Able Danger Coverup (Excerpt)
by William F. Jasper
October 17, 2005
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The Able Danger story has gradually gained traction and headline space, but official stonewalling and coverup continue to thwart efforts to get to the heart of the matter.
This past summer news began to break out about a super-secret Pentagon "data mining" operation that had identified the lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta as a terrorist threat long before the deadly attacks of September 11, 2001. The operation, code named "Able Danger," was a joint effort spearheaded by Army intelligence and the Special Operations Command. According to Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), Able Danger was in operation from 1998 to 2001 and was an effort "to map out Al Qaeda." Reportedly, the Able Danger staff had linked Atta and three other men (who turned out to be 9/11 hijackers) from al-Qaeda's Hamburg, Germany, operation to a cell in Brooklyn. They wanted to notify the FBI about the danger, but Pentagon officials scotched that idea. That was more than a year before the 9/11 attacks.
Rep. Weldon, who is vice chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the Homeland Security Committee, says that two weeks after 9/11.... To continue reading the complete article, place an online order for a PDF version of the October 17th issue of The New American, and get instant access to the full-text of this article along with the full-text of all the other articles in the same issue. Similarly, if you place an online order for one or more copies of the print version of the October 17th issue, you'll receive a complimentary link to the PDF version of that issue, also giving you instant access to the full-text of the "Able Danger Coverup" article and all of the other articles in that issue.
Full Version: Able Danger Coverup
"Able Danger" & 9/11 Foreknowledge
by William F. Jasper
October 31, 2005
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The ongoing coverup concerning the secret Able Danger operation provides further evidence that the "war on terror" is a farce.
There was nothing in outward appearance to draw attention to the four-bedroom apartment at 54 Marienstrasse. Nonetheless, the attention of the intelligence services of Germany, the U.S., Israel, and other Middle Eastern and European countries had been drawn to the nondescript flat in Hamburg, Germany, as early as 1998. That was when Mohammed Atta signed the lease and he and Ramzi bin al Shibh moved in. Soon thereafter, it was identified by intelligence agencies as a target of interest. It became known as the hub of al-Qaeda's "Hamburg Cell."
Over the next two and a half years, dozens of al-Qaeda operatives, including Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the reputed 9/11 "mastermind," passed through the 54 Marienstrasse apartment. Twenty-nine al-Qaeda recruits from the Middle East or Northern Africa listed it as their registered address. Mohammed Atta would later be labeled, after the fact, as the "ringleader" of the 9/11 terrorists who hijacked four jetliners to use as missiles against targets in New York City and Washington, D.C. Atta is believed to have been the suicide pilot who flew American Airlines Flight 11 into the north tower of the World Trade Center. His Hamburg roommate, Ramzi bin al Shibh, captured in Pakistan in 2002, has been described by U.S. officials as the al-Qaeda "coordinator and paymaster" for 9/11. In the months leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terror network were under intense scrutiny by intelligence services worldwide.
Cover Story Wearing Thin
Over the past several years, as more and more evidence has come out, it has grown more and more difficult for U.S. government officials to sustain the cover story that they had no way of anticipating the attacks. As it turns out, U.S. intelligence agencies and their foreign counterparts were almost tripping over each other as they shadowed the al-Qaeda network across the face of the planet. The FBI and CIA were tracking al-Qaeda operatives and their activities in the U.S. and overseas. The National Security Agency (NSA) was intercepting and recording the telephone calls of many al-Qaeda operatives, including Osama bin Laden himself. More recently, it has come to light that a super-secret Pentagon operation, known as "Able Danger," was also tracking and monitoring al-Qaeda. Using advanced computer "data mining" capabilities, the Able Danger team reportedly identified Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Midhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi as members of an al-Qaeda cell code-named "Brooklyn" because of its connections to New York City.
According to Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), in September 2000 the Able Danger team initiated at least three separate efforts to get its information on the hijackers to the FBI "so they could bring that cell in and take out the terrorists." That was one year before 9/11. Army Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Schaffer, one of the principal members of Able Danger, has stated in interviews given this past August that Able Danger had identified five al-Qaeda cells, including two of the three cells that ultimately would be used to pull off the 9/11 terror attacks. Lt. Col. Schaffer set up one Able Danger/FBI meeting in the fall of 2000. It was canceled — as were all other efforts to inform the FBI — per orders from higher-ups in the Department of Defense.
Was the intelligence developed by Able Danger of sufficient quality, specificity, and credibility that it could have and should have been used to prevent the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., that claimed almost 3,000 lives? We don't know the answer to that question since the executive branch has been blocking efforts by Congress and the public to gain access to information about Able Danger. This much we do know: first, the Clinton administration in 2000 and then the Bush administration in 2001 failed to heed the Able Danger warnings on al-Qaeda. Moreover, Clinton administration officials ordered the main Able Danger files destroyed in 2000; Bush administration officials ordered Lt. Col. Schaffer's duplicate Able Danger files destroyed in 2004. Both the Clinton administration and the Bush administration have attempted to cover up the existence of Able Danger and its findings. The official, bipartisan 9/11 Commission also covered up the existence of this operation and its findings. In recent months, members of the Able Danger team who have spoken out have been subjected to official harassment and intimidation. Considerable effort is being expended by Donald Rumsfeld's minions in the Defense Department to keep all information about this operation under wraps.
The first major exposure of Able Danger came on June 27 of this year, when Rep. Curt Weldon, who is vice chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the Homeland Security Committee, delivered a 45-minute speech on the House floor outlining the nature of the operation and the data it had developed on al-Qaeda prior to 9/11. Since then, Operation Able Danger has been the subject of growing controversy and intense international interest. Congressional hearings on Able Danger were scheduled, postponed, and rescheduled. Finally, on September 21, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee held a long-awaited hearing on Able Danger. It was a letdown; the Pentagon blocked the star witnesses from testifying. Able Danger team members James D. Smith and Lt. Col. Schaffer sat mute in the audience, prevented from testifying by the Bush/Rumsfeld Defense Department. Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) and other committee members, both Republicans and Democrats, angrily accused the Defense Department of obstructing the Senate's investigation.
Stung by the congressional criticism and the unfavorable public and media reaction to its stonewalling and obstruction, the Pentagon suddenly became cooperative — or so it seemed. On September 23, Senator Specter announced that new Able Danger hearings had been rescheduled for October 5 and that now the Pentagon would allow the witnesses to testify. However, Mark Zaid, the attorney for Schaffer and Smith, said the Defense Department had told him that his clients would not be allowed to testify. Mr. Zaid turned out to be correct. The October 5 hearings were canceled. When THE NEW AMERICAN contacted Mr. Zaid on October 5, he expressed the hope that there would still be hearings before the end of the year, but he had no idea when they might be.
Unfettered hearings in which Able Danger members are allowed to testify freely might provide useful information about al-Qaeda as well as about who was responsible — in both the Clinton and Bush administrations — for failing to heed the warnings of the Able Danger staff. However, there are some false assumptions underlying the arguments of Rep. Weldon and other advocates of Able Danger. Chief among these is the assumption that if only the FBI and the CIA had been given Able Danger's data on the al-Qaeda cells, they would have "taken out" the terrorists — either overseas or in the U.S. — prior to 9/11.
This line of argument dovetails with the standard conclusion of virtually every other official "investigation," to wit, 9/11 was an "intelligence failure" that demonstrated "lack of coordination and cooperation" among U.S. agencies. And the solution to this problem, we have been told, is to reward incompetence by giving the agencies involved still larger budgets and more manpower, and to combine them all together in a new gargantuan super-bureaucracy, the Department of Homeland Security.
However, as we noted above and will detail further below, the failure to "take out" the al-Qaeda cells before the deadly 9/11 attacks was not due to a lack of information. Whatever useful data Able Danger might have been able to offer concerning Mohammed Atta and his associates would have been superfluous. The FBI and CIA had been tracking the al-Qaeda 9/11 conspirators very closely for years — both in the U.S. and overseas, using both technical means and human intelligence. Dedicated FBI and CIA field operatives had warned their superiors repeatedly and had urged them to authorize the arrest of the terrorists. Those sensible pleas by agents in the field were rejected repeatedly by decision makers at the top levels of the federal government. Even worse, as we will show, co-conspirators with the 9/11 terrorists have been allowed to remain free and roaming at large in the United States. Many U.S. decision makers, instead of being penalized for their failures (or worse) in regard to 9/11, have received promotions! The agents who tried to warn and protect the country have been muzzled.
Disturbing Pattern
The continuity of coverup and conspiracy from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration to suppress Able Danger follows a disturbing pattern that is demonstrated in these cases directly related to 9/11:
• Hamburg Cell. Mohammed Atta, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and their roommates in Hamburg came under surveillance by German intelligence and the CIA in 1998 because of their association with al-Qaeda operatives in Hamburg who had been linked to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Those operatives included Mamoun Darkazanli, Mohammad Haidar Zammar, Said Bahaji, and Mounir al-Motassadek. The CIA station chief in Hamburg, Tom Volz, who posed as a U.S. embassy employee, actually tried to recruit Darkazanli as an informant in late 1999 and 2000. CIA agent David Edger shadowed the Hamburg Cell for several years, before returning to the U.S. in 2001 to take a professorship of political science at Oklahoma University at Norman, coincidentally, just a few blocks from an apartment where an al-Qaeda cell operated that included 9/11 terrorists Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Zacarias Moussaoui.
• San Diego Cell. Even the 9/11 Commission Report, which whitewashed federal government failures, acknowledged that the failure to identify hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar when they entered the U.S. was one of the biggest "lost opportunities." The CIA had tracked both men to the "secret" al-Qaeda planning meeting for 9/11 in Malaysia, where they and other participants were photographed and videotaped by the CIA and Malaysian intelligence. The FBI claims that the CIA didn't inform them about the two men, so they had no way of knowing about them.
That won't wash. Available evidence shows the FBI had multiple tails on the duo in San Diego, where Hazmi and Midhar lived with former San Diego State professor Abdussattar Shaikh, an acknowledged longtime undercover asset of the FBI! What's more, the two terrorists had regular contacts with several other area jihadists who had long been under FBI surveillance, including Omar al-Bayoumi, an agent of the Saudi government whom federal authorities acknowledge as a primary financial conduit for Hazmi and Midhar. Hazmi worked (illegally) at a San Diego convenience store/gas station owned by Osama Mustafa, a militant who had been under FBI surveillance since 1994 because of his violent threats and his membership in the PLO and PFLP terrorist groups.
These and a host of other red flags had caused FBI Agent Stephen Butler to press his superiors to take action against Hazmi and Midhar, but they refused. "He saw a pattern, a trail, and he told his supervisors, but it ended there," said one congressional investigator of Butler's predicament. FBI officials have blocked Butler from testifying before any of the 9/11 investigations.
• Phoenix Cell. FBI informant Aukai Collins, who monitored Middle East terrorist suspects for the FBI for four years in Phoenix, claims to have told the FBI about 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour while Hanjour was in flight training in Phoenix. Collins said the FBI knew Hanjour lived in Phoenix, knew his exact address, his phone number, and even what car he drove. "They knew everything about the guy," Collins claims. In July 2001, Phoenix FBI agent Ken Williams sent an electronic memo to FBI headquarters in Washington outlining his investigation into area flight schools that led him to believe al-Qaeda may be using U.S. flight schools to train terrorists as pilots. He recommended that the FBI should conduct an investigation of flight schools nationally to see if this was happening. His memo was never acted on.
• Brooklyn Cell. The official 9/11 Commission Report has this to say about Ali Mohamed and his terrorist cell: "As early as December 1993, a team of al Qaeda operatives had begun casing targets in Nairobi for future attacks. It was led by Ali Mohamed, a former Egyptian army officer who had moved to the United States in the mid-1980s, enlisted in the U.S. Army, and became an instructor at Fort Bragg. He had provided guidance and training to extremists at the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, including some who were subsequently convicted in the February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center." Known as "Al Qaeda's California connection," Mohamed worked for the FBI's Sacramento office, while training terrorists and escorting top al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri on a fundraising tour of the Golden State in 1995.
Mohamed pleaded guilty to terrorism charges in 2000 and was held in U.S. custody. Incredibly, he has been released and is now again on the streets. He can hardly be anything except a government agent provocateur.
• Minnesota. Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called "20th hijacker," would have gotten away scot-free if FBI officials in Washington had had their way. Thanks to FBI field agents like Coleen Rowley, who tenaciously dug in their heels on the issue, he was not released and was still in custody when the 9/11 attacks occurred.
• Norman Cell. In addition to Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Zacarias Moussaoui, the al-Qaeda cell that operated out of Norman, Oklahoma, included convicted felon Melvin Lattimore, a convert to militant Islam who now goes by the name Majahid Abdulquaadir Menepta.
Mr. Lattimore/Menepta's credit card was used to help finance the 1993 World Trade Center bombing masterminded by Ramzi Yousef. He was identified by an FBI informant as a top suspect in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and was identified by witnesses interviewed by this magazine as being in the company of Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City. Menepta's roommate Hussain al-Attas drove Moussaoui to Minnesota. According to FBI documents, 9/11 hijacker Salem al-Hazmi was also seen at Menepta's apartment, and when FBI agents visited the apartment three weeks before 9/11, they saw several men fleeing through the back door of the apartment. The airline ticket for 9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah (United Airlines Flight 93) was purchased from an Oklahoma University computer terminal just a few blocks from Menepta's apartment.
Like Ali Mohamed, Mr. Lattimore/Menepta is almost certainly a federal agent provocateur. As we have reported in a previous article ("Al-Qaeda's OKC-9/11 Ties," July 26, 2004), it is almost impossible rationally to explain his record in any other way. When Menepta was picked up and prosecuted, it was for only a minor weapons violation. He was sentenced to a few months in prison and is now back on the streets. Thus, a man who has been tied to the three most important terrorist attacks in U.S. history — 1993 WTC, 1995 OKC, and 9/11 — has been purposely set loose.
The current coverup of the terrorist bombing in Norman, Oklahoma, outside the stadium during the Oklahoma University-Kansas State football game on October 1 is yet another wake-up call. The 85,000 fans inside the stadium — and a national television audience — were the intended targets. Fortunately, the suicide bomber was unable to get inside the stadium and took only his own life. However, federal authorities have rushed to cover up all evidence that the bombing was a terrorist effort involving foreign nationals.
The official story is that the bomber was a mentally unstable student, Joel Henry Hinrichs III, with no ties to Islamic jihadists. However, news organizations and confidential sources in Oklahoma have challenged that account, producing contradictory evidence showing that Hinrichs was indeed involved with a ring of Pakistanis who were Islamic fanatics. (See article on page 19.)
Time for Truth, Not Partisan Politics
Predictably, Republicans and Democrats are both trying to use the Able Danger revelations for partisan purposes, to portray the opposition as weak and irresponsible on terrorism and national security. But like the Oklahoma football bombing and a number of other incidents, the ongoing Able Danger stonewalling demonstrates a continuity of pernicious policy that transcends party lines.
According to Rep. Weldon, two weeks after 9/11 he was provided with data from Able Danger that included "an extensive analysis chart of Al Qaeda, which I immediately took to the White House and personally delivered to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. Mr. Hadley was extremely interested in the chart and said that he would take it to the President."
During his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21, Rep. Weldon said: "And I can tell you this — I talked to Mr. Hadley three months ago when I briefed him on another issue, and I said, remember that chart that I gave you? And he said, yes, I remember it." However, Mr. Hadley, who has since been promoted to national security adviser, has been mum on the issue of that meeting.
One of the peripheral issues that has become a main bone of contention in the whole matter is whether or not the chart provided to Hadley actually included a photo of Mohammed Atta. According to Lt. Col. Schaffer and other Able Danger team members, the chart (roughly four-and-a-half feet by five feet) included a photo of Atta and showed his linkage to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the blind sheik Omar Abdul-Rahman, who was convicted and sent to prison on bombing conspiracy charges.
The Pentagon's story on the chart evolved through several stages. Initially, Defense Department officials claimed that there was no evidence that a chart ever existed. Then the chart's existence was acknowledged, but it was alleged that the data on it was non-specific. Then it was asserted that the chart had not included a photo of Atta. But on September 2, Rep. Weldon announced that on the previous day he had been to a Pentagon briefing in which officials "confirmed that five credible witnesses did see the 9/11 ringleader, Mohammad Atta, in data produced by Able Danger prior to the 9/11 attacks."
That "official" line could change again, of course, if an investigation proceeds. But Lt. Col. Schaffer and other Able Danger members are being pressured to drop the matter.
Likely as a penalty for not keeping silent, Schaffer's security clearance has been revoked. In October 2003, while stationed in Afghanistan, Schaffer briefed Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, and other Commission staff members on Able Danger. According to Schaffer, Zelikow stated that this was very important information, gave Schaffer his card, and told him to get back in touch when he returned to Washington, D.C. However, Schaffer says that when he called Zelikow's office in January 2004 to set up an appointment, he was given the brush off. When he called again, he was told Dr. Zelikow had all the information he needed on Able Danger and there was no need for a meeting. Shortly thereafter he was hit out of the blue with charges that he had run up unauthorized telephone charges, to the tune of $67. According to Schaffer, the Pentagon spent "in our estimation $400,000 to investigate all these issues simply to drum up this information." That fits a pattern of retaliation against other government whistleblowers who have been faced with similar charges.
Many additional examples could be cited to amplify this pattern. It is a pattern that reflects not incompetence or "lack of coordination" but something much worse. It is a pattern of conscious, purposeful action aimed at thwarting those who are tasked with defending America in the "war on terror." It is a pattern that is being carried out by policymakers at the highest levels of our government, and it is time to ask why.
by William F. Jasper
October 31, 2005
Email this article
Printer friendly page
The ongoing coverup concerning the secret Able Danger operation provides further evidence that the "war on terror" is a farce.
There was nothing in outward appearance to draw attention to the four-bedroom apartment at 54 Marienstrasse. Nonetheless, the attention of the intelligence services of Germany, the U.S., Israel, and other Middle Eastern and European countries had been drawn to the nondescript flat in Hamburg, Germany, as early as 1998. That was when Mohammed Atta signed the lease and he and Ramzi bin al Shibh moved in. Soon thereafter, it was identified by intelligence agencies as a target of interest. It became known as the hub of al-Qaeda's "Hamburg Cell."
Over the next two and a half years, dozens of al-Qaeda operatives, including Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the reputed 9/11 "mastermind," passed through the 54 Marienstrasse apartment. Twenty-nine al-Qaeda recruits from the Middle East or Northern Africa listed it as their registered address. Mohammed Atta would later be labeled, after the fact, as the "ringleader" of the 9/11 terrorists who hijacked four jetliners to use as missiles against targets in New York City and Washington, D.C. Atta is believed to have been the suicide pilot who flew American Airlines Flight 11 into the north tower of the World Trade Center. His Hamburg roommate, Ramzi bin al Shibh, captured in Pakistan in 2002, has been described by U.S. officials as the al-Qaeda "coordinator and paymaster" for 9/11. In the months leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terror network were under intense scrutiny by intelligence services worldwide.
Cover Story Wearing Thin
Over the past several years, as more and more evidence has come out, it has grown more and more difficult for U.S. government officials to sustain the cover story that they had no way of anticipating the attacks. As it turns out, U.S. intelligence agencies and their foreign counterparts were almost tripping over each other as they shadowed the al-Qaeda network across the face of the planet. The FBI and CIA were tracking al-Qaeda operatives and their activities in the U.S. and overseas. The National Security Agency (NSA) was intercepting and recording the telephone calls of many al-Qaeda operatives, including Osama bin Laden himself. More recently, it has come to light that a super-secret Pentagon operation, known as "Able Danger," was also tracking and monitoring al-Qaeda. Using advanced computer "data mining" capabilities, the Able Danger team reportedly identified Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Midhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi as members of an al-Qaeda cell code-named "Brooklyn" because of its connections to New York City.
According to Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), in September 2000 the Able Danger team initiated at least three separate efforts to get its information on the hijackers to the FBI "so they could bring that cell in and take out the terrorists." That was one year before 9/11. Army Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Schaffer, one of the principal members of Able Danger, has stated in interviews given this past August that Able Danger had identified five al-Qaeda cells, including two of the three cells that ultimately would be used to pull off the 9/11 terror attacks. Lt. Col. Schaffer set up one Able Danger/FBI meeting in the fall of 2000. It was canceled — as were all other efforts to inform the FBI — per orders from higher-ups in the Department of Defense.
Was the intelligence developed by Able Danger of sufficient quality, specificity, and credibility that it could have and should have been used to prevent the attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., that claimed almost 3,000 lives? We don't know the answer to that question since the executive branch has been blocking efforts by Congress and the public to gain access to information about Able Danger. This much we do know: first, the Clinton administration in 2000 and then the Bush administration in 2001 failed to heed the Able Danger warnings on al-Qaeda. Moreover, Clinton administration officials ordered the main Able Danger files destroyed in 2000; Bush administration officials ordered Lt. Col. Schaffer's duplicate Able Danger files destroyed in 2004. Both the Clinton administration and the Bush administration have attempted to cover up the existence of Able Danger and its findings. The official, bipartisan 9/11 Commission also covered up the existence of this operation and its findings. In recent months, members of the Able Danger team who have spoken out have been subjected to official harassment and intimidation. Considerable effort is being expended by Donald Rumsfeld's minions in the Defense Department to keep all information about this operation under wraps.
The first major exposure of Able Danger came on June 27 of this year, when Rep. Curt Weldon, who is vice chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the Homeland Security Committee, delivered a 45-minute speech on the House floor outlining the nature of the operation and the data it had developed on al-Qaeda prior to 9/11. Since then, Operation Able Danger has been the subject of growing controversy and intense international interest. Congressional hearings on Able Danger were scheduled, postponed, and rescheduled. Finally, on September 21, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee held a long-awaited hearing on Able Danger. It was a letdown; the Pentagon blocked the star witnesses from testifying. Able Danger team members James D. Smith and Lt. Col. Schaffer sat mute in the audience, prevented from testifying by the Bush/Rumsfeld Defense Department. Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) and other committee members, both Republicans and Democrats, angrily accused the Defense Department of obstructing the Senate's investigation.
Stung by the congressional criticism and the unfavorable public and media reaction to its stonewalling and obstruction, the Pentagon suddenly became cooperative — or so it seemed. On September 23, Senator Specter announced that new Able Danger hearings had been rescheduled for October 5 and that now the Pentagon would allow the witnesses to testify. However, Mark Zaid, the attorney for Schaffer and Smith, said the Defense Department had told him that his clients would not be allowed to testify. Mr. Zaid turned out to be correct. The October 5 hearings were canceled. When THE NEW AMERICAN contacted Mr. Zaid on October 5, he expressed the hope that there would still be hearings before the end of the year, but he had no idea when they might be.
Unfettered hearings in which Able Danger members are allowed to testify freely might provide useful information about al-Qaeda as well as about who was responsible — in both the Clinton and Bush administrations — for failing to heed the warnings of the Able Danger staff. However, there are some false assumptions underlying the arguments of Rep. Weldon and other advocates of Able Danger. Chief among these is the assumption that if only the FBI and the CIA had been given Able Danger's data on the al-Qaeda cells, they would have "taken out" the terrorists — either overseas or in the U.S. — prior to 9/11.
This line of argument dovetails with the standard conclusion of virtually every other official "investigation," to wit, 9/11 was an "intelligence failure" that demonstrated "lack of coordination and cooperation" among U.S. agencies. And the solution to this problem, we have been told, is to reward incompetence by giving the agencies involved still larger budgets and more manpower, and to combine them all together in a new gargantuan super-bureaucracy, the Department of Homeland Security.
However, as we noted above and will detail further below, the failure to "take out" the al-Qaeda cells before the deadly 9/11 attacks was not due to a lack of information. Whatever useful data Able Danger might have been able to offer concerning Mohammed Atta and his associates would have been superfluous. The FBI and CIA had been tracking the al-Qaeda 9/11 conspirators very closely for years — both in the U.S. and overseas, using both technical means and human intelligence. Dedicated FBI and CIA field operatives had warned their superiors repeatedly and had urged them to authorize the arrest of the terrorists. Those sensible pleas by agents in the field were rejected repeatedly by decision makers at the top levels of the federal government. Even worse, as we will show, co-conspirators with the 9/11 terrorists have been allowed to remain free and roaming at large in the United States. Many U.S. decision makers, instead of being penalized for their failures (or worse) in regard to 9/11, have received promotions! The agents who tried to warn and protect the country have been muzzled.
Disturbing Pattern
The continuity of coverup and conspiracy from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration to suppress Able Danger follows a disturbing pattern that is demonstrated in these cases directly related to 9/11:
• Hamburg Cell. Mohammed Atta, Ramzi bin al Shibh, and their roommates in Hamburg came under surveillance by German intelligence and the CIA in 1998 because of their association with al-Qaeda operatives in Hamburg who had been linked to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Those operatives included Mamoun Darkazanli, Mohammad Haidar Zammar, Said Bahaji, and Mounir al-Motassadek. The CIA station chief in Hamburg, Tom Volz, who posed as a U.S. embassy employee, actually tried to recruit Darkazanli as an informant in late 1999 and 2000. CIA agent David Edger shadowed the Hamburg Cell for several years, before returning to the U.S. in 2001 to take a professorship of political science at Oklahoma University at Norman, coincidentally, just a few blocks from an apartment where an al-Qaeda cell operated that included 9/11 terrorists Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Zacarias Moussaoui.
• San Diego Cell. Even the 9/11 Commission Report, which whitewashed federal government failures, acknowledged that the failure to identify hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Midhar when they entered the U.S. was one of the biggest "lost opportunities." The CIA had tracked both men to the "secret" al-Qaeda planning meeting for 9/11 in Malaysia, where they and other participants were photographed and videotaped by the CIA and Malaysian intelligence. The FBI claims that the CIA didn't inform them about the two men, so they had no way of knowing about them.
That won't wash. Available evidence shows the FBI had multiple tails on the duo in San Diego, where Hazmi and Midhar lived with former San Diego State professor Abdussattar Shaikh, an acknowledged longtime undercover asset of the FBI! What's more, the two terrorists had regular contacts with several other area jihadists who had long been under FBI surveillance, including Omar al-Bayoumi, an agent of the Saudi government whom federal authorities acknowledge as a primary financial conduit for Hazmi and Midhar. Hazmi worked (illegally) at a San Diego convenience store/gas station owned by Osama Mustafa, a militant who had been under FBI surveillance since 1994 because of his violent threats and his membership in the PLO and PFLP terrorist groups.
These and a host of other red flags had caused FBI Agent Stephen Butler to press his superiors to take action against Hazmi and Midhar, but they refused. "He saw a pattern, a trail, and he told his supervisors, but it ended there," said one congressional investigator of Butler's predicament. FBI officials have blocked Butler from testifying before any of the 9/11 investigations.
• Phoenix Cell. FBI informant Aukai Collins, who monitored Middle East terrorist suspects for the FBI for four years in Phoenix, claims to have told the FBI about 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour while Hanjour was in flight training in Phoenix. Collins said the FBI knew Hanjour lived in Phoenix, knew his exact address, his phone number, and even what car he drove. "They knew everything about the guy," Collins claims. In July 2001, Phoenix FBI agent Ken Williams sent an electronic memo to FBI headquarters in Washington outlining his investigation into area flight schools that led him to believe al-Qaeda may be using U.S. flight schools to train terrorists as pilots. He recommended that the FBI should conduct an investigation of flight schools nationally to see if this was happening. His memo was never acted on.
• Brooklyn Cell. The official 9/11 Commission Report has this to say about Ali Mohamed and his terrorist cell: "As early as December 1993, a team of al Qaeda operatives had begun casing targets in Nairobi for future attacks. It was led by Ali Mohamed, a former Egyptian army officer who had moved to the United States in the mid-1980s, enlisted in the U.S. Army, and became an instructor at Fort Bragg. He had provided guidance and training to extremists at the Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, including some who were subsequently convicted in the February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center." Known as "Al Qaeda's California connection," Mohamed worked for the FBI's Sacramento office, while training terrorists and escorting top al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri on a fundraising tour of the Golden State in 1995.
Mohamed pleaded guilty to terrorism charges in 2000 and was held in U.S. custody. Incredibly, he has been released and is now again on the streets. He can hardly be anything except a government agent provocateur.
• Minnesota. Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called "20th hijacker," would have gotten away scot-free if FBI officials in Washington had had their way. Thanks to FBI field agents like Coleen Rowley, who tenaciously dug in their heels on the issue, he was not released and was still in custody when the 9/11 attacks occurred.
• Norman Cell. In addition to Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Zacarias Moussaoui, the al-Qaeda cell that operated out of Norman, Oklahoma, included convicted felon Melvin Lattimore, a convert to militant Islam who now goes by the name Majahid Abdulquaadir Menepta.
Mr. Lattimore/Menepta's credit card was used to help finance the 1993 World Trade Center bombing masterminded by Ramzi Yousef. He was identified by an FBI informant as a top suspect in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and was identified by witnesses interviewed by this magazine as being in the company of Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City. Menepta's roommate Hussain al-Attas drove Moussaoui to Minnesota. According to FBI documents, 9/11 hijacker Salem al-Hazmi was also seen at Menepta's apartment, and when FBI agents visited the apartment three weeks before 9/11, they saw several men fleeing through the back door of the apartment. The airline ticket for 9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah (United Airlines Flight 93) was purchased from an Oklahoma University computer terminal just a few blocks from Menepta's apartment.
Like Ali Mohamed, Mr. Lattimore/Menepta is almost certainly a federal agent provocateur. As we have reported in a previous article ("Al-Qaeda's OKC-9/11 Ties," July 26, 2004), it is almost impossible rationally to explain his record in any other way. When Menepta was picked up and prosecuted, it was for only a minor weapons violation. He was sentenced to a few months in prison and is now back on the streets. Thus, a man who has been tied to the three most important terrorist attacks in U.S. history — 1993 WTC, 1995 OKC, and 9/11 — has been purposely set loose.
The current coverup of the terrorist bombing in Norman, Oklahoma, outside the stadium during the Oklahoma University-Kansas State football game on October 1 is yet another wake-up call. The 85,000 fans inside the stadium — and a national television audience — were the intended targets. Fortunately, the suicide bomber was unable to get inside the stadium and took only his own life. However, federal authorities have rushed to cover up all evidence that the bombing was a terrorist effort involving foreign nationals.
The official story is that the bomber was a mentally unstable student, Joel Henry Hinrichs III, with no ties to Islamic jihadists. However, news organizations and confidential sources in Oklahoma have challenged that account, producing contradictory evidence showing that Hinrichs was indeed involved with a ring of Pakistanis who were Islamic fanatics. (See article on page 19.)
Time for Truth, Not Partisan Politics
Predictably, Republicans and Democrats are both trying to use the Able Danger revelations for partisan purposes, to portray the opposition as weak and irresponsible on terrorism and national security. But like the Oklahoma football bombing and a number of other incidents, the ongoing Able Danger stonewalling demonstrates a continuity of pernicious policy that transcends party lines.
According to Rep. Weldon, two weeks after 9/11 he was provided with data from Able Danger that included "an extensive analysis chart of Al Qaeda, which I immediately took to the White House and personally delivered to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. Mr. Hadley was extremely interested in the chart and said that he would take it to the President."
During his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on September 21, Rep. Weldon said: "And I can tell you this — I talked to Mr. Hadley three months ago when I briefed him on another issue, and I said, remember that chart that I gave you? And he said, yes, I remember it." However, Mr. Hadley, who has since been promoted to national security adviser, has been mum on the issue of that meeting.
One of the peripheral issues that has become a main bone of contention in the whole matter is whether or not the chart provided to Hadley actually included a photo of Mohammed Atta. According to Lt. Col. Schaffer and other Able Danger team members, the chart (roughly four-and-a-half feet by five feet) included a photo of Atta and showed his linkage to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the blind sheik Omar Abdul-Rahman, who was convicted and sent to prison on bombing conspiracy charges.
The Pentagon's story on the chart evolved through several stages. Initially, Defense Department officials claimed that there was no evidence that a chart ever existed. Then the chart's existence was acknowledged, but it was alleged that the data on it was non-specific. Then it was asserted that the chart had not included a photo of Atta. But on September 2, Rep. Weldon announced that on the previous day he had been to a Pentagon briefing in which officials "confirmed that five credible witnesses did see the 9/11 ringleader, Mohammad Atta, in data produced by Able Danger prior to the 9/11 attacks."
That "official" line could change again, of course, if an investigation proceeds. But Lt. Col. Schaffer and other Able Danger members are being pressured to drop the matter.
Likely as a penalty for not keeping silent, Schaffer's security clearance has been revoked. In October 2003, while stationed in Afghanistan, Schaffer briefed Philip Zelikow, the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, and other Commission staff members on Able Danger. According to Schaffer, Zelikow stated that this was very important information, gave Schaffer his card, and told him to get back in touch when he returned to Washington, D.C. However, Schaffer says that when he called Zelikow's office in January 2004 to set up an appointment, he was given the brush off. When he called again, he was told Dr. Zelikow had all the information he needed on Able Danger and there was no need for a meeting. Shortly thereafter he was hit out of the blue with charges that he had run up unauthorized telephone charges, to the tune of $67. According to Schaffer, the Pentagon spent "in our estimation $400,000 to investigate all these issues simply to drum up this information." That fits a pattern of retaliation against other government whistleblowers who have been faced with similar charges.
Many additional examples could be cited to amplify this pattern. It is a pattern that reflects not incompetence or "lack of coordination" but something much worse. It is a pattern of conscious, purposeful action aimed at thwarting those who are tasked with defending America in the "war on terror." It is a pattern that is being carried out by policymakers at the highest levels of our government, and it is time to ask why.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,170878,00.html
Pentagon Revokes 'Able Danger' Officer's Clearance
Saturday, October 01, 2005
VIDEO
FREE FOX News Video:•Whistleblower Silenced?STORIES BACKGROUND LINKS
•'Able Danger' Will Get Second Hearing•Revised 9/11 Report Reveals New Details•9/11 Report: 'We Cannot Let Our Guard Down'•Flight 93 Downed Without Struggle•Qaeda Ties to Iran, Iraq Still Murky•9/11 Report Urges Communication•Families Not Done Pressing Gov't•Fast Facts: Missed Opportunities•Fast Facts: Panel's Major Findings•Bush Defends War on Terror Record•Kerry: Intelligence Reforms Overdue •Raw Data: 9/11 Report Chapters•9/11 Report: 'We Cannot Let Our Guard Down'•Fast Facts: 9/11 Panel's Guidance•Quotes: Reactions to 9/11 Report•Transcript: Bush Praises 9/11 Panel's Report•Intel Chief Idea Gets Mixed Response•Ridge: Intel Czar Not Needed 'Now'•Video Shows Hijackers at Security
WASHINGTON — An officer who has claimed that a classified military unit identified four Sept. 11 hijackers before the 2001 attacks is facing Pentagon accusations of breaking numerous rules, charges his lawyer suggests are aimed at undermining his credibility.
The alleged infractions by Army Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer (search), 42, include obtaining a service medal under false pretenses, improperly flashing military identification while drunk and stealing pens, according to military paperwork shown by his attorney to The Associated Press.
Shaffer was one of the first to publicly link Sept. 11 leader Mohamed Atta (search) to the unit code-named Able Danger (search). Shaffer was one of five witnesses the Pentagon ordered not to appear Sept. 21 before the Senate Judiciary Committee to discuss the unit's findings.
The military revoked Shaffer's top security clearance this month, a day before he was supposed to testify to a congressional committee.
Mark Zaid, Shaffer's attorney, said the Pentagon started looking into Shaffer's security clearance about the time in 2003 he met in Afghanistan with staff members of the bipartisan commission that studied the Sept. 11 attacks and told them about Able Danger.
(Story continues below)
ADVERTISEMENTSAdvertise Here
Zaid said he can't prove the Pentagon went after Shaffer because he's a whistleblower, but "all the timing associated with the clearance issue has been suspiciously coincidental."
Citing concerns with the privacy act, Cmdr. Terry Sutherland, a Defense Intelligence Agency (search) spokesman, declined to release any information on Shaffer.
According to papers provided by Zaid, the Defense Intelligence Agency is questioning whether Shaffer deserved a Defense Meritorious Service Medal (search) he was awarded. Shaffer, who is supported by a retired colonel who has praised his work, says those challenging the medal do not have firsthand knowledge of his actions.
Shaffer says he showed his government credentials during two incidents in 1990, when he was drunk, and 1996, when he was pulled over by police. The military says he misused his credentials, but Shaffer says he was not told he should not have used them. He also said he has joined Alcoholics Anonymous and has been sober for 13 years.
As for the pens and other office supplies taken, he blamed that on "youthful indiscretions" more than 20 years ago.
According to the paperwork, the alleged infractions against Shaffer also include:
-- Falsely claiming $341.80 in mileage and tolls fees. He said he filed travel expenses based on what he was told by human resources staff.
-- Obtaining $67.79 in personal cell phone charges. He said the amount was a legitimate expense accrued so he could forward calls.
-- Going over his chain of command to do briefings. Shaffer said he was providing briefings to higher-ups on projects even his direct superiors did not know about, and he received superior review ratings for that time.
-- Showing irresponsibility with $2,012 in credit card debt. He said he paid off the debt, and Zaid said DIA dropped the issue.
Shaffer, now a member of the Army Reserves, has been on administrative leave since March 2004. During the same time, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel on Oct. 1, 2004.
Shaffer has said he tried three times to meet with the FBI to convey the Able Danger unit's findings before Sept. 11, but was ordered not to by military attorneys.
Shaffer's assertions on Able Danger have been supported by Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa. If correct, they would change the timeline as to when authorities first learned of some of the Sept. 11 hijackers.
The Sept. 11 commission has dismissed the claims. The Pentagon has acknowledged some employees recall seeing an intelligence chart identifying Atta as a terrorist before the attacks, but said none have been able to find a copy of it.
Pentagon Revokes 'Able Danger' Officer's Clearance
Saturday, October 01, 2005
VIDEO
FREE FOX News Video:•Whistleblower Silenced?STORIES BACKGROUND LINKS
•'Able Danger' Will Get Second Hearing•Revised 9/11 Report Reveals New Details•9/11 Report: 'We Cannot Let Our Guard Down'•Flight 93 Downed Without Struggle•Qaeda Ties to Iran, Iraq Still Murky•9/11 Report Urges Communication•Families Not Done Pressing Gov't•Fast Facts: Missed Opportunities•Fast Facts: Panel's Major Findings•Bush Defends War on Terror Record•Kerry: Intelligence Reforms Overdue •Raw Data: 9/11 Report Chapters•9/11 Report: 'We Cannot Let Our Guard Down'•Fast Facts: 9/11 Panel's Guidance•Quotes: Reactions to 9/11 Report•Transcript: Bush Praises 9/11 Panel's Report•Intel Chief Idea Gets Mixed Response•Ridge: Intel Czar Not Needed 'Now'•Video Shows Hijackers at Security
WASHINGTON — An officer who has claimed that a classified military unit identified four Sept. 11 hijackers before the 2001 attacks is facing Pentagon accusations of breaking numerous rules, charges his lawyer suggests are aimed at undermining his credibility.
The alleged infractions by Army Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer (search), 42, include obtaining a service medal under false pretenses, improperly flashing military identification while drunk and stealing pens, according to military paperwork shown by his attorney to The Associated Press.
Shaffer was one of the first to publicly link Sept. 11 leader Mohamed Atta (search) to the unit code-named Able Danger (search). Shaffer was one of five witnesses the Pentagon ordered not to appear Sept. 21 before the Senate Judiciary Committee to discuss the unit's findings.
The military revoked Shaffer's top security clearance this month, a day before he was supposed to testify to a congressional committee.
Mark Zaid, Shaffer's attorney, said the Pentagon started looking into Shaffer's security clearance about the time in 2003 he met in Afghanistan with staff members of the bipartisan commission that studied the Sept. 11 attacks and told them about Able Danger.
(Story continues below)
ADVERTISEMENTSAdvertise Here
Zaid said he can't prove the Pentagon went after Shaffer because he's a whistleblower, but "all the timing associated with the clearance issue has been suspiciously coincidental."
Citing concerns with the privacy act, Cmdr. Terry Sutherland, a Defense Intelligence Agency (search) spokesman, declined to release any information on Shaffer.
According to papers provided by Zaid, the Defense Intelligence Agency is questioning whether Shaffer deserved a Defense Meritorious Service Medal (search) he was awarded. Shaffer, who is supported by a retired colonel who has praised his work, says those challenging the medal do not have firsthand knowledge of his actions.
Shaffer says he showed his government credentials during two incidents in 1990, when he was drunk, and 1996, when he was pulled over by police. The military says he misused his credentials, but Shaffer says he was not told he should not have used them. He also said he has joined Alcoholics Anonymous and has been sober for 13 years.
As for the pens and other office supplies taken, he blamed that on "youthful indiscretions" more than 20 years ago.
According to the paperwork, the alleged infractions against Shaffer also include:
-- Falsely claiming $341.80 in mileage and tolls fees. He said he filed travel expenses based on what he was told by human resources staff.
-- Obtaining $67.79 in personal cell phone charges. He said the amount was a legitimate expense accrued so he could forward calls.
-- Going over his chain of command to do briefings. Shaffer said he was providing briefings to higher-ups on projects even his direct superiors did not know about, and he received superior review ratings for that time.
-- Showing irresponsibility with $2,012 in credit card debt. He said he paid off the debt, and Zaid said DIA dropped the issue.
Shaffer, now a member of the Army Reserves, has been on administrative leave since March 2004. During the same time, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel on Oct. 1, 2004.
Shaffer has said he tried three times to meet with the FBI to convey the Able Danger unit's findings before Sept. 11, but was ordered not to by military attorneys.
Shaffer's assertions on Able Danger have been supported by Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa. If correct, they would change the timeline as to when authorities first learned of some of the Sept. 11 hijackers.
The Sept. 11 commission has dismissed the claims. The Pentagon has acknowledged some employees recall seeing an intelligence chart identifying Atta as a terrorist before the attacks, but said none have been able to find a copy of it.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?con...&articleId=1175
The Security Council Resolution on Syria is a pretext for the bombing and occupation of Syria
The Resolution is in Violation of the UN Charter
by Niloufer Bhagwat
November 2, 2005
GlobalResearch.ca
Rafik Harari died in a manner which anyone who has humanity would not want any individual to die, and it is conceded he was a former Prime Minister. Does that justify an investigation by the Secretary General of the United Nations and a Resolution by the Security Council, when the pogroms committed by the Phalangists and Israel army in conspiracy with General Aron Sharon have never been investigated, even though it took place during an international conflict and the occupation of Lebanon . Are the lives of the Palestinian refugees who who were brualy killed, raped, mutilated any less important than that of Rafik Hariri and which provision of the UN Charter says so?
The world has witnessed the killings by bomb blasts of Indian citizens from 1993 including in Kashmir, Delhi , Mumbai in scores of places with a death toll of thousands of citizens killed and maimed by covert agencies in India . The bombings mysteriously conincided invariably with some sharpening crisis of some nature or the other or of impending pogroms against minorities or other sections. Yet UN probe was ever ordered and there is no resolution of the Security Council on bomb blasts in India , the Philippines or Indonesia.
Recently no less a person than a former Minister of Indonesia has claimed that the Indonesian military had covert links with those perpetrating the blasts at Bali. Earlier Junior military officers in the Philippines had made similar allegations against some of the highest in the political leadership of their country .
The United Nations Charter explicitly and implicitly prohibits interference in the internal affairs and criminal investigations in any country, the only exception possible would be War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as defined by the Nuremberg principles perpetrated by any government, including the permanent members of the Security Council . Apart from this exception the sovereignty of every nation, society or people is guaranteed by the UN Charter and no country in the conduct of its criminal investigation can be influenced or pressurised by the permanent or elected members of the Security Council without this constituting an undue interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.
To illustrate the diabolical nature of the double standards the series of covert political assassinations carried out by some of the permanent and other governments in the Secuirity Council have been open knowledge the world over . The assassination of President Allende in Chile is one example ,where the UN and all the members of the Security Council continued to deal with the murderous Pinochet regime. The same General Pinochet is now indicted for receiving funds and other largesse from American Banks and other financial insitutions claiming age in defence . The role of Henry Kissinger in that assassination was carefully documented by impeccable American sources, and yet neither has Henry Kissinger been indicted nor anyone associated with the conspiracy to murder the innocent and instal in Chile a government favourable to US - UK Corporations and finance capital
In India two Prime Ministers were brually assassinated . Indira Gandhi in 1984 while in office and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, while leader of the opposition was killed by a suicide bomber mid way through an election , an act of covert agencies and terrorist organizations acting in a covert conspiracy . The Inquiry Commission inquiring into the assassination has held that it is necessary to further investigate the conspiracy and conspirators behind the suicide bomber as these have not been unmasked.
Prior to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a leading member of a terrorist organization sheltered in the UK announced on BBC that Mrs.Indira Gandhi should be killed . Neither the Secretary General of the United Nations nor the Security Council directed an investigation into the International conspiracy to assassinate Mrs Indira Gandhi despite prima facie evidence on record that the funds and training were being received by these covert organizations from the UK and across the Atlantic.
Similarly it cannot be forgotten that an urgent message was sent to the late Rajiv Gandhi by the late Yasser Arafat that there was a covert plot to assassinate him, which came to pass. The fact that Yasser Arafat communicated the existence of this covert conspiracy would reveal that Mossad could not be very far from this plot, as a former Mossad agent has admitted in a controversial book that more than one side to the fratricide in Sri Lanka were trained by Mossad in Israel including sections of the LTTE .
We have the example of the Kanishka aircraft which was bombed with hundreds of Indian and other passengers on board killed with the failure of Canadian Intelligence to conduct a public inquiry or to indict covert organizations being funded and operated from Canada, with a highly compromised trial satisfying none of the surviving relatives as comprehensive and thorough; yet the Security Council of the United Nations despite the hundreds of lives lost did not indict the government of Canada and put it on notice that those responsible must be proceeded against in the alternative Canada could be subjected to sanctions .
Can one Rafiq Harari whose assassination however brutal be given greater primacy over the murder of hundreds and thousands of citizens in covert International and national incidents which the UN Security Council has never cared to investigate even though when they have taken place across international boundaries as in the Kanishka crash, during wars of occupation as in the case of Sabra and Chatilla , in Kashmir and those killed in coups and counter coups by external forces in Latin America and other places . No inquiry has taken place as to how Ahmed Shah Massood of the Nothern Alliance was murdered in Afghanistan two days before 9/11.
An innocent Brazilian was recently murdered by the police in England and there has been no Resolution on the UK by the Security Council and no international investigation by a prosecutor into the suspicious London bomb blasts and no possibility of sanctions against the UK, India, Indonesia, Philippines or other countries where scoresof innocent citizens are being killed by bomb blasts.
The 9/11 tragedy remains a mystery with no UN investigation and no Security Council Resolution though thousands died in one incident alone and we are now informed of "Able Danger " and the implications of the controlled demolitions of the towers by explosives and not by aircraft .
For the last few years since 1993 in tandem with the neoliberal globalization program imposing a creeping economic death sentence on several classes of Indian society including weavers, peasants, workers, petty traders, bomb blasts have been occurring in different cities of the Indian Union on ordinarly citizens with covert agencies operating, leaving thousands killed and maimed including Kashmiris in the State of Jammu and Kashmir including sections of the middle classes and working people in Mumbai , New Delhi , Tamil Nad, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, among other cities . Despite the fact that this discloses a complete and abject failure of more than one national party in power at the Centre and in the States where the bomb blasts have taken place the Security Council has not appointed an international inquiry to protect the lives of the Indian people against these covert attacks from allegedly terrorist organizations operating from inside India or from outside India and not a single government has resigned acknowledging responsibility in not being able to secure the right to life of the citizen of India a basic function of government .
The propoganda systems national and International have broked down , no one believes the Goebelsian news reports , the Security Council and IAEA are seen to be aiding and abetting invasions and occupations . Even war can no longer camouflage the civlizational collapse when it is necessary to kill innocent men, women and children for systems to survive .
On the murder of Rafiq Hariri the central question asked in any crime is a simple one :" Who benefits ?"
The answer is that the murder of Rafiq Hariri benefits those corporations controlling governments who desire to militarily invade yet another country of the region vital for control of hydrocarbon resources and pipelines and for that purpose secured withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon a country which was articially severed from Syria by the elite classes of the big powers, in what has been the " Great Game " of redrawing artificially the maps of countries and societies in the age of Imperialism and now in its new camouflage neoliberal globalization in the tradition of Cecil Rhodes who recommended colonization as a policy to prevent revolution at home in societies increasingly polarized .
For governments like Syria who attempted for decades to comply with various and diverse requests of the Imperial powers, there is a lesson, which is no one is spared not even yesterday's ally.
Despite tight rope walking every single leader, the government and its members are dispensable in a brutal game which recognizes no one and makes not a single concession to humanity. Many leaders erstwhile friends and allies of the US-UK corporations will follow Saddam Hussain either to trial or to the grave including those who collaborated in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, former Yugoslavia, Iran, Pakistan, India and anywhere else ...
All the perfumes of Arabia cannot cleanse this blood of innocent humanity .
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Centre for Research on Globalization.
To become a Member of Global Research
The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) at www.globalresearch.ca grants permission to cross-post original Global Research articles in their entirety, or any portions thereof, on community internet sites, as long as the text & title are not modified. The source must be acknowledged and an active URL hyperlink address to the original CRG article must be indicated. The author's copyright note must be displayed. For publication of Global Research articles in print or other forms including commercial internet sites, contact: crgeditor@yahoo.com
www.globalresearch.ca contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available to our readers under the provisions of "fair use" in an effort to advance a better understanding of political, economic and social issues. The material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving it for research and educational purposes. If you wish to use copyrighted material for purposes other than "fair use" you must request permission from the copyright owner.
© Copyright Niloufer Bhagwat, GlobalResearch.ca, 2005
The url address of this article is: www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=BHA20051102&articleId=1175
The Security Council Resolution on Syria is a pretext for the bombing and occupation of Syria
The Resolution is in Violation of the UN Charter
by Niloufer Bhagwat
November 2, 2005
GlobalResearch.ca
Rafik Harari died in a manner which anyone who has humanity would not want any individual to die, and it is conceded he was a former Prime Minister. Does that justify an investigation by the Secretary General of the United Nations and a Resolution by the Security Council, when the pogroms committed by the Phalangists and Israel army in conspiracy with General Aron Sharon have never been investigated, even though it took place during an international conflict and the occupation of Lebanon . Are the lives of the Palestinian refugees who who were brualy killed, raped, mutilated any less important than that of Rafik Hariri and which provision of the UN Charter says so?
The world has witnessed the killings by bomb blasts of Indian citizens from 1993 including in Kashmir, Delhi , Mumbai in scores of places with a death toll of thousands of citizens killed and maimed by covert agencies in India . The bombings mysteriously conincided invariably with some sharpening crisis of some nature or the other or of impending pogroms against minorities or other sections. Yet UN probe was ever ordered and there is no resolution of the Security Council on bomb blasts in India , the Philippines or Indonesia.
Recently no less a person than a former Minister of Indonesia has claimed that the Indonesian military had covert links with those perpetrating the blasts at Bali. Earlier Junior military officers in the Philippines had made similar allegations against some of the highest in the political leadership of their country .
The United Nations Charter explicitly and implicitly prohibits interference in the internal affairs and criminal investigations in any country, the only exception possible would be War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as defined by the Nuremberg principles perpetrated by any government, including the permanent members of the Security Council . Apart from this exception the sovereignty of every nation, society or people is guaranteed by the UN Charter and no country in the conduct of its criminal investigation can be influenced or pressurised by the permanent or elected members of the Security Council without this constituting an undue interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.
To illustrate the diabolical nature of the double standards the series of covert political assassinations carried out by some of the permanent and other governments in the Secuirity Council have been open knowledge the world over . The assassination of President Allende in Chile is one example ,where the UN and all the members of the Security Council continued to deal with the murderous Pinochet regime. The same General Pinochet is now indicted for receiving funds and other largesse from American Banks and other financial insitutions claiming age in defence . The role of Henry Kissinger in that assassination was carefully documented by impeccable American sources, and yet neither has Henry Kissinger been indicted nor anyone associated with the conspiracy to murder the innocent and instal in Chile a government favourable to US - UK Corporations and finance capital
In India two Prime Ministers were brually assassinated . Indira Gandhi in 1984 while in office and Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, while leader of the opposition was killed by a suicide bomber mid way through an election , an act of covert agencies and terrorist organizations acting in a covert conspiracy . The Inquiry Commission inquiring into the assassination has held that it is necessary to further investigate the conspiracy and conspirators behind the suicide bomber as these have not been unmasked.
Prior to the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a leading member of a terrorist organization sheltered in the UK announced on BBC that Mrs.Indira Gandhi should be killed . Neither the Secretary General of the United Nations nor the Security Council directed an investigation into the International conspiracy to assassinate Mrs Indira Gandhi despite prima facie evidence on record that the funds and training were being received by these covert organizations from the UK and across the Atlantic.
Similarly it cannot be forgotten that an urgent message was sent to the late Rajiv Gandhi by the late Yasser Arafat that there was a covert plot to assassinate him, which came to pass. The fact that Yasser Arafat communicated the existence of this covert conspiracy would reveal that Mossad could not be very far from this plot, as a former Mossad agent has admitted in a controversial book that more than one side to the fratricide in Sri Lanka were trained by Mossad in Israel including sections of the LTTE .
We have the example of the Kanishka aircraft which was bombed with hundreds of Indian and other passengers on board killed with the failure of Canadian Intelligence to conduct a public inquiry or to indict covert organizations being funded and operated from Canada, with a highly compromised trial satisfying none of the surviving relatives as comprehensive and thorough; yet the Security Council of the United Nations despite the hundreds of lives lost did not indict the government of Canada and put it on notice that those responsible must be proceeded against in the alternative Canada could be subjected to sanctions .
Can one Rafiq Harari whose assassination however brutal be given greater primacy over the murder of hundreds and thousands of citizens in covert International and national incidents which the UN Security Council has never cared to investigate even though when they have taken place across international boundaries as in the Kanishka crash, during wars of occupation as in the case of Sabra and Chatilla , in Kashmir and those killed in coups and counter coups by external forces in Latin America and other places . No inquiry has taken place as to how Ahmed Shah Massood of the Nothern Alliance was murdered in Afghanistan two days before 9/11.
An innocent Brazilian was recently murdered by the police in England and there has been no Resolution on the UK by the Security Council and no international investigation by a prosecutor into the suspicious London bomb blasts and no possibility of sanctions against the UK, India, Indonesia, Philippines or other countries where scoresof innocent citizens are being killed by bomb blasts.
The 9/11 tragedy remains a mystery with no UN investigation and no Security Council Resolution though thousands died in one incident alone and we are now informed of "Able Danger " and the implications of the controlled demolitions of the towers by explosives and not by aircraft .
For the last few years since 1993 in tandem with the neoliberal globalization program imposing a creeping economic death sentence on several classes of Indian society including weavers, peasants, workers, petty traders, bomb blasts have been occurring in different cities of the Indian Union on ordinarly citizens with covert agencies operating, leaving thousands killed and maimed including Kashmiris in the State of Jammu and Kashmir including sections of the middle classes and working people in Mumbai , New Delhi , Tamil Nad, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, among other cities . Despite the fact that this discloses a complete and abject failure of more than one national party in power at the Centre and in the States where the bomb blasts have taken place the Security Council has not appointed an international inquiry to protect the lives of the Indian people against these covert attacks from allegedly terrorist organizations operating from inside India or from outside India and not a single government has resigned acknowledging responsibility in not being able to secure the right to life of the citizen of India a basic function of government .
The propoganda systems national and International have broked down , no one believes the Goebelsian news reports , the Security Council and IAEA are seen to be aiding and abetting invasions and occupations . Even war can no longer camouflage the civlizational collapse when it is necessary to kill innocent men, women and children for systems to survive .
On the murder of Rafiq Hariri the central question asked in any crime is a simple one :" Who benefits ?"
The answer is that the murder of Rafiq Hariri benefits those corporations controlling governments who desire to militarily invade yet another country of the region vital for control of hydrocarbon resources and pipelines and for that purpose secured withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon a country which was articially severed from Syria by the elite classes of the big powers, in what has been the " Great Game " of redrawing artificially the maps of countries and societies in the age of Imperialism and now in its new camouflage neoliberal globalization in the tradition of Cecil Rhodes who recommended colonization as a policy to prevent revolution at home in societies increasingly polarized .
For governments like Syria who attempted for decades to comply with various and diverse requests of the Imperial powers, there is a lesson, which is no one is spared not even yesterday's ally.
Despite tight rope walking every single leader, the government and its members are dispensable in a brutal game which recognizes no one and makes not a single concession to humanity. Many leaders erstwhile friends and allies of the US-UK corporations will follow Saddam Hussain either to trial or to the grave including those who collaborated in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, former Yugoslavia, Iran, Pakistan, India and anywhere else ...
All the perfumes of Arabia cannot cleanse this blood of innocent humanity .
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Centre for Research on Globalization.
To become a Member of Global Research
The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) at www.globalresearch.ca grants permission to cross-post original Global Research articles in their entirety, or any portions thereof, on community internet sites, as long as the text & title are not modified. The source must be acknowledged and an active URL hyperlink address to the original CRG article must be indicated. The author's copyright note must be displayed. For publication of Global Research articles in print or other forms including commercial internet sites, contact: crgeditor@yahoo.com
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© Copyright Niloufer Bhagwat, GlobalResearch.ca, 2005
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http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=46981
DAY OF INFAMY 2001
Weldon: Pentagon just trying to cover its backside
Full text of congressman's floor speech
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Posted: October 21, 2005
7:18 p.m. Eastern
© 2005 WorldNetDaily.com
Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to talk to our colleagues and through our colleagues to the American people about an issue that troubles me greatly.
I have been in this institution 19 years, and during those 19 years I have been on the Committee on Armed Services. Currently, I am the vice chairman of that committee and chairman of the subcommittee that oversees the purchase of our weapons systems. In the past I have chaired the research subcommittee. I have chaired the readiness subcommittee, and I have spent every available hour of my time working to make sure that our military troops were properly protected and have the proper equipment and training.
I am a strong supporter of our military. Whether it was in the last 2 years of the Reagan administration, the four years of the Bush administration, the 8 years of the Clinton administration, or the current administration of President George W. Bush, I have been a strong supporter of our military. I am a strong supporter of President Bush. I campaigned for him. I am a strong supporter of Secretary Rumsfeld. I say all of that, Mr. Speaker, because tonight I rise to express my absolute outrage and disgust with what is happening in our defense intelligence agencies.
Mr. Speaker, back in 1999 when I was Chair of the defense research subcommittee, the Army was doing cutting-edge work on a new type of technology to allow us to understand and predict emerging transnational terrorist threats. That technology was being done at several locations, but was being led by our Special Forces Command. The work that they were doing was unprecedented. And because of what I saw there, I supported the development of a national capability of a collaborative center that the CIA would just not accept.
In fact, in November 4 of 1999, 2 years before 9/11, in a meeting in my office with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Director of the CIA, Deputy Director of the FBI, we presented a nine-page proposal to create a national collaborative center. When we finished the brief, the CIA said we did not need that capability, and so before 9/11 we did not have it.
When President Bush came in after a year of research, he announced the formation of the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, exactly what I had proposed in 1999. Today it is known as the NCTC, the National Counterterrorism Center. But, Mr. Speaker, what troubles me is not the fact that we did not take those steps.
What troubles me is that I now have learned in the last 4 months that one of the tasks that was being done in 1999 and 2000 was a top-secret program organized at the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, carried out by the general in charge of our Special Forces Command, a very elite unit focusing on information regarding al Qaeda. It was a military language effort to allow us to identify the key cells of al Qaeda around the world and to give the military the capability to plan actions against those cells so they could not attack us as they did in 1993 at the Trade Center, at the Khobar Towers, the U.S.S. Cole attack, and the African embassy bombings.
What I did not know, Mr. Speaker, up until June of this year, was that that secret program called Able Danger actually identified the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda in January and February of 2000, over 1 year before 9/11 every happened. In addition, I learned that not only did we identify the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, but we identified Mohamed Atta as one of the members of that Brooklyn cell along with three other terrorists who were the leadership of the 9/11 attack.
I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, again, over 1 year before 9/11, that Able Danger team attempted on three separate occasions to provide information to the FBI about the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, and on three separate occasions they were denied by lawyers in the previous administration to transfer that information.
Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday on "Meet the Press," Louis Freeh, FBI Director at the time, was interviewed by Tim Russert. The first question to Louis Freeh was in regard to the FBI's ability to ferret out the terrorists. Louis Freeh's response, which can be obtained by anyone in this country as a part of the official record, was, Well, Tim, we are now finding out that a top-secret program of the military called Able Danger actually identified the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda and Mohammed Atta over a year before 9/11.
And what Louis Freeh said, Mr. Speaker, is that that kind of actionable data could have allowed us to prevent the hijackings that occurred on September 11.
So now we know, Mr. Speaker, that military intelligence officers working in a program authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the general in charge of Special Forces Command, identified Mohammed Atta and three terrorists a year before 9/11, tried to transfer that information to the FBI were denied; and the FBI Director has now said publicly if he would have had that information, the FBI could have used it to perhaps prevent the hijackings that struck the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the plane that landed in Pennsylvania and perhaps saved 3,000 lives and changed the course of world history.
Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight because we have been trying to get the story out about Able Danger and what really happened. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, I have to rise tonight to tell you that as bad as this story is, and as bad as it is that the data was not transferred to the FBI, and as bad as it is that the 9/11 Commission totally ignored this entire story and referred to it as historically insignificant even though it was authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, even though Louis Freeh has now said it could have provided information to prevent the attack against us, the 9/11 Commission ignored it. Not because the commissioners ignored it, but because someone at the staff level on the 9/11 Commission staff decided for whatever reason that they did not want to pursue the Abel Danger story.
Mr. Speaker, in August and September I met with the military officials involved with Abel Danger and one by one they told their story, until, Mr. Speaker, leaders in the Defense Intelligence Agency, including the deputy director, decided they do not want the story told. I think because they perhaps are fearful of being embarrassed and humiliated.
So what direction had they taken, Mr. Speaker?
They have gagged the military officers. They have prevented them from talking to any Member of Congress. They have prevented them from talking to the media. And the Defense Intelligence Agency has began a process to destroy the career and the life of Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer.
Now, it might be easy for us to ignore this, Mr. Speaker. We all have busy careers and worry about reelections every 2 years and worry about our own families and our jobs. But I cannot do that in this case and neither can this body, and neither can the other body. You see, Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer took an oath to defend our Constitution. He took the words "duty, honor, country" seriously and devoted 23 years of his life in four deployed intelligence operations of our military to protect America.
During the time he served our country, he has received the Bronze Star, an award that does not come easily, for showing acts of courage, leadership, and bravery in the course of his activities.
He has received public commendations from previous directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency, including General Patrick Hughes, including generals at Special Forces Command, and including Admiral Wilson of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has received dozens of letters and commendations for his work. The laudatory comments I reviewed in his files are unbelievable.
But, you see, Mr. Speaker, there is a problem. The Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency was in a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer almost a year before 9/11, and Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer showed him a disk in his office with information about al Qaeda and Mohammed Atta, and the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stopped the briefing and said, you cannot show me that. I do not want to see it. It might contain information I cannot look at.
Now, Tony Shaffer was not in the room alone, Mr. Speaker. There were other people, and we know their names. So we have witnesses. Now, the Deputy Director has denied that meeting and denied he was there and denied this particular story, but the fact is he knows that we are going to pursue it.
So what has happened to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, Mr. Speaker? The Defense Intelligence Agency has lifted his security clearance. One day before he was to testify before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in uniform, they permanently removed his security clearance. And now our Defense Intelligence Agency has told Colonel Shaffer's lawyer that they plan to seek a permanent removal of his pay and his health care benefits for him and his two children. Why, Mr. Speaker? Because Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, like Commander Scott Philpot of the Navy, like J. D. Smith, and like a host of other Able Danger employees, has told the truth.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I sat here in the 1990s and I sat here during the 9/11 investigation and watched a ridiculous situation develop with Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser under President Clinton. He walked into the National Archives before he was to testify before the 9/11 Commission looking through documents. He took documents out of the archives and stuffed them in his socks and pants so that no one would see them as he left the National Archives. Now, that is a felony, tampering with Federal documents and removing classified information regarding our security and information that the 9/11 commission needed to see.
Sandy Berger initially lied about it. He said he did not do it. Then he admitted it, and he was given a punishment. And, oh, by the way, his security clearance was temporarily lifted, but he will get it back again, for lying, for stealing, and for committing an act of outrage against our country's security. Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, a Bronze Star 23-year military veteran, simply told the truth and now his life is being ruined.
His career is ended. He is no longer in military intelligence. They have taken his security clearance, and they are about to destroy him as a person. They are about to deny him the basic health care and the salary that he has earned, and they are doing it in this way. This is outrageous. It is evil. They do not want to fire Tony because they also do not want him to talk to the media. So by suspending him and removing his pay and his health care, they hurt him bad, but he cannot talk because he is under suspension and his lawyer has advised him that to talk to the media, to talk to Members of Congress, even when he is not being paid, would cause him further problems and totally prevent him from ever having this gross problem reversed. Mr. Speaker, this is outrageous. Mr. Speaker, this is not America.
Over my 19 years in Congress, I have led 40 delegations to the former Soviet Union. I have sat in the face of the Soviet Communists and confronted them on full transparency. I sat at the table with President Lukashenko of Belarus, who has been called by our Secretary of State the last dictator in Europe. I took both delegations to North Korea, Mr. Speaker, and sat across the table from Kim Gye Gwan and I told him we abhor the way they treat their people, the way they lie about what is happening, and the way they distort information.
Mr. Speaker, I took three delegations to Libya to meet with Qadhafi, and I told him that we are absolutely outraged at what Libya did in helping complete the Lockerbie bombing and the bombing of the Berlin nightclub.
You know, Mr. Speaker, I never thought I would have to take the floor of this Chamber and make the same statements about the Defense Intelligence Agency. As a supporter of the President, as a supporter of the military, Mr. Speaker, if we allow this to go forward, then we send the signal to every man and woman wearing a uniform that if you tell the truth, you will be destroyed if a career bureaucrat above you does not like what you are saying. If you tell the truth, we will take your health care benefits away from your kids. If you tell the truth, we will ruin you.
Mr. Speaker, this is not America. Mr. Speaker, this is not what I have been told by Secretary Rumsfeld that we are doing with our troops in protecting them, in giving them the best equipment and the best training. This is not what I spend hours in committee hearings on. This sends the wrong signal to America's troops. It tells them, do not be honest. Do not respect the fact that you have to be truthful. If there is somebody that the truth offends, then you better be silent.
Mr. Speaker, I have today asked for an independent investigation of the Defense Intelligence Agency and their efforts at destroying Tony Shaffer's life. This is outrageous, Mr. Speaker. They trumped up charges against him. They said while he was overseas in Afghanistan, forward deployed, that he forwarded cell phone calls from his official phone to his personal phone; and when they checked that out, it ran up a cost to the taxpayers of about $60. The second verbal charge they gave him was that he went to a course at the Army War College and he got reimbursed for his travel, his mileage and tolls, 100-some dollars. And they said he received a commendation for which he was not entitled, even though it was signed by his commanding officer and the acting Secretary of the Army.
But they went beyond that, Mr. Speaker. They went beyond that with this man. They said he had $2,000 of debt, personal debt. Well, I would like to have every Pentagon employee tomorrow, I would like to have the senior leadership show us what debt they have in the Defense Intelligence Agency so we can make that public.
They even went to this length, Mr. Speaker: the Defense Intelligence Agency wrote in an official document that Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer stole public property. A serious charge. Well, when you check what that public property was, it was an assortment of pens, government pens. But what they did not say in the Defense Intelligence report was that he took those pens when he was 15 years of age and was with his father when he was on assignment at one of our embassy outposts. He took the pens to give to other students at the school when he was 15 years of age. And by the way, Mr. Speaker, it was Tony Shaffer himself who admitted to that thievery when he applied for his security clearance. So the Defense Intelligence Agency knew that during his entire career of 23 years, but they put that in the document against him.
This is a scandal, Mr. Speaker. It is an outrage. It is a travesty. Everyone that worked with Tony Shaffer, the Navy officers, the private citizens have all said the same thing. This is a scandal to get Tony Shaffer because he has told the truth.
Now, this Defense Intelligence Agency and this Deputy Director had the audacity to have their legal counsel send Tony Shaffer's lawyer a letter on September 23. I cannot put that letter in the RECORD because it is privileged information, but it will eventually come out. But in that letter, in the second to last paragraph, the legal counsel for the Defense Intelligence Agency says to Mr. Shaffer's lawyer, he cannot receive any more classified information from the Defense Intelligence Agency because I checked and his security clearances have all been removed. Therefore, he is not allowed to look at anything that is secret or confidential.
Now, that is a letter sent by the general counsel of the DIA on September 23 of this year. Two weeks later, Mr. Speaker, to show the stupidity of the Defense Intelligence Agency, they send seven packages to Mr. Shaffer's lawyer of his personal belongings, which the Deputy Director of the DIA told my staff 3 months ago did not exist any more. And in those seven boxes, Mr. Speaker, were five classified memos. The Defense Intelligence Agency sent five classified memos to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, which they told him on September 23 he was not allowed to have access to.
Mr. Speaker, that is a felony; and I have asked the Inspector General and the legal officials to investigate and prosecute the Defense Intelligence officials who sent five classified documents through the mail or by hand delivery to Tony Shaffer.
In addition, Mr. Speaker, the Defense Intelligence Agency, in its absolute total stupidity, included in those boxes $500 worth of Federal property, including a multi-hundred dollar GPS system owned by the Federal Government, which they sent to Tony Shaffer, I guess to keep. They also sent, Mr. Speaker, 25 pens, brand new, and marked on them is "Property of the U.S. Government." The Defense Intelligence Agency, in its absolute utter stupidity, sent Tony Shaffer Federal property which they accused him of taking when he was 15 years of age.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong here. There is a bureaucracy in the Defense Intelligence Agency that is out of control. They want to destroy the reputation of a 23-year military officer, Bronze Star recipient, hero of our country, with two kids because people in defense intelligence are embarrassed at what is going to come out.
And what is going to come out, Mr. Speaker? Well, we are going to find out, Mr. Speaker, that that unit, Able Danger, not only identified Mohammed Atta before 9/11, not only did they try to pass that information to the FBI, not only was that large data destroyed in the summer of 2000, but now, Mr. Speaker, I can add a new dimension to this whole story. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, I met with another Able Danger official. I was not aware of this official's knowledge because he does not live within the Beltway.
This official, Mr. Speaker, has impeccable credentials. I cannot reveal his name today. I will to any Member of this body, any of our colleagues that want to come to me, I will tell you privately who this official is, and you will agree with me when I tell you his name that he has impeccable credentials. This official yesterday, Mr. Speaker, in a meeting in my office, told me that he has never been talked to by the Pentagon. He has never been talked to by the Defense Intelligence Agency in their supposed investigation. He has never been talked to by the 9/11 Commission staff in their investigation; yet this official had a leadership position in Able Danger.
This official told me that there is a separate cache of information collected from over 20 Federal agencies in 1999 and 2000 on Able Danger that still may exist. Now, the Pentagon has told us all this material was destroyed, and now I have a senior official telling me there is a second pot of information that may well still exist.
Furthermore, at the hearing over in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, when Senator Specter asked why this data was destroyed, the witness who destroyed the data said, well, I was told that we could not keep this data for more than 90 days because it might involve information that contains U.S. persons, so we had to destroy it.
Well, I found out that is not the story. The reason the data was destroyed was because Special Forces Command asked the Army for that data and within a matter of days, that data was destroyed so the Army would not pass it to Special Forces Command. Yet there still is, was and I hope still is a massive pot of data.
But furthermore, that official that I talked to yesterday will also say that there was no 90-day requirement, as was testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. He said on a regular basis they kept information from Able Danger data mining for months and months and months. In fact, he will say he had a discussion with a lawyer in DOD named Schiffren who told him do not worry about it, just fill out a document, sign your name that you need it, put it in the box, and you can keep it as long as you want.
Mr. Speaker, that is entirely contradictory to what the Defense Intelligence Agency has been telling us, to what DOD has been telling us. Now we have someone who is willing to come forward and say that 90-day period is not real, they kept Able Danger information for months and months and months.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong here. A sitting President of the United States resigned his position because he tried to cover up a third-rate burglary when some low-level operatives from the Republican committee to reelect him broke into the Democrat headquarters in Washington, D.C. No one was killed. No money was stolen. No State secrets were stolen. It was a third-rate burglary, but it caused the resignation of President Richard Nixon.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about the deaths of 3,000 Americans.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about 2.5 terabytes of data about al Qaeda. That is equal to one-fourth of all of the printed material in the Library of Congress.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about Mohammed Atta and three of the terrorists that attacked us on 9/11.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about military intelligence officers, including an Annapolis graduate who will command one of our destroyers in January of 2006 who risked his entire career to state on the record I will swear until I die that I saw Mohammed Atta's face every day starting in January of 2000, a year and a half before 9/11.
Mr. Speaker, this is not somebody off the street, this is a graduate of Annapolis, a 23-year Naval officer who will command one of our destroyers in January who is agreeing with Lieutenant Shaffer. We have three other people who have testified under oath that they saw the same photograph, and the person I met yesterday will testify that he had the name of a Mohammed Atta before 9/11 but not the face.
Mr. Speaker, this is not some third-rate burglary coverup. This is not some Watergate incident. This is an attempt to prevent the American people from knowing the facts about how we could have prevented 9/11 and people are covering it up today. They are ruining the career of a military officer to do it and we cannot let it stand. I do not care whether you are Democrat or Republican, you cannot let a lieutenant colonel's career be ruined because of some bureaucrat in the Defense Intelligence Agency. If we let that happen, then no one who wears the uniform will ever feel protected because we will have let them down. Anyone who wears the uniform of this country who is serving today expects us to back him or her up and that is not happening. We are seeing lying, distortion.
Mr. Speaker, do you know, Wolf Blitzer on CNN told my staff that a Department of Defense employee told him that Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer was having an affair with one of my employees. How low can we go, Mr. Speaker? How low can we go to allow this Defense Department to try to ruin the reputation and the personal life of a lieutenant colonel with a Bronze Star? To Wolf Blitzer, Mr. Speaker.
We need to know the name of that defense official who told Wolf Blitzer who told my staff, and he is not the only one. I have other media people who will come forward in this grand effort to destroy the reputation of a uniformed military officer, to create scandalous accusations. He does not even know my staff, to accuse him of stealing pens when he was 15, to take away his health care benefits for his two kids because he is telling the truth.
What do we stand for if not the truth? Is it more important that we be politically correct? Is it more important that I not rock the boat because my party is in the White House, because I campaigned for Bush, and support Don Rumsfeld. Is that more important? If that is more important, I do not want to be here. I will leave. I will leave my post, but I will not do it until we get justice for this man and for these people who the 9/11 Commission called historically insignificant.
Mr. Speaker, there is something wrong inside the Beltway.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong when a military officer risks his life in Afghanistan time and again, embedded with our troops under an assumed name with a false beard and a false identity, forward deployed with our troops, gets castigated, gets ridiculed, gets some low life scum at the Pentagon spreading malicious lies about this individual, and then say to his lawyer, we are going to take away his health care benefits, we are going to take away his salary.
Mr. Speaker, if we allow this to stand as Democrats and Republicans, then none of us deserve to be here. When we all go overseas and meet the troops, we tell them how proud we are of them. We provide funding for them. We give them training and take care of their families. What we are allowing to happen right now is the Defense Intelligence Agency to ruin the career and the life of a man who spent 23 years protecting his Nation. If Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer was telling this story alone in a vacuum, that would be one thing. But he has been corroborated over and over again. I have met with at least 10 people who fully corroborate what Tony Shaffer says. Those meetings with the FBI, the FBI employee still works there and she told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, I set those meetings up with the FBI to transfer information about al Qaeda and Able Danger. So she is still there and she testified.
What we have here, I am convinced of this now, is an aggressive attempt by CIA management to cover up their own shortcomings in not being able to do what the Able Danger team did: They identified Mohammed Atta and the al Qaeda cell of Brooklyn 1 year before Р9/11. But even before that, as the story unfolds, you are going to hear the story that they also identified the threat to the USS Cole 2 weeks before the attack, and 2 days before the attack were screaming not to let the USS Cole come into the harbor at Yemen because they knew something was about to happen.
Mr. Speaker, bad news never comes easy; but in a democracy, the bad news has to come out so we can make sure it does not happen again.
Mr. Speaker, this whole thing started, not to embarrass anyone, this whole thing started because none of us knew that Mohammed Atta was identified before 9/11. It started because this Congress, this body in particular, tried to establish what is now in place back in 1999, a national collaborative center, but the CIA said we did not need it. The American people deserve to have the answers here. They deserve to know why 3,000 people died. They deserve to know what we could have done and should have done to better prepare ourselves and to work to prepare for the next incident. The American people need to know where those multiple terabytes of data is. Is it still being used? We know in January of 2001, General Shelton was given a 3-hour briefing on Able Danger. So even if they destroyed the data back in the summer of 2000, in January of 2001 there was enough material to give General Shelton, Commander of the Joint Chiefs, a 3-hour briefing.
Mr. Speaker, there is something here. I am not a conspiracy theorist, but there is something desperately wrong, Mr. Speaker. There is something outrageous at work here. This is not a third-rate burglary of a political campaign headquarters. This involved what is right now the covering up of information that led to the deaths of 3,000 people, changed the course of history, led to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and has disrupted our country, our economy and people's lives.
Mr. Speaker, we could ignore this. I cannot. If it means I have to resign from this body, I will resign. I will not allow, after 19 years in this body and as a vice chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, bureaucrats in the Defense Intelligence Agency to concoct stories, to talk about the theft of pens when this lieutenant colonel was 15 years old, to talk about this man's personal debt of $2,000. I would hate to check the indebtedness of Members of Congress. I know mine is more than $2,000.
Mr. Speaker, this is not America. I had a group of college students down from Drexel University. There were about 20 of them, including representative students from eight other nations. We talked about this. Of course we have talked about all of the problem countries in the world. We talk about our values as a Nation, the need for a democracy to have people involved, to have transparency, to have people who respect the rule of law and the Constitution.
How do I tell them that is what is working here, Mr. Speaker, when the Pentagon says that these people who simply want to tell the truth are not allowed? They are saying it is for classified purposes, yet the DOD lawyer on the Senate side there is nothing classified about any of the information. It is not about classified programs. I would be the last to want to see anything classified revealed. I have seen many, many instances where I have been given sensitive information that only a few people in the Congress and the country had. I would never reveal it. It is not about that. This is not about the DIA, this is not about the CIA, this is about CYA. It is about CYA by bureaucrats in the Defense Intelligence Agency and possibly some political operatives that do not want the facts to come out about Able Danger and the information that the Able Danger team put together. And in the process, they are going to destroy a man, a man who has been recognized by his country, who has a family, and who simply wants to do the right thing.
Mr. Speaker, I hated to take the floor tonight, but I did not know what else to do. We have committees of Congress working on this. I want to thank the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf), chairman of the FBI Appropriation Committee on Oversight. He is as outraged as I am. I want to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), who is looking at this, and the gentleman from California (Chairman Hunter). The Committee on Armed Services has a full-time staffer assigned to get to the facts of this. I want to thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. King), chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, because he is looking at this. I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan (Chairman Hoekstra) and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He has met with Tony Shaffer and has offered to get more information. I want to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for standing up and beginning to ask questions, and I want to thank Senator Specter and Senator Biden, who attended a Committee on the Judiciary hearing and expressed their outrage. I want to thank Senator Sessions, Senator Kyl, and Senator Grassley, who were all there. In fact, Senator Grassley called it a coverup.
Mr. Speaker, I cannot tell you the number of Members who have come to me and said this is unacceptable. I would hope that as a result of what we have heard tonight every Member of Congress will ask for an inquiry. The gentlewoman from Georgia (Ms. McKinney) wrote a letter to the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services asking for an investigation. We have from Republicans to Democrats, left to right, conservatives to liberals. What is happening here is unacceptable. It is unimaginable. It is un-American. All over the world tonight, young Americans are wearing our uniforms. They are doing a great job. They make us all proud when we travel overseas. They make us proud because of the pride they have. When I talk to them, they say I am glad to be doing what I am doing. I am doing the right thing for our country. I will go any place the Commander in Chief sends me. Whether I am in Afghanistan or Iraq, they will tell me that.
Whether we are in Kosovo or Somalia, they will tell us that. Whether we are at Hurricane Katrina, whether we are at Hurricane Andrew, or whether we are out in California, the earthquake, or the Midwestern floods, our troops are all the same. They respect our country. They respect our Constitution. If we allow this travesty to continue, Mr. Speaker, then we have let all of those people down for some nameless, faceless bureaucrat who is fearful that the information will finally come to light, that the DIA just did not get it.
Back in 1999 and 2000, they did not have a clue. They had millions of dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars, and could not do what a 20-member team did in being able to identify Mohammed Atta before the 9/11 attacks. DIA does not want that to come out, Mr. Speaker. They do not want that to come out. Heaven forbid the Defense Intelligence Agency, with hundreds of millions of dollars, would have a 20-member team do what they could not do because they were using new technology and new software. They do not want that to come out. That is why that Deputy Director, when he was at that meeting, said, I do not want to see this. Do not show it to me. And that is why today that Deputy Director is trying to ruin the career of Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer.
