tank shots only) ranged from 3 to 198 mg and are believed to relate not only to the aerosol deposited on vehicle surfaces, but also to the activities performed and the length of time and movement involved in those activities. 7.3.4 Aerosol Composition and Characteristics Cyclone residues were analyzed for their uranium content, content of other metals, uranium oxide phases, particle morphology and structure, and in vitro dissolution. Generalizations about these characteristics follow: • The percentages of uranium mass in the total mass of collected aerosol present in the cyclone samples (based on the combined results of three separate chemical analyses) varied as follows: �� 38 to 54% in the PI-7 shot (Abrams BHT/hull, conventional armor) �� 43 to 72% in the PI-3/4 shot (Abrams BHT/turret shots, conventional armor) �� 60 to 72% in the PIII-2 shot (Abrams BHT/turret shot, DU armor) �� 18 to 29% in the PII-1/2 shot (Bradley BHT/passenger compartment shots). • The percentages of uranium mass in the total cyclone mass varied by stage, but this variation was not consistent. It is not clear whether the reductions in uranium percentages are due to decreasing relative amounts of DU or increasing amounts of the other metals. The percentages present may be related to the mechanisms of aerosol formation. General results were the following (based on the combined chemical results): �� With the Abrams BHT/non-DU armor shots (PI-3/4), the uranium mass generally decreased with stage from a high of 72% on Stage 1 to a low of 48% on Stage 5. The uranium mass in the backup filter was about 44%. �� With the Abrams BHT/hull shot (PI-7), the uranium mass ranged from a maximum of 54% on Stage 1 to a minimum of 40% on Stage 5. The backup-filter mass was about 39%.
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�� With the Bradley BHT/double shot (PII-1/2), the uranium mass was the lowest on Stage 1 (18%) and remained relatively constant for Stage 2 through 5 (from 22 to 29%) and the backup filter. �� With the Abrams BHT/DU armor shot, in which insufficient material was collected on Stages 2 and 3 for analysis, the uranium masses on the stages and backup filter ranged from 60 to 72%. • The other metals present in the aerosol consisted primarily of aluminum and iron. Aluminum varied the most by phase and was highest in Phase-II samples and lowest in Phase-III samples. Other major constituents included iron, titanium (alloyed to DU in the penetrator), zinc, and copper. • Several oxidation phases were found in the uranium aerosol residues. The predominant phase consisted of U3O8/UO3, believed to be primarily hyperstoichometric forms of U3O8. Its presence increased as particle size decreased while the percentage of U4O9, which was highest with the large particles, decreased as particle size decreased. A small amount of schoepite was detected in several cyclone stages and in backup filter samples. • The particles obtained from the cyclone residues have a complex, heterogeneous structure. The uranium particles displayed many different shapes from spherical to granular and fractured structures. • The in vitro dissolution rates of the cyclone residues tended to increase with decreasing particle size, but there was variability in the results, believed to be caused by the particle heterogeneity. The samples had dissolution rates that most closely resembled Type-M absorption behavior with the exception of one backup filter, which resembled Type-S behavior. More than half of each sample (about 58 to 99%) fit the Class-Y clearance category of ICRP 30. In most cases, the remaining percentage fit the Class-D category, but Class-W behavior was present in the range of 9 to 17% for three Phase-II samples, 5 to 7% in two Phase-III samples, and 21% in one Phase-I sample. In any case, the evidence indicates that variable fractions (up to 40%) of the inhalable DU particles were relatively soluble. Studying the mechanisms of DU particle formation was not part of the Capstone project scope. However, electron micrographs may provide useful information about how they were formed, which may assist health risk assessors in modeling the deposition, dissolution, and clearance of DU-containing aerosols. 7.4 Capstone Study Evaluation The Capstone DU Aerosol Study was designed to generate data to fill knowledge gaps about aerosols created by impact and perforation of armored vehicles. Data sets useful for both retrospective and prospective scenarios were intended. A list of test evaluation priorities (Table 2.1) identified 11 types of data collection efforts and analyses that were the bases of this project. Review of the actual information collected reveals the extent to which the priorities were addressed.
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• Interior DU source term: The numerous IOM filter cassette samplers collected mass that was used to derive uranium concentrations within the target vehicles at sequential time intervals. Sample collection was conducted at a minimum of two points (and up to five counting the MVF sampler) for each time increment sampled over the first 2 h post shot. These data were graphed and are available for use in dose and risk assessments to address retrospective and prospective situations. This data-base is extensive and satisfies this priority. The primary limitations in the data are that the BHT target vehicles have greater interior volume than fully loaded operating vehicles (a potentially diluting effect counteracted to some extent by the loss of aerosol through greater deposition) and there was no ventilation system present and operating that would filter the air and more quickly remove aerosols. Therefore, the measured concentration levels are probably much higher than would actually occur with most operating vehicles. This expectation is supported by the limited results from the PIV-4 shot at an operating vehicle. • Interior DU concentration by particle size distribution over time: Particle size distributions were measured using the equally numerous 8-stage CIs that operated during the same sequential time intervals over the first 2 h post shot. AMADs were calculated using unimodal and bimodal fits of the data. The resulting database is extensive although the fits were not always satisfactory. The primary limitation is that the selection of AMADs in risk assessments will require careful decisions to avoid biasing the quantity available for inhalation. • Lung fluid solubility and dissolution rates by particle size: The following samples were analyzed for dissolution in vitro: three sets of 5-stage cyclone samples (PI-3/4, PI-7, and PII-1/2) and their backup filters (and a partial set [PIII-2]), one set of IOM filters, a PFDB filter, and the DU cone sample. This variety of samples helps bracket the range of dissolution rates in these heterogeneous DU aerosols over a series of particle sizes. The in vitro samples were analyzed for uranium only. It would be desirable to also evaluate the dissolution rates of the other metals present in the aerosols. • Chemical forms by particle size over time: The same cyclone samples identified above were analyzed for uranium oxide compositions along with the first segment from a MVF tape. These results help establish the trends of oxides present and their approximate ratios in DU aerosols of various particle sizes created in this manner. However, the cyclone samples were collected during a 2-h period and represent an integration of this time period rather than discrete time periods. As a result, the importance of and change in oxide composition over this short timeframe was not evaluated. • Particle shape and morphology by particle size over time: Samples evaluated by SEM included the same samples as those used for the chemical form analysis above, with the addition of several PFDB filters, the DU cone sample, three MVF segments, and several CI Stage-3 substrates. The SEM micrographs of the aerosol particles show a large variation in particle structures and combi-nations, probably related to several different mechanisms of formation. Again, this data set analyzes the aerosol collected over the 2-h sampling period, but it does not address any differences in shape and morphology over time except for samples collected within the first 5 sec. • Effect of Ventilation Systems (HVAC and EC/NBC) on interior DU concentration by particle size over time: Use of the BHT vehicles and the intent to maximize DU aerosols precluded the use of operating ventilation systems following vehicle perforation. To compensate for this, air exchange
