Palm Beach Post

Sunday, October 02, 2005

BAGHDAD — Eight-year-old Rudenah al-Hillali cried as the two American soldiers led her father into their apartment with a rifle barrel at his back and forced the family to stand in a corner at gunpoint.

"She was scared," said her father, Issam Abdul Jabbar al-Hillali, adding that the soldiers refused to let him give Rudenah water.

Al-Hillali said Army Pfc. John N. Lee and Spec. Timothy I. Barron claimed to be Marines searching for weapons. But once inside his house, he said, they used a knife to pry open a briefcase filled with money and eventually stole $2,000 in cash, silver and other valuables.

Although Army officials found some of the missing items in the soldiers' possession and they admitted to robbing houses under the guise of looking for illegal weapons, the Army dismissed the charges. In exchange, Barron said, both soldiers agreed to leave the military.

Using previously undisclosed Army records, the Dayton (Ohio) Daily News found that dozens of soldiers have been accused of crimes against Iraqis since the first troops deployed for Iraq. But despite strong evidence and convictions in some cases, only a small percentage resulted in punishments nearing those that civilian justice systems routinely impose for such crimes.

In a number of other cases, there was no evidence that thorough or timely criminal investigations were conducted. Other cases weren't prosecuted, and still others resulted in dismissals, light jail sentences or no jail sentence at all.

"I've been surprised at some of the lenient sentences," said Gary Solis, a former military judge and prosecutor who teaches military law at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. "I have an uneasy suspicion that it relates to the nationality of the victim."

Soldiers' criminal acts, and the lack of punishment, add to the hatred that is fueling the insurgency in Iraq, putting soldiers at greater risk, Solis and other experts said.

"There's been a decline for the respect for the rule of international law and a failure to understand that we, the United States, have to be the good guys," Solis said.

Pentagon defends probes

A Daily News analysis of records from the Army Court-Martial Management Information System database found that 226 soldiers were charged with offenses between the first deployments and Jan. 1, 2005.

Of the 1,038 separate charges, fewer than one in 10 involved crimes against Iraqis. Virtually all of the rest, more than 900 charges, involved crimes against other soldiers, property, drug or alcohol offenses and violations of military rules.

Charges involving Iraqi victims were three times more likely to be dismissed or withdrawn by the Army than cases in which the victims were soldiers or civilian military employees, the examination found.

The Air Force and the Navy, which includes the Marine Corps, did not release comparable copies of their databases.

The Army did not challenge specific findings of the Daily News examination, but a Pentagon spokeswoman defended the service's overall handling of criminal cases in Iraq.

"The Army has investigated every credible allegation of abuse or misconduct by U.S. soldiers toward Iraq citizens," says a written response from Lt. Col. Pamela Hart. "The process is designed to both assure proper punishment of offenses and protect rights of the accused. The end result is that punishments can vary based upon the myriad of potential facts and circumstances present in each case."

The Daily News examination found that soldiers accused of property crimes or violations of military rules sometimes were dealt with more harshly than soldiers convicted of beating, robbing and even killing Iraqis.

Spec. David Driggers Jr. was convicted of adultery, wrongfully consuming alcohol and committing an indecent act by having consensual sex with a female soldier in an "open sleep area."

Driggers was sentenced to six months, the combined sentence the Army handed out to both Genaro Trevino and Pfc. Raymond Garrett. The two were convicted of robbing an Iraqi shop owner at gunpoint after he allegedly sold them liquor.

The charges are felonies in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States, but the Army sent Trevino's case to its version of misdemeanor court, which found him guilty of armed robbery and sentenced him to five months. Garrett, who was convicted of armed robbery as well as assault and battery, was sentenced to a one-month confinement. Each was found not guilty of kidnapping.

Solis, who presided over about 350 cases as a military judge and another 450 as prosecutor during his 26 years in the Marine Corps, said the sentences may reflect an attitude that all Iraqis are linked to the insurgency and are not deserving of justice.

"I think it's an attitude that starts at the very top that these people (insurgents) somehow are beyond the law, and if they are beyond the law, they are essentially fair game," he said.

Prosecutions tell only part of the story. In response to a Daily News federal Freedom of Information Act request for records on all deaths caused by soldiers in Iraq, the Army Criminal Investigation Command acknowledged 114 investigations between Jan. 1, 2003, and August 2004, and sent records on 105 cases.

Of those, 78 involved deaths of Army soldiers, while 27 involved Iraqis and other foreigners, about half the number of investigations the Army conducted into vehicle accidents involving soldiers.

During that same period, Iraqis filed at least 353 separate claims seeking compensation from the military for more than 400 deaths, and those claims represent only a portion of the civilian deaths U.S. troops allegedly caused.

"In numerous cases, there are significant allegations that weren't followed up on," said Jameel Jaffer, an attorney who has investigated civilian deaths in Iraq for the American Civil Liberties Union. "We need to ask the question: Who's responsible for creating the climate in which soldiers felt like these kinds of abuses, this kind of conduct, was acceptable or would be winked at?"

Christopher Grey, spokesman for the Army Criminal Investigation Command, said it's possible more cases are being investigated in Iraq but that field agents have not been able to do the paperwork.

He acknowledged that he had no records of investigations into four cases the Daily News examined that resulted in civil claims: separate shooting deaths involving an 11-year-old boy, an Iraqi judge, a taxi driver at a checkpoint and two Iraqis at a demonstration.

"If you have pertinent information or information where you believe a death has occurred that involves criminality, please bring it to our attention," Grey said.

Even in cases in which the Army conducted criminal investigations, only a small percentage resulted in prosecutions, despite findings of sufficient evidence in some cases.

Of the 27 cases involving deaths of Iraqis and other foreign nationals identified in the files the Criminal Investigation Command released, 19 were determined to be accidental, justifiable or otherwise not warranting prosecution.

Of the remaining eight cases, four resulted in criminal convictions: two involving deaths of Iraqi civilians, one an Iraqi soldier and the other an Iraqi police officer.

An Army investigation found probable cause to believe that an Army specialist committed voluntary manslaughter when he "intentionally shot and killed" Malik Ghafel Mattar as the Iraqi teenager stole a box of military food rations in June 2003.

Military personnel have been giving the same rations to Iraqis, and Mattar was among children standing alongside the road waiting for candy and food from soldiers, Army records show.

A soldier riding in a vehicle directly behind the shooting scene told investigators that he didn't see any Iraqis throwing rocks or other objects and that he never felt threatened.

"Most were waving as they usually do," the soldier told investigators.

Army records show that the military convoy didn't stop to render aid to Mattar or to report the shooting.

An Army investigator's report says the accused soldier was surprised that the incident was under criminal investigation.

"He seemed to be under the impression no one would care that he shot an Iraqi," the investigator wrote.

The investigation was stopped after a commander decided to take no action against the soldier, and Army records show the soldier's punishment was to be "counseled" by a commander.

Al-Hillali, whose home in Baghdad was ransacked by the two American soldiers, said the robbery changed his family's "thought picture of Americans" and left his daughter, now 10, traumatized.

"Even now, when Rudenah sees Americans, she gets very scared. She hides in the car," he said, adding that she became hysterical again in July when U.S. soldiers took cover near their house.

"She thought they had come back to our house."

Good awarness post Ace!

Amazing what stats they have on what military operations produce in these ways. These numbers from this article are from what is reported. In most cases, many violationn against a population goes unreported. I'd say only about 10% is reported... but that's better than 0. I'm sure the Noecons and their friends are working hard to suppress that too.... it's how they play with other's lives at stake.

Posted on Wed, Sep. 28, 2005






Military higher-ups get to the bottom of abuse scandals

By JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY

Knight Ridder Newspapers



WASHINGTON - Well, they finally got to the bottom of the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal this week. An Army court martial convicted Pfc. Lynndie England and sentenced her to three years in prison and a dishonorable discharge for holding that leash, pointing with scorn and other offenses.


They've gotten to the bottom, all right. With Pfc. England's conviction, that wraps up the cases against nine enlisted soldiers who starred in those terrible digital photos in late 2003.


So that's it, huh? Not exactly. We still haven't gotten to the top of this scandal, the Guantanamo problems and the questions that were raised last week by an Army captain from the 82nd Airborne Division who is troubled by, of all things, a conscience.


Capt. Ian Fishback, a West Point graduate, was a lieutenant in both Afghanistan and Iraq when he became troubled by what he was seeing: American soldiers beating Iraqi detainees until their arms and legs were broken. Death threats. Extreme forced physical exertion. Sleep deprivation. Exposure to the elements.


He began a 17-month journey, or attempted journey, up the chain of command, asking, then pleading for simple guidance on whether American troops in Iraq were bound by terms of the Geneva Conventions. He wrote a letter to the two top Republicans on the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Warner, R-Va., and John McCain, R-Ariz.


"This is a tragedy," he wrote. "I can remember, as a cadet at West Point, resolving to ensure that my men would never commit a dishonorable act; that I would protect them from that type of burden."


What did this honorable American officer ask that was so hard? "Give (our soldiers) a clear standard that is in accordance with the bedrock principles of our nation."


Capt. Fishback added: "Some argue that since our actions are not as horrifying as al-Qaeda's we should not be concerned. When did al-Qaeda become any type of standard by which we measure the morality of the United States?"


Nobody in his chain of command showed the slightest concern about what the captain reported and what he sought. Nobody showed any interest until Human Rights Watch revealed details of his case last week.


Then the Army got very interested. Orders went down to interrogate the captain and demand that he identify two sergeants who also witnessed some of the abuse. Once again, the powers-that-be were eager to get to the bottom of the issue. Find some enlisted men or non-coms and hang them out to dry.


Shame on them.


And unless the good senators are ready at last to step up to the plate and hold independent hearings on the question of how the Unites States treats prisoners or detainees who end up in American custody anywhere in the world, shame on them, too.


We've been treated to the spectacle of a Republican-controlled House and Senate abdicating their constitutional responsibility to conduct rigorous oversight of actions and failings of the executive branch of government. This has gone on for the four-plus years that George W. Bush has occupied the White House, and it looks as if we'll get more of the same for three more years and a bit.


There have been 17 separate investigations of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and other prisoner abuse scandals. All have gone straight to the bottom of every case. All have consistently claimed that no one higher up the chain of command, including the civilian leadership in the Pentagon, bears any responsibility for any of this.


Hogwash. BS. Nonsense.


If the lowest private fails, then others have failed in training, leading and directing that private. The chain runs from sergeant to lieutenant to captain to lieutenant colonel to colonel to one, two, three and four stars, on to the longest serving, most arrogant secretary of defense in our history, Donald H. Rumsfeld, and beyond him to the commander in chief, President Bush.