The only way to resolve this, Mr. Speaker, is to have a full independent investigation by the Inspector General of the Pentagon. I have asked Secretary Rumsfeld today to do that. I would ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in that request. Let the independent inspector for the Pentagon go in, not DIA. DIA cannot investigate itself. It does not have the capability to do that. It does not have the integrity to do that. Let the Inspector General do the investigation and while that is being done, protect Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer. He does not deserve to have his career ruined or destroyed for telling the truth.
And while we are at it, Mr. Speaker, if DIA is going to continue to press this ridiculous set of facts, then as I said earlier, I want DIA prosecuted for the five felonies they committed in sending classified documents to a person that 2 weeks earlier they said was incapable of receiving classified information. And if this continues, I want DIA held responsible for illegally transferring $500 of public assets to a person, that in the process of sending that stuff to him, DIA committed fraud against the taxpayers. I want them held accountable: DIA's stupidity; DIA's incompetence.
We have a new nominee for the head of DIA, and I am going to ask every Senator to fully explore each of these issues before that person is confirmed. I will meet with every Senator personally and go over all of this information. And I would encourage the Senators and the House Members to interview the other people who worked with Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer and to get their assessments of what is going on there. They will all tell them the same thing: Shaffer is being abused and used as a scapegoat. If they can ruin Shaffer, they can silence the story.
It cannot happen, Mr. Speaker. We cannot let it. That is not what America is about. That is not what we say to our enlisted personnel when they sign up for duty. That is not what we say when we pass our defense bills every year.
This man is being maligned and mistreated. He is being harassed. The most scurrilous accusations, totally unfounded, have been given to the American media; and I will name names, and I will ask for an investigation of the people who made those statements to these media people because it all needs to be put on the record.
And as someone tomorrow who will chair another hearing on our defense oversight to try to get the best value for the dollars for our military, I ask all of our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, on both sides of the aisle to join us. This is not Republicans or Democrats. It is about what is fundamental to this country. I would ask our constituents across America we represent to join us, to express their outrage, to e-mail, make phone calls, write letters to the Secretary of Defense, the President of the United States, to Members of Congress to simply let the story be told. Let the Able Danger story finally come out to the American people. Let them understand what really happened. Let Scott Philpott talk. Let Tony Shaffer talk. Let the others who have been silenced have a chance to tell their story to Congress and openly to the American people. In the end, the country will be stronger.
DAY OF INFAMY 2001
Weldon: Pentagon just trying to cover its backside
Full text of congressman's floor speech
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Posted: October 21, 2005
7:18 p.m. Eastern
© 2005 WorldNetDaily.com
Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to talk to our colleagues and through our colleagues to the American people about an issue that troubles me greatly.
I have been in this institution 19 years, and during those 19 years I have been on the Committee on Armed Services. Currently, I am the vice chairman of that committee and chairman of the subcommittee that oversees the purchase of our weapons systems. In the past I have chaired the research subcommittee. I have chaired the readiness subcommittee, and I have spent every available hour of my time working to make sure that our military troops were properly protected and have the proper equipment and training.
I am a strong supporter of our military. Whether it was in the last 2 years of the Reagan administration, the four years of the Bush administration, the 8 years of the Clinton administration, or the current administration of President George W. Bush, I have been a strong supporter of our military. I am a strong supporter of President Bush. I campaigned for him. I am a strong supporter of Secretary Rumsfeld. I say all of that, Mr. Speaker, because tonight I rise to express my absolute outrage and disgust with what is happening in our defense intelligence agencies.
Mr. Speaker, back in 1999 when I was Chair of the defense research subcommittee, the Army was doing cutting-edge work on a new type of technology to allow us to understand and predict emerging transnational terrorist threats. That technology was being done at several locations, but was being led by our Special Forces Command. The work that they were doing was unprecedented. And because of what I saw there, I supported the development of a national capability of a collaborative center that the CIA would just not accept.
In fact, in November 4 of 1999, 2 years before 9/11, in a meeting in my office with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Director of the CIA, Deputy Director of the FBI, we presented a nine-page proposal to create a national collaborative center. When we finished the brief, the CIA said we did not need that capability, and so before 9/11 we did not have it.
When President Bush came in after a year of research, he announced the formation of the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, exactly what I had proposed in 1999. Today it is known as the NCTC, the National Counterterrorism Center. But, Mr. Speaker, what troubles me is not the fact that we did not take those steps.
What troubles me is that I now have learned in the last 4 months that one of the tasks that was being done in 1999 and 2000 was a top-secret program organized at the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, carried out by the general in charge of our Special Forces Command, a very elite unit focusing on information regarding al Qaeda. It was a military language effort to allow us to identify the key cells of al Qaeda around the world and to give the military the capability to plan actions against those cells so they could not attack us as they did in 1993 at the Trade Center, at the Khobar Towers, the U.S.S. Cole attack, and the African embassy bombings.
What I did not know, Mr. Speaker, up until June of this year, was that that secret program called Able Danger actually identified the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda in January and February of 2000, over 1 year before 9/11 every happened. In addition, I learned that not only did we identify the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, but we identified Mohamed Atta as one of the members of that Brooklyn cell along with three other terrorists who were the leadership of the 9/11 attack.
I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, again, over 1 year before 9/11, that Able Danger team attempted on three separate occasions to provide information to the FBI about the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, and on three separate occasions they were denied by lawyers in the previous administration to transfer that information.
Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday on "Meet the Press," Louis Freeh, FBI Director at the time, was interviewed by Tim Russert. The first question to Louis Freeh was in regard to the FBI's ability to ferret out the terrorists. Louis Freeh's response, which can be obtained by anyone in this country as a part of the official record, was, Well, Tim, we are now finding out that a top-secret program of the military called Able Danger actually identified the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda and Mohammed Atta over a year before 9/11.
And what Louis Freeh said, Mr. Speaker, is that that kind of actionable data could have allowed us to prevent the hijackings that occurred on September 11.
So now we know, Mr. Speaker, that military intelligence officers working in a program authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the general in charge of Special Forces Command, identified Mohammed Atta and three terrorists a year before 9/11, tried to transfer that information to the FBI were denied; and the FBI Director has now said publicly if he would have had that information, the FBI could have used it to perhaps prevent the hijackings that struck the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the plane that landed in Pennsylvania and perhaps saved 3,000 lives and changed the course of world history.
Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight because we have been trying to get the story out about Able Danger and what really happened. Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, I have to rise tonight to tell you that as bad as this story is, and as bad as it is that the data was not transferred to the FBI, and as bad as it is that the 9/11 Commission totally ignored this entire story and referred to it as historically insignificant even though it was authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, even though Louis Freeh has now said it could have provided information to prevent the attack against us, the 9/11 Commission ignored it. Not because the commissioners ignored it, but because someone at the staff level on the 9/11 Commission staff decided for whatever reason that they did not want to pursue the Abel Danger story.
Mr. Speaker, in August and September I met with the military officials involved with Abel Danger and one by one they told their story, until, Mr. Speaker, leaders in the Defense Intelligence Agency, including the deputy director, decided they do not want the story told. I think because they perhaps are fearful of being embarrassed and humiliated.
So what direction had they taken, Mr. Speaker?
They have gagged the military officers. They have prevented them from talking to any Member of Congress. They have prevented them from talking to the media. And the Defense Intelligence Agency has began a process to destroy the career and the life of Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer.
Now, it might be easy for us to ignore this, Mr. Speaker. We all have busy careers and worry about reelections every 2 years and worry about our own families and our jobs. But I cannot do that in this case and neither can this body, and neither can the other body. You see, Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer took an oath to defend our Constitution. He took the words "duty, honor, country" seriously and devoted 23 years of his life in four deployed intelligence operations of our military to protect America.
During the time he served our country, he has received the Bronze Star, an award that does not come easily, for showing acts of courage, leadership, and bravery in the course of his activities.
He has received public commendations from previous directors of the Defense Intelligence Agency, including General Patrick Hughes, including generals at Special Forces Command, and including Admiral Wilson of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has received dozens of letters and commendations for his work. The laudatory comments I reviewed in his files are unbelievable.
But, you see, Mr. Speaker, there is a problem. The Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency was in a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer almost a year before 9/11, and Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer showed him a disk in his office with information about al Qaeda and Mohammed Atta, and the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stopped the briefing and said, you cannot show me that. I do not want to see it. It might contain information I cannot look at.
Now, Tony Shaffer was not in the room alone, Mr. Speaker. There were other people, and we know their names. So we have witnesses. Now, the Deputy Director has denied that meeting and denied he was there and denied this particular story, but the fact is he knows that we are going to pursue it.
So what has happened to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, Mr. Speaker? The Defense Intelligence Agency has lifted his security clearance. One day before he was to testify before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in uniform, they permanently removed his security clearance. And now our Defense Intelligence Agency has told Colonel Shaffer's lawyer that they plan to seek a permanent removal of his pay and his health care benefits for him and his two children. Why, Mr. Speaker? Because Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, like Commander Scott Philpot of the Navy, like J. D. Smith, and like a host of other Able Danger employees, has told the truth.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I sat here in the 1990s and I sat here during the 9/11 investigation and watched a ridiculous situation develop with Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser under President Clinton. He walked into the National Archives before he was to testify before the 9/11 Commission looking through documents. He took documents out of the archives and stuffed them in his socks and pants so that no one would see them as he left the National Archives. Now, that is a felony, tampering with Federal documents and removing classified information regarding our security and information that the 9/11 commission needed to see.
Sandy Berger initially lied about it. He said he did not do it. Then he admitted it, and he was given a punishment. And, oh, by the way, his security clearance was temporarily lifted, but he will get it back again, for lying, for stealing, and for committing an act of outrage against our country's security. Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, a Bronze Star 23-year military veteran, simply told the truth and now his life is being ruined.
His career is ended. He is no longer in military intelligence. They have taken his security clearance, and they are about to destroy him as a person. They are about to deny him the basic health care and the salary that he has earned, and they are doing it in this way. This is outrageous. It is evil. They do not want to fire Tony because they also do not want him to talk to the media. So by suspending him and removing his pay and his health care, they hurt him bad, but he cannot talk because he is under suspension and his lawyer has advised him that to talk to the media, to talk to Members of Congress, even when he is not being paid, would cause him further problems and totally prevent him from ever having this gross problem reversed. Mr. Speaker, this is outrageous. Mr. Speaker, this is not America.
Over my 19 years in Congress, I have led 40 delegations to the former Soviet Union. I have sat in the face of the Soviet Communists and confronted them on full transparency. I sat at the table with President Lukashenko of Belarus, who has been called by our Secretary of State the last dictator in Europe. I took both delegations to North Korea, Mr. Speaker, and sat across the table from Kim Gye Gwan and I told him we abhor the way they treat their people, the way they lie about what is happening, and the way they distort information.
Mr. Speaker, I took three delegations to Libya to meet with Qadhafi, and I told him that we are absolutely outraged at what Libya did in helping complete the Lockerbie bombing and the bombing of the Berlin nightclub.
You know, Mr. Speaker, I never thought I would have to take the floor of this Chamber and make the same statements about the Defense Intelligence Agency. As a supporter of the President, as a supporter of the military, Mr. Speaker, if we allow this to go forward, then we send the signal to every man and woman wearing a uniform that if you tell the truth, you will be destroyed if a career bureaucrat above you does not like what you are saying. If you tell the truth, we will take your health care benefits away from your kids. If you tell the truth, we will ruin you.
Mr. Speaker, this is not America. Mr. Speaker, this is not what I have been told by Secretary Rumsfeld that we are doing with our troops in protecting them, in giving them the best equipment and the best training. This is not what I spend hours in committee hearings on. This sends the wrong signal to America's troops. It tells them, do not be honest. Do not respect the fact that you have to be truthful. If there is somebody that the truth offends, then you better be silent.
Mr. Speaker, I have today asked for an independent investigation of the Defense Intelligence Agency and their efforts at destroying Tony Shaffer's life. This is outrageous, Mr. Speaker. They trumped up charges against him. They said while he was overseas in Afghanistan, forward deployed, that he forwarded cell phone calls from his official phone to his personal phone; and when they checked that out, it ran up a cost to the taxpayers of about $60. The second verbal charge they gave him was that he went to a course at the Army War College and he got reimbursed for his travel, his mileage and tolls, 100-some dollars. And they said he received a commendation for which he was not entitled, even though it was signed by his commanding officer and the acting Secretary of the Army.
But they went beyond that, Mr. Speaker. They went beyond that with this man. They said he had $2,000 of debt, personal debt. Well, I would like to have every Pentagon employee tomorrow, I would like to have the senior leadership show us what debt they have in the Defense Intelligence Agency so we can make that public.
They even went to this length, Mr. Speaker: the Defense Intelligence Agency wrote in an official document that Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer stole public property. A serious charge. Well, when you check what that public property was, it was an assortment of pens, government pens. But what they did not say in the Defense Intelligence report was that he took those pens when he was 15 years of age and was with his father when he was on assignment at one of our embassy outposts. He took the pens to give to other students at the school when he was 15 years of age. And by the way, Mr. Speaker, it was Tony Shaffer himself who admitted to that thievery when he applied for his security clearance. So the Defense Intelligence Agency knew that during his entire career of 23 years, but they put that in the document against him.
This is a scandal, Mr. Speaker. It is an outrage. It is a travesty. Everyone that worked with Tony Shaffer, the Navy officers, the private citizens have all said the same thing. This is a scandal to get Tony Shaffer because he has told the truth.
Now, this Defense Intelligence Agency and this Deputy Director had the audacity to have their legal counsel send Tony Shaffer's lawyer a letter on September 23. I cannot put that letter in the RECORD because it is privileged information, but it will eventually come out. But in that letter, in the second to last paragraph, the legal counsel for the Defense Intelligence Agency says to Mr. Shaffer's lawyer, he cannot receive any more classified information from the Defense Intelligence Agency because I checked and his security clearances have all been removed. Therefore, he is not allowed to look at anything that is secret or confidential.
Now, that is a letter sent by the general counsel of the DIA on September 23 of this year. Two weeks later, Mr. Speaker, to show the stupidity of the Defense Intelligence Agency, they send seven packages to Mr. Shaffer's lawyer of his personal belongings, which the Deputy Director of the DIA told my staff 3 months ago did not exist any more. And in those seven boxes, Mr. Speaker, were five classified memos. The Defense Intelligence Agency sent five classified memos to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, which they told him on September 23 he was not allowed to have access to.
Mr. Speaker, that is a felony; and I have asked the Inspector General and the legal officials to investigate and prosecute the Defense Intelligence officials who sent five classified documents through the mail or by hand delivery to Tony Shaffer.
In addition, Mr. Speaker, the Defense Intelligence Agency, in its absolute total stupidity, included in those boxes $500 worth of Federal property, including a multi-hundred dollar GPS system owned by the Federal Government, which they sent to Tony Shaffer, I guess to keep. They also sent, Mr. Speaker, 25 pens, brand new, and marked on them is "Property of the U.S. Government." The Defense Intelligence Agency, in its absolute utter stupidity, sent Tony Shaffer Federal property which they accused him of taking when he was 15 years of age.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong here. There is a bureaucracy in the Defense Intelligence Agency that is out of control. They want to destroy the reputation of a 23-year military officer, Bronze Star recipient, hero of our country, with two kids because people in defense intelligence are embarrassed at what is going to come out.
And what is going to come out, Mr. Speaker? Well, we are going to find out, Mr. Speaker, that that unit, Able Danger, not only identified Mohammed Atta before 9/11, not only did they try to pass that information to the FBI, not only was that large data destroyed in the summer of 2000, but now, Mr. Speaker, I can add a new dimension to this whole story. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, I met with another Able Danger official. I was not aware of this official's knowledge because he does not live within the Beltway.
This official, Mr. Speaker, has impeccable credentials. I cannot reveal his name today. I will to any Member of this body, any of our colleagues that want to come to me, I will tell you privately who this official is, and you will agree with me when I tell you his name that he has impeccable credentials. This official yesterday, Mr. Speaker, in a meeting in my office, told me that he has never been talked to by the Pentagon. He has never been talked to by the Defense Intelligence Agency in their supposed investigation. He has never been talked to by the 9/11 Commission staff in their investigation; yet this official had a leadership position in Able Danger.
This official told me that there is a separate cache of information collected from over 20 Federal agencies in 1999 and 2000 on Able Danger that still may exist. Now, the Pentagon has told us all this material was destroyed, and now I have a senior official telling me there is a second pot of information that may well still exist.
Furthermore, at the hearing over in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, when Senator Specter asked why this data was destroyed, the witness who destroyed the data said, well, I was told that we could not keep this data for more than 90 days because it might involve information that contains U.S. persons, so we had to destroy it.
Well, I found out that is not the story. The reason the data was destroyed was because Special Forces Command asked the Army for that data and within a matter of days, that data was destroyed so the Army would not pass it to Special Forces Command. Yet there still is, was and I hope still is a massive pot of data.
But furthermore, that official that I talked to yesterday will also say that there was no 90-day requirement, as was testified before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. He said on a regular basis they kept information from Able Danger data mining for months and months and months. In fact, he will say he had a discussion with a lawyer in DOD named Schiffren who told him do not worry about it, just fill out a document, sign your name that you need it, put it in the box, and you can keep it as long as you want.
Mr. Speaker, that is entirely contradictory to what the Defense Intelligence Agency has been telling us, to what DOD has been telling us. Now we have someone who is willing to come forward and say that 90-day period is not real, they kept Able Danger information for months and months and months.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong here. A sitting President of the United States resigned his position because he tried to cover up a third-rate burglary when some low-level operatives from the Republican committee to reelect him broke into the Democrat headquarters in Washington, D.C. No one was killed. No money was stolen. No State secrets were stolen. It was a third-rate burglary, but it caused the resignation of President Richard Nixon.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about the deaths of 3,000 Americans.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about 2.5 terabytes of data about al Qaeda. That is equal to one-fourth of all of the printed material in the Library of Congress.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about Mohammed Atta and three of the terrorists that attacked us on 9/11.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about military intelligence officers, including an Annapolis graduate who will command one of our destroyers in January of 2006 who risked his entire career to state on the record I will swear until I die that I saw Mohammed Atta's face every day starting in January of 2000, a year and a half before 9/11.
Mr. Speaker, this is not somebody off the street, this is a graduate of Annapolis, a 23-year Naval officer who will command one of our destroyers in January who is agreeing with Lieutenant Shaffer. We have three other people who have testified under oath that they saw the same photograph, and the person I met yesterday will testify that he had the name of a Mohammed Atta before 9/11 but not the face.
Mr. Speaker, this is not some third-rate burglary coverup. This is not some Watergate incident. This is an attempt to prevent the American people from knowing the facts about how we could have prevented 9/11 and people are covering it up today. They are ruining the career of a military officer to do it and we cannot let it stand. I do not care whether you are Democrat or Republican, you cannot let a lieutenant colonel's career be ruined because of some bureaucrat in the Defense Intelligence Agency. If we let that happen, then no one who wears the uniform will ever feel protected because we will have let them down. Anyone who wears the uniform of this country who is serving today expects us to back him or her up and that is not happening. We are seeing lying, distortion.
Mr. Speaker, do you know, Wolf Blitzer on CNN told my staff that a Department of Defense employee told him that Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer was having an affair with one of my employees. How low can we go, Mr. Speaker? How low can we go to allow this Defense Department to try to ruin the reputation and the personal life of a lieutenant colonel with a Bronze Star? To Wolf Blitzer, Mr. Speaker.
We need to know the name of that defense official who told Wolf Blitzer who told my staff, and he is not the only one. I have other media people who will come forward in this grand effort to destroy the reputation of a uniformed military officer, to create scandalous accusations. He does not even know my staff, to accuse him of stealing pens when he was 15, to take away his health care benefits for his two kids because he is telling the truth.
What do we stand for if not the truth? Is it more important that we be politically correct? Is it more important that I not rock the boat because my party is in the White House, because I campaigned for Bush, and support Don Rumsfeld. Is that more important? If that is more important, I do not want to be here. I will leave. I will leave my post, but I will not do it until we get justice for this man and for these people who the 9/11 Commission called historically insignificant.
Mr. Speaker, there is something wrong inside the Beltway.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong when a military officer risks his life in Afghanistan time and again, embedded with our troops under an assumed name with a false beard and a false identity, forward deployed with our troops, gets castigated, gets ridiculed, gets some low life scum at the Pentagon spreading malicious lies about this individual, and then say to his lawyer, we are going to take away his health care benefits, we are going to take away his salary.
Mr. Speaker, if we allow this to stand as Democrats and Republicans, then none of us deserve to be here. When we all go overseas and meet the troops, we tell them how proud we are of them. We provide funding for them. We give them training and take care of their families. What we are allowing to happen right now is the Defense Intelligence Agency to ruin the career and the life of a man who spent 23 years protecting his Nation. If Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer was telling this story alone in a vacuum, that would be one thing. But he has been corroborated over and over again. I have met with at least 10 people who fully corroborate what Tony Shaffer says. Those meetings with the FBI, the FBI employee still works there and she told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, I set those meetings up with the FBI to transfer information about al Qaeda and Able Danger. So she is still there and she testified.
What we have here, I am convinced of this now, is an aggressive attempt by CIA management to cover up their own shortcomings in not being able to do what the Able Danger team did: They identified Mohammed Atta and the al Qaeda cell of Brooklyn 1 year before Р9/11. But even before that, as the story unfolds, you are going to hear the story that they also identified the threat to the USS Cole 2 weeks before the attack, and 2 days before the attack were screaming not to let the USS Cole come into the harbor at Yemen because they knew something was about to happen.
Mr. Speaker, bad news never comes easy; but in a democracy, the bad news has to come out so we can make sure it does not happen again.
Mr. Speaker, this whole thing started, not to embarrass anyone, this whole thing started because none of us knew that Mohammed Atta was identified before 9/11. It started because this Congress, this body in particular, tried to establish what is now in place back in 1999, a national collaborative center, but the CIA said we did not need it. The American people deserve to have the answers here. They deserve to know why 3,000 people died. They deserve to know what we could have done and should have done to better prepare ourselves and to work to prepare for the next incident. The American people need to know where those multiple terabytes of data is. Is it still being used? We know in January of 2001, General Shelton was given a 3-hour briefing on Able Danger. So even if they destroyed the data back in the summer of 2000, in January of 2001 there was enough material to give General Shelton, Commander of the Joint Chiefs, a 3-hour briefing.
Mr. Speaker, there is something here. I am not a conspiracy theorist, but there is something desperately wrong, Mr. Speaker. There is something outrageous at work here. This is not a third-rate burglary of a political campaign headquarters. This involved what is right now the covering up of information that led to the deaths of 3,000 people, changed the course of history, led to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and has disrupted our country, our economy and people's lives.
Mr. Speaker, we could ignore this. I cannot. If it means I have to resign from this body, I will resign. I will not allow, after 19 years in this body and as a vice chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, bureaucrats in the Defense Intelligence Agency to concoct stories, to talk about the theft of pens when this lieutenant colonel was 15 years old, to talk about this man's personal debt of $2,000. I would hate to check the indebtedness of Members of Congress. I know mine is more than $2,000.
Mr. Speaker, this is not America. I had a group of college students down from Drexel University. There were about 20 of them, including representative students from eight other nations. We talked about this. Of course we have talked about all of the problem countries in the world. We talk about our values as a Nation, the need for a democracy to have people involved, to have transparency, to have people who respect the rule of law and the Constitution.
How do I tell them that is what is working here, Mr. Speaker, when the Pentagon says that these people who simply want to tell the truth are not allowed? They are saying it is for classified purposes, yet the DOD lawyer on the Senate side there is nothing classified about any of the information. It is not about classified programs. I would be the last to want to see anything classified revealed. I have seen many, many instances where I have been given sensitive information that only a few people in the Congress and the country had. I would never reveal it. It is not about that. This is not about the DIA, this is not about the CIA, this is about CYA. It is about CYA by bureaucrats in the Defense Intelligence Agency and possibly some political operatives that do not want the facts to come out about Able Danger and the information that the Able Danger team put together. And in the process, they are going to destroy a man, a man who has been recognized by his country, who has a family, and who simply wants to do the right thing.
Mr. Speaker, I hated to take the floor tonight, but I did not know what else to do. We have committees of Congress working on this. I want to thank the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf), chairman of the FBI Appropriation Committee on Oversight. He is as outraged as I am. I want to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), who is looking at this, and the gentleman from California (Chairman Hunter). The Committee on Armed Services has a full-time staffer assigned to get to the facts of this. I want to thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. King), chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, because he is looking at this. I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan (Chairman Hoekstra) and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He has met with Tony Shaffer and has offered to get more information. I want to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for standing up and beginning to ask questions, and I want to thank Senator Specter and Senator Biden, who attended a Committee on the Judiciary hearing and expressed their outrage. I want to thank Senator Sessions, Senator Kyl, and Senator Grassley, who were all there. In fact, Senator Grassley called it a coverup.
Mr. Speaker, I cannot tell you the number of Members who have come to me and said this is unacceptable. I would hope that as a result of what we have heard tonight every Member of Congress will ask for an inquiry. The gentlewoman from Georgia (Ms. McKinney) wrote a letter to the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services asking for an investigation. We have from Republicans to Democrats, left to right, conservatives to liberals. What is happening here is unacceptable. It is unimaginable. It is un-American. All over the world tonight, young Americans are wearing our uniforms. They are doing a great job. They make us all proud when we travel overseas. They make us proud because of the pride they have. When I talk to them, they say I am glad to be doing what I am doing. I am doing the right thing for our country. I will go any place the Commander in Chief sends me. Whether I am in Afghanistan or Iraq, they will tell me that.
Whether we are in Kosovo or Somalia, they will tell us that. Whether we are at Hurricane Katrina, whether we are at Hurricane Andrew, or whether we are out in California, the earthquake, or the Midwestern floods, our troops are all the same. They respect our country. They respect our Constitution. If we allow this travesty to continue, Mr. Speaker, then we have let all of those people down for some nameless, faceless bureaucrat who is fearful that the information will finally come to light, that the DIA just did not get it.
Back in 1999 and 2000, they did not have a clue. They had millions of dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars, and could not do what a 20-member team did in being able to identify Mohammed Atta before the 9/11 attacks. DIA does not want that to come out, Mr. Speaker. They do not want that to come out. Heaven forbid the Defense Intelligence Agency, with hundreds of millions of dollars, would have a 20-member team do what they could not do because they were using new technology and new software. They do not want that to come out. That is why that Deputy Director, when he was at that meeting, said, I do not want to see this. Do not show it to me. And that is why today that Deputy Director is trying to ruin the career of Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer.
The only way to resolve this, Mr. Speaker, is to have a full independent investigation by the Inspector General of the Pentagon. I have asked Secretary Rumsfeld today to do that. I would ask my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in that request. Let the independent inspector for the Pentagon go in, not DIA. DIA cannot investigate itself. It does not have the capability to do that. It does not have the integrity to do that. Let the Inspector General do the investigation and while that is being done, protect Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer. He does not deserve to have his career ruined or destroyed for telling the truth.
And while we are at it, Mr. Speaker, if DIA is going to continue to press this ridiculous set of facts, then as I said earlier, I want DIA prosecuted for the five felonies they committed in sending classified documents to a person that 2 weeks earlier they said was incapable of receiving classified information. And if this continues, I want DIA held responsible for illegally transferring $500 of public assets to a person, that in the process of sending that stuff to him, DIA committed fraud against the taxpayers. I want them held accountable: DIA's stupidity; DIA's incompetence.
We have a new nominee for the head of DIA, and I am going to ask every Senator to fully explore each of these issues before that person is confirmed. I will meet with every Senator personally and go over all of this information. And I would encourage the Senators and the House Members to interview the other people who worked with Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer and to get their assessments of what is going on there. They will all tell them the same thing: Shaffer is being abused and used as a scapegoat. If they can ruin Shaffer, they can silence the story.
It cannot happen, Mr. Speaker. We cannot let it. That is not what America is about. That is not what we say to our enlisted personnel when they sign up for duty. That is not what we say when we pass our defense bills every year.
This man is being maligned and mistreated. He is being harassed. The most scurrilous accusations, totally unfounded, have been given to the American media; and I will name names, and I will ask for an investigation of the people who made those statements to these media people because it all needs to be put on the record.
And as someone tomorrow who will chair another hearing on our defense oversight to try to get the best value for the dollars for our military, I ask all of our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, on both sides of the aisle to join us. This is not Republicans or Democrats. It is about what is fundamental to this country. I would ask our constituents across America we represent to join us, to express their outrage, to e-mail, make phone calls, write letters to the Secretary of Defense, the President of the United States, to Members of Congress to simply let the story be told. Let the Able Danger story finally come out to the American people. Let them understand what really happened. Let Scott Philpott talk. Let Tony Shaffer talk. Let the others who have been silenced have a chance to tell their story to Congress and openly to the American people. In the end, the country will be stronger.
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U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
News Transcript
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Presenter: Various DoD Officials Thursday, September 1, 2005
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Special Defense Department Briefing
Participating in this brief were:
Mr. Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Media Operations)
Ms. Pat Downs, Senior Policy Analyst, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence)
Mr. Thomas Gandy, Army G-2 Director of Counterintelligence and HUMINT
Mr. Bill Huntington, Vice Deputy Director for HUMINT, Defense Intelligence Agency
Cmdr. Christopher Chope, Center for Special Operations, U.S. Special Operations Command
Whitman: When I scheduled this particular room I hadn't anticipated that we would have these other activities that are going on down south, but I'm glad there are some of you here to report on this and have an interest in this.
As you know, the department has been aggressively looking into this Able Danger program since there were some allegations that were made some three weeks ago I think now, about three weeks. There's been a very extensive effort by the department to look broad, to look deep, and to document as well as to interviewing individuals that are associated with the project. Today we have reached the point where we're prepared to tell you what that broad and deep and extensive review has revealed to us.
I've got a number of subject matter experts here whose organizations were involved. By the mere fact of the representatives here you can see that this was not something that was just looked at narrowly. What we'll be able to do today is talk a little bit about what Able Danger was and maybe more importantly what it wasn't; what type of products were a result of this activity; discuss a little bit about some of the legal authorities and things that have been reported on, sometimes inaccurately about this; and to really talk to you a bit about our interactions with the 9/11 Commission when they were doing their work.
I got you all here under the guise of a background briefing, but I think what we'll do is, we've discussed this and these individuals have agreed to be on the record. There has been a lot of anonymous reporting on this which I think has been unhelpful. I hope that as you write these reports that you give weight to those people that have been directly involved in this effort and are on the record to discuss what the department has found for you on this.
With that they're going to kind of open up with a little bit of a presentation, talk about it just a little bit. Pat's going to start I think, Pat Down is going to start from the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence Office. Then the commander here from Special Operations Command is going to give you a bit of a thumbnail on the activities. We've got some other subject matter experts if we get into Q&A that involves their areas. I promise not to make it too long because I know you all have day jobs on this other story too.
With that, Pat, why don't you go ahead and start us off.
Down: Let me give you an overview of what we have done to determine the facts concerning the recent public statements on Able Danger and where we are to date and what we've found. And then I'll turn it over to Commander Chope so he can give you background information on Able Danger. Some of you may not be as familiar with exactly what that is, what it isn't, and what the timeline is here. It can be confusing with all the various accounts that are in the press.
We have conducted two types of activities. One is extensive document searches from all the organizations including contracting firms that were associated with the Able Danger program. To date we have not identified the chart that is referenced in public statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot in particular, who say they saw a chart with the photo of Mohammed Attah and other hijackers, particularly Mohammed Attah, pre-9/11. We have not discovered that chart. We have identified a similar chart, but it does not contain the photo of Mohammed Attah or reference to him or reference to the other hijackers.
The second type of activity we've conducted is interviews of people involved, again associated with the Able Danger project. To date we've conducted interviews with 80 people, and that is still ongoing. We're not done yet. We're still refining the questions. As we talk to some people we have to come back to other and ask additional questions.
Most of those people do not recollect the existence of a chart with the picture of Mohammed Attah on it, or again, other hijackers pre-9/11. We have identified three other individuals besides Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot who have a recollection of either a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah or a reference to Mohammed Attah. That's basically where we are.
As I said, we continue, we also have searched the records, the documents that we sent to the 9/11 Commission just to be sure that our copies of those records don't include anything additional we might have missed, including a whole number of documents that were deemed non-responsive to Commission requests. It's possible we might have missed something in that collection. It's a fairly extensive collection. We have reviewed all that documentation and at this point have not identified, again, such a chart which references pre-9/11 hijackers.
Media: But the three people who do remember, those three people are from which agency or what's their function?
Down: We have from SOCOM, two individuals. One of those is Captain Philpot. We have, of course Tony Schaeffer, he's actually a DIA civilian employee. We have, the two other individuals are, one is from the Land Information Warfare Activity, the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity, now actually part of the Information Dominance Center. The last one is with the O'Ryan contractors.
Media: At the time.
Down: At the time, yes. And we can answer, Mr. Gandy can answer more questions on the contractors and some of these -- Five individuals all told. Four of them, five individuals including Captain Philpot and Mr. Schaeffer. Four of them remember a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah pre-9/11; the fifth person remembers a chart with a reference to Mohammed Attah, but not a photo.
As I said, we're continuing to interview or re-interview based on what we've discovered so far to be sure that we're not missing anything.
I think it probably is a good idea at this point to turn it over to Commander Chope, and he'll describe to you what Able Danger is. I think that would be helpful. Again, describe some of the timelines because, as I said, we're confused by some of the reports out. We're trying to find the facts. Some of the various accounts have conflicted somewhat. I think it would be helpful to put this in some context for you.
Chope: I'm Commander Chope from the Special Operations Command and I'll offer a brief chronology and overview of what Able Danger was and try and dispel some of the myths and rumors surrounding the effort.
In early October 1999 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the United States Special Operations Command with developing a campaign plan against transnational terrorism, specifically al-Qaida. That effort would result, or that tasking would result in a 15-month effort undertaken mostly out of Tampa, Florida with some peripheral collaborative partners, that would span a 15-month period. In order to accomplish this tasking SOCOM turned to an internal working group who again worked with elements within the Department of Defense and with the Department of the Army to construct this plan. Captain Scott Philpot, then Commander Scott Philpot was probably the team leader, you would call him, for the Able Danger effort.
Able Danger was never a special access program. Able Danger was never a military unit. Able Danger was never a targeting effort. It was not a military deception operation. It was merely the name attributed to a 15-month planning effort.
In January of 2001 the U.S. Special Operations Command delivered the final product of their plan which was a draft operations plan to the Joint Staff, and for all intents and purposes Able Danger ended at that time.
Media: Can you say how many people were involved in it?
Chope: From the Special Operations Command, probably ten people were involved throughout the effort.
Media: You say it wasn't military? It was --
Chope: It was not a military unit. It was a name given to the effort. It's like calling all of us in here Able Danger. That's not --
Media: Were they all military people?
Chope: No, not uniformed service members, no.
Media: You say it wasn't a targeting effort.
Chope: Correct.
Media: I'm very ignorant about military affairs, but wouldn't any kind of plan against transnational terrorism involve a list of targets?
Chope: It would, and that's a good question. Throughout the Able Danger effort we're going to talk about data mining and nodal analysis. What the data mining and nodal analysis actions were designed to do was characterize the al-Qaida terrorist network. Those were some of the tools they used in order to do that mapping, if you will. When I said it was not a targeting effort, I mean it was not meant to go after individual people. It was meant to determine vulnerabilities, key nodes, linkages among and within al-Qaida.
Media: Nodal analysis? What does that mean?
Chope: I think in layman's terms it means determining linkages and relationships among disparate entities.
Down: Looking for patterns based no previous activity.
Media: It would seem you would want to deal with individual names of people if you were trying to understand vulnerability and linkages. No?
Chope: I'm sure that they got to that level of detail, however when you look at the plan, what the task was rather, the task was develop a plan, so that was the focus of the effort. The effort was never determine which individuals we ought to roll up. Did Osama bin Laden's name come up? Of course it did. But as far as that granularity, that level of detail, that was not the desired or required level of effort on the project. It was a by-product.
Gandy: This is Tom Gandy from the Army. Let me just help out here a little. The way it works is there's a campaign plan and then if someone decides to act upon that plan they will give that plan to someone to execute. At that point you get into various specifics about how you're going to execute it, phases of the operation, what the targets are in each phase, and get really down to the down and dirty side of things.
But in a plan you're saying here's what we're trying to do against this threat element, in this case transnational terrorism, not al-Qaida, so it's a more generalized level. I'm just trying to help out there.
Media: Can I get some clarity on the subsets that people are talking about. There were ten in Able Danger.
Gandy: SOCOM personnel.
Media: SOCOM personnel. How large was Able Danger in all then?
Gandy: I would say in the 15-month period it waxed and wanted. It depended on which collaborative partner SOCOM dealt with at the time. AT some points there was a partnership with the Army; other points there were contracted personnel involved?
Media: What was the maximum number --
Media: Hang on just a second and let me finish this line of questioning.
So you've interviewed 80 people. Were all 80 of them Able Danger or were they people who got briefings by Able Danger? What is that universe that gave you 80 people?
Gandy: It probably spans both of those representations you just gave. Not only folks who were integrally involved in the effort, but also those that were peripherally involved. I don't think that we necessarily went out and amongst those 80 we'd count people who just happened to have been exposed. Those 80 I would say had something to do with Able Danger.
Media: And the five who have some recollection of something, are those Able Danger core members, are they people who received briefings, are they the peripherals?
Gandy: Out of the ten I quoted you, two of them are from that ten. So the other three would be from the other 70, if you will, if that math makes sense to you.
Media: So three are peripheral, quote/unquote, to use your phrase; and two are from Able Danger.
Gandy: No. The hard core U.S. SOCOM part of Able Danger was ten people. There were other collaborative partners who were as involved in Able Danger. I'm only speaking to the SOCOM Personnel involved in Able Danger with those ten. There were other people who were as involved in Able Danger during the time.
Media: Who were the five who have some recollection of something?
Gandy: We have two SOCOM personnel, one of whom is Captain Philpot, one is Mr. Schaeffer who is a DIA employee.
Down: Actually --
[Multiple voices].
Media: Just simple math here. This is a really --
Whitman: In the SOCOM people there's an unnamed analyst who's going to remain unnamed. Then there's Captain Philpot. Those are the two from the ten.
Media: Civilian analyst?
Whitman: Yes.
Media: But there are five with some recollection, so who are the other three?
Whitman: The other three, one was an analyst associated with the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) which is the Army activity, one of the partners spoke of where LIWA was supporting the SOCOM effort for a period of time in the planning effort.
Another was a contractor who supported the Land Information Warfare activity. That's one of the other.
The other was Mr. Schaeffer.
Media: That's very helpful. Thank you.
Media: One further thing on that, how would you characterize, of those three people -- the analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, well Schaeffer I think we know his relationship with Able Danger. But the other two. The analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, associated with LIWAC (sic) and the contractor, how would you characterize their degree of -- Were they part of the core? Were they in the periphery, out of periphery?
Whitman: They were doing analysis and production support of requirements to help build the plan. So they were provided with requirements from the core group of SOCOM planners and they would try to meet those requirements of intelligence analytical products.
Media: Intelligence requirements.
Whitman: Right. It's LIWA, by the way, Activity. Not LIWAC.
Down: And Captain Philpot was more managing the whole effort. As opposed to an analyst.
Media: So five people remember this, but you haven't been able to come up with the chart. So you're not here telling us this chart does exist or doesn't exist.
Down: We don't know. We don't have it. We have not to date identified that chart, discovered it in our recent searches, nor did we pull it up during the life of the 9/11 Commission where the Commission itself did ask us, sent us two document requests for information on Able Danger. It was not pulled up at that time.
Media: What could have happened to it? Could someone have destroyed it to cover up?
Whitman: Let me say something there, just for any other questions that might come up too. We're not going to get into the business of speculating in terms of what might have happened. We're here today to present the facts as they exist and as we know them.
Like Pat was saying, what we know is that we didn't discover such a chart when we first responded to the Commission back in November and December of '03 and we haven't discovered such a chart in the current search. That's the facts. It's just not productive for us to get into speculating beyond what we actually know.
Media: Does that mean that because it was a classified operation a lot of documents including the chart could have been destroyed and that's why you can't find it?
Down: There are regulations. At the time how they were interpreted, very strictly pre-9/11, for destruction of information which is embedded, I guess is the way I would say it, that would contain any information on U.S. persons. In a major data mining effort like this you're reaching out to a lot of open sources and within that there could be a lot of information on U.S. persons. We're not allowed to collect that type of information. So there are strict regulations about collection, dissemination, destruction procedures for this type of information. And we know that that did happen in the case of Able Danger documentation.
Media: So it's possible then that this is how the chart cannot be found. Along with other documents, they could have been destroyed and that's why you can't corroborate what these people are saying or say it's wrong.
Down: Correct.
Media: What is the definition for U.S. person?
Down: I wish we had our lawyer here.
Chope: A U.S. citizen or someone who is in the country legally.
Media: So a tourist is a U.S. person.
Chope: Can be.
Media: Under what circumstances?
Chope: For instance on a work visa. I think it's more than just a tourist, on a work visa or something like that.
Media: But there are work visas that allow you to come, I’m here on one --
Gandy: We have a whole class on that if you'd like to attend it. I'll invite you. We have it annually.
We have lots of regulations on this that spell out precisely what they are. I'd hate to make an off-the-cuff comment here.
Media: Okay.
Gandy: But there are strict definitions.
Media: Maybe you can direct me to --
Gandy: Executive Order 12333. You can go on the web tonight and do it. DoD Directive 5240-1R.
Media: That does not --
Gandy: And Army Regulation 381-10.
Media: Does that mean there could have been legal advice given by the department or somebody within SOCOM to destroy it before it got out of the military's possession?
Chope: We have negative indications that that was ever the case. We've spoken to all the attorneys at all levels of command and organization that were involved with Able Danger, and there was no legal advice given along those lines.
Media: That lines?
Chope: Along the lines to destroy anything.
Down: We have not discovered that legal advice was given to date.
Media: On this chart, can you say approximately what the date of the chart is these five people recall? And do all of them recall not only Attah, but the other hijackers?
Down: Maybe Tom can help with the details of the interviews, but I believe Captain Philpot says he saw the chart in January, February 2000. That's the general reference point.
Media: Are you saying that the recollections of Schaeffer and Philpot are incredible?
Down: They're our starting point. They're DoD people who -- Captain Philpot, or then Commander during when the 9/11 Commission was wrapping up, came to us and said I have this information. We took him to the 9/11 Commission to examine it further. It's really up to the Commission to determine the relevancy of the information.
Fortunately, Captain Philpot or then Commander Philpot did not have documentation either, and so the staff questioned, and you can talk to the 9/11 Public Discourse Project where the two former chairmen of the Commission now work. But in terms of the clarity of the dates, when things were produced. At the time that Commander Philpot spoke with the Commission, the Commission staff at that time believed it wasn't strong enough evidence, especially without documentation, to make a change in their report which was at that time being coordinated with us and had already been drafted.
Media: So now that you have three other individuals corroborating this chart, saying they've seen this chart, are you going back to brief the Discourse Project now? The 9/11 Commission?
Down: No, not at this point, but we will be shortly. Or at least --
Media: Has anything changed. Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.
Down: That's okay.
Media: Has anything changed about the way that U.S. persons who get sucked up in a data mining operation would be handled today as opposed to how they might have -- completely independent of this. Say if my name gets sucked up into a database tomorrow morning would it be handled differently today than it would have before 9/11?
Down: My understanding is that the same procedures are in place. We may exercise some flexibility, but I have to be careful here because the same procedures, the same regulations, they are still accurate. We have to be very careful of what we protect against U.S. persons --
Media: -- different or --
Down: Again I have to be careful. The procedures stand and I really can't speak for the analytical side at the moment, but I would think that in the post-9/11 mindset --
Chope: Let me get into some of the problems we have. We're looking back about 5.5 years. Data mining is a relatively new thing in the intelligence community. They were not using the most sophisticated tools. They were using what tools were available. Sophisticated at the time, but compared to now of course we're Moore's law a couple of times down and we've got a lot better tools. So at this point now in the analytical side, we're a lot better in identifying the type of data we get and where we get it from. Back then you would do what they called a web crawl and you'd get a lot of data and it would go in one pile.
Now when we put the data in a pile we tag it, you've heard about XML tagging and those sorts of things. So we understand where the data came from better, we understand the nature of that, and we have tools to help us identify the data.
So while the procedures haven't changed, the interpretation has probable become a little more flexible with hindsight on 9/11, a little more flexible, but we still have the procedures in place, believe me, and we have the training, but we also have the better ability now to say okay, this data came from this source, it's a U.S. person that has nothing to do with our problem set and we can expunge it a lot more easily than we could in the past. In the old days it was kind of an all or nothing.
Media: All these questions about Able Danger seem to sound like how could you possibly have missed Mohammed Attah did this, but I'm wondering if Mohammed Attah came in under the same circumstances at the same time tomorrow, he would still be of the same class. Wouldn't they get ditched, thrown out? Not that that's what happened with this, but if you were to tag him as a U.S. person wouldn't he automatically be thrown out of the data base tomorrow just as --
Chope: I don't know.
Media: Can you say whether you have gone through all the documents yet? You say you you're now going back and reintegrating, but have you looked through all the documents? Is that why you're here, to say you've completed that?
Down: We have done extensive searches including the documents that we delivered to the 9/11 Commission and the group of documents that were deemed unresponsive to the Commission's particular request. There are boxes and boxes of these.
As you can imagine, an organization as large as DoD with the speed at which we had to respond to the Commission's request, there were numerous documents that came through for all 39 of the Commission's requests that weren't really relevant to specific requests. So we have like a non-responsive pile. We weeded those out. If we had any doubt we left it up to the Commission to decide. It's their job to decide what's really relevant for them. But we went back through the old piles just to be sure we had not missed anything or to see if we could potentially identify this chart. And in terms of the other organizations, there have been very extensive document searches.
Media: Is there an estimate about how many pages you searched?
Down: Oh, boy --
Chope: We did a complete electronic search --
Down: Pages.
Chope: All holdings, physical searches, --
Down: Hundreds of thousands probably.
Media: Are you done with your effort?
Down: Including electronic files, of pages
Media: I'm sorry. Are you done with your review? Is this, are you finished or is this ongoing?
Down: Not in terms of the interview process. But in terms of document searches, unless there is some other source of documents that we find out through the interview process that we haven't looked at, and again, we haven't identified what that would be, right now we are complete on our document.
Media: Can I just return briefly on this chart that had Attah's picture or reference, did the chart, did all the people have a recollection that the other hijackers who have been mentioned were also on the chart or just Attah?
Chope: Most of the discussion's been about Attah --
Whitman: Before we get into that, let's address the question. You said the chart that had Attah on it. We have not found a chart that had Attah on it. I just want to make sure --
Media: You said five people said they recall --
Whitman: I just didn't want that to be out there as that there is a chart that exists that has Attah on it. Okay?
Chope: If there was a chart with Attah, [Laughter].
Whitman: It's important.
Media: These five people recall, do they recall it having Attah and additional hijackers on it?
Chope: I can't be certain. That would really be the, then Commander Philpot would be the one. The remainder talk about Attah and a picture, or Attah's name. The one person who only saw a name and no picture, and the others saw a picture and a name.
Media: So Philpot is the only one who recalls other hijackers?
Chope: I believe, but I'd have to check the notes I have from the discussions we had.
Media: Let me go back to the U.S. persons question for a second. To what extent did any controversy over that issue lead to the shutdown of this program? I talked to several people who said there was a separate program developing. They were looking at Chinese tech transfer. It wasn't Able Danger, but it used some of the same personnel, some of the same facilities at LIWA and came up with a name list of some very prominent U.S. persons and led to somebody saying terminate this thing. Is there any truth to that at all?
Chope: No. It had nothing -- There was a prior effort involved with those topics that you mentioned. That effort ended with a subpoena by Congress in November of '99. That was the end of it. It was a completely different target, different subjects, different data, everything.
Media: You say ended with a subpoena from Congress. From where? From which committee?
Chope: I'm not sure about the committee. That was a completely different effort. There were similar tools, but you've got to remember back here, let me just for the Land Information Warfare Activity, this was very experimental stuff back then. So what that was about was demonstrating can experimental stuff like this be useful in helping us solve some technology transfer riddles. That was kind of the purpose of that effort. That effort ended in the LIWA's eyes in November. LIWA did a lot of other analytical projects. That's what they do. They do intelligence analysis.
Media: -- open source, classified?
Chope: In which?
Media: In both.
Chope: In Able Danger it was mixed, both open source and classified.
Media: The five people that recall seeing either Attah's name or photograph on the charts, do they have any recollection of where that photograph might have come from, number one? How many people's names were on that chart? Was it five, was it 10,000?
Chope: We don't know what was on the chart.
Media: In their recollection, what is their recollection of that chart?
Chope: It's different compared to any person you talk to.
Gandy: Captain Philpot will contend there are upwards of 60 names on that chart. Not all of them will have photographs attributed to them. Some will just be outlined silhouettes of a head.
Media: Given the differences in their recollection, are their claims considered credible?
Chope: Don't know. We're just in the fact-finding mode.
Media: This is kind of a fair question, actually. We won't ask you to do hypotheticals or conjectures, but you all live in a world of analyzing data. Clearly if you're supervisors or Dr. Cambone said to you want do you think now? You’ve now gone from two to five people who recall it. You haven't found the document. What do you think?
Down: These people are, Captain Philpot for instance and the others, especially the ones that are involved in data mining, the contracting firms, are credible people. Again, we just -- We are unable to again provide corroborating evidence. We just, as I've said, can't find the document. But as I said, they are credible people.
Media: What do you make of that? That disparity. How do you conclude?
Chope: We can only hypothesize on how this --
Down: I don't --
Chope: -- might have come about is all you can do, hypothesize.
I agree with Pat. Most of the people involved in this are credible folks. We've checked out everything they've said. We can go to the same group of people you would think were sitting next to each other and say did you see a chart with a picture of Attah on it? No, no, no, yes. That's kind of the situation we're in right now. We drill into that and we still have the no, no, no, yes kind of situation.
Media: If these people are credible, what could account for this difference in your view?
Down: I don't know. We've seen a chart with different Mohammed's on them. Is it possible that Mohammed Ajaz, Mohammed -- what's the other one.
Chope: Arateff.
Down: Arateff, thank you. So we have charts with those names but not Mohammed Attah. Is there confusion there? Again, we don't know. We simply don't know. Was the reference to Mohammed Attah, did it come out early on in a chart? In that case if it came out early on, were there any kind of concerns which we again can't corroborate for our interviews. If it came out early, such as in a proof of concept chart, we may never find it.
So as I said, we haven't found any supporting evidence at this point, especially that documentation, to back those claims up.
[Multiple voices].
Down: We didn't, no.
Media: -- head of Special Ops at the time, wasn't he?
Chope: -- do not.
Media: You do not?
Down: Not yet.
Media: Can I ask a real basic question here? This effort to try to get to the bottom of this, this is responsive to Congress, to a directive from the Secretary, to what? Maybe you got into that in the beginning or maybe everyone in here knows it but me, I just -- You're getting to the bottom of this because Congress wants an answer or because you just want to know, because we're all asking these questions and you want us to shut up? [Laughter].
Down: Maybe all of the above. We --
Chope: -- Cambone has directed that we do fact-finding and find the facts in this case. Each of the components involved, SOCOM as the headquarters and supporting agencies have stepped forward and are doing their part to try and figure out what the facts are.
Media: Can I ask another question about the lawyers? You said I think that you had negative indication that that has happened, i.e. the destruction of documents.
Chope: That was taken a little out of context. No lawyer ever directed any Able Danger personnel to destroy documents. Any destruction of documents was conducted in accordance with established regulations and directives.
Media: What about the question of the meetings with the FBI?
Chope: Aside from the statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot we have found no corroborating statements or evidence or whatever you want to call it to that effect in the course of our interviews.
Media: So you talked to all of the lawyers who might have tried to stop this because it was U.S. person information and couldn't be disseminated to domestic agencies. And no one remembers --
Chope: We have talked to all the lawyers involved in the project and there is no hindrance upon the sharing of information.
Gandy: We know that data was destroyed, the Land Information Warfare Activity. But it was destroyed in compliance with our intelligence oversight directives, 12333, DoD 5240-1R, et cetera. So it was destroyed in complete protocols, normal protocols that we would follow with any kind of U.S. person data. It wasn't destroyed because a lawyer came in and said you've got to get rid of this stuff. It was the clock is ticking, show us how you can pull this U.S. person information out of here or not, you can't do it we have protocols and directives to comply with, we're going to comply, and they did. That's how the data was destroyed at LIWA and I believe later on in SOCOM was in a similar manner destroyed.
Media: So the people involved in the project were asked whether there was a way that they could extract intelligence which could be shared from this massive data that they had from this pile you talked about --
Gandy: I think you're confusing the sharing of data -- Data can be shared with anybody. U.S. person data can be shared in a wide variety of situations. We do that every day in the Department of Defense. For instance on the counter-intelligence side of the house which I am responsible for for the Army, our intelligence agents share information every day with the FBI no U.S. persons, and who has primacy in an investigation, and who doesn't. It's all laid out in the protocols surrounding EO-12333 and 5240, our counter-intelligence regulations. Promulgation of those sharing agreements. So we can share data with U.S. persons.
In this case because of the nature in which the data was collected, now we're 5.5 years ago. It was a gobbling up of a lot of data from a lot of sources and put in one pile. You had this commingling of U.S. person data with lots of other data, and there was no way to really pull it out. So the protocols were applied as they stood and really as they stand saying do you have a reason to do this. Like in the counter-intelligence case we have a reason, that we're doing a counter-espionage investigation or we're doing a force protection investigation. In this case there was no perceived imminent threat, imminent crime going to occur, any danger, those kinds of things that say that you can share it. That was not perceived to be the case in these situations and it was destroyed.
Media: So the identification of individuals who were linked to al-Qaida inside the United States was not perceived as an imminent threat after the USS Cole and after the embassy bombings --
Gandy: We don't know that they identified those people in this data.
Media: You say there was no imminent threat, there was no perceived imminent threat.
Gandy: That might be a reason you would keep the data. Those are the kind of reasons we're allowed to keep data about U.S. persons.
Media: And share it, right?
Gandy: Absolutely. It depends on the situation. If that person, for instance, if that person is located overseas, then you would share it with a different group of people than if the person was located in the United States. Just that there are links established doesn't really mean anything. And by the way, some of these links, in the primacy of this technology you get some very goofy links that require research. In fact when we interviewed these analysts to a person they said what was the nature of the stuff? They said you really need to dig into this to find out what these links meant.
Media: I was told that the, after the data run had been done on unclassified data bases it was then scrubbed against classified data in order to try and do this process. Like burrowing in and finding out what the links might be and which might be meaningful and so on. Have you been able to discover whether this chart that these five people remember was the product of a first stage of that or a second stage?
Gandy: One, we don't know there's a chart. But if there was a chart we believe it came from open source information.
Media: And not being scrubbed against classified --
Gandy: I don't know.
Media: Just to return to the question of the lawyers, Schaeffer said there were two occasions on which military lawyers intervened, the first was he said, that the military couldn't do anything with it and then when he tried to take it to the FBI again -- But you're saying that no -- Can you clarify exactly what you're saying about what the lawyers did? The document destruction stuff was SOP. You haven't found anything about a meeting with the FBI. I mean apart from the SOP on document destruction, what role did the regulations about U.S. persons and the legal interpretation of those made by lawyers of SOCOM play in how this all played out?
Gandy: Intelligence oversight drives how long we can store information on U.S. persons. It's really proscribed pretty clearly.
Media: Any activity that was proposed by people involved in Able Danger that was prohibited by lawyers --
Gandy: No. That's not the lawyers' job in this kind of a, in any situation within here. Their job is to give advice to the commander. The commander makes the ultimate determination. In no way, shape or form did the lawyers dissuade or hinder people from turning information over.
Media: The additional three people that recall seeing references to Mohammed Attah, do any of them recall what that was based on? You said --
Gandy: We asked where did this data come from and the person who saw the name and not the face couldn't tell. What it comes from is a big large conglomeration of data from lots of sources, and you drag a problem set through this data and you get lots of linkages and then you research the linkages is how it works.
We asked every single analyst if there was such a chart where would the data from that have come from? They didn't know. What they're doing is this huge data mining and they just get a pile of data, and in those days -- Now if you say okay, I have this piece of information, you could probably trace it back to its original parentage.
Media: But not in those days.
Gandy: In those days I think you could with some of the tools, but it depends upon analyst input to the tools, the linkages and all. They had some capability to do that because they would describe an anecdote where they'd say we'll read this information, and they'd say well, it's from a web site. They got to the web site it's kind of like a goofball web site. Then okay, get rid of that stuff. It's from something that really is not credible information. So they had some capability but I don't think they had the capability to scrub it in the fashion that the oversight rules could live with.
Media: The documents that were destroyed, is there a, if it's a standard operating procedure, are there rudimentary records that are kept of what documents are destroyed?
Gandy: There are certificates of destruction. What you'll have, traditionally for electronic it's very difficult. They'll say I destroyed so many disc drives, so many zip drives, so many CD roms were in the cruncher, that kind of stuff. You have lots and lost of data. So it's very general in nature.
Media: It doesn't really identify --
Gandy: It would never go down like in an index fashion or an inventory fashion. For those volumes of data it would say, the Y drive on this server at this place was wiped on this day, certified by the technician who conducted it.
Media: If there were a chart, a piece of paper, that would be different?
Gandy: You do physical destruction of it.
Media: Is that what it was?
Gandy: This is for documents that are actually published and numbered kind of documents that you would sign for. Those kind of documents. But if you have like working papers, charts that you're printing off looking that's not good, that's not good, you wouldn't do that. You’d just destroy all those.
Media: Schaeffer and Philpot's current status is?
Gandy: Captain Philpot's in the Navy and Mr. Schaeffer is --
Huntington: On administrative leave without (corrected – should be with) pay.
Media: From the DIA?
Huntington: That's correct.
Media: Is he in uniform still?
Huntington: I don't know the answer to that.
Media: Is he on administrative leave without pay as punishment?
Huntington: No. That's totally separate from any of this activity.
Media: Does he face any possible action for disposing of information?
Whitman: We're not going to get into any personnel issues that bump against the Privacy Act.
Media: Is the reason why he's on leave, does that affect his credibility at all in the investigation?
Huntington: No. These two things are entirely separate sorts of things. The reason for this action is totally unrelated to any of the activities related to Able Danger.
Media: How much of your resources has been devoted to digging this up? Is it something – do you have a lot of people who are looking in to this now? [Laughter].
Down: Yes.
Gandy: A lot of personal time.
Media: Your personal opinion of it, is it a waste of time? Is it constructive? Is it something you find helpful?
Gandy: Dr. Cambone says this is something we ought to look into, I go roger that, sir. It's very important.
Whitman: Like I said, we would present you the facts when we had some conviction on it, and that's where we're at today. I hope it's been useful.
Media: Thanks for doing it on the record.
Chope: You're welcome.
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Source: Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
News Transcript
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Presenter: Various DoD Officials Thursday, September 1, 2005
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Special Defense Department Briefing
Participating in this brief were:
Mr. Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Media Operations)
Ms. Pat Downs, Senior Policy Analyst, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence)
Mr. Thomas Gandy, Army G-2 Director of Counterintelligence and HUMINT
Mr. Bill Huntington, Vice Deputy Director for HUMINT, Defense Intelligence Agency
Cmdr. Christopher Chope, Center for Special Operations, U.S. Special Operations Command
Whitman: When I scheduled this particular room I hadn't anticipated that we would have these other activities that are going on down south, but I'm glad there are some of you here to report on this and have an interest in this.
As you know, the department has been aggressively looking into this Able Danger program since there were some allegations that were made some three weeks ago I think now, about three weeks. There's been a very extensive effort by the department to look broad, to look deep, and to document as well as to interviewing individuals that are associated with the project. Today we have reached the point where we're prepared to tell you what that broad and deep and extensive review has revealed to us.
I've got a number of subject matter experts here whose organizations were involved. By the mere fact of the representatives here you can see that this was not something that was just looked at narrowly. What we'll be able to do today is talk a little bit about what Able Danger was and maybe more importantly what it wasn't; what type of products were a result of this activity; discuss a little bit about some of the legal authorities and things that have been reported on, sometimes inaccurately about this; and to really talk to you a bit about our interactions with the 9/11 Commission when they were doing their work.
I got you all here under the guise of a background briefing, but I think what we'll do is, we've discussed this and these individuals have agreed to be on the record. There has been a lot of anonymous reporting on this which I think has been unhelpful. I hope that as you write these reports that you give weight to those people that have been directly involved in this effort and are on the record to discuss what the department has found for you on this.
With that they're going to kind of open up with a little bit of a presentation, talk about it just a little bit. Pat's going to start I think, Pat Down is going to start from the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence Office. Then the commander here from Special Operations Command is going to give you a bit of a thumbnail on the activities. We've got some other subject matter experts if we get into Q&A that involves their areas. I promise not to make it too long because I know you all have day jobs on this other story too.
With that, Pat, why don't you go ahead and start us off.
Down: Let me give you an overview of what we have done to determine the facts concerning the recent public statements on Able Danger and where we are to date and what we've found. And then I'll turn it over to Commander Chope so he can give you background information on Able Danger. Some of you may not be as familiar with exactly what that is, what it isn't, and what the timeline is here. It can be confusing with all the various accounts that are in the press.
We have conducted two types of activities. One is extensive document searches from all the organizations including contracting firms that were associated with the Able Danger program. To date we have not identified the chart that is referenced in public statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot in particular, who say they saw a chart with the photo of Mohammed Attah and other hijackers, particularly Mohammed Attah, pre-9/11. We have not discovered that chart. We have identified a similar chart, but it does not contain the photo of Mohammed Attah or reference to him or reference to the other hijackers.
The second type of activity we've conducted is interviews of people involved, again associated with the Able Danger project. To date we've conducted interviews with 80 people, and that is still ongoing. We're not done yet. We're still refining the questions. As we talk to some people we have to come back to other and ask additional questions.
Most of those people do not recollect the existence of a chart with the picture of Mohammed Attah on it, or again, other hijackers pre-9/11. We have identified three other individuals besides Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot who have a recollection of either a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah or a reference to Mohammed Attah. That's basically where we are.
As I said, we continue, we also have searched the records, the documents that we sent to the 9/11 Commission just to be sure that our copies of those records don't include anything additional we might have missed, including a whole number of documents that were deemed non-responsive to Commission requests. It's possible we might have missed something in that collection. It's a fairly extensive collection. We have reviewed all that documentation and at this point have not identified, again, such a chart which references pre-9/11 hijackers.
Media: But the three people who do remember, those three people are from which agency or what's their function?
Down: We have from SOCOM, two individuals. One of those is Captain Philpot. We have, of course Tony Schaeffer, he's actually a DIA civilian employee. We have, the two other individuals are, one is from the Land Information Warfare Activity, the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity, now actually part of the Information Dominance Center. The last one is with the O'Ryan contractors.
Media: At the time.
Down: At the time, yes. And we can answer, Mr. Gandy can answer more questions on the contractors and some of these -- Five individuals all told. Four of them, five individuals including Captain Philpot and Mr. Schaeffer. Four of them remember a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah pre-9/11; the fifth person remembers a chart with a reference to Mohammed Attah, but not a photo.
As I said, we're continuing to interview or re-interview based on what we've discovered so far to be sure that we're not missing anything.
I think it probably is a good idea at this point to turn it over to Commander Chope, and he'll describe to you what Able Danger is. I think that would be helpful. Again, describe some of the timelines because, as I said, we're confused by some of the reports out. We're trying to find the facts. Some of the various accounts have conflicted somewhat. I think it would be helpful to put this in some context for you.
Chope: I'm Commander Chope from the Special Operations Command and I'll offer a brief chronology and overview of what Able Danger was and try and dispel some of the myths and rumors surrounding the effort.
In early October 1999 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the United States Special Operations Command with developing a campaign plan against transnational terrorism, specifically al-Qaida. That effort would result, or that tasking would result in a 15-month effort undertaken mostly out of Tampa, Florida with some peripheral collaborative partners, that would span a 15-month period. In order to accomplish this tasking SOCOM turned to an internal working group who again worked with elements within the Department of Defense and with the Department of the Army to construct this plan. Captain Scott Philpot, then Commander Scott Philpot was probably the team leader, you would call him, for the Able Danger effort.
Able Danger was never a special access program. Able Danger was never a military unit. Able Danger was never a targeting effort. It was not a military deception operation. It was merely the name attributed to a 15-month planning effort.
In January of 2001 the U.S. Special Operations Command delivered the final product of their plan which was a draft operations plan to the Joint Staff, and for all intents and purposes Able Danger ended at that time.
Media: Can you say how many people were involved in it?
Chope: From the Special Operations Command, probably ten people were involved throughout the effort.
Media: You say it wasn't military? It was --
Chope: It was not a military unit. It was a name given to the effort. It's like calling all of us in here Able Danger. That's not --
Media: Were they all military people?
Chope: No, not uniformed service members, no.
Media: You say it wasn't a targeting effort.
Chope: Correct.
Media: I'm very ignorant about military affairs, but wouldn't any kind of plan against transnational terrorism involve a list of targets?
Chope: It would, and that's a good question. Throughout the Able Danger effort we're going to talk about data mining and nodal analysis. What the data mining and nodal analysis actions were designed to do was characterize the al-Qaida terrorist network. Those were some of the tools they used in order to do that mapping, if you will. When I said it was not a targeting effort, I mean it was not meant to go after individual people. It was meant to determine vulnerabilities, key nodes, linkages among and within al-Qaida.
Media: Nodal analysis? What does that mean?
Chope: I think in layman's terms it means determining linkages and relationships among disparate entities.
Down: Looking for patterns based no previous activity.
Media: It would seem you would want to deal with individual names of people if you were trying to understand vulnerability and linkages. No?
Chope: I'm sure that they got to that level of detail, however when you look at the plan, what the task was rather, the task was develop a plan, so that was the focus of the effort. The effort was never determine which individuals we ought to roll up. Did Osama bin Laden's name come up? Of course it did. But as far as that granularity, that level of detail, that was not the desired or required level of effort on the project. It was a by-product.
Gandy: This is Tom Gandy from the Army. Let me just help out here a little. The way it works is there's a campaign plan and then if someone decides to act upon that plan they will give that plan to someone to execute. At that point you get into various specifics about how you're going to execute it, phases of the operation, what the targets are in each phase, and get really down to the down and dirty side of things.
But in a plan you're saying here's what we're trying to do against this threat element, in this case transnational terrorism, not al-Qaida, so it's a more generalized level. I'm just trying to help out there.
Media: Can I get some clarity on the subsets that people are talking about. There were ten in Able Danger.
Gandy: SOCOM personnel.
Media: SOCOM personnel. How large was Able Danger in all then?
Gandy: I would say in the 15-month period it waxed and wanted. It depended on which collaborative partner SOCOM dealt with at the time. AT some points there was a partnership with the Army; other points there were contracted personnel involved?
Media: What was the maximum number --
Media: Hang on just a second and let me finish this line of questioning.
So you've interviewed 80 people. Were all 80 of them Able Danger or were they people who got briefings by Able Danger? What is that universe that gave you 80 people?
Gandy: It probably spans both of those representations you just gave. Not only folks who were integrally involved in the effort, but also those that were peripherally involved. I don't think that we necessarily went out and amongst those 80 we'd count people who just happened to have been exposed. Those 80 I would say had something to do with Able Danger.
Media: And the five who have some recollection of something, are those Able Danger core members, are they people who received briefings, are they the peripherals?
Gandy: Out of the ten I quoted you, two of them are from that ten. So the other three would be from the other 70, if you will, if that math makes sense to you.
Media: So three are peripheral, quote/unquote, to use your phrase; and two are from Able Danger.
Gandy: No. The hard core U.S. SOCOM part of Able Danger was ten people. There were other collaborative partners who were as involved in Able Danger. I'm only speaking to the SOCOM Personnel involved in Able Danger with those ten. There were other people who were as involved in Able Danger during the time.
Media: Who were the five who have some recollection of something?
Gandy: We have two SOCOM personnel, one of whom is Captain Philpot, one is Mr. Schaeffer who is a DIA employee.
Down: Actually --
[Multiple voices].
Media: Just simple math here. This is a really --
Whitman: In the SOCOM people there's an unnamed analyst who's going to remain unnamed. Then there's Captain Philpot. Those are the two from the ten.
Media: Civilian analyst?
Whitman: Yes.
Media: But there are five with some recollection, so who are the other three?
Whitman: The other three, one was an analyst associated with the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) which is the Army activity, one of the partners spoke of where LIWA was supporting the SOCOM effort for a period of time in the planning effort.
Another was a contractor who supported the Land Information Warfare activity. That's one of the other.
The other was Mr. Schaeffer.
Media: That's very helpful. Thank you.
Media: One further thing on that, how would you characterize, of those three people -- the analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, well Schaeffer I think we know his relationship with Able Danger. But the other two. The analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, associated with LIWAC (sic) and the contractor, how would you characterize their degree of -- Were they part of the core? Were they in the periphery, out of periphery?
Whitman: They were doing analysis and production support of requirements to help build the plan. So they were provided with requirements from the core group of SOCOM planners and they would try to meet those requirements of intelligence analytical products.
Media: Intelligence requirements.
Whitman: Right. It's LIWA, by the way, Activity. Not LIWAC.
Down: And Captain Philpot was more managing the whole effort. As opposed to an analyst.
Media: So five people remember this, but you haven't been able to come up with the chart. So you're not here telling us this chart does exist or doesn't exist.
Down: We don't know. We don't have it. We have not to date identified that chart, discovered it in our recent searches, nor did we pull it up during the life of the 9/11 Commission where the Commission itself did ask us, sent us two document requests for information on Able Danger. It was not pulled up at that time.
Media: What could have happened to it? Could someone have destroyed it to cover up?
Whitman: Let me say something there, just for any other questions that might come up too. We're not going to get into the business of speculating in terms of what might have happened. We're here today to present the facts as they exist and as we know them.
Like Pat was saying, what we know is that we didn't discover such a chart when we first responded to the Commission back in November and December of '03 and we haven't discovered such a chart in the current search. That's the facts. It's just not productive for us to get into speculating beyond what we actually know.
Media: Does that mean that because it was a classified operation a lot of documents including the chart could have been destroyed and that's why you can't find it?
Down: There are regulations. At the time how they were interpreted, very strictly pre-9/11, for destruction of information which is embedded, I guess is the way I would say it, that would contain any information on U.S. persons. In a major data mining effort like this you're reaching out to a lot of open sources and within that there could be a lot of information on U.S. persons. We're not allowed to collect that type of information. So there are strict regulations about collection, dissemination, destruction procedures for this type of information. And we know that that did happen in the case of Able Danger documentation.
Media: So it's possible then that this is how the chart cannot be found. Along with other documents, they could have been destroyed and that's why you can't corroborate what these people are saying or say it's wrong.
Down: Correct.
Media: What is the definition for U.S. person?
Down: I wish we had our lawyer here.
Chope: A U.S. citizen or someone who is in the country legally.
Media: So a tourist is a U.S. person.
Chope: Can be.
Media: Under what circumstances?
Chope: For instance on a work visa. I think it's more than just a tourist, on a work visa or something like that.
Media: But there are work visas that allow you to come, I’m here on one --
Gandy: We have a whole class on that if you'd like to attend it. I'll invite you. We have it annually.
We have lots of regulations on this that spell out precisely what they are. I'd hate to make an off-the-cuff comment here.
Media: Okay.
Gandy: But there are strict definitions.
Media: Maybe you can direct me to --
Gandy: Executive Order 12333. You can go on the web tonight and do it. DoD Directive 5240-1R.
Media: That does not --
Gandy: And Army Regulation 381-10.
Media: Does that mean there could have been legal advice given by the department or somebody within SOCOM to destroy it before it got out of the military's possession?
Chope: We have negative indications that that was ever the case. We've spoken to all the attorneys at all levels of command and organization that were involved with Able Danger, and there was no legal advice given along those lines.
Media: That lines?
Chope: Along the lines to destroy anything.
Down: We have not discovered that legal advice was given to date.
Media: On this chart, can you say approximately what the date of the chart is these five people recall? And do all of them recall not only Attah, but the other hijackers?
Down: Maybe Tom can help with the details of the interviews, but I believe Captain Philpot says he saw the chart in January, February 2000. That's the general reference point.
Media: Are you saying that the recollections of Schaeffer and Philpot are incredible?
Down: They're our starting point. They're DoD people who -- Captain Philpot, or then Commander during when the 9/11 Commission was wrapping up, came to us and said I have this information. We took him to the 9/11 Commission to examine it further. It's really up to the Commission to determine the relevancy of the information.
Fortunately, Captain Philpot or then Commander Philpot did not have documentation either, and so the staff questioned, and you can talk to the 9/11 Public Discourse Project where the two former chairmen of the Commission now work. But in terms of the clarity of the dates, when things were produced. At the time that Commander Philpot spoke with the Commission, the Commission staff at that time believed it wasn't strong enough evidence, especially without documentation, to make a change in their report which was at that time being coordinated with us and had already been drafted.
Media: So now that you have three other individuals corroborating this chart, saying they've seen this chart, are you going back to brief the Discourse Project now? The 9/11 Commission?
Down: No, not at this point, but we will be shortly. Or at least --
Media: Has anything changed. Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.
Down: That's okay.
Media: Has anything changed about the way that U.S. persons who get sucked up in a data mining operation would be handled today as opposed to how they might have -- completely independent of this. Say if my name gets sucked up into a database tomorrow morning would it be handled differently today than it would have before 9/11?
Down: My understanding is that the same procedures are in place. We may exercise some flexibility, but I have to be careful here because the same procedures, the same regulations, they are still accurate. We have to be very careful of what we protect against U.S. persons --
Media: -- different or --
Down: Again I have to be careful. The procedures stand and I really can't speak for the analytical side at the moment, but I would think that in the post-9/11 mindset --
Chope: Let me get into some of the problems we have. We're looking back about 5.5 years. Data mining is a relatively new thing in the intelligence community. They were not using the most sophisticated tools. They were using what tools were available. Sophisticated at the time, but compared to now of course we're Moore's law a couple of times down and we've got a lot better tools. So at this point now in the analytical side, we're a lot better in identifying the type of data we get and where we get it from. Back then you would do what they called a web crawl and you'd get a lot of data and it would go in one pile.
Now when we put the data in a pile we tag it, you've heard about XML tagging and those sorts of things. So we understand where the data came from better, we understand the nature of that, and we have tools to help us identify the data.
So while the procedures haven't changed, the interpretation has probable become a little more flexible with hindsight on 9/11, a little more flexible, but we still have the procedures in place, believe me, and we have the training, but we also have the better ability now to say okay, this data came from this source, it's a U.S. person that has nothing to do with our problem set and we can expunge it a lot more easily than we could in the past. In the old days it was kind of an all or nothing.
Media: All these questions about Able Danger seem to sound like how could you possibly have missed Mohammed Attah did this, but I'm wondering if Mohammed Attah came in under the same circumstances at the same time tomorrow, he would still be of the same class. Wouldn't they get ditched, thrown out? Not that that's what happened with this, but if you were to tag him as a U.S. person wouldn't he automatically be thrown out of the data base tomorrow just as --
Chope: I don't know.
Media: Can you say whether you have gone through all the documents yet? You say you you're now going back and reintegrating, but have you looked through all the documents? Is that why you're here, to say you've completed that?
Down: We have done extensive searches including the documents that we delivered to the 9/11 Commission and the group of documents that were deemed unresponsive to the Commission's particular request. There are boxes and boxes of these.
As you can imagine, an organization as large as DoD with the speed at which we had to respond to the Commission's request, there were numerous documents that came through for all 39 of the Commission's requests that weren't really relevant to specific requests. So we have like a non-responsive pile. We weeded those out. If we had any doubt we left it up to the Commission to decide. It's their job to decide what's really relevant for them. But we went back through the old piles just to be sure we had not missed anything or to see if we could potentially identify this chart. And in terms of the other organizations, there have been very extensive document searches.
Media: Is there an estimate about how many pages you searched?
Down: Oh, boy --
Chope: We did a complete electronic search --
Down: Pages.
Chope: All holdings, physical searches, --
Down: Hundreds of thousands probably.
Media: Are you done with your effort?
Down: Including electronic files, of pages
Media: I'm sorry. Are you done with your review? Is this, are you finished or is this ongoing?
Down: Not in terms of the interview process. But in terms of document searches, unless there is some other source of documents that we find out through the interview process that we haven't looked at, and again, we haven't identified what that would be, right now we are complete on our document.
Media: Can I just return briefly on this chart that had Attah's picture or reference, did the chart, did all the people have a recollection that the other hijackers who have been mentioned were also on the chart or just Attah?
Chope: Most of the discussion's been about Attah --
Whitman: Before we get into that, let's address the question. You said the chart that had Attah on it. We have not found a chart that had Attah on it. I just want to make sure --
Media: You said five people said they recall --
Whitman: I just didn't want that to be out there as that there is a chart that exists that has Attah on it. Okay?
Chope: If there was a chart with Attah, [Laughter].
Whitman: It's important.
Media: These five people recall, do they recall it having Attah and additional hijackers on it?
Chope: I can't be certain. That would really be the, then Commander Philpot would be the one. The remainder talk about Attah and a picture, or Attah's name. The one person who only saw a name and no picture, and the others saw a picture and a name.
Media: So Philpot is the only one who recalls other hijackers?
Chope: I believe, but I'd have to check the notes I have from the discussions we had.
Media: Let me go back to the U.S. persons question for a second. To what extent did any controversy over that issue lead to the shutdown of this program? I talked to several people who said there was a separate program developing. They were looking at Chinese tech transfer. It wasn't Able Danger, but it used some of the same personnel, some of the same facilities at LIWA and came up with a name list of some very prominent U.S. persons and led to somebody saying terminate this thing. Is there any truth to that at all?
Chope: No. It had nothing -- There was a prior effort involved with those topics that you mentioned. That effort ended with a subpoena by Congress in November of '99. That was the end of it. It was a completely different target, different subjects, different data, everything.
Media: You say ended with a subpoena from Congress. From where? From which committee?
Chope: I'm not sure about the committee. That was a completely different effort. There were similar tools, but you've got to remember back here, let me just for the Land Information Warfare Activity, this was very experimental stuff back then. So what that was about was demonstrating can experimental stuff like this be useful in helping us solve some technology transfer riddles. That was kind of the purpose of that effort. That effort ended in the LIWA's eyes in November. LIWA did a lot of other analytical projects. That's what they do. They do intelligence analysis.
Media: -- open source, classified?
Chope: In which?
Media: In both.
Chope: In Able Danger it was mixed, both open source and classified.
Media: The five people that recall seeing either Attah's name or photograph on the charts, do they have any recollection of where that photograph might have come from, number one? How many people's names were on that chart? Was it five, was it 10,000?
Chope: We don't know what was on the chart.
Media: In their recollection, what is their recollection of that chart?
Chope: It's different compared to any person you talk to.
Gandy: Captain Philpot will contend there are upwards of 60 names on that chart. Not all of them will have photographs attributed to them. Some will just be outlined silhouettes of a head.
Media: Given the differences in their recollection, are their claims considered credible?
Chope: Don't know. We're just in the fact-finding mode.
Media: This is kind of a fair question, actually. We won't ask you to do hypotheticals or conjectures, but you all live in a world of analyzing data. Clearly if you're supervisors or Dr. Cambone said to you want do you think now? You’ve now gone from two to five people who recall it. You haven't found the document. What do you think?
Down: These people are, Captain Philpot for instance and the others, especially the ones that are involved in data mining, the contracting firms, are credible people. Again, we just -- We are unable to again provide corroborating evidence. We just, as I've said, can't find the document. But as I said, they are credible people.
Media: What do you make of that? That disparity. How do you conclude?
Chope: We can only hypothesize on how this --
Down: I don't --
Chope: -- might have come about is all you can do, hypothesize.
I agree with Pat. Most of the people involved in this are credible folks. We've checked out everything they've said. We can go to the same group of people you would think were sitting next to each other and say did you see a chart with a picture of Attah on it? No, no, no, yes. That's kind of the situation we're in right now. We drill into that and we still have the no, no, no, yes kind of situation.
Media: If these people are credible, what could account for this difference in your view?
Down: I don't know. We've seen a chart with different Mohammed's on them. Is it possible that Mohammed Ajaz, Mohammed -- what's the other one.
Chope: Arateff.
Down: Arateff, thank you. So we have charts with those names but not Mohammed Attah. Is there confusion there? Again, we don't know. We simply don't know. Was the reference to Mohammed Attah, did it come out early on in a chart? In that case if it came out early on, were there any kind of concerns which we again can't corroborate for our interviews. If it came out early, such as in a proof of concept chart, we may never find it.
So as I said, we haven't found any supporting evidence at this point, especially that documentation, to back those claims up.
[Multiple voices].
Down: We didn't, no.
Media: -- head of Special Ops at the time, wasn't he?
Chope: -- do not.
Media: You do not?
Down: Not yet.
Media: Can I ask a real basic question here? This effort to try to get to the bottom of this, this is responsive to Congress, to a directive from the Secretary, to what? Maybe you got into that in the beginning or maybe everyone in here knows it but me, I just -- You're getting to the bottom of this because Congress wants an answer or because you just want to know, because we're all asking these questions and you want us to shut up? [Laughter].
Down: Maybe all of the above. We --
Chope: -- Cambone has directed that we do fact-finding and find the facts in this case. Each of the components involved, SOCOM as the headquarters and supporting agencies have stepped forward and are doing their part to try and figure out what the facts are.
Media: Can I ask another question about the lawyers? You said I think that you had negative indication that that has happened, i.e. the destruction of documents.