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rates in similar vehicles were evaluated with their systems off and on so that factors could be used to estimate aerosol concentrations under a variety of ventilation conditions. Though such rates were measured, they were quite variable and their usefulness in scaling from the BHT air exchange to operating vehicles will have to be further analyzed. • Total elemental concentration and composition by particle size: The primary non-DU metal constituents were evaluated for the cyclone and backup filter samples and for the DU cone sample. Trace metals in these samples were also identified. The cyclones/backup filters provided size separation so that the results represent composition by particle size. • Resuspension rates from interior and exterior surfaces: Resuspension rates from interior surfaces were studied during recovery activities. A limited number of samples were collected to assess interior resuspension rates, but the data provide some trends for aerosols that were deposited on a vehicles interior surface. Sample collection to determine vehicle exterior resuspension rates was not feasible given the various constraints of the tests. However, many wipe test samples were collected from the vehicles exterior surface, and the data obtained from analysis of these samples may be used as input to exterior resuspension modeling. Likewise, data obtained from analysis of the wipe test samples taken from the vehicle interiors may be used as input to interior resuspension modeling. • Transferable DU from interior and exterior surface contamination to hands: Entering personnel wore cotton gloves over their protective gloves during the sample recovery activities from several shots, and these cotton gloves were analyzed for DU content. These results have been associated with the activities and length of time during which these activities were performed. This information provides a useful starting point for estimating the transfer of surface contamination to hands when evaluating the hand-to-mouth pathway as part of human health risk assessments. • Exterior source term including particle size distribution: Samples were collected to determine exterior particle size distributions exterior to the vehicle from seven of the shots. Uranium concen-trations have also been calculated for these samples. Deposition trays and wipe test samples were collected to assess external surface contamination. Use of data from any of these samples for vehicle exterior estimates will provide an estimate greater than similar measurements performed in an open environment, because sampling was done within the confines of the Superbox, which precluded dispersion due to environmental conditions. This data must be used with care because estimates from them will be greater than an upper bound on similar data in an open environment and how much greater than an upper bound cannot be quantified. • Isotopic uranium concentration by particle size: The uranium-235 to uranium-238 atom ratios were evaluated by particle size by analyzing samples from Stages 1, 3, and 5 of three cyclones and Stages 1, 4, and 5 of a fourth cyclone. The atom ratios for uranium-235 to uranium-238 were consistent, ranging from 0.205 to 0.212, and no obvious pattern was identified. These results are consistent with previous analyses of DU used by the U.S. military.
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7.5 Lessons Learned and Recommendations During the course of firing DU munitions at the target vehicles and analyzing the aerosols collected, several lessons were learned, and implementing some of the lesson-based recommendations would improve future testing. These lessons (with and without recommendations) are described below. • The system monitoring the aerosol arrays was an essential part of the sample collection design that provided remote control and second-by-second data on the pressure drops for each sampler. This system was extremely useful and is recommended for future testing. • The sampler arrays require protection from the fragments produced during perforation. The types of sample filters also have a bearing on filter survival during the initial temperature/pressure pulse for samplers not fully covered with an armored shield. Survival of Zefluor was greater than Supor filters. Likewise, MCE substrates in the CIs were satisfactory for analysis of radioactivity but were not satisfactory for gravimetric analysis. • The DU in the aerosols was not in secular equilibrium with its immediate short-lived progeny when analyzed, and the extent of disequilibrium varied. If sample analysis depends on detection of immediate short-lived progeny of DU, then samples should be held an appropriate amount of time prior to analysis. If holding samples prior to analysis is not feasible, then methodology must be applied to determine the amount of disequilibrium and apply appropriate correction factors. • The DU aerosols showed significant heterogeneity in morphology and chemical composition, suggesting several mechanisms of formation. This heterogeneity led to greater than expected variation in solubility. • Particle size distribution data were successfully developed, but the use of these data is problematic. The particle size distributions vary widely, and no single model described all data well. Although the bimodal AMADs fit the majority of samples best, some samples were better characterized with a unimodal model, and other samples clearly were not well characterized by either. A possible approach to applying this data set is to develop a mechanism that uses the full set rather than one or two parameters. • Because models for internal exposure from inhalation depend strongly on applying appropriate dissolution factors, the use of these data would benefit from more study of the particle variation between samples and the extent that other metals present in the aerosols contribute to the dissolution rates. The Capstone DU Aerosol Study resulted in this independent, peer-reviewed report that contains a robust and scientifically valid data set describing many parameters of the DU aerosols formed when an LC, kinetic-energy, DU penetrator perforates an armored vehicle BHT and, to a lesser extent, a functional Abrams tank. This data set is applicable for assessing the human health risks associated with various DU exposure scenarios for DoD personnel and may be used to update the human health risk assessments associated with plausible DU exposure scenarios for DoD personnel involved in such incidents.
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http://www.deploymentlink.osd.mil/du_libra...01%20Ch%207.pdf