It's long past time for responsibility to begin flowing uphill in this administration. It's time for our leaders to take responsibility for what's being done in all our names and under our proud flag. It's time for Congress to do its job if the administration won't do its job.


The Teflon is wearing off this administration in a hurry. It's past time for an end to strutting, victory laps, crowing to the skies and boasting "Bring 'em on!" Now is the time to provide the leadership our troops deserve. Now is the time to state plainly and unequivocally that we are Americans, and we live by a rule of law that protects everyone, even the worst terrorist who ever fell into our hands. Maybe especially the worst terrorist who ever fell into our hands.


---



ABOUT THE WRITER

Joseph L. Galloway is the senior military correspondent for Knight Ridder Newspapers and co-author of the national best-seller "We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young." Readers may write to him at jgalloway@krwashington.com

It's all about the mentality in our leadership Ace.... that rubs off onto many of the troops under this leadership. The military becomes a place where most anything can take place... and not be held accountable for under the protection of the OD green machine.

There It Is!!
vvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvvv

[In other words, only the US has the power to kill others; only the US has the right to cause destruction, in time of war.]




http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?con...1&articleId=784


US War Crimes in Iraq: Manufactured Dissent
A Critique of Amnesty International's Report entitled Iraq, In Cold Blood: Abuses by Armed Groups

by Ghali Hassan

August 1, 2005
GlobalResearch.ca

The current US war against Iraq has helped blur the lines between those who advocate ‘human rights’ and those who facilitate imperialist power, and between those who "opposed" the war and those who support the war and the Occupation of Iraq.

Given the propagated importance of ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ in the West, it is important to take a brief critical look at the West's most well known ‘human rights’ group.

In its recent report on Iraq, Amnesty International (AI), the West's beacon of ‘human rights’, reveals that:

"armed groups opposed to the U.S.-led multinational force and Iraq's government are showing utter disdain for the lives of Iraqi civilians and others, continuing a pattern of war crimes and crimes against humanity".

Consider the title of the report: Iraq, In Cold Blood: Abuses by Armed Groups. AI does not use the same terminology when it criticises US forces in Iraq or Israel’s brutal treatment of the Palestinian people. Indeed, AI has not issued a similar report or statement about the much larger atrocity of US violence in Iraq.

As Francis Boyle, professor of international law at the University of Illinois, who was a member of AI, rightly wrote; "[AI] is primarily motivated not by human rights but by publicity. Second comes money. Third comes getting more members. Fourth, internal turf battles. And then finally, human rights, genuine human rights concerns". He added; "AI is accountable to its pro-Israel Zionist funders of AI in the US, which fund the AI operations in London", not to the people AI pretends to defend.

The killing of Iraqi civilians, the torture of innocent Iraqi men, women and children by U.S.-British forces are not as important as the actions of those "armed groups", may be even acceptable. [In other words, only the US has the power to kill others; only the US has the right to cause destruction, in time of war.] The aim of AI is to focus people’s attention on the violence of the occupied and oppressed, and turn people’s attention away from the violence of the occupiers and oppressors.

And how would you classify these 90 senators?

Senate Approves Detainee Treatment Rules
By LIZ SIDOTI, Associated Press Writer
53 minutes ago

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051006/ap_on_...HE0BHNlYwN0bWE-
The Senate faces a confrontation with the House over a $440 billion military spending bill that, despite White House opposition, would impose restrictions on the treatment of terrorism suspects.

Delivering a rare wartime slap at Pentagon authority and President Bush, the GOP-controlled Senate voted 90-9 on Wednesday to back an amendment that would prohibit the use of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" against anyone in U.S. government custody, regardless of where they are held.

Sponsored by Sen. John McCain (news, bio, voting record), R-Ariz., the proposal also would require all service members to follow procedures in the Army Field Manual when they detain and interrogate terrorism suspects.

"This amendment strives to establish uniform standards for the interrogation of prisoners and detainees as a means for helping ensure our service men and women are well trained, well briefed, knowledgeable of their legal, professional and moral duties and obligations," said Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn.

The Senate was expected to vote on the overall spending bill by week's end. The House-approved version of it does not include the detainee provision. It is unclear how much support the measure has in the GOP-run House.

However, Rep. John Murtha (news, bio, voting record) of Pennsylvania, the top Democrat on the House Appropriations subcommittee on defense, who supports the measure, could prove a powerful ally when House and Senate negotiators meet to reconcile differences in their bills.

And the House could face immense pressure after such a mandate by the Senate. All but nine Republicans voted in favor of the legislation.

Sen. Ted Stevens (news, bio, voting record), R-Alaska, said he was concerned that McCain's legislation could inadvertently endanger the lives of people who work in classified roles, and he hoped to fix the potential problems in the final bill.

"There are some changes that have to be made if we are going to be faithful to those people who live in the classified world," Stevens said.

The rebuke by members of the president's own party shows how reluctant some lawmakers are to give him unchecked wartime power as the conflict in Iraq drags on and U.S. casualties mount. It also comes as Bush seeks to show strength after weeks in which his approval rating plummeted as Americans questioned the direction of the war, the sluggish federal response to Hurricane Katrina and the surge in gas prices.

Bush administration officials say the legislation would limit the president's authority and flexibility in war, and advisers say they would recommend a veto of the spending bill if the prisoner provision is included in the version that goes to his desk.

However, Bush has never vetoed a bill, despite threats, and scrapping a measure that provides money for pay raises, benefits, equipment and weapons for troops while the country is fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would open the president to a flood of criticism.

Still pending is an amendment by Sen. Lindsey Graham (news, bio, voting record), R-S.C., that would distinguish between a "lawful enemy combatant" and an "unlawful enemy combatant," and put into law the procedures for prosecuting them at the Navy's Guantanamo Bay prison in Cuba.

Lawmakers increasingly started calling for Congress to provide U.S. troops with clear standards for detaining, interrogating and prosecuting terrorism suspects after allegations surfaced of mistreatment at Guantanamo Bay and the abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

"We demanded intelligence without ever clearly telling our troops what was permitted and what was forbidden. And when things went wrong, we blamed them and we punished them," said McCain, a prisoner of war in Vietnam.

Republican supporters say U.S. troops interrogating terrorism suspects do not know which techniques are allowed. "We have let the troops down when it comes to trying to give them guidance in very stressful situations," said Graham, an Air Force judge for 20 years.

But Sen. Jeff Sessions (news, bio, voting record), R-Ala., called the legislation unnecessary. "We do not have ... systematic abuse of prisoners going on by our United States military," he said.

Yes, by all means oppose 'their' actions as this article states. Do note that many troops are caught up in such action... under the brainwashed leadership that supports that BushCon mentality. For those of us who were in combat zones.... no information of such wrong acts and operations will get out into the public for the most part. It's only after a troop returns home and only if that person still has a conscience will that person report the real truth of what goes on in some military actions. In some cases as this thread's topic implies, the upper rankers will cover and make deals with lower rankers to keep them quiet. basically the lifers will make a troop's life pure hell if he reports the truth. That's how it works in the military just as how it works in the govt.... and most businesses too. You play it by our rules or you loose.

http://www.antiwar.com/orig/jfrank.php?articleid=5566

April 15, 2005

Support the Troops, Oppose Their Actions
Coming to terms with a complex reality by Joshua Frank

On Saturday, Nov. 6, 2004, U.S. forces pounded Fallujah and razed a civilian hospital. "Witnesses said only a facade remained of a small emergency hospital in the center of the city," reported the BBC News on the day of the military blitz. "A nearby medical supplies storeroom and dozens of houses were also damaged as U.S. forces continued preparing the ground for [the upcoming] major assault."

The catastrophe happened only days after the U.S. presidential election, and the antiwar movement was still mourning the triumph of George W. Bush's War Party. Needless to say, the movement wasn't moved to action, even though U.S. troops had committed a blatant war crime. For the Geneva Conventions are quite clear that the bombing of hospitals constitutes a crime:

"Article 18: Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.

"Article 19: The protection to which civilian hospitals are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only after due warning has been given, naming, in all appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit and after such warning has remained unheeded. The fact that sick or wounded members of the armed forces are nursed in these hospitals, or the presence of small arms and ammunition taken from such combatants and not yet been handed to the proper service, shall not be considered to be acts harmful to the enemy."

There was no warning put forth by the U.S. military prior to the bombing of this hospital where dozens of innocent civilians were reported dead and many more violently injured. Shortly after the incident, U.S. troops hit the ground running, and more war crimes were carried out in the name of "democracy." One such heartless act was notoriously captured on film.

Writing for his Internet blog, ex-Navy SEAL Matthew Heidt, with his machismo fully inflated, explained the hateful rationale for killing an unarmed prisoner of war:

"The shots fired at the 'unarmed' terrorist in that mosque in Fallujah are called 'security rounds.' Its [sic] a safety issue pure and simple. After assaulting through a target, put a security round in everybody's head. …There's no time to dick around in the target, you clear the space, [and] dump the chumps…."

Amnesty International didn't necessarily buy the bloody rhetoric Heidt and others used when defending the murder of an unarmed prisoner (whom Heidt called a "terrorist"). In a statement released after the televised execution, Amnesty said they were "deeply concerned that the rules of war protecting civilians and combatants have been violated in … fighting between U.S. and Iraqi forces and insurgents" in Fallujah.

The Geneva Conventions also spell it out quite clearly in the opening paragraph. "Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat [out of combat] by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely," it notes.

"The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture. The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."

And, it adds, "the wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for."

NCOs learn to combat stress abuse
Submitted by: MCAS Miramar
Story Identification #: 200582518118
Story by Staff Sgt. Maria C. Villanueva



MARINE CORPS AIR STATION MIRAMAR, Calif. (Aug. 22, 2005) -- Eight noncommissioned officers from Marine Corps Air Station Miramar represented the air station at the 2005 NCO Substance Abuse Prevention Symposium sponsored by Marine Corps Community Services in Dallas Aug. 16 though 18.

The symposium, the first ever to be offered to NCOs Corpswide, helps junior leaders identify and possibly prevent Marines from turning to mind-altering substances, especially upon return from a combat zone.

The NCOs, the first Marines usually in positions to best identify troops at risk, spent the three days learning how to identify factors that can contribute to substance abuse and programs available to deter and assist those who are at risk.

Helping Marines who suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder was a common concern for most of the NCOs who attended the symposium, some of whom have been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan as many as three times in two years.

According to statistics provided by the MCCS Prevention and Intervention Team, there is a 97 percent increase in Marines displaying dependency symptoms to substances like drugs and alcohol. The same statistics also show that those returning from combat zones are more likely to fall into these dependencies without knowing there are programs to assist them.