Chope: That was taken a little out of context. No lawyer ever directed any Able Danger personnel to destroy documents. Any destruction of documents was conducted in accordance with established regulations and directives.
Media: What about the question of the meetings with the FBI?
Chope: Aside from the statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot we have found no corroborating statements or evidence or whatever you want to call it to that effect in the course of our interviews.
Media: So you talked to all of the lawyers who might have tried to stop this because it was U.S. person information and couldn't be disseminated to domestic agencies. And no one remembers --
Chope: We have talked to all the lawyers involved in the project and there is no hindrance upon the sharing of information.
Gandy: We know that data was destroyed, the Land Information Warfare Activity. But it was destroyed in compliance with our intelligence oversight directives, 12333, DoD 5240-1R, et cetera. So it was destroyed in complete protocols, normal protocols that we would follow with any kind of U.S. person data. It wasn't destroyed because a lawyer came in and said you've got to get rid of this stuff. It was the clock is ticking, show us how you can pull this U.S. person information out of here or not, you can't do it we have protocols and directives to comply with, we're going to comply, and they did. That's how the data was destroyed at LIWA and I believe later on in SOCOM was in a similar manner destroyed.
Media: So the people involved in the project were asked whether there was a way that they could extract intelligence which could be shared from this massive data that they had from this pile you talked about --
Gandy: I think you're confusing the sharing of data -- Data can be shared with anybody. U.S. person data can be shared in a wide variety of situations. We do that every day in the Department of Defense. For instance on the counter-intelligence side of the house which I am responsible for for the Army, our intelligence agents share information every day with the FBI no U.S. persons, and who has primacy in an investigation, and who doesn't. It's all laid out in the protocols surrounding EO-12333 and 5240, our counter-intelligence regulations. Promulgation of those sharing agreements. So we can share data with U.S. persons.
In this case because of the nature in which the data was collected, now we're 5.5 years ago. It was a gobbling up of a lot of data from a lot of sources and put in one pile. You had this commingling of U.S. person data with lots of other data, and there was no way to really pull it out. So the protocols were applied as they stood and really as they stand saying do you have a reason to do this. Like in the counter-intelligence case we have a reason, that we're doing a counter-espionage investigation or we're doing a force protection investigation. In this case there was no perceived imminent threat, imminent crime going to occur, any danger, those kinds of things that say that you can share it. That was not perceived to be the case in these situations and it was destroyed.
Media: So the identification of individuals who were linked to al-Qaida inside the United States was not perceived as an imminent threat after the USS Cole and after the embassy bombings --
Gandy: We don't know that they identified those people in this data.
Media: You say there was no imminent threat, there was no perceived imminent threat.
Gandy: That might be a reason you would keep the data. Those are the kind of reasons we're allowed to keep data about U.S. persons.
Media: And share it, right?
Gandy: Absolutely. It depends on the situation. If that person, for instance, if that person is located overseas, then you would share it with a different group of people than if the person was located in the United States. Just that there are links established doesn't really mean anything. And by the way, some of these links, in the primacy of this technology you get some very goofy links that require research. In fact when we interviewed these analysts to a person they said what was the nature of the stuff? They said you really need to dig into this to find out what these links meant.
Media: I was told that the, after the data run had been done on unclassified data bases it was then scrubbed against classified data in order to try and do this process. Like burrowing in and finding out what the links might be and which might be meaningful and so on. Have you been able to discover whether this chart that these five people remember was the product of a first stage of that or a second stage?
Gandy: One, we don't know there's a chart. But if there was a chart we believe it came from open source information.
Media: And not being scrubbed against classified --
Gandy: I don't know.
Media: Just to return to the question of the lawyers, Schaeffer said there were two occasions on which military lawyers intervened, the first was he said, that the military couldn't do anything with it and then when he tried to take it to the FBI again -- But you're saying that no -- Can you clarify exactly what you're saying about what the lawyers did? The document destruction stuff was SOP. You haven't found anything about a meeting with the FBI. I mean apart from the SOP on document destruction, what role did the regulations about U.S. persons and the legal interpretation of those made by lawyers of SOCOM play in how this all played out?
Gandy: Intelligence oversight drives how long we can store information on U.S. persons. It's really proscribed pretty clearly.
Media: Any activity that was proposed by people involved in Able Danger that was prohibited by lawyers --
Gandy: No. That's not the lawyers' job in this kind of a, in any situation within here. Their job is to give advice to the commander. The commander makes the ultimate determination. In no way, shape or form did the lawyers dissuade or hinder people from turning information over.
Media: The additional three people that recall seeing references to Mohammed Attah, do any of them recall what that was based on? You said --
Gandy: We asked where did this data come from and the person who saw the name and not the face couldn't tell. What it comes from is a big large conglomeration of data from lots of sources, and you drag a problem set through this data and you get lots of linkages and then you research the linkages is how it works.
We asked every single analyst if there was such a chart where would the data from that have come from? They didn't know. What they're doing is this huge data mining and they just get a pile of data, and in those days -- Now if you say okay, I have this piece of information, you could probably trace it back to its original parentage.
Media: But not in those days.
Gandy: In those days I think you could with some of the tools, but it depends upon analyst input to the tools, the linkages and all. They had some capability to do that because they would describe an anecdote where they'd say we'll read this information, and they'd say well, it's from a web site. They got to the web site it's kind of like a goofball web site. Then okay, get rid of that stuff. It's from something that really is not credible information. So they had some capability but I don't think they had the capability to scrub it in the fashion that the oversight rules could live with.
Media: The documents that were destroyed, is there a, if it's a standard operating procedure, are there rudimentary records that are kept of what documents are destroyed?
Gandy: There are certificates of destruction. What you'll have, traditionally for electronic it's very difficult. They'll say I destroyed so many disc drives, so many zip drives, so many CD roms were in the cruncher, that kind of stuff. You have lots and lost of data. So it's very general in nature.
Media: It doesn't really identify --
Gandy: It would never go down like in an index fashion or an inventory fashion. For those volumes of data it would say, the Y drive on this server at this place was wiped on this day, certified by the technician who conducted it.
Media: If there were a chart, a piece of paper, that would be different?
Gandy: You do physical destruction of it.
Media: Is that what it was?
Gandy: This is for documents that are actually published and numbered kind of documents that you would sign for. Those kind of documents. But if you have like working papers, charts that you're printing off looking that's not good, that's not good, you wouldn't do that. You’d just destroy all those.
Media: Schaeffer and Philpot's current status is?
Gandy: Captain Philpot's in the Navy and Mr. Schaeffer is --
Huntington: On administrative leave without (corrected – should be with) pay.
Media: From the DIA?
Huntington: That's correct.
Media: Is he in uniform still?
Huntington: I don't know the answer to that.
Media: Is he on administrative leave without pay as punishment?
Huntington: No. That's totally separate from any of this activity.
Media: Does he face any possible action for disposing of information?
Whitman: We're not going to get into any personnel issues that bump against the Privacy Act.
Media: Is the reason why he's on leave, does that affect his credibility at all in the investigation?
Huntington: No. These two things are entirely separate sorts of things. The reason for this action is totally unrelated to any of the activities related to Able Danger.
Media: How much of your resources has been devoted to digging this up? Is it something – do you have a lot of people who are looking in to this now? [Laughter].
Down: Yes.
Gandy: A lot of personal time.
Media: Your personal opinion of it, is it a waste of time? Is it constructive? Is it something you find helpful?
Gandy: Dr. Cambone says this is something we ought to look into, I go roger that, sir. It's very important.
Whitman: Like I said, we would present you the facts when we had some conviction on it, and that's where we're at today. I hope it's been useful.
Media: Thanks for doing it on the record.
Chope: You're welcome.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Department of Defense
HOUSE INTEL COMMITTEE BEGINS HEARINGS ON LEAKS
The first of a series of congressional hearings on the unauthorized disclosure of classified information was held last week by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The closed hearing featured "a representative of the intelligence community" who discussed the consequences of such unauthorized disclosures.
Committee chairman Pete Hoekstra (R-Mich.) said the committee will hold open hearings on the issue in the future. He indicated that no legislation on unauthorized disclosure is pending before the committee and that no decision has been made to introduce a bill, according to a September 14 news release. See:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2005/09/hpsci091405.pdf
Meanwhile, the Committee voted on party lines to reject a resolution requesting that the executive branch provide documents on the unauthorized disclosure of the identity of CIA officer Valerie Plame.
When it comes to leaks, the Republican majority said, "the House must focus on the problem broadly rather than focusing solely on any specific case."
Democrats said "the Committee missed a critical opportunity to exercise appropriate and responsible oversight of this serious matter."
See the House Intelligence Committee report on the resolution here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_rpt/hrpt109-228.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GUIDELINES FOR ACCESS TO GEOSPATIAL DATA
Official guidelines for deciding whether and how to permit public access to geospatial data -- such as maps and satellite imagery -- have recently been issued by the Federal Geographic Data Committee of the U.S. Geological Survey.
"In the United States many public and private organizations and individuals originate geospatial data and make them available to the public," the Guidelines note. "Because of this condition centralized control of information is not viable and decision making about the sensitivity and safeguarding of geospatial data will be decentralized."
To assist in such decentralized decision making, the Guidelines define general procedures for identifying sensitive information and weighing the risks and benefits of disclosure.
See "Guidelines for Providing Appropriate Access to Geospatial Data in Response to Security Concerns," Federal Geographic Data Committee, June 2005:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/fgdc0605.pdf
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
US ARMY WEAPONS SYSTEM HANDBOOK
The 2005 U.S. Army Weapons System Handbook, a descriptive catalog of dozens of current and near-term weapons systems used by the U.S. Army, is now available on the Federation of American Scientists web site.
Previous editions of the Handbook were routinely made available on Army web sites. But along with many thousands of other unclassified documents, they were withdrawn from online public access a few years ago when the Army moved much of its web-based content behind a password-protected portal called Army Knowledge Online. A softcopy of the new edition was obtained by Secrecy News.
The unclassified Handbook is not sensitive, even by government standards. A hardcopy of the publication can still be purchased through the Government Printing Office. But the online version was a casualty of the Army's retreat from the web, until now.
See the 2005 U.S. Army Weapons System Handbook here:
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/wsh/index.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABLE DANGER HEARING
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing yesterday on ABLE DANGER, the Defense Department intelligence program that may or may not have identified Mohamed Atta and other September 11 hijackers a year or more before they struck.
The hearing ended inconclusively after the Pentagon refused to permit several witnesses to testify, citing classification concerns.
"That looks to me as if it may be obstruction of the committee's activities," said Judiciary Committee chair Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa).
"The Senate Intelligence Committee, as I understand it, has jurisdiction over this matter and is looking into it," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters in response.
"Second, the department, I'm told, offered a classified briefing because the subject matter was classified," Rumsfeld said. "And as I understand it, the Judiciary Committee preferred to have an open hearing on a classified matter, and therefore the department declined to participate in an open hearing on a classified matter."
The prepared testimony from the September 21 Judiciary Committee hearing is available here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/index.html
A September 1 Pentagon press briefing on ABLE DANGER is available here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/09/dod090105.html
The first of a series of congressional hearings on the unauthorized disclosure of classified information was held last week by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The closed hearing featured "a representative of the intelligence community" who discussed the consequences of such unauthorized disclosures.
Committee chairman Pete Hoekstra (R-Mich.) said the committee will hold open hearings on the issue in the future. He indicated that no legislation on unauthorized disclosure is pending before the committee and that no decision has been made to introduce a bill, according to a September 14 news release. See:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2005/09/hpsci091405.pdf
Meanwhile, the Committee voted on party lines to reject a resolution requesting that the executive branch provide documents on the unauthorized disclosure of the identity of CIA officer Valerie Plame.
When it comes to leaks, the Republican majority said, "the House must focus on the problem broadly rather than focusing solely on any specific case."
Democrats said "the Committee missed a critical opportunity to exercise appropriate and responsible oversight of this serious matter."
See the House Intelligence Committee report on the resolution here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_rpt/hrpt109-228.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GUIDELINES FOR ACCESS TO GEOSPATIAL DATA
Official guidelines for deciding whether and how to permit public access to geospatial data -- such as maps and satellite imagery -- have recently been issued by the Federal Geographic Data Committee of the U.S. Geological Survey.
"In the United States many public and private organizations and individuals originate geospatial data and make them available to the public," the Guidelines note. "Because of this condition centralized control of information is not viable and decision making about the sensitivity and safeguarding of geospatial data will be decentralized."
To assist in such decentralized decision making, the Guidelines define general procedures for identifying sensitive information and weighing the risks and benefits of disclosure.
See "Guidelines for Providing Appropriate Access to Geospatial Data in Response to Security Concerns," Federal Geographic Data Committee, June 2005:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/fgdc0605.pdf
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
US ARMY WEAPONS SYSTEM HANDBOOK
The 2005 U.S. Army Weapons System Handbook, a descriptive catalog of dozens of current and near-term weapons systems used by the U.S. Army, is now available on the Federation of American Scientists web site.
Previous editions of the Handbook were routinely made available on Army web sites. But along with many thousands of other unclassified documents, they were withdrawn from online public access a few years ago when the Army moved much of its web-based content behind a password-protected portal called Army Knowledge Online. A softcopy of the new edition was obtained by Secrecy News.
The unclassified Handbook is not sensitive, even by government standards. A hardcopy of the publication can still be purchased through the Government Printing Office. But the online version was a casualty of the Army's retreat from the web, until now.
See the 2005 U.S. Army Weapons System Handbook here:
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/wsh/index.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABLE DANGER HEARING
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing yesterday on ABLE DANGER, the Defense Department intelligence program that may or may not have identified Mohamed Atta and other September 11 hijackers a year or more before they struck.
The hearing ended inconclusively after the Pentagon refused to permit several witnesses to testify, citing classification concerns.
"That looks to me as if it may be obstruction of the committee's activities," said Judiciary Committee chair Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa).
"The Senate Intelligence Committee, as I understand it, has jurisdiction over this matter and is looking into it," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters in response.
"Second, the department, I'm told, offered a classified briefing because the subject matter was classified," Rumsfeld said. "And as I understand it, the Judiciary Committee preferred to have an open hearing on a classified matter, and therefore the department declined to participate in an open hearing on a classified matter."
The prepared testimony from the September 21 Judiciary Committee hearing is available here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/index.html
A September 1 Pentagon press briefing on ABLE DANGER is available here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/09/dod090105.html
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/08/pdp081205.pdf
Kean-Hamilton Statement on Able Danger
August 12, 2005
Kean-Hamilton Statement on Able Danger
August 12, 2005
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/09...kleinsmith.html
Testimony
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing
September 21, 2005
Erik Kleinsmith
former Army Major and Chief Intelligence of the Land Information Warfare Analysis LIWA , Lockheed Martin
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testimony of Erik Kleinsmith to the Senate Judiciary Committee for Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing, 21 September 2005
Good Morning. My name is Erik Kleinsmith. I was asked to testify as a witness today on my involvement in the Able Danger program.
Currently, I am an employee for Lockheed Martin Information Technology. I manage an intelligence analysis training team of about 28 instructors that specialize in integrating counterterrorism and asymmetric threat analysis with data mining technology. My primary customer is Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command or INSCOM. As part of the program, I also teach a counterterrorism analysis course for INSCOM.
From March of 1999 until February of 2001, I was an active duty Army Major and the Chief of Intelligence of what was then called the Land Information Warfare Activity or LIWA. My branch provided analytical support to Army Information Operations, but because of the data mining capabilities we possessed in the Information Dominance Center, we routinely provided direct analytical support to several combatant commands as well as other customers. One of our most prominent operations was in support of the data mining proof of concept demonstration for the Assistant Security of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence or ASD-C3I. Called the JCAG project, it demonstrated how data mining and intelligence analysis could be conducted in a counterintelligence and technology protection capacity. That project ran throughout the later half of 1999 and our results were ultimately subpoenaed by Congressman Dan Burton's office through the House Reform Committee on November 16th, 1999.
In December of 1999 we were approached by US Special Operations Command to support Able Danger. I assigned the same core team of analysts that worked the JCAG project, and with Dr. Eileen Preisser as the analytical lead, four of us conducted data mining and analysis of the Al Qaeda terrorist network coordinating with SOCOM and other organizations throughout that time. In the months that followed, we were able collect an immense amount of data for analysis that allowed us to map Al Qaeda as a world-wide threat with a surprisingly significant presence within the United States.
In approximately April of 2000 our support to Able Danger became severely restricted and ultimately shut down due to intelligence oversight concerns. Supported vigorously by the LIWA and INSCOM chains of command, we actively worked to overcome this shut down for the next several months. In the midst of this shut down, I along with CW3 Terri Stephens were forced to destroy all the data, charts, and other analytical products that we had not already passed on to SOCOM related to Able Danger. This destruction was dictated by, and conducted in accordance with intelligence oversight procedures.
Ultimately, we were able to restart our support to SOCOM at the end of September 2000. Additionally, the bombing of the USS Cole on October 12th brought USCENTCOM to the IDC, who then became our primary customer until my departure from active duty on April 1st 2001.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and am happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Testimony
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing
September 21, 2005
Erik Kleinsmith
former Army Major and Chief Intelligence of the Land Information Warfare Analysis LIWA , Lockheed Martin
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testimony of Erik Kleinsmith to the Senate Judiciary Committee for Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing, 21 September 2005
Good Morning. My name is Erik Kleinsmith. I was asked to testify as a witness today on my involvement in the Able Danger program.
Currently, I am an employee for Lockheed Martin Information Technology. I manage an intelligence analysis training team of about 28 instructors that specialize in integrating counterterrorism and asymmetric threat analysis with data mining technology. My primary customer is Headquarters, US Army Intelligence and Security Command or INSCOM. As part of the program, I also teach a counterterrorism analysis course for INSCOM.
From March of 1999 until February of 2001, I was an active duty Army Major and the Chief of Intelligence of what was then called the Land Information Warfare Activity or LIWA. My branch provided analytical support to Army Information Operations, but because of the data mining capabilities we possessed in the Information Dominance Center, we routinely provided direct analytical support to several combatant commands as well as other customers. One of our most prominent operations was in support of the data mining proof of concept demonstration for the Assistant Security of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence or ASD-C3I. Called the JCAG project, it demonstrated how data mining and intelligence analysis could be conducted in a counterintelligence and technology protection capacity. That project ran throughout the later half of 1999 and our results were ultimately subpoenaed by Congressman Dan Burton's office through the House Reform Committee on November 16th, 1999.
In December of 1999 we were approached by US Special Operations Command to support Able Danger. I assigned the same core team of analysts that worked the JCAG project, and with Dr. Eileen Preisser as the analytical lead, four of us conducted data mining and analysis of the Al Qaeda terrorist network coordinating with SOCOM and other organizations throughout that time. In the months that followed, we were able collect an immense amount of data for analysis that allowed us to map Al Qaeda as a world-wide threat with a surprisingly significant presence within the United States.
In approximately April of 2000 our support to Able Danger became severely restricted and ultimately shut down due to intelligence oversight concerns. Supported vigorously by the LIWA and INSCOM chains of command, we actively worked to overcome this shut down for the next several months. In the midst of this shut down, I along with CW3 Terri Stephens were forced to destroy all the data, charts, and other analytical products that we had not already passed on to SOCOM related to Able Danger. This destruction was dictated by, and conducted in accordance with intelligence oversight procedures.
Ultimately, we were able to restart our support to SOCOM at the end of September 2000. Additionally, the bombing of the USS Cole on October 12th brought USCENTCOM to the IDC, who then became our primary customer until my departure from active duty on April 1st 2001.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and am happy to answer any questions that you may have.
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/092105leahy.html
Statement
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing
September 21, 2005
The Honorable Patrick Leahy
United States Senator , Vermont
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy,
Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing On "Able Danger And Intelligence Information Sharing"
September 21, 2005
I thank the Chairman for convening today's hearing and commend his efforts to investigate the allegations that have been raised, arising from this program. He and I have a long history of conducting vigorous oversight investigations together, and I appreciate the energy he has dedicated to continuing this tradition since assuming his role as our Committee's chairman.
Several participants in the Able Danger project have recently come forward to say that the project identified Mohammed Atta, the leader of the hijackers who engineered the September 11th attacks, one year prior to those horrific attacks. These individuals further allege that they were rebuffed in their attempts to share this information with the FBI. Their accusations merit a thorough investigation. If they are proven accurate, the FBI, the Administration and the Congress must address the problems that prevented this intelligence from being shared with the appropriate agencies.
We have already taken significant steps to improve information sharing within and between agencies with the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and the National Intelligence Reform Act. Congress established the 9/11 Commission to investigate the attacks and then implemented many of the important unanimous recommendations contained in the Commission report. We must continue to evaluate what went wrong before 9/11and take all necessary steps to prevent terrorist attacks in the future.
There are many questions raised by the Able Danger project, including the use of data-mining by the military and intelligence community in their efforts to combat terrorism. While data-mining can have some useful, effective applications for enhancing law enforcement and national security, Congress must fulfill its constitutional oversight obligation to assess how federal departments and agencies are using this technology. Advances have allowed us broader and faster access to more and more information. In using this technology, we also have the challenge and the responsibility to ensure that it is being used effectively and that guidance and oversight are sufficient to prevent its being abused to undermine the privacy and the civil liberties of the American people.
In recent weeks, many individuals have spoken publicly about the Able Danger project. Some of the statements have included personal attacks on members of the 9/11 Commission. Some have implied that the Administration is attempting to thwart any real investigation into Able Danger. The review of this project should remain above the political fray and without resort to personal attacks. I recall the words of 9/11 Commission member and former Senator Slade Gorton, who said that in conducting its investigation, the commissioners checked their politics at the door. I hope everyone involved in this investigation does the same. Terrorists do not attack Democrats or Republicans or independents when they strike; they attack all of us as Americans. I believe that the Chairman is committed to this approach, and I look forward to working with him as we pursue this inquiry.
Statement
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing
September 21, 2005
The Honorable Patrick Leahy
United States Senator , Vermont
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy,
Ranking Member, Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing On "Able Danger And Intelligence Information Sharing"
September 21, 2005
I thank the Chairman for convening today's hearing and commend his efforts to investigate the allegations that have been raised, arising from this program. He and I have a long history of conducting vigorous oversight investigations together, and I appreciate the energy he has dedicated to continuing this tradition since assuming his role as our Committee's chairman.
Several participants in the Able Danger project have recently come forward to say that the project identified Mohammed Atta, the leader of the hijackers who engineered the September 11th attacks, one year prior to those horrific attacks. These individuals further allege that they were rebuffed in their attempts to share this information with the FBI. Their accusations merit a thorough investigation. If they are proven accurate, the FBI, the Administration and the Congress must address the problems that prevented this intelligence from being shared with the appropriate agencies.
We have already taken significant steps to improve information sharing within and between agencies with the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act and the National Intelligence Reform Act. Congress established the 9/11 Commission to investigate the attacks and then implemented many of the important unanimous recommendations contained in the Commission report. We must continue to evaluate what went wrong before 9/11and take all necessary steps to prevent terrorist attacks in the future.
There are many questions raised by the Able Danger project, including the use of data-mining by the military and intelligence community in their efforts to combat terrorism. While data-mining can have some useful, effective applications for enhancing law enforcement and national security, Congress must fulfill its constitutional oversight obligation to assess how federal departments and agencies are using this technology. Advances have allowed us broader and faster access to more and more information. In using this technology, we also have the challenge and the responsibility to ensure that it is being used effectively and that guidance and oversight are sufficient to prevent its being abused to undermine the privacy and the civil liberties of the American people.
In recent weeks, many individuals have spoken publicly about the Able Danger project. Some of the statements have included personal attacks on members of the 9/11 Commission. Some have implied that the Administration is attempting to thwart any real investigation into Able Danger. The review of this project should remain above the political fray and without resort to personal attacks. I recall the words of 9/11 Commission member and former Senator Slade Gorton, who said that in conducting its investigation, the commissioners checked their politics at the door. I hope everyone involved in this investigation does the same. Terrorists do not attack Democrats or Republicans or independents when they strike; they attack all of us as Americans. I believe that the Chairman is committed to this approach, and I look forward to working with him as we pursue this inquiry.
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/092105zaid.pdf
Prepared Statement of Mark S. Zaid, Esq before the Committee on Judiciary, United States Senate
Prepared Statement of Mark S. Zaid, Esq before the Committee on Judiciary, United States Senate
"Able Danger" And A Possible Coverup
By: patrickhenry · Section: Diaries
Yesterday while browsing the different news stories I came upon one of the most disturbing pieces of information that has not been played much in the media in the recent past since "Able Danger" was revealed on national television.
Rep Curt Weldon, who is currently the Vice-Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, gave a speech on the floor of the House on October 19 that should literally "shake up the defense bureaucracy." I have never had the privilage of meeting Mr. Weldon but he should be considered a reliable source on these matters given his high stature within the House of Representatives.
What happened in this speech? Mr. Weldon essentially accused the defense department covering up a story that could blow the entire 9/11 Commission Report out of the water. What did Mr. Weldon Say? Here is a summation.
OCT 19-Rep. Weldon- What I did not know, Mr. Speaker, up until June of this year, was that that secret program called Able Danger actually identified the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda in January and February of 2000, over 1 year before 9/11 every happened. In addition, I learned that not only did we identify the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, but we identified Mohamed Atta as one of the members of that Brooklyn cell along with three other terrorists who were the leadership of the 9/11 attack.
I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, again, over 1 year before 9/11, that Able Danger team attempted on three separate occasions to provide information to the FBI about the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, and on three separate occasions they were denied by lawyers in the previous administration to transfer that information......
What happened since "Able Danger" became public with the help of Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer ?
This is the result of attempting to change the military intelligence bureaucracy.
Rep. Weldon- So what has happened to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, Mr. Speaker? The Defense Intelligence Agency has lifted his security clearance. One day before he was to testify before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in uniform, they permanently removed his security clearance. And now our Defense Intelligence Agency has told Colonel Shaffer's lawyer that they plan to seek a permanent removal of his pay and his health care benefits for him and his two children. Why, Mr. Speaker? Because Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, like Commander Scott Philpot of the Navy, like J. D. Smith, and like a host of other Able Danger employees, has told the truth.
This is absolutely incredible. Shaffer has recieved medals in the past for his work and when he attempts to come public with information he is essentially fired and his clearance permanently lifted.
I urge all who read this to check out Mr. Weldon's incredible speech as his website. The mainstream media should pick up this story and run because this is a national security concern and not politics. Please encourage Mr. Weldon to keep up the good work and to stop this "possible government coverup" dead in its tracks.
website http://curtweldon.house.gov/
The story is listed under:
CONGRESSMAN WELDON SPEAKS OUT ON SMEAR CAMPAIGN AGAINST LTC SHAFFER; CALLS FOR INVESTIGATION
By: patrickhenry · Section: Diaries
Yesterday while browsing the different news stories I came upon one of the most disturbing pieces of information that has not been played much in the media in the recent past since "Able Danger" was revealed on national television.
Rep Curt Weldon, who is currently the Vice-Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, gave a speech on the floor of the House on October 19 that should literally "shake up the defense bureaucracy." I have never had the privilage of meeting Mr. Weldon but he should be considered a reliable source on these matters given his high stature within the House of Representatives.
What happened in this speech? Mr. Weldon essentially accused the defense department covering up a story that could blow the entire 9/11 Commission Report out of the water. What did Mr. Weldon Say? Here is a summation.
OCT 19-Rep. Weldon- What I did not know, Mr. Speaker, up until June of this year, was that that secret program called Able Danger actually identified the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda in January and February of 2000, over 1 year before 9/11 every happened. In addition, I learned that not only did we identify the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, but we identified Mohamed Atta as one of the members of that Brooklyn cell along with three other terrorists who were the leadership of the 9/11 attack.
I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, again, over 1 year before 9/11, that Able Danger team attempted on three separate occasions to provide information to the FBI about the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, and on three separate occasions they were denied by lawyers in the previous administration to transfer that information......
What happened since "Able Danger" became public with the help of Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer ?
This is the result of attempting to change the military intelligence bureaucracy.
Rep. Weldon- So what has happened to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, Mr. Speaker? The Defense Intelligence Agency has lifted his security clearance. One day before he was to testify before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in uniform, they permanently removed his security clearance. And now our Defense Intelligence Agency has told Colonel Shaffer's lawyer that they plan to seek a permanent removal of his pay and his health care benefits for him and his two children. Why, Mr. Speaker? Because Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, like Commander Scott Philpot of the Navy, like J. D. Smith, and like a host of other Able Danger employees, has told the truth.
This is absolutely incredible. Shaffer has recieved medals in the past for his work and when he attempts to come public with information he is essentially fired and his clearance permanently lifted.
I urge all who read this to check out Mr. Weldon's incredible speech as his website. The mainstream media should pick up this story and run because this is a national security concern and not politics. Please encourage Mr. Weldon to keep up the good work and to stop this "possible government coverup" dead in its tracks.
website http://curtweldon.house.gov/
The story is listed under:
CONGRESSMAN WELDON SPEAKS OUT ON SMEAR CAMPAIGN AGAINST LTC SHAFFER; CALLS FOR INVESTIGATION
http://www.therant.us/staff/guest/anderson/10222005.htm
Disabling Able Danger
Government/Barbara Anderson
October 22, 2005 - Able Danger came across the public’s radar screen in August, 2005. Helping this along was Representative Curt Weldon, who predicted that members of the 9/11 Commission would have “egg all over their faces” when the briefings they received on an elite group of military intelligence analysts, code named Able Danger, were made known. Weldon remarked that “The 9/11 Commission is trying to spin this because they’re embarrassed at what’s coming out”. In further angry remarks he noted that “In two weeks with two staffers, I’ve uncovered more in this regard than they did with 80 staffers and $15 million of taxpayers’ money!” He also claimed that “there’s something very sinister that’s going on here that really troubles me.”
The 9/11 Commission gave its participants the opportunity to come to the conclusion that there was enough blame to go around. CYA translation: “Don’t blame me!” Because of the different government agencies involved, it was difficult to follow the testimony, which was beyond the ordinary citizen to comprehend. This hearing might be gone and forgotten, as is the result of so many committee hearings, except that some whistleblowers became vocal about what they knew to be true and pertinent and covered up.
Whistleblowers are mostly vulnerable people who must blow the whistle on those who are usually their superiors, and those up the ladder in power. Laws have been enacted to protect whistleblowers, but to use those laws it takes the will and a certain amount of power.
LTC Anthony Shaffer, involved in Able Danger, went public in a big way, appearing on different talk shows. He, therefore, invoked the considerable wrath of those in the federal government on whom he was blowing the whistle. Retaliation came.
Rep. Weldon reports:
“They have gagged the military officers. They have prevented them from talking to any member of Congress, They have prevented them from talking to the media. And the Defense Intelligence Agency has began a process to destroy the career and the life of Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer.“
So what has happened to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer?
According to Representative Weldon, one day before the Lieutenant Colonel was to testify before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in uniform, they permanently removed his security clearance. And now our Defense Intelligence Agency has told Colonel Shaffer’s lawyer that they plan to seek a permanent removal of his pay and his health care benefits for him and his two children . Why? Because Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, like other Able Danger employees, has told the truth.
Representative Weldon compared the treatment of LTC Shaffer to that of Sandy Berger, member of the Clinton administration, who took documents out of the National Archives before he was to testify before the Commission. According to Representative Weldon, that is a felony, tampering with Federal documents and removing classified information regarding our security and information that the 9/11 Commission needed to see. Berger initially lied about it. Then, he admitted it and was given a punishment. Berger’s punishment included a temporary lifting of his security clearance. He will get it back again, despite his lying, stealing and committing an act of outrage regarding this country’s security.
LTC Shaffer, a Bronze Star 23-year military veteran, told the truth and his life is being systematically ruined. They have suspended him, and are about to take away his health care and the salary that he has earned. They do not want to fire him because they do not want him to go to the media. Under suspension, he cannot talk. They have planted scurrilous accusations with the media. They have trumped up charges against him, from serious to merely laughable, as accusing him of stealing pens when he was 15 years old, in their zeal to destroy this whistleblower.
What do the Able Danger people want us to know? That there were those who were tracking al Queda here and abroad before 9/11. Their reports were either not taken seriously or were suppressed. There were cells in Hamburg, San Diego, Phoenix, Minnesota, Norman, Oklahoma, and Brooklyn, among others. For whatever reason, reports did not reach the right places or were ignored. LTC Shaffer, and others, were ready to testify. They were never called. According to Representative Weldon, in September of 2000, over one year before 9/11, the Able Danger team attempted on three separate occasions to provide information
to the FBI about the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, and on three separate occasions they were denied by lawyers in the previous administration to transfer that information. Was this some of the information Sandy Berger was trying to remove from the record?
Perhaps the intelligence apparatus high up in the federal government could have allowed this story to die. Perhaps if they had not set about to destroy a valuable member of their own intelligence gathering apparatus, Representative Weldon would not have pursued what he knew had a stink to it. However, Weldon reacted as few in Washington do. He came out swinging in defense of one man, in particular, and Able Danger, in general.
It is well to remember what Weldon, an insider, said: “There’s something very sinister going on here that really troubles me.”
Barbara Anderson lives in a large city on the West coast. Things that are important to her are: God, family, country, heritage and borders. She enjoys music, painting and song writing.
Disabling Able Danger
Government/Barbara Anderson
October 22, 2005 - Able Danger came across the public’s radar screen in August, 2005. Helping this along was Representative Curt Weldon, who predicted that members of the 9/11 Commission would have “egg all over their faces” when the briefings they received on an elite group of military intelligence analysts, code named Able Danger, were made known. Weldon remarked that “The 9/11 Commission is trying to spin this because they’re embarrassed at what’s coming out”. In further angry remarks he noted that “In two weeks with two staffers, I’ve uncovered more in this regard than they did with 80 staffers and $15 million of taxpayers’ money!” He also claimed that “there’s something very sinister that’s going on here that really troubles me.”
The 9/11 Commission gave its participants the opportunity to come to the conclusion that there was enough blame to go around. CYA translation: “Don’t blame me!” Because of the different government agencies involved, it was difficult to follow the testimony, which was beyond the ordinary citizen to comprehend. This hearing might be gone and forgotten, as is the result of so many committee hearings, except that some whistleblowers became vocal about what they knew to be true and pertinent and covered up.
Whistleblowers are mostly vulnerable people who must blow the whistle on those who are usually their superiors, and those up the ladder in power. Laws have been enacted to protect whistleblowers, but to use those laws it takes the will and a certain amount of power.
LTC Anthony Shaffer, involved in Able Danger, went public in a big way, appearing on different talk shows. He, therefore, invoked the considerable wrath of those in the federal government on whom he was blowing the whistle. Retaliation came.
Rep. Weldon reports:
“They have gagged the military officers. They have prevented them from talking to any member of Congress, They have prevented them from talking to the media. And the Defense Intelligence Agency has began a process to destroy the career and the life of Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer.“
So what has happened to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer?
According to Representative Weldon, one day before the Lieutenant Colonel was to testify before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, in uniform, they permanently removed his security clearance. And now our Defense Intelligence Agency has told Colonel Shaffer’s lawyer that they plan to seek a permanent removal of his pay and his health care benefits for him and his two children . Why? Because Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, like other Able Danger employees, has told the truth.
Representative Weldon compared the treatment of LTC Shaffer to that of Sandy Berger, member of the Clinton administration, who took documents out of the National Archives before he was to testify before the Commission. According to Representative Weldon, that is a felony, tampering with Federal documents and removing classified information regarding our security and information that the 9/11 Commission needed to see. Berger initially lied about it. Then, he admitted it and was given a punishment. Berger’s punishment included a temporary lifting of his security clearance. He will get it back again, despite his lying, stealing and committing an act of outrage regarding this country’s security.
LTC Shaffer, a Bronze Star 23-year military veteran, told the truth and his life is being systematically ruined. They have suspended him, and are about to take away his health care and the salary that he has earned. They do not want to fire him because they do not want him to go to the media. Under suspension, he cannot talk. They have planted scurrilous accusations with the media. They have trumped up charges against him, from serious to merely laughable, as accusing him of stealing pens when he was 15 years old, in their zeal to destroy this whistleblower.
What do the Able Danger people want us to know? That there were those who were tracking al Queda here and abroad before 9/11. Their reports were either not taken seriously or were suppressed. There were cells in Hamburg, San Diego, Phoenix, Minnesota, Norman, Oklahoma, and Brooklyn, among others. For whatever reason, reports did not reach the right places or were ignored. LTC Shaffer, and others, were ready to testify. They were never called. According to Representative Weldon, in September of 2000, over one year before 9/11, the Able Danger team attempted on three separate occasions to provide information
to the FBI about the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, and on three separate occasions they were denied by lawyers in the previous administration to transfer that information. Was this some of the information Sandy Berger was trying to remove from the record?
Perhaps the intelligence apparatus high up in the federal government could have allowed this story to die. Perhaps if they had not set about to destroy a valuable member of their own intelligence gathering apparatus, Representative Weldon would not have pursued what he knew had a stink to it. However, Weldon reacted as few in Washington do. He came out swinging in defense of one man, in particular, and Able Danger, in general.
It is well to remember what Weldon, an insider, said: “There’s something very sinister going on here that really troubles me.”
Barbara Anderson lives in a large city on the West coast. Things that are important to her are: God, family, country, heritage and borders. She enjoys music, painting and song writing.
http://www.theconservativevoice.com/articl...le.html?id=9181
TCV News
Able Danger Cover Up Continues
October 24, 2005 10:04 AM EST
By Sher Zieve – Appearing on the Laura Ingraham Radio program Monday, Rep Curt Weldon (R-Il) said that the smear campaign and cover-up is continuing, in regards to Abel Danger Intel. Weldon advised that Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who has a gag-order placed on him by the Pentagon, DIA and DoD, is being summarily vilified by these government agencies.
Weldon said: “This is something I expect from Kim Jong Il of North Korea.”
At least 7 former Able Danger team members have volunteered to testify before Congress that former Clinton Administration officials were warned ahead of time of both the USS Cole bombing and of Mohammed Atta’s presence in the US a year before 9/11/2001. These individuals have also been placed under gag-orders and are not allowed to speak to any Senate Committees or the media.
TCV News
Able Danger Cover Up Continues
October 24, 2005 10:04 AM EST
By Sher Zieve – Appearing on the Laura Ingraham Radio program Monday, Rep Curt Weldon (R-Il) said that the smear campaign and cover-up is continuing, in regards to Abel Danger Intel. Weldon advised that Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who has a gag-order placed on him by the Pentagon, DIA and DoD, is being summarily vilified by these government agencies.
Weldon said: “This is something I expect from Kim Jong Il of North Korea.”
At least 7 former Able Danger team members have volunteered to testify before Congress that former Clinton Administration officials were warned ahead of time of both the USS Cole bombing and of Mohammed Atta’s presence in the US a year before 9/11/2001. These individuals have also been placed under gag-orders and are not allowed to speak to any Senate Committees or the media.
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/09/dod090105.html
U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
News Transcript
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Presenter: Various DoD Officials Thursday, September 1, 2005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Defense Department Briefing
Participating in this brief were:
Mr. Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Media Operations)
Ms. Pat Downs, Senior Policy Analyst, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence)
Mr. Thomas Gandy, Army G-2 Director of Counterintelligence and HUMINT
Mr. Bill Huntington, Vice Deputy Director for HUMINT, Defense Intelligence Agency
Cmdr. Christopher Chope, Center for Special Operations, U.S. Special Operations Command
Whitman: When I scheduled this particular room I hadn't anticipated that we would have these other activities that are going on down south, but I'm glad there are some of you here to report on this and have an interest in this.
As you know, the department has been aggressively looking into this Able Danger program since there were some allegations that were made some three weeks ago I think now, about three weeks. There's been a very extensive effort by the department to look broad, to look deep, and to document as well as to interviewing individuals that are associated with the project. Today we have reached the point where we're prepared to tell you what that broad and deep and extensive review has revealed to us.
I've got a number of subject matter experts here whose organizations were involved. By the mere fact of the representatives here you can see that this was not something that was just looked at narrowly. What we'll be able to do today is talk a little bit about what Able Danger was and maybe more importantly what it wasn't; what type of products were a result of this activity; discuss a little bit about some of the legal authorities and things that have been reported on, sometimes inaccurately about this; and to really talk to you a bit about our interactions with the 9/11 Commission when they were doing their work.
I got you all here under the guise of a background briefing, but I think what we'll do is, we've discussed this and these individuals have agreed to be on the record. There has been a lot of anonymous reporting on this which I think has been unhelpful. I hope that as you write these reports that you give weight to those people that have been directly involved in this effort and are on the record to discuss what the department has found for you on this.
With that they're going to kind of open up with a little bit of a presentation, talk about it just a little bit. Pat's going to start I think, Pat Down is going to start from the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence Office. Then the commander here from Special Operations Command is going to give you a bit of a thumbnail on the activities. We've got some other subject matter experts if we get into Q&A that involves their areas. I promise not to make it too long because I know you all have day jobs on this other story too.
With that, Pat, why don't you go ahead and start us off.
Down: Let me give you an overview of what we have done to determine the facts concerning the recent public statements on Able Danger and where we are to date and what we've found. And then I'll turn it over to Commander Chope so he can give you background information on Able Danger. Some of you may not be as familiar with exactly what that is, what it isn't, and what the timeline is here. It can be confusing with all the various accounts that are in the press.
We have conducted two types of activities. One is extensive document searches from all the organizations including contracting firms that were associated with the Able Danger program. To date we have not identified the chart that is referenced in public statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot in particular, who say they saw a chart with the photo of Mohammed Attah and other hijackers, particularly Mohammed Attah, pre-9/11. We have not discovered that chart. We have identified a similar chart, but it does not contain the photo of Mohammed Attah or reference to him or reference to the other hijackers.
The second type of activity we've conducted is interviews of people involved, again associated with the Able Danger project. To date we've conducted interviews with 80 people, and that is still ongoing. We're not done yet. We're still refining the questions. As we talk to some people we have to come back to other and ask additional questions.
Most of those people do not recollect the existence of a chart with the picture of Mohammed Attah on it, or again, other hijackers pre-9/11. We have identified three other individuals besides Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot who have a recollection of either a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah or a reference to Mohammed Attah. That's basically where we are.
As I said, we continue, we also have searched the records, the documents that we sent to the 9/11 Commission just to be sure that our copies of those records don't include anything additional we might have missed, including a whole number of documents that were deemed non-responsive to Commission requests. It's possible we might have missed something in that collection. It's a fairly extensive collection. We have reviewed all that documentation and at this point have not identified, again, such a chart which references pre-9/11 hijackers.
Media: But the three people who do remember, those three people are from which agency or what's their function?
Down: We have from SOCOM, two individuals. One of those is Captain Philpot. We have, of course Tony Schaeffer, he's actually a DIA civilian employee. We have, the two other individuals are, one is from the Land Information Warfare Activity, the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity, now actually part of the Information Dominance Center. The last one is with the O'Ryan contractors.
Media: At the time.
Down: At the time, yes. And we can answer, Mr. Gandy can answer more questions on the contractors and some of these -- Five individuals all told. Four of them, five individuals including Captain Philpot and Mr. Schaeffer. Four of them remember a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah pre-9/11; the fifth person remembers a chart with a reference to Mohammed Attah, but not a photo.
As I said, we're continuing to interview or re-interview based on what we've discovered so far to be sure that we're not missing anything.
I think it probably is a good idea at this point to turn it over to Commander Chope, and he'll describe to you what Able Danger is. I think that would be helpful. Again, describe some of the timelines because, as I said, we're confused by some of the reports out. We're trying to find the facts. Some of the various accounts have conflicted somewhat. I think it would be helpful to put this in some context for you.
Chope: I'm Commander Chope from the Special Operations Command and I'll offer a brief chronology and overview of what Able Danger was and try and dispel some of the myths and rumors surrounding the effort.
In early October 1999 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the United States Special Operations Command with developing a campaign plan against transnational terrorism, specifically al-Qaida. That effort would result, or that tasking would result in a 15-month effort undertaken mostly out of Tampa, Florida with some peripheral collaborative partners, that would span a 15-month period. In order to accomplish this tasking SOCOM turned to an internal working group who again worked with elements within the Department of Defense and with the Department of the Army to construct this plan. Captain Scott Philpot, then Commander Scott Philpot was probably the team leader, you would call him, for the Able Danger effort.
Able Danger was never a special access program. Able Danger was never a military unit. Able Danger was never a targeting effort. It was not a military deception operation. It was merely the name attributed to a 15-month planning effort.
In January of 2001 the U.S. Special Operations Command delivered the final product of their plan which was a draft operations plan to the Joint Staff, and for all intents and purposes Able Danger ended at that time.
Media: Can you say how many people were involved in it?
Chope: From the Special Operations Command, probably ten people were involved throughout the effort.
Media: You say it wasn't military? It was --
Chope: It was not a military unit. It was a name given to the effort. It's like calling all of us in here Able Danger. That's not --
Media: Were they all military people?
Chope: No, not uniformed service members, no.
Media: You say it wasn't a targeting effort.
Chope: Correct.
Media: I'm very ignorant about military affairs, but wouldn't any kind of plan against transnational terrorism involve a list of targets?
Chope: It would, and that's a good question. Throughout the Able Danger effort we're going to talk about data mining and nodal analysis. What the data mining and nodal analysis actions were designed to do was characterize the al-Qaida terrorist network. Those were some of the tools they used in order to do that mapping, if you will. When I said it was not a targeting effort, I mean it was not meant to go after individual people. It was meant to determine vulnerabilities, key nodes, linkages among and within al-Qaida.
Media: Nodal analysis? What does that mean?
Chope: I think in layman's terms it means determining linkages and relationships among disparate entities.
Down: Looking for patterns based no previous activity.
Media: It would seem you would want to deal with individual names of people if you were trying to understand vulnerability and linkages. No?
Chope: I'm sure that they got to that level of detail, however when you look at the plan, what the task was rather, the task was develop a plan, so that was the focus of the effort. The effort was never determine which individuals we ought to roll up. Did Osama bin Laden's name come up? Of course it did. But as far as that granularity, that level of detail, that was not the desired or required level of effort on the project. It was a by-product.
Gandy: This is Tom Gandy from the Army. Let me just help out here a little. The way it works is there's a campaign plan and then if someone decides to act upon that plan they will give that plan to someone to execute. At that point you get into various specifics about how you're going to execute it, phases of the operation, what the targets are in each phase, and get really down to the down and dirty side of things.
But in a plan you're saying here's what we're trying to do against this threat element, in this case transnational terrorism, not al-Qaida, so it's a more generalized level. I'm just trying to help out there.
Media: Can I get some clarity on the subsets that people are talking about. There were ten in Able Danger.
Gandy: SOCOM personnel.
Media: SOCOM personnel. How large was Able Danger in all then?
Gandy: I would say in the 15-month period it waxed and wanted. It depended on which collaborative partner SOCOM dealt with at the time. AT some points there was a partnership with the Army; other points there were contracted personnel involved?
Media: What was the maximum number --
Media: Hang on just a second and let me finish this line of questioning.
So you've interviewed 80 people. Were all 80 of them Able Danger or were they people who got briefings by Able Danger? What is that universe that gave you 80 people?
Gandy: It probably spans both of those representations you just gave. Not only folks who were integrally involved in the effort, but also those that were peripherally involved. I don't think that we necessarily went out and amongst those 80 we'd count people who just happened to have been exposed. Those 80 I would say had something to do with Able Danger.
Media: And the five who have some recollection of something, are those Able Danger core members, are they people who received briefings, are they the peripherals?
Gandy: Out of the ten I quoted you, two of them are from that ten. So the other three would be from the other 70, if you will, if that math makes sense to you.
Media: So three are peripheral, quote/unquote, to use your phrase; and two are from Able Danger.
Gandy: No. The hard core U.S. SOCOM part of Able Danger was ten people. There were other collaborative partners who were as involved in Able Danger. I'm only speaking to the SOCOM Personnel involved in Able Danger with those ten. There were other people who were as involved in Able Danger during the time.
Media: Who were the five who have some recollection of something?
Gandy: We have two SOCOM personnel, one of whom is Captain Philpot, one is Mr. Schaeffer who is a DIA employee.
Down: Actually --
[Multiple voices].
Media: Just simple math here. This is a really --
Whitman: In the SOCOM people there's an unnamed analyst who's going to remain unnamed. Then there's Captain Philpot. Those are the two from the ten.
Media: Civilian analyst?
Whitman: Yes.
Media: But there are five with some recollection, so who are the other three?
Whitman: The other three, one was an analyst associated with the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) which is the Army activity, one of the partners spoke of where LIWA was supporting the SOCOM effort for a period of time in the planning effort.
Another was a contractor who supported the Land Information Warfare activity. That's one of the other.
The other was Mr. Schaeffer.
Media: That's very helpful. Thank you.
Media: One further thing on that, how would you characterize, of those three people -- the analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, well Schaeffer I think we know his relationship with Able Danger. But the other two. The analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, associated with LIWAC (sic) and the contractor, how would you characterize their degree of -- Were they part of the core? Were they in the periphery, out of periphery?
Whitman: They were doing analysis and production support of requirements to help build the plan. So they were provided with requirements from the core group of SOCOM planners and they would try to meet those requirements of intelligence analytical products.
Media: Intelligence requirements.
Whitman: Right. It's LIWA, by the way, Activity. Not LIWAC.
Down: And Captain Philpot was more managing the whole effort. As opposed to an analyst.
Media: So five people remember this, but you haven't been able to come up with the chart. So you're not here telling us this chart does exist or doesn't exist.
Down: We don't know. We don't have it. We have not to date identified that chart, discovered it in our recent searches, nor did we pull it up during the life of the 9/11 Commission where the Commission itself did ask us, sent us two document requests for information on Able Danger. It was not pulled up at that time.
Media: What could have happened to it? Could someone have destroyed it to cover up?
Whitman: Let me say something there, just for any other questions that might come up too. We're not going to get into the business of speculating in terms of what might have happened. We're here today to present the facts as they exist and as we know them.
Like Pat was saying, what we know is that we didn't discover such a chart when we first responded to the Commission back in November and December of '03 and we haven't discovered such a chart in the current search. That's the facts. It's just not productive for us to get into speculating beyond what we actually know.
Media: Does that mean that because it was a classified operation a lot of documents including the chart could have been destroyed and that's why you can't find it?
Down: There are regulations. At the time how they were interpreted, very strictly pre-9/11, for destruction of information which is embedded, I guess is the way I would say it, that would contain any information on U.S. persons. In a major data mining effort like this you're reaching out to a lot of open sources and within that there could be a lot of information on U.S. persons. We're not allowed to collect that type of information. So there are strict regulations about collection, dissemination, destruction procedures for this type of information. And we know that that did happen in the case of Able Danger documentation.
Media: So it's possible then that this is how the chart cannot be found. Along with other documents, they could have been destroyed and that's why you can't corroborate what these people are saying or say it's wrong.
Down: Correct.
Media: What is the definition for U.S. person?
Down: I wish we had our lawyer here.
Chope: A U.S. citizen or someone who is in the country legally.
Media: So a tourist is a U.S. person.
Chope: Can be.
Media: Under what circumstances?
Chope: For instance on a work visa. I think it's more than just a tourist, on a work visa or something like that.
Media: But there are work visas that allow you to come, I’m here on one --
Gandy: We have a whole class on that if you'd like to attend it. I'll invite you. We have it annually.
We have lots of regulations on this that spell out precisely what they are. I'd hate to make an off-the-cuff comment here.
Media: Okay.
Gandy: But there are strict definitions.
Media: Maybe you can direct me to --
Gandy: Executive Order 12333. You can go on the web tonight and do it. DoD Directive 5240-1R.
Media: That does not --
Gandy: And Army Regulation 381-10.
Media: Does that mean there could have been legal advice given by the department or somebody within SOCOM to destroy it before it got out of the military's possession?
Chope: We have negative indications that that was ever the case. We've spoken to all the attorneys at all levels of command and organization that were involved with Able Danger, and there was no legal advice given along those lines.
Media: That lines?
Chope: Along the lines to destroy anything.
Down: We have not discovered that legal advice was given to date.
Media: On this chart, can you say approximately what the date of the chart is these five people recall? And do all of them recall not only Attah, but the other hijackers?
Down: Maybe Tom can help with the details of the interviews, but I believe Captain Philpot says he saw the chart in January, February 2000. That's the general reference point.
Media: Are you saying that the recollections of Schaeffer and Philpot are incredible?
Down: They're our starting point. They're DoD people who -- Captain Philpot, or then Commander during when the 9/11 Commission was wrapping up, came to us and said I have this information. We took him to the 9/11 Commission to examine it further. It's really up to the Commission to determine the relevancy of the information.
Fortunately, Captain Philpot or then Commander Philpot did not have documentation either, and so the staff questioned, and you can talk to the 9/11 Public Discourse Project where the two former chairmen of the Commission now work. But in terms of the clarity of the dates, when things were produced. At the time that Commander Philpot spoke with the Commission, the Commission staff at that time believed it wasn't strong enough evidence, especially without documentation, to make a change in their report which was at that time being coordinated with us and had already been drafted.
Media: So now that you have three other individuals corroborating this chart, saying they've seen this chart, are you going back to brief the Discourse Project now? The 9/11 Commission?
Down: No, not at this point, but we will be shortly. Or at least --
Media: Has anything changed. Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.
Down: That's okay.
Media: Has anything changed about the way that U.S. persons who get sucked up in a data mining operation would be handled today as opposed to how they might have -- completely independent of this. Say if my name gets sucked up into a database tomorrow morning would it be handled differently today than it would have before 9/11?
Down: My understanding is that the same procedures are in place. We may exercise some flexibility, but I have to be careful here because the same procedures, the same regulations, they are still accurate. We have to be very careful of what we protect against U.S. persons --
Media: -- different or --
Down: Again I have to be careful. The procedures stand and I really can't speak for the analytical side at the moment, but I would think that in the post-9/11 mindset --
Chope: Let me get into some of the problems we have. We're looking back about 5.5 years. Data mining is a relatively new thing in the intelligence community. They were not using the most sophisticated tools. They were using what tools were available. Sophisticated at the time, but compared to now of course we're Moore's law a couple of times down and we've got a lot better tools. So at this point now in the analytical side, we're a lot better in identifying the type of data we get and where we get it from. Back then you would do what they called a web crawl and you'd get a lot of data and it would go in one pile.
Now when we put the data in a pile we tag it, you've heard about XML tagging and those sorts of things. So we understand where the data came from better, we understand the nature of that, and we have tools to help us identify the data.
So while the procedures haven't changed, the interpretation has probable become a little more flexible with hindsight on 9/11, a little more flexible, but we still have the procedures in place, believe me, and we have the training, but we also have the better ability now to say okay, this data came from this source, it's a U.S. person that has nothing to do with our problem set and we can expunge it a lot more easily than we could in the past. In the old days it was kind of an all or nothing.
Media: All these questions about Able Danger seem to sound like how could you possibly have missed Mohammed Attah did this, but I'm wondering if Mohammed Attah came in under the same circumstances at the same time tomorrow, he would still be of the same class. Wouldn't they get ditched, thrown out? Not that that's what happened with this, but if you were to tag him as a U.S. person wouldn't he automatically be thrown out of the data base tomorrow just as --
Chope: I don't know.
Media: Can you say whether you have gone through all the documents yet? You say you you're now going back and reintegrating, but have you looked through all the documents? Is that why you're here, to say you've completed that?
Down: We have done extensive searches including the documents that we delivered to the 9/11 Commission and the group of documents that were deemed unresponsive to the Commission's particular request. There are boxes and boxes of these.
As you can imagine, an organization as large as DoD with the speed at which we had to respond to the Commission's request, there were numerous documents that came through for all 39 of the Commission's requests that weren't really relevant to specific requests. So we have like a non-responsive pile. We weeded those out. If we had any doubt we left it up to the Commission to decide. It's their job to decide what's really relevant for them. But we went back through the old piles just to be sure we had not missed anything or to see if we could potentially identify this chart. And in terms of the other organizations, there have been very extensive document searches.
Media: Is there an estimate about how many pages you searched?
Down: Oh, boy --
Chope: We did a complete electronic search --
Down: Pages.
Chope: All holdings, physical searches, --
Down: Hundreds of thousands probably.
Media: Are you done with your effort?
Down: Including electronic files, of pages
Media: I'm sorry. Are you done with your review? Is this, are you finished or is this ongoing?
Down: Not in terms of the interview process. But in terms of document searches, unless there is some other source of documents that we find out through the interview process that we haven't looked at, and again, we haven't identified what that would be, right now we are complete on our document.
Media: Can I just return briefly on this chart that had Attah's picture or reference, did the chart, did all the people have a recollection that the other hijackers who have been mentioned were also on the chart or just Attah?
Chope: Most of the discussion's been about Attah --
Whitman: Before we get into that, let's address the question. You said the chart that had Attah on it. We have not found a chart that had Attah on it. I just want to make sure --
Media: You said five people said they recall --
Whitman: I just didn't want that to be out there as that there is a chart that exists that has Attah on it. Okay?
Chope: If there was a chart with Attah, [Laughter].
Whitman: It's important.
Media: These five people recall, do they recall it having Attah and additional hijackers on it?
Chope: I can't be certain. That would really be the, then Commander Philpot would be the one. The remainder talk about Attah and a picture, or Attah's name. The one person who only saw a name and no picture, and the others saw a picture and a name.
Media: So Philpot is the only one who recalls other hijackers?
Chope: I believe, but I'd have to check the notes I have from the discussions we had.
Media: Let me go back to the U.S. persons question for a second. To what extent did any controversy over that issue lead to the shutdown of this program? I talked to several people who said there was a separate program developing. They were looking at Chinese tech transfer. It wasn't Able Danger, but it used some of the same personnel, some of the same facilities at LIWA and came up with a name list of some very prominent U.S. persons and led to somebody saying terminate this thing. Is there any truth to that at all?
Chope: No. It had nothing -- There was a prior effort involved with those topics that you mentioned. That effort ended with a subpoena by Congress in November of '99. That was the end of it. It was a completely different target, different subjects, different data, everything.
Media: You say ended with a subpoena from Congress. From where? From which committee?
Chope: I'm not sure about the committee. That was a completely different effort. There were similar tools, but you've got to remember back here, let me just for the Land Information Warfare Activity, this was very experimental stuff back then. So what that was about was demonstrating can experimental stuff like this be useful in helping us solve some technology transfer riddles. That was kind of the purpose of that effort. That effort ended in the LIWA's eyes in November. LIWA did a lot of other analytical projects. That's what they do. They do intelligence analysis.
Media: -- open source, classified?
Chope: In which?
Media: In both.
Chope: In Able Danger it was mixed, both open source and classified.
Media: The five people that recall seeing either Attah's name or photograph on the charts, do they have any recollection of where that photograph might have come from, number one? How many people's names were on that chart? Was it five, was it 10,000?
Chope: We don't know what was on the chart.
Media: In their recollection, what is their recollection of that chart?
Chope: It's different compared to any person you talk to.
Gandy: Captain Philpot will contend there are upwards of 60 names on that chart. Not all of them will have photographs attributed to them. Some will just be outlined silhouettes of a head.
Media: Given the differences in their recollection, are their claims considered credible?
Chope: Don't know. We're just in the fact-finding mode.
Media: This is kind of a fair question, actually. We won't ask you to do hypotheticals or conjectures, but you all live in a world of analyzing data. Clearly if you're supervisors or Dr. Cambone said to you want do you think now? You’ve now gone from two to five people who recall it. You haven't found the document. What do you think?
Down: These people are, Captain Philpot for instance and the others, especially the ones that are involved in data mining, the contracting firms, are credible people. Again, we just -- We are unable to again provide corroborating evidence. We just, as I've said, can't find the document. But as I said, they are credible people.
Media: What do you make of that? That disparity. How do you conclude?
Chope: We can only hypothesize on how this --
Down: I don't --
Chope: -- might have come about is all you can do, hypothesize.
I agree with Pat. Most of the people involved in this are credible folks. We've checked out everything they've said. We can go to the same group of people you would think were sitting next to each other and say did you see a chart with a picture of Attah on it? No, no, no, yes. That's kind of the situation we're in right now. We drill into that and we still have the no, no, no, yes kind of situation.
Media: If these people are credible, what could account for this difference in your view?
Down: I don't know. We've seen a chart with different Mohammed's on them. Is it possible that Mohammed Ajaz, Mohammed -- what's the other one.
Chope: Arateff.
Down: Arateff, thank you. So we have charts with those names but not Mohammed Attah. Is there confusion there? Again, we don't know. We simply don't know. Was the reference to Mohammed Attah, did it come out early on in a chart? In that case if it came out early on, were there any kind of concerns which we again can't corroborate for our interviews. If it came out early, such as in a proof of concept chart, we may never find it.
So as I said, we haven't found any supporting evidence at this point, especially that documentation, to back those claims up.
[Multiple voices].
Down: We didn't, no.
Media: -- head of Special Ops at the time, wasn't he?
Chope: -- do not.
Media: You do not?
Down: Not yet.
Media: Can I ask a real basic question here? This effort to try to get to the bottom of this, this is responsive to Congress, to a directive from the Secretary, to what? Maybe you got into that in the beginning or maybe everyone in here knows it but me, I just -- You're getting to the bottom of this because Congress wants an answer or because you just want to know, because we're all asking these questions and you want us to shut up? [Laughter].
Down: Maybe all of the above. We --
Chope: -- Cambone has directed that we do fact-finding and find the facts in this case. Each of the components involved, SOCOM as the headquarters and supporting agencies have stepped forward and are doing their part to try and figure out what the facts are.
Media: Can I ask another question about the lawyers? You said I think that you had negative indication that that has happened, i.e. the destruction of documents.
Chope: That was taken a little out of context. No lawyer ever directed any Able Danger personnel to destroy documents. Any destruction of documents was conducted in accordance with established regulations and directives.
Media: What about the question of the meetings with the FBI?
Chope: Aside from the statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot we have found no corroborating statements or evidence or whatever you want to call it to that effect in the course of our interviews.
Media: So you talked to all of the lawyers who might have tried to stop this because it was U.S. person information and couldn't be disseminated to domestic agencies. And no one remembers --
Chope: We have talked to all the lawyers involved in the project and there is no hindrance upon the sharing of information.
Gandy: We know that data was destroyed, the Land Information Warfare Activity. But it was destroyed in compliance with our intelligence oversight directives, 12333, DoD 5240-1R, et cetera. So it was destroyed in complete protocols, normal protocols that we would follow with any kind of U.S. person data. It wasn't destroyed because a lawyer came in and said you've got to get rid of this stuff. It was the clock is ticking, show us how you can pull this U.S. person information out of here or not, you can't do it we have protocols and directives to comply with, we're going to comply, and they did. That's how the data was destroyed at LIWA and I believe later on in SOCOM was in a similar manner destroyed.
Media: So the people involved in the project were asked whether there was a way that they could extract intelligence which could be shared from this massive data that they had from this pile you talked about --
Gandy: I think you're confusing the sharing of data -- Data can be shared with anybody. U.S. person data can be shared in a wide variety of situations. We do that every day in the Department of Defense. For instance on the counter-intelligence side of the house which I am responsible for for the Army, our intelligence agents share information every day with the FBI no U.S. persons, and who has primacy in an investigation, and who doesn't. It's all laid out in the protocols surrounding EO-12333 and 5240, our counter-intelligence regulations. Promulgation of those sharing agreements. So we can share data with U.S. persons.
In this case because of the nature in which the data was collected, now we're 5.5 years ago. It was a gobbling up of a lot of data from a lot of sources and put in one pile. You had this commingling of U.S. person data with lots of other data, and there was no way to really pull it out. So the protocols were applied as they stood and really as they stand saying do you have a reason to do this. Like in the counter-intelligence case we have a reason, that we're doing a counter-espionage investigation or we're doing a force protection investigation. In this case there was no perceived imminent threat, imminent crime going to occur, any danger, those kinds of things that say that you can share it. That was not perceived to be the case in these situations and it was destroyed.
Media: So the identification of individuals who were linked to al-Qaida inside the United States was not perceived as an imminent threat after the USS Cole and after the embassy bombings --
Gandy: We don't know that they identified those people in this data.
Media: You say there was no imminent threat, there was no perceived imminent threat.
Gandy: That might be a reason you would keep the data. Those are the kind of reasons we're allowed to keep data about U.S. persons.
Media: And share it, right?
Gandy: Absolutely. It depends on the situation. If that person, for instance, if that person is located overseas, then you would share it with a different group of people than if the person was located in the United States. Just that there are links established doesn't really mean anything. And by the way, some of these links, in the primacy of this technology you get some very goofy links that require research. In fact when we interviewed these analysts to a person they said what was the nature of the stuff? They said you really need to dig into this to find out what these links meant.
Media: I was told that the, after the data run had been done on unclassified data bases it was then scrubbed against classified data in order to try and do this process. Like burrowing in and finding out what the links might be and which might be meaningful and so on. Have you been able to discover whether this chart that these five people remember was the product of a first stage of that or a second stage?
Gandy: One, we don't know there's a chart. But if there was a chart we believe it came from open source information.
Media: And not being scrubbed against classified --
Gandy: I don't know.
Media: Just to return to the question of the lawyers, Schaeffer said there were two occasions on which military lawyers intervened, the first was he said, that the military couldn't do anything with it and then when he tried to take it to the FBI again -- But you're saying that no -- Can you clarify exactly what you're saying about what the lawyers did? The document destruction stuff was SOP. You haven't found anything about a meeting with the FBI. I mean apart from the SOP on document destruction, what role did the regulations about U.S. persons and the legal interpretation of those made by lawyers of SOCOM play in how this all played out?
Gandy: Intelligence oversight drives how long we can store information on U.S. persons. It's really proscribed pretty clearly.
Media: Any activity that was proposed by people involved in Able Danger that was prohibited by lawyers --
Gandy: No. That's not the lawyers' job in this kind of a, in any situation within here. Their job is to give advice to the commander. The commander makes the ultimate determination. In no way, shape or form did the lawyers dissuade or hinder people from turning information over.
Media: The additional three people that recall seeing references to Mohammed Attah, do any of them recall what that was based on? You said --
Gandy: We asked where did this data come from and the person who saw the name and not the face couldn't tell. What it comes from is a big large conglomeration of data from lots of sources, and you drag a problem set through this data and you get lots of linkages and then you research the linkages is how it works.
We asked every single analyst if there was such a chart where would the data from that have come from? They didn't know. What they're doing is this huge data mining and they just get a pile of data, and in those days -- Now if you say okay, I have this piece of information, you could probably trace it back to its original parentage.
Media: But not in those days.
Gandy: In those days I think you could with some of the tools, but it depends upon analyst input to the tools, the linkages and all. They had some capability to do that because they would describe an anecdote where they'd say we'll read this information, and they'd say well, it's from a web site. They got to the web site it's kind of like a goofball web site. Then okay, get rid of that stuff. It's from something that really is not credible information. So they had some capability but I don't think they had the capability to scrub it in the fashion that the oversight rules could live with.
Media: The documents that were destroyed, is there a, if it's a standard operating procedure, are there rudimentary records that are kept of what documents are destroyed?
Gandy: There are certificates of destruction. What you'll have, traditionally for electronic it's very difficult. They'll say I destroyed so many disc drives, so many zip drives, so many CD roms were in the cruncher, that kind of stuff. You have lots and lost of data. So it's very general in nature.
Media: It doesn't really identify --
Gandy: It would never go down like in an index fashion or an inventory fashion. For those volumes of data it would say, the Y drive on this server at this place was wiped on this day, certified by the technician who conducted it.
Media: If there were a chart, a piece of paper, that would be different?
Gandy: You do physical destruction of it.
Media: Is that what it was?
Gandy: This is for documents that are actually published and numbered kind of documents that you would sign for. Those kind of documents. But if you have like working papers, charts that you're printing off looking that's not good, that's not good, you wouldn't do that. You’d just destroy all those.
Media: Schaeffer and Philpot's current status is?
Gandy: Captain Philpot's in the Navy and Mr. Schaeffer is --
Huntington: On administrative leave without (corrected – should be with) pay.
Media: From the DIA?
Huntington: That's correct.
Media: Is he in uniform still?
Huntington: I don't know the answer to that.
Media: Is he on administrative leave without pay as punishment?
Huntington: No. That's totally separate from any of this activity.
Media: Does he face any possible action for disposing of information?
Whitman: We're not going to get into any personnel issues that bump against the Privacy Act.
Media: Is the reason why he's on leave, does that affect his credibility at all in the investigation?
Huntington: No. These two things are entirely separate sorts of things. The reason for this action is totally unrelated to any of the activities related to Able Danger.
Media: How much of your resources has been devoted to digging this up? Is it something – do you have a lot of people who are looking in to this now? [Laughter].
Down: Yes.
Gandy: A lot of personal time.
Media: Your personal opinion of it, is it a waste of time? Is it constructive? Is it something you find helpful?
Gandy: Dr. Cambone says this is something we ought to look into, I go roger that, sir. It's very important.
Whitman: Like I said, we would present you the facts when we had some conviction on it, and that's where we're at today. I hope it's been useful.
U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
News Transcript
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Presenter: Various DoD Officials Thursday, September 1, 2005
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Special Defense Department Briefing
Participating in this brief were:
Mr. Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Media Operations)
Ms. Pat Downs, Senior Policy Analyst, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence)
Mr. Thomas Gandy, Army G-2 Director of Counterintelligence and HUMINT
Mr. Bill Huntington, Vice Deputy Director for HUMINT, Defense Intelligence Agency
Cmdr. Christopher Chope, Center for Special Operations, U.S. Special Operations Command
Whitman: When I scheduled this particular room I hadn't anticipated that we would have these other activities that are going on down south, but I'm glad there are some of you here to report on this and have an interest in this.
As you know, the department has been aggressively looking into this Able Danger program since there were some allegations that were made some three weeks ago I think now, about three weeks. There's been a very extensive effort by the department to look broad, to look deep, and to document as well as to interviewing individuals that are associated with the project. Today we have reached the point where we're prepared to tell you what that broad and deep and extensive review has revealed to us.
I've got a number of subject matter experts here whose organizations were involved. By the mere fact of the representatives here you can see that this was not something that was just looked at narrowly. What we'll be able to do today is talk a little bit about what Able Danger was and maybe more importantly what it wasn't; what type of products were a result of this activity; discuss a little bit about some of the legal authorities and things that have been reported on, sometimes inaccurately about this; and to really talk to you a bit about our interactions with the 9/11 Commission when they were doing their work.
I got you all here under the guise of a background briefing, but I think what we'll do is, we've discussed this and these individuals have agreed to be on the record. There has been a lot of anonymous reporting on this which I think has been unhelpful. I hope that as you write these reports that you give weight to those people that have been directly involved in this effort and are on the record to discuss what the department has found for you on this.
With that they're going to kind of open up with a little bit of a presentation, talk about it just a little bit. Pat's going to start I think, Pat Down is going to start from the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence Office. Then the commander here from Special Operations Command is going to give you a bit of a thumbnail on the activities. We've got some other subject matter experts if we get into Q&A that involves their areas. I promise not to make it too long because I know you all have day jobs on this other story too.
With that, Pat, why don't you go ahead and start us off.
Down: Let me give you an overview of what we have done to determine the facts concerning the recent public statements on Able Danger and where we are to date and what we've found. And then I'll turn it over to Commander Chope so he can give you background information on Able Danger. Some of you may not be as familiar with exactly what that is, what it isn't, and what the timeline is here. It can be confusing with all the various accounts that are in the press.
We have conducted two types of activities. One is extensive document searches from all the organizations including contracting firms that were associated with the Able Danger program. To date we have not identified the chart that is referenced in public statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot in particular, who say they saw a chart with the photo of Mohammed Attah and other hijackers, particularly Mohammed Attah, pre-9/11. We have not discovered that chart. We have identified a similar chart, but it does not contain the photo of Mohammed Attah or reference to him or reference to the other hijackers.
The second type of activity we've conducted is interviews of people involved, again associated with the Able Danger project. To date we've conducted interviews with 80 people, and that is still ongoing. We're not done yet. We're still refining the questions. As we talk to some people we have to come back to other and ask additional questions.
Most of those people do not recollect the existence of a chart with the picture of Mohammed Attah on it, or again, other hijackers pre-9/11. We have identified three other individuals besides Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot who have a recollection of either a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah or a reference to Mohammed Attah. That's basically where we are.
As I said, we continue, we also have searched the records, the documents that we sent to the 9/11 Commission just to be sure that our copies of those records don't include anything additional we might have missed, including a whole number of documents that were deemed non-responsive to Commission requests. It's possible we might have missed something in that collection. It's a fairly extensive collection. We have reviewed all that documentation and at this point have not identified, again, such a chart which references pre-9/11 hijackers.
Media: But the three people who do remember, those three people are from which agency or what's their function?
Down: We have from SOCOM, two individuals. One of those is Captain Philpot. We have, of course Tony Schaeffer, he's actually a DIA civilian employee. We have, the two other individuals are, one is from the Land Information Warfare Activity, the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity, now actually part of the Information Dominance Center. The last one is with the O'Ryan contractors.
Media: At the time.
Down: At the time, yes. And we can answer, Mr. Gandy can answer more questions on the contractors and some of these -- Five individuals all told. Four of them, five individuals including Captain Philpot and Mr. Schaeffer. Four of them remember a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah pre-9/11; the fifth person remembers a chart with a reference to Mohammed Attah, but not a photo.
As I said, we're continuing to interview or re-interview based on what we've discovered so far to be sure that we're not missing anything.
I think it probably is a good idea at this point to turn it over to Commander Chope, and he'll describe to you what Able Danger is. I think that would be helpful. Again, describe some of the timelines because, as I said, we're confused by some of the reports out. We're trying to find the facts. Some of the various accounts have conflicted somewhat. I think it would be helpful to put this in some context for you.
Chope: I'm Commander Chope from the Special Operations Command and I'll offer a brief chronology and overview of what Able Danger was and try and dispel some of the myths and rumors surrounding the effort.
In early October 1999 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the United States Special Operations Command with developing a campaign plan against transnational terrorism, specifically al-Qaida. That effort would result, or that tasking would result in a 15-month effort undertaken mostly out of Tampa, Florida with some peripheral collaborative partners, that would span a 15-month period. In order to accomplish this tasking SOCOM turned to an internal working group who again worked with elements within the Department of Defense and with the Department of the Army to construct this plan. Captain Scott Philpot, then Commander Scott Philpot was probably the team leader, you would call him, for the Able Danger effort.
Able Danger was never a special access program. Able Danger was never a military unit. Able Danger was never a targeting effort. It was not a military deception operation. It was merely the name attributed to a 15-month planning effort.
In January of 2001 the U.S. Special Operations Command delivered the final product of their plan which was a draft operations plan to the Joint Staff, and for all intents and purposes Able Danger ended at that time.
Media: Can you say how many people were involved in it?
Chope: From the Special Operations Command, probably ten people were involved throughout the effort.
Media: You say it wasn't military? It was --
Chope: It was not a military unit. It was a name given to the effort. It's like calling all of us in here Able Danger. That's not --
Media: Were they all military people?
Chope: No, not uniformed service members, no.
Media: You say it wasn't a targeting effort.
Chope: Correct.
Media: I'm very ignorant about military affairs, but wouldn't any kind of plan against transnational terrorism involve a list of targets?
Chope: It would, and that's a good question. Throughout the Able Danger effort we're going to talk about data mining and nodal analysis. What the data mining and nodal analysis actions were designed to do was characterize the al-Qaida terrorist network. Those were some of the tools they used in order to do that mapping, if you will. When I said it was not a targeting effort, I mean it was not meant to go after individual people. It was meant to determine vulnerabilities, key nodes, linkages among and within al-Qaida.
Media: Nodal analysis? What does that mean?
Chope: I think in layman's terms it means determining linkages and relationships among disparate entities.
Down: Looking for patterns based no previous activity.
Media: It would seem you would want to deal with individual names of people if you were trying to understand vulnerability and linkages. No?
Chope: I'm sure that they got to that level of detail, however when you look at the plan, what the task was rather, the task was develop a plan, so that was the focus of the effort. The effort was never determine which individuals we ought to roll up. Did Osama bin Laden's name come up? Of course it did. But as far as that granularity, that level of detail, that was not the desired or required level of effort on the project. It was a by-product.
Gandy: This is Tom Gandy from the Army. Let me just help out here a little. The way it works is there's a campaign plan and then if someone decides to act upon that plan they will give that plan to someone to execute. At that point you get into various specifics about how you're going to execute it, phases of the operation, what the targets are in each phase, and get really down to the down and dirty side of things.
But in a plan you're saying here's what we're trying to do against this threat element, in this case transnational terrorism, not al-Qaida, so it's a more generalized level. I'm just trying to help out there.
Media: Can I get some clarity on the subsets that people are talking about. There were ten in Able Danger.
Gandy: SOCOM personnel.
Media: SOCOM personnel. How large was Able Danger in all then?
Gandy: I would say in the 15-month period it waxed and wanted. It depended on which collaborative partner SOCOM dealt with at the time. AT some points there was a partnership with the Army; other points there were contracted personnel involved?
Media: What was the maximum number --
Media: Hang on just a second and let me finish this line of questioning.
So you've interviewed 80 people. Were all 80 of them Able Danger or were they people who got briefings by Able Danger? What is that universe that gave you 80 people?
Gandy: It probably spans both of those representations you just gave. Not only folks who were integrally involved in the effort, but also those that were peripherally involved. I don't think that we necessarily went out and amongst those 80 we'd count people who just happened to have been exposed. Those 80 I would say had something to do with Able Danger.
Media: And the five who have some recollection of something, are those Able Danger core members, are they people who received briefings, are they the peripherals?
Gandy: Out of the ten I quoted you, two of them are from that ten. So the other three would be from the other 70, if you will, if that math makes sense to you.
Media: So three are peripheral, quote/unquote, to use your phrase; and two are from Able Danger.
Gandy: No. The hard core U.S. SOCOM part of Able Danger was ten people. There were other collaborative partners who were as involved in Able Danger. I'm only speaking to the SOCOM Personnel involved in Able Danger with those ten. There were other people who were as involved in Able Danger during the time.
Media: Who were the five who have some recollection of something?
Gandy: We have two SOCOM personnel, one of whom is Captain Philpot, one is Mr. Schaeffer who is a DIA employee.
Down: Actually --
[Multiple voices].
Media: Just simple math here. This is a really --
Whitman: In the SOCOM people there's an unnamed analyst who's going to remain unnamed. Then there's Captain Philpot. Those are the two from the ten.
Media: Civilian analyst?
Whitman: Yes.
Media: But there are five with some recollection, so who are the other three?
Whitman: The other three, one was an analyst associated with the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) which is the Army activity, one of the partners spoke of where LIWA was supporting the SOCOM effort for a period of time in the planning effort.
Another was a contractor who supported the Land Information Warfare activity. That's one of the other.
The other was Mr. Schaeffer.
Media: That's very helpful. Thank you.
Media: One further thing on that, how would you characterize, of those three people -- the analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, well Schaeffer I think we know his relationship with Able Danger. But the other two. The analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, associated with LIWAC (sic) and the contractor, how would you characterize their degree of -- Were they part of the core? Were they in the periphery, out of periphery?
Whitman: They were doing analysis and production support of requirements to help build the plan. So they were provided with requirements from the core group of SOCOM planners and they would try to meet those requirements of intelligence analytical products.
Media: Intelligence requirements.
Whitman: Right. It's LIWA, by the way, Activity. Not LIWAC.
Down: And Captain Philpot was more managing the whole effort. As opposed to an analyst.
Media: So five people remember this, but you haven't been able to come up with the chart. So you're not here telling us this chart does exist or doesn't exist.
Down: We don't know. We don't have it. We have not to date identified that chart, discovered it in our recent searches, nor did we pull it up during the life of the 9/11 Commission where the Commission itself did ask us, sent us two document requests for information on Able Danger. It was not pulled up at that time.
Media: What could have happened to it? Could someone have destroyed it to cover up?
Whitman: Let me say something there, just for any other questions that might come up too. We're not going to get into the business of speculating in terms of what might have happened. We're here today to present the facts as they exist and as we know them.
Like Pat was saying, what we know is that we didn't discover such a chart when we first responded to the Commission back in November and December of '03 and we haven't discovered such a chart in the current search. That's the facts. It's just not productive for us to get into speculating beyond what we actually know.
Media: Does that mean that because it was a classified operation a lot of documents including the chart could have been destroyed and that's why you can't find it?
Down: There are regulations. At the time how they were interpreted, very strictly pre-9/11, for destruction of information which is embedded, I guess is the way I would say it, that would contain any information on U.S. persons. In a major data mining effort like this you're reaching out to a lot of open sources and within that there could be a lot of information on U.S. persons. We're not allowed to collect that type of information. So there are strict regulations about collection, dissemination, destruction procedures for this type of information. And we know that that did happen in the case of Able Danger documentation.
Media: So it's possible then that this is how the chart cannot be found. Along with other documents, they could have been destroyed and that's why you can't corroborate what these people are saying or say it's wrong.
Down: Correct.
Media: What is the definition for U.S. person?
Down: I wish we had our lawyer here.
Chope: A U.S. citizen or someone who is in the country legally.
Media: So a tourist is a U.S. person.
Chope: Can be.
Media: Under what circumstances?
Chope: For instance on a work visa. I think it's more than just a tourist, on a work visa or something like that.
Media: But there are work visas that allow you to come, I’m here on one --
Gandy: We have a whole class on that if you'd like to attend it. I'll invite you. We have it annually.
We have lots of regulations on this that spell out precisely what they are. I'd hate to make an off-the-cuff comment here.
Media: Okay.
Gandy: But there are strict definitions.