UN agency releases new guidelines on depleted uranium's effects on health

26 April – The World Health Organization (WHO) today published a desk reference on depleted uranium (DU) containing guidelines on how to deal appropriately with the substance's impact on human health.

The monograph, Depleted Uranium: Sources, Exposure and Health Effects, provides a number of recommendations regarding DU -- a byproduct of nuclear power which has been used for heavy tank armour, anti-tank munitions, missiles and projectiles. The substance has 60 per cent of the radioactivity of natural uranium and "significant chemical toxicity," according to the agency.

"DU has the potential to have chemical and radiological effects on health, but we found in the review that exposure to DU would have to be significant before any health effects are observed," said Dr. Mike Repacholi, WHO's Coordinator for Occupational and Environmental Health.

Among other recommendations, WHO suggests that measures be taken to prevent against DU exposure of young children, who may face particular risk. Heavily affected DU munitions zones should be cordoned off and then cleaned up and treated as if any other heavy metal waste had contaminated the soil.

The disposal of DU fragments should follow appropriate national or international recommendations for discarding radioactive materials. Concerned individuals who believe they have been exposed to the substance should see their medical practitioner, the agency says, noting, however, that it is not necessary to conduct general population screenings in areas where DU munitions have been used.

The greatest potential for DU exposure occurs after conflicts when people living or working in affected areas could inhale dust or consume contaminated food and drinking water, WHO observes. The agency warns that after DU munitions are used, "in some instances the levels of contamination in food and ground water could rise after some years and should be monitored and appropriate measures taken where there is a reasonable possibility of significant quantities of depleted uranium entering the food chain."

The monograph states that the substance potentially has "chemical and radiological toxicity with the two important target organs being the kidneys and the lungs." Noting that DU munitions have been used only relatively recently and the science has not yet thoroughly addressed the effects, the monograph recommends further research, including studies to clarify the extent of kidney damage and its possible reversibility.

UNEP confirms low-level DU contamination - 22 March 2002

Geneva/Nairobi, 27 March 2002 - The UNEP study concludes that the DU sites studied do not present immediate radioactive or toxic risks for the environment or human health-significant. These findings are consistent with those of UNEP's 2001 DU study in Kosovo. Together, the two studies cover the entire geographical area affected by DU munitions during the Kosovo conflict.

However, UNEP recommends that the authorities take precautionary measures. The most important concern is the potential for future groundwater contamination by corroding penetrators (ammunition tips made out of DU). The penetrators recovered by the UNEP team had decreased in mass by 10-15% due to corrosion. This rapid corrosion speed underlines the importance of monitoring the water quality at the DU sites on an annual basis.


A new finding of particular interest was the detection through modern air sampling techniques of airborne DU particles at two of the sites. While the detected levels were still below international safety limits, these results have implications for site decontamination and construction work, activities that could potentially stir up DU dust from the ground surface. In addition, the results indicate that DU dust was widely dispersed into the environment following the explosion of DU rounds.


The study was conducted in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with additional support from the World Health Organization (WHO).


"This new study makes an important contribution to our scientific understanding of DU's environmental behaviour," said UNEP Executive Director Klaus Toepfer. "Even if the observed levels of contamination are low, we learn that particles of DU dust can even now be detected in soil samples and in sensitive biological indicators such as lichen."


"The UNEP study in Serbia and Montenegro confirms that contamination at the targeted sites is widespread. We did not find levels of radioactivity that could pose a direct threat to the environment or to human health. Nevertheless, we strongly recommend taking precautionary measures similar to those outlined in our Kosovo report last year," he said.


"The team was surprised to find DU particles still in the air two years after the conflict's end. Based on these findings, the authorities should carefully plan how DU-targeted sites are used in the future. Any soil disturbance at these sites could risk releasing DU particles into the air," said Pekka Haavisto, Chairman of the UNEP Depleted Uranium Assessment Team.we recommend the same precautionary measures that we outlined for Kosovo last year," said UNEP Executive Director Klaus Toepfer.


"Continued monitoring is clearly needed, and the local population should be informed about DU issues. Fortunately, although a complete clean-up may not be technically possible, decontamination operations have already started in both Serbia and Montenegro," he said.


UNEP sent a field mission to Serbia and Montenegro in late 2001 in response to an invitation from the Yugoslav authorities. From 27 October to 5 November 2001, the team of 14 international experts investigated five of the eleven sites that were struck with DU ordnance in Serbia, the single site that was hit in Montenegro plus one targeted military vehicle.


The sites were independently selected by the UNEP experts based on the quantity of DU used, environmental and security considerations and population density. In addition, the IAEA experts on the team evaluated the storage of DU at the Vinèa Institute of Nuclear Sciences in Belgrade, and the report raises a number of concerns about conditions there.


The assessment team collected 161 samples, including 69 vegetation, 54 soil, 17 air, 11 water, and 4 smear samples. Three penetrators and three penetrator fragments were also collected. The samples were analysed by Switzerland's Spiez laboratory and Italy's ANPA laboratory.


In addition to the key findings described above, the study report also noted that the DU sites had already been signposted and fenced off by the authorities, reflecting the recommendations made in UNEP's 2001 study; that the coordinates of one DU site identified by the Yugoslav authorities had not been provided to UNEP by NATO, highlighting the need for accurate and timely information on DU sites; that WHO found no evidence to link DU to the chromosome changes reported by Montenegrin authorities in six individuals who had worked on DU site decontamination for four months; and that it is very difficult to fully decontaminate DU sites. can be difficult to fully decontaminate DU sites when funds and technical support are limited.


The DU study was funded by the Government of Switzerland. Both Switzerland and Italy provided laboratory facilities for the analytical work. The governments of Greece, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the US also provided in-kind support.


Note to journalists: The report is available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/. For more information, please contact UNEP Depleted Uranium Assessment Team Chairman Mr. Pekka Haavisto at +41-79-477-0877 or pekka.haavisto@unep.ch; UNEP Spokesperson Mr. Tore Brevik at +254-2-623292 or tore.brevik@unep.org; Post-Conflict Unit Head Mr. Henrik Slotte at +41-22-917-8598; Senior Policy Advisor Mr. Pasi Rinne at +41-22-917-8617; or UNEP Press Officer Mr. Michael Williams at +41-22-917-8242, +41-79-409-1528 (cell), or michael.williams@unep.ch.



UNEP News Release: 2002/18

No matter how one slices it.. it's dangerous and ILLEGAL!


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Depleted_uranium

Legal status of military use

In 1996 and 1997, the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva, passed a resolution to ban the use of depleted uranium weapons. The Subcommission adopted resolutions which include depleted uranium weaponry amongst "weapons of mass and indiscriminate destruction, ... incompatible with international humanitarian or human rights law." (Secretary General's Report, 24 June 1997, E/CN. 4/Sub.2/1997/27)

A UN report of 2002 states that DU weapons also potentially breach each of the following laws: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Charter of the United Nations; the Genocide Convention; the Convention Against Torture; the four Geneva Conventions of 1949; the Conventional Weapons Convention of 1980; and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. All of these laws are designed to spare civilians from unwarranted suffering in or after armed conflicts.