After serving in Iraq, Cpl. William G. Pollard, finance clerk, MCAS Miramar, noticed his best friend, another Marine, turned to alcohol to deal with domestic issues that arose while the two were deployed. Pollard said the resources that he received at the conference could have better helped him deal with his friend when the situation occurred.

"He was getting into a lot of trouble because of alcohol," said Pollard, a native of Aiken, S.C. "I could have been able to talk to him better and get him help at a lower level."

Sergeant Pablo P. Torrez, motor transport mechanic, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, spent six months in Iraq and saw first hand the effects of combat stress on himself, his fellow Marines and overall mission readiness.

Torrez, a native of Keller, Texas, recently helped a fellow Marine deal with readjusting to garrison life after returning from combat. As a direct result of his intervention, Torrez saved the Marine's life.

"(PTSD) is something we should all focus on now," said Torrez. "In the future, I wouldn't second guess myself about getting anyone help."

Although many issues dealt with during the symposium were geared toward Marines dealing with negative factors, another tool discussed was the importance of spirituality when dealing with stressors.

Sergeant Joshua C. Collins, hygiene equipment operator, Support Company, 1st Combat Engineer Battalion, 1st Marine Division, served in Fallujah and recounted losing a Marine close to him in combat.

"When you lose someone you deploy with, you can't describe the hurt inside," said Collins.

He added that when he returned it was hard to explain what he went through with his family and friends who remained stateside. Collins said it was his spirituality that guided him through this very difficult phase of his life.

"Through my two tours in Iraq, I got the mission accomplished through Jesus Christ who strengthens me," Collins said.

Sergeant Andrew B. Williams, substance abuse counselor, Maintenance Battalion, 2nd Force Service Support Group, also served in the Middle East and can relate to how the other Marines have dealt and are dealing with the effects of stressors resulting from the Corps' operational tempo.

Williams described coming across a lot of Marines who witnessed traumatic events in theater and how many of them tried to cover up their emotions by not dealing with them at all.
Throughout the course, some of the speakers, many combat veterans from the Vietnam War-era, relayed experiences that the NCOs today were going through.

After his return, Williams admitted being more temperamental, depressed and having a "why me?" mentality but is currently undergoing counseling with his wife to deal with his emotions. While he said there were many things left to resolve, he is positive he will be able to work out the issues.

After taking the course, Williams said he now has better tools to help junior Marines before and after they deploy.

"A lot of Marines came back, and no one knew how to identify (the risks)," said Williams, a native of LaGrange, Ga. "The conference was a good idea, especially for the junior leaders of the Marine Corps.

"The more education I have, the better I am for the battalion. Good NCOs breed good NCOs. The better we improve ourselves, the better our younger Marines will be."

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,abuse

Stress and Psychological Readiness in Post-Cold War Operations
FARIS R. KIRKLAND, RONALD R. HALVERSON, and PAUL D. BLIESE

The increased frequency and variety of military interventions since the end of the Cold War have brought changes in the causes, management, and operational significance of psychological stress on soldiers. Research has found that all of the types of operations--combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian, and governmental support--conducted since 1989 have imposed stress.[1] In the past, conscripted soldiers fought their war and then were discharged to the civil sector--along with any stress disorders they may have developed. In the future, it is likely that soldiers will participate in more than one operation in a single enlistment. Commanders depend on them to be psychologically ready to carry out the next deployment. Responsibility for the management of soldiers' stress lies with command--with the support of the chaplaincy and military medical mental health professionals. This is not a trivial responsibility; management of stress and protection against post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are critical to maintaining the operational readiness of the force.[2] In this article we will discuss the stress imposed by various types of post-Cold War operations, and the measures that have proved to be successful in managing soldiers' reactions to them.

Stresses Imposed by Military Operations

Commanders and physicians have been wrestling with the psychological effects of combat since the Civil War.[3] Dr. Jonathan Shay and Lieutenant Colonel David Grossman, working from data on Vietnam veterans, have recently updated the factors that cause combat stress disorders (CSD) and PTSD. Shay contends that a soldier's principal source of stress in Vietnam was betrayal by his own leaders of values he understood to be the moral foundation of the war.[4] Grossman found taking the life of an enemy soldier to be the most stressful event a soldier encounters.[5] Both agree that the death or maiming of comrades and continuous fear, fatigue, filth, and hunger are stressors. Post-Cold War campaigns have not entailed prolonged combat, but they have imposed new kinds of stress. Sudden transitions from peace to war, and interventions with ambiguous objectives, can make it difficult for soldiers to develop clear attitudes about the values underlying a campaign. Furthermore, little is known about how soldiers and their families will cope in an era of frequent deployments. One set of evidence, from the Persian Gulf War, indicates that unresolved reactions to trauma in previous campaigns makes soldiers more vulnerable to stress in subsequent operations.[6] But research on soldiers in Haiti indicates that multiple deployments do not affect soldiers' psychological well-being.[7] Many such questions remain open, and they demonstrate the complexity of the origins of CSD and PTSD. It is essential that command and the medical community remain active in studying the psychological effects of combat and noncombat operations.

Panama (1989-1990)

In 1989 a force of about 20,000 US combat troops defeated and dismantled the entire Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) in 48 hours of hard infantry fighting (Operation Just Cause). Rules of engagement were strict to minimize civilian casualties and collateral damage, but they increased the risk to US servicemen.[8] The soldiers understood the purpose of the rules, often conceded the first shot to the PDF, and took pride in their fire discipline. Though the period of combat was brief, several soldiers reported psychological distress and turbulent postdeployment relations with their families.[9]

The most severe stress reactions were among soldiers who had killed PDF personnel. Some were agitated: "That night he was punching the wall and crying." Others withdrew: "He was dazed after shooting a PDF soldier--a perfect shot. But he didn't want to talk about it." The emotional pressure on the few US soldiers who killed was exacerbated by their isolation and by their compassion for the PDF.

Irrespective of whether friendly casualties were caused by enemy fire, friendly fire, or accident, soldiers and leaders expressed their helplessness and grief through rage toward the PDF. A comment typical of those whose comrades had been killed by any cause was: "If we hadn't been able to shoot at the PDF we'd have fallen apart." Leaders and medical aidmen--those who saw keeping others alive as their responsibility--experienced guilt and worried about whether they could have done more to prevent death. Open expression of grief was possible in some companies. Soldiers in one unit reported that during their memorial service, "There wasn't a dry eye in the place. The company commander spoke, and he broke down. That helped." But in other units different cultural values limited expression: "I'm sure people were sad, but we all felt it would be a sign of weakness to cry." Post-traumatic stress reactions followed familiar patterns: insomnia, nightmares, irritability, hyperalertness. Some soldiers kept a weapon within reach after returning to the United States. They dealt with their emotions not by expressing them but by vigorous activity--to distract their thoughts and to help them sleep. Some NCOs said they thought that many soldiers had problems with what they had seen and done in Panama; they worried that the "quiet ones" were likely to be the most distressed.

Management of post-traumatic stress reactions was complicated by a pervasive belief that admitting to having psychological problems would be damaging to one's military career. Most of the soldiers who described stress symptoms to debriefing teams said they would never go to a mental health clinic. Though most soldiers trusted chaplains, psychiatrists were suspect.

For the spouses and children who remained at home, the absence of soldiers imposed severe strains. When the soldiers returned, roles within the families had to be renegotiated. These negotiations were complicated by the irritability and tension the soldiers brought back with them. Chaplains in some brigades reported increases in the incidence of divorce, abuse of spouses, and spouses returning to their parents' homes.

Persian Gulf (1990-1991)

During the six months of Operation Desert Shield the Army Medical Department strove to bring divisional and corps mental health teams up to strength. Mental health professionals made a serious, and often successful, effort to establish their usefulness in the eyes of commanders. In addition to preparing to return stress casualties to duty, they worked with units to strengthen soldiers' resistance to stress and thereby prevented many such casualties from occurring.[10]

The principal stressors were similar but not identical to those encountered in Panama. Desert Shield exposed soldiers to a harsh environment in which fatigue and discomfort were exacerbated by fear of Iraqi chemical weapons.[11] During Desert Storm the most severe trauma came from experiencing the death or maiming of comrades.[12] Stress from killing enemy soldiers was mitigated because much of the killing was done indirectly in engagements between combat vehicles rather than face-to-face. Further, most of the soldiers in units that fought participated in killing, so the killers were not isolated. Finally, units had trained together for months to fight a specific adversary. In spite of these mitigating factors, many soldiers were distressed by seeing Iraqi soldiers mutilated on the battlefield.[13]

Following the ground war in Iraq, mental health personnel were proactive in facilitating and conducting post-battle and post-trauma debriefings. They taught leaders how to recognize and deal with "cease-fire letdown," a reaction to the decrease in tension after combat in which some soldiers engage in daredevil behavior. This behavior, which led to death and injuries, was identified for the first time following the Gulf War.[14]

Experience in the Persian Gulf War confirmed previous findings in Israel and Vietnam that reservists and members of rear-area service units are more vulnerable to post-battle stress reactions than are Active Army and combat soldiers.[15] Many of the reserve units mobilized for the Persian Gulf received a large number of fillers just before deploying, which weakened unit cohesion.[16] Though members of reserve component units were at higher risk for PTSD, most reserve units were demobilized rapidly upon return to the United States. They were given no time to experience recognition as members of the unit, to celebrate as a group, or to work through their experiences in debriefings.[17]

A survey of 4264 veterans of the Persian Gulf War found that 69 percent had experienced intrusive memories and dreams, 37 percent reported avoidance of memories or emotional detachment, 46 percent were troubled by irritability, insomnia, or hypervigilance, and 26 percent reported they had experienced all of these symptoms of PTSD.[18] Soldiers with unresolved stress reactions from an earlier conflict and those wounded during Desert Storm were in particular need of post-battle debriefing to reduce the likelihood of PTSD.[19]

Somalia (1992-1993)

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia is often perceived as a humanitarian relief effort. It was indeed so for the non-governmental organizations that distributed food and treated the sick. But for the US Army, it was a combat operation to assure the security of the relief workers and to quell fighting between the indigenous factions. More US soldiers were killed in Somalia than in Panama, and per capita, the casualty rate in Somalia was higher than in the Persian Gulf War. Even when they were not in actual combat, soldiers often faced hostile words and gestures from mobs of Somalis at close quarters.