Media: Maybe you can direct me to --
Gandy: Executive Order 12333. You can go on the web tonight and do it. DoD Directive 5240-1R.
Media: That does not --
Gandy: And Army Regulation 381-10.
Media: Does that mean there could have been legal advice given by the department or somebody within SOCOM to destroy it before it got out of the military's possession?
Chope: We have negative indications that that was ever the case. We've spoken to all the attorneys at all levels of command and organization that were involved with Able Danger, and there was no legal advice given along those lines.
Media: That lines?
Chope: Along the lines to destroy anything.
Down: We have not discovered that legal advice was given to date.
Media: On this chart, can you say approximately what the date of the chart is these five people recall? And do all of them recall not only Attah, but the other hijackers?
Down: Maybe Tom can help with the details of the interviews, but I believe Captain Philpot says he saw the chart in January, February 2000. That's the general reference point.
Media: Are you saying that the recollections of Schaeffer and Philpot are incredible?
Down: They're our starting point. They're DoD people who -- Captain Philpot, or then Commander during when the 9/11 Commission was wrapping up, came to us and said I have this information. We took him to the 9/11 Commission to examine it further. It's really up to the Commission to determine the relevancy of the information.
Fortunately, Captain Philpot or then Commander Philpot did not have documentation either, and so the staff questioned, and you can talk to the 9/11 Public Discourse Project where the two former chairmen of the Commission now work. But in terms of the clarity of the dates, when things were produced. At the time that Commander Philpot spoke with the Commission, the Commission staff at that time believed it wasn't strong enough evidence, especially without documentation, to make a change in their report which was at that time being coordinated with us and had already been drafted.
Media: So now that you have three other individuals corroborating this chart, saying they've seen this chart, are you going back to brief the Discourse Project now? The 9/11 Commission?
Down: No, not at this point, but we will be shortly. Or at least --
Media: Has anything changed. Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.
Down: That's okay.
Media: Has anything changed about the way that U.S. persons who get sucked up in a data mining operation would be handled today as opposed to how they might have -- completely independent of this. Say if my name gets sucked up into a database tomorrow morning would it be handled differently today than it would have before 9/11?
Down: My understanding is that the same procedures are in place. We may exercise some flexibility, but I have to be careful here because the same procedures, the same regulations, they are still accurate. We have to be very careful of what we protect against U.S. persons --
Media: -- different or --
Down: Again I have to be careful. The procedures stand and I really can't speak for the analytical side at the moment, but I would think that in the post-9/11 mindset --
Chope: Let me get into some of the problems we have. We're looking back about 5.5 years. Data mining is a relatively new thing in the intelligence community. They were not using the most sophisticated tools. They were using what tools were available. Sophisticated at the time, but compared to now of course we're Moore's law a couple of times down and we've got a lot better tools. So at this point now in the analytical side, we're a lot better in identifying the type of data we get and where we get it from. Back then you would do what they called a web crawl and you'd get a lot of data and it would go in one pile.
Now when we put the data in a pile we tag it, you've heard about XML tagging and those sorts of things. So we understand where the data came from better, we understand the nature of that, and we have tools to help us identify the data.
So while the procedures haven't changed, the interpretation has probable become a little more flexible with hindsight on 9/11, a little more flexible, but we still have the procedures in place, believe me, and we have the training, but we also have the better ability now to say okay, this data came from this source, it's a U.S. person that has nothing to do with our problem set and we can expunge it a lot more easily than we could in the past. In the old days it was kind of an all or nothing.
Media: All these questions about Able Danger seem to sound like how could you possibly have missed Mohammed Attah did this, but I'm wondering if Mohammed Attah came in under the same circumstances at the same time tomorrow, he would still be of the same class. Wouldn't they get ditched, thrown out? Not that that's what happened with this, but if you were to tag him as a U.S. person wouldn't he automatically be thrown out of the data base tomorrow just as --
Chope: I don't know.
Media: Can you say whether you have gone through all the documents yet? You say you you're now going back and reintegrating, but have you looked through all the documents? Is that why you're here, to say you've completed that?
Down: We have done extensive searches including the documents that we delivered to the 9/11 Commission and the group of documents that were deemed unresponsive to the Commission's particular request. There are boxes and boxes of these.
As you can imagine, an organization as large as DoD with the speed at which we had to respond to the Commission's request, there were numerous documents that came through for all 39 of the Commission's requests that weren't really relevant to specific requests. So we have like a non-responsive pile. We weeded those out. If we had any doubt we left it up to the Commission to decide. It's their job to decide what's really relevant for them. But we went back through the old piles just to be sure we had not missed anything or to see if we could potentially identify this chart. And in terms of the other organizations, there have been very extensive document searches.
Media: Is there an estimate about how many pages you searched?
Down: Oh, boy --
Chope: We did a complete electronic search --
Down: Pages.
Chope: All holdings, physical searches, --
Down: Hundreds of thousands probably.
Media: Are you done with your effort?
Down: Including electronic files, of pages
Media: I'm sorry. Are you done with your review? Is this, are you finished or is this ongoing?
Down: Not in terms of the interview process. But in terms of document searches, unless there is some other source of documents that we find out through the interview process that we haven't looked at, and again, we haven't identified what that would be, right now we are complete on our document.
Media: Can I just return briefly on this chart that had Attah's picture or reference, did the chart, did all the people have a recollection that the other hijackers who have been mentioned were also on the chart or just Attah?
Chope: Most of the discussion's been about Attah --
Whitman: Before we get into that, let's address the question. You said the chart that had Attah on it. We have not found a chart that had Attah on it. I just want to make sure --
Media: You said five people said they recall --
Whitman: I just didn't want that to be out there as that there is a chart that exists that has Attah on it. Okay?
Chope: If there was a chart with Attah, [Laughter].
Whitman: It's important.
Media: These five people recall, do they recall it having Attah and additional hijackers on it?
Chope: I can't be certain. That would really be the, then Commander Philpot would be the one. The remainder talk about Attah and a picture, or Attah's name. The one person who only saw a name and no picture, and the others saw a picture and a name.
Media: So Philpot is the only one who recalls other hijackers?
Chope: I believe, but I'd have to check the notes I have from the discussions we had.
Media: Let me go back to the U.S. persons question for a second. To what extent did any controversy over that issue lead to the shutdown of this program? I talked to several people who said there was a separate program developing. They were looking at Chinese tech transfer. It wasn't Able Danger, but it used some of the same personnel, some of the same facilities at LIWA and came up with a name list of some very prominent U.S. persons and led to somebody saying terminate this thing. Is there any truth to that at all?
Chope: No. It had nothing -- There was a prior effort involved with those topics that you mentioned. That effort ended with a subpoena by Congress in November of '99. That was the end of it. It was a completely different target, different subjects, different data, everything.
Media: You say ended with a subpoena from Congress. From where? From which committee?
Chope: I'm not sure about the committee. That was a completely different effort. There were similar tools, but you've got to remember back here, let me just for the Land Information Warfare Activity, this was very experimental stuff back then. So what that was about was demonstrating can experimental stuff like this be useful in helping us solve some technology transfer riddles. That was kind of the purpose of that effort. That effort ended in the LIWA's eyes in November. LIWA did a lot of other analytical projects. That's what they do. They do intelligence analysis.
Media: -- open source, classified?
Chope: In which?
Media: In both.
Chope: In Able Danger it was mixed, both open source and classified.
Media: The five people that recall seeing either Attah's name or photograph on the charts, do they have any recollection of where that photograph might have come from, number one? How many people's names were on that chart? Was it five, was it 10,000?
Chope: We don't know what was on the chart.
Media: In their recollection, what is their recollection of that chart?
Chope: It's different compared to any person you talk to.
Gandy: Captain Philpot will contend there are upwards of 60 names on that chart. Not all of them will have photographs attributed to them. Some will just be outlined silhouettes of a head.
Media: Given the differences in their recollection, are their claims considered credible?
Chope: Don't know. We're just in the fact-finding mode.
Media: This is kind of a fair question, actually. We won't ask you to do hypotheticals or conjectures, but you all live in a world of analyzing data. Clearly if you're supervisors or Dr. Cambone said to you want do you think now? You’ve now gone from two to five people who recall it. You haven't found the document. What do you think?
Down: These people are, Captain Philpot for instance and the others, especially the ones that are involved in data mining, the contracting firms, are credible people. Again, we just -- We are unable to again provide corroborating evidence. We just, as I've said, can't find the document. But as I said, they are credible people.
Media: What do you make of that? That disparity. How do you conclude?
Chope: We can only hypothesize on how this --
Down: I don't --
Chope: -- might have come about is all you can do, hypothesize.
I agree with Pat. Most of the people involved in this are credible folks. We've checked out everything they've said. We can go to the same group of people you would think were sitting next to each other and say did you see a chart with a picture of Attah on it? No, no, no, yes. That's kind of the situation we're in right now. We drill into that and we still have the no, no, no, yes kind of situation.
Media: If these people are credible, what could account for this difference in your view?
Down: I don't know. We've seen a chart with different Mohammed's on them. Is it possible that Mohammed Ajaz, Mohammed -- what's the other one.
Chope: Arateff.
Down: Arateff, thank you. So we have charts with those names but not Mohammed Attah. Is there confusion there? Again, we don't know. We simply don't know. Was the reference to Mohammed Attah, did it come out early on in a chart? In that case if it came out early on, were there any kind of concerns which we again can't corroborate for our interviews. If it came out early, such as in a proof of concept chart, we may never find it.
So as I said, we haven't found any supporting evidence at this point, especially that documentation, to back those claims up.
[Multiple voices].
Down: We didn't, no.
Media: -- head of Special Ops at the time, wasn't he?
Chope: -- do not.
Media: You do not?
Down: Not yet.
Media: Can I ask a real basic question here? This effort to try to get to the bottom of this, this is responsive to Congress, to a directive from the Secretary, to what? Maybe you got into that in the beginning or maybe everyone in here knows it but me, I just -- You're getting to the bottom of this because Congress wants an answer or because you just want to know, because we're all asking these questions and you want us to shut up? [Laughter].
Down: Maybe all of the above. We --
Chope: -- Cambone has directed that we do fact-finding and find the facts in this case. Each of the components involved, SOCOM as the headquarters and supporting agencies have stepped forward and are doing their part to try and figure out what the facts are.
Media: Can I ask another question about the lawyers? You said I think that you had negative indication that that has happened, i.e. the destruction of documents.
Chope: That was taken a little out of context. No lawyer ever directed any Able Danger personnel to destroy documents. Any destruction of documents was conducted in accordance with established regulations and directives.
Media: What about the question of the meetings with the FBI?
Chope: Aside from the statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot we have found no corroborating statements or evidence or whatever you want to call it to that effect in the course of our interviews.
Media: So you talked to all of the lawyers who might have tried to stop this because it was U.S. person information and couldn't be disseminated to domestic agencies. And no one remembers --
Chope: We have talked to all the lawyers involved in the project and there is no hindrance upon the sharing of information.
Gandy: We know that data was destroyed, the Land Information Warfare Activity. But it was destroyed in compliance with our intelligence oversight directives, 12333, DoD 5240-1R, et cetera. So it was destroyed in complete protocols, normal protocols that we would follow with any kind of U.S. person data. It wasn't destroyed because a lawyer came in and said you've got to get rid of this stuff. It was the clock is ticking, show us how you can pull this U.S. person information out of here or not, you can't do it we have protocols and directives to comply with, we're going to comply, and they did. That's how the data was destroyed at LIWA and I believe later on in SOCOM was in a similar manner destroyed.
Media: So the people involved in the project were asked whether there was a way that they could extract intelligence which could be shared from this massive data that they had from this pile you talked about --
Gandy: I think you're confusing the sharing of data -- Data can be shared with anybody. U.S. person data can be shared in a wide variety of situations. We do that every day in the Department of Defense. For instance on the counter-intelligence side of the house which I am responsible for for the Army, our intelligence agents share information every day with the FBI no U.S. persons, and who has primacy in an investigation, and who doesn't. It's all laid out in the protocols surrounding EO-12333 and 5240, our counter-intelligence regulations. Promulgation of those sharing agreements. So we can share data with U.S. persons.
In this case because of the nature in which the data was collected, now we're 5.5 years ago. It was a gobbling up of a lot of data from a lot of sources and put in one pile. You had this commingling of U.S. person data with lots of other data, and there was no way to really pull it out. So the protocols were applied as they stood and really as they stand saying do you have a reason to do this. Like in the counter-intelligence case we have a reason, that we're doing a counter-espionage investigation or we're doing a force protection investigation. In this case there was no perceived imminent threat, imminent crime going to occur, any danger, those kinds of things that say that you can share it. That was not perceived to be the case in these situations and it was destroyed.
Media: So the identification of individuals who were linked to al-Qaida inside the United States was not perceived as an imminent threat after the USS Cole and after the embassy bombings --
Gandy: We don't know that they identified those people in this data.
Media: You say there was no imminent threat, there was no perceived imminent threat.
Gandy: That might be a reason you would keep the data. Those are the kind of reasons we're allowed to keep data about U.S. persons.
Media: And share it, right?
Gandy: Absolutely. It depends on the situation. If that person, for instance, if that person is located overseas, then you would share it with a different group of people than if the person was located in the United States. Just that there are links established doesn't really mean anything. And by the way, some of these links, in the primacy of this technology you get some very goofy links that require research. In fact when we interviewed these analysts to a person they said what was the nature of the stuff? They said you really need to dig into this to find out what these links meant.
Media: I was told that the, after the data run had been done on unclassified data bases it was then scrubbed against classified data in order to try and do this process. Like burrowing in and finding out what the links might be and which might be meaningful and so on. Have you been able to discover whether this chart that these five people remember was the product of a first stage of that or a second stage?
Gandy: One, we don't know there's a chart. But if there was a chart we believe it came from open source information.
Media: And not being scrubbed against classified --
Gandy: I don't know.
Media: Just to return to the question of the lawyers, Schaeffer said there were two occasions on which military lawyers intervened, the first was he said, that the military couldn't do anything with it and then when he tried to take it to the FBI again -- But you're saying that no -- Can you clarify exactly what you're saying about what the lawyers did? The document destruction stuff was SOP. You haven't found anything about a meeting with the FBI. I mean apart from the SOP on document destruction, what role did the regulations about U.S. persons and the legal interpretation of those made by lawyers of SOCOM play in how this all played out?
Gandy: Intelligence oversight drives how long we can store information on U.S. persons. It's really proscribed pretty clearly.
Media: Any activity that was proposed by people involved in Able Danger that was prohibited by lawyers --
Gandy: No. That's not the lawyers' job in this kind of a, in any situation within here. Their job is to give advice to the commander. The commander makes the ultimate determination. In no way, shape or form did the lawyers dissuade or hinder people from turning information over.
Media: The additional three people that recall seeing references to Mohammed Attah, do any of them recall what that was based on? You said --
Gandy: We asked where did this data come from and the person who saw the name and not the face couldn't tell. What it comes from is a big large conglomeration of data from lots of sources, and you drag a problem set through this data and you get lots of linkages and then you research the linkages is how it works.
We asked every single analyst if there was such a chart where would the data from that have come from? They didn't know. What they're doing is this huge data mining and they just get a pile of data, and in those days -- Now if you say okay, I have this piece of information, you could probably trace it back to its original parentage.
Media: But not in those days.
Gandy: In those days I think you could with some of the tools, but it depends upon analyst input to the tools, the linkages and all. They had some capability to do that because they would describe an anecdote where they'd say we'll read this information, and they'd say well, it's from a web site. They got to the web site it's kind of like a goofball web site. Then okay, get rid of that stuff. It's from something that really is not credible information. So they had some capability but I don't think they had the capability to scrub it in the fashion that the oversight rules could live with.
Media: The documents that were destroyed, is there a, if it's a standard operating procedure, are there rudimentary records that are kept of what documents are destroyed?
Gandy: There are certificates of destruction. What you'll have, traditionally for electronic it's very difficult. They'll say I destroyed so many disc drives, so many zip drives, so many CD roms were in the cruncher, that kind of stuff. You have lots and lost of data. So it's very general in nature.
Media: It doesn't really identify --
Gandy: It would never go down like in an index fashion or an inventory fashion. For those volumes of data it would say, the Y drive on this server at this place was wiped on this day, certified by the technician who conducted it.
Media: If there were a chart, a piece of paper, that would be different?
Gandy: You do physical destruction of it.
Media: Is that what it was?
Gandy: This is for documents that are actually published and numbered kind of documents that you would sign for. Those kind of documents. But if you have like working papers, charts that you're printing off looking that's not good, that's not good, you wouldn't do that. You’d just destroy all those.
Media: Schaeffer and Philpot's current status is?
Gandy: Captain Philpot's in the Navy and Mr. Schaeffer is --
Huntington: On administrative leave without (corrected – should be with) pay.
Media: From the DIA?
Huntington: That's correct.
Media: Is he in uniform still?
Huntington: I don't know the answer to that.
Media: Is he on administrative leave without pay as punishment?
Huntington: No. That's totally separate from any of this activity.
Media: Does he face any possible action for disposing of information?
Whitman: We're not going to get into any personnel issues that bump against the Privacy Act.
Media: Is the reason why he's on leave, does that affect his credibility at all in the investigation?
Huntington: No. These two things are entirely separate sorts of things. The reason for this action is totally unrelated to any of the activities related to Able Danger.
Media: How much of your resources has been devoted to digging this up? Is it something – do you have a lot of people who are looking in to this now? [Laughter].
Down: Yes.
Gandy: A lot of personal time.
Media: Your personal opinion of it, is it a waste of time? Is it constructive? Is it something you find helpful?
Gandy: Dr. Cambone says this is something we ought to look into, I go roger that, sir. It's very important.
Whitman: Like I said, we would present you the facts when we had some conviction on it, and that's where we're at today. I hope it's been useful.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,165408,00.html
Raw Data: Weldon Letter on 'Able Danger'
Thursday, August 11, 2005
On Wednesday, Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA), vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees, sent the following letter to the former 9/11 Commission members, also known as the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, in which he rejects the Commission's claim that they were not briefed on "Able Danger".
Below is a copy of a letter sent by Congressman Curt Weldon to the former 9/11 Commission members:
August 10, 2005
The Honorable Thomas H. Kean, Chairman
The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chairman
9/11 Public Discourse Project
One DuPont Circle, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20036
Dear Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton:
I am contacting you to discuss an important issue that concerns the terrible events of September 11, 2001, and our country's efforts to ensure that such a calamity is never again allowed to occur. Your bipartisan work on The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States shed light on much that was unclear in the minds of the American people regarding what happened that fateful day, however there appears to be more to the story than the public has been told. I bring this before you because of my respect for you both, and for the 9-11 Commission's service to America.
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Almost seven years ago, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 established the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, otherwise known as the Gilmore Commission. The Gilmore Commission reached many of the same conclusions as your panel, and in December of 2000 called for the creation of a "National Office for Combating Terrorism." I mention this because prior to 9/11, Congress was aware of many of the institutional obstacles to preventing a terrorist attack, and was actively attempting to address them. I know this because I authored the language establishing the Gilmore Commission.
In the 1990's, as chairman of the congressional subcommittee that oversaw research & development for the Department of Defense, I paid special attention to the activities of the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) at Ft. Belvoir. During that time, I led a bipartisan delegation of Members of Congress to Vienna, Austria to meet with members of the Russian parliament, or Duma. Before leaving, I received a brief from the CIA on a Serbian individual that would be attending the meeting. The CIA provided me with a single paragraph of information. On the other hand, representatives of LIWA gave me five pages of far more in-depth analysis. This was cause for concern, but my debriefing with the CIA and FBI following the trip was cause for outright alarm: neither had ever heard of LIWA or the data mining capability it possessed.
As a result of experiences such as these, I introduced language into three successive Defense Authorization bills calling for the creation of an intelligence fusion center which I called NOAH, or National Operations and Analysis Hub. The NOAH concept is certainly familiar now, and is one of several recommendations made by your commission that has a basis in earlier acts of Congress. Despite my repeated efforts to establish NOAH, the CIA insisted that it would not be practical. Fortunately, this bureaucratic intransigence was overcome when Congress and President Bush acted in 2003 to create the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (now the National Counterterrorism Center). Unfortunately, it took the deaths of 3,000 people to bring us to the point where we could make this happen. Now, I am confident that under the able leadership of John Negroponte, the days of toleration for intelligence agencies that refuse to share information with each other are behind us.
The 9-11 Commission produced a book-length account of its findings, that the American people might educate themselves on the challenges facing our national effort to resist and defeat terrorism. Though under different circumstances, I eventually decided to do the same. I recently published a book critical of our intelligence agencies because even after 9/11, they were not getting the message. After failing to win the bureaucratic battle inside the Beltway, I decided to take my case to the American people.
In recent years, a reliable source that I refer to as "Ali" began providing me with detailed inside information on Iran's role in supporting terror and undermining the United States' global effort to eradicate it. I have forwarded literally hundreds of pages of information from Ali to the CIA, FBI, and DIA, as well as the appropriate congressional oversight committees. The response from our intelligence agencies has been underwhelming, to put it mildly. Worse, I have documented occasions where the CIA has outright lied to me. While the mid-level bureaucrats at Langley may not be interested in what I have to say, their new boss is. Porter Goss has all of the information I have gathered, and I know he is ready to do what it takes to challenge the circle-the-wagons culture of the CIA. And Pete Hoekstra, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, is energized as well. Director Goss and Chairman Hoekstra are both outstanding leaders that know each other well from their work together in the House of Representatives, and I will continue to strongly support their efforts at reform.
All of this background leads to the reason I am writing to you today. Yesterday the national news media began in-depth coverage of a story that is not new. In fact, I have been talking about it for some time. From 1998 to 2001, Army Intelligence and Special Operations Command spearheaded an effort called Able Danger that was intended to map out al Qaeda. According to individuals that were part of the project, Able Danger identified Mohammed Atta as a terrorist threat before 9/11. Team members believed that the Atta cell in Brooklyn should be subject to closer scrutiny, but somewhere along the food chain of Administration bureaucrats and lawyers, a decision was made in late 2000 against passing the information to the FBI. These details are understandably of great interest to the American people, thus the recent media frenzy. However I have spoken on this topic for some time, in the House Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees, on the floor of the House on June 27, 2005, and at various speaking engagements.
The impetus for this letter is my extreme disappointment in the recent, and false, claim of the 9-11 Commission staff that the Commission was never given access to any information on Able Danger. The 9-11 Commission staff received not one but two briefings on Able Danger from former team members, yet did not pursue the matter. Furthermore, commissioners never returned calls from a defense intelligence official that had made contact with them to discuss this issue as a follow on to a previous meeting.
In retrospect, it appears that my own suggestions to the Commission might have directed investigators in the direction of Able Danger, had they been heeded. I personally reached out to members of the Commission several times with information on the need for a national collaborative capability, of which Able Danger was a prototype. In the context of those discussions, I referenced LIWA and the work it had been doing prior to 9/11. My chief of staff physically handed a package containing this information to one of the commissioners at your Commission's appearance on April 13, 2004 in the Hart Senate Office Building. I have spoken with Governor Kean by phone on this subject, and my office delivered a package with this information to the 9-11 Commission staff via courier. When the Commission briefed Congress with their findings on July 22, 2004, I asked the very first question in exasperation: "Why didn't you let Members of Congress who were involved in these issues testify before, or meet with, the Commission?"
The 9-11 Commission took a very high-profile role in critiquing intelligence agencies that refused to listen to outside information. The commissioners very publicly expressed their disapproval of agencies and departments that would not entertain ideas that did not originate in-house. Therefore it is no small irony that the Commission would in the end prove to be guilty of the very same offense when information of potentially critical importance was brought to its attention. The Commission's refusal to investigate Able Danger after being notified of its existence, and its recent efforts to feign ignorance of the project while blaming others for supposedly withholding information on it, brings shame on the commissioners, and is evocative of the worst tendencies in the federal government that the Commission worked to expose.
Questions remain to be answered. The first: What lawyers in the Department of Defense made the decision in late 2000 not to pass the information from Able Danger to the FBI? And second: Why did the 9-11 Commission staff not find it necessary to pass this information to the Commissioners, and why did the 9-11 Commission staff not request full documentation of Able Danger from the team member that volunteered the information?
Answering these questions is the work of the commissioners now, and fear of tarnishing the Commission's legacy cannot be allowed to override the truth. The American people are counting on you not to "go native" by succumbing to the very temptations your Commission was assembled to indict. In the meantime, I have shared all that I know on this topic with the congressional committee chairmen that have oversight over the Department of Defense, the CIA, the FBI, and the rest of our intelligence gathering and analyzing agencies. You can rest assured that Congress will share your interest in how it is that this critical information is only now seeing the light of day.
Sincerely,
CURT WELDON
Member of Congress
cc:
Richard Ben-Veniste
Fred F. Fielding
Jamie S. Gorelick
Slade Gorton
Bob Kerrey
John F. Lehman
Timothy J. Roemer
James R. Thompson
Dennis Hastert
Peter Hoekstra
Frank Wolf
Pat Roberts
Richard Shelby
Raw Data: Weldon Letter on 'Able Danger'
Thursday, August 11, 2005
On Wednesday, Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA), vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees, sent the following letter to the former 9/11 Commission members, also known as the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, in which he rejects the Commission's claim that they were not briefed on "Able Danger".
Below is a copy of a letter sent by Congressman Curt Weldon to the former 9/11 Commission members:
August 10, 2005
The Honorable Thomas H. Kean, Chairman
The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, Vice Chairman
9/11 Public Discourse Project
One DuPont Circle, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20036
Dear Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton:
I am contacting you to discuss an important issue that concerns the terrible events of September 11, 2001, and our country's efforts to ensure that such a calamity is never again allowed to occur. Your bipartisan work on The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States shed light on much that was unclear in the minds of the American people regarding what happened that fateful day, however there appears to be more to the story than the public has been told. I bring this before you because of my respect for you both, and for the 9-11 Commission's service to America.
ADVERTISEMENTS
Almost seven years ago, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 established the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, otherwise known as the Gilmore Commission. The Gilmore Commission reached many of the same conclusions as your panel, and in December of 2000 called for the creation of a "National Office for Combating Terrorism." I mention this because prior to 9/11, Congress was aware of many of the institutional obstacles to preventing a terrorist attack, and was actively attempting to address them. I know this because I authored the language establishing the Gilmore Commission.
In the 1990's, as chairman of the congressional subcommittee that oversaw research & development for the Department of Defense, I paid special attention to the activities of the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) at Ft. Belvoir. During that time, I led a bipartisan delegation of Members of Congress to Vienna, Austria to meet with members of the Russian parliament, or Duma. Before leaving, I received a brief from the CIA on a Serbian individual that would be attending the meeting. The CIA provided me with a single paragraph of information. On the other hand, representatives of LIWA gave me five pages of far more in-depth analysis. This was cause for concern, but my debriefing with the CIA and FBI following the trip was cause for outright alarm: neither had ever heard of LIWA or the data mining capability it possessed.
As a result of experiences such as these, I introduced language into three successive Defense Authorization bills calling for the creation of an intelligence fusion center which I called NOAH, or National Operations and Analysis Hub. The NOAH concept is certainly familiar now, and is one of several recommendations made by your commission that has a basis in earlier acts of Congress. Despite my repeated efforts to establish NOAH, the CIA insisted that it would not be practical. Fortunately, this bureaucratic intransigence was overcome when Congress and President Bush acted in 2003 to create the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (now the National Counterterrorism Center). Unfortunately, it took the deaths of 3,000 people to bring us to the point where we could make this happen. Now, I am confident that under the able leadership of John Negroponte, the days of toleration for intelligence agencies that refuse to share information with each other are behind us.
The 9-11 Commission produced a book-length account of its findings, that the American people might educate themselves on the challenges facing our national effort to resist and defeat terrorism. Though under different circumstances, I eventually decided to do the same. I recently published a book critical of our intelligence agencies because even after 9/11, they were not getting the message. After failing to win the bureaucratic battle inside the Beltway, I decided to take my case to the American people.
In recent years, a reliable source that I refer to as "Ali" began providing me with detailed inside information on Iran's role in supporting terror and undermining the United States' global effort to eradicate it. I have forwarded literally hundreds of pages of information from Ali to the CIA, FBI, and DIA, as well as the appropriate congressional oversight committees. The response from our intelligence agencies has been underwhelming, to put it mildly. Worse, I have documented occasions where the CIA has outright lied to me. While the mid-level bureaucrats at Langley may not be interested in what I have to say, their new boss is. Porter Goss has all of the information I have gathered, and I know he is ready to do what it takes to challenge the circle-the-wagons culture of the CIA. And Pete Hoekstra, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, is energized as well. Director Goss and Chairman Hoekstra are both outstanding leaders that know each other well from their work together in the House of Representatives, and I will continue to strongly support their efforts at reform.
All of this background leads to the reason I am writing to you today. Yesterday the national news media began in-depth coverage of a story that is not new. In fact, I have been talking about it for some time. From 1998 to 2001, Army Intelligence and Special Operations Command spearheaded an effort called Able Danger that was intended to map out al Qaeda. According to individuals that were part of the project, Able Danger identified Mohammed Atta as a terrorist threat before 9/11. Team members believed that the Atta cell in Brooklyn should be subject to closer scrutiny, but somewhere along the food chain of Administration bureaucrats and lawyers, a decision was made in late 2000 against passing the information to the FBI. These details are understandably of great interest to the American people, thus the recent media frenzy. However I have spoken on this topic for some time, in the House Armed Services and Homeland Security Committees, on the floor of the House on June 27, 2005, and at various speaking engagements.
The impetus for this letter is my extreme disappointment in the recent, and false, claim of the 9-11 Commission staff that the Commission was never given access to any information on Able Danger. The 9-11 Commission staff received not one but two briefings on Able Danger from former team members, yet did not pursue the matter. Furthermore, commissioners never returned calls from a defense intelligence official that had made contact with them to discuss this issue as a follow on to a previous meeting.
In retrospect, it appears that my own suggestions to the Commission might have directed investigators in the direction of Able Danger, had they been heeded. I personally reached out to members of the Commission several times with information on the need for a national collaborative capability, of which Able Danger was a prototype. In the context of those discussions, I referenced LIWA and the work it had been doing prior to 9/11. My chief of staff physically handed a package containing this information to one of the commissioners at your Commission's appearance on April 13, 2004 in the Hart Senate Office Building. I have spoken with Governor Kean by phone on this subject, and my office delivered a package with this information to the 9-11 Commission staff via courier. When the Commission briefed Congress with their findings on July 22, 2004, I asked the very first question in exasperation: "Why didn't you let Members of Congress who were involved in these issues testify before, or meet with, the Commission?"
The 9-11 Commission took a very high-profile role in critiquing intelligence agencies that refused to listen to outside information. The commissioners very publicly expressed their disapproval of agencies and departments that would not entertain ideas that did not originate in-house. Therefore it is no small irony that the Commission would in the end prove to be guilty of the very same offense when information of potentially critical importance was brought to its attention. The Commission's refusal to investigate Able Danger after being notified of its existence, and its recent efforts to feign ignorance of the project while blaming others for supposedly withholding information on it, brings shame on the commissioners, and is evocative of the worst tendencies in the federal government that the Commission worked to expose.
Questions remain to be answered. The first: What lawyers in the Department of Defense made the decision in late 2000 not to pass the information from Able Danger to the FBI? And second: Why did the 9-11 Commission staff not find it necessary to pass this information to the Commissioners, and why did the 9-11 Commission staff not request full documentation of Able Danger from the team member that volunteered the information?
Answering these questions is the work of the commissioners now, and fear of tarnishing the Commission's legacy cannot be allowed to override the truth. The American people are counting on you not to "go native" by succumbing to the very temptations your Commission was assembled to indict. In the meantime, I have shared all that I know on this topic with the congressional committee chairmen that have oversight over the Department of Defense, the CIA, the FBI, and the rest of our intelligence gathering and analyzing agencies. You can rest assured that Congress will share your interest in how it is that this critical information is only now seeing the light of day.
Sincerely,
CURT WELDON
Member of Congress
cc:
Richard Ben-Veniste
Fred F. Fielding
Jamie S. Gorelick
Slade Gorton
Bob Kerrey
John F. Lehman
Timothy J. Roemer
James R. Thompson
Dennis Hastert
Peter Hoekstra
Frank Wolf
Pat Roberts
Richard Shelby
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,165414,00.html
'Able Danger' Could Rewrite History
Friday, August 12, 2005
WASHINGTON — The federal commission that probed the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks was told twice about "Able Danger," a military intelligence unit that had identified Mohamed Atta and other hijackers a year before the attacks, a congressman close to the investigation said Wednesday.
Rep. Curt Weldon (search), R-Pa., a champion of integrated intelligence-sharing among U.S. agencies, wrote to the former chairman and vice-chairman of the Sept. 11 commission late Wednesday, telling them that their staff had received two briefings on the military intelligence unit — once in October 2003 and again in July 2004.
Weldon said he was upset by suggestions earlier Wednesday by 9/11 panel members that it had been not been given critical information on Able Danger's capabilities and findings.
"The impetus for this letter is my extreme disappointment in the recent, and false, claim of the 9/11 commission staff that the commission was never given access to any information on Able Danger," Weldon wrote to former Chairman Gov. Thomas Kean (search) and Vice-Chairman Rep. Lee Hamilton (search). "The 9/11 commission staff received not one but two briefings on Able Danger from former team members, yet did not pursue the matter.
"The commission's refusal to investigate Able Danger after being notified of its existence, and its recent efforts to feign ignorance of the project while blaming others for supposedly withholding information on it, brings shame on the commissioners, and is evocative of the worst tendencies in the federal government that the commission worked to expose," Weldon added.
On Wednesday, a source familiar with the Sept. 11 commission — formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (search) — told FOX News that aides who still had security clearances had gone back to the National Archives outside Washington, D.C., to review notes on Atta and any information the U.S. government had on him and his terror cell before the Sept. 11 attacks.
The source acknowledged that the aides were looking for a memo about a briefing given to four staff members by defense intelligence officials during an overseas trip to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the fall of 2003.
Staffers apparently did not recall being told of the Able Danger information at that meeting and wanted to double-check their records.
Former commission spokesman Al Felzenberg told The New York Times in Thursday editions that Atta was mentioned to panel investigators during at least one meeting with a military officer. That briefing came in July 2004, less than two weeks before the commission's final report was issued to the public.
Felzenberg said the information about Atta was considered suspect because it didn't jibe with many other findings. For example, the intelligence officer said Atta was in the United States in late 1999, but travel records confirmed that he did not enter the country until late 2000.
"He wasn't brushed off," Felzenberg told The Times about the military officer's briefing. "I'm not aware of anybody being brushed off. The information that he provided us did not mesh with other conclusions that we were drawing."
But Weldon said that argument was not good enough.
"The 9/11 commission took a very high-profile role in critiquing intelligence agencies that refused to listen to outside information. The commissioners very publicly expressed their disapproval of agencies and departments that would not entertain ideas that did not originate in-house," Weldon wrote in his letter Wednesday night.
"Therefore it is no small irony," Weldon pointed out, "that the commission would in the end prove to be guilty of the very same offense when information of potentially critical importance was brought to its attention."
On Thursday, Weldon told FOX News that the military official, who was under cover when he was in Afghanistan for the October 2003 briefing, is certain he told the staffers about Atta at that time.
The military intelligence officer who attended that meeting with staffers "kept notes of that meeting and will testify under oath that he not only told" the staffers about Able Danger's mission, but about Atta.
Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana, told FOX News on Wednesday that if Atta's name had been mentioned in the October 2003 briefing, it would have jumped out at staffers.
He said that the commission did not include the claims by Able Danger in the definitive report of the events leading up to Sept. 11 because it had no "information that the United States government had under surveillance or had any knowledge of Mohamed Atta prior to the attacks.
"It could be a very crucial incident in terms of the lead-up to 9/11. It could reveal flaws in the intelligence sharing or the lack of intelligence that we have not yet focused on," Hamilton said of the military's tracking of Atta and its inability to get domestic intelligence agencies to follow up.
Hamilton told FOX News that the commission team would get to the bottom of the confusion over what the United States knew about Atta and whether it played into the commission's investigation.
"I think the 9/11 commission's obligation at this point is to review our records very, very carefully and make very soon — we hope within the next few days — a complete statement about what happened during our investigation," Hamilton said.
Weldon said that he personally knows five members of the commission and is not attacking the integrity of any of them. He said he discussed the matter with two commissioners who told him they were never briefed about Able Danger.
"I have to ask why. I would hope there was not a deliberate attempt by someone on the 9/11 commission staff to keep this information" from the commissioners, Weldon said, adding "I find no fault right now with the commissioners."
A commission spokesman told FOX News that the panel expected to issue a statement before the end of the week.
Among the most critical facts to be determined, if the information about Atta did exist in 2000, would be who then blocked the intelligence from going to the FBI, which could have tracked down the terror cell.
"Team members believed that the Atta cell in Brooklyn should be subject to closer scrutiny, but somewhere along the food chain of administration bureaucrats and lawyers, a decision was made in late 2000 against passing the information to the FBI," Weldon wrote.
"Fear of tarnishing the commission's legacy cannot be allowed to override the truth. The American people are counting on you not to 'go native' by succumbing to the very temptations your commission was assembled to indict," he added.
'Able Danger' Could Rewrite History
Friday, August 12, 2005
WASHINGTON — The federal commission that probed the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks was told twice about "Able Danger," a military intelligence unit that had identified Mohamed Atta and other hijackers a year before the attacks, a congressman close to the investigation said Wednesday.
Rep. Curt Weldon (search), R-Pa., a champion of integrated intelligence-sharing among U.S. agencies, wrote to the former chairman and vice-chairman of the Sept. 11 commission late Wednesday, telling them that their staff had received two briefings on the military intelligence unit — once in October 2003 and again in July 2004.
Weldon said he was upset by suggestions earlier Wednesday by 9/11 panel members that it had been not been given critical information on Able Danger's capabilities and findings.
"The impetus for this letter is my extreme disappointment in the recent, and false, claim of the 9/11 commission staff that the commission was never given access to any information on Able Danger," Weldon wrote to former Chairman Gov. Thomas Kean (search) and Vice-Chairman Rep. Lee Hamilton (search). "The 9/11 commission staff received not one but two briefings on Able Danger from former team members, yet did not pursue the matter.
"The commission's refusal to investigate Able Danger after being notified of its existence, and its recent efforts to feign ignorance of the project while blaming others for supposedly withholding information on it, brings shame on the commissioners, and is evocative of the worst tendencies in the federal government that the commission worked to expose," Weldon added.
On Wednesday, a source familiar with the Sept. 11 commission — formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (search) — told FOX News that aides who still had security clearances had gone back to the National Archives outside Washington, D.C., to review notes on Atta and any information the U.S. government had on him and his terror cell before the Sept. 11 attacks.
The source acknowledged that the aides were looking for a memo about a briefing given to four staff members by defense intelligence officials during an overseas trip to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the fall of 2003.
Staffers apparently did not recall being told of the Able Danger information at that meeting and wanted to double-check their records.
Former commission spokesman Al Felzenberg told The New York Times in Thursday editions that Atta was mentioned to panel investigators during at least one meeting with a military officer. That briefing came in July 2004, less than two weeks before the commission's final report was issued to the public.
Felzenberg said the information about Atta was considered suspect because it didn't jibe with many other findings. For example, the intelligence officer said Atta was in the United States in late 1999, but travel records confirmed that he did not enter the country until late 2000.
"He wasn't brushed off," Felzenberg told The Times about the military officer's briefing. "I'm not aware of anybody being brushed off. The information that he provided us did not mesh with other conclusions that we were drawing."
But Weldon said that argument was not good enough.
"The 9/11 commission took a very high-profile role in critiquing intelligence agencies that refused to listen to outside information. The commissioners very publicly expressed their disapproval of agencies and departments that would not entertain ideas that did not originate in-house," Weldon wrote in his letter Wednesday night.
"Therefore it is no small irony," Weldon pointed out, "that the commission would in the end prove to be guilty of the very same offense when information of potentially critical importance was brought to its attention."
On Thursday, Weldon told FOX News that the military official, who was under cover when he was in Afghanistan for the October 2003 briefing, is certain he told the staffers about Atta at that time.
The military intelligence officer who attended that meeting with staffers "kept notes of that meeting and will testify under oath that he not only told" the staffers about Able Danger's mission, but about Atta.
Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana, told FOX News on Wednesday that if Atta's name had been mentioned in the October 2003 briefing, it would have jumped out at staffers.
He said that the commission did not include the claims by Able Danger in the definitive report of the events leading up to Sept. 11 because it had no "information that the United States government had under surveillance or had any knowledge of Mohamed Atta prior to the attacks.
"It could be a very crucial incident in terms of the lead-up to 9/11. It could reveal flaws in the intelligence sharing or the lack of intelligence that we have not yet focused on," Hamilton said of the military's tracking of Atta and its inability to get domestic intelligence agencies to follow up.
Hamilton told FOX News that the commission team would get to the bottom of the confusion over what the United States knew about Atta and whether it played into the commission's investigation.
"I think the 9/11 commission's obligation at this point is to review our records very, very carefully and make very soon — we hope within the next few days — a complete statement about what happened during our investigation," Hamilton said.
Weldon said that he personally knows five members of the commission and is not attacking the integrity of any of them. He said he discussed the matter with two commissioners who told him they were never briefed about Able Danger.
"I have to ask why. I would hope there was not a deliberate attempt by someone on the 9/11 commission staff to keep this information" from the commissioners, Weldon said, adding "I find no fault right now with the commissioners."
A commission spokesman told FOX News that the panel expected to issue a statement before the end of the week.
Among the most critical facts to be determined, if the information about Atta did exist in 2000, would be who then blocked the intelligence from going to the FBI, which could have tracked down the terror cell.
"Team members believed that the Atta cell in Brooklyn should be subject to closer scrutiny, but somewhere along the food chain of administration bureaucrats and lawyers, a decision was made in late 2000 against passing the information to the FBI," Weldon wrote.
"Fear of tarnishing the commission's legacy cannot be allowed to override the truth. The American people are counting on you not to 'go native' by succumbing to the very temptations your commission was assembled to indict," he added.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,166504,00.html
Navy Captain Backs Able Danger Claims
Tuesday, August 23, 2005
WASHINGTON — A second military officer has publicly backed claims by a military intelligence officer that a Pentagon unit named "Able Danger" (search) identified lead Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta (search) in early 2000 as a security risk.
Navy Capt. Scott Phillpott (search) told FOX News in a statement Monday evening that the lead hijacker in the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks was identified as someone with ties to known terrorists. Phillpott, a 22-year active duty serviceman, would not provide more detail, except to say that he is going through the proper channels at the Department of Defense.
"I will not discuss this outside of my chain of command. I have briefed the Department of the Army, the Special Operations Command and the office of (Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence) Dr. Cambone as well as the 9/11 Commission. My story has remained consistent. Atta was identified by Able Danger in January/February 2000," he wrote.
Phillpott is a decorated officer who briefed the Sept. 11 commission in July 2004 before its final report was issued. His statement appears to back up claims first brought forward by Rep. Curt Weldon (search), R-Pa., who has led the charge on this story.
Weldon's claims also seem to be backed up by a defense contractor who says he worked on Able Danger and for the first time has offered an explanation of how Atta's name surfaced in the investigation. J.D. Smith told FOX News that he coordinated the information sources, reported to the government on the project's spending and generated some of the charts, including the "Al Qaeda Global Map" that had Atta's name on it. He added that he saw Atta's photo during the unit's investigation.
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Smith said one way the unit came to know Atta was through Omar Abdul Rahman (search), part of the first World Trade Center (search) bomb plot in 1993. Smith said Able Danger used data mining techniques — publicly available information — to look at mosques and religious ties and it was, in part, through the investigation of Rahman that Atta's name surfaced.
The Sept. 11 commission determined in its report that intelligence agencies did not learn of Atta until after the attacks happened. The claims by Phillpot and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer (search) contradict that. They say that Pentagon lawyers prevented the sharing of the information with the FBI because Atta was in the country legally.
In a statement to FOX News, Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita said he is not certain the Pentagon can substantiate the claims made by the officers.
"There appear to be more memories than there is information to substantiate those memories. We're reviewing the matter carefully, but thus far have not found what it is these handful of individuals seem to remember," he said.
DiRita also suggested on Monday that Phillpott and others should have documentation to back up their claims. But two sources who worked on Able Danger told FOX News that it was a classified project and it would be illegal for them to retain documents for personal use.
Navy Captain Backs Able Danger Claims
Tuesday, August 23, 2005
WASHINGTON — A second military officer has publicly backed claims by a military intelligence officer that a Pentagon unit named "Able Danger" (search) identified lead Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta (search) in early 2000 as a security risk.
Navy Capt. Scott Phillpott (search) told FOX News in a statement Monday evening that the lead hijacker in the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks was identified as someone with ties to known terrorists. Phillpott, a 22-year active duty serviceman, would not provide more detail, except to say that he is going through the proper channels at the Department of Defense.
"I will not discuss this outside of my chain of command. I have briefed the Department of the Army, the Special Operations Command and the office of (Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence) Dr. Cambone as well as the 9/11 Commission. My story has remained consistent. Atta was identified by Able Danger in January/February 2000," he wrote.
Phillpott is a decorated officer who briefed the Sept. 11 commission in July 2004 before its final report was issued. His statement appears to back up claims first brought forward by Rep. Curt Weldon (search), R-Pa., who has led the charge on this story.
Weldon's claims also seem to be backed up by a defense contractor who says he worked on Able Danger and for the first time has offered an explanation of how Atta's name surfaced in the investigation. J.D. Smith told FOX News that he coordinated the information sources, reported to the government on the project's spending and generated some of the charts, including the "Al Qaeda Global Map" that had Atta's name on it. He added that he saw Atta's photo during the unit's investigation.
ADVERTISEMENTS
Smith said one way the unit came to know Atta was through Omar Abdul Rahman (search), part of the first World Trade Center (search) bomb plot in 1993. Smith said Able Danger used data mining techniques — publicly available information — to look at mosques and religious ties and it was, in part, through the investigation of Rahman that Atta's name surfaced.
The Sept. 11 commission determined in its report that intelligence agencies did not learn of Atta until after the attacks happened. The claims by Phillpot and Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer (search) contradict that. They say that Pentagon lawyers prevented the sharing of the information with the FBI because Atta was in the country legally.
In a statement to FOX News, Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita said he is not certain the Pentagon can substantiate the claims made by the officers.
"There appear to be more memories than there is information to substantiate those memories. We're reviewing the matter carefully, but thus far have not found what it is these handful of individuals seem to remember," he said.
DiRita also suggested on Monday that Phillpott and others should have documentation to back up their claims. But two sources who worked on Able Danger told FOX News that it was a classified project and it would be illegal for them to retain documents for personal use.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,166800,00.html
Senate May Hold Hearings on Able Danger, Info-Sharing
Thursday, August 25, 2005
STORIES
•Former 9/11 Commission Slade Gorton on 'Able Danger' Debate
•Navy Captain Backs Able Danger Claims
•Pentagon Probes Able Danger Claims
•Senate Considers Hearing on Able Danger Findings
•Agent Defends Military Unit's Data on 9/11 Hijackers
•9/11 Commissioners Defend Intel Lapse
•'Able Danger' Could Rewrite History
•Raw Data: Weldon Letter on 'Able Danger'
WASHINGTON — Aides to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (search), R-Pa., are actively discussing scheduling a hearing on "Able Danger" and the larger issue of information-sharing between the Pentagon and the FBI, FOX News has confirmed.
Able Danger (search) is the code name for a military-intelligence unit that apparently learned a year before the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks that lead hijacker Mohamed Atta (search) and other terrorists were already in the United States.
One of the central Able Danger claims — that military lawyers blocked the sharing of the Atta information from the FBI in the late summer and early fall of 2000 — will be a focus of the committee if a hearing takes place, FOX News has confirmed.
Though no date has been set for any hearings, Specter sent a letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller on Wednesday asking the agency to provide to the committee "all information and documents it has in connection with Able Danger, Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer, Captain Scott Philpott or any other persons having any connections with Project Able Danger, including, but not limited to, e-mail communication, notes, phone message slips, memos or any other supporting documentation."
Specter also asked Mueller to make available FBI agent Xanthig Mangum to meet with his staff. Mangum is reported to have corresponded in 2000 with Shaffer, who helped run Able Danger's mission and has offered to testify on its findings, about scheduling a meeting between Able Danger and FBI staffs. No meeting ever took place.
Senate May Hold Hearings on Able Danger, Info-Sharing
Thursday, August 25, 2005
STORIES
•Former 9/11 Commission Slade Gorton on 'Able Danger' Debate
•Navy Captain Backs Able Danger Claims
•Pentagon Probes Able Danger Claims
•Senate Considers Hearing on Able Danger Findings
•Agent Defends Military Unit's Data on 9/11 Hijackers
•9/11 Commissioners Defend Intel Lapse
•'Able Danger' Could Rewrite History
•Raw Data: Weldon Letter on 'Able Danger'
WASHINGTON — Aides to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (search), R-Pa., are actively discussing scheduling a hearing on "Able Danger" and the larger issue of information-sharing between the Pentagon and the FBI, FOX News has confirmed.
Able Danger (search) is the code name for a military-intelligence unit that apparently learned a year before the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks that lead hijacker Mohamed Atta (search) and other terrorists were already in the United States.
One of the central Able Danger claims — that military lawyers blocked the sharing of the Atta information from the FBI in the late summer and early fall of 2000 — will be a focus of the committee if a hearing takes place, FOX News has confirmed.
Though no date has been set for any hearings, Specter sent a letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller on Wednesday asking the agency to provide to the committee "all information and documents it has in connection with Able Danger, Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer, Captain Scott Philpott or any other persons having any connections with Project Able Danger, including, but not limited to, e-mail communication, notes, phone message slips, memos or any other supporting documentation."
Specter also asked Mueller to make available FBI agent Xanthig Mangum to meet with his staff. Mangum is reported to have corresponded in 2000 with Shaffer, who helped run Able Danger's mission and has offered to testify on its findings, about scheduling a meeting between Able Danger and FBI staffs. No meeting ever took place.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,167130,00.html
Third Source Backs 'Able Danger' Claims About Atta
Sunday, August 28, 2005
STORIES
•Former 9/11 Commission Slade Gorton on 'Able Danger' Debate
•Navy Captain Backs Able Danger Claims
•Pentagon Probes Able Danger Claims
•Senate Considers Hearing on Able Danger Findings
•Agent Defends Military Unit's Data on 9/11 Hijackers
•9/11 Commissioners Defend Intel Lapse
•'Able Danger' Could Rewrite History
•Raw Data: Weldon Letter on 'Able Danger'
WASHINGTON — A third person has now come forward to verify claims made by a military intelligence unit that a year before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, it had information showing that lead hijacker Mohamed Atta (search) and other terrorists were identified as being in the United States.
J.D. Smith, a defense contractor who claims he worked on the technical side of the unit, code-named "Able Danger" (search), told reporters Friday that he helped gather open-source information (search), reported on government spending and helped generate charts associated with the unit's work. Able Danger was set up in the 1990s to track Al Qaeda activity worldwide.
"I am absolutely positive that he [Atta] was on our chart among other pictures and ties that we were doing mainly based upon [terror] cells in New York City," Smith said.
Smith said data was gathered from a variety of sources, including about 30 or 40 individuals. He said they all had strong Middle Eastern connections and were paid for their information. Smith said Able Danger's photo of Atta was obtained from overseas.
Rep. Curt Weldon (search), R-Pa., arranged the media roundtable with Smith. Weldon drew attention to Able Danger by speaking about it on the House floor months ago and has publicly called for the Sept. 11 commission to explain why the intelligence information wasn't detailed in its final report.
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Besides Smith, Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer (search) and Navy Captain Scott Philpott (search) have also gone on the record, saying they were discouraged from looking further into Atta, and their attempts to share their information with the FBI were thwarted because Atta was a legal foreign visitor at the time.
"This story needs to be told. The American people need to be told what could have been done to prevent 3,000 people from losing their lives," Weldon told FOX News this week.
Shaffer and Philpott claim that in October 2003, they told Sept. 11 commission staffers of the presence of Al Qaeda operatives in the United States in 2000 yet little was included in the panel's final report about those conversations.
During Friday's roundtable with Smith, he was asked by reporters about Atta, who was using another name during 1999-2000. Smith said the charts Able Danger was using had identified him through a number of name variations, one being "Atta."
Two sources familiar with Able Danger told FOX News that part of its investigative work focused on mosques and the religious ties between known terrorist operatives such as Omar Abdul Rahman (search), who was part of the first World Trade Center bombing plot in 1993.
An independent terrorism analyst pointed out to FOX News that German intelligence had no record of Atta before the Sept. 11 attack; that's significant because Atta headed up the Sept. 11 Al Qaeda cell in Hamburg. The analyst also questioned how Atta could be connected to Rahman, who was in prison by the mid-1990s.
Smith claims that one way the unit came to know Atta was through Rahman. Smith said Able Danger used data mining techniques — publicly available information — to look at mosques and religious ties and it was, in part, through the investigation of Rahman that Atta's name surfaced.
Aides to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (search), R-Pa., are actively discussing scheduling a hearing on Able Danger and the larger issue of information-sharing between the Pentagon and the FBI.
One of the central Able Danger claims — that military lawyers blocked the sharing of the Atta information from the FBI in the late summer and early fall of 2000 — will be a focus of the committee if a hearing takes place, FOX News has confirmed.
Specter sent a letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller on Wednesday asking the agency to provide to the committee "all information and documents it has in connection with Able Danger, , Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer, Captain Scott Philpott or any other persons having any connections with Project Able Danger, including, but not limited to, e-mail communication, notes, phone message slips, memos or any other supporting documentation."
Specter also asked Mueller to make available FBI agent Xanthig Mangum to meet with his staff. Mangum is reported to have corresponded in 2000 with Shaffer, who helped run Able Danger's mission and has offered to testify on its findings, about scheduling a meeting between Able Danger and FBI staffs. No meeting ever took place.
The Pentagon has been looking into what it knew and when it knew it, but defense officials have not been able to verify the Able Danger claims so far. A Pentagon spokesman confirmed Thursday that the department has interviewed both Shaffer and Philpott.
"There's something very sinister going on here that really troubles me," Weldon told FOX News on Thursday, blasting the Sept. 11 commission (search) for not taking the claims more seriously. He said some panel members were trying to smear Shaffer and Able Danger.
"What's the Sept. 11 commission got to hide?" Weldon asked. "The commission is trying to spin this because they're embarrassed about what's coming out. In two weeks with two staffers, I've uncovered more in this regard than they did with 80 staffers and $15 million of taxpayer money."
Sept. 11 commission Chairman Thomas Kean recently told FOX News that the panel is waiting for a response from the Pentagon. Until then, the commission has stood by its work, maintaining that no documents they received from the military backed up the Atta claims.
Weldon added that at least five people on the federal payroll will testify under oath about the validity of the Able Danger intelligence.
"When this is over, the Sept. 11 commission is going to have egg all over their face," he said.
FOX News' Catherine Herridge, Molly Hooper and Liza Porteus contributed to this report.
Third Source Backs 'Able Danger' Claims About Atta
Sunday, August 28, 2005
STORIES
•Former 9/11 Commission Slade Gorton on 'Able Danger' Debate
•Navy Captain Backs Able Danger Claims
•Pentagon Probes Able Danger Claims
•Senate Considers Hearing on Able Danger Findings
•Agent Defends Military Unit's Data on 9/11 Hijackers
•9/11 Commissioners Defend Intel Lapse
•'Able Danger' Could Rewrite History
•Raw Data: Weldon Letter on 'Able Danger'
WASHINGTON — A third person has now come forward to verify claims made by a military intelligence unit that a year before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, it had information showing that lead hijacker Mohamed Atta (search) and other terrorists were identified as being in the United States.
J.D. Smith, a defense contractor who claims he worked on the technical side of the unit, code-named "Able Danger" (search), told reporters Friday that he helped gather open-source information (search), reported on government spending and helped generate charts associated with the unit's work. Able Danger was set up in the 1990s to track Al Qaeda activity worldwide.
"I am absolutely positive that he [Atta] was on our chart among other pictures and ties that we were doing mainly based upon [terror] cells in New York City," Smith said.
Smith said data was gathered from a variety of sources, including about 30 or 40 individuals. He said they all had strong Middle Eastern connections and were paid for their information. Smith said Able Danger's photo of Atta was obtained from overseas.
Rep. Curt Weldon (search), R-Pa., arranged the media roundtable with Smith. Weldon drew attention to Able Danger by speaking about it on the House floor months ago and has publicly called for the Sept. 11 commission to explain why the intelligence information wasn't detailed in its final report.
ADVERTISEMENTS
Besides Smith, Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer (search) and Navy Captain Scott Philpott (search) have also gone on the record, saying they were discouraged from looking further into Atta, and their attempts to share their information with the FBI were thwarted because Atta was a legal foreign visitor at the time.
"This story needs to be told. The American people need to be told what could have been done to prevent 3,000 people from losing their lives," Weldon told FOX News this week.
Shaffer and Philpott claim that in October 2003, they told Sept. 11 commission staffers of the presence of Al Qaeda operatives in the United States in 2000 yet little was included in the panel's final report about those conversations.
During Friday's roundtable with Smith, he was asked by reporters about Atta, who was using another name during 1999-2000. Smith said the charts Able Danger was using had identified him through a number of name variations, one being "Atta."
Two sources familiar with Able Danger told FOX News that part of its investigative work focused on mosques and the religious ties between known terrorist operatives such as Omar Abdul Rahman (search), who was part of the first World Trade Center bombing plot in 1993.
An independent terrorism analyst pointed out to FOX News that German intelligence had no record of Atta before the Sept. 11 attack; that's significant because Atta headed up the Sept. 11 Al Qaeda cell in Hamburg. The analyst also questioned how Atta could be connected to Rahman, who was in prison by the mid-1990s.
Smith claims that one way the unit came to know Atta was through Rahman. Smith said Able Danger used data mining techniques — publicly available information — to look at mosques and religious ties and it was, in part, through the investigation of Rahman that Atta's name surfaced.
Aides to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (search), R-Pa., are actively discussing scheduling a hearing on Able Danger and the larger issue of information-sharing between the Pentagon and the FBI.
One of the central Able Danger claims — that military lawyers blocked the sharing of the Atta information from the FBI in the late summer and early fall of 2000 — will be a focus of the committee if a hearing takes place, FOX News has confirmed.
Specter sent a letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller on Wednesday asking the agency to provide to the committee "all information and documents it has in connection with Able Danger, , Lt. Colonel Anthony Shaffer, Captain Scott Philpott or any other persons having any connections with Project Able Danger, including, but not limited to, e-mail communication, notes, phone message slips, memos or any other supporting documentation."
Specter also asked Mueller to make available FBI agent Xanthig Mangum to meet with his staff. Mangum is reported to have corresponded in 2000 with Shaffer, who helped run Able Danger's mission and has offered to testify on its findings, about scheduling a meeting between Able Danger and FBI staffs. No meeting ever took place.
The Pentagon has been looking into what it knew and when it knew it, but defense officials have not been able to verify the Able Danger claims so far. A Pentagon spokesman confirmed Thursday that the department has interviewed both Shaffer and Philpott.
"There's something very sinister going on here that really troubles me," Weldon told FOX News on Thursday, blasting the Sept. 11 commission (search) for not taking the claims more seriously. He said some panel members were trying to smear Shaffer and Able Danger.
"What's the Sept. 11 commission got to hide?" Weldon asked. "The commission is trying to spin this because they're embarrassed about what's coming out. In two weeks with two staffers, I've uncovered more in this regard than they did with 80 staffers and $15 million of taxpayer money."
Sept. 11 commission Chairman Thomas Kean recently told FOX News that the panel is waiting for a response from the Pentagon. Until then, the commission has stood by its work, maintaining that no documents they received from the military backed up the Atta claims.
Weldon added that at least five people on the federal payroll will testify under oath about the validity of the Able Danger intelligence.
"When this is over, the Sept. 11 commission is going to have egg all over their face," he said.
FOX News' Catherine Herridge, Molly Hooper and Liza Porteus contributed to this report.
http://www.timesherald.com/site/news.cfm?n..._id=33380&rfi=6
Able Danger warned of attack on USS Cole
By: KEITH PHUCAS, Times Herald Staff10/25/2005
NORRISTOWN - Senior Pentagon officials were warned not to let the USS Cole dock in Yemen two days before terrorists attacked the ship five years ago killing 17 sailors, according to Congressman Curt Weldon, who said the crucial intelligence was gleaned from the former secret defense operation, "Able Danger."
Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, revealed the information in a House speech last Wednesday evening that blasted the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) attempts to discredit Army Reserve Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a DIA employee who worked as a liaison with the "Able Danger" team.
In June, Shaffer told The Times Herald during an interview on Capitol Hill that the now-defunct data mining operation had linked Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta to an al-Qaida cell in Brooklyn in 2000 - more than a year before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
The military's Special Operations Command ran the high-tech dragnet that searched for terrorist linkages. The terrorist associations were mapped out on large charts, according to Shaffer and other of "Able Danger" colleagues, during the program that operated between 1999 and 2001.
However, following Shaffer's attempts to broker an arrangement that would draw the FBI into the operation, the program was shut down.
Weldon and Shaffer believe "Able Danger" intelligence may have disrupted - or even prevented - the Sept. 11 attacks if it had continued.
In August, Navy Capt. Scott Phillpott and James D. Smith, a defense contractor, corroborated Shaffer's story.
On Wednesday, Weldon again criticized the Pentagon for dragging its feet in its probe of the defense program's history, and continued his criticism of the CIA, which he said tried to protect its own intelligence turf from other government intelligence agencies. "What we have here, I am convinced of this now, is an aggressive attempt by CIA management to cover up their own shortcomings in not being able to do what the Able Danger team did," he said.
Besides claiming to identifying Atta from a grainy photograph prior to Sept. 11, the intelligence team also tried to warn the Pentagon not to allow the USS Cole to make a refueling stop in Yemen five years ago, Weldon said.
On Oct. 12, 2000, a small boat loaded with explosives rammed into the side of the USS Cole as the ship refueled in port at Aden, killing the 17 Navy personnel.
"(Able Danger members) also identified the threat to the USS Cole two weeks before the attack, and two days before the attack were screaming not to let the (ship) come into the harbor at Yemen, because they knew something was going to happen," he said.
The "Able Danger" group operated at the Army's former Land Information Warfare Center (LIWA), in Ft. Belvoir, Va. After LIWA's intelligence gathering capability impressed Weldon, he tried to pitch the idea of a collaborative intelligence center to the CIA in 1999, but was rebuffed. Also in his speech, Weldon accused the DIA of trying to smear Shaffer rather than come clean on why "Able Danger" was shut down.
Shaffer, who was awarded a Bronze Star for his service in Afghanistan, had his top-secret security clearance suspended in 2004 allegedly because of disputes over travel expenses and phone bills. But his supporters suggest Shaffer is being made a scapegoat for going public with the "Able Danger" revelations in August.
Two days before he was set to testify about the program before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 21, the Reserve officer's secret clearance was revoked, and the Defense Department barred him, Phillpott and Smith from testifying at the hearing.
Also in August, Pentagon officials told reporters at a press conference that "Able Danger" data had been deleted from computers. A former Army intelligence officer, Erik Kleinsmith, confirmed this at the Judiciary Committee hearing, testifying he was ordered to destroy information.
During the life of the program, the operation's team members created charts linking terrorists. However, during the recent investigation, none have been found.
The Pentagon, which claimed it is restricted from retaining intelligence on United States citizens and foreign residents living in the U.S., so-called "U.S. persons," for more than 90 days.
However, Weldon has previously said most of the program's data was open source information and not classified. According to guidelines in Army Regulation 381-10, intelligence data can be kept indefinitely if it was culled from open sources.
An unnamed "Able Danger official," Weldon said, was told by a Pentagon lawyer that it's okay to extend the time intelligence information is stored.
A Pentagon spokesman, Lt. Col. Chris Conway, said recently that Defense Department officials worried that any public testimony given about "Able Danger" risked revealing classified information. "Prior to any testimony, we expressed our security concerns with Congress," Conway said. "We said in discussing Able Danger, (it) could inadvertently reveal classified information."
Defense officials said they would allow military personnel to testify about the program behind closed doors. Previously, Shaffer said that Atta, an Egyptian, had been linked to the El Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, N.Y., a hotbed of anti-American sentiment once frequented by Sheik Omar Ahmed Abdul Rahman, know as the "Blind Sheik." Rahman is also Egyptian. Atta was not believed to be in the U.S., however, when he came to the attention of the team.
In 1995, Rahman was convicted of plotting to bomb various sites in New York City. Four of Rahman's associates were convicted in 2002 of conspiring with him to commit terrorist acts while he was in prison.
T
hough Shaffer was not allowed to give testimony at the Sept. 21 committee hearing, his attorney, Mark Zaid, did testify. As a sobering reminder of "Able Danger's" unfulfilled promise, Zaid said the missing charts showing terrorist links likely still contained "several dozen" individuals yet to be captured.
"There are terrorist on the chart who may still be out there and planning attacks," Zaid said. Keith Phucas can be reached at kphucas@timesherald.com or 610-272-2500, ext. 211.
Able Danger warned of attack on USS Cole
By: KEITH PHUCAS, Times Herald Staff10/25/2005
NORRISTOWN - Senior Pentagon officials were warned not to let the USS Cole dock in Yemen two days before terrorists attacked the ship five years ago killing 17 sailors, according to Congressman Curt Weldon, who said the crucial intelligence was gleaned from the former secret defense operation, "Able Danger."
Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, revealed the information in a House speech last Wednesday evening that blasted the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) attempts to discredit Army Reserve Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a DIA employee who worked as a liaison with the "Able Danger" team.
In June, Shaffer told The Times Herald during an interview on Capitol Hill that the now-defunct data mining operation had linked Sept. 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta to an al-Qaida cell in Brooklyn in 2000 - more than a year before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
The military's Special Operations Command ran the high-tech dragnet that searched for terrorist linkages. The terrorist associations were mapped out on large charts, according to Shaffer and other of "Able Danger" colleagues, during the program that operated between 1999 and 2001.
However, following Shaffer's attempts to broker an arrangement that would draw the FBI into the operation, the program was shut down.
Weldon and Shaffer believe "Able Danger" intelligence may have disrupted - or even prevented - the Sept. 11 attacks if it had continued.
In August, Navy Capt. Scott Phillpott and James D. Smith, a defense contractor, corroborated Shaffer's story.
On Wednesday, Weldon again criticized the Pentagon for dragging its feet in its probe of the defense program's history, and continued his criticism of the CIA, which he said tried to protect its own intelligence turf from other government intelligence agencies. "What we have here, I am convinced of this now, is an aggressive attempt by CIA management to cover up their own shortcomings in not being able to do what the Able Danger team did," he said.
Besides claiming to identifying Atta from a grainy photograph prior to Sept. 11, the intelligence team also tried to warn the Pentagon not to allow the USS Cole to make a refueling stop in Yemen five years ago, Weldon said.
On Oct. 12, 2000, a small boat loaded with explosives rammed into the side of the USS Cole as the ship refueled in port at Aden, killing the 17 Navy personnel.
"(Able Danger members) also identified the threat to the USS Cole two weeks before the attack, and two days before the attack were screaming not to let the (ship) come into the harbor at Yemen, because they knew something was going to happen," he said.
The "Able Danger" group operated at the Army's former Land Information Warfare Center (LIWA), in Ft. Belvoir, Va. After LIWA's intelligence gathering capability impressed Weldon, he tried to pitch the idea of a collaborative intelligence center to the CIA in 1999, but was rebuffed. Also in his speech, Weldon accused the DIA of trying to smear Shaffer rather than come clean on why "Able Danger" was shut down.
Shaffer, who was awarded a Bronze Star for his service in Afghanistan, had his top-secret security clearance suspended in 2004 allegedly because of disputes over travel expenses and phone bills. But his supporters suggest Shaffer is being made a scapegoat for going public with the "Able Danger" revelations in August.
Two days before he was set to testify about the program before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 21, the Reserve officer's secret clearance was revoked, and the Defense Department barred him, Phillpott and Smith from testifying at the hearing.
Also in August, Pentagon officials told reporters at a press conference that "Able Danger" data had been deleted from computers. A former Army intelligence officer, Erik Kleinsmith, confirmed this at the Judiciary Committee hearing, testifying he was ordered to destroy information.
During the life of the program, the operation's team members created charts linking terrorists. However, during the recent investigation, none have been found.
The Pentagon, which claimed it is restricted from retaining intelligence on United States citizens and foreign residents living in the U.S., so-called "U.S. persons," for more than 90 days.
However, Weldon has previously said most of the program's data was open source information and not classified. According to guidelines in Army Regulation 381-10, intelligence data can be kept indefinitely if it was culled from open sources.
An unnamed "Able Danger official," Weldon said, was told by a Pentagon lawyer that it's okay to extend the time intelligence information is stored.
A Pentagon spokesman, Lt. Col. Chris Conway, said recently that Defense Department officials worried that any public testimony given about "Able Danger" risked revealing classified information. "Prior to any testimony, we expressed our security concerns with Congress," Conway said. "We said in discussing Able Danger, (it) could inadvertently reveal classified information."
Defense officials said they would allow military personnel to testify about the program behind closed doors. Previously, Shaffer said that Atta, an Egyptian, had been linked to the El Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, N.Y., a hotbed of anti-American sentiment once frequented by Sheik Omar Ahmed Abdul Rahman, know as the "Blind Sheik." Rahman is also Egyptian. Atta was not believed to be in the U.S., however, when he came to the attention of the team.
In 1995, Rahman was convicted of plotting to bomb various sites in New York City. Four of Rahman's associates were convicted in 2002 of conspiring with him to commit terrorist acts while he was in prison.
T
hough Shaffer was not allowed to give testimony at the Sept. 21 committee hearing, his attorney, Mark Zaid, did testify. As a sobering reminder of "Able Danger's" unfulfilled promise, Zaid said the missing charts showing terrorist links likely still contained "several dozen" individuals yet to be captured.
"There are terrorist on the chart who may still be out there and planning attacks," Zaid said. Keith Phucas can be reached at kphucas@timesherald.com or 610-272-2500, ext. 211.
http://blogs.washingtonpost.com/earlywarni...ling_able_.html
William M. Arkin on National and Homeland Security
Disabling Able Danger
In April 2000, Able Danger, only months old, was abruptly shut down. Caught violating Reagan administration Executive Orders and Defense Department and Army regulations restricting intelligence agencies from collecting information on United States "persons," the highly compartmented cell within the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) was halted in its effort to use data mining and link analysis to characterize the worldwide nature of the al Qaeda terrorist network.
Anthony Shaffer, the whistle blower who went public in August, claims lawyers shut down the operation just at the point that it named and identified 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta.
As I wrote yesterday, Shaffer is pretty lonely in his recollections. Of some 80 people interviewed by the Defense Department as part of its Able Danger internal investigation, the Pentagon says that three additional workers remember seeing either a chart with a photo or a reference to Mohamed Atta.
The general in charge of the Special Operations Command, Gen. Bryan "Doug" Brown, also went on the record this weekend telling the St. Petersburg Times that he was "pretty sure" Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta before 9/11.
Two Defense Department lawyers familiar with the case told me that there is no evidence that lawyers directed the destruction of information nor restricted any sharing of useful intelligence with the FBI, as Shaffer claims.
The real story here is how another renegade intelligence effort subsisting on hyper secrecy ran afoul of regulations first implemented in the Ford administration when U.S. intelligence agencies were caught collecting information on community, religious and labor leaders, civil rights protestors, and anti-Vietnam war demonstrators.
"What began as a force protection mission for DOD organizations, evolved, through mission creep, lack of clear rules, and the lack of meaningful oversight, into an abuse of … Constitutional rights…," William Dugan, Pentagon chief of intelligence oversight, said last week. He was describing the experiences of the 1960s and 1970s.
Shaffer and others use words like "out-of-the-box" and "entrepreneurial" to describe the LIWA intelligence collection. The buzz words suggest, of course, that other intelligence efforts were in-the-box and boring, that only the LIWA and other compartmented workers were motivated and insightful enough to take chances, that if the lawyers and the bureaucrats and the Clintonistas and the other villains had just gotten out of the way, there would have been no 9/11. If only…
But in 2000, the problem was also a pretty simple one: An off-the-books intelligence effort once again abused the "force protection" justification to collect information on Americans. Military commanders, mindful of the law and regulations, shut down the operation.
When Able Danger approached LIWA in 1999 to help with the al Qaeda campaign plan, the organization was already involved in a number of highly classified counter-terrorism data mining efforts. LIWA's al Qaeda project collected 2.5 terabytes of "open source" information, Shaffer says, a ridiculously immense amount of data equivalent to 500 million pages of text or a pile of paper 30,000 miles high if it were all printed out -- court records, news databases, credit card and telephone records. "Anything we could get our hands on," says Shaffer.
"Open source" here means unclassified information, that is, information that has not been collected and compiled by U.S. intelligence, for example, intelligence information derived from electronic eavesdropping or human agents that the United States classifies at birth.
However, the open source label tends to hide the real problem the Able Danger sponsored effort ran into.
"They were not only using advanced data mining technology, they were also looking at data that no one else was looking at," Shaffer says.
According to military sources familiar with the Able Danger legal side, the effort stepped over the line when LIWA contractors purchased photographic collections of people entering and exiting mosques in the United States and overseas. One source says that LIWA contractors dealt with a questionable source of photographs in California, either a white supremacy group or some other anti-Islamic organization.
"There are records of who goes where regarding visits to mosques," Shaffer told Government Security News. "That was the data that LIWA was buying off the Internet from information brokers." It was stuff no one else bothered to look at, says Shaffer.
LIWA purchased an open-source, six-month data run, Shaffer says, and analysts developed a set of eight data points common to 1993 World Trade Center bombers and associates. With advanced software, including facial recognition software able to track individuals from the collected photographs, Shaffer says contractors "made the link between [Mohammed] Atta and [Sheik Omar Abdel] Rahman, the first World Trade Center bomber."
Thomas Gandy, Army Director of Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence, said at the September 1 Pentagon briefing that the problem with LIWA’s work was that "it was a gobbling up of a lot of data from a lot of sources and put (it) in one pile." Thus there was a "commingling of U.S. person data" with other data. The contractors and software specialists did not take precautions to tag data from different sources or to segregate information about wholly innocent Americans of Islamic faith from others who were not US persons.
Gandy says "there was no perceived imminent threat" or "imminent crime going to occur" that might have justified retention of the gigantic database. Under the regulations, LIWA could have argued that it indeed was on to something and sought justification to continue, but the truth seems to be that while LIWA workers and contractor might have seen what there were doing as actual detective work to uncover terrorists, Able Danger and SOCOM saw the project mostly as an experiment to prove the usefulness of the technology.
So just months after LIWA began its seat-of-the-pants effort, it was directed to destroy its 2.5 terabytes.
(Tomorrow: The Law Takes Hold)
Note to readers: In my original posting, I used the spelling "Mohammed" that readers latched onto as some perhaps some kind of conspiracy on my part. It was an error to spell Atta's name different than he did in his visa applications and on his Florida drivers license. Though I hesitate to quote the 911 Commission's spelling as so many readers think that is a conspiracy as well. According to the Wikipedia entry, Atta used "several aliases and alternate spellings, including Mehan Atta, Mohammed Atta, Mohammad El Amir, Mohamed El Sayed, Muhammad Muhammad Al Amir Awag Al Sayyid Atta, and Muhammad Muhammad Al-Amir Awad Al Sayad. The will that he allegedly wrote in 1996 gives his name as 'Mohamed Mohamed Elamir Awad Elsayed.'"
I did a LexisNexis search of the last 90 days of news to check the prevailing spelling. There were 482 hits for "Mohammed Atta" and 528 for "Mohamed Atta." The Washington Post convention is Mohamed Atta.
By William M. Arkin | September 28, 2005; 08:27 AM ET | Category: Intelligence
Previous: The Secret History of Able Danger | Main Index | Next: Another Law Under Assault
William M. Arkin on National and Homeland Security
Disabling Able Danger
In April 2000, Able Danger, only months old, was abruptly shut down. Caught violating Reagan administration Executive Orders and Defense Department and Army regulations restricting intelligence agencies from collecting information on United States "persons," the highly compartmented cell within the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) was halted in its effort to use data mining and link analysis to characterize the worldwide nature of the al Qaeda terrorist network.
Anthony Shaffer, the whistle blower who went public in August, claims lawyers shut down the operation just at the point that it named and identified 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta.
As I wrote yesterday, Shaffer is pretty lonely in his recollections. Of some 80 people interviewed by the Defense Department as part of its Able Danger internal investigation, the Pentagon says that three additional workers remember seeing either a chart with a photo or a reference to Mohamed Atta.
The general in charge of the Special Operations Command, Gen. Bryan "Doug" Brown, also went on the record this weekend telling the St. Petersburg Times that he was "pretty sure" Able Danger did not identify Mohamed Atta before 9/11.
Two Defense Department lawyers familiar with the case told me that there is no evidence that lawyers directed the destruction of information nor restricted any sharing of useful intelligence with the FBI, as Shaffer claims.
The real story here is how another renegade intelligence effort subsisting on hyper secrecy ran afoul of regulations first implemented in the Ford administration when U.S. intelligence agencies were caught collecting information on community, religious and labor leaders, civil rights protestors, and anti-Vietnam war demonstrators.
"What began as a force protection mission for DOD organizations, evolved, through mission creep, lack of clear rules, and the lack of meaningful oversight, into an abuse of … Constitutional rights…," William Dugan, Pentagon chief of intelligence oversight, said last week. He was describing the experiences of the 1960s and 1970s.
Shaffer and others use words like "out-of-the-box" and "entrepreneurial" to describe the LIWA intelligence collection. The buzz words suggest, of course, that other intelligence efforts were in-the-box and boring, that only the LIWA and other compartmented workers were motivated and insightful enough to take chances, that if the lawyers and the bureaucrats and the Clintonistas and the other villains had just gotten out of the way, there would have been no 9/11. If only…
But in 2000, the problem was also a pretty simple one: An off-the-books intelligence effort once again abused the "force protection" justification to collect information on Americans. Military commanders, mindful of the law and regulations, shut down the operation.
When Able Danger approached LIWA in 1999 to help with the al Qaeda campaign plan, the organization was already involved in a number of highly classified counter-terrorism data mining efforts. LIWA's al Qaeda project collected 2.5 terabytes of "open source" information, Shaffer says, a ridiculously immense amount of data equivalent to 500 million pages of text or a pile of paper 30,000 miles high if it were all printed out -- court records, news databases, credit card and telephone records. "Anything we could get our hands on," says Shaffer.
"Open source" here means unclassified information, that is, information that has not been collected and compiled by U.S. intelligence, for example, intelligence information derived from electronic eavesdropping or human agents that the United States classifies at birth.
However, the open source label tends to hide the real problem the Able Danger sponsored effort ran into.
"They were not only using advanced data mining technology, they were also looking at data that no one else was looking at," Shaffer says.
According to military sources familiar with the Able Danger legal side, the effort stepped over the line when LIWA contractors purchased photographic collections of people entering and exiting mosques in the United States and overseas. One source says that LIWA contractors dealt with a questionable source of photographs in California, either a white supremacy group or some other anti-Islamic organization.
"There are records of who goes where regarding visits to mosques," Shaffer told Government Security News. "That was the data that LIWA was buying off the Internet from information brokers." It was stuff no one else bothered to look at, says Shaffer.
LIWA purchased an open-source, six-month data run, Shaffer says, and analysts developed a set of eight data points common to 1993 World Trade Center bombers and associates. With advanced software, including facial recognition software able to track individuals from the collected photographs, Shaffer says contractors "made the link between [Mohammed] Atta and [Sheik Omar Abdel] Rahman, the first World Trade Center bomber."
Thomas Gandy, Army Director of Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence, said at the September 1 Pentagon briefing that the problem with LIWA’s work was that "it was a gobbling up of a lot of data from a lot of sources and put (it) in one pile." Thus there was a "commingling of U.S. person data" with other data. The contractors and software specialists did not take precautions to tag data from different sources or to segregate information about wholly innocent Americans of Islamic faith from others who were not US persons.
Gandy says "there was no perceived imminent threat" or "imminent crime going to occur" that might have justified retention of the gigantic database. Under the regulations, LIWA could have argued that it indeed was on to something and sought justification to continue, but the truth seems to be that while LIWA workers and contractor might have seen what there were doing as actual detective work to uncover terrorists, Able Danger and SOCOM saw the project mostly as an experiment to prove the usefulness of the technology.
So just months after LIWA began its seat-of-the-pants effort, it was directed to destroy its 2.5 terabytes.
(Tomorrow: The Law Takes Hold)
Note to readers: In my original posting, I used the spelling "Mohammed" that readers latched onto as some perhaps some kind of conspiracy on my part. It was an error to spell Atta's name different than he did in his visa applications and on his Florida drivers license. Though I hesitate to quote the 911 Commission's spelling as so many readers think that is a conspiracy as well. According to the Wikipedia entry, Atta used "several aliases and alternate spellings, including Mehan Atta, Mohammed Atta, Mohammad El Amir, Mohamed El Sayed, Muhammad Muhammad Al Amir Awag Al Sayyid Atta, and Muhammad Muhammad Al-Amir Awad Al Sayad. The will that he allegedly wrote in 1996 gives his name as 'Mohamed Mohamed Elamir Awad Elsayed.'"
I did a LexisNexis search of the last 90 days of news to check the prevailing spelling. There were 482 hits for "Mohammed Atta" and 528 for "Mohamed Atta." The Washington Post convention is Mohamed Atta.