According to the UN, the resolutions in 1996-97 were passed because DU breaches several international laws concerning inhumane weapons: it is not limited in time or space to the legal field of battle, or to military targets; it continues to act after the war; it is "inhumane" by virtue of its ability to cause prolonged or long term death by cancer and other serious health issues, it causes harm to future civilians and passers by (including unborn children and those breathing the air or drinking water); and it has an "unduly negative" and long term effect on the natural environment and food chain. In detail:

1. Weapons may only be used in the legal field of battle, defined as legal military targets of the enemy in war. Weapons may not have an adverse effect off the legal field of battle. DU shells burn into fine particles which remain in the air or the environment. So they infect others over a wide range, and future passers-by, with uranium poisoning.
2. Weapons can only be used for the duration of an armed conflict. A weapon that is used or continues to act after the war is over violates this criterion.
3. Weapons may not be unduly inhumane. Weapons that cause cancer and illness long after the war are widely considered to be legally "inhumane". Health issues to unborn children and civilians may also be crimes against humanity under international law.
4. Weapons may not have an "unduly negative" effect on the natural environment. The dust from DU impact becomes widespread in the environment, and (as with other heavy metals) becomes highly concentrated within living beings and the food chain.

AFIP Collaborates on Depleted Uranium Testing Program
Unique Registry provides key resource for DOD, VA investigators by Christopher C. Kelly AFIP Public Affairs
Are there any long-term health risks to veterans who were potentially exposed to depleted uranium (DU) during the 1991 Gulf WarNULL AFIP is playing an essential role in helping to answer this question by collaborating with the Baltimore VA Medical Center in the Depleted Uranium Follow-up Program, which provides comprehensive screening and monitoring services for hundreds of Gulf War veterans concerned about undiagnosed illnesses. Established by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) at Baltimore, this program also utilizes AFIP’s Depleted Uranium Registry for pathology, toxicology and related analytical techniques on tissue, urine or other bodily fluids. “We want to increase our understanding of DU health effects to assist in the development of best-use policies,” said Florabel G. Mullick, MD, ScD, FCAP, SES, AFIP Principal Deputy Director and Chair, Department of Environmental and Toxicologic Pathology. Coordinating the AFIP DU Testing Program and serving as Director of the AFIP’s DU Registry is Jose A. Centeno, PhD, chief of the Division of Biophysical Toxicology, Department of Environmental and Toxicologic Pathology.


DU is a byproduct of the enrichment process used to make nuclear fuel or weapons-grade uranium, and is 60% less radioactive than natural uranium as it has been depleted of much of the more radioactive 235U and 234U isotopes. Its metallurgical and chemical properties, however, make it ideal for the development of superior armor-penetrating ammunition and in armor protection used in tanks on the battlefield. DU is also used commercially by chemical companies, for example, as counterweights in commercial aircraft. The first widespread use of DU by US military forces was during the 1991 Gulf War. Veterans could have been exposed to DU through inhalation or ingestion, but the most direct route has been through wounds sustained in friendly- fire incidents.


“We’re especially concerned about the potential chemical toxicity of DU in these veterans, which is thousands of times greater than its radiological toxicity,” Centeno said. “We know that in high doses uranium exposure could cause renal failure, which is why we focus on testing DU levels in the urine.” AFIP experts review not only the route of exposure, but also soluble and insoluble chemical forms; the amount internalized; the solubility and dissolution rate; and particle size distribution. In addition to the kidney, other target sites include lung, liver, bone, and skin.


In 1993 the VA first began monitoring 33 veterans who were seriously injured in friendly-fire incidents involving depleted uranium. “The VA found that those veterans who still have DU fragments in their bodies have higher than normal uranium levels in their urine, while those who do not have fragments have normal levels,” Centeno said. Despite higher than normal uranium levels, no clinical manifestations of toxicity or internal malignancy have been observed, and kidney function tests remain normal for this group.


AFIP also played a key role in diagnosing DU in tissue specimens. In 1996, a Gulf War veteran with embedded shrapnel in his shoulder had the lesion removed at the Baltimore VA. AFIP’s experts examined the excised tissue, which contained a blackened pellet remnant. Although the pellet had crumbled in situ over time, AFIP experts utilized energy dispersive x-ray microanalysis (EDXA) to confirm the presence of uranium in the tissue, and quantified the amount through inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectrometry (ICP-OES). This became the first known human pathology case of a “uranium granuloma.”


The Institute’s formal collaboration with the Baltimore VA began in the late 1990s with the appointment of lead scientist John Ejnik, LT, MS, USN, who developed the AFIP’s program on uranium analysis and chemical isotopic speciation. Dr. Ejnik developed a proficiency testing program in conjunction with Melissa A. McDiarmaid, MD, MPH, Department of Medicine, University of Maryland School of Medicine and Director of the VA’s Depleted Uranium Follow-Up Program, and Katherine S. Squibb, PhD, a toxicologist at the Department of Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine, University of Maryland School of Medicine, Baltimore. “LT Ejnik did an outstanding job developing not only a methodology to evaluate low levels of DU in biological samples, but a proficiency testing program as well,” Centeno said. In addition to providing comprehensive histology, diagnosis and special chemical toxicology studies, the AFIP’s DU Registry today is a valuable resource for archived material and pathology analysis, including tissues and urine samples. “Today we are looking at DU in biological samples from different theaters, including Kuwait and Iraq, and have analyzed and archived specimens from over 280 veterans.”


Also collaborating with AFIP in the program is the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFFRI), which conducts basic toxicology, immuno-toxicity, and carcinogenicity studies and studies on reproductive effects; and the US Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM), which provides a comprehensive health risk assessment from potential DU exposure cases. AFIP conducts the DU proficiency-testing program on samples submitted by the Baltimore VA Depleted Uranium Program and USACHPPM.


Joining Dr. Centeno and Dr. Mullick from the department are staff pathologist Linda A. Murakata, LtCol, USAF, MC; laboratory manager Todor Todorov, PhD; environmental chemist Simina Lal, MS; and database manager Albin Moroz. “We also owe a debt of gratitude to the late David Busch, MD, PhD, who initiated the characterization of DU in tissue. Dave was chief of the Mutagen and Radiation Pathology Branch for many years and was a valued member of the staff.”

Depleted uranium has long been used as ballast in military and commercial planes, but the introduction of DU onto the battlefield began modestly, without fanfare. According to a Pentagon official, U.S. troops carried DU "penetrators" into both Grenada and Panama. "It wouldn't have been very much, because there wasn't much to shoot at," says Naughton. "The first large-scale use was Desert Storm."