Research conducted with soldiers in Somalia indicates that they were well prepared to witness privation, starvation, and despair on a catastrophic scale, and the few who were exposed handled these tragedies without psychological damage.[20] Most soldiers took pride in coping with the harsh climate, pervasive danger, and persistent casualties. The principal stressors reported were relative deprivation, an ambiguous mission, belief that their superiors did not trust them, uncertainty about how long they would be there, lack of resources to do their jobs, separation from family and friends, and a sense of having failed to do anything significant for the Somalis.[21]

Complaints about lack of mission-relevant resources specified poor maps and other intelligence materials, inadequate information about aspects of the mission being executed by other units, and insufficient numbers of interpreters and troops to carry out the numerous missions assigned.[22] Lack of information about the progress of the expedition as a whole was one facet of the troops' perception that their commanders did not trust them. An order that male and female soldiers were to sleep in separate tents was also perceived by many as lack of trust and, in addition, it impugned their professionalism. They knew that soldiers of both sexes had shared tents in Desert Storm.

The cumulative effect of deficiencies in trust, resources, and information was a sense of failure and disillusionment. This did not reflect well on command in two ways. First, the soldiers had not failed. They had maintained their poise and discipline, provided a measure of order, and assured that in most of the country the mission of alleviating the famine was accomplished. Because a sense of failure can sap morale, erode cohesion, and possibly compromise the future psychological readiness of the units, it is essential that soldiers have accurate feedback on their performance. Second, failure is certainly possible, but when it occurs it should be handled constructively, as an opportunity to learn.

Disillusionment was not the inevitable consequence of service in Somalia. Members of a Greek medical company that deployed to Somalia, and that suffered a fatality, were uniformly positive about their experience.[23] The Greeks' experience differed from the Americans' in many respects. The Greeks had a clearly defined and achievable mission, a mission for which the members of the unit were specifically trained, and a mission that provided the Greek soldiers opportunities to help Somalis. The Greeks believed they had been successful, and this belief was confirmed by the Somalis' expressions of appreciation. To the extent that US commanders can structure missions to embody characteristics such as these, they will reduce stress and strengthen morale and satisfaction among their soldiers.

Croatia (1992-1993)

Most of the deployments since the end of the Cold War have been for peacekeeping (Sinai, Macedonia, Bosnia), support of United Nations or national civilian governments, (Croatia, Haiti), or humanitarian relief (Rwanda). Combat was not part of these interventions, so the participants did not have to cope with the psychological effects of killing enemy soldiers or the death or injury of comrades. Nonetheless there was often an undercurrent of danger, and some soldiers experienced fatigue, filth, and hunger--but never on the scale encountered in combat. At the end of 1992 the 212th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) deployed to Zagreb, Croatia, to provide medical services for the 20,000 members of the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia.[24] The 212th MASH was the core unit of a medical task force with a full range of medical capabilities. Though there was often gunfire nearby, and any unpaved ground had to be treated as infested with mines, the unit was on an airport protected by UN combat units. No members of the 212th MASH Task Force engaged in combat or became casualties.

The principal source of stress was a Byzantine command structure. Above the 212th MASH there was a proliferation of headquarters and three separate chains of command. The Army chain of command was through 68th Medical Group to III Corps Support Command to V Corps. The hospital with its attachments comprised Joint Task Force Provide Promise (Forward), which had its own command staff. The Task Force reported to US European Command. The Task Force was also under the operational control of the Force Medical Officer of the UN Protection Force.

A few vignettes illustrate how the command structure affected the troops: (1) The mission proved to require only 20 percent of the capabilities of the task force, but command vetoed suggestions to offer humanitarian treatment to injured Yugoslavs or to send medical teams into the field to treat UN personnel. (2) Junior enlisted personnel were subject to a unit chain of command and a hospital chain of command that often spoke with different voices, and the information from each passed through so many levels that it was often garbled. (3) The hospital commander authorized seven-day leaves to Germany. After the policy had been in effect three months, someone at a higher headquarters learned of it and complained that he had not been consulted. There was a threat that leaves already approved would be canceled, but ultimately the leave policy was approved provided that the manning level of the hospital was maintained at a higher level. (4) The Task Force staff, though it had only one unit to supervise, took for itself comfortable offices in pre-fab structures or permanent buildings. The hospital staff, which had a real mission, had to do its work in crowded tents. (5) The numerous commanders invited generals, politicians, and reporters to inspect 212th MASH. The troops saw these visits as self-promoting, not as aimed at recognizing the work of junior personnel or assisting in the accomplishment of the mission.

Among the attachments to 212th MASH was a mental health specialist from the US Army Medical Research Unit-Europe. He reported that he observed no apparent symptoms of stress among the soldiers who deployed to Croatia. But the soldiers had witnessed a major medical resource standing idle while sick and injured people suffered. They knew their own time and abilities were being wasted, and they saw their unit used as a backdrop for photo opportunities for senior officials. Their contributions, passive though they were through no fault of their own, went unrecognized. The effects of the top-heavy command structure have not been measured empirically, but the anecdotal evidence indicates that they could have compromised morale, cohesion, and psychological readiness.

Haiti (1994-1996)

Though the deployment to Haiti (Operation Uphold Democracy) was planned as a forced entry using helicopters launched from an aircraft carrier, the reality was a minimally dangerous operation in support of the civilian government.[25] The principal sources of stress reported were living conditions, separation from family, the ambiguity of the mission, and the command climate in certain units.

Eighty-four percent of soldiers surveyed two months into the mission complained about poor sanitation: insufficient numbers of portable toilets, toilets that were rarely emptied, foul water, and no showers. Seventy-four percent of the soldiers worried about contracting life-threatening diseases.[26] There were numerous comments about inadequate and monotonous food. Relative deprivation was an issue. Some enlisted soldiers thought that officers lived in air-conditioned quarters, and that enlisted members of other services lived in greater comfort than they themselves did.[27] Poor living conditions characterized the early stages of the deployment, but were improved as the theater matured.

Many combat soldiers perceived the mission to be pointless, to be unrelated to their military qualifications, and to be prolonged excessively. Several expressed disillusionment because they did not think the activities of the Army did anything to improve the lives or prospects of the Haitians.[28] Some leaders were unable to provide their subordinates with information that could have convinced them that their contributions were important or that their discomforts served a purpose. Some junior soldiers believed that the emphasis on force protection, which included a requirement to wear complete body armor in hot weather, was unnecessary. A relatively large number of soldiers and junior leaders complained of being micromanaged and the lack of trust that it implied. A theme in many soldiers' comments was that they were treated like children.[29]

Some complained that senior commanders inappropriately treated the operation as a maximum effort that transcended any personal needs of their subordinates. Specifically, soldiers were forced to deploy when they had only joined their units a few days before and had not had time to settle their families, and soldiers who had children born during the deployment were not permitted to return to be with their wives for the birth process.

In spite of their complaints, a majority of the soldiers supported the mission in Haiti, and almost all performed their duties in a professional manner.[30] Standardized and well-respected measures of psychological well- being indicated that soldiers showed less evidence of stress in Haiti, where there was no danger, than in Somalia, where there was danger, and much less than in Operation Desert Shield, where serious danger lay in the immediate future. This finding is anything but surprising, but there is a lesson in the deployments that did not involve combat: most stress is avoidable if commanders implement basic precepts of leadership--taking care of the troops, making sure that troops' time, energy, and abilities are used productively, and telling troops the whole truth early and often. When the whole truth is that the leader does not know, he or she should say so.

Managing Stress

An Army Medical System Program Review conducted in 1984-85 developed doctrine and organization for the control of combat stress in high-intensity, fast-moving operations on the lethal battlefields expected in a war with the Soviet Union.[31] However, by 1989 when the current pattern of frequent intervention began, little training had taken place, few mental health positions were staffed, and the single Active Army mental health detachment existed only on paper. During Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm, commanders, chaplains, and mental health professionals responded to the need for combat stress control on an ad hoc basis. They found that in managing combat stress the key process was debriefing, with validation and decompression playing supporting roles. The fragmentary evidence from the deployments to Somalia, Croatia, and Haiti suggests that validation is most important, with debriefing and decompression in support.

Validation

Validation is the set of efforts to reassure soldiers that their actions and feelings in performance of their duties were acceptable. Validation is an essential prerequisite to enable combat veterans to put their horror, fear, doubt, guilt, and shame behind them; it is also the most important factor in preserving vertical cohesion during and after peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. We have identified three categories of validation that appear to be effective in mitigating combat stress: substantive, institutional, and commemorative.

Substantive validation comes from the comrades and immediate leaders with whom the soldier participated in the operation: "We sat around with Sergeant P and went over what we did. He'd say things like `That must have scared you,' and I'd think, `Yeah,' and somebody else would say he felt scared and then it would seem like, okay, I wasn't any more yellow than anyone else." This type of validation is similar to debriefing, but it can continue for a prolonged period after the event: "We had a secret place for the platoon and we fixed it up. We'd go there at night and talk it through. The lieutenant always came. Little by little I got less uptight."

Institutional validation is the process of conferring the approval of the Army, the government, and the public on the soldier. It is a responsibility of command to see that soldiers and units who endured great stress and made significant contributions receive awards. It is equally important that senior commanders assure that all of their units receive attention in the news media. Several soldiers who participated in combat deployments voiced the opinion that since their units had received no television coverage, "We might as well not have been here." Soldiers who carry out the noncombat interventions that attract less attention have more pressing needs for institutional validation, and commanders will have to exert more effort to arrange that they get it.

Commemorative validation is for soldiers who have died. Its importance lies in the affection that the survivors have for the departed, and in soldiers' awareness that they are in a rough business, that they might be next, and that they do not want to be forgotten. Commemorative validation consists of memorial services and shrines in the unit. Memorials must be handled with regard for the feelings of those who were closest to the deceased. Memorials can strengthen cohesion, but it is easy to make mistakes that alienate the troops: "The company service in Panama was healing. But the colonel had another back home. All the senior brass came, and the press. It looked like a photo opportunity for the Old Man. Bunch of PR bullcrap."

Validation proved to be elusive in Somalia, Croatia, and Haiti. The most likely reason is that interventions that do not include fighting will leave many combat soldiers feeling insecure. Their competence in mission-related activities is the foundation of their confidence and their source of positive feedback. Dependent as always on their leaders, they look to them to validate the deployment, their discomfort, and their separation from their families.

The leaders' task in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations is to minimize their troops' discomforts while validating those that they must endure and trying to engage in activities whose validity is evident. It is a confusing task, because there may be little apparent validity inherent in the operation, and what valid action is possible may be foreign to the expertise of the unit. Soldiers have shown that they can adapt to unfamiliar missions, and that they will do jobs even when they think they are not appropriate for them. They will take the stress. But vertical cohesion, which is the strongest buffer against stress, starts to unravel when leaders are not candid or make demands that are manifestly unreasonable without acknowledging their unreasonableness.