By William M. Arkin | September 28, 2005; 08:27 AM ET | Category: Intelligence
Previous: The Secret History of Able Danger | Main Index | Next: Another Law Under Assault
http://fairuse.1accesshost.com/news2/latimes807.html
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seeing what we want to see
How could it be that, despite the facts, people -- and computers -- place one of the Sept. 11 hijackers in places he probably wasn't?
By Terry McDermott
TERRY MCDERMOTT is a Los Angeles Times staff writer and the author of "Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers -- Who They Were and Why They Did It" (HarperCollins, 2005).
August 26, 2005
IN THE NEVER-ENDING effort to find someone — anyone — to blame for Sept. 11, the latest scrum involves claims by an ambitious congressman about a secret Defense Department unit pursuing a pilot program in data mining.
Data mining is a technique in which huge databases are fed into powerful computers that sift them looking for links. It's a technology that holds vast promise, but its main usefulness to date seems to be giving mortgage lenders the ability to find out how much you still owe on your house.
The Defense data-mining program, established in 1998, was called Able Danger. It focused on identifying potential Al Qaeda terrorists. Two weeks ago, Curt Weldon, a melodramatic Republican congressman from Pennsylvania, introduced it to the world via Fox News and the New York Times. The story has changed in its details almost daily since, as asserted high-flying facts have fallen to ground, but the gist has remained the same:
Sometime before Sept. 11, 2001 — the dates vary but lately have settled around the first few months of 2000 — the Able Danger computers came up with the name Mohamed Atta as a potential terrorist associated with an Al Qaeda cell in Brooklyn, N.Y. Atta, remembers Weldon and a pair of military men he has dragged before the cameras and notebooks, was one of four 9/11 hijackers identified by the computers more than a year before the attacks. They can't produce records, and the Pentagon denies it, but it's what they remember seeing, hearing and being told.
I know nothing about Able Danger other than what I've read, so I can't speak with authority on what the program uncovered about Atta, or when. But, having spent the better part of the last four years investigating Atta's life, I can speak to what is otherwise known about him and his whereabouts.
Atta's academic, immigration, credit, transit and telephone records provide a fairly complete account from the time he left his native Egypt in autumn 1992 to his death. This includes the period during which Able Danger is said to have identified him as a terrorist in the United States. The story those records, and corroborating interviews, tell is that Atta was not in the United States and made almost no contact with the U.S. until June 2000.
In November 1999, Atta and three friends traveled from Germany — via Istanbul and Karachi — to Afghanistan, where they intended to receive military training before going to fight the infidels in Chechnya. They were, instead, recruited into Al Qaeda and assigned the Sept. 11 mission. Atta returned to Hamburg in late February, and the next month he made what is thought to be his first contact with someone in the United States. He e-mailed dozens of flight schools inquiring about commercial pilot training for "a small group of Arab men." He also e-mailed a friend from Egypt who was studying at a Florida university and asked about visa requirements. In May, he applied for a visa from the U.S. Embassy in Berlin. Six weeks later he landed in Newark, N.J.
It is hard to see how computers could have named Atta as a member of an American cell before he got here. Some have argued that perhaps Able Danger mined data that included flight records of young Arab men traveling to Pakistan. Even if it did, it probably would not have found Atta. He was listed on airline flight manifests as Mohamed el-Amir, not Atta. His full name was Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta. El-Amir is how Atta was known to friends at school, to the banks that issued his credit cards and to the immigration service in Germany. It's the name on his high school and college diplomas.
Even if Able Danger somehow produced a name, "Mohamed Atta," that might not mean much. Variations of "Mohamed" are overwhelmingly the most common name in the Muslim world. It is James, John and Robert combined. Atta isn't Smith or Jones, but it isn't Einstein either. There are plenty of Mohamed Attas — and plenty of Mohamed el-Amirs too. The likelihood of mistaken identity is enormous.
But there is another possibility. Over the last four years I have interviewed dozens of people who swore they saw Atta somewhere he wasn't. This includes an assortment of waiters, students, flight instructors, taxi drivers and, more dramatically, two women who each claim to have been married to Atta, this despite the fact that they were never in the same city at the same time he was.
How could it be that so many people remember that they knew Atta, that they saw him or his name, when all the facts argue otherwise? I don't think they are all lying. Maybe none of them are. I think Atta entered an American psyche desperate for a name and face and an explanation. He came complete with what has become one of the iconic images of 9/11 — his Florida DMV mug shot, an image so memorable, so powerful and perfect for the moment that it allowed people to see in it whatever they needed to see. I think people subsequently, subconsciously placed that face where it made sense to them. There is no reason that a congressman or even two career military men searching for solutions are any less susceptible to seeing what they need to see, where they want to see it.
Whatever the resolution of the Able Danger imbroglio, there were plenty of missed opportunities on the road to 9/11. German law enforcement knew in mid-1999 that Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, another Sept. 11 hijacker, were acquaintances of an Al Qaeda recruiter. This information was passed on to the CIA. The name of a third hijacker, Ziad Jarrah, was given to U.S. intelligence agencies in early 2000 when he was interrogated at length as he passed through customs in the United Arab Emirates en route from Afghanistan to Germany. He told Emiratis he was going to the United States to become a pilot. The Emiratis say they passed this information to the Americans.
More famously, the CIA tracked two known Al Qaeda operatives through eight CIA stations from the Middle East to Malaysia, then somehow didn't notice as they walked onto a jetway and a plane bound for Los Angeles. We don't need to invent intelligence failures; we need to grapple with those that we already have.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seeing what we want to see
How could it be that, despite the facts, people -- and computers -- place one of the Sept. 11 hijackers in places he probably wasn't?
By Terry McDermott
TERRY MCDERMOTT is a Los Angeles Times staff writer and the author of "Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers -- Who They Were and Why They Did It" (HarperCollins, 2005).
August 26, 2005
IN THE NEVER-ENDING effort to find someone — anyone — to blame for Sept. 11, the latest scrum involves claims by an ambitious congressman about a secret Defense Department unit pursuing a pilot program in data mining.
Data mining is a technique in which huge databases are fed into powerful computers that sift them looking for links. It's a technology that holds vast promise, but its main usefulness to date seems to be giving mortgage lenders the ability to find out how much you still owe on your house.
The Defense data-mining program, established in 1998, was called Able Danger. It focused on identifying potential Al Qaeda terrorists. Two weeks ago, Curt Weldon, a melodramatic Republican congressman from Pennsylvania, introduced it to the world via Fox News and the New York Times. The story has changed in its details almost daily since, as asserted high-flying facts have fallen to ground, but the gist has remained the same:
Sometime before Sept. 11, 2001 — the dates vary but lately have settled around the first few months of 2000 — the Able Danger computers came up with the name Mohamed Atta as a potential terrorist associated with an Al Qaeda cell in Brooklyn, N.Y. Atta, remembers Weldon and a pair of military men he has dragged before the cameras and notebooks, was one of four 9/11 hijackers identified by the computers more than a year before the attacks. They can't produce records, and the Pentagon denies it, but it's what they remember seeing, hearing and being told.
I know nothing about Able Danger other than what I've read, so I can't speak with authority on what the program uncovered about Atta, or when. But, having spent the better part of the last four years investigating Atta's life, I can speak to what is otherwise known about him and his whereabouts.
Atta's academic, immigration, credit, transit and telephone records provide a fairly complete account from the time he left his native Egypt in autumn 1992 to his death. This includes the period during which Able Danger is said to have identified him as a terrorist in the United States. The story those records, and corroborating interviews, tell is that Atta was not in the United States and made almost no contact with the U.S. until June 2000.
In November 1999, Atta and three friends traveled from Germany — via Istanbul and Karachi — to Afghanistan, where they intended to receive military training before going to fight the infidels in Chechnya. They were, instead, recruited into Al Qaeda and assigned the Sept. 11 mission. Atta returned to Hamburg in late February, and the next month he made what is thought to be his first contact with someone in the United States. He e-mailed dozens of flight schools inquiring about commercial pilot training for "a small group of Arab men." He also e-mailed a friend from Egypt who was studying at a Florida university and asked about visa requirements. In May, he applied for a visa from the U.S. Embassy in Berlin. Six weeks later he landed in Newark, N.J.
It is hard to see how computers could have named Atta as a member of an American cell before he got here. Some have argued that perhaps Able Danger mined data that included flight records of young Arab men traveling to Pakistan. Even if it did, it probably would not have found Atta. He was listed on airline flight manifests as Mohamed el-Amir, not Atta. His full name was Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta. El-Amir is how Atta was known to friends at school, to the banks that issued his credit cards and to the immigration service in Germany. It's the name on his high school and college diplomas.
Even if Able Danger somehow produced a name, "Mohamed Atta," that might not mean much. Variations of "Mohamed" are overwhelmingly the most common name in the Muslim world. It is James, John and Robert combined. Atta isn't Smith or Jones, but it isn't Einstein either. There are plenty of Mohamed Attas — and plenty of Mohamed el-Amirs too. The likelihood of mistaken identity is enormous.
But there is another possibility. Over the last four years I have interviewed dozens of people who swore they saw Atta somewhere he wasn't. This includes an assortment of waiters, students, flight instructors, taxi drivers and, more dramatically, two women who each claim to have been married to Atta, this despite the fact that they were never in the same city at the same time he was.
How could it be that so many people remember that they knew Atta, that they saw him or his name, when all the facts argue otherwise? I don't think they are all lying. Maybe none of them are. I think Atta entered an American psyche desperate for a name and face and an explanation. He came complete with what has become one of the iconic images of 9/11 — his Florida DMV mug shot, an image so memorable, so powerful and perfect for the moment that it allowed people to see in it whatever they needed to see. I think people subsequently, subconsciously placed that face where it made sense to them. There is no reason that a congressman or even two career military men searching for solutions are any less susceptible to seeing what they need to see, where they want to see it.
Whatever the resolution of the Able Danger imbroglio, there were plenty of missed opportunities on the road to 9/11. German law enforcement knew in mid-1999 that Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, another Sept. 11 hijacker, were acquaintances of an Al Qaeda recruiter. This information was passed on to the CIA. The name of a third hijacker, Ziad Jarrah, was given to U.S. intelligence agencies in early 2000 when he was interrogated at length as he passed through customs in the United Arab Emirates en route from Afghanistan to Germany. He told Emiratis he was going to the United States to become a pilot. The Emiratis say they passed this information to the Americans.
More famously, the CIA tracked two known Al Qaeda operatives through eight CIA stations from the Middle East to Malaysia, then somehow didn't notice as they walked onto a jetway and a plane bound for Los Angeles. We don't need to invent intelligence failures; we need to grapple with those that we already have.
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/18/news/intel.php
Assessment of officers' 9/1l accounts sought
By Philip Shenon The New York Times
FRIDAY, AUGUST 19, 2005
WASHINGTON The chairman of the Sept. 11 commission has called on the Pentagon to move quickly to evaluate the credibility of military officers who say that a highly classified intelligence program identified the Sept. 11 ringleader more than a year before the 2001 attacks.
The chairman, Thomas Kean, a Republican who is a former governor of New Jersey, offered no judgment about the accuracy of the officers' accounts. But he said in an interview that if the accounts were true, it suggested that detailed information about the intelligence program, Able Danger, had been withheld from the commission and that the program and its findings should have been mentioned prominently in the panel's final report last year.
"If they identified Atta and any of the other terrorists, of course it was an important program," Kean said, referring to Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian who was ringleader of the attacks. "Obviously, if there were materials that weren't given to us, information that wasn't given to us, we're disappointed. It's up to the Pentagon to clear up any misunderstanding."
In a statement last week, Kean and the vice chairman of the commission, Lee Hamilton, said that Able Danger, a computerized data-mining operation run from within the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, "did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts."
But Kean suggested Wednesday that the statement would need to be revised if information from officers involved in Able Danger proved to be true.
This week, an Army intelligence veteran, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, became the first officer associated with Able Danger to let himself to be named publicly. Shaffer said the project's analysts had identified Atta and three of the other hijackers by name by mid-2000.
The Sept. 11 commission has said that it received similar information in July 2004, only days before it issued its final report, from a Navy captain who was also involved in Able Danger. It said the captain's information was determined not to be "sufficiently reliable to warrant" additional investigation. The Navy captain has not been publicly identified.
The Pentagon has not contradicted Shaffer or the Navy captain, but has withheld comment on Able Danger.
Members of the Sept. 11 commission have disputed Shaffer's statements that he told commission staff members in October 2003 about the identification of Atta. The staff members have said they recall no mention of Atta's name in the meeting or in Pentagon documents that were later turned over.
Kean said he found it difficult to imagine they would have failed to follow up on any information about Atta. "The name Mohamed Atta was electric," he said.
Sept. 11 Advocates, a group led by five women from New Jersey and Connecticut whose husbands died in the attacks, said Shaffer's account was evidence that panel members "failed in their obligation to the American public and to those who lost their lives on 9/11."
WASHINGTON The chairman of the Sept. 11 commission has called on the Pentagon to move quickly to evaluate the credibility of military officers who say that a highly classified intelligence program identified the Sept. 11 ringleader more than a year before the 2001 attacks.
The chairman, Thomas Kean, a Republican who is a former governor of New Jersey, offered no judgment about the accuracy of the officers' accounts. But he said in an interview that if the accounts were true, it suggested that detailed information about the intelligence program, Able Danger, had been withheld from the commission and that the program and its findings should have been mentioned prominently in the panel's final report last year.
"If they identified Atta and any of the other terrorists, of course it was an important program," Kean said, referring to Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian who was ringleader of the attacks. "Obviously, if there were materials that weren't given to us, information that wasn't given to us, we're disappointed. It's up to the Pentagon to clear up any misunderstanding."
In a statement last week, Kean and the vice chairman of the commission, Lee Hamilton, said that Able Danger, a computerized data-mining operation run from within the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, "did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts."
But Kean suggested Wednesday that the statement would need to be revised if information from officers involved in Able Danger proved to be true.
This week, an Army intelligence veteran, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, became the first officer associated with Able Danger to let himself to be named publicly. Shaffer said the project's analysts had identified Atta and three of the other hijackers by name by mid-2000.
The Sept. 11 commission has said that it received similar information in July 2004, only days before it issued its final report, from a Navy captain who was also involved in Able Danger. It said the captain's information was determined not to be "sufficiently reliable to warrant" additional investigation. The Navy captain has not been publicly identified.
The Pentagon has not contradicted Shaffer or the Navy captain, but has withheld comment on Able Danger.
Members of the Sept. 11 commission have disputed Shaffer's statements that he told commission staff members in October 2003 about the identification of Atta. The staff members have said they recall no mention of Atta's name in the meeting or in Pentagon documents that were later turned over.
Kean said he found it difficult to imagine they would have failed to follow up on any information about Atta. "The name Mohamed Atta was electric," he said.
Sept. 11 Advocates, a group led by five women from New Jersey and Connecticut whose husbands died in the attacks, said Shaffer's account was evidence that panel members "failed in their obligation to the American public and to those who lost their lives on 9/11."
WASHINGTON The chairman of the Sept. 11 commission has called on the Pentagon to move quickly to evaluate the credibility of military officers who say that a highly classified intelligence program identified the Sept. 11 ringleader more than a year before the 2001 attacks.
The chairman, Thomas Kean, a Republican who is a former governor of New Jersey, offered no judgment about the accuracy of the officers' accounts. But he said in an interview that if the accounts were true, it suggested that detailed information about the intelligence program, Able Danger, had been withheld from the commission and that the program and its findings should have been mentioned prominently in the panel's final report last year.
"If they identified Atta and any of the other terrorists, of course it was an important program," Kean said, referring to Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian who was ringleader of the attacks. "Obviously, if there were materials that weren't given to us, information that wasn't given to us, we're disappointed. It's up to the Pentagon to clear up any misunderstanding."
In a statement last week, Kean and the vice chairman of the commission, Lee Hamilton, said that Able Danger, a computerized data-mining operation run from within the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, "did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts."
But Kean suggested Wednesday that the statement would need to be revised if information from officers involved in Able Danger proved to be true.
This week, an Army intelligence veteran, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, became the first officer associated with Able Danger to let himself to be named publicly. Shaffer said the project's analysts had identified Atta and three of the other hijackers by name by mid-2000.
The Sept. 11 commission has said that it received similar information in July 2004, only days before it issued its final report, from a Navy captain who was also involved in Able Danger. It said the captain's information was determined not to be "sufficiently reliable to warrant" additional investigation. The Navy captain has not been publicly identified.
The Pentagon has not contradicted Shaffer or the Navy captain, but has withheld comment on Able Danger.
Members of the Sept. 11 commission have disputed Shaffer's statements that he told commission staff members in October 2003 about the identification of Atta. The staff members have said they recall no mention of Atta's name in the meeting or in Pentagon documents that were later turned over.
Kean said he found it difficult to imagine they would have failed to follow up on any information about Atta. "The name Mohamed Atta was electric," he said.
Sept. 11 Advocates, a group led by five women from New Jersey and Connecticut whose husbands died in the attacks, said Shaffer's account was evidence that panel members "failed in their obligation to the American public and to those who lost their lives on 9/11."
WASHINGTON The chairman of the Sept. 11 commission has called on the Pentagon to move quickly to evaluate the credibility of military officers who say that a highly classified intelligence program identified the Sept. 11 ringleader more than a year before the 2001 attacks.
The chairman, Thomas Kean, a Republican who is a former governor of New Jersey, offered no judgment about the accuracy of the officers' accounts. But he said in an interview that if the accounts were true, it suggested that detailed information about the intelligence program, Able Danger, had been withheld from the commission and that the program and its findings should have been mentioned prominently in the panel's final report last year.
"If they identified Atta and any of the other terrorists, of course it was an important program," Kean said, referring to Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian who was ringleader of the attacks. "Obviously, if there were materials that weren't given to us, information that wasn't given to us, we're disappointed. It's up to the Pentagon to clear up any misunderstanding."
In a statement last week, Kean and the vice chairman of the commission, Lee Hamilton, said that Able Danger, a computerized data-mining operation run from within the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, "did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts."
But Kean suggested Wednesday that the statement would need to be revised if information from officers involved in Able Danger proved to be true.
This week, an Army intelligence veteran, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, became the first officer associated with Able Danger to let himself to be named publicly. Shaffer said the project's analysts had identified Atta and three of the other hijackers by name by mid-2000.
The Sept. 11 commission has said that it received similar information in July 2004, only days before it issued its final report, from a Navy captain who was also involved in Able Danger. It said the captain's information was determined not to be "sufficiently reliable to warrant" additional investigation. The Navy captain has not been publicly identified.
The Pentagon has not contradicted Shaffer or the Navy captain, but has withheld comment on Able Danger.
Members of the Sept. 11 commission have disputed Shaffer's statements that he told commission staff members in October 2003 about the identification of Atta. The staff members have said they recall no mention of Atta's name in the meeting or in Pentagon documents that were later turned over.
Kean said he found it difficult to imagine they would have failed to follow up on any information about Atta. "The name Mohamed Atta was electric," he said.
Sept. 11 Advocates, a group led by five women from New Jersey and Connecticut whose husbands died in the attacks, said Shaffer's account was evidence that panel members "failed in their obligation to the American public and to those who lost their lives on 9/11."
Assessment of officers' 9/1l accounts sought
By Philip Shenon The New York Times
FRIDAY, AUGUST 19, 2005
WASHINGTON The chairman of the Sept. 11 commission has called on the Pentagon to move quickly to evaluate the credibility of military officers who say that a highly classified intelligence program identified the Sept. 11 ringleader more than a year before the 2001 attacks.
The chairman, Thomas Kean, a Republican who is a former governor of New Jersey, offered no judgment about the accuracy of the officers' accounts. But he said in an interview that if the accounts were true, it suggested that detailed information about the intelligence program, Able Danger, had been withheld from the commission and that the program and its findings should have been mentioned prominently in the panel's final report last year.
"If they identified Atta and any of the other terrorists, of course it was an important program," Kean said, referring to Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian who was ringleader of the attacks. "Obviously, if there were materials that weren't given to us, information that wasn't given to us, we're disappointed. It's up to the Pentagon to clear up any misunderstanding."
In a statement last week, Kean and the vice chairman of the commission, Lee Hamilton, said that Able Danger, a computerized data-mining operation run from within the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, "did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts."
But Kean suggested Wednesday that the statement would need to be revised if information from officers involved in Able Danger proved to be true.
This week, an Army intelligence veteran, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, became the first officer associated with Able Danger to let himself to be named publicly. Shaffer said the project's analysts had identified Atta and three of the other hijackers by name by mid-2000.
The Sept. 11 commission has said that it received similar information in July 2004, only days before it issued its final report, from a Navy captain who was also involved in Able Danger. It said the captain's information was determined not to be "sufficiently reliable to warrant" additional investigation. The Navy captain has not been publicly identified.
The Pentagon has not contradicted Shaffer or the Navy captain, but has withheld comment on Able Danger.
Members of the Sept. 11 commission have disputed Shaffer's statements that he told commission staff members in October 2003 about the identification of Atta. The staff members have said they recall no mention of Atta's name in the meeting or in Pentagon documents that were later turned over.
Kean said he found it difficult to imagine they would have failed to follow up on any information about Atta. "The name Mohamed Atta was electric," he said.
Sept. 11 Advocates, a group led by five women from New Jersey and Connecticut whose husbands died in the attacks, said Shaffer's account was evidence that panel members "failed in their obligation to the American public and to those who lost their lives on 9/11."
WASHINGTON The chairman of the Sept. 11 commission has called on the Pentagon to move quickly to evaluate the credibility of military officers who say that a highly classified intelligence program identified the Sept. 11 ringleader more than a year before the 2001 attacks.
The chairman, Thomas Kean, a Republican who is a former governor of New Jersey, offered no judgment about the accuracy of the officers' accounts. But he said in an interview that if the accounts were true, it suggested that detailed information about the intelligence program, Able Danger, had been withheld from the commission and that the program and its findings should have been mentioned prominently in the panel's final report last year.
"If they identified Atta and any of the other terrorists, of course it was an important program," Kean said, referring to Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian who was ringleader of the attacks. "Obviously, if there were materials that weren't given to us, information that wasn't given to us, we're disappointed. It's up to the Pentagon to clear up any misunderstanding."
In a statement last week, Kean and the vice chairman of the commission, Lee Hamilton, said that Able Danger, a computerized data-mining operation run from within the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, "did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts."
But Kean suggested Wednesday that the statement would need to be revised if information from officers involved in Able Danger proved to be true.
This week, an Army intelligence veteran, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, became the first officer associated with Able Danger to let himself to be named publicly. Shaffer said the project's analysts had identified Atta and three of the other hijackers by name by mid-2000.
The Sept. 11 commission has said that it received similar information in July 2004, only days before it issued its final report, from a Navy captain who was also involved in Able Danger. It said the captain's information was determined not to be "sufficiently reliable to warrant" additional investigation. The Navy captain has not been publicly identified.
The Pentagon has not contradicted Shaffer or the Navy captain, but has withheld comment on Able Danger.
Members of the Sept. 11 commission have disputed Shaffer's statements that he told commission staff members in October 2003 about the identification of Atta. The staff members have said they recall no mention of Atta's name in the meeting or in Pentagon documents that were later turned over.
Kean said he found it difficult to imagine they would have failed to follow up on any information about Atta. "The name Mohamed Atta was electric," he said.
Sept. 11 Advocates, a group led by five women from New Jersey and Connecticut whose husbands died in the attacks, said Shaffer's account was evidence that panel members "failed in their obligation to the American public and to those who lost their lives on 9/11."
WASHINGTON The chairman of the Sept. 11 commission has called on the Pentagon to move quickly to evaluate the credibility of military officers who say that a highly classified intelligence program identified the Sept. 11 ringleader more than a year before the 2001 attacks.
The chairman, Thomas Kean, a Republican who is a former governor of New Jersey, offered no judgment about the accuracy of the officers' accounts. But he said in an interview that if the accounts were true, it suggested that detailed information about the intelligence program, Able Danger, had been withheld from the commission and that the program and its findings should have been mentioned prominently in the panel's final report last year.
"If they identified Atta and any of the other terrorists, of course it was an important program," Kean said, referring to Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian who was ringleader of the attacks. "Obviously, if there were materials that weren't given to us, information that wasn't given to us, we're disappointed. It's up to the Pentagon to clear up any misunderstanding."
In a statement last week, Kean and the vice chairman of the commission, Lee Hamilton, said that Able Danger, a computerized data-mining operation run from within the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, "did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts."
But Kean suggested Wednesday that the statement would need to be revised if information from officers involved in Able Danger proved to be true.
This week, an Army intelligence veteran, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, became the first officer associated with Able Danger to let himself to be named publicly. Shaffer said the project's analysts had identified Atta and three of the other hijackers by name by mid-2000.
The Sept. 11 commission has said that it received similar information in July 2004, only days before it issued its final report, from a Navy captain who was also involved in Able Danger. It said the captain's information was determined not to be "sufficiently reliable to warrant" additional investigation. The Navy captain has not been publicly identified.
The Pentagon has not contradicted Shaffer or the Navy captain, but has withheld comment on Able Danger.
Members of the Sept. 11 commission have disputed Shaffer's statements that he told commission staff members in October 2003 about the identification of Atta. The staff members have said they recall no mention of Atta's name in the meeting or in Pentagon documents that were later turned over.
Kean said he found it difficult to imagine they would have failed to follow up on any information about Atta. "The name Mohamed Atta was electric," he said.
Sept. 11 Advocates, a group led by five women from New Jersey and Connecticut whose husbands died in the attacks, said Shaffer's account was evidence that panel members "failed in their obligation to the American public and to those who lost their lives on 9/11."
WASHINGTON The chairman of the Sept. 11 commission has called on the Pentagon to move quickly to evaluate the credibility of military officers who say that a highly classified intelligence program identified the Sept. 11 ringleader more than a year before the 2001 attacks.
The chairman, Thomas Kean, a Republican who is a former governor of New Jersey, offered no judgment about the accuracy of the officers' accounts. But he said in an interview that if the accounts were true, it suggested that detailed information about the intelligence program, Able Danger, had been withheld from the commission and that the program and its findings should have been mentioned prominently in the panel's final report last year.
"If they identified Atta and any of the other terrorists, of course it was an important program," Kean said, referring to Mohamed Atta, the Egyptian who was ringleader of the attacks. "Obviously, if there were materials that weren't given to us, information that wasn't given to us, we're disappointed. It's up to the Pentagon to clear up any misunderstanding."
In a statement last week, Kean and the vice chairman of the commission, Lee Hamilton, said that Able Danger, a computerized data-mining operation run from within the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, "did not turn out to be historically significant, set against the larger context of U.S. policy and intelligence efforts."
But Kean suggested Wednesday that the statement would need to be revised if information from officers involved in Able Danger proved to be true.
This week, an Army intelligence veteran, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer, became the first officer associated with Able Danger to let himself to be named publicly. Shaffer said the project's analysts had identified Atta and three of the other hijackers by name by mid-2000.
The Sept. 11 commission has said that it received similar information in July 2004, only days before it issued its final report, from a Navy captain who was also involved in Able Danger. It said the captain's information was determined not to be "sufficiently reliable to warrant" additional investigation. The Navy captain has not been publicly identified.
The Pentagon has not contradicted Shaffer or the Navy captain, but has withheld comment on Able Danger.
Members of the Sept. 11 commission have disputed Shaffer's statements that he told commission staff members in October 2003 about the identification of Atta. The staff members have said they recall no mention of Atta's name in the meeting or in Pentagon documents that were later turned over.
Kean said he found it difficult to imagine they would have failed to follow up on any information about Atta. "The name Mohamed Atta was electric," he said.
Sept. 11 Advocates, a group led by five women from New Jersey and Connecticut whose husbands died in the attacks, said Shaffer's account was evidence that panel members "failed in their obligation to the American public and to those who lost their lives on 9/11."
http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?Stor...05-102323-1829r
9-11 Commission 'swinging in the wind' on Abel Danger
By Shaun Waterman
UPI Homeland and National Security Editor
Published September 5, 2005
WASHINGTON -- Members of the Sept. 11 commission feel they have been left swinging in the wind by the growing tide of revelations about a secret Pentagon program that may have identified the ringleader of the attacks more than a year before they happened.
Claims by two people who worked on the project -- code-named Able Danger -- that they were ignored by commission staff when they briefed them have touched off a firestorm of criticism: including allegations from some victims' relatives of a cover-up.
"Other people have questions they need to answer," Al Felzenberg, the spokesman for the commission's embattled successor body, the 9-11 Public Discourse Project told United Press International.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States disbanded after publishing its report in July last year, when its mandate expired. But its members formed the public discourse project to follow up on their work.
"The American people deserve answers," Felzenberg said, adding that both the White House and the Pentagon had left questions about the issue unresolved for weeks -- something other commission sources say has exposed them to a fierce backlash.
"They are sitting on their hands and we are swinging in the wind," complained one former commission official.
Others, including Rep. Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich., chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, say the commission is merely getting "a little bit of its own medicine," being second-guessed in hindsight much as it judged the actions of officials before Sept. 11.
"In hindsight it is always easy to see people's mistakes," Hoekstra told UPI. "You have to be sympathetic to people in hindsight. More sympathetic than they were."
At the center of the controversy is a claim that Able Danger, a data-mining project that trawled vast quantities of open source information for patterns, linkages and associations, produced a chart in 2000 bearing the names (and in some case, photographs) of about 60 people thought linked to al-Qaida.
Among them was Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the attacks, according to five people who worked on the project.
If their recollections prove to be accurate, they will entail a major re-write of the commission's accounts of the missed opportunities to thwart the attacks.
But many questions remain.
Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Penn., a passionate advocate of data-mining technology, and the man who first publicized the claims about Able Danger, has said repeatedly that he gave a copy of the chart to Steven Hadley, now the national security advisor, at the White House on Sept. 25, 2001, and that Hadley said he would show it to the president.
The chart Weldon gave to Hadley, if it exists, may be the only copy that remains. Last week Pentagon officials told reporters that vast quantities of data from Able Danger were destroyed as a matter of routine.
The White House has point blank refused to comment on Weldon's statements about the meeting, or to allow reporters to interview Mr. Hadley about them.
"It would be helpful if Mr. Hadley would answer those questions," said Felzenberg. "He could make this whole thing go away."
Weldon says he does not know why the White House refuses to comment, but told UPI that at a meeting in June, Hadley acknowledged meeting him in September 2001 and receiving the chart.
"I've never had a detailed discussion about it with him, but he remembered the meeting," Weldon said.
Hoekstra says that his committee is conducting inquiries, and "the people who've been reported to have information that could help answer these questions are the Pentagon and the National Security Council."
But he declined to discuss what inquiries committee staff had made. "We don't talk about what we investigate or how," he said.
Commission staff say that -- in the absence of any corroboration among the papers they had received about Able Danger -- they did not believe the accounts about the project they received.
"We had two-and-a-half million pieces of paper we'd crowbarred out of the administration," said Felzenberg, referring to the uphill struggle the commission had to get documents about their pre-Sept. 11 activities from federal agencies. "We'd interviewed 1,200 people."
"It was (their) story stacked up against these mountains of material -- none of which mentioned Atta before Sept. 11 or this famous chart," he concluded.
Hoekstra said the commission "may have been blindsided by their own stove-piped thinking" -- a reference to one of the panel's more famous criticisms of how U.S. intelligence was organized. "(They may have thought) that information that comes through unconventional channels isn't worth looking into."
"But that's hindsight," he added.
The Pentagon said last week that it had again searched millions of documents -- including many not turned over to the commission -- but had found neither the chart nor any reference to it.
Nonetheless, they said that a total of five people who had worked on the project remembered seeing a chart with Atta's name on it, and called them "credible."
Felzenberg says that response raises more questions than it answers.
"Did they have Mohammed Atta in their sights before Sept. 11?" he asked. "They stand accused of that. People they say are credible are accusing them of calling off the dogs," Felzenberg said, a reference to charges that Pentagon lawyers blocked the Able Danger team from passing information to the FBI.
"Anything they say now only raises questions about what they told us then," he said.
The Defense Department was notorious among commission staff as the most recalcitrant government agency when it came to document production.
"At every agency there was an element of CYA about the handling of our document requests, but (the Department of Defense) was the most difficult to get material out of," said one.
"The bureaucracy there was just so, so thick... The people on the ground were awesome, but they'd say 'Yes, you can have something,' and that would be the start of this slippery slope. It was such a vast bureaucracy, and so many people had to sign off on anything, sooner or later there'd be someone who'd say 'No.'
"Usually a lawyer."
Felzenberg insists that history will absolve the commission.
"If it turns out that the commission missed this, that will be a failure on our part. But if it turns out (the Pentagon) had (Mohamed Atta) in their sights and let him get away, that is a much bigger failure."
9-11 Commission 'swinging in the wind' on Abel Danger
By Shaun Waterman
UPI Homeland and National Security Editor
Published September 5, 2005
WASHINGTON -- Members of the Sept. 11 commission feel they have been left swinging in the wind by the growing tide of revelations about a secret Pentagon program that may have identified the ringleader of the attacks more than a year before they happened.
Claims by two people who worked on the project -- code-named Able Danger -- that they were ignored by commission staff when they briefed them have touched off a firestorm of criticism: including allegations from some victims' relatives of a cover-up.
"Other people have questions they need to answer," Al Felzenberg, the spokesman for the commission's embattled successor body, the 9-11 Public Discourse Project told United Press International.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States disbanded after publishing its report in July last year, when its mandate expired. But its members formed the public discourse project to follow up on their work.
"The American people deserve answers," Felzenberg said, adding that both the White House and the Pentagon had left questions about the issue unresolved for weeks -- something other commission sources say has exposed them to a fierce backlash.
"They are sitting on their hands and we are swinging in the wind," complained one former commission official.
Others, including Rep. Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich., chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, say the commission is merely getting "a little bit of its own medicine," being second-guessed in hindsight much as it judged the actions of officials before Sept. 11.
"In hindsight it is always easy to see people's mistakes," Hoekstra told UPI. "You have to be sympathetic to people in hindsight. More sympathetic than they were."
At the center of the controversy is a claim that Able Danger, a data-mining project that trawled vast quantities of open source information for patterns, linkages and associations, produced a chart in 2000 bearing the names (and in some case, photographs) of about 60 people thought linked to al-Qaida.
Among them was Mohamed Atta, the ringleader of the attacks, according to five people who worked on the project.
If their recollections prove to be accurate, they will entail a major re-write of the commission's accounts of the missed opportunities to thwart the attacks.
But many questions remain.
Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Penn., a passionate advocate of data-mining technology, and the man who first publicized the claims about Able Danger, has said repeatedly that he gave a copy of the chart to Steven Hadley, now the national security advisor, at the White House on Sept. 25, 2001, and that Hadley said he would show it to the president.
The chart Weldon gave to Hadley, if it exists, may be the only copy that remains. Last week Pentagon officials told reporters that vast quantities of data from Able Danger were destroyed as a matter of routine.
The White House has point blank refused to comment on Weldon's statements about the meeting, or to allow reporters to interview Mr. Hadley about them.
"It would be helpful if Mr. Hadley would answer those questions," said Felzenberg. "He could make this whole thing go away."
Weldon says he does not know why the White House refuses to comment, but told UPI that at a meeting in June, Hadley acknowledged meeting him in September 2001 and receiving the chart.
"I've never had a detailed discussion about it with him, but he remembered the meeting," Weldon said.
Hoekstra says that his committee is conducting inquiries, and "the people who've been reported to have information that could help answer these questions are the Pentagon and the National Security Council."
But he declined to discuss what inquiries committee staff had made. "We don't talk about what we investigate or how," he said.
Commission staff say that -- in the absence of any corroboration among the papers they had received about Able Danger -- they did not believe the accounts about the project they received.
"We had two-and-a-half million pieces of paper we'd crowbarred out of the administration," said Felzenberg, referring to the uphill struggle the commission had to get documents about their pre-Sept. 11 activities from federal agencies. "We'd interviewed 1,200 people."
"It was (their) story stacked up against these mountains of material -- none of which mentioned Atta before Sept. 11 or this famous chart," he concluded.
Hoekstra said the commission "may have been blindsided by their own stove-piped thinking" -- a reference to one of the panel's more famous criticisms of how U.S. intelligence was organized. "(They may have thought) that information that comes through unconventional channels isn't worth looking into."
"But that's hindsight," he added.
The Pentagon said last week that it had again searched millions of documents -- including many not turned over to the commission -- but had found neither the chart nor any reference to it.
Nonetheless, they said that a total of five people who had worked on the project remembered seeing a chart with Atta's name on it, and called them "credible."
Felzenberg says that response raises more questions than it answers.
"Did they have Mohammed Atta in their sights before Sept. 11?" he asked. "They stand accused of that. People they say are credible are accusing them of calling off the dogs," Felzenberg said, a reference to charges that Pentagon lawyers blocked the Able Danger team from passing information to the FBI.
"Anything they say now only raises questions about what they told us then," he said.
The Defense Department was notorious among commission staff as the most recalcitrant government agency when it came to document production.
"At every agency there was an element of CYA about the handling of our document requests, but (the Department of Defense) was the most difficult to get material out of," said one.
"The bureaucracy there was just so, so thick... The people on the ground were awesome, but they'd say 'Yes, you can have something,' and that would be the start of this slippery slope. It was such a vast bureaucracy, and so many people had to sign off on anything, sooner or later there'd be someone who'd say 'No.'
"Usually a lawyer."
Felzenberg insists that history will absolve the commission.
"If it turns out that the commission missed this, that will be a failure on our part. But if it turns out (the Pentagon) had (Mohamed Atta) in their sights and let him get away, that is a much bigger failure."
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/A...i=5070&emc=eta1
Pentagon Revokes 9 / 11 Officer's Clearance
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: September 30, 2005
Filed at 9:46 p.m. ET
WASHINGTON (AP) -- An officer who has claimed that a classified military unit identified four Sept. 11 hijackers before the 2001 attacks is facing Pentagon accusations of breaking numerous rules, charges his lawyer suggests are aimed at undermining his credibility.
The alleged infractions by Army Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, 42, include obtaining a service medal under false pretenses, improperly flashing military identification while drunk and stealing pens, according to military paperwork shown by his attorney to The Associated Press.
Shaffer was one of the first to publicly link Sept. 11 leader Mohamed Atta to the unit code-named Able Danger. Shaffer was one of five witnesses the Pentagon ordered not to appear Sept. 21 before the Senate Judiciary Committee to discuss the unit's findings.
The military revoked Shaffer's top security clearance this month, a day before he was supposed to testify to a congressional committee.
Mark Zaid, Shaffer's attorney, said the Pentagon started looking into Shaffer's security clearance about the time in 2003 he met in Afghanistan with staff members of the bipartisan commission that studied the Sept. 11 attacks and told them about Able Danger.
Zaid said he can't prove the Pentagon went after Shaffer because he's a whistleblower, but ''all the timing associated with the clearance issue has been suspiciously coincidental.''
Citing concerns with the privacy act, Cmdr. Terry Sutherland, a Defense Intelligence Agency spokesman, declined to release any information on Shaffer.
According to papers provided by Zaid, the Defense Intelligence Agency is questioning whether Shaffer deserved a Defense Meritorious Service Medal he was awarded. Shaffer, who is supported by a retired colonel who has praised his work, says those challenging the medal do not have firsthand knowledge of his actions.
Shaffer says he showed his government credentials during two incidents in 1990, when he was drunk, and 1996, when he was pulled over by police. The military says he misused his credentials, but Shaffer says he was not told he should not have used them. He also said he has joined Alcoholics Anonymous and has been sober for 13 years.
As for the pens and other office supplies taken, he blamed that on ''youthful indiscretions'' more than 20 years ago.
According to the paperwork, the alleged infractions against Shaffer also include:
-- Falsely claiming $341.80 in mileage and tolls fees. He said he filed travel expenses based on what he was told by human resources staff.
-- Obtaining $67.79 in personal cell phone charges. He said the amount was a legitimate expense accrued so he could forward calls.
-- Going over his chain of command to do briefings. Shaffer said he was providing briefings to higher-ups on projects even his direct superiors did not know about, and he received superior review ratings for that time.
-- Showing irresponsibility with $2,012 in credit card debt. He said he paid off the debt, and Zaid said DIA dropped the issue.
Shaffer, now a member of the Army Reserves, has been on administrative leave since March 2004. During the same time, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel on Oct. 1, 2004.
Shaffer has said he tried three times to meet with the FBI to convey the Able Danger unit's findings before Sept. 11, but was ordered not to by military attorneys.
Shaffer's assertions on Able Danger have been supported by Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa. If correct, they would change the timeline as to when authorities first learned of some of the Sept. 11 hijackers.
The Sept. 11 commission has dismissed the claims. The Pentagon has acknowledged some employees recall seeing an intelligence chart identifying Atta as a terrorist before the attacks, but said none have been able to find a copy of it.
Pentagon Revokes 9 / 11 Officer's Clearance
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Published: September 30, 2005
Filed at 9:46 p.m. ET
WASHINGTON (AP) -- An officer who has claimed that a classified military unit identified four Sept. 11 hijackers before the 2001 attacks is facing Pentagon accusations of breaking numerous rules, charges his lawyer suggests are aimed at undermining his credibility.
The alleged infractions by Army Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, 42, include obtaining a service medal under false pretenses, improperly flashing military identification while drunk and stealing pens, according to military paperwork shown by his attorney to The Associated Press.
Shaffer was one of the first to publicly link Sept. 11 leader Mohamed Atta to the unit code-named Able Danger. Shaffer was one of five witnesses the Pentagon ordered not to appear Sept. 21 before the Senate Judiciary Committee to discuss the unit's findings.
The military revoked Shaffer's top security clearance this month, a day before he was supposed to testify to a congressional committee.
Mark Zaid, Shaffer's attorney, said the Pentagon started looking into Shaffer's security clearance about the time in 2003 he met in Afghanistan with staff members of the bipartisan commission that studied the Sept. 11 attacks and told them about Able Danger.
Zaid said he can't prove the Pentagon went after Shaffer because he's a whistleblower, but ''all the timing associated with the clearance issue has been suspiciously coincidental.''
Citing concerns with the privacy act, Cmdr. Terry Sutherland, a Defense Intelligence Agency spokesman, declined to release any information on Shaffer.
According to papers provided by Zaid, the Defense Intelligence Agency is questioning whether Shaffer deserved a Defense Meritorious Service Medal he was awarded. Shaffer, who is supported by a retired colonel who has praised his work, says those challenging the medal do not have firsthand knowledge of his actions.
Shaffer says he showed his government credentials during two incidents in 1990, when he was drunk, and 1996, when he was pulled over by police. The military says he misused his credentials, but Shaffer says he was not told he should not have used them. He also said he has joined Alcoholics Anonymous and has been sober for 13 years.
As for the pens and other office supplies taken, he blamed that on ''youthful indiscretions'' more than 20 years ago.
According to the paperwork, the alleged infractions against Shaffer also include:
-- Falsely claiming $341.80 in mileage and tolls fees. He said he filed travel expenses based on what he was told by human resources staff.
-- Obtaining $67.79 in personal cell phone charges. He said the amount was a legitimate expense accrued so he could forward calls.
-- Going over his chain of command to do briefings. Shaffer said he was providing briefings to higher-ups on projects even his direct superiors did not know about, and he received superior review ratings for that time.
-- Showing irresponsibility with $2,012 in credit card debt. He said he paid off the debt, and Zaid said DIA dropped the issue.
Shaffer, now a member of the Army Reserves, has been on administrative leave since March 2004. During the same time, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel on Oct. 1, 2004.
Shaffer has said he tried three times to meet with the FBI to convey the Able Danger unit's findings before Sept. 11, but was ordered not to by military attorneys.
Shaffer's assertions on Able Danger have been supported by Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa. If correct, they would change the timeline as to when authorities first learned of some of the Sept. 11 hijackers.
The Sept. 11 commission has dismissed the claims. The Pentagon has acknowledged some employees recall seeing an intelligence chart identifying Atta as a terrorist before the attacks, but said none have been able to find a copy of it.
ABLE DANGER: WELDON UNLEASHED
Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) caused a stir lately by alleging that a
classified military intelligence data mining program codenamed ABLE
DANGER had identified September 11 hijacker Mohammed Atta as a
threat as early as summer of 2000 and that the 9/11 Commission had
been so informed but had chosen to suppress the information.
In an official statement on the matter, former Commission Chair and
Vice Chair Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton disputed Weldon's account,
and Weldon himself has begun to backtrack, stating that he is no
longer certain that a chart he obtained from the military in 2001
actually named Atta.
A copy of the August 12 Kean-Hamilton statement is here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/08/pdp081205.pdf
Rep. Weldon has a history of making inflammatory allegations that
later proved to be unfounded.
On June 7, 1999 he stood on the House floor and accused the Clinton
Administration of leaking the design of the W87 nuclear warhead to
U.S. News and World Report. It was a charge he repeated several
times, referring to an artist's rendering of the W87 warhead which
appeared in the magazine's July 31, 1995 edition.
"This administration leaked this document to U.S. News & World
Report, giving the entire populace of the world... access to the
design of the W87 nuclear warhead," he alleged.
"I have been told... that it was [Secretary of Energy] Hazel O'Leary
herself who gave U.S. News & World Report the actual diagram of the
W87 nuclear warhead in 1995," he said.
On June 8, 1999 he stated flatly: "Hazel O'Leary leaked the plans,
which are in this magazine, for the W87 nuclear warhead."
None of this was true.
No government diagram of the W87 warhead was given to U.S. News.
The artist's rendering of the weapon was a conceptual drawing, not
a design. It was explicitly credited by the magazine to the
Natural Resources Defense Council. An NRDC analyst confirmed that
he had supplied the information to the graphic artist, and that it
was based on informed speculation, not classified information.
In accordance with the political tactics used to attack the
Clinton-Gore Administration throughout much of the 1990s, Rep.
Weldon never retracted or apologized for his unfounded accusations.
See:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/bulletin/sec80.html#weldon
According to an August 10 story in The Hill, Rep. Weldon said House
Speaker Dennis Hastert will support his potential bid to become the
next chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in 2008.
NRC ADOPTS POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION
Following a dispute with the National Academy of Sciences over the
release of security-related information in an NAS report on spent
nuclear fuel, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission undertook a review
of its policy regarding public disclosure of such information.
An NRC Task Force prepared a report on the subject, and the NRC
recently approved a new statement of disclosure policy.
"The task force has concluded that the Commission has considerable
authority to withhold from public disclosure information that could
be useful, or could reasonably be expected to be useful, to a
terrorist, provided that the information is not readily available
to the public already," the report stated.
The resulting NRC policy concluded generally that "to the extent
practicable," the withholding of sensitive information from public
disclosure should conform to Freedom of Information Act principles
for withholding security-related information.
See "NRC Task Force Report on Public Disclosure of Security-Related
Information," Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 18, 2005 (approved
June 30, 2005) (thanks to MJR):
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/nrc-disc.pdf
Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) caused a stir lately by alleging that a
classified military intelligence data mining program codenamed ABLE
DANGER had identified September 11 hijacker Mohammed Atta as a
threat as early as summer of 2000 and that the 9/11 Commission had
been so informed but had chosen to suppress the information.
In an official statement on the matter, former Commission Chair and
Vice Chair Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton disputed Weldon's account,
and Weldon himself has begun to backtrack, stating that he is no
longer certain that a chart he obtained from the military in 2001
actually named Atta.
A copy of the August 12 Kean-Hamilton statement is here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/08/pdp081205.pdf
Rep. Weldon has a history of making inflammatory allegations that
later proved to be unfounded.
On June 7, 1999 he stood on the House floor and accused the Clinton
Administration of leaking the design of the W87 nuclear warhead to
U.S. News and World Report. It was a charge he repeated several
times, referring to an artist's rendering of the W87 warhead which
appeared in the magazine's July 31, 1995 edition.
"This administration leaked this document to U.S. News & World
Report, giving the entire populace of the world... access to the
design of the W87 nuclear warhead," he alleged.
"I have been told... that it was [Secretary of Energy] Hazel O'Leary
herself who gave U.S. News & World Report the actual diagram of the
W87 nuclear warhead in 1995," he said.
On June 8, 1999 he stated flatly: "Hazel O'Leary leaked the plans,
which are in this magazine, for the W87 nuclear warhead."
None of this was true.
No government diagram of the W87 warhead was given to U.S. News.
The artist's rendering of the weapon was a conceptual drawing, not
a design. It was explicitly credited by the magazine to the
Natural Resources Defense Council. An NRDC analyst confirmed that
he had supplied the information to the graphic artist, and that it
was based on informed speculation, not classified information.
In accordance with the political tactics used to attack the
Clinton-Gore Administration throughout much of the 1990s, Rep.
Weldon never retracted or apologized for his unfounded accusations.
See:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/bulletin/sec80.html#weldon
According to an August 10 story in The Hill, Rep. Weldon said House
Speaker Dennis Hastert will support his potential bid to become the
next chairman of the House Armed Services Committee in 2008.
NRC ADOPTS POLICY ON DISCLOSURE OF SECURITY INFORMATION
Following a dispute with the National Academy of Sciences over the
release of security-related information in an NAS report on spent
nuclear fuel, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission undertook a review
of its policy regarding public disclosure of such information.
An NRC Task Force prepared a report on the subject, and the NRC
recently approved a new statement of disclosure policy.
"The task force has concluded that the Commission has considerable
authority to withhold from public disclosure information that could
be useful, or could reasonably be expected to be useful, to a
terrorist, provided that the information is not readily available
to the public already," the report stated.
The resulting NRC policy concluded generally that "to the extent
practicable," the withholding of sensitive information from public
disclosure should conform to Freedom of Information Act principles
for withholding security-related information.
See "NRC Task Force Report on Public Disclosure of Security-Related
Information," Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 18, 2005 (approved
June 30, 2005) (thanks to MJR):
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/nrc-disc.pdf
ABLE DANGER HEARING
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing yesterday on ABLE
DANGER, the Defense Department intelligence program that may or may
not have identified Mohamed Atta and other September 11 hijackers a
year or more before they struck.
The hearing ended inconclusively after the Pentagon refused to
permit several witnesses to testify, citing classification
concerns.
"That looks to me as if it may be obstruction of the committee's
activities," said Judiciary Committee chair Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa).
"The Senate Intelligence Committee, as I understand it, has
jurisdiction over this matter and is looking into it," Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters in response.
"Second, the department, I'm told, offered a classified briefing
because the subject matter was classified," Rumsfeld said. "And as
I understand it, the Judiciary Committee preferred to have an open
hearing on a classified matter, and therefore the department
declined to participate in an open hearing on a classified matter."
The prepared testimony from the September 21 Judiciary Committee
hearing is available here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/index.html
A September 1 Pentagon press briefing on ABLE DANGER is available
here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/09/dod090105.html
The Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing yesterday on ABLE
DANGER, the Defense Department intelligence program that may or may
not have identified Mohamed Atta and other September 11 hijackers a
year or more before they struck.
The hearing ended inconclusively after the Pentagon refused to
permit several witnesses to testify, citing classification
concerns.
"That looks to me as if it may be obstruction of the committee's
activities," said Judiciary Committee chair Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa).
"The Senate Intelligence Committee, as I understand it, has
jurisdiction over this matter and is looking into it," Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters in response.
"Second, the department, I'm told, offered a classified briefing
because the subject matter was classified," Rumsfeld said. "And as
I understand it, the Judiciary Committee preferred to have an open
hearing on a classified matter, and therefore the department
declined to participate in an open hearing on a classified matter."
The prepared testimony from the September 21 Judiciary Committee
hearing is available here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/index.html
A September 1 Pentagon press briefing on ABLE DANGER is available
here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/09/dod090105.html
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_cr/weldon101905.html
Congressional Record: October 19, 2005 (House)
Page H8979-H8983
ABLE DANGER FAILURE
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Reichert). Under the Speaker's announced
policy of January 4, 2005, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon)
is recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to talk to
our colleagues and through our colleagues to the American people about
an issue that troubles me greatly.
I have been in this institution 19 years, and during those 19 years I
have been on the Committee on Armed Services. Currently, I am the vice
chairman of that committee and chairman of the subcommittee that
oversees the purchase of our weapons systems. In the past I have
chaired the research subcommittee. I have chaired the readiness
subcommittee, and I have spent every available hour of my time working
to make sure that our military troops were properly protected and have
the proper equipment and training.
I am a strong supporter of our military. Whether it was in the last 2
years of the Reagan administration, the four years of the Bush
administration, the 8 years of the Clinton administration, or the
current administration of President George W. Bush, I have been a
strong supporter of our military. I am a strong supporter of President
Bush. I campaigned for him. I am a strong supporter of Secretary
Rumsfeld. I say all of that, Mr. Speaker, because tonight I rise to
express my absolute outrage and disgust with what is happening in our
defense intelligence agencies.
Mr. Speaker, back in 1999 when I was Chair of the defense research
subcommittee, the Army was doing cutting-edge work on a new type of
technology to allow us to understand and predict emerging transnational
terrorist threats. That technology was being done at several locations,
but was being led by our Special Forces Command. The work that they
were doing was unprecedented. And because of what I saw there, I
supported the development of a national capability of a collaborative
center that the CIA would just not accept.
In fact, in November 4 of 1999, 2 years before 9/11, in a meeting in
my office with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Director of the
CIA, Deputy Director of the FBI, we presented a nine-page proposal to
create a national collaborative center. When we finished the brief, the
CIA said we did not need that capability, and so before 9/11 we did not
have it.
When President Bush came in after a year of research, he announced
the formation of the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, exactly what
I had proposed in 1999. Today it is known as the NCTC, the National
Counterterrorism Center. But, Mr. Speaker, what troubles me is not the
fact that we did not take those steps.
What troubles me is that I now have learned in the last 4 months that
one of the tasks that was being done in 1999 and 2000 was a top-secret
program organized at the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, carried out by the general in charge of our Special Forces
Command, a very elite unit focusing on information regarding al Qaeda.
It was a military language effort to allow us to identify the key cells
of al Qaeda around the world and to give the military the capability to
plan actions against those cells so they could not attack us as they
did in 1993 at the Trade Center, at the Khobar Towers, the U.S.S. Cole
attack, and the African embassy bombings.
What I did not know, Mr. Speaker, up until June of this year, was
that that secret program called Able Danger actually identified the
Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda in January and February of 2000, over 1 year
before 9/11 every happened. In addition, I learned that not only did we
identify the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, but we identified Mohamed Atta
as one of the members of that Brooklyn cell along with three other
terrorists who were the leadership of the 9/11 attack.
I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, again,
over 1 year before 9/11, that Able Danger team attempted on three
separate occasions to provide information to the FBI about the Brooklyn
cell of al Qaeda, and on three separate occasions they were denied by
lawyers in the previous administration to transfer that information.
Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday on ``Meet the Press,'' Louis Freeh, FBI
Director at the time, was interviewed by Tim Russert. The first
question to Louis Freeh was in regard to the FBI's ability to ferret
out the terrorists. Louis Freeh's response, which can be obtained by
anyone in this country as a part of the official record, was, Well,
Tim, we are now finding out that a top-secret program of the military
called Able Danger actually identified the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda
and Mohammed Atta over a year before 9/11.
And what Louis Freeh said, Mr. Speaker, is that that kind of
actionable data could have allowed us to prevent the hijackings that
occurred on September 11.
So now we know, Mr. Speaker, that military intelligence officers
working in a program authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the general in charge of Special Forces Command, identified
Mohammed Atta and three terrorists a year before 9/11, tried to
transfer that information to the FBI were denied; and the FBI Director
has now said publicly if he would have had that information, the FBI
could have used it to perhaps prevent the hijackings that struck the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the plane that landed in
Pennsylvania and perhaps saved 3,000 lives and changed the course of
world history.
Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight because we have been trying to get the
story out about Able Danger and what really happened. Unfortunately,
Mr. Speaker, I have to rise tonight to tell you that as bad as this
story is, and as bad as it is that the data was not transferred to the
FBI, and as bad as it is that the 9/11 Commission totally ignored this
entire story and referred to it as historically insignificant even
though it was authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
even though Louis Freeh has now said it could have provided information
to prevent the attack against us, the 9/11 Commission ignored it. Not
because the commissioners ignored it, but because someone at the staff
level on the 9/11 Commission staff decided for whatever reason that
they did not want to pursue the Abel Danger story.
Mr. Speaker, in August and September I met with the military
officials involved with Abel Danger and one by one they told their
story, until, Mr. Speaker, leaders in the Defense Intelligence Agency,
including the deputy director, decided they do not want the story told.
I think because they perhaps are fearful of being embarrassed and
humiliated.
So what direction had they taken, Mr. Speaker?
They have gagged the military officers. They have prevented them from
talking to any Member of Congress. They have prevented them from
talking to the media. And the Defense Intelligence Agency has began a
process to destroy the career and the life of Lieutenant Colonel
Anthony Shaffer.
Now, it might be easy for us to ignore this, Mr. Speaker. We all have
busy careers and worry about reelections every 2 years and worry about
our own families and our jobs. But I cannot do that in this case and
neither can this body, and neither can the other body. You see,
Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer took an oath to defend our Constitution. He
took the words ``duty, honor, country'' seriously and devoted 23 years
of his life in four deployed intelligence operations of our military to
protect America.
During the time he served our country, he has received the Bronze
Star, an award that does not come easily, for showing acts of courage,
leadership, and bravery in the course of his activities.
[[Page H8980]]
{time} 2030
He has received public commendations from previous directors of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, including General Patrick Hughes,
including generals at Special Forces Command, and including Admiral
Wilson of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has received dozens of
letters and commendations for his work. The laudatory comments I
reviewed in his files are unbelievable.
But, you see, Mr. Speaker, there is a problem. The Deputy Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency was in a meeting with Lieutenant
Colonel Shaffer almost a year before 9/11, and Lieutenant Colonel
Shaffer showed him a disk in his office with information about al Qaeda
and Mohammed Atta, and the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency stopped the briefing and said, you cannot show me that. I do not
want to see it. It might contain information I cannot look at.
Now, Tony Shaffer was not in the room alone, Mr. Speaker. There were
other people, and we know their names. So we have witnesses. Now, the
Deputy Director has denied that meeting and denied he was there and
denied this particular story, but the fact is he knows that we are
going to pursue it.
So what has happened to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, Mr. Speaker? The
Defense Intelligence Agency has lifted his security clearance. One day
before he was to testify before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
in uniform, they permanently removed his security clearance. And now
our Defense Intelligence Agency has told Colonel Shaffer's lawyer that
they plan to seek a permanent removal of his pay and his health care
benefits for him and his two children. Why, Mr. Speaker? Because
Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, like Commander Scott Philpot of the Navy,
like J. D. Smith, and like a host of other Able Danger employees, has
told the truth.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I sat here in the 1990s and I sat here during the
9/11 investigation and watched a ridiculous situation develop with
Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser under President Clinton. He
walked into the National Archives before he was to testify before the
9/11 Commission looking through documents. He took documents out of the
archives and stuffed them in his socks and pants so that no one would
see them as he left the National Archives. Now, that is a felony,
tampering with Federal documents and removing classified information
regarding our security and information that the 9/11 commission needed
to see.
Sandy Berger initially lied about it. He said he did not do it. Then
he admitted it, and he was given a punishment. And, oh, by the way, his
security clearance was temporarily lifted, but he will get it back
again, for lying, for stealing, and for committing an act of outrage
against our country's security. Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, a Bronze
Star 23-year military veteran, simply told the truth and now his life
is being ruined.
His career is ended. He is no longer in military intelligence. They
have taken his security clearance, and they are about to destroy him as
a person. They are about to deny him the basic health care and the
salary that he has earned, and they are doing it in this way. This is
outrageous. It is evil. They do not want to fire Tony because they also
do not want him to talk to the media. So by suspending him and removing
his pay and his health care, they hurt him bad, but he cannot talk
because he is under suspension and his lawyer has advised him that to
talk to the media, to talk to Members of Congress, even when he is not
being paid, would cause him further problems and totally prevent him
from ever having this gross problem reversed. Mr. Speaker, this is
outrageous. Mr. Speaker, this is not America.
Over my 19 years in Congress, I have led 40 delegations to the former
Soviet Union. I have sat in the face of the Soviet Communists and
confronted them on full transparency. I sat at the table with President
Lukashenko of Belarus, who has been called by our Secretary of State
the last dictator in Europe. I took both delegations to North Korea,
Mr. Speaker, and sat across the table from Kim Gye Gwan and I told him
we abhor the way they treat their people, the way they lie about what
is happening, and the way they distort information.
Mr. Speaker, I took three delegations to Libya to meet with Qadhafi,
and I told him that we are absolutely outraged at what Libya did in
helping complete the Lockerbie bombing and the bombing of the Berlin
nightclub.
You know, Mr. Speaker, I never thought I would have to take the floor
of this Chamber and make the same statements about the Defense
Intelligence Agency. As a supporter of the President, as a supporter of
the military, Mr. Speaker, if we allow this to go forward, then we send
the signal to every man and woman wearing a uniform that if you tell
the truth, you will be destroyed if a career bureaucrat above you does
not like what you are saying. If you tell the truth, we will take your
health care benefits away from your kids. If you tell the truth, we
will ruin you.
Mr. Speaker, this is not America. Mr. Speaker, this is not what I
have been told by Secretary Rumsfeld that we are doing with our troops
in protecting them, in giving them the best equipment and the best
training. This is not what I spend hours in committee hearings on. This
sends the wrong signal to America's troops. It tells them, do not be
honest. Do not respect the fact that you have to be truthful. If there
is somebody that the truth offends, then you better be silent.
Mr. Speaker, I have today asked for an independent investigation of
the Defense Intelligence Agency and their efforts at destroying Tony
Shaffer's life. This is outrageous, Mr. Speaker. They trumped up
charges against him. They said while he was overseas in Afghanistan,
forward deployed, that he forwarded cell phone calls from his official
phone to his personal phone; and when they checked that out, it ran up
a cost to the taxpayers of about $60. The second verbal charge they
gave him was that he went to a course at the Army War College and he
got reimbursed for his travel, his mileage and tolls, 100-some dollars.
And they said he received a commendation for which he was not entitled,
even though it was signed by his commanding officer and the acting
Secretary of the Army.
But they went beyond that, Mr. Speaker. They went beyond that with
this man. They said he had $2,000 of debt, personal debt. Well, I would
like to have every Pentagon employee tomorrow, I would like to have the
senior leadership show us what debt they have in the Defense
Intelligence Agency so we can make that public.
They even went to this length, Mr. Speaker: the Defense Intelligence
Agency wrote in an official document that Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer
stole public property. A serious charge. Well, when you check what that
public property was, it was an assortment of pens, government pens. But
what they did not say in the Defense Intelligence report was that he
took those pens when he was 15 years of age and was with his father
when he was on assignment at one of our embassy outposts. He took the
pens to give to other students at the school when he was 15 years of
age. And by the way, Mr. Speaker, it was Tony Shaffer himself who
admitted to that thievery when he applied for his security clearance.
So the Defense Intelligence Agency knew that during his entire career
of 23 years, but they put that in the document against him.
This is a scandal, Mr. Speaker. It is an outrage. It is a travesty.
Everyone that worked with Tony Shaffer, the Navy officers, the private
citizens have all said the same thing. This is a scandal to get Tony
Shaffer because he has told the truth.
Now, this Defense Intelligence Agency and this Deputy Director had
the audacity to have their legal counsel send Tony Shaffer's lawyer a
letter on September 23. I cannot put that letter in the Record because
it is privileged information, but it will eventually come out. But in
that letter, in the second to last paragraph, the legal counsel for the
Defense Intelligence Agency says to Mr. Shaffer's lawyer, he cannot
receive any more classified information from the Defense Intelligence
Agency because I checked and his security clearances have all been
removed. Therefore, he is not allowed to look at anything that is
secret or confidential.
Now, that is a letter sent by the general counsel of the DIA on
September 23 of this year. Two weeks later, Mr. Speaker, to show the
stupidity of the Defense Intelligence Agency, they send seven packages
to Mr. Shaffer's lawyer
[[Page H8981]]
of his personal belongings, which the Deputy Director of the DIA told
my staff 3 months ago did not exist any more. And in those seven boxes,
Mr. Speaker, were five classified memos. The Defense Intelligence
Agency sent five classified memos to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, which
they told him on September 23 he was not allowed to have access to.
Mr. Speaker, that is a felony; and I have asked the Inspector General
and the legal officials to investigate and prosecute the Defense
Intelligence officials who sent five classified documents through the
mail or by hand delivery to Tony Shaffer.
In addition, Mr. Speaker, the Defense Intelligence Agency, in its
absolute total stupidity, included in those boxes $500 worth of Federal
property, including a multi-hundred dollar GPS system owned by the
Federal Government, which they sent to Tony Shaffer, I guess to keep.
They also sent, Mr. Speaker, 25 pens, brand new, and marked on them is
``Property of the U.S. Government.'' The Defense Intelligence Agency,
in its absolute utter stupidity, sent Tony Shaffer Federal property
which they accused him of taking when he was 15 years of age.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong here. There is a
bureaucracy in the Defense Intelligence Agency that is out of control.
They want to destroy the reputation of a 23-year military officer,
Bronze Star recipient, hero of our country, with two kids because
people in defense intelligence are embarrassed at what is going to come
out.
And what is going to come out, Mr. Speaker? Well, we are going to
find out, Mr. Speaker, that that unit, Able Danger, not only identified
Mohammed Atta before 9/11, not only did they try to pass that
information to the FBI, not only was that large data destroyed in the
summer of 2000, but now, Mr. Speaker, I can add a new dimension to this
whole story. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, I met with another Able Danger
official. I was not aware of this official's knowledge because he does
not live within the Beltway.
This official, Mr. Speaker, has impeccable credentials. I cannot
reveal his name today. I will to any Member of this body, any of our
colleagues that want to come to me, I will tell you privately who this
official is, and you will agree with me when I tell you his name that
he has impeccable credentials. This official yesterday, Mr. Speaker, in
a meeting in my office, told me that he has never been talked to by the
Pentagon. He has never been talked to by the Defense Intelligence
Agency in their supposed investigation. He has never been talked to by
the 9/11 Commission staff in their investigation; yet this official had
a leadership position in Able Danger.
This official told me that there is a separate cache of information
collected from over 20 Federal agencies in 1999 and 2000 on Able Danger
that still may exist. Now, the Pentagon has told us all this material
was destroyed, and now I have a senior official telling me there is a
second pot of information that may well still exist.
Furthermore, at the hearing over in the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, when Senator Specter asked why this data was destroyed, the
witness who destroyed the data said, well, I was told that we could not
keep this data for more than 90 days because it might involve
information that contains U.S. persons, so we had to destroy it.
{time} 2045
Well, I found out that is not the story. The reason the data was
destroyed was because Special Forces Command asked the Army for that
data and within a matter of days, that data was destroyed so the Army
would not pass it to Special Forces Command. Yet there still is, was
and I hope still is a massive pot of data.
But furthermore, that official that I talked to yesterday will also
say that there was no 90-day requirement, as was testified before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. He said on a regular basis they kept
information from Able Danger data mining for months and months and
months. In fact, he will say he had a discussion with a lawyer in DOD
named Schiffren who told him do not worry about it, just fill out a
document, sign your name that you need it, put it in the box, and you
can keep it as long as you want.
Mr. Speaker, that is entirely contradictory to what the Defense
Intelligence Agency has been telling us, to what DOD has been telling
us. Now we have someone who is willing to come forward and say that 90-
day period is not real, they kept Able Danger information for months
and months and months.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong here. A sitting
President of the United States resigned his position because he tried
to cover up a third-rate burglary when some low-level operatives from
the Republican committee to reelect him broke into the Democrat
headquarters in Washington, D.C. No one was killed. No money was
stolen. No State secrets were stolen. It was a third-rate burglary, but
it caused the resignation of President Richard Nixon.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about the deaths of 3,000 Americans.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about 2.5 terabytes of data about al
Qaeda. That is equal to one-fourth of all of the printed material in
the Library of Congress.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about Mohammed Atta and three of the
terrorists that attacked us on 9/11.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about military intelligence officers,
including an Annapolis graduate who will command one of our destroyers
in January of 2006 who risked his entire career to state on the record
I will swear until I die that I saw Mohammed Atta's face every day
starting in January of 2000, a year and a half before 9/11.
Mr. Speaker, this is not somebody off the street, this is a graduate
of Annapolis, a 23-year Naval officer who will command one of our
destroyers in January who is agreeing with Lieutenant Shaffer. We have
three other people who have testified under oath that they saw the same
photograph, and the person I met yesterday will testify that he had the
name of a Mohammed Atta before 9/11 but not the face.
Mr. Speaker, this is not some third-rate burglary coverup. This is
not some Watergate incident. This is an attempt to prevent the American
people from knowing the facts about how we could have prevented 9/11
and people are covering it up today. They are ruining the career of a
military officer to do it and we cannot let it stand. I do not care
whether you are Democrat or Republican, you cannot let a lieutenant
colonel's career be ruined because of some bureaucrat in the Defense
Intelligence Agency. If we let that happen, then no one who wears the
uniform will ever feel protected because we will have let them down.
Anyone who wears the uniform of this country who is serving today
expects us to back him or her up and that is not happening. We are
seeing lying, distortion.
Mr. Speaker, do you know, Wolf Blitzer on CNN told my staff that a
Department of Defense employee told him that Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer
was having an affair with one of my employees. How low can we go, Mr.
Speaker? How low can we go to allow this Defense Department to try to
ruin the reputation and the personal life of a lieutenant colonel with
a Bronze Star? To Wolf Blitzer, Mr. Speaker.
We need to know the name of that defense official who told Wolf
Blitzer who told my staff, and he is not the only one. I have other
media people who will come forward in this grand effort to destroy the
reputation of a uniformed military officer, to create scandalous
accusations. He does not even know my staff, to accuse him of stealing
pens when he was 15, to take away his health care benefits for his two
kids because he is telling the truth.
What do we stand for if not the truth? Is it more important that we
be politically correct? Is it more important that I not rock the boat
because my party is in the White House, because I campaigned for Bush,
and support Don Rumsfeld. Is that more important? If that is more
important, I do not want to be here. I will leave. I will leave my
post, but I will not do it until we get justice for this man and for
these people who the 9/11 Commission called historically insignificant.
Mr. Speaker, there is something wrong inside the Beltway.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong when a military
officer risks his life in Afghanistan time and again, embedded with our
troops under
[[Page H8982]]
an assumed name with a false beard and a false identity, forward
deployed with our troops, gets castigated, gets ridiculed, gets some
low life scum at the Pentagon spreading malicious lies about this
individual, and then say to his lawyer, we are going to take away his
health care benefits, we are going to take away his salary.
Mr. Speaker, if we allow this to stand as Democrats and Republicans,
then none of us deserve to be here. When we all go overseas and meet
the troops, we tell them how proud we are of them. We provide funding
for them. We give them training and take care of their families. What
we are allowing to happen right now is the Defense Intelligence Agency
to ruin the career and the life of a man who spent 23 years protecting
his Nation. If Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer was telling this story alone
in a vacuum, that would be one thing. But he has been corroborated over
and over again. I have met with at least 10 people who fully
corroborate what Tony Shaffer says. Those meetings with the FBI, the
FBI employee still works there and she told the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, I set those meetings up with the FBI to transfer information
about al Qaeda and Able Danger. So she is still there and she
testified.
What we have here, I am convinced of this now, is an aggressive
attempt by CIA management to cover up their own shortcomings in not
being able to do what the Able Danger team did: They identified
Mohammed Atta and the al Qaeda cell of Brooklyn 1 year before
9/11. But even before that, as the story unfolds, you are going to hear
the story that they also identified the threat to the USS Cole 2 weeks
before the attack, and 2 days before the attack were screaming not to
let the USS Cole come into the harbor at Yemen because they knew
something was about to happen.
Mr. Speaker, bad news never comes easy; but in a democracy, the bad
news has to come out so we can make sure it does not happen again.
Mr. Speaker, this whole thing started, not to embarrass anyone, this
whole thing started because none of us knew that Mohammed Atta was
identified before 9/11. It started because this Congress, this body in
particular, tried to establish what is now in place back in 1999, a
national collaborative center, but the CIA said we did not need it. The
American people deserve to have the answers here. They deserve to know
why 3,000 people died. They deserve to know what we could have done and
should have done to better prepare ourselves and to work to prepare for
the next incident. The American people need to know where those
multiple terabytes of data is. Is it still being used? We know in
January of 2001, General Shelton was given a 3-hour briefing on Able
Danger. So even if they destroyed the data back in the summer of 2000,
in January of 2001 there was enough material to give General Shelton,
Commander of the Joint Chiefs, a 3-hour briefing.
Mr. Speaker, there is something here. I am not a conspiracy theorist,
but there is something desperately wrong, Mr. Speaker. There is
something outrageous at work here. This is not a third-rate burglary of
a political campaign headquarters. This involved what is right now the
covering up of information that led to the deaths of 3,000 people,
changed the course of history, led to the invasion of Iraq and
Afghanistan, and has disrupted our country, our economy and people's
lives.
Mr. Speaker, we could ignore this. I cannot. If it means I have to
resign from this body, I will resign. I will not allow, after 19 years
in this body and as a vice chairman of the Committee on Armed Services,
bureaucrats in the Defense Intelligence Agency to concoct stories, to
talk about the theft of pens when this lieutenant colonel was 15 years
old, to talk about this man's personal debt of $2,000. I would hate to
check the indebtedness of Members of Congress. I know mine is more than
$2,000.
Mr. Speaker, this is not America. I had a group of college students
down from Drexel University. There were about 20 of them, including
representative students from eight other nations. We talked about this.
Of course we have talked about all of the problem countries in the
world. We talk about our values as a Nation, the need for a democracy
to have people involved, to have transparency, to have people who
respect the rule of law and the Constitution.
How do I tell them that is what is working here, Mr. Speaker, when
the Pentagon says that these people who simply want to tell the truth
are not allowed? They are saying it is for classified purposes, yet the
DOD lawyer on the Senate side there is nothing classified about any of
the information. It is not about classified programs. I would be the
last to want to see anything classified revealed. I have seen many,
many instances where I have been given sensitive information that only
a few people in the Congress and the country had. I would never reveal
it. It is not about that. This is not about the DIA, this is not about
the CIA, this is about CYA. It is about CYA by bureaucrats in the
Defense Intelligence Agency and possibly some political operatives that
do not want the facts to come out about Able Danger and the information
that the Able Danger team put together. And in the process, they are
going to destroy a man, a man who has been recognized by his country,
who has a family, and who simply wants to do the right thing.
Mr. Speaker, I hated to take the floor tonight, but I did not know
what else to do. We have committees of Congress working on this. I want
to thank the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf), chairman of the FBI
Appropriation Committee on Oversight. He is as outraged as I am. I want
to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), who is
looking at this, and the gentleman from California (Chairman Hunter).
The Committee on Armed Services has a full-time staffer assigned to get
to the facts of this. I want to thank the gentleman from New York (Mr.
King), chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, because he is
looking at this. I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan (Chairman
Hoekstra) and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He has
met with Tony Shaffer and has offered to get more information. I want
to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for standing up
and beginning to ask questions, and I want to thank Senator Specter and
Senator Biden, who attended a Committee on the Judiciary hearing and
expressed their outrage. I want to thank Senator Sessions, Senator Kyl,
and Senator Grassley, who were all there. In fact, Senator Grassley
called it a coverup.
Mr. Speaker, I cannot tell you the number of Members who have come to
me and said this is unacceptable. I would hope that as a result of what
we have heard tonight every Member of Congress will ask for an inquiry.
The gentlewoman from Georgia (Ms. McKinney) wrote a letter to the
chairman of the Committee on Armed Services asking for an
investigation. We have from Republicans to Democrats, left to right,
conservatives to liberals. What is happening here is unacceptable. It
is unimaginable. It is un-American. All over the world tonight, young
Americans are wearing our uniforms. They are doing a great job. They
make us all proud when we travel overseas. They make us proud because
of the pride they have. When I talk to them, they say I am glad to be
doing what I am doing. I am doing the right thing for our country. I
will go any place the Commander in Chief sends me. Whether I am in
Afghanistan or Iraq, they will tell me that.
{time} 2100
Whether we are in Kosovo or Somalia, they will tell us that. Whether
we are at Hurricane Katrina, whether we are at Hurricane Andrew, or
whether we are out in California, the earthquake, or the Midwestern
floods, our troops are all the same. They respect our country. They
respect our Constitution. If we allow this travesty to continue, Mr.
Speaker, then we have let all of those people down for some nameless,
faceless bureaucrat who is fearful that the information will finally
come to light, that the DIA just did not get it.
Back in 1999 and 2000, they did not have a clue. They had millions of
dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars, and could not do what a 20-
member team did in being able to identify Mohammed Atta before the 9/11
attacks. DIA does not want that to come out, Mr. Speaker. They do not
want that to come out. Heaven forbid the Defense Intelligence Agency,
with hundreds of millions of dollars, would have a 20-member team do
what they could not
[[Page H8983]]
do because they were using new technology and new software. They do not
want that to come out. That is why that Deputy Director, when he was at
that meeting, said, I do not want to see this. Do not show it to me.
And that is why today that Deputy Director is trying to ruin the career
of Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer.
The only way to resolve this, Mr. Speaker, is to have a full
independent investigation by the Inspector General of the Pentagon. I
have asked Secretary Rumsfeld today to do that. I would ask my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in that request. Let
the independent inspector for the Pentagon go in, not DIA. DIA cannot
investigate itself. It does not have the capability to do that. It does
not have the integrity to do that. Let the Inspector General do the
investigation and while that is being done, protect Lieutenant Colonel
Shaffer. He does not deserve to have his career ruined or destroyed for
telling the truth.
And while we are at it, Mr. Speaker, if DIA is going to continue to
press this ridiculous set of facts, then as I said earlier, I want DIA
prosecuted for the five felonies they committed in sending classified
documents to a person that 2 weeks earlier they said was incapable of
receiving classified information. And if this continues, I want DIA
held responsible for illegally transferring $500 of public assets to a
person, that in the process of sending that stuff to him, DIA committed
fraud against the taxpayers. I want them held accountable: DIA's
stupidity; DIA's incompetence.
We have a new nominee for the head of DIA, and I am going to ask
every Senator to fully explore each of these issues before that person
is confirmed. I will meet with every Senator personally and go over all
of this information. And I would encourage the Senators and the House
Members to interview the other people who worked with Lieutenant
Colonel Shaffer and to get their assessments of what is going on there.
They will all tell them the same thing: Shaffer is being abused and
used as a scapegoat. If they can ruin Shaffer, they can silence the
story.
It cannot happen, Mr. Speaker. We cannot let it. That is not what
America is about. That is not what we say to our enlisted personnel
when they sign up for duty. That is not what we say when we pass our
defense bills every year.
This man is being maligned and mistreated. He is being harassed. The
most scurrilous accusations, totally unfounded, have been given to the
American media; and I will name names, and I will ask for an
investigation of the people who made those statements to these media
people because it all needs to be put on the record.
And as someone tomorrow who will chair another hearing on our defense
oversight to try to get the best value for the dollars for our
military, I ask all of our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, on both sides of
the aisle to join us. This is not Republicans or Democrats. It is about
what is fundamental to this country. I would ask our constituents
across America we represent to join us, to express their outrage, to e-
mail, make phone calls, write letters to the Secretary of Defense, the
President of the United States, to Members of Congress to simply let
the story be told. Let the Able Danger story finally come out to the
American people. Let them understand what really happened. Let Scott
Philpott talk. Let Tony Shaffer talk. Let the others who have been
silenced have a chance to tell their story to Congress and openly to
the American people. In the end, the country will be stronger.
____________________
Congressional Record: October 19, 2005 (House)
Page H8979-H8983
ABLE DANGER FAILURE
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Reichert). Under the Speaker's announced
policy of January 4, 2005, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon)
is recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight to talk to
our colleagues and through our colleagues to the American people about
an issue that troubles me greatly.
I have been in this institution 19 years, and during those 19 years I
have been on the Committee on Armed Services. Currently, I am the vice
chairman of that committee and chairman of the subcommittee that
oversees the purchase of our weapons systems. In the past I have
chaired the research subcommittee. I have chaired the readiness
subcommittee, and I have spent every available hour of my time working
to make sure that our military troops were properly protected and have
the proper equipment and training.
I am a strong supporter of our military. Whether it was in the last 2
years of the Reagan administration, the four years of the Bush
administration, the 8 years of the Clinton administration, or the
current administration of President George W. Bush, I have been a
strong supporter of our military. I am a strong supporter of President
Bush. I campaigned for him. I am a strong supporter of Secretary
Rumsfeld. I say all of that, Mr. Speaker, because tonight I rise to
express my absolute outrage and disgust with what is happening in our
defense intelligence agencies.
Mr. Speaker, back in 1999 when I was Chair of the defense research
subcommittee, the Army was doing cutting-edge work on a new type of
technology to allow us to understand and predict emerging transnational
terrorist threats. That technology was being done at several locations,
but was being led by our Special Forces Command. The work that they
were doing was unprecedented. And because of what I saw there, I
supported the development of a national capability of a collaborative
center that the CIA would just not accept.
In fact, in November 4 of 1999, 2 years before 9/11, in a meeting in
my office with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Director of the
CIA, Deputy Director of the FBI, we presented a nine-page proposal to
create a national collaborative center. When we finished the brief, the
CIA said we did not need that capability, and so before 9/11 we did not
have it.
When President Bush came in after a year of research, he announced
the formation of the Terrorism Threat Integration Center, exactly what
I had proposed in 1999. Today it is known as the NCTC, the National
Counterterrorism Center. But, Mr. Speaker, what troubles me is not the
fact that we did not take those steps.