By its own estimates, the military exploded as many as 320 tons of DU in sabot-encased projectiles in the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait. Gunners shot DU rounds from the cannons of Abrams tanks or from airships such as the A-10 "Warthog". Depleted uranium is the heaviest of metals, which results in its superior penetrating abilities; it is also highly pyrophoric, bursting into flames at temperatures of 170 degrees Celsius. To imagine the carnage, one need only recall Iraq's infamous "Highway of Death", a desert road between Basra and Kuwait's border that remains strewn with radioactive trucks, cars, and tanks. U.S. soldiers found bodies inside those vehicles that were burned in such astonishing ways that they dubbed the remains "crispy critters".

Iraqi civilians were also exposed to low-level radiation from DU -- and preliminary evidence indicates that the consequences have been devastating. Iraqi doctors, many of them specialists trained at eminent Western institutions, such as Sloan-Kettering in New York or Great Ormond Street Hospital in London, report twelve-fold increases in Iraqi cancer rates since the first Gulf War, as well as sharp rises in birth defects in southern Iraq, where much 0f the fighting took place. According to Iraqi doctors, some infants there emerged from the womb with one eye, or no brain, or without limbs. They add that in the dozen years since the conflict, rates of childhood cancer linked to radiation exposure -- especially leukemia and lymphoma -- have jumped four-fold.

As for U.S. troops, the Pentagon says that only 900 of the 700,000 soldiers deployed during the war were exposed to DU, when they were fired upon or went into destroyed tanks to rescue others. But scientists and military whistle-blowers who have studied the campaign say the number of soldiers exposed to DU dust and debris is closer to 300,000. Soon after the fighting stopped, soldiers who worked on supply lines at the rear were loaded on buses and taken to the battlefields so they could be photographed with their comrades on burned-out Iraqi tanks. No one warned them to avoid the sticky black soot coating the vehicles, which was radioactive.

Within months of the war's end, thousands of Gulf War veterans began suffering from odd, nameless maladies, including hair loss, bleeding gums, memory loss, joint pain, incontinence. and disabling fatigue. In 1992, Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) asked the General Accounting Office, an independent research arm of Congress, to study American tanks that had been hit by DU rounds during the war. GAO investigators learned that most soldiers had never been informed by their superiors about the hazards of DU. The GAO's findings were summarized in the title of its report issued a year later: "Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal with Depleted Uranium Contamination".


It will take years, if not decades, to determine how much of a role DU played in the illnesses, but the sheer magnitude of the problem could make the struggle over Agent Orange, the cancer-inducing chemical used to defoliate jungles during the Vietnam War, look like an encounter with Dr. Phil. More than 150,000 veterans of the first Gulf War are currently on medical disability, and another 50,000 have applied for benefits -- nearly one-third of the entire fighting force. By comparison, nine percent of veterans from World War II and the Vietnam War applied for similar compensation.

http://feedthefish.org/blog/materials/johnson.html

AIFP Depleted Uranium

November 6, 2004, ICBUW Netherlands: Final Report link (PDF)

Presentation by Dr. Keith Baverstock

Additional Reports

Well Winston, how would you like to consider the negative impact created by an armoured vehicle you just shot at with an ineffectual anti-tank weapon? I bet you the DU wouldn't get you near as quick.

Depleted uranium

Uranium

Metallic uranium (U) is a silver-white, lustrous, dense, weakly radioactive element. It is ubiquitous throughout the natural environment, and is found in varying but small amounts in rocks, soils, water, air, plants, animals and in all human beings.
Natural uranium consists of a mixture of three radioactive isotopes which are identified by the mass numbers 238U (99.27% by mass), 235U (0.72%) and 234U (0.0054%).
On average, approximately 90 µg (micrograms) of uranium exists in the human body from normal intakes of water, food and air. About 66% is found in the skeleton, 16% in the liver, 8% in the kidneys and 10% in other tissues.
Uranium is used primarily in nuclear power plants. However, most reactors require uranium in which the 235U content is enriched from 0.72% to about 1.5-3%.
Depleted uranium

The uranium remaining after removal of the enriched fraction contains about 99.8% 238U, 0.2% 235U and 0.001% 234U by mass; this is referred to as depleted uranium or DU.
The main difference between DU and natural uranium is that the former contains at least three times less 235U than the latter.
DU, consequently, is weakly radioactive and a radiation dose from it would be about 60% of that from purified natural uranium with the same mass.
The behaviour of DU in the body is identical to that of natural uranium.
Spent uranium fuel from nuclear reactors is sometimes reprocessed in plants for natural uranium enrichment. Some reactor-created radioisotopes can consequently contaminate the reprocessing equipment and the DU. Under these conditions another uranium isotope, 236U, may be present in the DU together with very small amounts of the transuranic elements plutonium, americium and neptunium and the fission product technetium-99. However, the additional radiation dose following intake of DU into the human body from these isotopes would be less than 1%.
Applications of depleted uranium

Due to its high density, about twice that of lead, the main civilian uses of DU include counterweights in aircraft, radiation shields in medical radiation therapy machines and containers for the transport of radioactive materials. The military uses DU for defensive armour plate.
DU is used in armour penetrating military ordnance because of its high density, and also because DU can ignite on impact if the temperature exceeds 600°C.
Exposure to uranium and depleted uranium

Under most circumstances, use of DU will make a negligible contribution to the overall natural background levels of uranium in the environment. Probably the greatest potential for DU exposure will follow conflict where DU munitions are used.
A recent United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report giving field measurements taken around selected impact sites in Kosovo (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) indicates that contamination by DU in the environment was localized to a few tens of metres around impact sites. Contamination by DU dusts of local vegetation and water supplies was found to be extremely low. Thus, the probability of significant exposure to local populations was considered to be very low.
A UN expert team reported in November 2002 that they found traces of DU in three locations among 14 sites investigated in Bosnia following NATO airstrikes in 1995. A full report is expected to be published by UNEP in March 2003.
Levels of DU may exceed background levels of uranium close to DU contaminating events. Over the days and years following such an event, the contamination normally becomes dispersed into the wider natural environment by wind and rain. People living or working in affected areas may inhale contaminated dusts or consume contaminated food and drinking water.
People near an aircraft crash may be exposed to DU dusts if counterweights are exposed to prolonged intense heat. Significant exposure would be rare, as large masses of DU counterweights are unlikely to ignite and would oxidize only slowly. Exposures of clean-up and emergency workers to DU following aircraft accidents are possible, but normal occupational protection measures would prevent any significant exposure.
Intake of depleted uranium