Successful validation lies in honesty from the top down, discretion for subordinate leaders to make decisions about the welfare of their troops, and a command climate that supports treating troops with the respect due professional colleagues. Commanders must distinguish between a war in which the success of the mission and the survival of personnel are dependent on every team being complete, and an operation in which the military presence is more symbolic. For example, when commanders decree that an arbitrary percentage of soldiers must deploy, they limit their subordinate commanders' ability to take care of their troops. They also demonstrate disdain for the welfare of newly arrived junior soldiers whose families are not yet settled.

Empowering subordinate leaders with discretion in personnel matters is a more powerful leadership tool than is policy. Policy provides a basis for equitable treatment, and it takes the monkey off the commander's back. Basing personnel actions on impersonal policies works in a mass army that discharges its soldiers after a war. But soldiers in a professional army stay, and they depend on each other. Trust, respect, and personal consideration across ranks are the bases of vertical cohesion. It is less important that soldiers know they are entitled to 30 days to get their families settled before deploying than that they know they can trust their commanders to respect their individual situations. The monkey belongs on the commander's back. A commander who has the authority to care for each soldier in the way that he or she needs can reconcile the urgency of the mission with the soldier's situation. The tyranny of policy can render commanders powerless to protect cohesion in their units.

Debriefing

Debriefing has facilitated recovery from combat stress for centuries. In the 1900s soldiers went off to war, fought, and returned with their regiments. During long sea voyages and overland marches they could talk through their experiences, detoxify traumatic events, and receive reassurance about their fears and behavior from the most credible of authorities--the men who had been with them in combat. But in 1917 the US Army introduced individual replacement, in 1944 individual rotation home, and in 1951 fixed-length tours in combat zones. These policies progressively isolated soldiers from their social supports, weakened cohesion in units, and complicated the management of post-operational stress. In the most developed form of these policies, during the war in Vietnam, most soldiers went home by air. There was no time to detoxify their experiences even if, by chance, a comrade or two went with them. Combined with the moral ambiguities and cultural confusion in the Army that existed during the War in Vietnam, these policies led to an unprecedented number of veterans with PTSD.[32]

Since 1989 most units have gone into action together, come home together, and for the most part stayed together after the operation. In addition, most units routinely employ after-action reviews (AARs)--comprehensive debriefings in which everyone participates, regardless of rank. Intended to enhance performance by immediate analyses of training and operational events and to strengthen cohesion by honest acknowledgment and acceptance of errors, AARs also get the sources of guilt and shame out in the open. One soldier said: "I thought I had really blown it when Smitty got hit, but we went over it in the AAR and everybody said they would have done the same thing I did."[33] During and after Desert Storm, mental health professionals conducted supplementary debriefings for groups that had experienced particularly stressful events.[34] Debriefings are useful in managing stress in noncombat operations when soldiers are exposed to traumatic events, and when commanders need feedback about their troops' perceptions of complex or ambiguous missions.

Decompression

There is general agreement that decompression leave following combat is essential. In the words of one particularly distinguished young officer, "Soldiers need time to dream away the emotional storms they experienced."[35] But few commanders recognize the need for decompression time when there has been no combat. One of the primary purposes of decompression leave is the reintegration of families. Whether the soldier deploys for a combat or a noncombat mission, the family experiences anxiety and has to reorganize to function without him or her. Uninterrupted time together, predictable duty schedules, and the help of family support groups can facilitate reintegration. The sensitivity of leaders to their subordinates' needs for decompression leave can solidify or fragment vertical cohesion.

Conclusion

Research conducted on the human dimensions of the Army indicates that it is beginning to handle the stresses of post-Cold War operations fairly well. Many leaders have experienced the power of cohesion to protect soldiers against stress and are making efforts to keep their units intact before, during, and after operations. Some first sergeants may even think twice before breaking up squads to cross-level their platoons. After-Action Reviews are in general use. They improve efficiency, cement cohesion, reduce stress, and alleviate guilt. Leaders have seen, or perhaps experienced, the problems soldiers and their families have putting their lives back together after a deployment. The same processes--debriefings, validation, and decompression--that alleviate soldiers' combat stress also work to alleviate family members' anxieties and strain. And as the stresses are lifted, both soldiers' and families' emotional resources are liberated to support each other.[36]

The Army Medical Department has a sound doctrine for assisting units that have faced severe stress. It has trained some people to work with line units, and some psychiatrists are getting out of their offices and into the field.[37] During the Persian Gulf War there was cooperation rather than avoidance among commanders, chaplains, and mental health professionals. The bottom line is that the Army is getting better at handling the stress arising from killing, taking casualties, and living in fear and misery.

It is noteworthy that during the post-Cold War era, there have been almost no instances of stress arising from soldiers feeling betrayed by their own leaders. This is important because that is the kind of stress that was the primary source of PTSD and moral disintegration in the Vietnam-era Army.[38] Though we have a lot to learn about stress experienced by soldiers in noncombat interventions, it does appear that some of it is self-inflicted, and that prevention is the key. Prevention will require the same kind of leadership behavior that fosters the development of cohesion--honesty and trust across ranks, respect down as well as up the line, empowerment of subordinates, technical competence, sharing of hardships, and attention to the personal, professional, and familial welfare of one's troops.

It is hard for leaders to keep their bearings when they have missions that have nothing to do with the expertise of the unit, when there is evidence all around of misery, helplessness, and corruption, and when no one in the unit knows what to do about it. If the purpose of the mission is not clear, it becomes almost impossible for leaders to validate their soldiers' sacrifices and exertions. In the closely knit web of interdependence that is a military unit, if leaders lose their bearings and are less than honest with the troops, trust will wither and vertical cohesion will start to fray. This is a real problem, because the Army will continue to be charged with executing missions that arise from complex political negotiations. Guidelines will often be inconsistent or even contradictory. The solution is for everyone, from the senior commander down, to describe the situation accurately. Then all soldiers can respond on the basis of a common view of reality rather than wondering anxiously whether they are in synch with the current set of euphemisms. Validation is possible only in terms of the soldiers' actual experience; to be less than candid is to be disrespectful of the soldiers' intelligence and risk compromising the vital bond of trust that unites leaders and subordinates.


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NOTES

Authors' note: The research which forms the basis for this article was conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research between 1990 and 1995. The authors wish to express their appreciation to the former Chief of the Department of Military Psychiatry, Dr. David H. Marlowe, for his support and guidance of the research effort. The authors also wish to express their thanks to Colonel Robert K. Gifford, the present Chief of the Department, for his substantive contributions to the data, for his observations based on personal experience in the operations discussed in the article, and for his assistance in refining the text.

1. The Department of Military Psychiatry of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research has conducted comprehensive survey research, interviews, and participant observation with US Army troops following Operation Just Cause in Panama, during and after Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, during Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope in Somalia, and during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti as well as smaller scale research with troops on almost every deployment since 1989.

2. Robert N. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 33, 35-36, 380.

3. Franklin D. Jones, "Traditional Warfare Combat Stress Casualties" in F. D. Jones, L. R. Sparacino, V. L. Wilcox, and J. M. Rothberg, War Psychiatry. Textbook of Military Medicine, Part I, Vol. 6 (Washington: Office of the Surgeon General, US Army, 1995), pp. 36-61.

4. Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (New York: Scribner, 1994), pp. 5-22, 69-76.

5. David A. Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Little, Brown, 1995), pp. 66-76, 87-95.

6. Amy B. Adler, Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms in U.S. Veterans of the Gulf War (Heidelberg, Germany: US Army Medical Research Unit-Europe Research Report # 20, 15 February 1994).

7. Leonard Wong, Paul D. Bliese, and Ronald R. Halverson, "Multiple Deployments: Do They Make a Difference?" paper presented at the Biannual Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, October 1995.

8. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 390, 406; Malcolm McConnell, Just Cause (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 31, 25, 94, 166, 295; Lorenzo Crowell, "The Anatomy of Just Cause: The Forces Involved, the Adequacy of Intelligence, and Its Success as a Joint Operation," in Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras, Operation Just Cause: The U.S. Intervention in Panama (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 81-82.

9. The discussion of stress reactions in Operation Just Cause is based on research by the Department of Military Psychiatry of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR). WRAIR teams interviewed more than 800 soldiers of all ranks from ten infantry battalions and two military police companies that had participated in Just Cause. The research caught the units in the midst of reentry just after they returned to their home stations. Basic data are summarized in Faris R. Kirkland and Morten G. Ender, "Analysis of Interview Data from Operation Just Cause" (Washington: working paper available from the Department of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, June 1991); a summary is in Faris R. Kirkland, Morton G. Ender, Robert K. Gifford, Kathleen M. Wright, and David H. Marlowe, "Human Dimensions of Rapid Force Projection: Operation Just Cause, December 1989," Military Review, 76 (March-April 1996), 57-64.

10. L. S. Holsenbeck, "PSYCH-FORCE 90: The OM (Combat Stress) Team in the Gulf," The Journal of the U.S. Army Medical Department (March-April 1992), pp. 32-36; James A. Martin and Gregory Belenky, "After-Action Critical Incident Stress Debriefings and Battle Reconstructions Following Combat," and Loree Sutton and Daniel W. Clark, "Combat Psychiatry in the 1st Armored Division," in James A. Martin, Linette R. Sparacino, and Gregory Belenky, A Shield in the Storm: Mental Health in the Gulf War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, in press).

11. Scales, pp. 119-21.

12. James A. Martin, Mark A. Vaitkus, David H. Marlowe, Paul T. Bartone, Robert K. Gifford, and Kathleen M. Wright, "Psychological Well-Being Among U.S. Soldiers Deployed from Germany to the Gulf War," The Journal of the U.S. Army Medical Department (September-October 1992), pp. 29-34.

13. Thomas Taylor, Lightning in the Storm: The 101st Air Assault Division in the Gulf War (New York: Hippocrene, 1994), pp. 346, 351-55; Scales, p. 353; Kirkland and Ender, p. 19.

14. Sutton and Clark.

15. Holsenbeck; Martin and Belenky.

16. Ian Robbins, "Factors Affecting Psychological Health in the Gulf War Combat Zone," and James Pecanno and Deborah Hickey, "Stress Debriefings Following Death from Unexploded Ordnance" in Martin, Sparacino, and Belenky.

17. Holsenbeck.

18. Adler.

19. Paul A. Newhouse and Paula Howie, "Psychiatric Consultation to Wounded Soldiers Evacuated to the U.S.," in Martin, Sparacino, and Belenky; Holsenbeck; Pecanno and Hickey.