What troubles me is that I now have learned in the last 4 months that
one of the tasks that was being done in 1999 and 2000 was a top-secret
program organized at the request of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, carried out by the general in charge of our Special Forces
Command, a very elite unit focusing on information regarding al Qaeda.
It was a military language effort to allow us to identify the key cells
of al Qaeda around the world and to give the military the capability to
plan actions against those cells so they could not attack us as they
did in 1993 at the Trade Center, at the Khobar Towers, the U.S.S. Cole
attack, and the African embassy bombings.
What I did not know, Mr. Speaker, up until June of this year, was
that that secret program called Able Danger actually identified the
Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda in January and February of 2000, over 1 year
before 9/11 every happened. In addition, I learned that not only did we
identify the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda, but we identified Mohamed Atta
as one of the members of that Brooklyn cell along with three other
terrorists who were the leadership of the 9/11 attack.
I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, again,
over 1 year before 9/11, that Able Danger team attempted on three
separate occasions to provide information to the FBI about the Brooklyn
cell of al Qaeda, and on three separate occasions they were denied by
lawyers in the previous administration to transfer that information.
Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday on ``Meet the Press,'' Louis Freeh, FBI
Director at the time, was interviewed by Tim Russert. The first
question to Louis Freeh was in regard to the FBI's ability to ferret
out the terrorists. Louis Freeh's response, which can be obtained by
anyone in this country as a part of the official record, was, Well,
Tim, we are now finding out that a top-secret program of the military
called Able Danger actually identified the Brooklyn cell of al Qaeda
and Mohammed Atta over a year before 9/11.
And what Louis Freeh said, Mr. Speaker, is that that kind of
actionable data could have allowed us to prevent the hijackings that
occurred on September 11.
So now we know, Mr. Speaker, that military intelligence officers
working in a program authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the general in charge of Special Forces Command, identified
Mohammed Atta and three terrorists a year before 9/11, tried to
transfer that information to the FBI were denied; and the FBI Director
has now said publicly if he would have had that information, the FBI
could have used it to perhaps prevent the hijackings that struck the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the plane that landed in
Pennsylvania and perhaps saved 3,000 lives and changed the course of
world history.
Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight because we have been trying to get the
story out about Able Danger and what really happened. Unfortunately,
Mr. Speaker, I have to rise tonight to tell you that as bad as this
story is, and as bad as it is that the data was not transferred to the
FBI, and as bad as it is that the 9/11 Commission totally ignored this
entire story and referred to it as historically insignificant even
though it was authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
even though Louis Freeh has now said it could have provided information
to prevent the attack against us, the 9/11 Commission ignored it. Not
because the commissioners ignored it, but because someone at the staff
level on the 9/11 Commission staff decided for whatever reason that
they did not want to pursue the Abel Danger story.
Mr. Speaker, in August and September I met with the military
officials involved with Abel Danger and one by one they told their
story, until, Mr. Speaker, leaders in the Defense Intelligence Agency,
including the deputy director, decided they do not want the story told.
I think because they perhaps are fearful of being embarrassed and
humiliated.
So what direction had they taken, Mr. Speaker?
They have gagged the military officers. They have prevented them from
talking to any Member of Congress. They have prevented them from
talking to the media. And the Defense Intelligence Agency has began a
process to destroy the career and the life of Lieutenant Colonel
Anthony Shaffer.
Now, it might be easy for us to ignore this, Mr. Speaker. We all have
busy careers and worry about reelections every 2 years and worry about
our own families and our jobs. But I cannot do that in this case and
neither can this body, and neither can the other body. You see,
Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer took an oath to defend our Constitution. He
took the words ``duty, honor, country'' seriously and devoted 23 years
of his life in four deployed intelligence operations of our military to
protect America.
During the time he served our country, he has received the Bronze
Star, an award that does not come easily, for showing acts of courage,
leadership, and bravery in the course of his activities.
[[Page H8980]]
{time} 2030
He has received public commendations from previous directors of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, including General Patrick Hughes,
including generals at Special Forces Command, and including Admiral
Wilson of the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has received dozens of
letters and commendations for his work. The laudatory comments I
reviewed in his files are unbelievable.
But, you see, Mr. Speaker, there is a problem. The Deputy Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency was in a meeting with Lieutenant
Colonel Shaffer almost a year before 9/11, and Lieutenant Colonel
Shaffer showed him a disk in his office with information about al Qaeda
and Mohammed Atta, and the Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency stopped the briefing and said, you cannot show me that. I do not
want to see it. It might contain information I cannot look at.
Now, Tony Shaffer was not in the room alone, Mr. Speaker. There were
other people, and we know their names. So we have witnesses. Now, the
Deputy Director has denied that meeting and denied he was there and
denied this particular story, but the fact is he knows that we are
going to pursue it.
So what has happened to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, Mr. Speaker? The
Defense Intelligence Agency has lifted his security clearance. One day
before he was to testify before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
in uniform, they permanently removed his security clearance. And now
our Defense Intelligence Agency has told Colonel Shaffer's lawyer that
they plan to seek a permanent removal of his pay and his health care
benefits for him and his two children. Why, Mr. Speaker? Because
Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, like Commander Scott Philpot of the Navy,
like J. D. Smith, and like a host of other Able Danger employees, has
told the truth.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I sat here in the 1990s and I sat here during the
9/11 investigation and watched a ridiculous situation develop with
Sandy Berger, the National Security Adviser under President Clinton. He
walked into the National Archives before he was to testify before the
9/11 Commission looking through documents. He took documents out of the
archives and stuffed them in his socks and pants so that no one would
see them as he left the National Archives. Now, that is a felony,
tampering with Federal documents and removing classified information
regarding our security and information that the 9/11 commission needed
to see.
Sandy Berger initially lied about it. He said he did not do it. Then
he admitted it, and he was given a punishment. And, oh, by the way, his
security clearance was temporarily lifted, but he will get it back
again, for lying, for stealing, and for committing an act of outrage
against our country's security. Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, a Bronze
Star 23-year military veteran, simply told the truth and now his life
is being ruined.
His career is ended. He is no longer in military intelligence. They
have taken his security clearance, and they are about to destroy him as
a person. They are about to deny him the basic health care and the
salary that he has earned, and they are doing it in this way. This is
outrageous. It is evil. They do not want to fire Tony because they also
do not want him to talk to the media. So by suspending him and removing
his pay and his health care, they hurt him bad, but he cannot talk
because he is under suspension and his lawyer has advised him that to
talk to the media, to talk to Members of Congress, even when he is not
being paid, would cause him further problems and totally prevent him
from ever having this gross problem reversed. Mr. Speaker, this is
outrageous. Mr. Speaker, this is not America.
Over my 19 years in Congress, I have led 40 delegations to the former
Soviet Union. I have sat in the face of the Soviet Communists and
confronted them on full transparency. I sat at the table with President
Lukashenko of Belarus, who has been called by our Secretary of State
the last dictator in Europe. I took both delegations to North Korea,
Mr. Speaker, and sat across the table from Kim Gye Gwan and I told him
we abhor the way they treat their people, the way they lie about what
is happening, and the way they distort information.
Mr. Speaker, I took three delegations to Libya to meet with Qadhafi,
and I told him that we are absolutely outraged at what Libya did in
helping complete the Lockerbie bombing and the bombing of the Berlin
nightclub.
You know, Mr. Speaker, I never thought I would have to take the floor
of this Chamber and make the same statements about the Defense
Intelligence Agency. As a supporter of the President, as a supporter of
the military, Mr. Speaker, if we allow this to go forward, then we send
the signal to every man and woman wearing a uniform that if you tell
the truth, you will be destroyed if a career bureaucrat above you does
not like what you are saying. If you tell the truth, we will take your
health care benefits away from your kids. If you tell the truth, we
will ruin you.
Mr. Speaker, this is not America. Mr. Speaker, this is not what I
have been told by Secretary Rumsfeld that we are doing with our troops
in protecting them, in giving them the best equipment and the best
training. This is not what I spend hours in committee hearings on. This
sends the wrong signal to America's troops. It tells them, do not be
honest. Do not respect the fact that you have to be truthful. If there
is somebody that the truth offends, then you better be silent.
Mr. Speaker, I have today asked for an independent investigation of
the Defense Intelligence Agency and their efforts at destroying Tony
Shaffer's life. This is outrageous, Mr. Speaker. They trumped up
charges against him. They said while he was overseas in Afghanistan,
forward deployed, that he forwarded cell phone calls from his official
phone to his personal phone; and when they checked that out, it ran up
a cost to the taxpayers of about $60. The second verbal charge they
gave him was that he went to a course at the Army War College and he
got reimbursed for his travel, his mileage and tolls, 100-some dollars.
And they said he received a commendation for which he was not entitled,
even though it was signed by his commanding officer and the acting
Secretary of the Army.
But they went beyond that, Mr. Speaker. They went beyond that with
this man. They said he had $2,000 of debt, personal debt. Well, I would
like to have every Pentagon employee tomorrow, I would like to have the
senior leadership show us what debt they have in the Defense
Intelligence Agency so we can make that public.
They even went to this length, Mr. Speaker: the Defense Intelligence
Agency wrote in an official document that Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer
stole public property. A serious charge. Well, when you check what that
public property was, it was an assortment of pens, government pens. But
what they did not say in the Defense Intelligence report was that he
took those pens when he was 15 years of age and was with his father
when he was on assignment at one of our embassy outposts. He took the
pens to give to other students at the school when he was 15 years of
age. And by the way, Mr. Speaker, it was Tony Shaffer himself who
admitted to that thievery when he applied for his security clearance.
So the Defense Intelligence Agency knew that during his entire career
of 23 years, but they put that in the document against him.
This is a scandal, Mr. Speaker. It is an outrage. It is a travesty.
Everyone that worked with Tony Shaffer, the Navy officers, the private
citizens have all said the same thing. This is a scandal to get Tony
Shaffer because he has told the truth.
Now, this Defense Intelligence Agency and this Deputy Director had
the audacity to have their legal counsel send Tony Shaffer's lawyer a
letter on September 23. I cannot put that letter in the Record because
it is privileged information, but it will eventually come out. But in
that letter, in the second to last paragraph, the legal counsel for the
Defense Intelligence Agency says to Mr. Shaffer's lawyer, he cannot
receive any more classified information from the Defense Intelligence
Agency because I checked and his security clearances have all been
removed. Therefore, he is not allowed to look at anything that is
secret or confidential.
Now, that is a letter sent by the general counsel of the DIA on
September 23 of this year. Two weeks later, Mr. Speaker, to show the
stupidity of the Defense Intelligence Agency, they send seven packages
to Mr. Shaffer's lawyer
[[Page H8981]]
of his personal belongings, which the Deputy Director of the DIA told
my staff 3 months ago did not exist any more. And in those seven boxes,
Mr. Speaker, were five classified memos. The Defense Intelligence
Agency sent five classified memos to Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer, which
they told him on September 23 he was not allowed to have access to.
Mr. Speaker, that is a felony; and I have asked the Inspector General
and the legal officials to investigate and prosecute the Defense
Intelligence officials who sent five classified documents through the
mail or by hand delivery to Tony Shaffer.
In addition, Mr. Speaker, the Defense Intelligence Agency, in its
absolute total stupidity, included in those boxes $500 worth of Federal
property, including a multi-hundred dollar GPS system owned by the
Federal Government, which they sent to Tony Shaffer, I guess to keep.
They also sent, Mr. Speaker, 25 pens, brand new, and marked on them is
``Property of the U.S. Government.'' The Defense Intelligence Agency,
in its absolute utter stupidity, sent Tony Shaffer Federal property
which they accused him of taking when he was 15 years of age.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong here. There is a
bureaucracy in the Defense Intelligence Agency that is out of control.
They want to destroy the reputation of a 23-year military officer,
Bronze Star recipient, hero of our country, with two kids because
people in defense intelligence are embarrassed at what is going to come
out.
And what is going to come out, Mr. Speaker? Well, we are going to
find out, Mr. Speaker, that that unit, Able Danger, not only identified
Mohammed Atta before 9/11, not only did they try to pass that
information to the FBI, not only was that large data destroyed in the
summer of 2000, but now, Mr. Speaker, I can add a new dimension to this
whole story. Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, I met with another Able Danger
official. I was not aware of this official's knowledge because he does
not live within the Beltway.
This official, Mr. Speaker, has impeccable credentials. I cannot
reveal his name today. I will to any Member of this body, any of our
colleagues that want to come to me, I will tell you privately who this
official is, and you will agree with me when I tell you his name that
he has impeccable credentials. This official yesterday, Mr. Speaker, in
a meeting in my office, told me that he has never been talked to by the
Pentagon. He has never been talked to by the Defense Intelligence
Agency in their supposed investigation. He has never been talked to by
the 9/11 Commission staff in their investigation; yet this official had
a leadership position in Able Danger.
This official told me that there is a separate cache of information
collected from over 20 Federal agencies in 1999 and 2000 on Able Danger
that still may exist. Now, the Pentagon has told us all this material
was destroyed, and now I have a senior official telling me there is a
second pot of information that may well still exist.
Furthermore, at the hearing over in the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, when Senator Specter asked why this data was destroyed, the
witness who destroyed the data said, well, I was told that we could not
keep this data for more than 90 days because it might involve
information that contains U.S. persons, so we had to destroy it.
{time} 2045
Well, I found out that is not the story. The reason the data was
destroyed was because Special Forces Command asked the Army for that
data and within a matter of days, that data was destroyed so the Army
would not pass it to Special Forces Command. Yet there still is, was
and I hope still is a massive pot of data.
But furthermore, that official that I talked to yesterday will also
say that there was no 90-day requirement, as was testified before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. He said on a regular basis they kept
information from Able Danger data mining for months and months and
months. In fact, he will say he had a discussion with a lawyer in DOD
named Schiffren who told him do not worry about it, just fill out a
document, sign your name that you need it, put it in the box, and you
can keep it as long as you want.
Mr. Speaker, that is entirely contradictory to what the Defense
Intelligence Agency has been telling us, to what DOD has been telling
us. Now we have someone who is willing to come forward and say that 90-
day period is not real, they kept Able Danger information for months
and months and months.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong here. A sitting
President of the United States resigned his position because he tried
to cover up a third-rate burglary when some low-level operatives from
the Republican committee to reelect him broke into the Democrat
headquarters in Washington, D.C. No one was killed. No money was
stolen. No State secrets were stolen. It was a third-rate burglary, but
it caused the resignation of President Richard Nixon.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about the deaths of 3,000 Americans.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about 2.5 terabytes of data about al
Qaeda. That is equal to one-fourth of all of the printed material in
the Library of Congress.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about Mohammed Atta and three of the
terrorists that attacked us on 9/11.
Mr. Speaker, we are talking about military intelligence officers,
including an Annapolis graduate who will command one of our destroyers
in January of 2006 who risked his entire career to state on the record
I will swear until I die that I saw Mohammed Atta's face every day
starting in January of 2000, a year and a half before 9/11.
Mr. Speaker, this is not somebody off the street, this is a graduate
of Annapolis, a 23-year Naval officer who will command one of our
destroyers in January who is agreeing with Lieutenant Shaffer. We have
three other people who have testified under oath that they saw the same
photograph, and the person I met yesterday will testify that he had the
name of a Mohammed Atta before 9/11 but not the face.
Mr. Speaker, this is not some third-rate burglary coverup. This is
not some Watergate incident. This is an attempt to prevent the American
people from knowing the facts about how we could have prevented 9/11
and people are covering it up today. They are ruining the career of a
military officer to do it and we cannot let it stand. I do not care
whether you are Democrat or Republican, you cannot let a lieutenant
colonel's career be ruined because of some bureaucrat in the Defense
Intelligence Agency. If we let that happen, then no one who wears the
uniform will ever feel protected because we will have let them down.
Anyone who wears the uniform of this country who is serving today
expects us to back him or her up and that is not happening. We are
seeing lying, distortion.
Mr. Speaker, do you know, Wolf Blitzer on CNN told my staff that a
Department of Defense employee told him that Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer
was having an affair with one of my employees. How low can we go, Mr.
Speaker? How low can we go to allow this Defense Department to try to
ruin the reputation and the personal life of a lieutenant colonel with
a Bronze Star? To Wolf Blitzer, Mr. Speaker.
We need to know the name of that defense official who told Wolf
Blitzer who told my staff, and he is not the only one. I have other
media people who will come forward in this grand effort to destroy the
reputation of a uniformed military officer, to create scandalous
accusations. He does not even know my staff, to accuse him of stealing
pens when he was 15, to take away his health care benefits for his two
kids because he is telling the truth.
What do we stand for if not the truth? Is it more important that we
be politically correct? Is it more important that I not rock the boat
because my party is in the White House, because I campaigned for Bush,
and support Don Rumsfeld. Is that more important? If that is more
important, I do not want to be here. I will leave. I will leave my
post, but I will not do it until we get justice for this man and for
these people who the 9/11 Commission called historically insignificant.
Mr. Speaker, there is something wrong inside the Beltway.
Mr. Speaker, there is something desperately wrong when a military
officer risks his life in Afghanistan time and again, embedded with our
troops under
[[Page H8982]]
an assumed name with a false beard and a false identity, forward
deployed with our troops, gets castigated, gets ridiculed, gets some
low life scum at the Pentagon spreading malicious lies about this
individual, and then say to his lawyer, we are going to take away his
health care benefits, we are going to take away his salary.
Mr. Speaker, if we allow this to stand as Democrats and Republicans,
then none of us deserve to be here. When we all go overseas and meet
the troops, we tell them how proud we are of them. We provide funding
for them. We give them training and take care of their families. What
we are allowing to happen right now is the Defense Intelligence Agency
to ruin the career and the life of a man who spent 23 years protecting
his Nation. If Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer was telling this story alone
in a vacuum, that would be one thing. But he has been corroborated over
and over again. I have met with at least 10 people who fully
corroborate what Tony Shaffer says. Those meetings with the FBI, the
FBI employee still works there and she told the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, I set those meetings up with the FBI to transfer information
about al Qaeda and Able Danger. So she is still there and she
testified.
What we have here, I am convinced of this now, is an aggressive
attempt by CIA management to cover up their own shortcomings in not
being able to do what the Able Danger team did: They identified
Mohammed Atta and the al Qaeda cell of Brooklyn 1 year before
9/11. But even before that, as the story unfolds, you are going to hear
the story that they also identified the threat to the USS Cole 2 weeks
before the attack, and 2 days before the attack were screaming not to
let the USS Cole come into the harbor at Yemen because they knew
something was about to happen.
Mr. Speaker, bad news never comes easy; but in a democracy, the bad
news has to come out so we can make sure it does not happen again.
Mr. Speaker, this whole thing started, not to embarrass anyone, this
whole thing started because none of us knew that Mohammed Atta was
identified before 9/11. It started because this Congress, this body in
particular, tried to establish what is now in place back in 1999, a
national collaborative center, but the CIA said we did not need it. The
American people deserve to have the answers here. They deserve to know
why 3,000 people died. They deserve to know what we could have done and
should have done to better prepare ourselves and to work to prepare for
the next incident. The American people need to know where those
multiple terabytes of data is. Is it still being used? We know in
January of 2001, General Shelton was given a 3-hour briefing on Able
Danger. So even if they destroyed the data back in the summer of 2000,
in January of 2001 there was enough material to give General Shelton,
Commander of the Joint Chiefs, a 3-hour briefing.
Mr. Speaker, there is something here. I am not a conspiracy theorist,
but there is something desperately wrong, Mr. Speaker. There is
something outrageous at work here. This is not a third-rate burglary of
a political campaign headquarters. This involved what is right now the
covering up of information that led to the deaths of 3,000 people,
changed the course of history, led to the invasion of Iraq and
Afghanistan, and has disrupted our country, our economy and people's
lives.
Mr. Speaker, we could ignore this. I cannot. If it means I have to
resign from this body, I will resign. I will not allow, after 19 years
in this body and as a vice chairman of the Committee on Armed Services,
bureaucrats in the Defense Intelligence Agency to concoct stories, to
talk about the theft of pens when this lieutenant colonel was 15 years
old, to talk about this man's personal debt of $2,000. I would hate to
check the indebtedness of Members of Congress. I know mine is more than
$2,000.
Mr. Speaker, this is not America. I had a group of college students
down from Drexel University. There were about 20 of them, including
representative students from eight other nations. We talked about this.
Of course we have talked about all of the problem countries in the
world. We talk about our values as a Nation, the need for a democracy
to have people involved, to have transparency, to have people who
respect the rule of law and the Constitution.
How do I tell them that is what is working here, Mr. Speaker, when
the Pentagon says that these people who simply want to tell the truth
are not allowed? They are saying it is for classified purposes, yet the
DOD lawyer on the Senate side there is nothing classified about any of
the information. It is not about classified programs. I would be the
last to want to see anything classified revealed. I have seen many,
many instances where I have been given sensitive information that only
a few people in the Congress and the country had. I would never reveal
it. It is not about that. This is not about the DIA, this is not about
the CIA, this is about CYA. It is about CYA by bureaucrats in the
Defense Intelligence Agency and possibly some political operatives that
do not want the facts to come out about Able Danger and the information
that the Able Danger team put together. And in the process, they are
going to destroy a man, a man who has been recognized by his country,
who has a family, and who simply wants to do the right thing.
Mr. Speaker, I hated to take the floor tonight, but I did not know
what else to do. We have committees of Congress working on this. I want
to thank the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf), chairman of the FBI
Appropriation Committee on Oversight. He is as outraged as I am. I want
to thank the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), who is
looking at this, and the gentleman from California (Chairman Hunter).
The Committee on Armed Services has a full-time staffer assigned to get
to the facts of this. I want to thank the gentleman from New York (Mr.
King), chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, because he is
looking at this. I want to thank the gentleman from Michigan (Chairman
Hoekstra) and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He has
met with Tony Shaffer and has offered to get more information. I want
to thank my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for standing up
and beginning to ask questions, and I want to thank Senator Specter and
Senator Biden, who attended a Committee on the Judiciary hearing and
expressed their outrage. I want to thank Senator Sessions, Senator Kyl,
and Senator Grassley, who were all there. In fact, Senator Grassley
called it a coverup.
Mr. Speaker, I cannot tell you the number of Members who have come to
me and said this is unacceptable. I would hope that as a result of what
we have heard tonight every Member of Congress will ask for an inquiry.
The gentlewoman from Georgia (Ms. McKinney) wrote a letter to the
chairman of the Committee on Armed Services asking for an
investigation. We have from Republicans to Democrats, left to right,
conservatives to liberals. What is happening here is unacceptable. It
is unimaginable. It is un-American. All over the world tonight, young
Americans are wearing our uniforms. They are doing a great job. They
make us all proud when we travel overseas. They make us proud because
of the pride they have. When I talk to them, they say I am glad to be
doing what I am doing. I am doing the right thing for our country. I
will go any place the Commander in Chief sends me. Whether I am in
Afghanistan or Iraq, they will tell me that.
{time} 2100
Whether we are in Kosovo or Somalia, they will tell us that. Whether
we are at Hurricane Katrina, whether we are at Hurricane Andrew, or
whether we are out in California, the earthquake, or the Midwestern
floods, our troops are all the same. They respect our country. They
respect our Constitution. If we allow this travesty to continue, Mr.
Speaker, then we have let all of those people down for some nameless,
faceless bureaucrat who is fearful that the information will finally
come to light, that the DIA just did not get it.
Back in 1999 and 2000, they did not have a clue. They had millions of
dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars, and could not do what a 20-
member team did in being able to identify Mohammed Atta before the 9/11
attacks. DIA does not want that to come out, Mr. Speaker. They do not
want that to come out. Heaven forbid the Defense Intelligence Agency,
with hundreds of millions of dollars, would have a 20-member team do
what they could not
[[Page H8983]]
do because they were using new technology and new software. They do not
want that to come out. That is why that Deputy Director, when he was at
that meeting, said, I do not want to see this. Do not show it to me.
And that is why today that Deputy Director is trying to ruin the career
of Lieutenant Colonel Shaffer.
The only way to resolve this, Mr. Speaker, is to have a full
independent investigation by the Inspector General of the Pentagon. I
have asked Secretary Rumsfeld today to do that. I would ask my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in that request. Let
the independent inspector for the Pentagon go in, not DIA. DIA cannot
investigate itself. It does not have the capability to do that. It does
not have the integrity to do that. Let the Inspector General do the
investigation and while that is being done, protect Lieutenant Colonel
Shaffer. He does not deserve to have his career ruined or destroyed for
telling the truth.
And while we are at it, Mr. Speaker, if DIA is going to continue to
press this ridiculous set of facts, then as I said earlier, I want DIA
prosecuted for the five felonies they committed in sending classified
documents to a person that 2 weeks earlier they said was incapable of
receiving classified information. And if this continues, I want DIA
held responsible for illegally transferring $500 of public assets to a
person, that in the process of sending that stuff to him, DIA committed
fraud against the taxpayers. I want them held accountable: DIA's
stupidity; DIA's incompetence.
We have a new nominee for the head of DIA, and I am going to ask
every Senator to fully explore each of these issues before that person
is confirmed. I will meet with every Senator personally and go over all
of this information. And I would encourage the Senators and the House
Members to interview the other people who worked with Lieutenant
Colonel Shaffer and to get their assessments of what is going on there.
They will all tell them the same thing: Shaffer is being abused and
used as a scapegoat. If they can ruin Shaffer, they can silence the
story.
It cannot happen, Mr. Speaker. We cannot let it. That is not what
America is about. That is not what we say to our enlisted personnel
when they sign up for duty. That is not what we say when we pass our
defense bills every year.
This man is being maligned and mistreated. He is being harassed. The
most scurrilous accusations, totally unfounded, have been given to the
American media; and I will name names, and I will ask for an
investigation of the people who made those statements to these media
people because it all needs to be put on the record.
And as someone tomorrow who will chair another hearing on our defense
oversight to try to get the best value for the dollars for our
military, I ask all of our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, on both sides of
the aisle to join us. This is not Republicans or Democrats. It is about
what is fundamental to this country. I would ask our constituents
across America we represent to join us, to express their outrage, to e-
mail, make phone calls, write letters to the Secretary of Defense, the
President of the United States, to Members of Congress to simply let
the story be told. Let the Able Danger story finally come out to the
American people. Let them understand what really happened. Let Scott
Philpott talk. Let Tony Shaffer talk. Let the others who have been
silenced have a chance to tell their story to Congress and openly to
the American people. In the end, the country will be stronger.
____________________
http://www.homelandsecurityus.com/abledanger.asp
ABLE DANGER: "Bigger than Watergate"
Rep. Curt Weldon's Testimony before Senate Judiciary Committee on ABLE DANGER
Transcript of interview: Rep. Curt Weldon on Michael Savage Radio Program
For a fantastic compilation of all Able-Danger related information, visit QT MONSTER'S PLACE, an Internet Blog unmatched for factual information about what will potentially be the largest political cover-up in U.S. History.
The Northeast Intelligence Network thanks and gratefully acknowledges QT MONSTER'S PLACE for permitting the reproduction of the Weldon transcript cited here.
"A MUST READ."
Here are the facts: President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12333 entitled "United States Intelligence Activities" on 4 December 1981.
Here is the historical data concerning this specific Executive Order:
SOURCE: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/e...981-reagan.html
Executive Order 12333
United States Intelligence Activities
Signed: December 4, 1981
Federal Register page and date: 46 FR 59941; December 8, 1981
Amends: EO 12139, May 23, 1979
Amended by: EO 13284, January 23, 2003; EO 13355, August 27, 2004
Revokes: EO 12036, January 24, 1978
See: EO 12564, September 15, 1986; Pub. L. 102-396 (106 Stat. 1910); EO 12829, January 6, 1993; EO 13231, October 16, 2001; EO 13283, January 21, 2003; EO 13354, August 27, 2004; EO 13356, August 27, 2004
E.O. 13284 Amended EO 12333 on 23 January 2003 with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and its insertion into United States Intelligence Activities, per Section 18. This EO did nothing to otherwise alter the legal effect to EO 12333.
E.O. 13355 Amended E.O. 12333 on 27 August 2004 which Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community per its Section 2 and applied directly to E.O. 12333. This E.O. strengthened the legal provisions of E.O. 12333.
Therefore, there is no legal basis for the provisions of Executive Order 12333 to have been interfered with or blatantly ignored by Department of Justice or Department of Defense lawyers pursuant to the exchange of intelligence data between USSOCOM project Able danger and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Furthermore, E.O. 12333 mandated such collaboration and exchanges of data occur specifically between the DoD and the FBI when intelligence data was indicative of international terrorist activity occurred or was active within the territory of the United States.
There MUST BE A FULL AND UNBIASED INVESTIGATION into this matter. Eventually this E.O. must become the focus of national attention if the crux of the Able Danger story is to be told truthfully to the American people. This has been our position since August 9, 2005 and it is where we publicly continue to stand on this issue.
Sadly, The 9/11 Commission Has Failed Every American
By Douglas J. Hagmann, Director
"This is a very, very important part of history and we've got to tell it right." Thomas Kean, Chairman of the 9/11 Committee; December 17, 2003.
"Promises Broken"
Kean promises major revelations in public testimony beginning next month from top officials in the FBI, CIA, Defense Department, National Security Agency and, maybe, President Bush and former President Clinton. CBS NEWS
”Thanks to your democratic laws, we will invade you; thanks to our religious laws, we will dominate you.” Islam Cleric
19 August 2005: Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer is a true American patriot of great character and integrity. Placing the unbridled truth over potential negative career ramifications and harassment, the Army intelligence officer yesterday publicly charged that the unit in which he worked had identified two al Qaeda cells inside the U.S. and 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta more than a year before the terrorist attacks. Properly handled, according to Lt. Colonel Shaffer, that information might have prevented the terror attacks.
Lt. Col. Shaffer stated that his unit, code-named Able Danger, provided this very information to the 9/11 commission headed by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean; nonetheless, the commission failed to include any reference to this vital information in its final report.
Kean, the very person who promised all Americans that he would “tell it right,” referring to the events leading up to 9/11, and other commission staff members initially denied ever receiving any information about Able Danger and its findings. When it could not be denied any further, Kean and his commission members ultimately admitted that yes, they were told of the information developed by Able Danger. Now, Kean and his commission members are dismissing the information as "historically insignificant."
Also missing from the final report are any references to declassified documents proving that State Department analysts repeatedly warned the Clinton administration as early as 1996 that Osama bin Laden posed a major threat to U.S. interests.
From an outright lie to a twisting of the facts and onward to a minimization of the “significance” of the data, the 9/11 commission continues to fail every American citizen to cover their own failings and political cover-ups.
Worse than Watergate: Commission Members Protecting Their Own
Opening the U.S. to Multiple Foreign Attacks, from the first WTC bombing to the events of 9/11 will be President William Jefferson Clinton’s Legacy
Allowing the 9/11 Commission to Mislead the American Public, Covering the Incompetence of Intelligence Officials and Career Politicians Could be the Legacy Left by President Bush.
The script for 9/11 Commission was written before it began. Legitimate and well-founded controversy surrounded the appointment of Jamie Gorelick, former Deputy Attorney General under Janet Reno and the Clinton administration. Gorelick was at the center of controversy as a result of her March 4, 1995 controversial memo to U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White and others, erecting “a wall of separation” disallowing the sharing of intelligence between law-enforcement agencies about terrorists in the United States. What a concept.
Gorelick, refusing to withdraw from the commission despite actual and perceived conflicts of interest, and Kean, who led the commission, must be held accountable for their failure to address a number of issues and answering some important questions, including:
Why didn’t the final 9/11 Commission report address the “Gorelick Wall of Separation” that was described in 1995, after the first World Trade Center bombing and before the Oklahoma City bombing, as "very dangerous," with potentially "deadly results," by then-U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, the prosecutor of the first World Trade Center bombing by Islamic terrorists inside the U.S.
Why didn’t the final 9/11 Commission report address a series of important memos from U.S. Attorney May Jo White complaining about the Justice Department, under then President William Jefferson Clinton, was obviously hindering the ability of our own military and intelligence agencies to find terrorists before they struck. Not surprisingly, Gorelick knew about the memos as she sat on the commission, but said absolutely nothing about them.
Why did the 9/11 commission ignore the information offered by the Able Danger operation and then lie about it – and continue to minimize it to this day.
Why is no one addressing the fact that Lt. Col. Shaffer stated that his unit tried, on 3 separate occasions in 2000 to meet with FBI agents from the Washington field office, but was rebuffed each time at the direction of military lawyers who were concerned that Able Danger might have violated the privacy of terrorists legally present in the U.S., despite of the provisions of Executive Order 12333? Every American citizen who died in terrorist attacks during the last 12 years and two Presidential administrations deserves answers, and not politics as usual.
Most are Ignoring the Obvious
A Simple, Primary Fact Concerning Able Danger
Executive Order 12333 Places Final Authority with the President of the United States
By Sean Osborne, Senior Analyst & Military Affairs Expert
15 August 2005: On Friday, 11 August 2005, I outlined where the final legal authority rested that was in effect when the highly-classified US Special Operations Command Project Able Danger military intelligence team attempted to get its intelligence findings about Mohamed Atta and his al Qaeda terrorist cell in the U.S. to the FBI. It was not with the lawyers from the Department of Defense or with the Department of Justice. The defining legal authority of this entire affair DID NOT LEGALLY RESIDE with the reported Department of Justice lawyers who actually prevented that exchange of data. Accordingly, the road block and redirection were patently illegal - but few appear to be getting the very simple but most important point.
ALL US Department of Defense intelligence activities are conducted as specifically mandated per Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan on 4 December 1981. All authority for the conduct of military intelligence operations in conjunction with other federal law enforcement agencies and bureaus resides and has resided since that time with the President of the United States, who is the military Commander-In-Chief as well as the chief constitutional law enforcement officer of the land. The direction found in this Executive Order is completely unambiguous and has remained in effect for the past 19 years. The order is directed to the Directors of US Central Intelligence, the FBI, NSA, NRO, DIA and the US Secretary of Defense, and to all branches of American military intelligence, and has encompassed every administration since the Reagan Administration, including the 8-year tenure of William Jefferson Clinton.
It is just that simple.
Details of E.O. 12333 can be found here.
Specifically, as found section 1.11, line items (d), (f) and (k) Presidential Executive Order 12333 gives direction to the Secretary of Defense as follows:
(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General;
(f) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government;
(k) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (j) above.
Section 1.12, line item (d) states the following:
The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,
Whose responsibilities shall include: (1) Collection, production and dissemination of military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and information on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. When collection is conducted in response to national foreign intelligence requirements, it will be conducted in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Collection of national foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable, outside the United States shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI;
Additionally, EO 12333 concludes with the following:
Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to:
(
Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities;
Finally we come to the strawman legal argument which came from the “administration lawyers” as related by Congressman Weldon regarding the possession of “green cards”. The facts are these: Mohammed Atta and his terrorist cohorts were clearly and factually established as Al-Qaeda functionaries of a foreign government [Taliban of Afghanistan] with Al-Qaeda itself being a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (DFTO). Designated terrorist’s do not receive and retain "green card" status, and any card so previously attained would have to be considered a priori fraudulent, null and void.
These are the salient facts regarding the intelligence collected by “Able Danger”. What remains is the also overlooked Congressional oversight of intelligence activities as delineated in EO 12333. The now defunct blue-ribbon 9/11 Commission having dropped the ball once is excused from further inquiry, and we call for a full-scale Congressional investigation which must reveal the truth of the matter to the American people. This is what we taxpayers pay them to do. It what our tax dollars paid “Able Danger” to do, and what EO-12333 signed by President Ronald Reagan in December 1981 directed them to do on our behalf.
Anything less is a white-wash, a cover-up and professionally incompetent.
“Able Danger”: The American People Should Demand Answers
Questions of Legal Issues, Intelligence Oversight and Sharing of Collected Intelligence from US SOCOM that ARE NOT being asked
By Sean Osborne, Senior Analyst & Military Affairs Expert
11 August 2005: As we reported yesterday, Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) delivered to his peers in Congress on 27 June, 2005 revelations and evidence gained by a secret military intelligence entity, Code Name: “Able Danger” a full year prior to the events of September 11, 2001. (See article below). According to Congressman Weldon, and as reported by FoxNews yesterday, "Lawyers within the administration — and we're talking about the Clinton administration, not the Bush administration — said 'you can't do it'" when referencing the “taking out” of a known terrorist cell that would be the main component of the 9/11 attacks. These “lawyers” then placed 3M Post-It brand stickers over Mohammed Atta's face. In my professional opinion, the words and actions taken by these lawyers were the beginning of a literal, real-world cover-up which would result in the deaths of 2,819 innocent human beings.
This situation begs for Congressional inquiry into exactly who these lawyers are- their names, where are they today and additionally, where is the evidence of any legal oversight of their actions - which appear to be demonstrably illegal, incompetent, negligent and possibly conducted with the highest degree of malfeasance.. Furthermore, additional questions for a Congressional inquiry are: (1) under whose specific direction did they act, and (2) under what legal authority did they act? In general, why did they NOT share information with our intelligence agencies to allow Atta and his fellow terrorists to be stopped when there was ample legal ability to do so?
There is a very salient and critical point virtually every reporting media outlet has been remiss in identifying regarding intelligence collection activities by the United States Department of Defense. It is this: ALL US Department of Defense intelligence activities, just like US SOCOM's "Able Danger," ARE NOT derived from, emanate from or promulgated by US law and Congressional legislation. They arise specifically from Executive Order 12333 (signed by President Ronald Reagan on December 4, 1981) and all the authority resides and has resided since that time with the President of the United States who is the military Commander-In-Chief as well as the chief constitutional law enforcement officer of the land.
Details of E.O. 12333 can be found here.
Specifically, as found section 1.11, line items (d), (f) and (k) Presidential Executive Order 12333 gives direction to the Secretary of Defense as follows:
(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General;
(f) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government;
(k) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (j) above.
Section 1.12, line item (d) states the following:
The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,
Whose responsibilities shall include: (1) Collection, production and dissemination of military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and information on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. When collection is conducted in response to national foreign intelligence requirements, it will be conducted in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Collection of national foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable, outside the United States shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI;
Additionally, EO 12333 concludes with the following:
Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to:
( Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities;
Finally we come to the strawman legal argument which came from the “administration lawyers” as related by Congressman Weldon regarding the possession of “green cards”. The facts are these: Mohammed Atta and his terrorist cohorts were clearly and factually established as Al-Qaeda functionaries of a foreign government [Taliban of Afghanistan] with Al-Qaeda itself being a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (DFTO). Designated terrorist’s do not receive and retain "green card" status, and any card so previously attained would have to be considered a priori fraudulent, null and void.
These are the salient facts regarding the intelligence collected by “Able Danger”. What remains is the also overlooked Congressional oversight of intelligence activities as delineated in EO 12333. The now defunct blue-ribbon 9/11 Commission having dropped the ball once is excused from further inquiry, and we call for a full-scale Congressional investigation which must reveal the truth of the matter to the American people. This is what we taxpayers pay them to do. It what our tax dollars paid “Able Danger” to do, and what EO-12333 signed by President Ronald Reagan in December 1981 directed them to do on our behalf.
Able Danger, the 9/11 Commission & the Strange (But Now Explainable) Actions of Sandy Berger
By Sean Osborne, Senior Analyst & Military Affairs Expert
& Douglas J. Hagmann,Director
10 August 2005: Hey America… do you remember the strange actions of President Clinton’s national security adviser Sandy Berger during the 9/11 Commission investigation when he removed highly classified terrorism documents that should have been turned over to that independent commission? Did you ever wonder what Berger was attempting to hide and even more importantly, why? Did you also wonder why, even though he committed a felony, he received nothing more than a slap on the wrist while various political and intelligence officials played down his actions, wanting them to disappear as quickly as possible? It appears that we just might have discovered the answers to these and other troubling questions: Able Danger.
Able Danger is the code name of a secret team of U.S. Army military intelligence operatives created in 1999 under a directive signed by General Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to assemble information about al Qaeda networks around the world. In mid-2000, the Able Danger team discovered the existence of the key 9/11 terror cell of Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawar al-Hamzi inside the U.S. and recommended to their military superiors that the FBI be called in to “take out that cell,” according to Representative Curt Weldon, the Pennsylvania House member and vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. That information was presented in the summer of 2000 in the form of a chart complete with photographs of the terrorists to the Pentagon's Special Operations Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Our intelligence was dead-on accurate, but was not acted upon a full year before the 9/11 attacks.
In fact, Representative Weldon said Able Danger members had recommended that the information they uncovered be shared with the FBI, but the idea was rejected and they “were directed to take those 3M yellow stickers and place them over the faces of Atta and the other terrorists and pretend they didn’t exist.”
Despite the findings of Able Danger, absolutely no action was pursued to take out the cell during the weeks leading up to the 2000 presidential election, said Weldon. The reason? Mohammed Atta possessed a “green card” at the time. Under the rules of the Clinton Justice Department, lawyers working for Special Operations decided that anyone holding a green card had to be granted essentially the same legal protections as any U.S. citizen. They did not want to recommend that the FBI go after someone holding a green card, Weldon told his House colleagues on June 27, 2005 during a speech, known as a “special order,” which he delivered on the House floor. Defense Department lawyers were also said to be reluctant to suggest a bold action by FBI agents after the bureau’s disastrous 1993 strike against the Branch Davidian religious cult in Waco, Texas.
Read Curt Weldon’s June 27, 2005 Testimony
This week, Representative Weldon and a former defense intelligence official said they had spoken with three Able Danger team members, all still working in the government, including two in the military, and that they were consistent in asserting that Mohammed Atta's affiliation with a Qaeda terrorism cell in the United States was known within the Defense Department by mid-2000 but was not acted upon. Further and after the fact, the 9-11 Commission was reportedly never told about Able Danger or its findings.
Enter Sandy Berger – During the 9/11 Commission
While the investigation by the 9/11 Commission was in progress, Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, who served as Clinton's national security adviser for all of President's Clinton’s second term, was caught removing documents from the national Archives – the very same documents that should have been turned over to the independent commission probing the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. Berger ultimately admitted to intentionally taking and destroying various classified documents relating to terrorism collected under the Clinton administration. Berger and his lawyer said on July 19, 2004 that he knowingly removed the handwritten notes by placing them in his jacket, pants and socks, and also “inadvertently” took copies of actual classified documents in a leather portfolio. Those documents reportedly included an assessment of America's terror vulnerabilities at airports, something very relevant to Able Danger’s findings and key to the 9/11 attacks. What Sandy Berger did was a felony, yet was allowed a generous plea agreement of a fine and a three-year suspension of his security clearance.
Under the prism of Able Danger, we are now able to make sense out of the previously curious actions of Sandy Berger.
Able Danger & the Saga of the 9/11 Commission; Warren Commission Redux
According to Weldon, staff members of the 9/11 Commission were briefed on the findings of the Able Danger intelligence unit within the Special Operations Command and about the specific recommendation to break up the Mohammed Atta cell, yet those members reportedly decided not to brief the commission’s members on those matters. Why not?
Clearer now is the conflict of interest of having Jamie Gorelick, the Assistant Attorney General under Bill Clinton serving on the 9/11 Commission. Ms. Gorelick worked directly for Janet Reno and was directly involved in matters that were under review by the 9/11 Commission.
Remember the reason the findings of Able Danger were not acted upon? In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Attorney General John Ashcroft stated the following:
"In 1995, the Justice Department embraced flawed legal reasoning, imposing a series of restrictions on the FBI that went beyond what the law required," he said. "The 1995 Guidelines and the procedures developed around them imposed draconian barriers to communications between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. The wall left intelligence agents afraid to talk with criminal prosecutors or agents. In 1995, the Justice Department designed a system destined to fail."
Continuing his testimony, Ashcroft stated:
"Somebody built this wall.” Ashcroft added: "The basic architecture for the wall . . . was contained in a classified memorandum entitled 'Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations. Full disclosure compels me to inform you that its author is a member of this Commission."
Ashcroft was referring to Jamie Gorelick, who served as Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Administration as well as general counsel at the Department of Defense. Both jobs put her at the very center of the former administration's anti-terrorism efforts. Consequently, her actions, as well as those of her superiors, were the subject of review by the very commission on which she is a member. Most assuredly, that is a huge conflict of interest. In her position at the Justice Department, Gorelick wrote a memo that provides a picture of the role she played setting policy for intelligence gathering and sharing during the Clinton Administration. The memo stemmed from the Justice Department's prosecution of the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.
Gorelick wrote in 1995:
“During the course of those investigations, significant counterintelligence information has been developed related to the activities and plans of agents of foreign powers operating in this country and overseas, including previously unknown connections between separate terrorist groups." We believe that it is prudent to establish a set of instructions that will clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation."
And therein is the framework for the legal conundrum faced by Able Danger, and why Atta and his minions were free to hijack 4 airliners on 9/11.
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ABLE DANGER: "Bigger than Watergate"
Rep. Curt Weldon's Testimony before Senate Judiciary Committee on ABLE DANGER
Transcript of interview: Rep. Curt Weldon on Michael Savage Radio Program
For a fantastic compilation of all Able-Danger related information, visit QT MONSTER'S PLACE, an Internet Blog unmatched for factual information about what will potentially be the largest political cover-up in U.S. History.
The Northeast Intelligence Network thanks and gratefully acknowledges QT MONSTER'S PLACE for permitting the reproduction of the Weldon transcript cited here.
"A MUST READ."
Here are the facts: President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12333 entitled "United States Intelligence Activities" on 4 December 1981.
Here is the historical data concerning this specific Executive Order:
SOURCE: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/e...981-reagan.html
Executive Order 12333
United States Intelligence Activities
Signed: December 4, 1981
Federal Register page and date: 46 FR 59941; December 8, 1981
Amends: EO 12139, May 23, 1979
Amended by: EO 13284, January 23, 2003; EO 13355, August 27, 2004
Revokes: EO 12036, January 24, 1978
See: EO 12564, September 15, 1986; Pub. L. 102-396 (106 Stat. 1910); EO 12829, January 6, 1993; EO 13231, October 16, 2001; EO 13283, January 21, 2003; EO 13354, August 27, 2004; EO 13356, August 27, 2004
E.O. 13284 Amended EO 12333 on 23 January 2003 with the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and its insertion into United States Intelligence Activities, per Section 18. This EO did nothing to otherwise alter the legal effect to EO 12333.
E.O. 13355 Amended E.O. 12333 on 27 August 2004 which Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community per its Section 2 and applied directly to E.O. 12333. This E.O. strengthened the legal provisions of E.O. 12333.
Therefore, there is no legal basis for the provisions of Executive Order 12333 to have been interfered with or blatantly ignored by Department of Justice or Department of Defense lawyers pursuant to the exchange of intelligence data between USSOCOM project Able danger and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Furthermore, E.O. 12333 mandated such collaboration and exchanges of data occur specifically between the DoD and the FBI when intelligence data was indicative of international terrorist activity occurred or was active within the territory of the United States.
There MUST BE A FULL AND UNBIASED INVESTIGATION into this matter. Eventually this E.O. must become the focus of national attention if the crux of the Able Danger story is to be told truthfully to the American people. This has been our position since August 9, 2005 and it is where we publicly continue to stand on this issue.
Sadly, The 9/11 Commission Has Failed Every American
By Douglas J. Hagmann, Director
"This is a very, very important part of history and we've got to tell it right." Thomas Kean, Chairman of the 9/11 Committee; December 17, 2003.
"Promises Broken"
Kean promises major revelations in public testimony beginning next month from top officials in the FBI, CIA, Defense Department, National Security Agency and, maybe, President Bush and former President Clinton. CBS NEWS
”Thanks to your democratic laws, we will invade you; thanks to our religious laws, we will dominate you.” Islam Cleric
19 August 2005: Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer is a true American patriot of great character and integrity. Placing the unbridled truth over potential negative career ramifications and harassment, the Army intelligence officer yesterday publicly charged that the unit in which he worked had identified two al Qaeda cells inside the U.S. and 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta more than a year before the terrorist attacks. Properly handled, according to Lt. Colonel Shaffer, that information might have prevented the terror attacks.
Lt. Col. Shaffer stated that his unit, code-named Able Danger, provided this very information to the 9/11 commission headed by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean; nonetheless, the commission failed to include any reference to this vital information in its final report.
Kean, the very person who promised all Americans that he would “tell it right,” referring to the events leading up to 9/11, and other commission staff members initially denied ever receiving any information about Able Danger and its findings. When it could not be denied any further, Kean and his commission members ultimately admitted that yes, they were told of the information developed by Able Danger. Now, Kean and his commission members are dismissing the information as "historically insignificant."
Also missing from the final report are any references to declassified documents proving that State Department analysts repeatedly warned the Clinton administration as early as 1996 that Osama bin Laden posed a major threat to U.S. interests.
From an outright lie to a twisting of the facts and onward to a minimization of the “significance” of the data, the 9/11 commission continues to fail every American citizen to cover their own failings and political cover-ups.
Worse than Watergate: Commission Members Protecting Their Own
Opening the U.S. to Multiple Foreign Attacks, from the first WTC bombing to the events of 9/11 will be President William Jefferson Clinton’s Legacy
Allowing the 9/11 Commission to Mislead the American Public, Covering the Incompetence of Intelligence Officials and Career Politicians Could be the Legacy Left by President Bush.
The script for 9/11 Commission was written before it began. Legitimate and well-founded controversy surrounded the appointment of Jamie Gorelick, former Deputy Attorney General under Janet Reno and the Clinton administration. Gorelick was at the center of controversy as a result of her March 4, 1995 controversial memo to U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White and others, erecting “a wall of separation” disallowing the sharing of intelligence between law-enforcement agencies about terrorists in the United States. What a concept.
Gorelick, refusing to withdraw from the commission despite actual and perceived conflicts of interest, and Kean, who led the commission, must be held accountable for their failure to address a number of issues and answering some important questions, including:
Why didn’t the final 9/11 Commission report address the “Gorelick Wall of Separation” that was described in 1995, after the first World Trade Center bombing and before the Oklahoma City bombing, as "very dangerous," with potentially "deadly results," by then-U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, the prosecutor of the first World Trade Center bombing by Islamic terrorists inside the U.S.
Why didn’t the final 9/11 Commission report address a series of important memos from U.S. Attorney May Jo White complaining about the Justice Department, under then President William Jefferson Clinton, was obviously hindering the ability of our own military and intelligence agencies to find terrorists before they struck. Not surprisingly, Gorelick knew about the memos as she sat on the commission, but said absolutely nothing about them.
Why did the 9/11 commission ignore the information offered by the Able Danger operation and then lie about it – and continue to minimize it to this day.
Why is no one addressing the fact that Lt. Col. Shaffer stated that his unit tried, on 3 separate occasions in 2000 to meet with FBI agents from the Washington field office, but was rebuffed each time at the direction of military lawyers who were concerned that Able Danger might have violated the privacy of terrorists legally present in the U.S., despite of the provisions of Executive Order 12333? Every American citizen who died in terrorist attacks during the last 12 years and two Presidential administrations deserves answers, and not politics as usual.
Most are Ignoring the Obvious
A Simple, Primary Fact Concerning Able Danger
Executive Order 12333 Places Final Authority with the President of the United States
By Sean Osborne, Senior Analyst & Military Affairs Expert
15 August 2005: On Friday, 11 August 2005, I outlined where the final legal authority rested that was in effect when the highly-classified US Special Operations Command Project Able Danger military intelligence team attempted to get its intelligence findings about Mohamed Atta and his al Qaeda terrorist cell in the U.S. to the FBI. It was not with the lawyers from the Department of Defense or with the Department of Justice. The defining legal authority of this entire affair DID NOT LEGALLY RESIDE with the reported Department of Justice lawyers who actually prevented that exchange of data. Accordingly, the road block and redirection were patently illegal - but few appear to be getting the very simple but most important point.
ALL US Department of Defense intelligence activities are conducted as specifically mandated per Executive Order 12333, signed by President Ronald Reagan on 4 December 1981. All authority for the conduct of military intelligence operations in conjunction with other federal law enforcement agencies and bureaus resides and has resided since that time with the President of the United States, who is the military Commander-In-Chief as well as the chief constitutional law enforcement officer of the land. The direction found in this Executive Order is completely unambiguous and has remained in effect for the past 19 years. The order is directed to the Directors of US Central Intelligence, the FBI, NSA, NRO, DIA and the US Secretary of Defense, and to all branches of American military intelligence, and has encompassed every administration since the Reagan Administration, including the 8-year tenure of William Jefferson Clinton.
It is just that simple.
Details of E.O. 12333 can be found here.
Specifically, as found section 1.11, line items (d), (f) and (k) Presidential Executive Order 12333 gives direction to the Secretary of Defense as follows:
(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General;
(f) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government;
(k) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (j) above.
Section 1.12, line item (d) states the following:
The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,
Whose responsibilities shall include: (1) Collection, production and dissemination of military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and information on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. When collection is conducted in response to national foreign intelligence requirements, it will be conducted in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Collection of national foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable, outside the United States shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI;
Additionally, EO 12333 concludes with the following:
Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to:
(
Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities; Finally we come to the strawman legal argument which came from the “administration lawyers” as related by Congressman Weldon regarding the possession of “green cards”. The facts are these: Mohammed Atta and his terrorist cohorts were clearly and factually established as Al-Qaeda functionaries of a foreign government [Taliban of Afghanistan] with Al-Qaeda itself being a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (DFTO). Designated terrorist’s do not receive and retain "green card" status, and any card so previously attained would have to be considered a priori fraudulent, null and void.
These are the salient facts regarding the intelligence collected by “Able Danger”. What remains is the also overlooked Congressional oversight of intelligence activities as delineated in EO 12333. The now defunct blue-ribbon 9/11 Commission having dropped the ball once is excused from further inquiry, and we call for a full-scale Congressional investigation which must reveal the truth of the matter to the American people. This is what we taxpayers pay them to do. It what our tax dollars paid “Able Danger” to do, and what EO-12333 signed by President Ronald Reagan in December 1981 directed them to do on our behalf.
Anything less is a white-wash, a cover-up and professionally incompetent.
“Able Danger”: The American People Should Demand Answers
Questions of Legal Issues, Intelligence Oversight and Sharing of Collected Intelligence from US SOCOM that ARE NOT being asked
By Sean Osborne, Senior Analyst & Military Affairs Expert
11 August 2005: As we reported yesterday, Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA) delivered to his peers in Congress on 27 June, 2005 revelations and evidence gained by a secret military intelligence entity, Code Name: “Able Danger” a full year prior to the events of September 11, 2001. (See article below). According to Congressman Weldon, and as reported by FoxNews yesterday, "Lawyers within the administration — and we're talking about the Clinton administration, not the Bush administration — said 'you can't do it'" when referencing the “taking out” of a known terrorist cell that would be the main component of the 9/11 attacks. These “lawyers” then placed 3M Post-It brand stickers over Mohammed Atta's face. In my professional opinion, the words and actions taken by these lawyers were the beginning of a literal, real-world cover-up which would result in the deaths of 2,819 innocent human beings.
This situation begs for Congressional inquiry into exactly who these lawyers are- their names, where are they today and additionally, where is the evidence of any legal oversight of their actions - which appear to be demonstrably illegal, incompetent, negligent and possibly conducted with the highest degree of malfeasance.. Furthermore, additional questions for a Congressional inquiry are: (1) under whose specific direction did they act, and (2) under what legal authority did they act? In general, why did they NOT share information with our intelligence agencies to allow Atta and his fellow terrorists to be stopped when there was ample legal ability to do so?
There is a very salient and critical point virtually every reporting media outlet has been remiss in identifying regarding intelligence collection activities by the United States Department of Defense. It is this: ALL US Department of Defense intelligence activities, just like US SOCOM's "Able Danger," ARE NOT derived from, emanate from or promulgated by US law and Congressional legislation. They arise specifically from Executive Order 12333 (signed by President Ronald Reagan on December 4, 1981) and all the authority resides and has resided since that time with the President of the United States who is the military Commander-In-Chief as well as the chief constitutional law enforcement officer of the land.
Details of E.O. 12333 can be found here.
Specifically, as found section 1.11, line items (d), (f) and (k) Presidential Executive Order 12333 gives direction to the Secretary of Defense as follows:
(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General;
(f) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government;
(k) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in sections (a) through (j) above.
Section 1.12, line item (d) states the following:
The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,
Whose responsibilities shall include: (1) Collection, production and dissemination of military and military-related foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and information on the foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. When collection is conducted in response to national foreign intelligence requirements, it will be conducted in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Collection of national foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable, outside the United States shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection within the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI;
Additionally, EO 12333 concludes with the following:
Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized to:
(
Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities; Finally we come to the strawman legal argument which came from the “administration lawyers” as related by Congressman Weldon regarding the possession of “green cards”. The facts are these: Mohammed Atta and his terrorist cohorts were clearly and factually established as Al-Qaeda functionaries of a foreign government [Taliban of Afghanistan] with Al-Qaeda itself being a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (DFTO). Designated terrorist’s do not receive and retain "green card" status, and any card so previously attained would have to be considered a priori fraudulent, null and void.
These are the salient facts regarding the intelligence collected by “Able Danger”. What remains is the also overlooked Congressional oversight of intelligence activities as delineated in EO 12333. The now defunct blue-ribbon 9/11 Commission having dropped the ball once is excused from further inquiry, and we call for a full-scale Congressional investigation which must reveal the truth of the matter to the American people. This is what we taxpayers pay them to do. It what our tax dollars paid “Able Danger” to do, and what EO-12333 signed by President Ronald Reagan in December 1981 directed them to do on our behalf.
Able Danger, the 9/11 Commission & the Strange (But Now Explainable) Actions of Sandy Berger
By Sean Osborne, Senior Analyst & Military Affairs Expert
& Douglas J. Hagmann,Director
10 August 2005: Hey America… do you remember the strange actions of President Clinton’s national security adviser Sandy Berger during the 9/11 Commission investigation when he removed highly classified terrorism documents that should have been turned over to that independent commission? Did you ever wonder what Berger was attempting to hide and even more importantly, why? Did you also wonder why, even though he committed a felony, he received nothing more than a slap on the wrist while various political and intelligence officials played down his actions, wanting them to disappear as quickly as possible? It appears that we just might have discovered the answers to these and other troubling questions: Able Danger.
Able Danger is the code name of a secret team of U.S. Army military intelligence operatives created in 1999 under a directive signed by General Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to assemble information about al Qaeda networks around the world. In mid-2000, the Able Danger team discovered the existence of the key 9/11 terror cell of Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawar al-Hamzi inside the U.S. and recommended to their military superiors that the FBI be called in to “take out that cell,” according to Representative Curt Weldon, the Pennsylvania House member and vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. That information was presented in the summer of 2000 in the form of a chart complete with photographs of the terrorists to the Pentagon's Special Operations Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida. Our intelligence was dead-on accurate, but was not acted upon a full year before the 9/11 attacks.
In fact, Representative Weldon said Able Danger members had recommended that the information they uncovered be shared with the FBI, but the idea was rejected and they “were directed to take those 3M yellow stickers and place them over the faces of Atta and the other terrorists and pretend they didn’t exist.”
Despite the findings of Able Danger, absolutely no action was pursued to take out the cell during the weeks leading up to the 2000 presidential election, said Weldon. The reason? Mohammed Atta possessed a “green card” at the time. Under the rules of the Clinton Justice Department, lawyers working for Special Operations decided that anyone holding a green card had to be granted essentially the same legal protections as any U.S. citizen. They did not want to recommend that the FBI go after someone holding a green card, Weldon told his House colleagues on June 27, 2005 during a speech, known as a “special order,” which he delivered on the House floor. Defense Department lawyers were also said to be reluctant to suggest a bold action by FBI agents after the bureau’s disastrous 1993 strike against the Branch Davidian religious cult in Waco, Texas.
Read Curt Weldon’s June 27, 2005 Testimony
This week, Representative Weldon and a former defense intelligence official said they had spoken with three Able Danger team members, all still working in the government, including two in the military, and that they were consistent in asserting that Mohammed Atta's affiliation with a Qaeda terrorism cell in the United States was known within the Defense Department by mid-2000 but was not acted upon. Further and after the fact, the 9-11 Commission was reportedly never told about Able Danger or its findings.
Enter Sandy Berger – During the 9/11 Commission
While the investigation by the 9/11 Commission was in progress, Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger, who served as Clinton's national security adviser for all of President's Clinton’s second term, was caught removing documents from the national Archives – the very same documents that should have been turned over to the independent commission probing the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. Berger ultimately admitted to intentionally taking and destroying various classified documents relating to terrorism collected under the Clinton administration. Berger and his lawyer said on July 19, 2004 that he knowingly removed the handwritten notes by placing them in his jacket, pants and socks, and also “inadvertently” took copies of actual classified documents in a leather portfolio. Those documents reportedly included an assessment of America's terror vulnerabilities at airports, something very relevant to Able Danger’s findings and key to the 9/11 attacks. What Sandy Berger did was a felony, yet was allowed a generous plea agreement of a fine and a three-year suspension of his security clearance.
Under the prism of Able Danger, we are now able to make sense out of the previously curious actions of Sandy Berger.
Able Danger & the Saga of the 9/11 Commission; Warren Commission Redux
According to Weldon, staff members of the 9/11 Commission were briefed on the findings of the Able Danger intelligence unit within the Special Operations Command and about the specific recommendation to break up the Mohammed Atta cell, yet those members reportedly decided not to brief the commission’s members on those matters. Why not?
Clearer now is the conflict of interest of having Jamie Gorelick, the Assistant Attorney General under Bill Clinton serving on the 9/11 Commission. Ms. Gorelick worked directly for Janet Reno and was directly involved in matters that were under review by the 9/11 Commission.
Remember the reason the findings of Able Danger were not acted upon? In his testimony before the 9/11 Commission, Attorney General John Ashcroft stated the following:
"In 1995, the Justice Department embraced flawed legal reasoning, imposing a series of restrictions on the FBI that went beyond what the law required," he said. "The 1995 Guidelines and the procedures developed around them imposed draconian barriers to communications between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. The wall left intelligence agents afraid to talk with criminal prosecutors or agents. In 1995, the Justice Department designed a system destined to fail."
Continuing his testimony, Ashcroft stated:
"Somebody built this wall.” Ashcroft added: "The basic architecture for the wall . . . was contained in a classified memorandum entitled 'Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations. Full disclosure compels me to inform you that its author is a member of this Commission."
Ashcroft was referring to Jamie Gorelick, who served as Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Administration as well as general counsel at the Department of Defense. Both jobs put her at the very center of the former administration's anti-terrorism efforts. Consequently, her actions, as well as those of her superiors, were the subject of review by the very commission on which she is a member. Most assuredly, that is a huge conflict of interest. In her position at the Justice Department, Gorelick wrote a memo that provides a picture of the role she played setting policy for intelligence gathering and sharing during the Clinton Administration. The memo stemmed from the Justice Department's prosecution of the 1993 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center.
Gorelick wrote in 1995:
“During the course of those investigations, significant counterintelligence information has been developed related to the activities and plans of agents of foreign powers operating in this country and overseas, including previously unknown connections between separate terrorist groups." We believe that it is prudent to establish a set of instructions that will clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These procedures, which go beyond what is legally required, will prevent any risk of creating an unwarranted appearance that FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) is being used to avoid procedural safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation."
And therein is the framework for the legal conundrum faced by Able Danger, and why Atta and his minions were free to hijack 4 airliners on 9/11.
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http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?con...7&articleId=867
Able Danger adds twist to 9/11
9/11 Ringleader connected to secret Pentagon operation
by Dr. Daniele Ganser
August 27, 2005
ISN Security Watch
We bring to the attention of our readers this important analysis of Dr. Daniele Ganser of the Zurich Polytechnic published by the International Relations and Security Network (ISN). Dr Ganser's study is based on official US documents and reports. It identifies the role of 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta and 3 other hijackers in a secret Pentagon operation. It largely refutes the official US government narrative as presented by the 9/11 Commission.
Four years after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, the revelation of a top secret Pentagon operation adds a new twist to a story about which we still know very little.
For the past four years, we have been told by the administration of George Bush and by the official 9/11 Commission report of Chairman Thomas Kean and Executive Director Philip Zelikow that Egyptian extremist Mohammed Atta was the key player in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Atta, according to the Kean report, was the “tactical leader of the 9/11 plot”. He was the pilot who on that dreadful morning flew the first plane, American Airlines 11, into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York. It was Atta’s face, on television and in newspapers across the world, that became the symbol of Islamic terrorism. And it was Atta’s name - not the names of any of the 18 other hijackers allegedly lead by Atta on that day - that was cited by international security researchers. Atta was, as the Kean report stresses, “the tactical commander of the operation in the United States”. According to both the Bush administration and the official 9/11 Commission report, he was working on the orders of Osama Bin Laden who, from remote Afghanistan, controlled the entire operation.
Now, almost exactly four years after 9/11, the facts appear to have been turned upside down. We now learn that Atta was also connected to a top secret operation of the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the US. According to Army reserve Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Shaffer, a top secret Pentagon project code-named Able Danger had identified Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers as members of an al-Qaida cell more than a year before the attacks.
Able Danger was an 18-month highly classified operation tasked, according to Shaffer, with “developing targeting information for al-Qaida on a global scale”, and used data-mining techniques to look for “patterns, associations, and linkages”. He said he himself had first encountered the names of the four hijackers in mid-2000.
Schaffer himself was fully aware of the delicacy of his revelations. As such, he chose to first speak to US lawmaker and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (Republican, Illinois) and House Intelligence Committee Chairman Peter Hoekstra (Republican, Michigan). Schaffer said the two had assured him that exposing the secret “was the right thing to do”. “I was given assurances we would not suffer any adverse consequences for bringing this to the attention of the public,” he said.
The conversations with Hastert and Hoekstra took place before Schaffer anonymously leaked the information to the media on 8 August in the offices of Republican Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, the vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees who also supported the exposure of this secret.
Schaffer’s decision to expose Operation Able Danger has given rise to some difficult questions, not the least of which concerns the role of Atta in the top secret operation. It also raises the question of whether anyone in the Pentagon knew in advance what Atta was planning on 9/11.
For now, though, the questions are likely to go unanswered, as the Pentagon claims there is no evidence to support allegations that it had had military intelligence on a 9/11 bomber a year before the attack. The Pentagon has acknowledged the existence of Operation Able Danger, but denies claims that it had identified Atta and three others as early as 1999.
When the “official” facts are turned upside down, we need to go back to the sources and ask: What do we really know about 9/11? Our most important source, Atta himself, is dead. So for now, there is only Schaffer, a 42-year-old native of Kansas City, who worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks and had insights into the Pentagon’s top secret operation. According to Schaffer, when he informed the FBI and urged them to arrest Atta, the Pentagon’s lawyers intervened and protected Atta for reasons that remain unclear.
The official 9/11 Commission report, which according to its own declaration aimed “to provide the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11” in its 567-page report, fails to mention Operation Able Danger or any other US-based SOCOM operations. On the contrary, in its recommendations as to how the US could be better protected from “terrorists” in the future, the Kean report on page 415 suggests that SOCOM be given larger powers to carry out covert action operations, previously a domain controlled by the CIA.
The Kean commission also recommended better oversight in order “to combat the secrecy and complexity”. Yet, at the same time, we learn from Schaffer that the Kean commission did not provide the full story on 9/11, and specifically on Able Danger. Schaffer, according to his own testimony, had personally informed Zelikow about Able Danger. Yet Zelikow covered up this piece of the puzzle and, to Schaffer’s frustration and disbelief, decided not to include this data on the pretext that it was “not historically relevant”.
If it is true that Zelikow declined to include the information on Able Danger in the Kean report, and if it is true, as Zelikow wrote, that Atta was the “tactical leader of the 9/11 plot”, and if it is furthermore true, as Schaffer publicly explained, that SOCOM protected Atta prior to his deadly attack on the US, which claimed 3,000 lives, then the account as provided by the official 9/11 report is discredited, and we are faced with a sea of lies and cover-ups.
Four years after 9/11, we are presented with facts that are diametrically opposed to the official narrative. While the biggest questions remain unanswered and there is a possibility that they will never be answered, the media would do well by the public to be diligent enough to keep the issue alive and not allow it to be swept under the rug in the face of confusion and complexity.
Dr. Daniele Ganser specializes in secret warfare and is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies. The opinions contained in this commentary do not necessarily reflect those of the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
The opinions contained in this commentary do not necessarily reflect those of the ISN.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Centre for Research on Globalization.
The Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG) at www.globalresearch.ca grants permission to cross-post original Global Research articles in their entirety, or any portions thereof, on community internet sites, as long as the text & title are not modified. The source must be acknowledged and an active URL hyperlink address to the original CRG article must be indicated. The author's copyright note must be displayed. For publication of Global Research articles in print or other forms including commercial internet sites, contact: crgeditor@yahoo.com
Able Danger adds twist to 9/11
9/11 Ringleader connected to secret Pentagon operation
by Dr. Daniele Ganser
August 27, 2005
ISN Security Watch
We bring to the attention of our readers this important analysis of Dr. Daniele Ganser of the Zurich Polytechnic published by the International Relations and Security Network (ISN). Dr Ganser's study is based on official US documents and reports. It identifies the role of 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta and 3 other hijackers in a secret Pentagon operation. It largely refutes the official US government narrative as presented by the 9/11 Commission.
Four years after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, the revelation of a top secret Pentagon operation adds a new twist to a story about which we still know very little.
For the past four years, we have been told by the administration of George Bush and by the official 9/11 Commission report of Chairman Thomas Kean and Executive Director Philip Zelikow that Egyptian extremist Mohammed Atta was the key player in the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. Atta, according to the Kean report, was the “tactical leader of the 9/11 plot”. He was the pilot who on that dreadful morning flew the first plane, American Airlines 11, into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York. It was Atta’s face, on television and in newspapers across the world, that became the symbol of Islamic terrorism. And it was Atta’s name - not the names of any of the 18 other hijackers allegedly lead by Atta on that day - that was cited by international security researchers. Atta was, as the Kean report stresses, “the tactical commander of the operation in the United States”. According to both the Bush administration and the official 9/11 Commission report, he was working on the orders of Osama Bin Laden who, from remote Afghanistan, controlled the entire operation.
Now, almost exactly four years after 9/11, the facts appear to have been turned upside down. We now learn that Atta was also connected to a top secret operation of the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in the US. According to Army reserve Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony Shaffer, a top secret Pentagon project code-named Able Danger had identified Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers as members of an al-Qaida cell more than a year before the attacks.
Able Danger was an 18-month highly classified operation tasked, according to Shaffer, with “developing targeting information for al-Qaida on a global scale”, and used data-mining techniques to look for “patterns, associations, and linkages”. He said he himself had first encountered the names of the four hijackers in mid-2000.
Schaffer himself was fully aware of the delicacy of his revelations. As such, he chose to first speak to US lawmaker and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (Republican, Illinois) and House Intelligence Committee Chairman Peter Hoekstra (Republican, Michigan). Schaffer said the two had assured him that exposing the secret “was the right thing to do”. “I was given assurances we would not suffer any adverse consequences for bringing this to the attention of the public,” he said.
The conversations with Hastert and Hoekstra took place before Schaffer anonymously leaked the information to the media on 8 August in the offices of Republican Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania, the vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees who also supported the exposure of this secret.
Schaffer’s decision to expose Operation Able Danger has given rise to some difficult questions, not the least of which concerns the role of Atta in the top secret operation. It also raises the question of whether anyone in the Pentagon knew in advance what Atta was planning on 9/11.
For now, though, the questions are likely to go unanswered, as the Pentagon claims there is no evidence to support allegations that it had had military intelligence on a 9/11 bomber a year before the attack. The Pentagon has acknowledged the existence of Operation Able Danger, but denies claims that it had identified Atta and three others as early as 1999.
When the “official” facts are turned upside down, we need to go back to the sources and ask: What do we really know about 9/11? Our most important source, Atta himself, is dead. So for now, there is only Schaffer, a 42-year-old native of Kansas City, who worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Washington at the time of the 9/11 attacks and had insights into the Pentagon’s top secret operation. According to Schaffer, when he informed the FBI and urged them to arrest Atta, the Pentagon’s lawyers intervened and protected Atta for reasons that remain unclear.
The official 9/11 Commission report, which according to its own declaration aimed “to provide the fullest possible account of the events surrounding 9/11” in its 567-page report, fails to mention Operation Able Danger or any other US-based SOCOM operations. On the contrary, in its recommendations as to how the US could be better protected from “terrorists” in the future, the Kean report on page 415 suggests that SOCOM be given larger powers to carry out covert action operations, previously a domain controlled by the CIA.
The Kean commission also recommended better oversight in order “to combat the secrecy and complexity”. Yet, at the same time, we learn from Schaffer that the Kean commission did not provide the full story on 9/11, and specifically on Able Danger. Schaffer, according to his own testimony, had personally informed Zelikow about Able Danger. Yet Zelikow covered up this piece of the puzzle and, to Schaffer’s frustration and disbelief, decided not to include this data on the pretext that it was “not historically relevant”.
If it is true that Zelikow declined to include the information on Able Danger in the Kean report, and if it is true, as Zelikow wrote, that Atta was the “tactical leader of the 9/11 plot”, and if it is furthermore true, as Schaffer publicly explained, that SOCOM protected Atta prior to his deadly attack on the US, which claimed 3,000 lives, then the account as provided by the official 9/11 report is discredited, and we are faced with a sea of lies and cover-ups.
Four years after 9/11, we are presented with facts that are diametrically opposed to the official narrative. While the biggest questions remain unanswered and there is a possibility that they will never be answered, the media would do well by the public to be diligent enough to keep the issue alive and not allow it to be swept under the rug in the face of confusion and complexity.
Dr. Daniele Ganser specializes in secret warfare and is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies. The opinions contained in this commentary do not necessarily reflect those of the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
The opinions contained in this commentary do not necessarily reflect those of the ISN.
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http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view....19-040108-6365r
Congressman wants new Able Danger probe
WASHINGTON, Oct. 19 (UPI) -- A vocal House Republican is calling for a new probe into what he says is a "witch-hunt" by defense officials against a Sept. 11 intelligence whistleblower.
Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Penn., told United Press International that officials at the Defense Intelligence Agency, or DIA, had "conducted a deliberate campaign of character assassination" against the whistleblower, retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer.
Shaffer has said that a highly classified Pentagon data-mining project he worked on, codenamed Able Danger, identified the ringleaders of the Sept. 11 terror attacks as linked to al-Qaida more than a year before they hijacked four planes and crashed them, killing nearly 3,000 people.
Weldon told UPI he had written to the Department of Defense inspector general to ask for "an immediate formal inquiry, with people testifying under oath," into what he called "a clear witch-hunt" against Shaffer, who has been on administrative leave while minor allegations about some expenses are investigated.
Weldon's move comes after Shaffer said that boxes of his personal effects, returned to him by the DIA earlier this month, contained both government property and classified documents.
"Sending classified material through the mail is a felony, and much more serious than any of these minor, trumped up charges against (Shaffer)," he said, adding that "I want the appropriate persons held accountable."
Weldon said that the DIA had now taken steps to fire Shaffer. "It's outrageous and scandalous," he said.
A DIA spokesman had no immediate comment.
Congressman wants new Able Danger probe
WASHINGTON, Oct. 19 (UPI) -- A vocal House Republican is calling for a new probe into what he says is a "witch-hunt" by defense officials against a Sept. 11 intelligence whistleblower.
Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Penn., told United Press International that officials at the Defense Intelligence Agency, or DIA, had "conducted a deliberate campaign of character assassination" against the whistleblower, retired U.S. Army Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer.
Shaffer has said that a highly classified Pentagon data-mining project he worked on, codenamed Able Danger, identified the ringleaders of the Sept. 11 terror attacks as linked to al-Qaida more than a year before they hijacked four planes and crashed them, killing nearly 3,000 people.
Weldon told UPI he had written to the Department of Defense inspector general to ask for "an immediate formal inquiry, with people testifying under oath," into what he called "a clear witch-hunt" against Shaffer, who has been on administrative leave while minor allegations about some expenses are investigated.
Weldon's move comes after Shaffer said that boxes of his personal effects, returned to him by the DIA earlier this month, contained both government property and classified documents.
"Sending classified material through the mail is a felony, and much more serious than any of these minor, trumped up charges against (Shaffer)," he said, adding that "I want the appropriate persons held accountable."
Weldon said that the DIA had now taken steps to fire Shaffer. "It's outrageous and scandalous," he said.
A DIA spokesman had no immediate comment.
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/frank200508260819.asp
August 26, 2005, 8:19 a.m.
Unable Danger
Liable to sue? No way to run a war.
By Ted Frank
Veteran Army intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer claims that the Pentagon identified Mohammed Atta as a terrorist well before he led the September 11 hijackings. But, Shaffer says, there was no follow-up because lawyers were concerned about potential liability for the violation of privacy if something went wrong. This worry was prominent even though there was nothing illegal about the Pentagon cooperating with domestic law enforcement. Shaffer claims this liability concern left the FBI ignorant of Atta’s al Qaeda cell’s operations in the U.S., resulting in a missed opportunity to prevent the terrible events of September 11.
If Shaffer is right, this would be just another example of how our country’s litigation crisis costs us much more than the $246 billion per year that Tillinghast-Towers-Perrin has estimated are the direct costs of the nation’s tort system. Lawyers’ indiscriminate attacks — not just on wrongdoing, but also on socially beneficial behavior — have had adverse ripple effects on Americans’ health and safety.
For example, lawyers using bogus science have collected hundreds of millions by suing obstetricians for “causing” cerebral palsy through “malpractice.” Because the lawsuits have nothing to do with the ability of obstetricians to prevent cerebral palsy, the only thing they have deterred is obstetrical care. This might explain why — as a forthcoming American Enterprise Institute Liability Project monograph will show — states that have not adopted medical malpractice reform have higher infant mortality rates than states that have. In another forthcoming AEI Liability Project monograph, Professors Peter Rubin and Joanna Shepherd of Emory Law School study fatal accident rates and suggest that tort reform has saved 14,000 lives in the states that have implemented such laws by dampening the ripple effects from excessive litigation. Can we also attribute the 3,000 September 11 victims to the litigation crisis?
Perhaps not: Shaffer might be telling tall tales, or his description of the Able Danger program might be suffering from a common problem in litigation: cherry-picking hindsight. In a large organization, there are often mechanisms that produce warnings for hundreds of improbable events. It's not uncommon for lawyers to find those warnings in the process of litigation discovery, show a jury and the world the ones that might have prevented a disaster, and then accuse the defendant of having failed to heed its own internal warnings. At the same time, the plaintiffs and the press will completely disregard the hundreds or thousands of warnings the corporation legitimately disregarded as false alarms, and no one will point out that taking preventative action on every one of these warnings would've completely paralyzed the defendant.
We should avoid that sort of selective reasoning here. Was Atta one of a handful of potential terrorists identified, or was his name buried in a list with thousands of false positives? We don't know yet.
But, if Shaffer turns out to be right, it’s worth noting how plaintiffs’ lawyers might have contributed to the Able Danger failure. In September 11-related lawsuits, the plaintiffs' bar has sued airlines, airports, architects, New York City, and Motorola (!). Trial lawyers might have extorted billions from legitimate businesses seeking to avoid the risk of a bankrupting judgment at trial had there not been a taxpayer bail-out of the September 11 victims in exchange for their agreement not to sue.
Trial lawyers have opportunistically capitalized on catastrophes in order to mine the deep pockets of big corporations. In a lawsuit stemming from an October 2001 incident where a man attacked a driver with a box cutter and caused the bus to crash, a jury held Greyhound liable for $8 million for one woman’s injuries. Why? The plaintiff’s attorney made much of an incident where one of Greyhound’s executives had raised the possibility of the use of driver partitions. Greyhound’s failure to implement this off-hand suggestion was used against them — never mind that no business operates like this, much less that the accident was intentionally caused by one of the bus crash fatalities.
We see this year the power of threatened lawsuits: faced with a roll of the dice at trial over a claim for $50 billion in damages, several banks have agreed to pay attorney Bill Lerach billions of dollars to avoid being sued over the Enron collapse. At less than a nickel on the dollar compared to the possible cost of a successful lawsuit, this is a small protection price for them to pay.
If Shaffer’s allegations hold water, should the lawyers be treated any differently than the defendants they attack? In my mind, fear of litigation may be a "but-for" cause without which September 11 would not have happened. Clearly, the fault for that catastrophe lies squarely with al Qaeda and the militant Islamists who deliberately chose to commit unspeakable atrocities. But it’s hard to avoid noticing that the logic of the trial lawyers — who regularly ask the judicial system to redistribute billions from bystanders’ deep pockets to those of the plaintiffs’ bar because of tenuous connections that skip over the worst wrongdoers — would hold the litigation lobby responsible for their role in creating a culture of fear that prevented the American government from doing its job to protect its citizens. This is not a double standard the American public should continue to tolerate.
— Ted Frank is resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of the AEI Liability Project. He blogs at overlawyered.com.
* * *
August 26, 2005, 8:19 a.m.
Unable Danger
Liable to sue? No way to run a war.
By Ted Frank
Veteran Army intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer claims that the Pentagon identified Mohammed Atta as a terrorist well before he led the September 11 hijackings. But, Shaffer says, there was no follow-up because lawyers were concerned about potential liability for the violation of privacy if something went wrong. This worry was prominent even though there was nothing illegal about the Pentagon cooperating with domestic law enforcement. Shaffer claims this liability concern left the FBI ignorant of Atta’s al Qaeda cell’s operations in the U.S., resulting in a missed opportunity to prevent the terrible events of September 11.
If Shaffer is right, this would be just another example of how our country’s litigation crisis costs us much more than the $246 billion per year that Tillinghast-Towers-Perrin has estimated are the direct costs of the nation’s tort system. Lawyers’ indiscriminate attacks — not just on wrongdoing, but also on socially beneficial behavior — have had adverse ripple effects on Americans’ health and safety.