Average annual intakes of uranium by adults are estimated to be about 0.5mg (500 μg) from ingestion of food and water and 0.6 μg from breathing air.
Ingestion of small amounts of DU contaminated soil by small children may occur while playing.
Contact exposure of DU through the skin is normally very low and unimportant.
Intake from wound contamination or embedded fragments in skin tissues may allow DU to enter the systemic circulation.
Absorption of depleted uranium

About 98% of uranium entering the body via ingestion is not absorbed, but is eliminated via the faeces. Typical gut absorption rates for uranium in food and water are about 2% for soluble and about 0.2% for insoluble uranium compounds.
The fraction of uranium absorbed into the blood is generally greater following inhalation than following ingestion of the same chemical form. The fraction will also depend on the particle size distribution. For some soluble forms, more than 20% of the inhaled material could be absorbed into blood.
Of the uranium that is absorbed into the blood, approximately 70% will be filtered by the kidney and excreted in the urine within 24 hours; this amount increases to 90% within a few days.
Potential health effects of exposure to depleted uranium

In the kidneys, the proximal tubules (the main filtering component of the kidney) are considered to be the main site of potential damage from chemical toxicity of uranium. There is limited information from human studies indicating that the severity of effects on kidney function and the time taken for renal function to return to normal both increase with the level of uranium exposure.
In a number of studies on uranium miners, an increased risk of lung cancer was demonstrated, but this has been attributed to exposure from radon decay products. Lung tissue damage is possible leading to a risk of lung cancer that increases with increasing radiation dose. However, because DU is only weakly radioactive, very large amounts of dust (on the order of grams) would have to be inhaled for the additional risk of lung cancer to be detectable in an exposed group. Risks for other radiation-induced cancers, including leukaemia, are considered to be very much lower than for lung cancer.
Erythema (superficial inflammation of the skin) or other effects on the skin are unlikely to occur even if DU is held against the skin for long periods (weeks).
No consistent or confirmed adverse chemical effects of uranium have been reported for the skeleton or liver.
No reproductive or developmental effects have been reported in humans.
Although uranium released from embedded fragments may accumulate in the central nervous system (CNS) tissue, and some animal and human studies are suggestive of effects on CNS function, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from the few studies reported.
Maximum radiation exposure limits and their limited application to uranium and depleted uranium

The International Basic Safety Standards, agreed by all applicable UN agencies in 1996, provide for radiation dose limits above normal background exposure levels.

The general public should not receive a dose of more than 1 millisievert (mSv) in a year. In special circumstances, an effective dose of up to 5 mSv in a single year is permitted provided that the average dose over five consecutive years does not exceed 1 mSv per year. An equivalent dose to the skin should not exceed 50 mSv in a year.
Occupational exposure should not exceed an effective dose of 20 mSv per year averaged over five consecutive years or an effective dose of 50 mSv in any single year. An equivalent dose to the extremities (hands and feet) or the skin should not surpass 500 mSv in a year.
In case of uranium or DU intake, the radiation dose limits are applied to inhaled insoluble uranium-compounds only. For all other exposure pathways and the soluble uranium-compounds, chemical toxicity is the factor that limits exposure.
Guidance on exposure based on chemical toxicity of uranium

WHO has guidelines for determining the values of health-based exposure limits or tolerable intakes for chemical substances. The tolerable intakes given below are applicable to long-term exposure of the general public (as opposed to workers). For single and short-term exposures, higher exposure levels may be tolerated without adverse effects.

The general public's intake via inhalation or ingestion of soluble DU compounds should be based on a tolerable intake value of 0.5 µg per kg of body weight per day. This leads to an air concentration of 1 µg/m3 for inhalation, and about 11 mg/y for ingestion by the average adult.
Insoluble uranium compounds with very low absorption rate are markedly less toxic to the kidney, and a tolerable intake via ingestion of 5 µg per kg of body weight per day is applicable.
When the solubility characteristics of the uranium compounds are not known, which is often the case in exposure to DU, it would be prudent to apply 0.5 µg per kg of body weight per day for ingestion.
Monitoring and treatment of exposed individuals

For the general population, neither civilian nor military use of DU is likely to produce exposures to DU significantly above normal background levels of uranium. Therefore, individual exposure assessments for DU will normally not be required. Exposure assessments based on environmental measurements may, however, be needed for public information and reassurance.
When an individual is suspected of being exposed to DU at a level significantly above the normal background level, an assessment of DU exposure may be required. This is best achieved by analysis of daily urine excretion. Urine analysis can provide useful information for the prognosis of kidney pathology from uranium or DU. The proportion of DU in the urine is determined from the 235U/238U ratio, obtained using sensitive mass spectrometric techniques.
Faecal measurement can also give useful information on DU intake. However, faecal excretion of natural uranium from the diet is considerable (on average 500 μg per day, but very variable) and this needs to be taken into account.
External radiation measurements over the chest, using radiation monitors for determining the amount of DU in the lungs, require special facilities. This technique can measure about 10 milligrams of DU in the lungs, and (except for souble compounds) can be useful soon after exposure.
There are no specific means to decrease the absorption of uranium from the gastrointestinal tract or lungs. Following severe internal contamination, treatment in special hospitals consists of the slow intravenous transfusion of isotonic 1.4 % sodium bicarbonate to increase excretion of uranium. DU levels in the human, however, are not expected to reach a value that would justify intravenous treatment any more than dialysis.
Recommendations

Following conflict, levels of DU contamination in food and drinking water might be detected in affected areas even after a few years. This should be monitored where it is considered there is a reasonable possibility of significant quantities of DU entering the ground water or food chain.
Where justified and possible, clean-up operations in impact zones should be undertaken if there are substantial numbers of radioactive projectiles remaining and where qualified experts deem contamination levels to be unacceptable. If high concentrations of DU dust or metal fragments are present, then areas may need to be cordoned off until removal can be accomplished. Such impact sites are likely to contain a variety of hazardous materials, in particular unexploded ordnance. Due consideration needs to be given to all hazards, and the potential hazard from DU kept in perspective.
Small children could receive greater exposure to DU when playing in or near DU impact sites. Their typical hand-to-mouth activity could lead to high DU ingestion from contaminated soil. Necessary preventative measures should be taken.
Disposal of DU should follow appropriate national or international recommendations.

RELATED LINKS

- Depleted Uranium
Provides a summary of the scientific literature on uranium and depleted uranium.