20. Robert K. Gifford, James N. Jackson, and Kathleen B. DeShazo, "Field Research During Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope," paper presented at the 35th Annual Conference of the Military Testing Association, Williamsburg, Va., 15-18 November 1993, p. 2.

21. Gifford, Jackson, and DeShazo, pp. 3-4.

22. Martin N. Stanton, "A Riot in Wanwaylen: Lessons Learned," Army, December 1994, pp. 24-30.

23. D. Smokovitis, "Greek Armed Forces in Somalia: Humanitarian Relief Operation," paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, 22-24 October 1993.

24. Bradley M. Powers, Mark A. Vaitkus, and James A. Martin, "Observations from a U.S. Army Medical Unit Deployed to Support the U.N. Protection Force in Croatia," paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, 22-24 October 1993.

25. Raoul Archambault, III, "Joint Operations in Haiti," Army, November 1995, pp. 22-29.

26. Ronald R. Halverson, Paul D. Bliese, Robert E. Moore, and Carl A. Castro, Psychological Well-Being and Physical Health Symptoms of Soldiers Deployed for Operation Uphold Democracy: A Summary of Human Dimensions Research in Haiti (Alexandria, Va.: Defense Technical Information Center, 17 May 1995) (ADA # 298125) pp. 15-16.

27. Ronald Halverson, Robert Moore, John Valentine, Glen Litman, Mark Duncan, and Lathan Newkirk, Verbatim Comments (N=2650) from Soldiers Deployed for Operation Uphold Democracy: Sorted by Content, Tone, and Unit Type (Washington: Dept. of Military Psychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, 5 June 1995), pp. 2-3, 9-10, 25, 30.

28. Halverson, Moore, et al., pp. 73-106.

29. Ibid., pp. 22-34.

30. Ronald R. Halverson and Paul D. Bliese, "Determinants of Soldier Support for Operation Uphold Democracy," Armed Forces and Society, forthcoming.

31. James M. Stokes, "U.S. Army Mental-Health System: Army Divisional and Corps-Level Mental-Health Units," in Martin, Sparacino, and Belenky.

32. R. A. Kulka et al., Executive Summary: Contractual Report of Findings from the National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study (Research Triangle Park: Research Triangle Institute, 1988).

33. Interview with a private first class following Operation Just Cause.

34. Martin and Belenky, Pecanno and Hickey, Newhouse and Howie.

35. Interview with platoon leader whose platoon had suffered casualties in Operation Just Cause.

36. Faris R. Kirkland and Pearl Katz, "Combat Readiness and the Army Family," Military Review, 69 (April 1989), 65, 74.

37. David C. Ruck, "18th Airborne Corps OM Team," and Spencer J. Campbell and Charles C. Engel, Jr., "Combat Psychiatry the `First Team' Way: First Cavalry Division Mental Health Operations During the Persian Gulf War," in Martin, Sparacino, and Belenky; see also chapters by Stokes, and by Sutton and Clark, in the same volume.

38. US Department of the Army, Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army War College, 1970), pp. iii-iv.


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Lieutenant Colonel Faris R. Kirkland is a retired artillery officer who served in the wars in Korea and Vietnam. His A.B. is from Princeton University and his Ph.D. is from the University of Pennsylvania.

Captain Ronald R. Halverson is a research psychologist at the Department of Military Psychiatry at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. He is a graduate of St. Norbert's College and earned his Ph.D. from De Paul University.

Captain Paul D. Bliese also is a research psychologist at the Department of Military Psychiatry at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. He holds a B.A. from Texas Lutheran College and a Ph.D. from Texas Tech University.


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http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Paramet...er/kirkland.htm

By your attitude Marine I take it that your in favor of these kinds of things. Well as a veteran I'm not I'm discusted to be quite honest.

What are they teaching the troops now days marine? Do you condone this? Is this the impression you want the rest of the world to have of us?

Is this the soldiers fault or is this an attitude reflected by their higher ups and carried out by the troops?

You can print your marine bulletins till your blue in the face but it won't disguise the truth!

I put it down to the heresy being taught as Christian fundamentalism. They think that accepting the Lord Jesus Christ is a ticket to Heaven no matter how you behave in life. It reminds me of the ancient Greeks' heresy of Gnosticism (I hope there are no religious education experts reading this and correcting me) but they believed that they had the Knowledge and that this special knowledge would get them to Heaven. The fact that both are wrong is not much comfort once you are in Hell for having not equipped yourself with the correct knowledge , that is, that we have to keep a few rules written in the Bible...like Love thy Neighbour...And who is my neighbour?....(Go and look it up yourself it might make the difference between Hell and Heaven for ETERNITY) Heresy = wrong. Since America is supposed to be a Christian country, the Christians should start to study their Bibles.

LazyBoy while I would love to debate that. we were talking about The American image overseas.

Hawaii MPs give ways to crack down on local crime
Submitted by: MCB Hawaii
Story Identification #: 20031113205629
Story by Provost Marshals Office



MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII, KANEOHE BAY, Hawai (Nov. 14, 2003) -- Burglary is a crime of opportunity, and no one ever has plans to be the victim of crime. We would all like to think that we are safe and secure and not susceptible to crime wherever we live.
Unfortunately, in today's world, that isn't the case.

Crime can and does happen in the best of neighborhoods - including Marine Corps family housing neighborhoods. However, property crimes in housing communities on MCB Hawaii continue to happen less frequently than elsewhere in Hawaii.

Still, one crime is one crime too many.
There are things that everyone can do to deter would-be burglars and criminals. An essential ingredient in reducing crime is teamwork between military police and housing residents. Also, residents can be more pro-active in their community.

"Eyes on" awareness is the key to maintaining our way of life. This community approach is crucial to fighting crime and terrorism. Everyone can help the Military Police Department foster a safe environment for our families.

Military police are asking you, the community, to assist in providing information concerning suspicious activity. This request is part of MCB Hawaii's "Let Freedom Ring" program. Timely reporting of suspicious or criminal activity will increase the installation's awareness as well as deter any future illegal activity.

You can contact military police, 24 hours a day, every day of the year, at (808) 257-7114 or by e-mail at lfr@mcbh.us mc.mil.

Another key to deterring crime is to get involved in the neighborhood crime watch program.

Residents who do not have a program in place in their community can call 257-8556 for more information on how to get one started.

Statistics prove that crime in communities with an active neighborhood crime watch program is substantially lower than in neighborhoods that do not have crime watch programs.

The neighborhood crime watch program uses total citizen participants and involvement to combat crime in residential areas. Military police stress the importance of housing residents being aware of what is happening in their neighborhoods.

Housing residents can help to protect themselves by knowing their neighborhood. Residents should know who belongs and who does not, what cars are parked where and at what time of day, and if there is a suspicious person or vehicle driving down the street.

Suspicious people or vehicles could turn out to be a visitor or lost motorist. Or perhaps, they could be potential burglars or car thieves looking for an opportunity to commit a crime.

The crime watch program can only be as good as the support it receives from neighborhood residents. If a family needs assistance, it would want its neighbor to call for help. Therefore, do respond to your neighbor's needs, as you would want them to respond to yours. In this instance, it's O.K. to be the "nosy neighbor."

Neighborhood Crime Watch Goals

The program is based on the following goals:

(1) To increase public education concerning local problems and effective preventative measures that lead to improved residential security.

(2) To implement community-based programs that are designed to increase the level of community awareness.

(3) To identify and develop effective programs that increase the crime prevention posture of the community.

(4) To enhance relations between the military police and the community.

The crime prevention section at the Military Police Department can train residents to recognize and report suspicious activities in their neighborhood.

This section also has residential security checklists available for your use. The checklist is designed to help you conduct a security survey of your home, whether or not you choose to participate in a neighborhood crime watch program.


Crime Prevention Tips

The following common sense tips are provided to help residents avoid becoming victims of crime:

-Roll your car windows up and lock the doors.

-Don't leave valuables in your car.

-Don't leave expensive toys, bicycles, tools, etc., unsecured in an opened garage or carport.

-Use proper exterior lighting.

-Clear away or trim overgrown bushes and shrubs that could be used as hiding places.

-Leave a light on when leaving for a substantial period of time.

-Lock all exterior residence doors when asleep or leaving your home.

-Consider using a timer to control interior lighting.

-Close all windows when you leave your home.

-Don't leave valuables in plain view when you leave your home.

-Participate in Operation Identification, which is a program that allows you to mark your high valuable items with an engraver to deter a thief from stealing them or to identify your valuables if they are recovered by military police.

-Don't leave a spare key concealed outside your home.

-Don't label your car or residential keys with your home address.

-If you going to leave your residence, have a friend or neighbor pick up your mail, put your trash cans out on scheduled days, collect your newspapers and perhaps cut your grass.

-Arrange to have security checks conducted of your residence by military police by contacting the MCB Hawaii Base Housing Office.

Neighborhood crime watch programs do work, so be a concerned citizen.

For emergencies dial 911. For non-emergencies, call Crime Stoppers at (808) 257-7114.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,crime

October Proclaimed Crime Prevention Month in Hawaii, Marine honored for services
Submitted by: Marine Forces Pacific
Story Identification #: 2005929213714
Story by Lance Cpl. R. Drew Hendricks



U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES PACIFIC, CAMP H. M. SMITH, Hawaii (Sept. 29, 2005) -- Hawaii Lieutenant Governor James R. “Duke” Aiona, Jr. signed a proclamation commemorating Crime Prevention Month October 2005 and McGruff’s 25th Anniversary in Crime Prevention, Sept. 27.

McGruff the Crime Dog, along with programs like Drug Abuse Resistance Education and Drug Education for Youth, have been molding the young minds of America’s youth for many years.

“Programs, like the McGruff Truck, are a great asset to crime prevention,” said Aiona. “I know I’m preaching to the choir, because you are the ones who are working to keep this state safe, and who have dedicated your time and efforts to teaching others how to do their part.”

For Sgt. Nathan J. DeWeerd, who was recognized for his services to the Mcgruff program, the best way to teach people about crime prevention is to get them while they’re young.

DeWeerd, a military policeman at Marine Corps Base Hawaii, does his part by teaching children as a DARE instructor and a DEFY mentor.

“The biggest reason we do the DARE program, and others like it, is to help children make better decisions, not just how to say no to drugs,” said DeWeerd, who teaches DARE to 3rd and 5th grade students.

The curriculums of these programs show children the effects of poor decisions, such as drug and alcohol abuse. This information helps the children make an educated decision. Rather then just telling them what’s right and wrong, it shows them.