For example, lawyers using bogus science have collected hundreds of millions by suing obstetricians for “causing” cerebral palsy through “malpractice.” Because the lawsuits have nothing to do with the ability of obstetricians to prevent cerebral palsy, the only thing they have deterred is obstetrical care. This might explain why — as a forthcoming American Enterprise Institute Liability Project monograph will show — states that have not adopted medical malpractice reform have higher infant mortality rates than states that have. In another forthcoming AEI Liability Project monograph, Professors Peter Rubin and Joanna Shepherd of Emory Law School study fatal accident rates and suggest that tort reform has saved 14,000 lives in the states that have implemented such laws by dampening the ripple effects from excessive litigation. Can we also attribute the 3,000 September 11 victims to the litigation crisis?
Perhaps not: Shaffer might be telling tall tales, or his description of the Able Danger program might be suffering from a common problem in litigation: cherry-picking hindsight. In a large organization, there are often mechanisms that produce warnings for hundreds of improbable events. It's not uncommon for lawyers to find those warnings in the process of litigation discovery, show a jury and the world the ones that might have prevented a disaster, and then accuse the defendant of having failed to heed its own internal warnings. At the same time, the plaintiffs and the press will completely disregard the hundreds or thousands of warnings the corporation legitimately disregarded as false alarms, and no one will point out that taking preventative action on every one of these warnings would've completely paralyzed the defendant.
We should avoid that sort of selective reasoning here. Was Atta one of a handful of potential terrorists identified, or was his name buried in a list with thousands of false positives? We don't know yet.
But, if Shaffer turns out to be right, it’s worth noting how plaintiffs’ lawyers might have contributed to the Able Danger failure. In September 11-related lawsuits, the plaintiffs' bar has sued airlines, airports, architects, New York City, and Motorola (!). Trial lawyers might have extorted billions from legitimate businesses seeking to avoid the risk of a bankrupting judgment at trial had there not been a taxpayer bail-out of the September 11 victims in exchange for their agreement not to sue.
Trial lawyers have opportunistically capitalized on catastrophes in order to mine the deep pockets of big corporations. In a lawsuit stemming from an October 2001 incident where a man attacked a driver with a box cutter and caused the bus to crash, a jury held Greyhound liable for $8 million for one woman’s injuries. Why? The plaintiff’s attorney made much of an incident where one of Greyhound’s executives had raised the possibility of the use of driver partitions. Greyhound’s failure to implement this off-hand suggestion was used against them — never mind that no business operates like this, much less that the accident was intentionally caused by one of the bus crash fatalities.
We see this year the power of threatened lawsuits: faced with a roll of the dice at trial over a claim for $50 billion in damages, several banks have agreed to pay attorney Bill Lerach billions of dollars to avoid being sued over the Enron collapse. At less than a nickel on the dollar compared to the possible cost of a successful lawsuit, this is a small protection price for them to pay.
If Shaffer’s allegations hold water, should the lawyers be treated any differently than the defendants they attack? In my mind, fear of litigation may be a "but-for" cause without which September 11 would not have happened. Clearly, the fault for that catastrophe lies squarely with al Qaeda and the militant Islamists who deliberately chose to commit unspeakable atrocities. But it’s hard to avoid noticing that the logic of the trial lawyers — who regularly ask the judicial system to redistribute billions from bystanders’ deep pockets to those of the plaintiffs’ bar because of tenuous connections that skip over the worst wrongdoers — would hold the litigation lobby responsible for their role in creating a culture of fear that prevented the American government from doing its job to protect its citizens. This is not a double standard the American public should continue to tolerate.
— Ted Frank is resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of the AEI Liability Project. He blogs at overlawyered.com.
* * *
3 September 2005
Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/200...50901-3844.html
U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
News Transcript
Thursday, September 1, 2005
Special Defense Department Briefing
Participating in this brief were:
Mr. Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Media Operations)
Ms. Pat Downs, Senior Policy Analyst, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence)
Mr. Thomas Gandy, Army G-2 Director of Counterintelligence and HUMINT
Mr. Bill Huntington, Vice Deputy Director for HUMINT, Defense Intelligence Agency
Cmdr. Christopher Chope, Center for Special Operations, U.S. Special Operations Command
Whitman: When I scheduled this particular room I hadn't anticipated that we would have these other activities that are going on down south, but I'm glad there are some of you here to report on this and have an interest in this.
As you know, the department has been aggressively looking into this Able Danger program since there were some allegations that were made some three weeks ago I think now, about three weeks. There's been a very extensive effort by the department to look broad, to look deep, and to document as well as to interviewing individuals that are associated with the project. Today we have reached the point where we're prepared to tell you what that broad and deep and extensive review has revealed to us.
I've got a number of subject matter experts here whose organizations were involved. By the mere fact of the representatives here you can see that this was not something that was just looked at narrowly. What we'll be able to do today is talk a little bit about what Able Danger was and maybe more importantly what it wasn't; what type of products were a result of this activity; discuss a little bit about some of the legal authorities and things that have been reported on, sometimes inaccurately about this; and to really talk to you a bit about our interactions with the 9/11 Commission when they were doing their work.
I got you all here under the guise of a background briefing, but I think what we'll do is, we've discussed this and these individuals have agreed to be on the record. There has been a lot of anonymous reporting on this which I think has been unhelpful. I hope that as you write these reports that you give weight to those people that have been directly involved in this effort and are on the record to discuss what the department has found for you on this.
With that they're going to kind of open up with a little bit of a presentation, talk about it just a little bit. Pat's going to start I think, Pat Down is going to start from the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence Office. Then the commander here from Special Operations Command is going to give you a bit of a thumbnail on the activities. We've got some other subject matter experts if we get into Q&A that involves their areas. I promise not to make it too long because I know you all have day jobs on this other story too.
With that, Pat, why don't you go ahead and start us off.
Down: Let me give you an overview of what we have done to determine the facts concerning the recent public statements on Able Danger and where we are to date and what we've found. And then I'll turn it over to Commander Chope so he can give you background information on Able Danger. Some of you may not be as familiar with exactly what that is, what it isn't, and what the timeline is here. It can be confusing with all the various accounts that are in the press.
We have conducted two types of activities. One is extensive document searches from all the organizations including contracting firms that were associated with the Able Danger program. To date we have not identified the chart that is referenced in public statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot in particular, who say they saw a chart with the photo of Mohammed Attah and other hijackers, particularly Mohammed Attah, pre-9/11. We have not discovered that chart. We have identified a similar chart, but it does not contain the photo of Mohammed Attah or reference to him or reference to the other hijackers.
The second type of activity we've conducted is interviews of people involved, again associated with the Able Danger project. To date we've conducted interviews with 80 people, and that is still ongoing. We're not done yet. We're still refining the questions. As we talk to some people we have to come back to other and ask additional questions.
Most of those people do not recollect the existence of a chart with the picture of Mohammed Attah on it, or again, other hijackers pre-9/11. We have identified three other individuals besides Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot who have a recollection of either a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah or a reference to Mohammed Attah. That's basically where we are.
As I said, we continue, we also have searched the records, the documents that we sent to the 9/11 Commission just to be sure that our copies of those records don't include anything additional we might have missed, including a whole number of documents that were deemed non-responsive to Commission requests. It's possible we might have missed something in that collection. It's a fairly extensive collection. We have reviewed all that documentation and at this point have not identified, again, such a chart which references pre-9/11 hijackers.
Media: But the three people who do remember, those three people are from which agency or what's their function?
Down: We have from SOCOM, two individuals. One of those is Captain Philpot. We have, of course Tony Schaeffer, he's actually a DIA civilian employee. We have, the two other individuals are, one is from the Land Information Warfare Activity, the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity, now actually part of the Information Dominance Center. The last one is with the O'Ryan contractors.
Media: At the time.
Down: At the time, yes. And we can answer, Mr. Gandy can answer more questions on the contractors and some of these -- Five individuals all told. Four of them, five individuals including Captain Philpot and Mr. Schaeffer. Four of them remember a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah pre-9/11; the fifth person remembers a chart with a reference to Mohammed Attah, but not a photo.
As I said, we're continuing to interview or re-interview based on what we've discovered so far to be sure that we're not missing anything.
I think it probably is a good idea at this point to turn it over to Commander Chope, and he'll describe to you what Able Danger is. I think that would be helpful. Again, describe some of the timelines because, as I said, we're confused by some of the reports out. We're trying to find the facts. Some of the various accounts have conflicted somewhat. I think it would be helpful to put this in some context for you.
Chope: I'm Commander Chope from the Special Operations Command and I'll offer a brief chronology and overview of what Able Danger was and try and dispel some of the myths and rumors surrounding the effort.
In early October 1999 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the United States Special Operations Command with developing a campaign plan against transnational terrorism, specifically al-Qaida. That effort would result, or that tasking would result in a 15-month effort undertaken mostly out of Tampa, Florida with some peripheral collaborative partners, that would span a 15-month period. In order to accomplish this tasking SOCOM turned to an internal working group who again worked with elements within the Department of Defense and with the Department of the Army to construct this plan. Captain Scott Philpot, then Commander Scott Philpot was probably the team leader, you would call him, for the Able Danger effort.
Able Danger was never a special access program. Able Danger was never a military unit. Able Danger was never a targeting effort. It was not a military deception operation. It was merely the name attributed to a 15-month planning effort.
In January of 2001 the U.S. Special Operations Command delivered the final product of their plan which was a draft operations plan to the Joint Staff, and for all intents and purposes Able Danger ended at that time.
Media: Can you say how many people were involved in it?
Chope: From the Special Operations Command, probably ten people were involved throughout the effort.
Media: You say it wasn't military? It was --
Chope: It was not a military unit. It was a name given to the effort. It's like calling all of us in here Able Danger. That's not --
Media: Were they all military people?
Chope: No, not uniformed service members, no.
Media: You say it wasn't a targeting effort.
Chope: Correct.
Media: I'm very ignorant about military affairs, but wouldn't any kind of plan against transnational terrorism involve a list of targets?
Chope: It would, and that's a good question. Throughout the Able Danger effort we're going to talk about data mining and nodal analysis. What the data mining and nodal analysis actions were designed to do was characterize the al-Qaida terrorist network. Those were some of the tools they used in order to do that mapping, if you will. When I said it was not a targeting effort, I mean it was not meant to go after individual people. It was meant to determine vulnerabilities, key nodes, linkages among and within al-Qaida.
Media: Nodal analysis? What does that mean?
Chope: I think in layman's terms it means determining linkages and relationships among disparate entities.
Down: Looking for patterns based no previous activity.
Media: It would seem you would want to deal with individual names of people if you were trying to understand vulnerability and linkages. No?
Chope: I'm sure that they got to that level of detail, however when you look at the plan, what the task was rather, the task was develop a plan, so that was the focus of the effort. The effort was never determine which individuals we ought to roll up. Did Osama bin Laden's name come up? Of course it did. But as far as that granularity, that level of detail, that was not the desired or required level of effort on the project. It was a by-product.
Gandy: This is Tom Gandy from the Army. Let me just help out here a little. The way it works is there's a campaign plan and then if someone decides to act upon that plan they will give that plan to someone to execute. At that point you get into various specifics about how you're going to execute it, phases of the operation, what the targets are in each phase, and get really down to the down and dirty side of things.
But in a plan you're saying here's what we're trying to do against this threat element, in this case transnational terrorism, not al-Qaida, so it's a more generalized level. I'm just trying to help out there.
Media: Can I get some clarity on the subsets that people are talking about. There were ten in Able Danger.
Gandy: SOCOM personnel.
Media: SOCOM personnel. How large was Able Danger in all then?
Gandy: I would say in the 15-month period it waxed and wanted. It depended on which collaborative partner SOCOM dealt with at the time. AT some points there was a partnership with the Army; other points there were contracted personnel involved?
Media: What was the maximum number --
Media: Hang on just a second and let me finish this line of questioning.
So you've interviewed 80 people. Were all 80 of them Able Danger or were they people who got briefings by Able Danger? What is that universe that gave you 80 people?
Gandy: It probably spans both of those representations you just gave. Not only folks who were integrally involved in the effort, but also those that were peripherally involved. I don't think that we necessarily went out and amongst those 80 we'd count people who just happened to have been exposed. Those 80 I would say had something to do with Able Danger.
Media: And the five who have some recollection of something, are those Able Danger core members, are they people who received briefings, are they the peripherals?
Gandy: Out of the ten I quoted you, two of them are from that ten. So the other three would be from the other 70, if you will, if that math makes sense to you.
Media: So three are peripheral, quote/unquote, to use your phrase; and two are from Able Danger.
Gandy: No. The hard core U.S. SOCOM part of Able Danger was ten people. There were other collaborative partners who were as involved in Able Danger. I'm only speaking to the SOCOM Personnel involved in Able Danger with those ten. There were other people who were as involved in Able Danger during the time.
Media: Who were the five who have some recollection of something?
Gandy: We have two SOCOM personnel, one of whom is Captain Philpot, one is Mr. Schaeffer who is a DIA employee.
Down: Actually --
[Multiple voices].
Media: Just simple math here. This is a really --
Whitman: In the SOCOM people there's an unnamed analyst who's going to remain unnamed. Then there's Captain Philpot. Those are the two from the ten.
Media: Civilian analyst?
Whitman: Yes.
Media: But there are five with some recollection, so who are the other three?
Whitman: The other three, one was an analyst associated with the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) which is the Army activity, one of the partners spoke of where LIWA was supporting the SOCOM effort for a period of time in the planning effort.
Another was a contractor who supported the Land Information Warfare activity. That's one of the other.
The other was Mr. Schaeffer.
Media: That's very helpful. Thank you.
Media: One further thing on that, how would you characterize, of those three people -- the analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, well Schaeffer I think we know his relationship with Able Danger. But the other two. The analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, associated with LIWAC (sic) and the contractor, how would you characterize their degree of -- Were they part of the core? Were they in the periphery, out of periphery?
Whitman: They were doing analysis and production support of requirements to help build the plan. So they were provided with requirements from the core group of SOCOM planners and they would try to meet those requirements of intelligence analytical products.
Media: Intelligence requirements.
Whitman: Right. It's LIWA, by the way, Activity. Not LIWAC.
Down: And Captain Philpot was more managing the whole effort. As opposed to an analyst.
Media: So five people remember this, but you haven't been able to come up with the chart. So you're not here telling us this chart does exist or doesn't exist.
Down: We don't know. We don't have it. We have not to date identified that chart, discovered it in our recent searches, nor did we pull it up during the life of the 9/11 Commission where the Commission itself did ask us, sent us two document requests for information on Able Danger. It was not pulled up at that time.
Media: What could have happened to it? Could someone have destroyed it to cover up?
Whitman: Let me say something there, just for any other questions that might come up too. We're not going to get into the business of speculating in terms of what might have happened. We're here today to present the facts as they exist and as we know them.
Like Pat was saying, what we know is that we didn't discover such a chart when we first responded to the Commission back in November and December of '03 and we haven't discovered such a chart in the current search. That's the facts. It's just not productive for us to get into speculating beyond what we actually know.
Media: Does that mean that because it was a classified operation a lot of documents including the chart could have been destroyed and that's why you can't find it?
Down: There are regulations. At the time how they were interpreted, very strictly pre-9/11, for destruction of information which is embedded, I guess is the way I would say it, that would contain any information on U.S. persons. In a major data mining effort like this you're reaching out to a lot of open sources and within that there could be a lot of information on U.S. persons. We're not allowed to collect that type of information. So there are strict regulations about collection, dissemination, destruction procedures for this type of information. And we know that that did happen in the case of Able Danger documentation.
Media: So it's possible then that this is how the chart cannot be found. Along with other documents, they could have been destroyed and that's why you can't corroborate what these people are saying or say it's wrong.
Down: Correct.
Media: What is the definition for U.S. person?
Down: I wish we had our lawyer here.
Chope: A U.S. citizen or someone who is in the country legally.
Media: So a tourist is a U.S. person.
Chope: Can be.
Media: Under what circumstances?
Chope: For instance on a work visa. I think it's more than just a tourist, on a work visa or something like that.
Media: But there are work visas that allow you to come, I’m here on one --
Gandy: We have a whole class on that if you'd like to attend it. I'll invite you. We have it annually.
We have lots of regulations on this that spell out precisely what they are. I'd hate to make an off-the-cuff comment here.
Media: Okay.
Gandy: But there are strict definitions.
Media: Maybe you can direct me to --
Gandy: Executive Order 12333. You can go on the web tonight and do it. DoD Directive 5240-1R.
Media: That does not --
Gandy: And Army Regulation 381-10.
Media: Does that mean there could have been legal advice given by the department or somebody within SOCOM to destroy it before it got out of the military's possession?
Chope: We have negative indications that that was ever the case. We've spoken to all the attorneys at all levels of command and organization that were involved with Able Danger, and there was no legal advice given along those lines.
Media: That lines?
Chope: Along the lines to destroy anything.
Down: We have not discovered that legal advice was given to date.
Media: On this chart, can you say approximately what the date of the chart is these five people recall? And do all of them recall not only Attah, but the other hijackers?
Down: Maybe Tom can help with the details of the interviews, but I believe Captain Philpot says he saw the chart in January, February 2000. That's the general reference point.
Media: Are you saying that the recollections of Schaeffer and Philpot are incredible?
Down: They're our starting point. They're DoD people who -- Captain Philpot, or then Commander during when the 9/11 Commission was wrapping up, came to us and said I have this information. We took him to the 9/11 Commission to examine it further. It's really up to the Commission to determine the relevancy of the information.
Fortunately, Captain Philpot or then Commander Philpot did not have documentation either, and so the staff questioned, and you can talk to the 9/11 Public Discourse Project where the two former chairmen of the Commission now work. But in terms of the clarity of the dates, when things were produced. At the time that Commander Philpot spoke with the Commission, the Commission staff at that time believed it wasn't strong enough evidence, especially without documentation, to make a change in their report which was at that time being coordinated with us and had already been drafted.
Media: So now that you have three other individuals corroborating this chart, saying they've seen this chart, are you going back to brief the Discourse Project now? The 9/11 Commission?
Down: No, not at this point, but we will be shortly. Or at least --
Media: Has anything changed. Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.
Down: That's okay.
Media: Has anything changed about the way that U.S. persons who get sucked up in a data mining operation would be handled today as opposed to how they might have -- completely independent of this. Say if my name gets sucked up into a database tomorrow morning would it be handled differently today than it would have before 9/11?
Down: My understanding is that the same procedures are in place. We may exercise some flexibility, but I have to be careful here because the same procedures, the same regulations, they are still accurate. We have to be very careful of what we protect against U.S. persons --
Media: -- different or --
Down: Again I have to be careful. The procedures stand and I really can't speak for the analytical side at the moment, but I would think that in the post-9/11 mindset --
Chope: Let me get into some of the problems we have. We're looking back about 5.5 years. Data mining is a relatively new thing in the intelligence community. They were not using the most sophisticated tools. They were using what tools were available. Sophisticated at the time, but compared to now of course we're Moore's law a couple of times down and we've got a lot better tools. So at this point now in the analytical side, we're a lot better in identifying the type of data we get and where we get it from. Back then you would do what they called a web crawl and you'd get a lot of data and it would go in one pile.
Now when we put the data in a pile we tag it, you've heard about XML tagging and those sorts of things. So we understand where the data came from better, we understand the nature of that, and we have tools to help us identify the data.
So while the procedures haven't changed, the interpretation has probable become a little more flexible with hindsight on 9/11, a little more flexible, but we still have the procedures in place, believe me, and we have the training, but we also have the better ability now to say okay, this data came from this source, it's a U.S. person that has nothing to do with our problem set and we can expunge it a lot more easily than we could in the past. In the old days it was kind of an all or nothing.
Media: All these questions about Able Danger seem to sound like how could you possibly have missed Mohammed Attah did this, but I'm wondering if Mohammed Attah came in under the same circumstances at the same time tomorrow, he would still be of the same class. Wouldn't they get ditched, thrown out? Not that that's what happened with this, but if you were to tag him as a U.S. person wouldn't he automatically be thrown out of the data base tomorrow just as --
Chope: I don't know.
Media: Can you say whether you have gone through all the documents yet? You say you you're now going back and reintegrating, but have you looked through all the documents? Is that why you're here, to say you've completed that?
Down: We have done extensive searches including the documents that we delivered to the 9/11 Commission and the group of documents that were deemed unresponsive to the Commission's particular request. There are boxes and boxes of these.
As you can imagine, an organization as large as DoD with the speed at which we had to respond to the Commission's request, there were numerous documents that came through for all 39 of the Commission's requests that weren't really relevant to specific requests. So we have like a non-responsive pile. We weeded those out. If we had any doubt we left it up to the Commission to decide. It's their job to decide what's really relevant for them. But we went back through the old piles just to be sure we had not missed anything or to see if we could potentially identify this chart. And in terms of the other organizations, there have been very extensive document searches.
Media: Is there an estimate about how many pages you searched?
Down: Oh, boy --
Chope: We did a complete electronic search --
Down: Pages.
Chope: All holdings, physical searches, --
Down: Hundreds of thousands probably.
Media: Are you done with your effort?
Down: Including electronic files, of pages
Media: I'm sorry. Are you done with your review? Is this, are you finished or is this ongoing?
Down: Not in terms of the interview process. But in terms of document searches, unless there is some other source of documents that we find out through the interview process that we haven't looked at, and again, we haven't identified what that would be, right now we are complete on our document.
Media: Can I just return briefly on this chart that had Attah's picture or reference, did the chart, did all the people have a recollection that the other hijackers who have been mentioned were also on the chart or just Attah?
Chope: Most of the discussion's been about Attah --
Whitman: Before we get into that, let's address the question. You said the chart that had Attah on it. We have not found a chart that had Attah on it. I just want to make sure --
Media: You said five people said they recall --
Whitman: I just didn't want that to be out there as that there is a chart that exists that has Attah on it. Okay?
Chope: If there was a chart with Attah, [Laughter].
Whitman: It's important.
Media: These five people recall, do they recall it having Attah and additional hijackers on it?
Chope: I can't be certain. That would really be the, then Commander Philpot would be the one. The remainder talk about Attah and a picture, or Attah's name. The one person who only saw a name and no picture, and the others saw a picture and a name.
Media: So Philpot is the only one who recalls other hijackers?
Chope: I believe, but I'd have to check the notes I have from the discussions we had.
Media: Let me go back to the U.S. persons question for a second. To what extent did any controversy over that issue lead to the shutdown of this program? I talked to several people who said there was a separate program developing. They were looking at Chinese tech transfer. It wasn't Able Danger, but it used some of the same personnel, some of the same facilities at LIWA and came up with a name list of some very prominent U.S. persons and led to somebody saying terminate this thing. Is there any truth to that at all?
Chope: No. It had nothing -- There was a prior effort involved with those topics that you mentioned. That effort ended with a subpoena by Congress in November of '99. That was the end of it. It was a completely different target, different subjects, different data, everything.
Media: You say ended with a subpoena from Congress. From where? From which committee?
Chope: I'm not sure about the committee. That was a completely different effort. There were similar tools, but you've got to remember back here, let me just for the Land Information Warfare Activity, this was very experimental stuff back then. So what that was about was demonstrating can experimental stuff like this be useful in helping us solve some technology transfer riddles. That was kind of the purpose of that effort. That effort ended in the LIWA's eyes in November. LIWA did a lot of other analytical projects. That's what they do. They do intelligence analysis.
Media: -- open source, classified?
Chope: In which?
Media: In both.
Chope: In Able Danger it was mixed, both open source and classified.
Media: The five people that recall seeing either Attah's name or photograph on the charts, do they have any recollection of where that photograph might have come from, number one? How many people's names were on that chart? Was it five, was it 10,000?
Chope: We don't know what was on the chart.
Media: In their recollection, what is their recollection of that chart?
Chope: It's different compared to any person you talk to.
Gandy: Captain Philpot will contend there are upwards of 60 names on that chart. Not all of them will have photographs attributed to them. Some will just be outlined silhouettes of a head.
Media: Given the differences in their recollection, are their claims considered credible?
Chope: Don't know. We're just in the fact-finding mode.
Media: This is kind of a fair question, actually. We won't ask you to do hypotheticals or conjectures, but you all live in a world of analyzing data. Clearly if you're supervisors or Dr. Cambone said to you want do you think now? You’ve now gone from two to five people who recall it. You haven't found the document. What do you think?
Down: These people are, Captain Philpot for instance and the others, especially the ones that are involved in data mining, the contracting firms, are credible people. Again, we just -- We are unable to again provide corroborating evidence. We just, as I've said, can't find the document. But as I said, they are credible people.
Media: What do you make of that? That disparity. How do you conclude?
Chope: We can only hypothesize on how this --
Down: I don't --
Chope: -- might have come about is all you can do, hypothesize.
I agree with Pat. Most of the people involved in this are credible folks. We've checked out everything they've said. We can go to the same group of people you would think were sitting next to each other and say did you see a chart with a picture of Attah on it? No, no, no, yes. That's kind of the situation we're in right now. We drill into that and we still have the no, no, no, yes kind of situation.
Media: If these people are credible, what could account for this difference in your view?
Down: I don't know. We've seen a chart with different Mohammed's on them. Is it possible that Mohammed Ajaz, Mohammed -- what's the other one.
Chope: Arateff.
Down: Arateff, thank you. So we have charts with those names but not Mohammed Attah. Is there confusion there? Again, we don't know. We simply don't know. Was the reference to Mohammed Attah, did it come out early on in a chart? In that case if it came out early on, were there any kind of concerns which we again can't corroborate for our interviews. If it came out early, such as in a proof of concept chart, we may never find it.
So as I said, we haven't found any supporting evidence at this point, especially that documentation, to back those claims up.
[Multiple voices].
Down: We didn't, no.
Media: -- head of Special Ops at the time, wasn't he?
Chope: -- do not.
Media: You do not?
Down: Not yet.
Media: Can I ask a real basic question here? This effort to try to get to the bottom of this, this is responsive to Congress, to a directive from the Secretary, to what? Maybe you got into that in the beginning or maybe everyone in here knows it but me, I just -- You're getting to the bottom of this because Congress wants an answer or because you just want to know, because we're all asking these questions and you want us to shut up? [Laughter].
Down: Maybe all of the above. We --
Chope: -- Cambone has directed that we do fact-finding and find the facts in this case. Each of the components involved, SOCOM as the headquarters and supporting agencies have stepped forward and are doing their part to try and figure out what the facts are.
Media: Can I ask another question about the lawyers? You said I think that you had negative indication that that has happened, i.e. the destruction of documents.
Chope: That was taken a little out of context. No lawyer ever directed any Able Danger personnel to destroy documents. Any destruction of documents was conducted in accordance with established regulations and directives.
Media: What about the question of the meetings with the FBI?
Chope: Aside from the statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot we have found no corroborating statements or evidence or whatever you want to call it to that effect in the course of our interviews.
Media: So you talked to all of the lawyers who might have tried to stop this because it was U.S. person information and couldn't be disseminated to domestic agencies. And no one remembers --
Chope: We have talked to all the lawyers involved in the project and there is no hindrance upon the sharing of information.
Gandy: We know that data was destroyed, the Land Information Warfare Activity. But it was destroyed in compliance with our intelligence oversight directives, 12333, DoD 5240-1R, et cetera. So it was destroyed in complete protocols, normal protocols that we would follow with any kind of U.S. person data. It wasn't destroyed because a lawyer came in and said you've got to get rid of this stuff. It was the clock is ticking, show us how you can pull this U.S. person information out of here or not, you can't do it we have protocols and directives to comply with, we're going to comply, and they did. That's how the data was destroyed at LIWA and I believe later on in SOCOM was in a similar manner destroyed.
Media: So the people involved in the project were asked whether there was a way that they could extract intelligence which could be shared from this massive data that they had from this pile you talked about --
Gandy: I think you're confusing the sharing of data -- Data can be shared with anybody. U.S. person data can be shared in a wide variety of situations. We do that every day in the Department of Defense. For instance on the counter-intelligence side of the house which I am responsible for for the Army, our intelligence agents share information every day with the FBI no U.S. persons, and who has primacy in an investigation, and who doesn't. It's all laid out in the protocols surrounding EO-12333 and 5240, our counter-intelligence regulations. Promulgation of those sharing agreements. So we can share data with U.S. persons.
In this case because of the nature in which the data was collected, now we're 5.5 years ago. It was a gobbling up of a lot of data from a lot of sources and put in one pile. You had this commingling of U.S. person data with lots of other data, and there was no way to really pull it out. So the protocols were applied as they stood and really as they stand saying do you have a reason to do this. Like in the counter-intelligence case we have a reason, that we're doing a counter-espionage investigation or we're doing a force protection investigation. In this case there was no perceived imminent threat, imminent crime going to occur, any danger, those kinds of things that say that you can share it. That was not perceived to be the case in these situations and it was destroyed.
Media: So the identification of individuals who were linked to al-Qaida inside the United States was not perceived as an imminent threat after the USS Cole and after the embassy bombings --
Gandy: We don't know that they identified those people in this data.
Media: You say there was no imminent threat, there was no perceived imminent threat.
Gandy: That might be a reason you would keep the data. Those are the kind of reasons we're allowed to keep data about U.S. persons.
Media: And share it, right?
Gandy: Absolutely. It depends on the situation. If that person, for instance, if that person is located overseas, then you would share it with a different group of people than if the person was located in the United States. Just that there are links established doesn't really mean anything. And by the way, some of these links, in the primacy of this technology you get some very goofy links that require research. In fact when we interviewed these analysts to a person they said what was the nature of the stuff? They said you really need to dig into this to find out what these links meant.
Media: I was told that the, after the data run had been done on unclassified data bases it was then scrubbed against classified data in order to try and do this process. Like burrowing in and finding out what the links might be and which might be meaningful and so on. Have you been able to discover whether this chart that these five people remember was the product of a first stage of that or a second stage?
Gandy: One, we don't know there's a chart. But if there was a chart we believe it came from open source information.
Media: And not being scrubbed against classified --
Gandy: I don't know.
Media: Just to return to the question of the lawyers, Schaeffer said there were two occasions on which military lawyers intervened, the first was he said, that the military couldn't do anything with it and then when he tried to take it to the FBI again -- But you're saying that no -- Can you clarify exactly what you're saying about what the lawyers did? The document destruction stuff was SOP. You haven't found anything about a meeting with the FBI. I mean apart from the SOP on document destruction, what role did the regulations about U.S. persons and the legal interpretation of those made by lawyers of SOCOM play in how this all played out?
Gandy: Intelligence oversight drives how long we can store information on U.S. persons. It's really proscribed pretty clearly.
Media: Any activity that was proposed by people involved in Able Danger that was prohibited by lawyers --
Gandy: No. That's not the lawyers' job in this kind of a, in any situation within here. Their job is to give advice to the commander. The commander makes the ultimate determination. In no way, shape or form did the lawyers dissuade or hinder people from turning information over.
Media: The additional three people that recall seeing references to Mohammed Attah, do any of them recall what that was based on? You said --
Gandy: We asked where did this data come from and the person who saw the name and not the face couldn't tell. What it comes from is a big large conglomeration of data from lots of sources, and you drag a problem set through this data and you get lots of linkages and then you research the linkages is how it works.
We asked every single analyst if there was such a chart where would the data from that have come from? They didn't know. What they're doing is this huge data mining and they just get a pile of data, and in those days -- Now if you say okay, I have this piece of information, you could probably trace it back to its original parentage.
Media: But not in those days.
Gandy: In those days I think you could with some of the tools, but it depends upon analyst input to the tools, the linkages and all. They had some capability to do that because they would describe an anecdote where they'd say we'll read this information, and they'd say well, it's from a web site. They got to the web site it's kind of like a goofball web site. Then okay, get rid of that stuff. It's from something that really is not credible information. So they had some capability but I don't think they had the capability to scrub it in the fashion that the oversight rules could live with.
Media: The documents that were destroyed, is there a, if it's a standard operating procedure, are there rudimentary records that are kept of what documents are destroyed?
Gandy: There are certificates of destruction. What you'll have, traditionally for electronic it's very difficult. They'll say I destroyed so many disc drives, so many zip drives, so many CD roms were in the cruncher, that kind of stuff. You have lots and lost of data. So it's very general in nature.
Media: It doesn't really identify --
Gandy: It would never go down like in an index fashion or an inventory fashion. For those volumes of data it would say, the Y drive on this server at this place was wiped on this day, certified by the technician who conducted it.
Media: If there were a chart, a piece of paper, that would be different?
Gandy: You do physical destruction of it.
Media: Is that what it was?
Gandy: This is for documents that are actually published and numbered kind of documents that you would sign for. Those kind of documents. But if you have like working papers, charts that you're printing off looking that's not good, that's not good, you wouldn't do that. You’d just destroy all those.
Media: Schaeffer and Philpot's current status is?
Gandy: Captain Philpot's in the Navy and Mr. Schaeffer is --
Huntington: On administrative leave without (corrected – should be with) pay.
Media: From the DIA?
Huntington: That's correct.
Media: Is he in uniform still?
Huntington: I don't know the answer to that.
Media: Is he on administrative leave without pay as punishment?
Huntington: No. That's totally separate from any of this activity.
Media: Does he face any possible action for disposing of information?
Whitman: We're not going to get into any personnel issues that bump against the Privacy Act.
Media: Is the reason why he's on leave, does that affect his credibility at all in the investigation?
Huntington: No. These two things are entirely separate sorts of things. The reason for this action is totally unrelated to any of the activities related to Able Danger.
Media: How much of your resources has been devoted to digging this up? Is it something – do you have a lot of people who are looking in to this now? [Laughter].
Down: Yes.
Gandy: A lot of personal time.
Media: Your personal opinion of it, is it a waste of time? Is it constructive? Is it something you find helpful?
Gandy: Dr. Cambone says this is something we ought to look into, I go roger that, sir. It's very important.
Whitman: Like I said, we would present you the facts when we had some conviction on it, and that's where we're at today. I hope it's been useful.
Media: Thanks for doing it on the record.
Chope: You're welcome.
Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/200...50901-3844.html
U.S. Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
News Transcript
Thursday, September 1, 2005
Special Defense Department Briefing
Participating in this brief were:
Mr. Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (Media Operations)
Ms. Pat Downs, Senior Policy Analyst, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Intelligence)
Mr. Thomas Gandy, Army G-2 Director of Counterintelligence and HUMINT
Mr. Bill Huntington, Vice Deputy Director for HUMINT, Defense Intelligence Agency
Cmdr. Christopher Chope, Center for Special Operations, U.S. Special Operations Command
Whitman: When I scheduled this particular room I hadn't anticipated that we would have these other activities that are going on down south, but I'm glad there are some of you here to report on this and have an interest in this.
As you know, the department has been aggressively looking into this Able Danger program since there were some allegations that were made some three weeks ago I think now, about three weeks. There's been a very extensive effort by the department to look broad, to look deep, and to document as well as to interviewing individuals that are associated with the project. Today we have reached the point where we're prepared to tell you what that broad and deep and extensive review has revealed to us.
I've got a number of subject matter experts here whose organizations were involved. By the mere fact of the representatives here you can see that this was not something that was just looked at narrowly. What we'll be able to do today is talk a little bit about what Able Danger was and maybe more importantly what it wasn't; what type of products were a result of this activity; discuss a little bit about some of the legal authorities and things that have been reported on, sometimes inaccurately about this; and to really talk to you a bit about our interactions with the 9/11 Commission when they were doing their work.
I got you all here under the guise of a background briefing, but I think what we'll do is, we've discussed this and these individuals have agreed to be on the record. There has been a lot of anonymous reporting on this which I think has been unhelpful. I hope that as you write these reports that you give weight to those people that have been directly involved in this effort and are on the record to discuss what the department has found for you on this.
With that they're going to kind of open up with a little bit of a presentation, talk about it just a little bit. Pat's going to start I think, Pat Down is going to start from the Under Secretary of Defense Intelligence Office. Then the commander here from Special Operations Command is going to give you a bit of a thumbnail on the activities. We've got some other subject matter experts if we get into Q&A that involves their areas. I promise not to make it too long because I know you all have day jobs on this other story too.
With that, Pat, why don't you go ahead and start us off.
Down: Let me give you an overview of what we have done to determine the facts concerning the recent public statements on Able Danger and where we are to date and what we've found. And then I'll turn it over to Commander Chope so he can give you background information on Able Danger. Some of you may not be as familiar with exactly what that is, what it isn't, and what the timeline is here. It can be confusing with all the various accounts that are in the press.
We have conducted two types of activities. One is extensive document searches from all the organizations including contracting firms that were associated with the Able Danger program. To date we have not identified the chart that is referenced in public statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot in particular, who say they saw a chart with the photo of Mohammed Attah and other hijackers, particularly Mohammed Attah, pre-9/11. We have not discovered that chart. We have identified a similar chart, but it does not contain the photo of Mohammed Attah or reference to him or reference to the other hijackers.
The second type of activity we've conducted is interviews of people involved, again associated with the Able Danger project. To date we've conducted interviews with 80 people, and that is still ongoing. We're not done yet. We're still refining the questions. As we talk to some people we have to come back to other and ask additional questions.
Most of those people do not recollect the existence of a chart with the picture of Mohammed Attah on it, or again, other hijackers pre-9/11. We have identified three other individuals besides Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot who have a recollection of either a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah or a reference to Mohammed Attah. That's basically where we are.
As I said, we continue, we also have searched the records, the documents that we sent to the 9/11 Commission just to be sure that our copies of those records don't include anything additional we might have missed, including a whole number of documents that were deemed non-responsive to Commission requests. It's possible we might have missed something in that collection. It's a fairly extensive collection. We have reviewed all that documentation and at this point have not identified, again, such a chart which references pre-9/11 hijackers.
Media: But the three people who do remember, those three people are from which agency or what's their function?
Down: We have from SOCOM, two individuals. One of those is Captain Philpot. We have, of course Tony Schaeffer, he's actually a DIA civilian employee. We have, the two other individuals are, one is from the Land Information Warfare Activity, the Army's Land Information Warfare Activity, now actually part of the Information Dominance Center. The last one is with the O'Ryan contractors.
Media: At the time.
Down: At the time, yes. And we can answer, Mr. Gandy can answer more questions on the contractors and some of these -- Five individuals all told. Four of them, five individuals including Captain Philpot and Mr. Schaeffer. Four of them remember a chart with a photo of Mohammed Attah pre-9/11; the fifth person remembers a chart with a reference to Mohammed Attah, but not a photo.
As I said, we're continuing to interview or re-interview based on what we've discovered so far to be sure that we're not missing anything.
I think it probably is a good idea at this point to turn it over to Commander Chope, and he'll describe to you what Able Danger is. I think that would be helpful. Again, describe some of the timelines because, as I said, we're confused by some of the reports out. We're trying to find the facts. Some of the various accounts have conflicted somewhat. I think it would be helpful to put this in some context for you.
Chope: I'm Commander Chope from the Special Operations Command and I'll offer a brief chronology and overview of what Able Danger was and try and dispel some of the myths and rumors surrounding the effort.
In early October 1999 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tasked the United States Special Operations Command with developing a campaign plan against transnational terrorism, specifically al-Qaida. That effort would result, or that tasking would result in a 15-month effort undertaken mostly out of Tampa, Florida with some peripheral collaborative partners, that would span a 15-month period. In order to accomplish this tasking SOCOM turned to an internal working group who again worked with elements within the Department of Defense and with the Department of the Army to construct this plan. Captain Scott Philpot, then Commander Scott Philpot was probably the team leader, you would call him, for the Able Danger effort.
Able Danger was never a special access program. Able Danger was never a military unit. Able Danger was never a targeting effort. It was not a military deception operation. It was merely the name attributed to a 15-month planning effort.
In January of 2001 the U.S. Special Operations Command delivered the final product of their plan which was a draft operations plan to the Joint Staff, and for all intents and purposes Able Danger ended at that time.
Media: Can you say how many people were involved in it?
Chope: From the Special Operations Command, probably ten people were involved throughout the effort.
Media: You say it wasn't military? It was --
Chope: It was not a military unit. It was a name given to the effort. It's like calling all of us in here Able Danger. That's not --
Media: Were they all military people?
Chope: No, not uniformed service members, no.
Media: You say it wasn't a targeting effort.
Chope: Correct.
Media: I'm very ignorant about military affairs, but wouldn't any kind of plan against transnational terrorism involve a list of targets?
Chope: It would, and that's a good question. Throughout the Able Danger effort we're going to talk about data mining and nodal analysis. What the data mining and nodal analysis actions were designed to do was characterize the al-Qaida terrorist network. Those were some of the tools they used in order to do that mapping, if you will. When I said it was not a targeting effort, I mean it was not meant to go after individual people. It was meant to determine vulnerabilities, key nodes, linkages among and within al-Qaida.
Media: Nodal analysis? What does that mean?
Chope: I think in layman's terms it means determining linkages and relationships among disparate entities.
Down: Looking for patterns based no previous activity.
Media: It would seem you would want to deal with individual names of people if you were trying to understand vulnerability and linkages. No?
Chope: I'm sure that they got to that level of detail, however when you look at the plan, what the task was rather, the task was develop a plan, so that was the focus of the effort. The effort was never determine which individuals we ought to roll up. Did Osama bin Laden's name come up? Of course it did. But as far as that granularity, that level of detail, that was not the desired or required level of effort on the project. It was a by-product.
Gandy: This is Tom Gandy from the Army. Let me just help out here a little. The way it works is there's a campaign plan and then if someone decides to act upon that plan they will give that plan to someone to execute. At that point you get into various specifics about how you're going to execute it, phases of the operation, what the targets are in each phase, and get really down to the down and dirty side of things.
But in a plan you're saying here's what we're trying to do against this threat element, in this case transnational terrorism, not al-Qaida, so it's a more generalized level. I'm just trying to help out there.
Media: Can I get some clarity on the subsets that people are talking about. There were ten in Able Danger.
Gandy: SOCOM personnel.
Media: SOCOM personnel. How large was Able Danger in all then?
Gandy: I would say in the 15-month period it waxed and wanted. It depended on which collaborative partner SOCOM dealt with at the time. AT some points there was a partnership with the Army; other points there were contracted personnel involved?
Media: What was the maximum number --
Media: Hang on just a second and let me finish this line of questioning.
So you've interviewed 80 people. Were all 80 of them Able Danger or were they people who got briefings by Able Danger? What is that universe that gave you 80 people?
Gandy: It probably spans both of those representations you just gave. Not only folks who were integrally involved in the effort, but also those that were peripherally involved. I don't think that we necessarily went out and amongst those 80 we'd count people who just happened to have been exposed. Those 80 I would say had something to do with Able Danger.
Media: And the five who have some recollection of something, are those Able Danger core members, are they people who received briefings, are they the peripherals?
Gandy: Out of the ten I quoted you, two of them are from that ten. So the other three would be from the other 70, if you will, if that math makes sense to you.
Media: So three are peripheral, quote/unquote, to use your phrase; and two are from Able Danger.
Gandy: No. The hard core U.S. SOCOM part of Able Danger was ten people. There were other collaborative partners who were as involved in Able Danger. I'm only speaking to the SOCOM Personnel involved in Able Danger with those ten. There were other people who were as involved in Able Danger during the time.
Media: Who were the five who have some recollection of something?
Gandy: We have two SOCOM personnel, one of whom is Captain Philpot, one is Mr. Schaeffer who is a DIA employee.
Down: Actually --
[Multiple voices].
Media: Just simple math here. This is a really --
Whitman: In the SOCOM people there's an unnamed analyst who's going to remain unnamed. Then there's Captain Philpot. Those are the two from the ten.
Media: Civilian analyst?
Whitman: Yes.
Media: But there are five with some recollection, so who are the other three?
Whitman: The other three, one was an analyst associated with the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) which is the Army activity, one of the partners spoke of where LIWA was supporting the SOCOM effort for a period of time in the planning effort.
Another was a contractor who supported the Land Information Warfare activity. That's one of the other.
The other was Mr. Schaeffer.
Media: That's very helpful. Thank you.
Media: One further thing on that, how would you characterize, of those three people -- the analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, well Schaeffer I think we know his relationship with Able Danger. But the other two. The analyst from LIWAC (sic) and the, associated with LIWAC (sic) and the contractor, how would you characterize their degree of -- Were they part of the core? Were they in the periphery, out of periphery?
Whitman: They were doing analysis and production support of requirements to help build the plan. So they were provided with requirements from the core group of SOCOM planners and they would try to meet those requirements of intelligence analytical products.
Media: Intelligence requirements.
Whitman: Right. It's LIWA, by the way, Activity. Not LIWAC.
Down: And Captain Philpot was more managing the whole effort. As opposed to an analyst.
Media: So five people remember this, but you haven't been able to come up with the chart. So you're not here telling us this chart does exist or doesn't exist.
Down: We don't know. We don't have it. We have not to date identified that chart, discovered it in our recent searches, nor did we pull it up during the life of the 9/11 Commission where the Commission itself did ask us, sent us two document requests for information on Able Danger. It was not pulled up at that time.
Media: What could have happened to it? Could someone have destroyed it to cover up?
Whitman: Let me say something there, just for any other questions that might come up too. We're not going to get into the business of speculating in terms of what might have happened. We're here today to present the facts as they exist and as we know them.
Like Pat was saying, what we know is that we didn't discover such a chart when we first responded to the Commission back in November and December of '03 and we haven't discovered such a chart in the current search. That's the facts. It's just not productive for us to get into speculating beyond what we actually know.
Media: Does that mean that because it was a classified operation a lot of documents including the chart could have been destroyed and that's why you can't find it?
Down: There are regulations. At the time how they were interpreted, very strictly pre-9/11, for destruction of information which is embedded, I guess is the way I would say it, that would contain any information on U.S. persons. In a major data mining effort like this you're reaching out to a lot of open sources and within that there could be a lot of information on U.S. persons. We're not allowed to collect that type of information. So there are strict regulations about collection, dissemination, destruction procedures for this type of information. And we know that that did happen in the case of Able Danger documentation.
Media: So it's possible then that this is how the chart cannot be found. Along with other documents, they could have been destroyed and that's why you can't corroborate what these people are saying or say it's wrong.
Down: Correct.
Media: What is the definition for U.S. person?
Down: I wish we had our lawyer here.
Chope: A U.S. citizen or someone who is in the country legally.
Media: So a tourist is a U.S. person.
Chope: Can be.
Media: Under what circumstances?
Chope: For instance on a work visa. I think it's more than just a tourist, on a work visa or something like that.
Media: But there are work visas that allow you to come, I’m here on one --
Gandy: We have a whole class on that if you'd like to attend it. I'll invite you. We have it annually.
We have lots of regulations on this that spell out precisely what they are. I'd hate to make an off-the-cuff comment here.
Media: Okay.
Gandy: But there are strict definitions.
Media: Maybe you can direct me to --
Gandy: Executive Order 12333. You can go on the web tonight and do it. DoD Directive 5240-1R.
Media: That does not --
Gandy: And Army Regulation 381-10.
Media: Does that mean there could have been legal advice given by the department or somebody within SOCOM to destroy it before it got out of the military's possession?
Chope: We have negative indications that that was ever the case. We've spoken to all the attorneys at all levels of command and organization that were involved with Able Danger, and there was no legal advice given along those lines.
Media: That lines?
Chope: Along the lines to destroy anything.
Down: We have not discovered that legal advice was given to date.
Media: On this chart, can you say approximately what the date of the chart is these five people recall? And do all of them recall not only Attah, but the other hijackers?
Down: Maybe Tom can help with the details of the interviews, but I believe Captain Philpot says he saw the chart in January, February 2000. That's the general reference point.
Media: Are you saying that the recollections of Schaeffer and Philpot are incredible?
Down: They're our starting point. They're DoD people who -- Captain Philpot, or then Commander during when the 9/11 Commission was wrapping up, came to us and said I have this information. We took him to the 9/11 Commission to examine it further. It's really up to the Commission to determine the relevancy of the information.
Fortunately, Captain Philpot or then Commander Philpot did not have documentation either, and so the staff questioned, and you can talk to the 9/11 Public Discourse Project where the two former chairmen of the Commission now work. But in terms of the clarity of the dates, when things were produced. At the time that Commander Philpot spoke with the Commission, the Commission staff at that time believed it wasn't strong enough evidence, especially without documentation, to make a change in their report which was at that time being coordinated with us and had already been drafted.
Media: So now that you have three other individuals corroborating this chart, saying they've seen this chart, are you going back to brief the Discourse Project now? The 9/11 Commission?
Down: No, not at this point, but we will be shortly. Or at least --
Media: Has anything changed. Sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt.
Down: That's okay.
Media: Has anything changed about the way that U.S. persons who get sucked up in a data mining operation would be handled today as opposed to how they might have -- completely independent of this. Say if my name gets sucked up into a database tomorrow morning would it be handled differently today than it would have before 9/11?
Down: My understanding is that the same procedures are in place. We may exercise some flexibility, but I have to be careful here because the same procedures, the same regulations, they are still accurate. We have to be very careful of what we protect against U.S. persons --
Media: -- different or --
Down: Again I have to be careful. The procedures stand and I really can't speak for the analytical side at the moment, but I would think that in the post-9/11 mindset --
Chope: Let me get into some of the problems we have. We're looking back about 5.5 years. Data mining is a relatively new thing in the intelligence community. They were not using the most sophisticated tools. They were using what tools were available. Sophisticated at the time, but compared to now of course we're Moore's law a couple of times down and we've got a lot better tools. So at this point now in the analytical side, we're a lot better in identifying the type of data we get and where we get it from. Back then you would do what they called a web crawl and you'd get a lot of data and it would go in one pile.
Now when we put the data in a pile we tag it, you've heard about XML tagging and those sorts of things. So we understand where the data came from better, we understand the nature of that, and we have tools to help us identify the data.
So while the procedures haven't changed, the interpretation has probable become a little more flexible with hindsight on 9/11, a little more flexible, but we still have the procedures in place, believe me, and we have the training, but we also have the better ability now to say okay, this data came from this source, it's a U.S. person that has nothing to do with our problem set and we can expunge it a lot more easily than we could in the past. In the old days it was kind of an all or nothing.
Media: All these questions about Able Danger seem to sound like how could you possibly have missed Mohammed Attah did this, but I'm wondering if Mohammed Attah came in under the same circumstances at the same time tomorrow, he would still be of the same class. Wouldn't they get ditched, thrown out? Not that that's what happened with this, but if you were to tag him as a U.S. person wouldn't he automatically be thrown out of the data base tomorrow just as --
Chope: I don't know.
Media: Can you say whether you have gone through all the documents yet? You say you you're now going back and reintegrating, but have you looked through all the documents? Is that why you're here, to say you've completed that?
Down: We have done extensive searches including the documents that we delivered to the 9/11 Commission and the group of documents that were deemed unresponsive to the Commission's particular request. There are boxes and boxes of these.
As you can imagine, an organization as large as DoD with the speed at which we had to respond to the Commission's request, there were numerous documents that came through for all 39 of the Commission's requests that weren't really relevant to specific requests. So we have like a non-responsive pile. We weeded those out. If we had any doubt we left it up to the Commission to decide. It's their job to decide what's really relevant for them. But we went back through the old piles just to be sure we had not missed anything or to see if we could potentially identify this chart. And in terms of the other organizations, there have been very extensive document searches.
Media: Is there an estimate about how many pages you searched?
Down: Oh, boy --
Chope: We did a complete electronic search --
Down: Pages.
Chope: All holdings, physical searches, --
Down: Hundreds of thousands probably.
Media: Are you done with your effort?
Down: Including electronic files, of pages
Media: I'm sorry. Are you done with your review? Is this, are you finished or is this ongoing?
Down: Not in terms of the interview process. But in terms of document searches, unless there is some other source of documents that we find out through the interview process that we haven't looked at, and again, we haven't identified what that would be, right now we are complete on our document.
Media: Can I just return briefly on this chart that had Attah's picture or reference, did the chart, did all the people have a recollection that the other hijackers who have been mentioned were also on the chart or just Attah?
Chope: Most of the discussion's been about Attah --
Whitman: Before we get into that, let's address the question. You said the chart that had Attah on it. We have not found a chart that had Attah on it. I just want to make sure --
Media: You said five people said they recall --
Whitman: I just didn't want that to be out there as that there is a chart that exists that has Attah on it. Okay?
Chope: If there was a chart with Attah, [Laughter].
Whitman: It's important.
Media: These five people recall, do they recall it having Attah and additional hijackers on it?
Chope: I can't be certain. That would really be the, then Commander Philpot would be the one. The remainder talk about Attah and a picture, or Attah's name. The one person who only saw a name and no picture, and the others saw a picture and a name.
Media: So Philpot is the only one who recalls other hijackers?
Chope: I believe, but I'd have to check the notes I have from the discussions we had.
Media: Let me go back to the U.S. persons question for a second. To what extent did any controversy over that issue lead to the shutdown of this program? I talked to several people who said there was a separate program developing. They were looking at Chinese tech transfer. It wasn't Able Danger, but it used some of the same personnel, some of the same facilities at LIWA and came up with a name list of some very prominent U.S. persons and led to somebody saying terminate this thing. Is there any truth to that at all?
Chope: No. It had nothing -- There was a prior effort involved with those topics that you mentioned. That effort ended with a subpoena by Congress in November of '99. That was the end of it. It was a completely different target, different subjects, different data, everything.
Media: You say ended with a subpoena from Congress. From where? From which committee?
Chope: I'm not sure about the committee. That was a completely different effort. There were similar tools, but you've got to remember back here, let me just for the Land Information Warfare Activity, this was very experimental stuff back then. So what that was about was demonstrating can experimental stuff like this be useful in helping us solve some technology transfer riddles. That was kind of the purpose of that effort. That effort ended in the LIWA's eyes in November. LIWA did a lot of other analytical projects. That's what they do. They do intelligence analysis.
Media: -- open source, classified?
Chope: In which?
Media: In both.
Chope: In Able Danger it was mixed, both open source and classified.
Media: The five people that recall seeing either Attah's name or photograph on the charts, do they have any recollection of where that photograph might have come from, number one? How many people's names were on that chart? Was it five, was it 10,000?
Chope: We don't know what was on the chart.
Media: In their recollection, what is their recollection of that chart?
Chope: It's different compared to any person you talk to.
Gandy: Captain Philpot will contend there are upwards of 60 names on that chart. Not all of them will have photographs attributed to them. Some will just be outlined silhouettes of a head.
Media: Given the differences in their recollection, are their claims considered credible?
Chope: Don't know. We're just in the fact-finding mode.
Media: This is kind of a fair question, actually. We won't ask you to do hypotheticals or conjectures, but you all live in a world of analyzing data. Clearly if you're supervisors or Dr. Cambone said to you want do you think now? You’ve now gone from two to five people who recall it. You haven't found the document. What do you think?
Down: These people are, Captain Philpot for instance and the others, especially the ones that are involved in data mining, the contracting firms, are credible people. Again, we just -- We are unable to again provide corroborating evidence. We just, as I've said, can't find the document. But as I said, they are credible people.
Media: What do you make of that? That disparity. How do you conclude?
Chope: We can only hypothesize on how this --
Down: I don't --
Chope: -- might have come about is all you can do, hypothesize.
I agree with Pat. Most of the people involved in this are credible folks. We've checked out everything they've said. We can go to the same group of people you would think were sitting next to each other and say did you see a chart with a picture of Attah on it? No, no, no, yes. That's kind of the situation we're in right now. We drill into that and we still have the no, no, no, yes kind of situation.
Media: If these people are credible, what could account for this difference in your view?
Down: I don't know. We've seen a chart with different Mohammed's on them. Is it possible that Mohammed Ajaz, Mohammed -- what's the other one.
Chope: Arateff.
Down: Arateff, thank you. So we have charts with those names but not Mohammed Attah. Is there confusion there? Again, we don't know. We simply don't know. Was the reference to Mohammed Attah, did it come out early on in a chart? In that case if it came out early on, were there any kind of concerns which we again can't corroborate for our interviews. If it came out early, such as in a proof of concept chart, we may never find it.
So as I said, we haven't found any supporting evidence at this point, especially that documentation, to back those claims up.
[Multiple voices].
Down: We didn't, no.
Media: -- head of Special Ops at the time, wasn't he?
Chope: -- do not.
Media: You do not?
Down: Not yet.
Media: Can I ask a real basic question here? This effort to try to get to the bottom of this, this is responsive to Congress, to a directive from the Secretary, to what? Maybe you got into that in the beginning or maybe everyone in here knows it but me, I just -- You're getting to the bottom of this because Congress wants an answer or because you just want to know, because we're all asking these questions and you want us to shut up? [Laughter].
Down: Maybe all of the above. We --
Chope: -- Cambone has directed that we do fact-finding and find the facts in this case. Each of the components involved, SOCOM as the headquarters and supporting agencies have stepped forward and are doing their part to try and figure out what the facts are.
Media: Can I ask another question about the lawyers? You said I think that you had negative indication that that has happened, i.e. the destruction of documents.
Chope: That was taken a little out of context. No lawyer ever directed any Able Danger personnel to destroy documents. Any destruction of documents was conducted in accordance with established regulations and directives.
Media: What about the question of the meetings with the FBI?
Chope: Aside from the statements by Mr. Schaeffer and Captain Philpot we have found no corroborating statements or evidence or whatever you want to call it to that effect in the course of our interviews.
Media: So you talked to all of the lawyers who might have tried to stop this because it was U.S. person information and couldn't be disseminated to domestic agencies. And no one remembers --
Chope: We have talked to all the lawyers involved in the project and there is no hindrance upon the sharing of information.
Gandy: We know that data was destroyed, the Land Information Warfare Activity. But it was destroyed in compliance with our intelligence oversight directives, 12333, DoD 5240-1R, et cetera. So it was destroyed in complete protocols, normal protocols that we would follow with any kind of U.S. person data. It wasn't destroyed because a lawyer came in and said you've got to get rid of this stuff. It was the clock is ticking, show us how you can pull this U.S. person information out of here or not, you can't do it we have protocols and directives to comply with, we're going to comply, and they did. That's how the data was destroyed at LIWA and I believe later on in SOCOM was in a similar manner destroyed.
Media: So the people involved in the project were asked whether there was a way that they could extract intelligence which could be shared from this massive data that they had from this pile you talked about --
Gandy: I think you're confusing the sharing of data -- Data can be shared with anybody. U.S. person data can be shared in a wide variety of situations. We do that every day in the Department of Defense. For instance on the counter-intelligence side of the house which I am responsible for for the Army, our intelligence agents share information every day with the FBI no U.S. persons, and who has primacy in an investigation, and who doesn't. It's all laid out in the protocols surrounding EO-12333 and 5240, our counter-intelligence regulations. Promulgation of those sharing agreements. So we can share data with U.S. persons.
In this case because of the nature in which the data was collected, now we're 5.5 years ago. It was a gobbling up of a lot of data from a lot of sources and put in one pile. You had this commingling of U.S. person data with lots of other data, and there was no way to really pull it out. So the protocols were applied as they stood and really as they stand saying do you have a reason to do this. Like in the counter-intelligence case we have a reason, that we're doing a counter-espionage investigation or we're doing a force protection investigation. In this case there was no perceived imminent threat, imminent crime going to occur, any danger, those kinds of things that say that you can share it. That was not perceived to be the case in these situations and it was destroyed.
Media: So the identification of individuals who were linked to al-Qaida inside the United States was not perceived as an imminent threat after the USS Cole and after the embassy bombings --
Gandy: We don't know that they identified those people in this data.
Media: You say there was no imminent threat, there was no perceived imminent threat.
Gandy: That might be a reason you would keep the data. Those are the kind of reasons we're allowed to keep data about U.S. persons.
Media: And share it, right?
Gandy: Absolutely. It depends on the situation. If that person, for instance, if that person is located overseas, then you would share it with a different group of people than if the person was located in the United States. Just that there are links established doesn't really mean anything. And by the way, some of these links, in the primacy of this technology you get some very goofy links that require research. In fact when we interviewed these analysts to a person they said what was the nature of the stuff? They said you really need to dig into this to find out what these links meant.
Media: I was told that the, after the data run had been done on unclassified data bases it was then scrubbed against classified data in order to try and do this process. Like burrowing in and finding out what the links might be and which might be meaningful and so on. Have you been able to discover whether this chart that these five people remember was the product of a first stage of that or a second stage?
Gandy: One, we don't know there's a chart. But if there was a chart we believe it came from open source information.
Media: And not being scrubbed against classified --
Gandy: I don't know.
Media: Just to return to the question of the lawyers, Schaeffer said there were two occasions on which military lawyers intervened, the first was he said, that the military couldn't do anything with it and then when he tried to take it to the FBI again -- But you're saying that no -- Can you clarify exactly what you're saying about what the lawyers did? The document destruction stuff was SOP. You haven't found anything about a meeting with the FBI. I mean apart from the SOP on document destruction, what role did the regulations about U.S. persons and the legal interpretation of those made by lawyers of SOCOM play in how this all played out?
Gandy: Intelligence oversight drives how long we can store information on U.S. persons. It's really proscribed pretty clearly.
Media: Any activity that was proposed by people involved in Able Danger that was prohibited by lawyers --
Gandy: No. That's not the lawyers' job in this kind of a, in any situation within here. Their job is to give advice to the commander. The commander makes the ultimate determination. In no way, shape or form did the lawyers dissuade or hinder people from turning information over.
Media: The additional three people that recall seeing references to Mohammed Attah, do any of them recall what that was based on? You said --
Gandy: We asked where did this data come from and the person who saw the name and not the face couldn't tell. What it comes from is a big large conglomeration of data from lots of sources, and you drag a problem set through this data and you get lots of linkages and then you research the linkages is how it works.
We asked every single analyst if there was such a chart where would the data from that have come from? They didn't know. What they're doing is this huge data mining and they just get a pile of data, and in those days -- Now if you say okay, I have this piece of information, you could probably trace it back to its original parentage.
Media: But not in those days.
Gandy: In those days I think you could with some of the tools, but it depends upon analyst input to the tools, the linkages and all. They had some capability to do that because they would describe an anecdote where they'd say we'll read this information, and they'd say well, it's from a web site. They got to the web site it's kind of like a goofball web site. Then okay, get rid of that stuff. It's from something that really is not credible information. So they had some capability but I don't think they had the capability to scrub it in the fashion that the oversight rules could live with.
Media: The documents that were destroyed, is there a, if it's a standard operating procedure, are there rudimentary records that are kept of what documents are destroyed?
Gandy: There are certificates of destruction. What you'll have, traditionally for electronic it's very difficult. They'll say I destroyed so many disc drives, so many zip drives, so many CD roms were in the cruncher, that kind of stuff. You have lots and lost of data. So it's very general in nature.
Media: It doesn't really identify --
Gandy: It would never go down like in an index fashion or an inventory fashion. For those volumes of data it would say, the Y drive on this server at this place was wiped on this day, certified by the technician who conducted it.
Media: If there were a chart, a piece of paper, that would be different?
Gandy: You do physical destruction of it.
Media: Is that what it was?
Gandy: This is for documents that are actually published and numbered kind of documents that you would sign for. Those kind of documents. But if you have like working papers, charts that you're printing off looking that's not good, that's not good, you wouldn't do that. You’d just destroy all those.
Media: Schaeffer and Philpot's current status is?
Gandy: Captain Philpot's in the Navy and Mr. Schaeffer is --
Huntington: On administrative leave without (corrected – should be with) pay.
Media: From the DIA?
Huntington: That's correct.
Media: Is he in uniform still?
Huntington: I don't know the answer to that.
Media: Is he on administrative leave without pay as punishment?
Huntington: No. That's totally separate from any of this activity.
Media: Does he face any possible action for disposing of information?
Whitman: We're not going to get into any personnel issues that bump against the Privacy Act.
Media: Is the reason why he's on leave, does that affect his credibility at all in the investigation?
Huntington: No. These two things are entirely separate sorts of things. The reason for this action is totally unrelated to any of the activities related to Able Danger.
Media: How much of your resources has been devoted to digging this up? Is it something – do you have a lot of people who are looking in to this now? [Laughter].
Down: Yes.
Gandy: A lot of personal time.
Media: Your personal opinion of it, is it a waste of time? Is it constructive? Is it something you find helpful?
Gandy: Dr. Cambone says this is something we ought to look into, I go roger that, sir. It's very important.
Whitman: Like I said, we would present you the facts when we had some conviction on it, and that's where we're at today. I hope it's been useful.
Media: Thanks for doing it on the record.
Chope: You're welcome.
http://www.democrats.org/a/2005/09/able_danger_wha.php
Able Danger: What Lurks Behind Bush’s Stonewall?
September 23, 2005
Washington, DC - Yesterday, the Bush Administration prevented witnesses from providing public testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee about Able Danger, "a secret military unit that is said to have identified four of the Sept. 11 hijackers more than a year before the terrorist attacks." [Foxnews.com, 9/22/05] Even Republican members of Congress blasted the White House's unwillingness to be open and honest with the American people about our fight against terrorism.
Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean issued the following statement calling on the President to stop stonewalling on Able Danger and said it demonstrated the importance of appointing a genuinely independent commission to examine the federal government's failed response to Hurricane Katrina:
"The Bush White House has once again shown a preference for playing politics rather than protecting the American people from terrorist attacks. At every turn, this Administration has been unwilling to investigate its own officials, their friends and their cronies. Now, even Republicans in Congress are rebelling against Bush's inability to tell the truth about his Administration's failures. It's time for President Bush to stop stonewalling and demonstrate genuine leadership by working with Congress to independently and thoroughly answer the serious questions about our national security raised by the failures of Able Danger and the failed response to Katrina."
GOP Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA): Bush Administration Owes American People an Explanation. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter blasted the Pentagon's decision not to allow five key officials to testify in front of his committee. "I think the Department of Defense owes the American people an explanation of what went on here. The American people are entitled to some answers." Specter also noted, "that looks to me like it may be obstruction of the committee's activities, something we will have to determine." [Reuters, 9/22/05; AP, 9/22/05; Foxnews.com, 9/22/05]
GOP Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA): Pentagon Wants to Avoid "Egg on Their Face." "A Pentagon spokesman had said the decision to limit testimony was based on concerns about disclosing classified information, but Senator Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, said he believed the reason was a concern 'that they'll just have egg on their face.'" [New York Times, 9/22/05]
GOP Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA): "There's something wrong with the system, and we should be able to discuss that." [Portland (Maine) Press-Herald, 9/22/05]
Able Danger: What Lurks Behind Bush’s Stonewall?
September 23, 2005
Washington, DC - Yesterday, the Bush Administration prevented witnesses from providing public testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee about Able Danger, "a secret military unit that is said to have identified four of the Sept. 11 hijackers more than a year before the terrorist attacks." [Foxnews.com, 9/22/05] Even Republican members of Congress blasted the White House's unwillingness to be open and honest with the American people about our fight against terrorism.
Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean issued the following statement calling on the President to stop stonewalling on Able Danger and said it demonstrated the importance of appointing a genuinely independent commission to examine the federal government's failed response to Hurricane Katrina:
"The Bush White House has once again shown a preference for playing politics rather than protecting the American people from terrorist attacks. At every turn, this Administration has been unwilling to investigate its own officials, their friends and their cronies. Now, even Republicans in Congress are rebelling against Bush's inability to tell the truth about his Administration's failures. It's time for President Bush to stop stonewalling and demonstrate genuine leadership by working with Congress to independently and thoroughly answer the serious questions about our national security raised by the failures of Able Danger and the failed response to Katrina."
GOP Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA): Bush Administration Owes American People an Explanation. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter blasted the Pentagon's decision not to allow five key officials to testify in front of his committee. "I think the Department of Defense owes the American people an explanation of what went on here. The American people are entitled to some answers." Specter also noted, "that looks to me like it may be obstruction of the committee's activities, something we will have to determine." [Reuters, 9/22/05; AP, 9/22/05; Foxnews.com, 9/22/05]
GOP Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA): Pentagon Wants to Avoid "Egg on Their Face." "A Pentagon spokesman had said the decision to limit testimony was based on concerns about disclosing classified information, but Senator Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, said he believed the reason was a concern 'that they'll just have egg on their face.'" [New York Times, 9/22/05]
GOP Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA): "There's something wrong with the system, and we should be able to discuss that." [Portland (Maine) Press-Herald, 9/22/05]
http://rawstory.com/news/2005/Whitewashing...n_of__0818.html
Whitewashing the Protection of Terrorists on US Soil
Nafeez Ahmed
Exclusive: Well known Mid-East expert questions omission of "Able Danger" by 9/11 Commission
Exactly one year before 9/11, a highly classified US Army intelligence unit known as "Able Danger" had already pinpointed four of the 9/11 hijackers. Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid Almidhar, and Nawaf Alhamzi were identified as members of a "Brooklyn" al-Qaeda cell on a detailed chart that included visa photographs. The Army unit was established by the Special Operations Command in 1999 by Gen. Hugh Shelton, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The startling revelations first surfaced in late June, from Congressman. Curt Weldon (R-PA), Vice-Chairman of the House Homeland Security and Armed Services Committees, citing at least three active military and intelligence officials. The story eventually made the New York Times headlines, thrice, the latest report on Tuesday quoting Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who was a liaison with the Able Danger unit at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Lt. Col. Shaffer gave on the record confirmation of the details revealed by Rep. Weldon, but further stated that Able Danger had scheduled three meetings in the summer of 2000 with the FBI's Washington field office to share the findings and recommend to "take out that cell."
Those meetings were unilaterally cancelled by military lawyers at the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, and information sharing was blocked.
The stated reason? Apparently, Atta and his comrades were in the US on "valid entry visas" - the law, it was claimed, bars US citizens and green-card holders from being targeted for intelligence-collection operations. Although, this does not include visa holders, the law supposedly provided a disincentive for sharing intelligence with law enforcement. "We were directed to take those 3M yellow stickers and place them over the faces of Atta and the other terrorists and pretend they didn't exist," said another defense intelligence official.
Terrorists don't get and keep visas:
The explanation was disingenuous. "Mohammed Atta and his terrorist cohorts were clearly and factually established as Al-Qaeda functionaries of a foreign government [Taliban of Afghanistan] with Al-Qaeda itself being a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (DFTO)", noted Sean Osborne of the US Army's Program Executive Office - Command, Control, Communications Tactical (PEOC3T) within the Special Project Office (SPO).
"Designated terrorist's do not receive and retain 'green card' status, and any card so previously attained would have to be considered a priori fraudulent, null and void," Osborne stated.
In fact, there are 13 exceptions within Executive Order 12333 allowing intelligence-collection on US Persons and bona-fide green card-holders, including for Counterintelligence purposes, allowing for collection of against individuals reasonably suspected of involvement in international terrorism, as well as their associates.
Atta:
But all this is academic. Mohamed Atta was never a green-card holder. Worse still, he never had a valid entry visa. On the contrary, in January 2001, Atta was permitted reentry into the United States after a trip to Germany, despite being in violation of his visa status. He had landed in Miami on January 10 on a flight from Madrid on a tourist visa - yet he had told immigration inspectors that he was taking flying lessons in the US, for which an M-1 student visa is strictly required.
Essentially, Atta had entered the US three times on a tourist visa in 2001, although INS officials knew the visa had expired in 2000, and Atta had violated its terms by taking flight lessons. So Atta was illegal - and the Defense Department lawyers who blocked the FBI from accessing the Able Danger data were lying. So the question remains: why was the Able Danger report prevented by the DoD from circulating in the US intelligence community?
According to the 9/11 Commission report, Atta was not identified as a potential terrorist until after 9/11, and Almidhar and Alhamzi were only identified in late 1999 and 2000 by the CIA - but the FBI was apparently only notified in summer 2001. The Able Danger story demonstrates that the 9/11 Commission's narrative is false - reliable information that four al-Qaeda members were operating within a cell to plan a terrorist attack was available, but its circulation was inexplicably obstructed by the government.
The Able Danger story, however, is only the latest confirmation that the intelligence community had extensive information on many of the 9/11 hijackers years prior to 9/11.
The Miami Herald (6/7/02) reported that the National Security Agency had "monitored telephone conversations before Sept. 11 between the suspected commander of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and the alleged chief hijacker." Anonymous NSA officials told the Herald that "the conversations between Khalid Shaikh Mohammed" - the operational mastermind of 9/11 - "and Mohamed Atta were intercepted", while Atta was in the US. How much was gleaned about the plot was not disclosed. But The Independent (9/15/02) reported that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed "received a telephone call from Mohammed Atta on 10 September", in which he gave Atta "the final approval to launch the strikes." Like Able Danger, these facts were also apparently considered "historically irrelevant" by the Commission.
Las Vegas is not a Muslim destination:
Other facts were also considered irrelevant by the Commission. For instance, the fact that numerous reports in the San Francisco Chronicle, South Florida Sun Sentinel, Los Angeles Times, and numerous other sources, confirmed from multiple eyewitnesses that the hijackers, including Mohamed Atta, had "engaged in some decidedly un-Islamic sampling of prohibited pleasures in America's reputed capital of moral corrosion," in Las Vegas and elsewhere - behavior that just doesn't quite fit with al-Qaeda's puritan salafist ideology of strict adherence to Islamic tenets.
More Terrorist Training:
Or the reports that emerged in Newsweek, the Washington Post, and the New York Times that at least "five of the alleged hijackers received training in the 1990s at secure US military installations", including Mohamed Atta who attended International Officers School at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama.
The US Air Force later argued that they "might not" be the same persons, due to some "biographical discrepancies" - which of course were never revealed to the public. When Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL) tried to investigate, shocked at the possibility that Pensacola Naval Air Station could have hosted and trained Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Alghamdi, among others, he was told by the FBI - after several weeks - that they were trying to work through something "complicated and difficult."
Daniel Hopsicker, a former Producer at PBS Wall Street Week and investigative report at NBC News, decided to investigate. After pressing an official at the Defense Department, he was finally told: "I do not have the authority to tell you who attended which schools" - in other words, terrorists did train at secure US military installations, but who trained where is none of our concern. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these people were, for reasons undisclosed, protected.
Attempts to silence Able Danger revelations:
Such facts have fallen into the memory hole. There is currently an active attempt to achieve the same results for the Able Danger revelations. The 9/11 Commission's attempts to explain its omission of the revelations from its final report were riddled with contradictions.
First the Commission completely denied any knowledge of Able Danger. Allegedly, the staff and panel members simply hadn't been told. When it became clear, from Weldon's military intelligence sources, that the Commission had been officially briefed on the Able Danger report, they relented, and claimed instead that they simply didn't take the material seriously, because it had already established that the hijackers had not been identified at that early time.
When this explanation started to falter, it was stated that the briefing made no mention at all of Mohamed Atta, and thus was not considered to be of value to the investigation.
The Whistleblower:
But Lt. Col. Shaffer has now come on public record confirming that he had personally "provided information about Able Danger and its identification of Mr. Atta in a private meeting in October 2003 with members of the Sept. 11 commission staff when they visited Afghanistan", according to the newspaper of record. Former Commissioners suddenly emerged to chorus the insistence that they had never been briefed so specifically about Able Danger, that the material was vague, and made no mention of Atta.
The backtracking and side-stepping of the now disbanded Commission hardly lends its position further credibility.
Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is author of four books, including:
The War on Truth: 9/11, Disinformation and the Anatomy of Terrorism
The War on Freedom: How and Why America was Attacked, September 11, 2001
Behind the War on Terror : Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for Iraq
He is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development in London, and a Doctoral Candidate in International Relations at the University of Sussex, Brighton.
Originally published on Thursday August 18, 2005.
Copyright © 2004-05 Raw Story Media, Inc. All rights reserved. | Site map | Privacy policy
Whitewashing the Protection of Terrorists on US Soil
Nafeez Ahmed
Exclusive: Well known Mid-East expert questions omission of "Able Danger" by 9/11 Commission
Exactly one year before 9/11, a highly classified US Army intelligence unit known as "Able Danger" had already pinpointed four of the 9/11 hijackers. Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid Almidhar, and Nawaf Alhamzi were identified as members of a "Brooklyn" al-Qaeda cell on a detailed chart that included visa photographs. The Army unit was established by the Special Operations Command in 1999 by Gen. Hugh Shelton, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The startling revelations first surfaced in late June, from Congressman. Curt Weldon (R-PA), Vice-Chairman of the House Homeland Security and Armed Services Committees, citing at least three active military and intelligence officials. The story eventually made the New York Times headlines, thrice, the latest report on Tuesday quoting Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, who was a liaison with the Able Danger unit at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Lt. Col. Shaffer gave on the record confirmation of the details revealed by Rep. Weldon, but further stated that Able Danger had scheduled three meetings in the summer of 2000 with the FBI's Washington field office to share the findings and recommend to "take out that cell."
Those meetings were unilaterally cancelled by military lawyers at the Defense Department's Special Operations Command, and information sharing was blocked.
The stated reason? Apparently, Atta and his comrades were in the US on "valid entry visas" - the law, it was claimed, bars US citizens and green-card holders from being targeted for intelligence-collection operations. Although, this does not include visa holders, the law supposedly provided a disincentive for sharing intelligence with law enforcement. "We were directed to take those 3M yellow stickers and place them over the faces of Atta and the other terrorists and pretend they didn't exist," said another defense intelligence official.
Terrorists don't get and keep visas:
The explanation was disingenuous. "Mohammed Atta and his terrorist cohorts were clearly and factually established as Al-Qaeda functionaries of a foreign government [Taliban of Afghanistan] with Al-Qaeda itself being a Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (DFTO)", noted Sean Osborne of the US Army's Program Executive Office - Command, Control, Communications Tactical (PEOC3T) within the Special Project Office (SPO).
"Designated terrorist's do not receive and retain 'green card' status, and any card so previously attained would have to be considered a priori fraudulent, null and void," Osborne stated.
In fact, there are 13 exceptions within Executive Order 12333 allowing intelligence-collection on US Persons and bona-fide green card-holders, including for Counterintelligence purposes, allowing for collection of against individuals reasonably suspected of involvement in international terrorism, as well as their associates.
Atta:
But all this is academic. Mohamed Atta was never a green-card holder. Worse still, he never had a valid entry visa. On the contrary, in January 2001, Atta was permitted reentry into the United States after a trip to Germany, despite being in violation of his visa status. He had landed in Miami on January 10 on a flight from Madrid on a tourist visa - yet he had told immigration inspectors that he was taking flying lessons in the US, for which an M-1 student visa is strictly required.
Essentially, Atta had entered the US three times on a tourist visa in 2001, although INS officials knew the visa had expired in 2000, and Atta had violated its terms by taking flight lessons. So Atta was illegal - and the Defense Department lawyers who blocked the FBI from accessing the Able Danger data were lying. So the question remains: why was the Able Danger report prevented by the DoD from circulating in the US intelligence community?
According to the 9/11 Commission report, Atta was not identified as a potential terrorist until after 9/11, and Almidhar and Alhamzi were only identified in late 1999 and 2000 by the CIA - but the FBI was apparently only notified in summer 2001. The Able Danger story demonstrates that the 9/11 Commission's narrative is false - reliable information that four al-Qaeda members were operating within a cell to plan a terrorist attack was available, but its circulation was inexplicably obstructed by the government.
The Able Danger story, however, is only the latest confirmation that the intelligence community had extensive information on many of the 9/11 hijackers years prior to 9/11.
The Miami Herald (6/7/02) reported that the National Security Agency had "monitored telephone conversations before Sept. 11 between the suspected commander of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and the alleged chief hijacker." Anonymous NSA officials told the Herald that "the conversations between Khalid Shaikh Mohammed" - the operational mastermind of 9/11 - "and Mohamed Atta were intercepted", while Atta was in the US. How much was gleaned about the plot was not disclosed. But The Independent (9/15/02) reported that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed "received a telephone call from Mohammed Atta on 10 September", in which he gave Atta "the final approval to launch the strikes." Like Able Danger, these facts were also apparently considered "historically irrelevant" by the Commission.
Las Vegas is not a Muslim destination:
Other facts were also considered irrelevant by the Commission. For instance, the fact that numerous reports in the San Francisco Chronicle, South Florida Sun Sentinel, Los Angeles Times, and numerous other sources, confirmed from multiple eyewitnesses that the hijackers, including Mohamed Atta, had "engaged in some decidedly un-Islamic sampling of prohibited pleasures in America's reputed capital of moral corrosion," in Las Vegas and elsewhere - behavior that just doesn't quite fit with al-Qaeda's puritan salafist ideology of strict adherence to Islamic tenets.
More Terrorist Training:
Or the reports that emerged in Newsweek, the Washington Post, and the New York Times that at least "five of the alleged hijackers received training in the 1990s at secure US military installations", including Mohamed Atta who attended International Officers School at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama.
The US Air Force later argued that they "might not" be the same persons, due to some "biographical discrepancies" - which of course were never revealed to the public. When Senator Bill Nelson (D-FL) tried to investigate, shocked at the possibility that Pensacola Naval Air Station could have hosted and trained Saeed Alghamdi, Ahmed Alghamdi, among others, he was told by the FBI - after several weeks - that they were trying to work through something "complicated and difficult."
Daniel Hopsicker, a former Producer at PBS Wall Street Week and investigative report at NBC News, decided to investigate. After pressing an official at the Defense Department, he was finally told: "I do not have the authority to tell you who attended which schools" - in other words, terrorists did train at secure US military installations, but who trained where is none of our concern. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these people were, for reasons undisclosed, protected.
Attempts to silence Able Danger revelations:
Such facts have fallen into the memory hole. There is currently an active attempt to achieve the same results for the Able Danger revelations. The 9/11 Commission's attempts to explain its omission of the revelations from its final report were riddled with contradictions.