- WHO guidance on exposure to depleted uranium [pdf 394kb]
Provides information on medical treatment from excessive DU exposure and advice for programme administrators sending personnel to DU contaminated areas.

- Uranium


For more information contact:


WHO Media centre
Telephone: +41 22 791 2222
E-mail: mediainquiries@who.int

© World Health Organization 2005. All rights reserved

Despite the ignorance of Bush supporters who not only defy the fact that we are in a country illegally in the first place and causing such destruction but also their ignorance to what short and long range damages that DU is also causing, along with BushForces on the spot killing of civilians. Pay close attention to what these goobers laugh at in these discussions. What I'd like to see (not that that is proper in itself) is for those who support Bush policies to themselves experience the sufferage in their own families that many civilians undergo thanks to BushCo's presence in their country. Lets see how cool they think it all is then.

http://www.infowars.net/Pages/Aug05/300805potkettleblack.htm

DU remains radioactive longer than the age of the earth (estimated at 4.5 billion years).
Professor Yagasaki a physicist and well-respected nuclear radiation expert, from the
University of the Ryukyus, Okinawahas, calculated that 800 tons of DU is the atomicity equivalent to 83,000 Nagasaki bombs in a paper presented at the World Uranium Weapons Conference in Hamburg in October 2003. The amount of DU used in Iraq in 2003 alone was equivalent to nearly 250,000 Nagasaki bombs.

We have documented how the former head of the Pentagon's Depleted Uranium Project, Dr Doug Rokke, asserts that thousands of troops are sick and dying from illegal DU use.

“The VA has determined that 250,000 troops are now permanently disabled, 15,000 troops are dead and over 425,000 are ill and slowly dying from what the Department of Defense still calls a mystery disease. How many more will have to die before action is taken?”

Further eminent scientific minds such as Dr Keith Baverstock PhD; Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Kuopio, KUOPIO, Finland, who presented evidence to the European Parliament in June 2003 have gone public, stating how the evidence on DU is irrefutable and is being ignored.

Dr. James A. Howenstine is a board certified specialist in internal medicine who spent 34 years caring for office and hospital patients. He, among many others has spoken out about how another horrifying consequence of DU exposure is damage to sperm causing many severe deformities in the children born to veterans of the first Gulf War. A group of 251 soldiers from Mississippi, who all had normal babies before service in Iraq, were studied. Sixty seven percent of their post war babies were born with severe birth defects. These children were missing legs, arms, organs or eyes and had immune system and blood diseases. In some Gulf War veterans families the only normal children are those who were born before serving in Iraq. The Department of Defense denies any knowledge of birth defects in Gulf War I veterans.

Just one of the many pictures of the deformities that our governments' use of Depleted Uranium is causing to children. This is a mild example compared to many others that are simply too horrific to post.


Of course, many many Iraqi children continue to be born with deformities due to excessive DU use. The effects are simply horrific and for the Department of State to even suggest the effects are an urban myth is simply SICK.

Does the story claim that vast, powerful, evil forces are secretly manipulating events? If so, this fits the profile of a conspiracy theory. The U.S. military or intelligence community is a favorite villain in many conspiracy theories.

In many cases we do publish stories that suggest the Intelligence communities and the government are manipulating events, covering up information and perpetrating evil acts. That is because, as you have seen here, in the majority of cases THEY ARE.

Why should we take advice on what to believe from a government that LIES continually, over and over again. A government that uses fake weapons dossiers and invented intelligence in order to invade and overthrow sovereign countries to forward their own agenda, whilst killing hundreds of thousands in the process?

Why should we listen to a government that puts out fake news casts and in many cases controls the information we see on our nightly news? More and more people are turning off the TV and coming to us for their news because they know what we report is more accurate and better researched.

This is why they are desperately trying to crack down on the Internet and the free press, passing laws in order that they can deem any anti-government stance as hate speech. It's time to see through THEIR misinformation and turn off their false transmissions. WE are the majority, WE are the mainstream, WE identify the misinformation.

Of course, many many Iraqi children continue to be born with deformities due to excessive DU use. The effects are simply horrific and for the Department of State to even suggest the effects are an urban myth is simply SICK.

Does the story claim that vast, powerful, evil forces are secretly manipulating events? If so, this fits the profile of a conspiracy theory. The U.S. military or intelligence community is a favorite villain in many conspiracy theories.

In many cases we do publish stories that suggest the Intelligence communities and the government are manipulating events, covering up information and perpetrating evil acts. That is because, as you have seen here, in the majority of cases THEY ARE.

Why should we take advice on what to believe from a government that LIES continually, over and over again. A government that uses fake weapons dossiers and invented intelligence in order to invade and overthrow sovereign countries to forward their own agenda, whilst killing hundreds of thousands in the process?

Statement
by the NATO Spokesman

As there have been a number of queries about the presence of U-236 and Plutonium in Depleted Uranium munitions used in Kosovo and Bosnia, I wish to draw to the media's attention the following information.

It has been long established that there may be trace elements of U-236 and Plutonium in Depleted Uranium, which is a by-product of the nuclear industry. According to independent experts, however, the levels found are so low as to present no cause for concern.

Concerning the presence of U-236, I draw your attention to the UN Environment Programme press release of January 16. UNEP, with full NATO support, has taken DU samples from Kosovo and is having them tested in a number of laboratories. Along with the more commonly expected isotopes, one of the laboratories has reported finding 0.0028% of U-236. The UNEP press release says, "According to the laboratory the content of U-236 in the depleted uranium is so small that the radiotoxicity is not changed compared to DU without U-236."

In other words, from a safety viewpoint, the presence of minute quantities of U-236 in Depleted Uranium is irrelevant. As NATO has indicated in previous briefings, Depleted Uranium itself may present a low-level hazard in specific, limited circumstances.

With regard to the presence of Plutonium, I would draw attention to the US Environment Exposure Report. Depleted Uranium in Gulf: 2. This report was published, and placed on the Internet on 13 December 2000. It comments on the presence of trace elements of other materials in Depleted Uranium. Specifically, it state that Depleted Uranium "may contain trace levels (a few parts per billion parts) of transuranics (neptunium, plutonium, and americium)." Tests on samples of DU showed that transuranic contamination added 0.8% to the radiation dose from DU. The report draws the conclusion that "the quantities are so small they add very little to the radiation dose from depleted uranium itself. Both DOE (US Department of Energy) and DOD (US Department of Defense) concluded that measures designed to protect personnel from the DU itself are more than adequate to protect them from the trace quantities of transuranics."