“If you just tell the children to say no and they don’t know why, what’s keeping them from eventually just finding out why?” asked DeWeerd.

Aiona and DeWeerd both say that crime prevention is not just for the young. It is imperative that adults learn how to better protect themselves as well.

“It’s the duty of every citizen young and old to do their best to prevent crime,” said Aiona.
For this reason, the MP’s at MCBH offer crime prevention classes and even house walkthroughs for anyone who wants to learn how to better protect themselves, their families and their property.

“If the person wants to better protect their house and everything in it, we will come by and check out the house. We can give them pointers and show them the things they may be doing wrong,” said DeWeerd.

Since October is Crime Prevention Month, the Military Police Department will be focusing on teaching the public about crime prevention. However, they are willing to give crime prevention classes whenever they’re requested. Those that want to take advantage of these services should call 257-8556.

According to Deweerd, all of these things are necessary to reduce crime, but according to him, the focus should be the children.

“If I teach 1,000 children and 999 of them choose a life of crime, but one listened to what I had to say, then it would have been worth it,” said DeWeerd.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,crime

Military police host ongoing crime prevention campaign
Submitted by: MCB Camp Butler
Story Identification #: 20058223556
Story by Pfc. C. Warren Peace



CAMP FOSTER, OKINAWA, Japan (Aug. 19, 2005) -- — The military police on Camp Butler are being proactive in their fight against crime with an ongoing crime prevention campaign according to 1st Lt. Timothy A. Martin, the Crime Prevention Unit officer in charge, Provost Marshall’s Office, Marine Corps Base Camp Butler.

The mission goes along with the idea that a community will feel more comfortable with the police if individual community members know the police personally, explained Martin.

“Our mission is to conduct crime prevention initiatives through environmental design and media,” Martin said. “Environmental design is conducting surveys in connection with physical security, like barracks safety inspections, as well as community awareness programs at schools and youth centers, including bicycle patrols and Drug Abuse Resistance Education.”

Drug Abuse Resistance Education officers routinely ride bicycles through base housing areas to get to know the community on a personal level, stated Sgt. Eric J. Wilson, crime prevention noncommissioned officer in charge, PMO, MCB Butler.

“This is especially true with kids,” Wilson said. “If they know a policeman, they are more prone to communicate with him.”

Bicycle rodeos are another program used by military police, explained Wilson. During the rodeos, community members can register their bikes with the PMO. Registering a bike is a great way to help the police find it if it is stolen or lost.

Bike inspections, during the Bicycle Rodeos, allow the police to check for safety issues and mechanical problems, Wilson continued. “We will show the kids what to look for and fix any problems we can.”

Military police also address crime prevention through “environmental design,” explained Martin. Police inspect barracks, looking for physical discrepancies, such as whether or not the doors and windows function properly, inadequate lighting inside and outside and defects on or around the building that may make it more susceptible to crime.

“The whole point of crime prevention is making people more aware of current regulations and that we are here to enforce them,” Martin said. “We want to proactively educate our community in order to prevent crime.”

For more information on upcoming crime prevention events sponsored by the Camp Foster Provost Marshall’s Office, contact them at 645-3955 or 645-9183.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,crime

Neighbors getting to know each other keeps homes safe
Submitted by: MCB Camp Lejeune
Story Identification #: 200567715
Story by Pfc. Drew W. Barker



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. (June 3, 2005) -- Officials from the Provost Marshal’s Office are scheduled to host a Community Watch Program meeting for residents of Berkeley Manor and Watkins Village at the base theater June 13 at 6 p.m. The meeting will focus on enlisting the active participation of residents in cooperation with military police to reduce and prevent crime in their neighborhoods.

“It’s a great chance to help reduce crime in neighborhoods where service members and their families act as the eyes and ears of PMO,” said Staff Sgt. Rob Jadwin, physical security chief with Crime Resistance Unit, PMO, MCB.

The program focuses on discouraging criminals from preying on potentially vulnerable neighbors.

“The main goals of the program are to reduce and deter crime and to provide a more secure feeling for service members and their families, especially during these times of high deployment,” said retired Master Gunnery Sgt. James E. Harris, crime prevention clerk with Crime Resistance Unit.

These goals can only be achieved when citizen involvement is present to combat crime, because law enforcement officers are not always on every street corner. Citizens can protect themselves and their property by using common sense and community involvement, including getting to know neighbors, watching out for suspicious activity and reporting such things, according to Harris.

The Community Watch Program will be organized and run by members of the community with support from PMO, according to Jadwin.

The program does not involve active patrolling nor does it give any type of special authority to local residents. It does, however, empower them through community involvement according to Jadwin.

The program consists of members, block leaders, and the Community Watch committee. Members are responsible to be familiar with area children and vehicles, and to report any unusual activity to Military Police. Block leaders watch homes of people on leave and pass on concerns of their block’s members to the committee. Committee members attend monthly meetings and inform community leaders and law enforcement of current happenings in order to maintain good communication and teamwork, according to the official Community Watch Program brochure.

“It’s really quite simple,” said Jadwin. “If you take an active role in your community, spend some time to get to know your neighbors, and keep an eye out for suspicious activity, the program works great.”

Provost Marshal’s Office also plans to hold meetings for Tarawa Terrace at 1800 on 27 June at the base theater, and for Midway Park at 1800 on 11 July at the Midway Park Theater, according to Jadwin.

“We hope to set up watch programs in all neighborhoods on base,” said Haris. “This is just the beginning of what could be a really great base-wide program.”



http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,crime

Crime Victims' Rights week recognized
Submitted by: MCLB Albany
Story Identification #: 2003414155750
Story by Cpl. Denyelle D. Spillane



MARINE CORPS LOGISTICS BASE ALBANY, Ga. (April 14, 2003) -- Thirty-one years ago sponsors from some of the most crime-ridden neighborhoods of St. Louis, San Francisco, and the nation's capital founded the nation's first assistance programs for crime victims.

Since then, all 50 States have passed victims' rights laws, and more than half U.S. state constitutions have been amended to guarantee rights for crime victims.
Centers were established in communities where violence is common. Their mission is to bring help, hope and healing to those who suffer the effects of crime. The creation of these victim-assistance programs launched a movement that started other programs and support groups to help victims throughout the United States.

In 2002 president George W. Bush stated, "The nation has come to realize the tragic toll that crime takes and has developed the resources to ease crime's physical, emotional and financial impact."
April 6 began National Victims' Rights Week.

Many events were scheduled last week in honor of this national remembrance. A golf tournament, candlelight vigil, and blood drive were just a few of the events held.

The base also offers programs to help people who are victims or witnesses of crime.
Personnel in the Provost Marshal's Office offer materials to inform victims and witnesses of their rights.

When a crime is committed, PMO offers the victims and witnesses a form called the "Initial Information for Victims and Witnesses of Crimes," also known as the DD Form 2701. This pamphlet provides information about rights of victims and witnesses based on the crime, restraining orders, confinement and trials for the criminals, and telephone numbers for answers to any questions.

"Most victims and witnesses don't know or understand the proceedings of a trial or what their rights are during them [trials]," said Gunnery Sgt. Casey Robinson, PMO Support Services Chief. "We ensure that they have the information so they will be educated and more aware of what they can do to protect themselves."

Marine Corps Community Services' Personal Services Branch also offers programs.

The Family Advocacy Program, offered by MCCS, includes victim advocacy. A representative from FAP is on call 24 hours a day to provide crisis intervention and referrals to community resources for any services not available on base. If needed, counselors can accompany witnesses or victims to medical examinations and court proceedings. FAP can also put victims and witnesses in safe houses, if needed.

All Family Advocacy counselors are required to have, at a minimum, a Masters Degree in Marriage and Family Counseling or Social Work and a certified state license.



http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,crime

Move over McGruff, here comes 'Farid the Crime-Fighting Falcon'
Submitted by: 1st Marine Division
Story Identification #: 20049114338
Story by Cpl. Randy L. Bernard



CAMP AL ASAD, Iraq (Aug. 28, 2004) -- The crime-fighting character named McGruff coined the famous phrase "take a bite out of crime" to help educate children across America. In Iraq, the principle will hopefully soon be reproduced with 'Farid the Crime-Fighting Falcon.'

Marines with Military Police Company C here came up with the idea for a crime-fighting mascot to pass along to the Iraqi Police. While this project is still in its introductory phase to the IP, Cpl. Justin Weber, a squad leader for the company, is the brains behind the bird.

"I was the first person to don the costume, and since then I've become known as Farid," said Weber, 25, of Dayton, Ohio.

Weber recounted first introducing the idea to the IP with a smile on his face.

"Two other Marines introduced me to the classroom of 35 Iraqi Police, and I came running in the door squawking and flapping my arms," Weber explained. "They jumped back and were scared. But once they got used to me, they started to understand what it was about."

The company put their heads together when thinking about what they could do to create a character, and they decided on a falcon for the values it represents.

"The original idea was to make the mascot 'Clucko the Crime-Fighting Chicken,'" said Chief Warrant Officer 2 Rod Barnes, a platoon commander with the MPs, "But we decided the falcon represented dignity, strength and independence."

"The falcon is to the Iraqis as the eagle is to Americans," said Staff Sgt. Greg Orick, a platoon sergeant with Company C. "Weber has done an excellent job of portraying the falcon. It's almost like an extension of his personality. It gives him a chance to relax and behave more animated and act playful."

It's not all fun and games when it comes to being a crime-fighting bird of prey, though.

"It gets really hot in there," Weber said. "You can only be in there for about five minutes before sweat is running into your eyes."

The biggest challenge that the Marines will face while introducing Farid is explaining its purpose in the police force. Although the IP have been coming to Al Asad to learn from US military policemen, many of them initially found it difficult to grasp where a bird costume fits into their line of work.

However, once the idea of Farid had been explained to the Iraqis as an educational tool for the Iraqi Police to use, they saw past the feathers and beak, explained Orick.

"It has a lot of potential as a liaison between the IP's and citizens of Iraq," said Orick. "They are unfamiliar with the idea of using a mascot to teach about fighting crime, but children will be drawn toward it."

It is this attraction for the children that the Marines hope will benefit the IP in teaching Iraq's youth about crime and danger in the area through visits to schools and other areas.

"It is still early in its development but the Iraqis think it is a good thing," Weber explained.

"He is a 'spokes-bird' of crime-prevention," Weber added. "The Iraqis will have to see it in action for it to really sink in for them. Once we give it to the Iraqis and they understand what it is about, it will do a lot of good."

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,crime

PMO Bike Patrol hits streets
Submitted by: MCB Camp Lejeune
Story Identification #: 200562384217
Story by Lance Cpl. Brandon R. Holgersen



MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. (June 14, 2005) -- MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. – The Provost Marshal’s Office has recently restarted its Bike Patrol unit, which began in May and will continue until the Fall.

The Bike Patrol operates in different housing areas aboard Camp Lejeune to provide additional safety and security, according to Cpl. Lon Roberson, a military policeman with the Bike Patrol. It also shows a police presence to try and prevent crimes from taking place.

“Law enforcement is not all about catching the bad guy,” Roberson said. “It’s about crime prevention.”

The bikes allow the patrol to be more mobile and also more aware of their surroundings because they are not limited to a patrol vehicle, according to Roberson. This allows them to be able to patrol more constricted areas and are not restricted to the roads as they would be in a patrol vehicle.

The bikes facilitate law enforcement because they cover a lot of the same area in a short amount of time so they can possibly prevent crimes before they happen, according to Roberson. Instead of responding to a crime, they would like to stop it before it happens by maintaining a visible law enforcement presence.

“At first, we will give verbal warnings to residents and we make sure that the children in the housing area are safe and wearing safety equipment when out riding their bikes,” said Cpl. Jason P. Lamke, a military policeman with the bike patrol. The bike patrol is also able to issue traffic citations, and is able to respond to other law enforcement service calls such as assaults, larcenies, etc. Other types of incidents that the bike patrol encounters are mini-motorcycles illegally riding on roads, ATVs and dirt bikes illegally riding on roads and in the housing areas, and preventing malicious mischief.

The bikes also allow them to be more approachable and personable with the community, according to Roberson. People are very receptive to the patrol and the military policemen spend time talking to the residents of the housing areas to find out what’s going on in the neighborhood.

“When we are out riding, we are out there all day and making contact with people instead of driving around in a patrol vehicle,” Roberson said. “It’s more proactive and personal.”

The bike patrol underwent a weeklong intensive course on bike police work taught by the Jacksonville Police Department, according to Roberson. During the course, the military policemen learn how to operate as military policeman on a bicycle. They learn the basics of safe riding, endurance riding, and most importantly bike maintenance.

The bike patrol rides for an average of 40 miles during an 8-hour day, according to Roberson.

“It’s basically 8 hours of cardiovascular exercise,” Roberson said.

Almost all of the policemen on the patrol have at least two years of road time as a military policeman, according to Roberson.

The bike patrol has been proven as an effective law enforcement tool and a community policing resource. It helps to portray a positive image of law enforcement, and assists in keeping residents safe and deterring crime.

http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,crime

United States Marine Corps

Press Release
Division of Public Affairs
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C. 20380-1775
Telephone: 703-614-4309 DSN 224-4309 Fax 703-695-7460
Contact: American Forces Press Service

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Release # 0701-03-0644
June 27, 2003

Silent No Longer: Iraqi People Reveal the Past

WASHINGTON--By Linda D. Kozaryn
American Forces Press Service

For the first time in decades, the Iraqi people can talk openly about what happened during Saddam Hussein's regime.

They're talking, and the world is listening.

Each day, U.S. and coalition officials in Iraq hear more and more about the atrocities that occurred over the last two decades, according to Sandra Hodgkinson, the Coalition Provisional Authority's director of human rights. Whether they're Kurdish, Sunni, Shiia or Christian, she said, "it seems like every Iraqi has a story."

"In some way, the regime affected their day-to-day life, either someone they knew, or loved or cared about," Hodgkinson said this week during a telephone interview from her office in Baghdad. While many Iraqis seek out the Human Rights Office, she said, others talk to coalition military forces, nongovernmental organizations staff or provisional authority personnel.

"Everybody that is interacting with the local Iraqis is inundated with these complaints," Hodgkinson said.

Several Iraqi employees at the Human Rights Office in Baghdad take summaries of past atrocities from Iraqi victims.

"When they want to come in and tell their story to somebody," Hodgkinson said, "we allow them to sit down in an office and talk about what happened, or we give them a summary of past abuse form that they can fill out." One purpose of the form, she said, "is to get information that may be useful at some point in a future, Iraqi-led, justice system for crimes against humanity."

The Iraqis describe missing loved ones. They talk of torture and executions. They tell where the bodies are buried.

"To date, we have had reports of over 80 mass graves, and we have confirmed the existence of over 20 where we're sure that it is a mass grave, that there are bodies in there," Hodgkinson said.

The human rights specialist is from the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (a href="http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/">http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/. She is also a Navy Reserve judge advocate general officer with the International and Operational Law Unit at the Pentagon. She's worked as a military prosecutor and an instructor in crimes against humanity issues through the International Military Education and Training program.

Under the Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998, defense officials provided some war crimes and crimes against humanity training at the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies in Newport, R.I., for the Iraqi opposition. "I was the course coordinator and an instructor for that program," Hodgkinson said, "which early on, got me working with Iraqi opposition in areas related to crimes against humanity, human rights protection and how to investigate and preserve evidence of these crimes."

In her civilian capacity, Hodgkinson has participated in the State Department's Future of Iraq Project, and about two years ago, she spoke at a Human Rights and Transitional Justice seminar arranged by the Iraqi National Congress in London. In February she began working with the Defense Department's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, deploying first to Kuwait and then to Baghdad March 16.

With all her experiences over the years, Hodgkinson has heard numerous stories about what was going on inside Iraq. Even so, she said, "you can't possibly imagine what it would have been like to be an Iraqi under Saddam's regime until you actually walk out to one of these sites and see the marks of bulldozing at the bottom of the pit from 10, 15 years ago -- where they specifically dug a grave just to throw bodies in it. And to see bullet holes in skulls. To see blindfolds over their eyes. To see ligatures holding their hands behind their back, and handcuffs, and to hear the local witnesses' stories."

Visiting the gravesites has been overwhelming, Hodgkinson said, particularly where the local people have rushed out to the site, trying to find any remains of their missing loved ones.

"It is just heart-wrenching to see them sobbing, lying there -- men, women, children, entire families ? just trying to find something to help them reconcile with what they've been through. It's really, really very moving. It's proof that everything we've been hearing about for years is absolutely true and possibly at an even higher level than what we'd expected."

Coalition officials have been getting daily reports of mass graves in neighborhoods, villages and towns throughout Iraq, Hodgkinson said. Military officials do preliminary investigations and determine whether further inquiry is warranted. In some cases, coalition forces secure the site, pending further examination.

"We try to verify as quickly as possible whether or not there is, in fact, a mass grave, and what's the likelihood that something could happen to the grave in the short term, if we don't maintain a presence or cordon it off," she said.

"For the past six weeks now, we've had a forensic assessment team in from the United Kingdom," she added. "We brought them in to help not only do initial site surveys and initial assessments, but also to help advise us on our overall graves strategy."

The team has been creating "forensic protocols," she noted, "which are standards that every forensic team that comes in to assist in the exhumation process will have to live by in all the graves around the country. It was most important to make sure that this is done in a systematic way so that the identifications that are done and the evidence that is pulled from these graves can actually be useful in the future."

The British team has done initial assessments at many of the graves in the Baghdad area, Hodgkinson said. Coalition officials will use the team's input to help prioritize where they'll send full forensic exhumation teams.

"We've been contacting many of our coalition partners to explore the possibility of getting donor exhumation teams," she said. "Given the sophisticated level of expertise necessary to do this, we're going to need all the forensic teams possible."


/Related Site of Interest: http://www.defendamerica.mil/specials/june2003/a
trocities.html


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Marines rid drugs for country, community
Submitted by: Marine Forces Reserve
Story Identification #: 200252211388
Story by



TRINIDAD (May 22, 2002) -- As police officers in their respective local neighborhoods, reserve Marines Staff Sgt. John C. Hanke, Sgt. John A. Barone, and Cpl. Miguel Espinosa deal with violence and drugs every day.

Seeing the results of drug production and use is not uncommon for these three Marines in their line of work. Because of this, their recent opportunity to participate in "Operation Weedeater" was something that each Marine embraced with open arms.

During Operation Weedeater, more than 60 U.S. Marines provided training and support to the Defense Force and Police Department of Trinidad and Tobago, and U.S. Drug Enforcement Agents who were conducting narcotics eradication missions.

"We don't doubt that every Marine takes this exercise very seriously," Barone said. "However, I think that for us it's a little more closely related to what we see and do on a daily basis."

"It's amazing how many people we see each day whose crime or circumstance is affected by some type of drug," Hanke said. "Even if it?s a petty theft or a crime that some would consider insignificant, many times it can be linked somehow to narcotics."

Although the Marines' role in Operation Weedeater was far away from the communities they serve, they were finally helping to stop the problem at its source.

"I think we take it so seriously because of how we look at the situation," Hanke said. "For instance, if I run into a man or woman who's just hurt someone, we look at the cause for the incident. Most of the time, the story begins with a minor narcotic such as marijuana. This person began using the drug, and it eventually led them to another drug. Once heavily addicted, this person sells everything short of the clothes off their back, and exhausts all possible loans and monetary support until they have nothing. At this point, the person decides to steal to get what they want, and you know as well as I do that most people are not going to stand by and watch the things they've worked hard for just be taken from them. So now the person runs into conflict, and in their state of desperation stabs or shoots an innocent person to get what they want."

The three officers said that not every situation develops this way, but have no doubt in their minds about the major role drugs play in their everyday work.

"It's amazing that after this operation, we will return home to patrolling the streets and see just as many drug dealers and users as we did before we left," Espinosa said. "Yet, somewhere in the back of our minds we have to remember that through what we're doing now we've made a difference."

While the Marines took pride in the fact that they were ridding the streets of nearly $400 million of narcotics, they were still very eager to do more.

"I think it's hard being used to a job where everything we do is very much hands on," Hanke said. "And now, we're here, and rules and regulations restrict us from going in and doing the eradications ourselves."

The Marines were limiting to playing a supporting role while the local law enforcement and DEA agents conducted the missions. Marines could not assist or conduct any arrests or enter locations in which narcotics were to be eradicated.

While the reasoning behind this included the safety of the Marines, restrictions on military use and international laws on policing, for these three Marines it was hard.

"I think I would feel a lot better if I was the one out there doing the cutting and burning of the plants. At least then I could physically see the change I'm making as it occurs," said Barone.

Despite not being able to get as up close and personal as the Marines would have preferred, the experience was definitely rewarding.

"Something like this operation really makes a difference to us," Espinosa said. "It is operations like this one that allow me, whenever someone asks why I'm a police officer or a Marine, to inform them that everything I do is an effort to make the world a safer place for them and future generations to live in."


http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf...ghlight=2,crime