Thus, from a safety viewpoint, the presence of such small traces of Plutonium in Depleted Uranium is also irrelevant. This report and the information in it has been publicly available for some time, and has been restated by independent experts in more recent media reports.

All of the material mentioned above, plus links to other sites and fuller reports can be found on a special section of the NATO website.

http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-006e.htm

Depleted Uranium


Michael E. Kilpatrick, MD
Office of the Special Assistant
(703) 578-8510

COL Eric G. Daxon, PhD, CHP
US Army Medical Command
(210) 221-6612

•Over 35 US studies measuring the amount of DU dust inside and around struck vehicles –Only personnel in, on, or near vehicles at the time the vehicles are struck may internalize in excess of safety standards –Safety standards may be approached by maintenance personnel who routinely work inside struck vehicles –Routine precautions recommended not just because of DU but the other toxicants in these vehicles

•Uranium has been extensively studied and shown not be linked with leukemia in humans
•Medical surveillance of highest exposed shows no adverse health effects related to DU
•Reviewed by multiple US and non-US scientific organizations with consistent conclusions
•DU radiation and chemical doses below safety standards – DU Capstone test underway
•Research on embedded DU fragments is continuing

http://www.nato.int/du/010110pc/frame.htm

Briefing
by Mr. Mark Laity, NATO Acting Spokesman,
Lt. Col Scott Bethel, Dr. Michael Kilpatrick and Col. Eric Daxon
Mark Laity: (...inaudible...) scientific information about depleted uranium, its use, the medical effects of it. I have with me a number of briefers: on my left is Lt.Col Scott Bethel, he works for SHAPE down at Mons and he is going to brief on the use of depleted uranium and then how we safeguard our own troops and the handling procedures in the use of depleted uranium. On my right we have two briefers from the Pentagon: there is Dr. Michael Kilpatrick from the Office of the Special Assistant. Just beyond him, Col. Eric Daxon. Now these two gentlemen have just been briefing the North Atlantic Council. In other words, the briefing they are going to give you is exactly the same briefing that the Ambassadors of the North Atlantic Council have just received, so you are getting the same information. We'll start off with Lt.Col. Bethel, then we'll take the medical briefing and then we'll take questions which will be directed through me.


Lt.Col Bethel: Good afternoon. As Mr. Laity said, I am Lt.Col. Scott Bethel and I am from the SHAPE Operations Division and this afternoon I will provide you with some information on munitions that contain depleted uranium (...inaudible...). I will first briefly discuss the particular qualities of depleted uranium and how it's handled, next I'll describe its operational employment in general terms and finally I'll briefly discuss its use during operations in the Balkans. As Mr. Laity said, I will be followed by Col. Daxon and Dr. Kilpatrick, who will provide some of the medical implications.

Depleted uranium is a residual metal by-product of the uranium enriching process. Since most of the radioactive isotopes have been removed from it in the process, DU has only about 40 per cent of the radioactivity, but retains all of the extraordinary density and metallurgical properties that are characteristic in naturally occurring uranium. This makes munitions containing DU especially suited as (...inaudible...) weapons and I'll show you an example of an A10 30 mm round. This is an actual depleted uranium around on the top with the proper casing.

Mark Laity: So it is a real depleted uranium round?


Lt.Col Bethel: It is. For those of you who would like to know, it is inert, it will not go off, etcetera, so you don't need to flee the room.

Such munitions include rounds fired from main battle tanks such as the Abrams and the AMX 30, fighting vehicles and some aircraft cannon. DU is not used in any bombs. Because of its extreme density it cannot only act as a penetrator for a kinetic munition, but when used as a barrier it is difficult to be penetrated. For this reason, several NATO nations have experimented with incorporating DU into armour used on tanks. DU has also many commercial applications: these include use as ballast on commercial aircraft, and in the keels of sailboats.

DU rounds are handled and stored like any other live munition. All NATO rounds are stored along with other munitions inside bunkers until they are loaded into a delivery system. For the A-10, weapons loaders insert each round into the A-10 belt loading system, which is then transferred to the aircraft. These technicians have been handling these rounds since the A-10 was added the the US inventory in 1975. DU rounds are never loaded into the aircraft for non-combat missions. DU is used for combat missions only. The same is true for tank munitions; it is part of a standard combat load of the tank and for combat or contingency operations is stored along with other types of rounds inside the tank for immediate use if necessary.

Initially, in both Bosnia and Kosovo operations, the most significant weapons NATO and Partner forces had to contend with was armoured vehicles. In particular, VJ - or Yugoslav army - is very armour heavy. This was particularly true when the VJ or the MUP - which were the Yugoslav national police forces - were attacking civilians and conducting ethnic cleansing operations in both Bosnia and Kosovo. NATO solicited each nation during a force generation process to provide its very best resources for action as directed by the North Atlantic Council. To fulfil the air-to-ground and close-air-support role, the US offered the A-10. The capabilities and standard configurations of this aircraft are readily available in a variety of sources. But its primary weapons system is the GAU-8 or 30 mm gun. Its performance in The Gulf War solidified it as a premier armour destroyer, and when it became necessary to conduct an offensive operations against ground forces in the Balkans, the A-10s were called upon to deal with the armoured targets. In Bosnia, NATO used approximately 10,800 rounds during operations in support of UNPROFOR. The area where DU munitions were expended was confined to the so-called 20 km exclusion zone surrounding the city of Sarajevo. Two sorties were tasked in August and September of 1994. The majority of the A-10 sorties were during Operation Deliberate Force in August and September of 1995. No other DU rounds were expended in Bosnia. In Kosovo, NATO expended approximately 31,000 depleted uranium rounds. The vast majority were used against VJ and MUP armour targets along the westernmost part of the province where these armoured units were engaged in an aggressive ethnic cleansing campaign against the Albanian population. Nearly one million ethnic Albanians were displaced into neighbouring countries at this time. Most missions flew in the areas between Pec and Prizren, with the highest concentration near Dakovica.


In conclusion, let me make four clear points. First, DU munitions are technically handled like all other live pieces of ordnance. A special threat assessment from the medical point of view will be given by Col. Daxon and Dr. Kilpatrick.


Second, DU munitions are only used during combat operations.

Third, during NATO campaigns in both Bosnia and Kosovo, the DU round was the most effective weapon to stop aggression carried out by troops using armoured vehicles.

Fourth, in July 1999, SHAPE received a message provided by the US joint staff outlining in general terms the hazards associ