First the Commission completely denied any knowledge of Able Danger. Allegedly, the staff and panel members simply hadn't been told. When it became clear, from Weldon's military intelligence sources, that the Commission had been officially briefed on the Able Danger report, they relented, and claimed instead that they simply didn't take the material seriously, because it had already established that the hijackers had not been identified at that early time.
When this explanation started to falter, it was stated that the briefing made no mention at all of Mohamed Atta, and thus was not considered to be of value to the investigation.
The Whistleblower:
But Lt. Col. Shaffer has now come on public record confirming that he had personally "provided information about Able Danger and its identification of Mr. Atta in a private meeting in October 2003 with members of the Sept. 11 commission staff when they visited Afghanistan", according to the newspaper of record. Former Commissioners suddenly emerged to chorus the insistence that they had never been briefed so specifically about Able Danger, that the material was vague, and made no mention of Atta.
The backtracking and side-stepping of the now disbanded Commission hardly lends its position further credibility.
Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is author of four books, including:
The War on Truth: 9/11, Disinformation and the Anatomy of Terrorism
The War on Freedom: How and Why America was Attacked, September 11, 2001
Behind the War on Terror : Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for Iraq
He is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development in London, and a Doctoral Candidate in International Relations at the University of Sussex, Brighton.
Originally published on Thursday August 18, 2005.
Copyright © 2004-05 Raw Story Media, Inc. All rights reserved. | Site map | Privacy policy
Here is a big THANK YOU, Snuffysmith. This should be being discussed in the cafe. I believe Silver (who has now said Goodbye) brought this up first. It is probably what George Bush wants to cover up most. It should be exposed. Thanks again for the great work of putting the whole thing together for us.
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.php?article_id=4957
How the Able Danger method bagged Saddam
November 2nd, 2005
“We believed rightly that Saddam was in our AO (area of operations) from summer ’03 on, and also believed that if he were caught, he would likely be caught in our area as in any. We publicly stated so from June ’03 onward.”
These words are from an e-mail Lt. Col. Steven D. Russell wrote to me recently. He commanded Task Force 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, which was based in Tikrit, Saddam’s tribal homeground, about 100 miles north of Baghdad. It was the unit most responsible for capturing Saddam Hussein, though the credit must be shared with the special operations task force with whom Russell and his men worked closely. In his words:
“Colonel (James B.) Hickey (commander, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division) and I have always been on record as stating that it was very hard work from both conventional and special ops guys in combination with raids, conventional combat ops and intel-driven operations”
that Saddam and others identified in the high value target “deck of cards” were captured.
With Saddam Hussein’s trial underway, this would be an appropriate occasion to re-visit the persevering efforts that led to that historic day in December 2003 when the Butcher of Baghdad was pulled from his rathole. One of the intelligence techniques employed was the same used by the Able Danger to identify Mohammed Atta.
“Data mining is the slang for it,” Captain Timothy Morrow explained to me. That is, slang for the methods he and his small team employed. Captain Morrow served as intelligence officer for 1/22nd Infantry and credited LTC Russell and Col. Hickey for allowing his staff the leeway to work outside the box. In this case, it meant a free hand to develop a non-standard database that included information from all known sources, which in turn served as the basis for a link diagram. That diagram – an intelligence mosaic if you will – depicted the nature of different enemy factions, including the identities of many of Saddam’s facilitators. Further, Morrow and his staff were given the freedom to share their data directly with other units and agencies, thereby insuring that they received actionable intelligence in a timely manner. To make the process seamless and retain its simplicity, the captain regularly briefed the special operations task force and Major Stan Murphy’s1st Brigade’s intelligence team himself.
The leeway allowed by his superior officers also permitted Capt. Morrow to shift his focus early on from regime members and scientists who may have been involved with WMD to hunting insurgency enablers. He believed that, since Saddam ran his regime like a mafia organization with close relatives at the top, and that they all had trusted bodyguards, he would target those bodyguards, along with Saddam’s business associates.
“We interrogated them to get new information and to verify older intelligence. Then we passed them off to other agencies and units. We did all of this, including handoffs, as rapidly as possible so no intelligence would get stale.”
Captain Morrow stressed that the database and link diagram had to be simple enough to tie together information flowing in from various sources, e.g., human intelligence (the most important), spot intelligence reports from other units in the field and items such as photos found on captured enemy personnel, photos that might, for instance, depict the bodyguard who carried them posing with a known associate of Saddam Hussein, or Saddam Hussein himself. It was the use of these multiple sources that defined data mining in this case. Capt. Morrow told me that the entire process was an art, not a science; that by June 2003 his team had published the first link diagram of Saddam’s inner circle bodyguards and associates with photographs of many of them. This, together with the database, “continued to be a living, growing document used for analysis and briefings.”
The link diagram would, for instance, have at its top high-value target #1, or, Saddam Hussein. Below would be the people who enabled him to thrive and operate: family associates, bodyguards, financiers, all the way down to bomb makers and active terror cells. From top to bottom all were connected and the linkages between and among them were illustrated by the diagram. The diagram, Capt. Morrow said,
“helps you visualize relationships between people using all the same sources that are in the database. It, along with the database, is where the real work is accomplished.”
The database contained all the raw information about, for instance, family or tribal connections. Captain Morrow’s database was contained on an Excel spreadsheet in his laptop computer. Identifying names was one of the biggest problems in Iraq, one that made information collection, targeting and handling detainees more difficult. His database made that less problematical; allowed him to pinpoint the names of particular bombers, arms dealers, bodyguards and other enablers. It “helps you identify targets,” Morrow told me, “and, by tracking informant names, it will help you discern who is really an enemy operator and who is just disliked by a certain informant or family.” Reiterating the importance of human intelligence, the captain stressed that it was the key to the capture of the top four people in the deck of cards.
“No computer or satellite gadgetry can replace it, nor can they equal it in effectiveness. By treating locals honestly and with respect you will be overwhelmed with good, solid enemy information whether you want it or not.”
For LTC Russell’s Task Force 1/22nd Infantry, a priority mission was
“locating and destroying or capturing personnel on the ‘most wanted’ and ‘black’ lists associated with Saddam’s regime who posed a threat to a liberated Iraq.”
Accomplishing that mission began in earnest with the capture of one of Saddam’s nephews, who was carrying a gym bag containing $800,000 and a jewel-filled plastic tube. On June 16, 2003 they nabbed #4 in the deck of cards, Saddam’s personal secretary and cabinet member, General Hamid Mahmud Al-Tikriti. In a follow-on raid at the general’s family farm, millions of dollars in US and Iraqi money were recovered, along with an estimated $2 million in jewelry belonging to Saddam’s wife, Sajida Kerala Telfa.. As LTC Russell later wrote:
“Using multiple, simultaneous raids we captured a number of individuals that led to bigger fish. (other personal bodyguards and enablers of Saddam) Our men performed superbly and worked in cooperation with special operations forces. Information from raids and pressure on people we detained (interrogated by Captain Morrow) led us to the information for # 4’s capture and culminated with the raids on the Hadooshi farm.”
The Hadooshis were known to be some of Saddam’s personal bodyguards. From his intelligence sources Capt. Morrow knew them to be Hussein’s drinking buddies who captured women for his “use.” One of them was with Saddam’s sons when they were killed. Russell referred to these ongoing operations as “draining the swamp” and these thugs were bottom feeders.
In late July another inner circle figure and Saddam’s bodyguard, Adnan Abdullah Abid Musslit, was captured. Acting on information from local Iraqis who knew him to be a vicious murderer, Captain Mark Stoufer’s A Company and LT Chris Morris’ Recon Platoon conducted a lightning raid in residential Tikrit that netted Musslit, another bodyguard, and a former regime organizer.
By September the five controlling families that surrounded, supported and protected Saddam had been identified. They all lived in villages straddling a 12 mile corridor along the Tigris River. One of those villages was Owja, Saddam’s birthplace. Each family had specific tasks such as logistics, operations or planning. Each one then delegated assignments to a web of lower tier cells which also had individual responsibilities, e.g., safe houses, food, transportation. The entire organization was depicted on Captain Morrow’s link diagram.
“We now had a clear blood trail of the inner circle and an excitement began to build,” LTC Russell later wrote. If we could break the inner circle, we felt it would come down fast. It did. On November 13 we conducted raids in Tikrit and pulled four more men from the swamp. Though lesser players, they were related to recent attacks and had key information.”
Beginning the first week of December events began to cascade. A special operations team raid in Tikrit captured another inner circle member whose family helped protect Saddam. A Company nabbed a known Saddam associate on December 9 at a desert farmhouse. A subsequent special operations mission bagged another inner circle member. And then, the fat man sang. Captured in Baghdad and taken immediately to 1st Brigade headquarters, this innermost circle member, never identified, was described by officers there as one of the “42 inch waistband guys.” Major Murphy called him “Saddam’s right arm.” He had been a senior official in Saddam’s elite Special Security Organization based in Abu Ajeel, home village for one of the supporting families in the Tigris River corridor. It took some intense sessions, but the fat man talked, revealing after several interrogations that Saddam was hiding in Ad Dawr, east of Tikrit along the Tigris.
Planning for Operation Red Dawn commenced. Col. Hickey had told LTC Russell to have his men ready at a moment’s notice for any contingency. But because at that time the fat man hadn’t yet provided the specific location, Task Force 1/22 was deployed west of the Tigris. When the Ad Dawr site became known, planners identified two objectives there, a house and a farm designated Wolverine 1 and Wolverine 2. Col. Hickey deployed 4/42d Field Artillery and G Troop, 10th Cavalry as outer and inner cordons around the objectives, with 1/10th Cavalry covering the air corridor. Across the Tigris were Russell’s men, with A Company positioned right along the riverbank.
Special operations teams hit Wolverine 1 and Wolverine 2 simultaneously on December 13. At 8:10 p.m. the team at Wolverine 2 reported finding a hole. Several minutes later came the words, “We have an individual in the hole.” In it and nearby were: 1 pistol, 2 AK-47 rifles, $750,000 in U.S. currency and a taxi. Col. Hickey sealed off the site immediately. The “individual” was whisked off by special operations personnel. Two hours later, Russell received a phone call from Col. Hickey, who relayed the good news. “Cesar Romero!” he exclaimed. In earlier discussions of how Saddam might look now, Hickey had joked that he might resemble the famous actor.
Saddam Hussein had been captured. In the words of LTC Russell: “ We knew our months of raiding, painstaking intelligence work and capture of several deck of card leaders, along with large percentages of Saddam’s inner circle, got us to where we were. I’m very proud of our part in his capture. It was a great accomplishment for the United States, the 4th Infantry Division and Special Operations Forces.”
Captain Timothy Morrow wasn’t on hand for that historic event. He was back home in Texas recuperating from a gunshot wound to the upper chest received October 28 while on patrol in Tikrit. Though frustrated, he could rest content knowing that the intelligence he and his staff produced was vital to the planning of Red Dawn and bagging the Butcher of Baghdad.
John B. Dwyer is a military historian.
Author’s note:
The 4th ID is now beginning its second deployment to Iraq, which will continue through December. Now re-organized & “modular” the “Iron Horse” division under Maj. Gen. James Thurman, will be based in Baghdad. Besides its four brigade combat teams, the 4th ID will have 3 Iraqi divisions attached to it. God Speed these superbly trained fighting men & women.
John B. Dwyer
How the Able Danger method bagged Saddam
November 2nd, 2005
“We believed rightly that Saddam was in our AO (area of operations) from summer ’03 on, and also believed that if he were caught, he would likely be caught in our area as in any. We publicly stated so from June ’03 onward.”
These words are from an e-mail Lt. Col. Steven D. Russell wrote to me recently. He commanded Task Force 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, which was based in Tikrit, Saddam’s tribal homeground, about 100 miles north of Baghdad. It was the unit most responsible for capturing Saddam Hussein, though the credit must be shared with the special operations task force with whom Russell and his men worked closely. In his words:
“Colonel (James B.) Hickey (commander, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division) and I have always been on record as stating that it was very hard work from both conventional and special ops guys in combination with raids, conventional combat ops and intel-driven operations”
that Saddam and others identified in the high value target “deck of cards” were captured.
With Saddam Hussein’s trial underway, this would be an appropriate occasion to re-visit the persevering efforts that led to that historic day in December 2003 when the Butcher of Baghdad was pulled from his rathole. One of the intelligence techniques employed was the same used by the Able Danger to identify Mohammed Atta.
“Data mining is the slang for it,” Captain Timothy Morrow explained to me. That is, slang for the methods he and his small team employed. Captain Morrow served as intelligence officer for 1/22nd Infantry and credited LTC Russell and Col. Hickey for allowing his staff the leeway to work outside the box. In this case, it meant a free hand to develop a non-standard database that included information from all known sources, which in turn served as the basis for a link diagram. That diagram – an intelligence mosaic if you will – depicted the nature of different enemy factions, including the identities of many of Saddam’s facilitators. Further, Morrow and his staff were given the freedom to share their data directly with other units and agencies, thereby insuring that they received actionable intelligence in a timely manner. To make the process seamless and retain its simplicity, the captain regularly briefed the special operations task force and Major Stan Murphy’s1st Brigade’s intelligence team himself.
The leeway allowed by his superior officers also permitted Capt. Morrow to shift his focus early on from regime members and scientists who may have been involved with WMD to hunting insurgency enablers. He believed that, since Saddam ran his regime like a mafia organization with close relatives at the top, and that they all had trusted bodyguards, he would target those bodyguards, along with Saddam’s business associates.
“We interrogated them to get new information and to verify older intelligence. Then we passed them off to other agencies and units. We did all of this, including handoffs, as rapidly as possible so no intelligence would get stale.”
Captain Morrow stressed that the database and link diagram had to be simple enough to tie together information flowing in from various sources, e.g., human intelligence (the most important), spot intelligence reports from other units in the field and items such as photos found on captured enemy personnel, photos that might, for instance, depict the bodyguard who carried them posing with a known associate of Saddam Hussein, or Saddam Hussein himself. It was the use of these multiple sources that defined data mining in this case. Capt. Morrow told me that the entire process was an art, not a science; that by June 2003 his team had published the first link diagram of Saddam’s inner circle bodyguards and associates with photographs of many of them. This, together with the database, “continued to be a living, growing document used for analysis and briefings.”
The link diagram would, for instance, have at its top high-value target #1, or, Saddam Hussein. Below would be the people who enabled him to thrive and operate: family associates, bodyguards, financiers, all the way down to bomb makers and active terror cells. From top to bottom all were connected and the linkages between and among them were illustrated by the diagram. The diagram, Capt. Morrow said,
“helps you visualize relationships between people using all the same sources that are in the database. It, along with the database, is where the real work is accomplished.”
The database contained all the raw information about, for instance, family or tribal connections. Captain Morrow’s database was contained on an Excel spreadsheet in his laptop computer. Identifying names was one of the biggest problems in Iraq, one that made information collection, targeting and handling detainees more difficult. His database made that less problematical; allowed him to pinpoint the names of particular bombers, arms dealers, bodyguards and other enablers. It “helps you identify targets,” Morrow told me, “and, by tracking informant names, it will help you discern who is really an enemy operator and who is just disliked by a certain informant or family.” Reiterating the importance of human intelligence, the captain stressed that it was the key to the capture of the top four people in the deck of cards.
“No computer or satellite gadgetry can replace it, nor can they equal it in effectiveness. By treating locals honestly and with respect you will be overwhelmed with good, solid enemy information whether you want it or not.”
For LTC Russell’s Task Force 1/22nd Infantry, a priority mission was
“locating and destroying or capturing personnel on the ‘most wanted’ and ‘black’ lists associated with Saddam’s regime who posed a threat to a liberated Iraq.”
Accomplishing that mission began in earnest with the capture of one of Saddam’s nephews, who was carrying a gym bag containing $800,000 and a jewel-filled plastic tube. On June 16, 2003 they nabbed #4 in the deck of cards, Saddam’s personal secretary and cabinet member, General Hamid Mahmud Al-Tikriti. In a follow-on raid at the general’s family farm, millions of dollars in US and Iraqi money were recovered, along with an estimated $2 million in jewelry belonging to Saddam’s wife, Sajida Kerala Telfa.. As LTC Russell later wrote:
“Using multiple, simultaneous raids we captured a number of individuals that led to bigger fish. (other personal bodyguards and enablers of Saddam) Our men performed superbly and worked in cooperation with special operations forces. Information from raids and pressure on people we detained (interrogated by Captain Morrow) led us to the information for # 4’s capture and culminated with the raids on the Hadooshi farm.”
The Hadooshis were known to be some of Saddam’s personal bodyguards. From his intelligence sources Capt. Morrow knew them to be Hussein’s drinking buddies who captured women for his “use.” One of them was with Saddam’s sons when they were killed. Russell referred to these ongoing operations as “draining the swamp” and these thugs were bottom feeders.
In late July another inner circle figure and Saddam’s bodyguard, Adnan Abdullah Abid Musslit, was captured. Acting on information from local Iraqis who knew him to be a vicious murderer, Captain Mark Stoufer’s A Company and LT Chris Morris’ Recon Platoon conducted a lightning raid in residential Tikrit that netted Musslit, another bodyguard, and a former regime organizer.
By September the five controlling families that surrounded, supported and protected Saddam had been identified. They all lived in villages straddling a 12 mile corridor along the Tigris River. One of those villages was Owja, Saddam’s birthplace. Each family had specific tasks such as logistics, operations or planning. Each one then delegated assignments to a web of lower tier cells which also had individual responsibilities, e.g., safe houses, food, transportation. The entire organization was depicted on Captain Morrow’s link diagram.
“We now had a clear blood trail of the inner circle and an excitement began to build,” LTC Russell later wrote. If we could break the inner circle, we felt it would come down fast. It did. On November 13 we conducted raids in Tikrit and pulled four more men from the swamp. Though lesser players, they were related to recent attacks and had key information.”
Beginning the first week of December events began to cascade. A special operations team raid in Tikrit captured another inner circle member whose family helped protect Saddam. A Company nabbed a known Saddam associate on December 9 at a desert farmhouse. A subsequent special operations mission bagged another inner circle member. And then, the fat man sang. Captured in Baghdad and taken immediately to 1st Brigade headquarters, this innermost circle member, never identified, was described by officers there as one of the “42 inch waistband guys.” Major Murphy called him “Saddam’s right arm.” He had been a senior official in Saddam’s elite Special Security Organization based in Abu Ajeel, home village for one of the supporting families in the Tigris River corridor. It took some intense sessions, but the fat man talked, revealing after several interrogations that Saddam was hiding in Ad Dawr, east of Tikrit along the Tigris.
Planning for Operation Red Dawn commenced. Col. Hickey had told LTC Russell to have his men ready at a moment’s notice for any contingency. But because at that time the fat man hadn’t yet provided the specific location, Task Force 1/22 was deployed west of the Tigris. When the Ad Dawr site became known, planners identified two objectives there, a house and a farm designated Wolverine 1 and Wolverine 2. Col. Hickey deployed 4/42d Field Artillery and G Troop, 10th Cavalry as outer and inner cordons around the objectives, with 1/10th Cavalry covering the air corridor. Across the Tigris were Russell’s men, with A Company positioned right along the riverbank.
Special operations teams hit Wolverine 1 and Wolverine 2 simultaneously on December 13. At 8:10 p.m. the team at Wolverine 2 reported finding a hole. Several minutes later came the words, “We have an individual in the hole.” In it and nearby were: 1 pistol, 2 AK-47 rifles, $750,000 in U.S. currency and a taxi. Col. Hickey sealed off the site immediately. The “individual” was whisked off by special operations personnel. Two hours later, Russell received a phone call from Col. Hickey, who relayed the good news. “Cesar Romero!” he exclaimed. In earlier discussions of how Saddam might look now, Hickey had joked that he might resemble the famous actor.
Saddam Hussein had been captured. In the words of LTC Russell: “ We knew our months of raiding, painstaking intelligence work and capture of several deck of card leaders, along with large percentages of Saddam’s inner circle, got us to where we were. I’m very proud of our part in his capture. It was a great accomplishment for the United States, the 4th Infantry Division and Special Operations Forces.”
Captain Timothy Morrow wasn’t on hand for that historic event. He was back home in Texas recuperating from a gunshot wound to the upper chest received October 28 while on patrol in Tikrit. Though frustrated, he could rest content knowing that the intelligence he and his staff produced was vital to the planning of Red Dawn and bagging the Butcher of Baghdad.
John B. Dwyer is a military historian.
Author’s note:
The 4th ID is now beginning its second deployment to Iraq, which will continue through December. Now re-organized & “modular” the “Iron Horse” division under Maj. Gen. James Thurman, will be based in Baghdad. Besides its four brigade combat teams, the 4th ID will have 3 Iraqi divisions attached to it. God Speed these superbly trained fighting men & women.
John B. Dwyer
Many people requested that I move this topic to the Cafe. So that is why it is here. Please keep your eyes and ears open for any news on this subject. I think it will be most important to the forthcoming Senate investigation of pre war intel along with the Niger forgeries. The corresponding thread on the Niger Forgeries is pinned in the Plamegate subforum. Thanks. Snuffysmith
Able Danger
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Able Danger was a small, highly classified U.S. Army intelligence program under the command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). It was created as a result of a directive in early October 1999 by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hugh Shelton, to USASOC to develop a campaign plan against transnational terrorism, "specifically al-Qaida." According to claims made by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and confirmed by four others, Able Danger had identified the 9/11 attack leader, Mohamed Atta, and three other 9/11 hijackers as possible members of an al Qaeda cell operating in the United States by mid-2000, more than a year before the attack. Data mining has been cited as the method by which this information was found. The claim appears to contradict the official conclusion of the 9/11 Commission that American intelligence agencies had not identified Atta as a terrorist prior to the attack. This has resulted in a political controversy that has begun to damage the credibility of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission.
A new data mining effort based on a reconstituted Able Danger type team called "Able Providence" has been proposed by Congressman Weldon.[1]
Assertion that Able Danger identified 9/11 hijackers
The existence of Able Danger and its claimed identification of the 9/11 terrorists was first disclosed publicly on June 27, 2005, by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA), vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees, in a special orders speech on the House floor [2].
Mr. Speaker, I rise because information has come to my attention over the past several months that is very disturbing. I have learned that, in fact, one of our Federal agencies had, in fact, identified the major New York cell of Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; and I have learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, that Federal agency actually was prepared to bring the FBI in and prepared to work with the FBI to take down the cell that Mohamed Atta was involved in in New York City, along with two of the other terrorists. I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that when that recommendation was discussed within that Federal agency, the lawyers in the administration at that time said, you cannot pursue contact with the FBI against that cell. Mohamed Atta is in the U.S. on a green card, and we are fearful of the fallout from the Waco incident. So we did not allow that Federal agency to proceed.
Able Danger and the 9/11 Commission
Weldon's claims that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers were picked up by the national media in August 2005 after it was reported in Government Security News [3]. In addition to the claim that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers and was prevented from passing that information onto the FBI, Weldon also claimed that the intelligence concerning Able Danger was provided to the 9/11 Commission and ignored. Two 9/11 Commission members, Timothy J. Roemer and John F. Lehman, both claimed not to have received any information on Able Danger.
Following the report in Government Security News, members of the 9/11 Commission began commenting on the information they had on Able Danger and Atta. Lee H. Hamilton, former Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission, and Al Felzenberg, a former spokesman for the 9/11 Commission, both denied that the 9/11 Commission had any information on the identification of Mohammed Atta prior to the attacks. Hamilton stated that The Sept. 11 commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell . . . Had we learned of it obviously it would've been a major focus of our investigation. [4][5][6]
On August 12, 2005, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, former Chair and Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission, issued a statement [7] in response to media inquiries about the Commission's investigation of the Able Danger program. They stated that the Commission had been aware of the Able Danger program and requested and obtained information about it from the Department of Defense (DoD), but none of the information provided had indicated that the program had identified Atta or other 9/11 hijackers. They further stated that a claim about Atta having been identified prior to the attacks had been made to the 9/11 Commission on July 12, 2004 (just days before the Commission's report was released), by a U.S. Navy officer employed at DOD, but that
The interviewee had no documentary evidence and said he had only seen the document briefly some years earlier. He could not describe what information had led to this supposed Atta identification. Nor could the interviewee recall, when questioned, any details about how he thought a link to Atta could have been made by this DOD program in 2000 or any time before 9/11. The Department of Defense documents had mentioned nothing about Atta, nor had anyone come forward between September 2001 and July 2004 with any similar information. Weighing this with the information about Atta's actual activities, the negligible information available about Atta to other U.S. government agencies and the German government before 9/11, and the interviewer's assessment of the interviewee's knowledge and credibility, the Commission staff concluded that the officer's account was not sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or further investigation.
Congressman Weldon issued a response to the 9/11 Commission statement [8] clarifying the mission of Able Danger, expressing concern over the statements made by various members of the 9/11 Commission, and promising to push forward until it is understood why the DoD was unable to pass the information uncovered by Able Danger to the FBI and why the 9/11 Commission failed to follow up on the information they were given on Able Danger.
The 9/11 Commission has released multiple statements over the past week, each of which has significantly changed — from initially denying ever being briefed to acknowledging being briefed on both operation ABLE DANGER and Mohammed Atta. The information was omitted primarily because they found it to be suspect despite having been briefed on it two times by two different military officers on active duty. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission also received documents from the Department of Defense on ABLE DANGER.
Congressman Weldon reiterated these statements in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 21, 2005. [9] The Senate Judiciary Committee will be looking into these claims.
Able Danger Data Destroyed
In his book Countdown to Terror [10] Weldon asserted that an Able Danger chart produced in 1999 identifying 9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi had been presented to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg. Weldon went on to claim that he had personally presented the chart to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley in 2001 days after the 9/11 attacks.
A Time magazine article dated August 14, 2005, [11] reports that Weldon admitted he is no longer sure that Atta's name was on the chart he presented to Hadley and that he was unable to verify whether this was the case, having handed over his only copy, and that a reconstruction was used for post-9/11 presentations. Weldon gave a talk at the Heritage Foundation with a chart he described as the one handed over on May 23, 2002. [12](Time 33:33).
House intelligence committee chairman Peter Hoekstra is currently investigating the matter at Weldon's request, but is reported by Time as having cautioned against "hyperventilating" before the completion of a "thorough" probe.
Pentagon officials said they were unaware that any Able Danger material named Atta. They declined to comment on the reports as they worked to clarify the matter.
"There's something very sinister going on here that really troubles me," Weldon told FOX News on August 25, blasting the Sept. 11 commission for not investigating the Able Danger claims. Weldon said some panel members were trying to smear Shaffer and Able Danger.
"What's the Sept. 11 commission got to hide?" Weldon asked. "The commission is trying to spin this because they're embarrassed about what's coming out. In two weeks with two staffers, I've uncovered more in this regard than they did with 80 staffers and $15 million of taxpayer money." [13]
On August 14, Mike Kelly, a columnist for the Bergen Record (New Jersey), described a telephone interview, arranged by the staff of Rep. Weldon, with a man who identified himself as a member of the Able Danger team but asked that his name not be revealed. [14] In the interview the man claimed that his team had identified Mohamed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers as likely al Qaeda terrorists operating in the United States, but were prevented from passing this information on to the FBI by government lawyers. He also claimed that he was ignored by the 9/11 Commission's staff when he approached them on two occasions to explain Able Danger's work.
On September 15, Weldon asserted that he had identified an employee who had been ordered to destroy the 2.5 terabytes (TB) of data collected by Able Danger two years before the 9/11 attack.[15] For comparison, all the books in the U.S. Library of Congress combined contain approximately 20TB of text.
Able Danger's 2.5 Terabytes is a small percentage of all available internet data. A University of California at Berkeley study showed that, in 2002, 532,897 terabytes of new data flowed across the Internet, 440,606 terabytes of email was sent, and the Web contained 167 terabytes of data that was accessible to all users, plus another 91,850 terabytes in the deep Web where access is controlled. Data collected by data mining techniques, such as was used in Able Danger, could result in a large amounts of data.
Comments by members of the Able Danger team
Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer
After Weldon's assertions were disputed by the media, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a member of the Able Danger team, identified himself as Weldon's source. Shaffer claimed that he alerted the FBI in September 2000 about the information uncovered by the secret military unit "Able Danger," but he alleges three meetings he set up with bureau officials were blocked by military lawyers. Shaffer, who currently works for the Defense Intelligence Agency, claims he communicated to members of the 9/11 Commission that Able Danger had identified two of the three cells responsible for 9/11 prior to the attacks, but the Commission did not include this information in their final report. [16]
Shaffer's lawyer, Mark Zaid, has revealed that Shaffer had been placed on paid administrative leave for what he called "petty and frivolous" reasons and had his security clearance suspended in March 2004 following a dispute over travel mileage expenses and personal use of a work cell phone. [17]
Congressman Weldon has asked for a new probe into the activities undertaken to silence Lt. Col Shaffer public comment on Able Danger and Able Danger's identification of the 9/11 hijackers. Weldon called the activities "a deliberate campaign of character assassination." [18]
Shaffer has also told the story of CIA opposition to Able Danger, prior to 9/11, based on the view Able Danger was encroaching on CIA turf. According to Shaffer, the CIA representative said, "I clearly understand. We're going after the leadership. You guys are going after the body. But, it doesn't matter. The bottom line is, CIA will never give you the best information from 'Alex Base' or anywhere else. CIA will never provide that to you because if were successful in your effort to target Al Qaeda, you will steal our thunder. Therefore, we will not support this." [19]
Navy Captain Scott Philpott
Capt. Scott Philpott, an expert in futuristic naval warfare, confirmed Shaffer's claims. "I will not discuss this outside of my chain of command," Philpott said in a statement to Fox News. "I have briefed the Department of the Army, the Special Operations Command and the office of (Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence) Dr. Cambone as well as the 9/11 Commission. My story has remained consistent. Atta was identified by Able Danger in January/February 2000," he wrote. [20]
Mr. J.D. Smith
Shaffer's claims were also confirmed by J.D. Smith, a civilian contractor who worked on Able Danger. In an interview with Fox News, Smith reported that the project had involved analysis of data from a large number of public sources and 20 to 30 individuals. [21]
Smith stated that Atta's name had emerged during an examination of individuals known to have ties to Omar Abdel Rahman, a leading figure in the first World Trade Center bombing.
Anonymous Pentagon sources have alleged that Smith was fired after a similar data analysis project to examine Chinese strategic and business connections in the U.S. identified Condoleezza Rice and former Defense Secretary William Perry based on their associations through Stanford University [22]. Kevin Drum has interpreted these allegations as a possible attempt to construct an alibi, and hence an indication that it is likely that Able Danger did identify a person named Mohamed Atta as a terrorist [23].
Major Eric Kleinsmith
Major Eric Kleinsmith, who was with the Army and chief of intelligence for LIWA until February 2001, testified that he was ordered to destroy Able Danger’s information. “I deleted the data,” he said. “There were two sets, classified and unclassified, and also an ‘all sorts,’ ” which contained a blend of the two, “plus charts we’d produced.” Kleinsmith deleted the 2.5Tbytes of data in May and June 2000 on orders of Tony Gentry, general counsel of the Army Intelligence and Security Command. [24]
Other Witnesses
The Defense Department announced its findings on September 1, 2005, after a three-week investigation into Able Danger [25]. The DoD admitted that they have found three other witnesses in addition to Shaffer and Philpott who confirm Able Danger had produced a chart that "either mentioned Atta by name as an al-Qaida operative [and/or] showed his photograph." Four of the five remember the photo on the chart. The fifth remembers only Atta being cited by name. The Pentagon describes the witnesses as "credible" but did not rule out the possibility that their recollections were faulty. [26]
Media Comment
Fox News pundit Bill O'Reilly and others have asserted that the Able Danger intelligence was suppressed as a result of a policy of forbidding the CIA and FBI to share intelligence known as "the wall." During the 9/11 Commission hearings, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft testified the wall was strengthened under the Clinton administration by Jamie Gorelick to prohibit sharing of terrorist intelligence within the federal government. [27]
This assertion was disputed by former senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), a member of the 9-11 Commission, who said, "nothing Jamie Gorelick wrote had the slightest impact on the Department of Defense or its willingness or ability to share intelligence information with other intelligence agencies." Gorton also asserted that "the wall" was a long-standing policy that had resulted from the Church committee in the 1970s, and that the policy only prohibits transfer of certain information from prosecutors to the intelligence services and never prohibited information flowing in the opposite direction.
Gorelick's presence as a member of the 9/11 Commission, and her refusal to recuse herself from judgements of her activities, has deepened the controversy surrounding the commission and Able Danger. The controversy is beginning to erode the credibility of the 9/11 Commission in areas outside of Able Danger as well. Columnist Mike Kelly has written that the 9/11 Commission's work is "under a cloud." [28]
Skepticism
The Two Attas Theory
Mickey Kaus of Slate.com [29], referring to Tom Maguire's Two Attas theory [30], speculates that "the 'Atta' fingered by Able Danger was really the first, 'Abu Nidal' Atta, and not the second, 9/11 'Al Qaeda' Atta," and that this may help explain this Able Danger issue. Snopes.com clarified a widely circulated email that claimed the two Atta's were one and the same [31].
Another variation of the Two Attas theory reported by Kaus notes that Omar Abdel Rahman also had an associate with the name Mohamed El-Amir (a name sometimes used by Atta) who was not the Mohamed Atta involved in the 9/11 hijacking [32].
However, Shaffer clarified that. He told 9/11 Commission staffers Able Danger identified terrorist cells and not just individual terrorists, and that the New York City al-Qaeda cell included Mohamed Atta and two other 9/11 terrorists. A fourth 9/11 terrorist came from the second cell. [33] Eric Umansky states the problem this way: "In fact, the two-Atta theory only leaves one major issue unexplained: What about the three other 9/11 hijackers that Able Danger purportedly fingered? Possible answers: 1) Mr. Shaffer was embellishing. (Has he named the specific hijackers who were purportedly ID'd?) 2) They indeed were named and--just like Atta may be--are also cases of mistaken identity. That would be understandable." [34]
Timing
Kevin Drum writing for the Washington Monthly notes that reports of the precise date at which the information was allegedly passed to the FBI vary considerably. It is most unlikely that Able Danger would have identified a terrorist called "Mohamed Atta" before May 2000.
Since 9/11, of course, we have retrieved every scrap of information ever known about Mohamed Atta, so we know what information would have been available to the Able Danger data mining operation. And what we know is that Mohamed Atta sent his first email to friends in the U.S. in March 2000 and received his first U.S. visa on May 18, 2000. Moreover, that was the first time he had ever gone by the name "Mohamed Atta." His full name is "Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta," and prior to 2000 he went by "Mohamed el-Amir."
Congressional Hearings
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter held a hearing on September 21, 2005, looking into the facts about Able Danger. However, Lt. Col Shaffer and the other four members of Able Danger were ordered not to testify by the Department of Defense. Senator Specter decided to go forward with the hearings hoping "to produce a change of heart by the Department of Defense." [35]
Senator Specter wondered if the Posse Comitatus Act may have been the reason Defense Department attorneys would not allow Able Danger to turn over information to the FBI. The Posse Comitatus Act prevents the military from being engaged in law enforcement activities, including gathering information on U.S. persons. Speaking on behalf of Lt. Col Shaffer, attorney Mark Zaid testified "Those within Able Danger were confident they weren't compiling information on US persons. They were potentially people connected to US persons." [36]
Former Army Major Erik Kleinsmith, former head of the Pentagon's Land Warfare Analysis Department, testified that he was instructed to destroy data and documents related to Able Danger in May and June of 2000. The instruction came from a top Pentagon lawyer. He testified, "I go to bed every night and other members of our team do as well [thinking] that if [Able Danger] had not been shut down that we would have at least been able to prevent something or assist the United States in some way. Could we have prevented 9/11? I could never speculate to that extent." [37] [38]
See also
9/11 commission report
External links
Wikinews has news related to this article:
U.S. Army intelligence had detected 9/11 terrorists year before, says officerWikinews has news related to this article:
Update: U.S. Army intelligence had detected 9/11 terrorists year before, says officerTimeline about Able Danger Program on cooperativeresearch.org
Hefling,Kimberly (September 21 2005) [39]
Goodwin, Jacob (August 2005). Did DoD lawyers blow the chance to nab Atta? Government Security News.
AP Report: The 9/11 Commission Omitted Able Danger information
Pentagon Identifies 3 more Able Danger eye-witnesses
Joint House and Senate intelligence committee report excerpt
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review document on the "wall"
Agent Defends Military Unit's Data on 9/11 Hijackers Fox News
Four in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied to Qaeda in '00 New York Times 9 Aug 05
Officer Says Pentagon Barred Sharing Pre-9/11 Qaeda Data With F.B.I. New York Times 16 Aug 05
Attorney Mark Zaid Interview Transcript From the Jerry Doyle Show
Shaffer interview on The Savage Nation
Shaffer interview on CNN
'Able Danger' and Coordinating Pre-Sept. 11 Intelligence -- Interview on NPR's Talk of the Nation including Anthony Shaffer, Thomas Kean, Harry "Skip" Brandon, and Tom Fitton.
Able Danger Project Identified 9/11 Hijackers
A Pentagon Whitewash - Able Dangers Hearing Postponed Again (September 28, 2005)
An Interview with Curt Weldon following hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Published September 30, 2005)
Republican Congressman Curt Weldon Alleges 9/11 Cover-up by Pentagon on CNN
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Able_Danger"
Categories: September 11, 2001 attacks | U.S. intelligence agencies | Conspiracy theories
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Able Danger was a small, highly classified U.S. Army intelligence program under the command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). It was created as a result of a directive in early October 1999 by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hugh Shelton, to USASOC to develop a campaign plan against transnational terrorism, "specifically al-Qaida." According to claims made by Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer and confirmed by four others, Able Danger had identified the 9/11 attack leader, Mohamed Atta, and three other 9/11 hijackers as possible members of an al Qaeda cell operating in the United States by mid-2000, more than a year before the attack. Data mining has been cited as the method by which this information was found. The claim appears to contradict the official conclusion of the 9/11 Commission that American intelligence agencies had not identified Atta as a terrorist prior to the attack. This has resulted in a political controversy that has begun to damage the credibility of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission.
A new data mining effort based on a reconstituted Able Danger type team called "Able Providence" has been proposed by Congressman Weldon.[1]
Assertion that Able Danger identified 9/11 hijackers
The existence of Able Danger and its claimed identification of the 9/11 terrorists was first disclosed publicly on June 27, 2005, by Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA), vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees, in a special orders speech on the House floor [2].
Mr. Speaker, I rise because information has come to my attention over the past several months that is very disturbing. I have learned that, in fact, one of our Federal agencies had, in fact, identified the major New York cell of Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; and I have learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, that Federal agency actually was prepared to bring the FBI in and prepared to work with the FBI to take down the cell that Mohamed Atta was involved in in New York City, along with two of the other terrorists. I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that when that recommendation was discussed within that Federal agency, the lawyers in the administration at that time said, you cannot pursue contact with the FBI against that cell. Mohamed Atta is in the U.S. on a green card, and we are fearful of the fallout from the Waco incident. So we did not allow that Federal agency to proceed.
Able Danger and the 9/11 Commission
Weldon's claims that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers were picked up by the national media in August 2005 after it was reported in Government Security News [3]. In addition to the claim that Able Danger identified the 9/11 hijackers and was prevented from passing that information onto the FBI, Weldon also claimed that the intelligence concerning Able Danger was provided to the 9/11 Commission and ignored. Two 9/11 Commission members, Timothy J. Roemer and John F. Lehman, both claimed not to have received any information on Able Danger.
Following the report in Government Security News, members of the 9/11 Commission began commenting on the information they had on Able Danger and Atta. Lee H. Hamilton, former Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission, and Al Felzenberg, a former spokesman for the 9/11 Commission, both denied that the 9/11 Commission had any information on the identification of Mohammed Atta prior to the attacks. Hamilton stated that The Sept. 11 commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell . . . Had we learned of it obviously it would've been a major focus of our investigation. [4][5][6]
On August 12, 2005, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, former Chair and Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission, issued a statement [7] in response to media inquiries about the Commission's investigation of the Able Danger program. They stated that the Commission had been aware of the Able Danger program and requested and obtained information about it from the Department of Defense (DoD), but none of the information provided had indicated that the program had identified Atta or other 9/11 hijackers. They further stated that a claim about Atta having been identified prior to the attacks had been made to the 9/11 Commission on July 12, 2004 (just days before the Commission's report was released), by a U.S. Navy officer employed at DOD, but that
The interviewee had no documentary evidence and said he had only seen the document briefly some years earlier. He could not describe what information had led to this supposed Atta identification. Nor could the interviewee recall, when questioned, any details about how he thought a link to Atta could have been made by this DOD program in 2000 or any time before 9/11. The Department of Defense documents had mentioned nothing about Atta, nor had anyone come forward between September 2001 and July 2004 with any similar information. Weighing this with the information about Atta's actual activities, the negligible information available about Atta to other U.S. government agencies and the German government before 9/11, and the interviewer's assessment of the interviewee's knowledge and credibility, the Commission staff concluded that the officer's account was not sufficiently reliable to warrant revision of the report or further investigation.
Congressman Weldon issued a response to the 9/11 Commission statement [8] clarifying the mission of Able Danger, expressing concern over the statements made by various members of the 9/11 Commission, and promising to push forward until it is understood why the DoD was unable to pass the information uncovered by Able Danger to the FBI and why the 9/11 Commission failed to follow up on the information they were given on Able Danger.
The 9/11 Commission has released multiple statements over the past week, each of which has significantly changed — from initially denying ever being briefed to acknowledging being briefed on both operation ABLE DANGER and Mohammed Atta. The information was omitted primarily because they found it to be suspect despite having been briefed on it two times by two different military officers on active duty. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission also received documents from the Department of Defense on ABLE DANGER.
Congressman Weldon reiterated these statements in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 21, 2005. [9] The Senate Judiciary Committee will be looking into these claims.
Able Danger Data Destroyed
In his book Countdown to Terror [10] Weldon asserted that an Able Danger chart produced in 1999 identifying 9/11 hijackers Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi had been presented to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Jim Steinberg. Weldon went on to claim that he had personally presented the chart to then-Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley in 2001 days after the 9/11 attacks.
A Time magazine article dated August 14, 2005, [11] reports that Weldon admitted he is no longer sure that Atta's name was on the chart he presented to Hadley and that he was unable to verify whether this was the case, having handed over his only copy, and that a reconstruction was used for post-9/11 presentations. Weldon gave a talk at the Heritage Foundation with a chart he described as the one handed over on May 23, 2002. [12](Time 33:33).
House intelligence committee chairman Peter Hoekstra is currently investigating the matter at Weldon's request, but is reported by Time as having cautioned against "hyperventilating" before the completion of a "thorough" probe.
Pentagon officials said they were unaware that any Able Danger material named Atta. They declined to comment on the reports as they worked to clarify the matter.
"There's something very sinister going on here that really troubles me," Weldon told FOX News on August 25, blasting the Sept. 11 commission for not investigating the Able Danger claims. Weldon said some panel members were trying to smear Shaffer and Able Danger.
"What's the Sept. 11 commission got to hide?" Weldon asked. "The commission is trying to spin this because they're embarrassed about what's coming out. In two weeks with two staffers, I've uncovered more in this regard than they did with 80 staffers and $15 million of taxpayer money." [13]
On August 14, Mike Kelly, a columnist for the Bergen Record (New Jersey), described a telephone interview, arranged by the staff of Rep. Weldon, with a man who identified himself as a member of the Able Danger team but asked that his name not be revealed. [14] In the interview the man claimed that his team had identified Mohamed Atta and three other 9/11 hijackers as likely al Qaeda terrorists operating in the United States, but were prevented from passing this information on to the FBI by government lawyers. He also claimed that he was ignored by the 9/11 Commission's staff when he approached them on two occasions to explain Able Danger's work.
On September 15, Weldon asserted that he had identified an employee who had been ordered to destroy the 2.5 terabytes (TB) of data collected by Able Danger two years before the 9/11 attack.[15] For comparison, all the books in the U.S. Library of Congress combined contain approximately 20TB of text.
Able Danger's 2.5 Terabytes is a small percentage of all available internet data. A University of California at Berkeley study showed that, in 2002, 532,897 terabytes of new data flowed across the Internet, 440,606 terabytes of email was sent, and the Web contained 167 terabytes of data that was accessible to all users, plus another 91,850 terabytes in the deep Web where access is controlled. Data collected by data mining techniques, such as was used in Able Danger, could result in a large amounts of data.
Comments by members of the Able Danger team
Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer
After Weldon's assertions were disputed by the media, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer, a member of the Able Danger team, identified himself as Weldon's source. Shaffer claimed that he alerted the FBI in September 2000 about the information uncovered by the secret military unit "Able Danger," but he alleges three meetings he set up with bureau officials were blocked by military lawyers. Shaffer, who currently works for the Defense Intelligence Agency, claims he communicated to members of the 9/11 Commission that Able Danger had identified two of the three cells responsible for 9/11 prior to the attacks, but the Commission did not include this information in their final report. [16]
Shaffer's lawyer, Mark Zaid, has revealed that Shaffer had been placed on paid administrative leave for what he called "petty and frivolous" reasons and had his security clearance suspended in March 2004 following a dispute over travel mileage expenses and personal use of a work cell phone. [17]
Congressman Weldon has asked for a new probe into the activities undertaken to silence Lt. Col Shaffer public comment on Able Danger and Able Danger's identification of the 9/11 hijackers. Weldon called the activities "a deliberate campaign of character assassination." [18]
Shaffer has also told the story of CIA opposition to Able Danger, prior to 9/11, based on the view Able Danger was encroaching on CIA turf. According to Shaffer, the CIA representative said, "I clearly understand. We're going after the leadership. You guys are going after the body. But, it doesn't matter. The bottom line is, CIA will never give you the best information from 'Alex Base' or anywhere else. CIA will never provide that to you because if were successful in your effort to target Al Qaeda, you will steal our thunder. Therefore, we will not support this." [19]
Navy Captain Scott Philpott
Capt. Scott Philpott, an expert in futuristic naval warfare, confirmed Shaffer's claims. "I will not discuss this outside of my chain of command," Philpott said in a statement to Fox News. "I have briefed the Department of the Army, the Special Operations Command and the office of (Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence) Dr. Cambone as well as the 9/11 Commission. My story has remained consistent. Atta was identified by Able Danger in January/February 2000," he wrote. [20]
Mr. J.D. Smith
Shaffer's claims were also confirmed by J.D. Smith, a civilian contractor who worked on Able Danger. In an interview with Fox News, Smith reported that the project had involved analysis of data from a large number of public sources and 20 to 30 individuals. [21]
Smith stated that Atta's name had emerged during an examination of individuals known to have ties to Omar Abdel Rahman, a leading figure in the first World Trade Center bombing.
Anonymous Pentagon sources have alleged that Smith was fired after a similar data analysis project to examine Chinese strategic and business connections in the U.S. identified Condoleezza Rice and former Defense Secretary William Perry based on their associations through Stanford University [22]. Kevin Drum has interpreted these allegations as a possible attempt to construct an alibi, and hence an indication that it is likely that Able Danger did identify a person named Mohamed Atta as a terrorist [23].
Major Eric Kleinsmith
Major Eric Kleinsmith, who was with the Army and chief of intelligence for LIWA until February 2001, testified that he was ordered to destroy Able Danger’s information. “I deleted the data,” he said. “There were two sets, classified and unclassified, and also an ‘all sorts,’ ” which contained a blend of the two, “plus charts we’d produced.” Kleinsmith deleted the 2.5Tbytes of data in May and June 2000 on orders of Tony Gentry, general counsel of the Army Intelligence and Security Command. [24]
Other Witnesses
The Defense Department announced its findings on September 1, 2005, after a three-week investigation into Able Danger [25]. The DoD admitted that they have found three other witnesses in addition to Shaffer and Philpott who confirm Able Danger had produced a chart that "either mentioned Atta by name as an al-Qaida operative [and/or] showed his photograph." Four of the five remember the photo on the chart. The fifth remembers only Atta being cited by name. The Pentagon describes the witnesses as "credible" but did not rule out the possibility that their recollections were faulty. [26]
Media Comment
Fox News pundit Bill O'Reilly and others have asserted that the Able Danger intelligence was suppressed as a result of a policy of forbidding the CIA and FBI to share intelligence known as "the wall." During the 9/11 Commission hearings, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft testified the wall was strengthened under the Clinton administration by Jamie Gorelick to prohibit sharing of terrorist intelligence within the federal government. [27]
This assertion was disputed by former senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), a member of the 9-11 Commission, who said, "nothing Jamie Gorelick wrote had the slightest impact on the Department of Defense or its willingness or ability to share intelligence information with other intelligence agencies." Gorton also asserted that "the wall" was a long-standing policy that had resulted from the Church committee in the 1970s, and that the policy only prohibits transfer of certain information from prosecutors to the intelligence services and never prohibited information flowing in the opposite direction.
Gorelick's presence as a member of the 9/11 Commission, and her refusal to recuse herself from judgements of her activities, has deepened the controversy surrounding the commission and Able Danger. The controversy is beginning to erode the credibility of the 9/11 Commission in areas outside of Able Danger as well. Columnist Mike Kelly has written that the 9/11 Commission's work is "under a cloud." [28]
Skepticism
The Two Attas Theory
Mickey Kaus of Slate.com [29], referring to Tom Maguire's Two Attas theory [30], speculates that "the 'Atta' fingered by Able Danger was really the first, 'Abu Nidal' Atta, and not the second, 9/11 'Al Qaeda' Atta," and that this may help explain this Able Danger issue. Snopes.com clarified a widely circulated email that claimed the two Atta's were one and the same [31].
Another variation of the Two Attas theory reported by Kaus notes that Omar Abdel Rahman also had an associate with the name Mohamed El-Amir (a name sometimes used by Atta) who was not the Mohamed Atta involved in the 9/11 hijacking [32].
However, Shaffer clarified that. He told 9/11 Commission staffers Able Danger identified terrorist cells and not just individual terrorists, and that the New York City al-Qaeda cell included Mohamed Atta and two other 9/11 terrorists. A fourth 9/11 terrorist came from the second cell. [33] Eric Umansky states the problem this way: "In fact, the two-Atta theory only leaves one major issue unexplained: What about the three other 9/11 hijackers that Able Danger purportedly fingered? Possible answers: 1) Mr. Shaffer was embellishing. (Has he named the specific hijackers who were purportedly ID'd?) 2) They indeed were named and--just like Atta may be--are also cases of mistaken identity. That would be understandable." [34]
Timing
Kevin Drum writing for the Washington Monthly notes that reports of the precise date at which the information was allegedly passed to the FBI vary considerably. It is most unlikely that Able Danger would have identified a terrorist called "Mohamed Atta" before May 2000.
Since 9/11, of course, we have retrieved every scrap of information ever known about Mohamed Atta, so we know what information would have been available to the Able Danger data mining operation. And what we know is that Mohamed Atta sent his first email to friends in the U.S. in March 2000 and received his first U.S. visa on May 18, 2000. Moreover, that was the first time he had ever gone by the name "Mohamed Atta." His full name is "Mohamed Mohamed el-Amir Awad el-Sayed Atta," and prior to 2000 he went by "Mohamed el-Amir."
Congressional Hearings
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter held a hearing on September 21, 2005, looking into the facts about Able Danger. However, Lt. Col Shaffer and the other four members of Able Danger were ordered not to testify by the Department of Defense. Senator Specter decided to go forward with the hearings hoping "to produce a change of heart by the Department of Defense." [35]
Senator Specter wondered if the Posse Comitatus Act may have been the reason Defense Department attorneys would not allow Able Danger to turn over information to the FBI. The Posse Comitatus Act prevents the military from being engaged in law enforcement activities, including gathering information on U.S. persons. Speaking on behalf of Lt. Col Shaffer, attorney Mark Zaid testified "Those within Able Danger were confident they weren't compiling information on US persons. They were potentially people connected to US persons." [36]
Former Army Major Erik Kleinsmith, former head of the Pentagon's Land Warfare Analysis Department, testified that he was instructed to destroy data and documents related to Able Danger in May and June of 2000. The instruction came from a top Pentagon lawyer. He testified, "I go to bed every night and other members of our team do as well [thinking] that if [Able Danger] had not been shut down that we would have at least been able to prevent something or assist the United States in some way. Could we have prevented 9/11? I could never speculate to that extent." [37] [38]
See also
9/11 commission report
External links
Wikinews has news related to this article:
U.S. Army intelligence had detected 9/11 terrorists year before, says officerWikinews has news related to this article:
Update: U.S. Army intelligence had detected 9/11 terrorists year before, says officerTimeline about Able Danger Program on cooperativeresearch.org
Hefling,Kimberly (September 21 2005) [39]
Goodwin, Jacob (August 2005). Did DoD lawyers blow the chance to nab Atta? Government Security News.
AP Report: The 9/11 Commission Omitted Able Danger information
Pentagon Identifies 3 more Able Danger eye-witnesses
Joint House and Senate intelligence committee report excerpt
United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review document on the "wall"
Agent Defends Military Unit's Data on 9/11 Hijackers Fox News
Four in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied to Qaeda in '00 New York Times 9 Aug 05
Officer Says Pentagon Barred Sharing Pre-9/11 Qaeda Data With F.B.I. New York Times 16 Aug 05
Attorney Mark Zaid Interview Transcript From the Jerry Doyle Show
Shaffer interview on The Savage Nation
Shaffer interview on CNN
'Able Danger' and Coordinating Pre-Sept. 11 Intelligence -- Interview on NPR's Talk of the Nation including Anthony Shaffer, Thomas Kean, Harry "Skip" Brandon, and Tom Fitton.
Able Danger Project Identified 9/11 Hijackers
A Pentagon Whitewash - Able Dangers Hearing Postponed Again (September 28, 2005)
An Interview with Curt Weldon following hearings of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Published September 30, 2005)
Republican Congressman Curt Weldon Alleges 9/11 Cover-up by Pentagon on CNN
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Able_Danger"
Categories: September 11, 2001 attacks | U.S. intelligence agencies | Conspiracy theories
QUOTE(Snuffysmith @ Nov 2 2005, 06:45 PM)
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/frank200508260819.asp
August 26, 2005, 8:19 a.m.
Unable Danger
Liable to sue? No way to run a war.
By Ted Frank
Veteran Army intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer claims that the Pentagon identified Mohammed Atta as a terrorist well before he led the September 11 hijackings. But, Shaffer says, there was no follow-up because lawyers were concerned about potential liability for the violation of privacy if something went wrong. This worry was prominent even though there was nothing illegal about the Pentagon cooperating with domestic law enforcement. Shaffer claims this liability concern left the FBI ignorant of Atta’s al Qaeda cell’s operations in the U.S., resulting in a missed opportunity to prevent the terrible events of September 11.
If Shaffer is right, this would be just another example of how our country’s litigation crisis costs us much more than the $246 billion per year that Tillinghast-Towers-Perrin has estimated are the direct costs of the nation’s tort system. Lawyers’ indiscriminate attacks — not just on wrongdoing, but also on socially beneficial behavior — have had adverse ripple effects on Americans’ health and safety.
For example, lawyers using bogus science have collected hundreds of millions by suing obstetricians for “causing” cerebral palsy through “malpractice.” Because the lawsuits have nothing to do with the ability of obstetricians to prevent cerebral palsy, the only thing they have deterred is obstetrical care. This might explain why — as a forthcoming American Enterprise Institute Liability Project monograph will show — states that have not adopted medical malpractice reform have higher infant mortality rates than states that have. In another forthcoming AEI Liability Project monograph, Professors Peter Rubin and Joanna Shepherd of Emory Law School study fatal accident rates and suggest that tort reform has saved 14,000 lives in the states that have implemented such laws by dampening the ripple effects from excessive litigation. Can we also attribute the 3,000 September 11 victims to the litigation crisis?
Perhaps not: Shaffer might be telling tall tales, or his description of the Able Danger program might be suffering from a common problem in litigation: cherry-picking hindsight. In a large organization, there are often mechanisms that produce warnings for hundreds of improbable events. It's not uncommon for lawyers to find those warnings in the process of litigation discovery, show a jury and the world the ones that might have prevented a disaster, and then accuse the defendant of having failed to heed its own internal warnings. At the same time, the plaintiffs and the press will completely disregard the hundreds or thousands of warnings the corporation legitimately disregarded as false alarms, and no one will point out that taking preventative action on every one of these warnings would've completely paralyzed the defendant.
We should avoid that sort of selective reasoning here. Was Atta one of a handful of potential terrorists identified, or was his name buried in a list with thousands of false positives? We don't know yet.
But, if Shaffer turns out to be right, it’s worth noting how plaintiffs’ lawyers might have contributed to the Able Danger failure. In September 11-related lawsuits, the plaintiffs' bar has sued airlines, airports, architects, New York City, and Motorola (!). Trial lawyers might have extorted billions from legitimate businesses seeking to avoid the risk of a bankrupting judgment at trial had there not been a taxpayer bail-out of the September 11 victims in exchange for their agreement not to sue.
Trial lawyers have opportunistically capitalized on catastrophes in order to mine the deep pockets of big corporations. In a lawsuit stemming from an October 2001 incident where a man attacked a driver with a box cutter and caused the bus to crash, a jury held Greyhound liable for $8 million for one woman’s injuries. Why? The plaintiff’s attorney made much of an incident where one of Greyhound’s executives had raised the possibility of the use of driver partitions. Greyhound’s failure to implement this off-hand suggestion was used against them — never mind that no business operates like this, much less that the accident was intentionally caused by one of the bus crash fatalities.
We see this year the power of threatened lawsuits: faced with a roll of the dice at trial over a claim for $50 billion in damages, several banks have agreed to pay attorney Bill Lerach billions of dollars to avoid being sued over the Enron collapse. At less than a nickel on the dollar compared to the possible cost of a successful lawsuit, this is a small protection price for them to pay.
If Shaffer’s allegations hold water, should the lawyers be treated any differently than the defendants they attack? In my mind, fear of litigation may be a "but-for" cause without which September 11 would not have happened. Clearly, the fault for that catastrophe lies squarely with al Qaeda and the militant Islamists who deliberately chose to commit unspeakable atrocities. But it’s hard to avoid noticing that the logic of the trial lawyers — who regularly ask the judicial system to redistribute billions from bystanders’ deep pockets to those of the plaintiffs’ bar because of tenuous connections that skip over the worst wrongdoers — would hold the litigation lobby responsible for their role in creating a culture of fear that prevented the American government from doing its job to protect its citizens. This is not a double standard the American public should continue to tolerate.
— Ted Frank is resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of the AEI Liability Project. He blogs at overlawyered.com.
* * *
August 26, 2005, 8:19 a.m.
Unable Danger
Liable to sue? No way to run a war.
By Ted Frank
Veteran Army intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Shaffer claims that the Pentagon identified Mohammed Atta as a terrorist well before he led the September 11 hijackings. But, Shaffer says, there was no follow-up because lawyers were concerned about potential liability for the violation of privacy if something went wrong. This worry was prominent even though there was nothing illegal about the Pentagon cooperating with domestic law enforcement. Shaffer claims this liability concern left the FBI ignorant of Atta’s al Qaeda cell’s operations in the U.S., resulting in a missed opportunity to prevent the terrible events of September 11.
If Shaffer is right, this would be just another example of how our country’s litigation crisis costs us much more than the $246 billion per year that Tillinghast-Towers-Perrin has estimated are the direct costs of the nation’s tort system. Lawyers’ indiscriminate attacks — not just on wrongdoing, but also on socially beneficial behavior — have had adverse ripple effects on Americans’ health and safety.
For example, lawyers using bogus science have collected hundreds of millions by suing obstetricians for “causing” cerebral palsy through “malpractice.” Because the lawsuits have nothing to do with the ability of obstetricians to prevent cerebral palsy, the only thing they have deterred is obstetrical care. This might explain why — as a forthcoming American Enterprise Institute Liability Project monograph will show — states that have not adopted medical malpractice reform have higher infant mortality rates than states that have. In another forthcoming AEI Liability Project monograph, Professors Peter Rubin and Joanna Shepherd of Emory Law School study fatal accident rates and suggest that tort reform has saved 14,000 lives in the states that have implemented such laws by dampening the ripple effects from excessive litigation. Can we also attribute the 3,000 September 11 victims to the litigation crisis?
Perhaps not: Shaffer might be telling tall tales, or his description of the Able Danger program might be suffering from a common problem in litigation: cherry-picking hindsight. In a large organization, there are often mechanisms that produce warnings for hundreds of improbable events. It's not uncommon for lawyers to find those warnings in the process of litigation discovery, show a jury and the world the ones that might have prevented a disaster, and then accuse the defendant of having failed to heed its own internal warnings. At the same time, the plaintiffs and the press will completely disregard the hundreds or thousands of warnings the corporation legitimately disregarded as false alarms, and no one will point out that taking preventative action on every one of these warnings would've completely paralyzed the defendant.
We should avoid that sort of selective reasoning here. Was Atta one of a handful of potential terrorists identified, or was his name buried in a list with thousands of false positives? We don't know yet.
But, if Shaffer turns out to be right, it’s worth noting how plaintiffs’ lawyers might have contributed to the Able Danger failure. In September 11-related lawsuits, the plaintiffs' bar has sued airlines, airports, architects, New York City, and Motorola (!). Trial lawyers might have extorted billions from legitimate businesses seeking to avoid the risk of a bankrupting judgment at trial had there not been a taxpayer bail-out of the September 11 victims in exchange for their agreement not to sue.
Trial lawyers have opportunistically capitalized on catastrophes in order to mine the deep pockets of big corporations. In a lawsuit stemming from an October 2001 incident where a man attacked a driver with a box cutter and caused the bus to crash, a jury held Greyhound liable for $8 million for one woman’s injuries. Why? The plaintiff’s attorney made much of an incident where one of Greyhound’s executives had raised the possibility of the use of driver partitions. Greyhound’s failure to implement this off-hand suggestion was used against them — never mind that no business operates like this, much less that the accident was intentionally caused by one of the bus crash fatalities.
We see this year the power of threatened lawsuits: faced with a roll of the dice at trial over a claim for $50 billion in damages, several banks have agreed to pay attorney Bill Lerach billions of dollars to avoid being sued over the Enron collapse. At less than a nickel on the dollar compared to the possible cost of a successful lawsuit, this is a small protection price for them to pay.
If Shaffer’s allegations hold water, should the lawyers be treated any differently than the defendants they attack? In my mind, fear of litigation may be a "but-for" cause without which September 11 would not have happened. Clearly, the fault for that catastrophe lies squarely with al Qaeda and the militant Islamists who deliberately chose to commit unspeakable atrocities. But it’s hard to avoid noticing that the logic of the trial lawyers — who regularly ask the judicial system to redistribute billions from bystanders’ deep pockets to those of the plaintiffs’ bar because of tenuous connections that skip over the worst wrongdoers — would hold the litigation lobby responsible for their role in creating a culture of fear that prevented the American government from doing its job to protect its citizens. This is not a double standard the American public should continue to tolerate.
— Ted Frank is resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of the AEI Liability Project. He blogs at overlawyered.com.
* * *
QUOTE
this would be just another example of how our country’s litigation crisis costs us much more than the $246 billion per year that Tillinghast-Towers-Perrin has estimated are the direct costs of the nation’s tort system. Lawyers’ indiscriminate attacks — not just on wrongdoing, but also on socially beneficial behavior — have had adverse ripple effects on Americans’ health and safety.
For crying out loud...un- blanking-believable. These "tort reform" zealots can always be counted on to twist the facts in any situation so that they can push their favorite argument. Yep, they can always be counted on to put the blame directly where it doesn't belong. Their abuse excuse logic is getting very old.
According to them there are only two options -- either Schaffer is lying (what their Pentagon client really want you to believe) or if that won't fly why not at least get something out of the mess by blaming it on the trial lawyers. Good grief, have they no shame.
Complete 911 Timeline: Able Danger program
Project: Complete 911 Timeline
Open-Content project managed by Paul Thompson
Mid-1999-November 1999: LIWA Data Mining Study Causes Controversy After Connecting Prominent US Figures to Weapons Purchases for Chinese Military
A report commissioned in mid-1999 by Rep. Curt Weldon ® looks into possible Chinese front companies in the US seeking technology for the Chinese military. Dr. Eileen Preisser and Michael Maloof are commissioned to make the report. Dr. Preisser, who runs the Information Dominance Center at the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) and will later become closely tied to Able Danger, uses LIWA's data mining capabilities to search unclassified information. According to Maloof, their results show Chinese front companies in the US posing as US corporations that acquire technology from US defense contractors. When the study is completed in November 1999, the General Counsel's office in the Office of the Defense Secretary orders the study destroyed. Weldon complains about this to Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, and apparently delays the destruction of the report. Weldon also writes a letter to FBI Director Louis Freeh requesting an espionage investigation into these Chinese links, but Freeh never responds to this. [Washington Times, 10/9/05] As part of this report, LIWA analysts had produced a chart of Chinese strategic and business connections in the US. But this data mining effort runs into controversy when the chart apparently shows connections between future National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and other prominent US figures, and business deals benefiting the Chinese military. [New York Post, 8/27/05; Washington Times, 9/22/05] The China chart was put together by private contractor James D. Smith, who will come forward in August 2005 to corroborate revelations about the Able Danger unit and its findings (see August 22-September 1, 2005). The New York Post later says there is “no suggestion that Rice or any of the others had done anything wrong.” [New York Post, 8/27/05] However, articles first appear one month later and through 2001 in the conservative publications WorldNetDaily and NewsMax, which connect Perry and Rice to Hua Di, a Chinese missile scientist and possible spy, and question the nature of their relationship with him. [WorldNetDaily, 12/21/99; WorldNetDaily, 4/5/00; NewsMax, 1/24/01] Di defected to the US in 1989 and worked most of the 1990s at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control, which was co-directed by Perry. Di later returned to China and is subsequently sentenced to ten years in prison for writing influential articles said to reveal vital Chinese state secrets. [Stanford Report, 2/7/01] However, other accounts claim that he was in fact passing on disinformation through these articles, successfully misleading the US military for a couple of years about the abilities of certain Chinese missile programs. [WorldNetDaily, 12/21/99] Additionally, Hua Di teamed in 1994 with Stanford professor Dr. John Lewis and William Perry to buy an advanced AT&T fiber-optic communications system for “civilian” use inside China that instead is used by the Chinese army. The General Accounting Office later criticized the sale. In 1997, Stanford University investigated Dr. Lewis for his role in it, but Condoleezza Rice, serving as a Stanford provost at the time, apparently stopped the investigation. [WorldNetDaily, 4/5/00; NewsMax, 1/24/01] Able Danger and LIWA's data mining efforts will be severely proscribed in April 2000 as part of the fallout from this China controversy (see April 2000), and the destruction of their collected data will follow shortly thereafter (see May-June 2000).
People and organizations involved: China, Eric Shinseki, James D. Smith, Land Information Warfare Activity, Louis J. Freeh, Condoleezza Rice, Hua Di, William Perry, F. Michael Maloof, Eileen Preisser, Curt Weldon
Fall 1999: Army Intelligence Program Is Set Up to Gather Information on Al-Qaeda
On the orders of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the head of the military's Special Operations Command (SOCOM), sets up an intelligence program called Able Danger, to assemble information about al-Qaeda networks around the world. SOCOM, based in Tampa, Florida, is responsible for America's secret commando units. [Government Security News, 9/05] At least some of the data is collected on behalf of Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Lambert, the J3 at US Special Operations Command. [Curt Weldon Statement, 9/21/05] Mark Zaid, a lawyer for several Able Danger whistleblowers in 2005, will give this description of Able Danger: “In the most understandable and simplistic terms, Able Danger involved the searching out and compiling of open source or other publicly available information regarding specific targets or tasks that were connected through associational links. No classified information was used. No government database systems were used. In addition to examining al-Qaeda links, Able Danger also handled tasks relating to Bosnia and China. The search and compilation efforts were primarily handled by defense contractors, who did not necessarily know they were working for Able Danger, and that information was then to be utilized by the military members of Able Danger for whatever appropriate purposes.” [Mark Zaid Testimony, 9/21/05] Eleven intelligence employees are directly involved in Able Danger's work. Six are with SOCOM's Able Danger unit. Four more, including Dr. Eileen Preisser and Maj. Eric Kleinsmith, are with the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), which joins the effort in December 1999. LIWA had been conducing data mining already on a wide variety of topics, including international drug cartels, corruption in Russia and Serbia, terrorist linkages in the Far East, and the proliferation of sensitive military technology to China (see April 2000). Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer running a unit called Stratus Ivy in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will also take part in the effort. [Norristown Times Herald, 6/19/05; Government Security News, 8/05; New York Times, 8/9/05; St Petersburg Times, 8/10/05; Bergen Record, 8/14/05; Government Security News, 9/05; Erik Kleinsmith Statement, 9/21/05; Curt Weldon Statement, 9/21/05] Using computers, the unit collects huge amounts of data in a technique called “data mining.” They get information from such sources as al-Qaeda Internet chat rooms, news accounts, web sites, and financial records. Using sophisticated software, they compare this with government records such as visa applications by foreign tourists, to find any correlations and depict these visually. [Bergen Record, 8/14/05; Government Security News, 9/05] The program lasts for 18 months, and is shut down early in 2001 (see Early 2001).
People and organizations involved: Special Operations Command, Mark Zaid, Hugh Shelton, China, Bosnia, Russia, Curt Weldon, al-Qaeda, Peter J. Schoomaker, Able Danger, Geoffrey Lambert, Eileen Preisser, Eric Kleinsmith, Anthony Shaffer
October 1999: CIA Does Not Share Information with Able Danger Program
Capt. Scott Phillpott, head of the Able Danger program, asks Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer to talk to a representative of CIA Director George Tenet and attempt to convince him that the new Able Danger program is not competing with the CIA. Shaffer later recalls the CIA representative replying, “I clearly understand the difference. I clearly understand. We're going after the leadership. You guys are going after the body. But, it doesn't matter. The bottom line is, CIA will never give you the best information from ‘Alex Base’ [the CIA's covert action element targeting bin Laden] or anywhere else. CIA will never provide that to you because if you were successful in your effort to target al-Qaeda, you will steal our thunder. Therefore, we will not support this.” Shaffer claims that for the duration of Able Danger's existence, “To my knowledge, and my other colleagues' knowledge, there was no information ever released to us because CIA chose not to participate in Able Danger.” [Government Security News, 9/05]
People and organizations involved: George Tenet, Able Danger, Anthony Shaffer, Central Intelligence Agency, Scott Phillpott
January-February 2000: Secret Military Unit Identifies al-Qaeda ‘Brooklyn’ Cell; Mohamed Atta is a Member
A blurry photograph of a 2005 reconstruction of the pre-9/11 Able Danger chart showing Mohamed Atta and others.
A US Army intelligence program called Able Danger identifies five al-Qaeda terrorist cells; one of them has connections to Brooklyn, New York and will become informally known as the “Brooklyn” cell by the Able Danger team. This cell includes 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta, and three other 9/11 hijackers: Marwan Alshehhi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Nawaf Alhazmi. According to a former intelligence officer who claims he worked closely with Able Danger, the link to Brooklyn is not based upon any firm evidence, but computer analysis that established patterns in links between the four men. “[T]he software put them all together in Brooklyn.” [New York Times, 8/9/05; Washington Times, 8/22/05; Fox News, 8/23/05; Government Security News, 9/05] However, that does not necessarily imply them being physically present in Brooklyn. A lawyer later representing members of Able Danger states, “At no time did Able Danger identify Mohamed Atta as being physically present in the United States.” Furthermore, “No information obtained at the time would have led anyone to believe criminal activity had taken place or that any specific terrorist activities were being planned.” [CNN, 9/21/05; Mark Zaid Statement, 9/21/05] James D. Smith, a contractor working with the unit, discovers Mohamed Atta's link to al-Qaeda. [WTOP News, 9/1/05] Smith has been using advanced computer software and analysing individuals who are going between mosques. He has made a link between Mohamed Atta and Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, ringleader of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. [Fox News, 8/28/05; Government Security News, 9/05] Atta is said to have some unspecified connection to the El Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, a hotbed of anti-American sentiment once frequented by Abdul-Rahman. [Norristown Times-Herald, 9/20/05] Smith obtained Atta's name and photograph through a private researcher in California who was paid to gather the information from contacts in the Middle East. [New York Times, 8/22/05] Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer claims the photo is not the well-known menacing Florida driver's license photo of Atta. “This is an older, more grainy photo we had of him. It was not the best picture in the world.” It is said to contain several names or aliases for Atta underneath it. [Chicago Tribune, 9/28/05; Jerry Doyle Show, 9/20/05] LIWA analysts supporting Able Danger make a chart, which Shaffer describes in a radio interview as, “A chart probably about a 2x3 which had essentially five clusters around the center point which was bin Laden and his leadership.” [Savage Nation, 9/16/05] The 9/11 Commission later claims that Atta only enters the United States for the first time several months later, in June 2000 (see June 3, 2000). [9/11 Commission Final Report, 7/24/04, p. 224] However, investigations in the months after 9/11 find that Mohamed Atta and another of the hijackers rented rooms in Brooklyn around this time (see Spring 2000). Other newspaper accounts have the CIA monitoring Atta starting in January 2000, while he is living in Germany (see January-May 2000).
People and organizations involved: Marwan Alshehhi, Able Danger, Mohamed Atta, Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, al-Qaeda, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, El Farouq
Mid-1999-November 1999: LIWA Data Mining Study Causes Controversy After Connecting Prominent US Figures to Weapons Purchases for Chinese Military
A report commissioned in mid-1999 by Rep. Curt Weldon ® looks into possible Chinese front companies in the US seeking technology for the Chinese military. Dr. Eileen Preisser and Michael Maloof are commissioned to make the report. Dr. Preisser, who runs the Information Dominance Center at the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) and will later become closely tied to Able Danger, uses LIWA's data mining capabilities to search unclassified information. According to Maloof, their results show Chinese front companies in the US posing as US corporations that acquire technology from US defense contractors. When the study is completed in November 1999, the General Counsel's office in the Office of the Defense Secretary orders the study destroyed. Weldon complains about this to Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, and apparently delays the destruction of the report. Weldon also writes a letter to FBI Director Louis Freeh requesting an espionage investigation into these Chinese links, but Freeh never responds to this. [Washington Times, 10/9/05] As part of this report, LIWA analysts had produced a chart of Chinese strategic and business connections in the US. But this data mining effort runs into controversy when the chart apparently shows connections between future National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and other prominent US figures, and business deals benefiting the Chinese military. [New York Post, 8/27/05; Washington Times, 9/22/05] The China chart was put together by private contractor James D. Smith, who will come forward in August 2005 to corroborate revelations about the Able Danger unit and its findings (see August 22-September 1, 2005). The New York Post later says there is “no suggestion that Rice or any of the others had done anything wrong.” [New York Post, 8/27/05] However, articles first appear one month later and through 2001 in the conservative publications WorldNetDaily and NewsMax, which connect Perry and Rice to Hua Di, a Chinese missile scientist and possible spy, and question the nature of their relationship with him. [WorldNetDaily, 12/21/99; WorldNetDaily, 4/5/00; NewsMax, 1/24/01] Di defected to the US in 1989 and worked most of the 1990s at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control, which was co-directed by Perry. Di later returned to China and is subsequently sentenced to ten years in prison for writing influential articles said to reveal vital Chinese state secrets. [Stanford Report, 2/7/01] However, other accounts claim that he was in fact passing on disinformation through these articles, successfully misleading the US military for a couple of years about the abilities of certain Chinese missile programs. [WorldNetDaily, 12/21/99] Additionally, Hua Di teamed in 1994 with Stanford professor Dr. John Lewis and William Perry to buy an advanced AT&T fiber-optic communications system for “civilian” use inside China that instead is used by the Chinese army. The General Accounting Office later criticized the sale. In 1997, Stanford University investigated Dr. Lewis for his role in it, but Condoleezza Rice, serving as a Stanford provost at the time, apparently stopped the investigation. [WorldNetDaily, 4/5/00; NewsMax, 1/24/01] Able Danger and LIWA's data mining efforts will be severely proscribed in April 2000 as part of the fallout from this China controversy (see April 2000), and the destruction of their collected data will follow shortly thereafter (see May-June 2000).
People and organizations involved: China, Eric Shinseki, James D. Smith, Land Information Warfare Activity, Louis J. Freeh, Condoleezza Rice, Hua Di, William Perry, F. Michael Maloof, Eileen Preisser, Curt Weldon
January-May 2000: CIA Has Atta Under Surveillance
Hijacker Mohamed Atta is put under surveillance by the CIA while living in Germany. [Agence France-Presse, 9/22/01; Focus, 9/24/01; Berliner Zeitung, 9/24/01] He is “reportedly observed buying large quantities of chemicals in Frankfurt, apparently for the production of explosives [and/or] for biological warfare.” “The US agents reported to have trailed Atta are said to have failed to inform the German authorities about their investigation,” even as the Germans are investigating many of his associates. “The disclosure that Atta was being trailed by police long before 11 September raises the question why the attacks could not have been prevented with the man's arrest.” [Observer, 9/30/01] A German newspaper adds that Atta is able to get a visa into the US on May 18. According to some reports, the surveillance stops when he leaves for the US at the start of June. However, “experts believe that the suspect [remains] under surveillance in the United States.” [Berliner Zeitung, 9/24/01] A German intelligence official also states, “We can no longer exclude the possibility that the Americans wanted to keep an eye on Atta after his entry in the US” [Focus, 9/24/01] This correlates with a Newsweek claim that US officials knew Atta was a “known [associate] of Islamic terrorists well before [9/11].” [Newsweek, 9/20/01] However, a congressional inquiry later reports that the US “intelligence community possessed no intelligence or law enforcement information linking 16 of the 19 hijackers [including Atta] to terrorism or terrorist groups.” [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02] In 2005, after accounts of the Able Danger program learning Atta's name become news, newspaper account will neglect to mention this prior report about Atta being known by US intelligence. For instance, the New York Times will report, “The account [about Able Danger] is the first assertion that Mr. Atta, an Egyptian who became the lead hijacker in the plot, was identified by any American government agency as a potential threat before the Sept. 11 attacks”(see August 9, 2005) . [New York Times, 8/9/05]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Central Intelligence Agency
Spring 2000: Atta and Alshehhi Rent Rooms in Brooklyn and the Bronx
Mohamed Atta and another of the 9/11 hijackers (presumably Marwan Alshehhi) rent rooms in New York City, according to a federal investigator. These rooms are in the Bronx and Brooklyn. Following 9/11, Atta is traced back to Brooklyn by a parking ticket issued to a rental car he was driving. However, immigration records have Mohamed Atta entering the US for the first time on June 3, 2000 (see June 3, 2000). The Associated Press article on this subject does not specify if Atta first stayed in New York before or after that date. [Associated Press, 12/8/01] According to a brief mention in the 9/11 Commission's final report, in the month of June, “As [Atta and Marwan Alshehhi] looked at flight schools on the East Coast, [they] stayed in a series of short-term rentals in New York City.” [9/11 Commission Final Report, 7/24/04, p. 224; Washington Post, 8/13/05] Earlier in 2000, a US Army intelligence program called Able Danger identified an al-Qaeda terrorist cell based in Brooklyn, of which Atta is a member (see January-February 2000). Also, a number of eyewitnesses later report seeing Atta in Maine and Florida before this official arrival date (see April 2000; Late April-Mid-May 2000).
People and organizations involved: Able Danger, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, al-Qaeda
April 2000: LIWA Support For Able Danger Program Ends; It Later Restarts
Four analysts from the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) unit are forced to stop their work supporting the Able Danger program. At the same time, private contractors working for Able Danger are fired. This occurs around the time that it becomes known by some inside the military that LIWA had identified future National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and other prominent Americans as potential security risks (see April 2000). It was apparently these LIWA analysts (such as Dr. Eileen Preisser) and contractors (such as James D. Smith) who conducted most of the data mining and analysis of al-Qaeda in the preceding months. One of the four LIWA analysts, Maj. Erik Kleinsmith, will later be ordered to destroy all the data collected (see May-June 2000). LIWA's support for Able Danger will resume a few months later (see Late September 2000). [Erik Kleinsmith Statement, 9/21/05; Washington Times, 9/22/05; New York Post, 8/27/05]
People and organizations involved: William Perry, Able Danger, James D. Smith, Eileen Preisser, Condoleezza Rice, Land Information Warfare Activity
April 2000: LIWA and Able Danger Face Trouble After LIWA Connects Prominent US Figures to Chinese Military
A 1999 study by the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) to look into possible Chinese front companies in the US seeking technology for the Chinese military created controversy and was ordered destroyed in November 1999 (see Mid-1999-November 1999). However, apparently Rep. Curt Weldon ® protests, and the issue finally comes to a head during this month. One result of this controversy will be what Maj. Erik Kleinsmith will later call “severely restricted” support for Able Danger, including a temporary end to LIWA support (see April 2000) In an April 14, 2000 memorandum from the legal counsel in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capt. Michael Lohr writes that the concern over the LIWA data mining study raises privacy concerns: “Preliminary review of subject methodology raised the possibility that LIWA ‘data mining’ would potentially access both foreign intelligence (FI) information and domestic information relating to US citizens (i.e. law enforcement, tax, customs, immigration, etc... ... I recognize that an argument can be made that LIWA is not ‘collecting’ in the strict sense (i.e. they are accessing public areas of the Internet and non-FI federal government databases of already lawfully collected information). This effort would, however, have the potential to pull together into a single database a wealth of privacy-protected US citizen information in a more sweeping and exhaustive manner than was previously contemplated.” Additionally, the content of the study is another reason why it caused what Weldon calls a “wave of controversy.” The study had connected future National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and other prominent US citizens to business transactions with Chinese military officials.(see Mid-1999-November 1999). [New York Post, 8/27/05; Washington Times, 9/22/05; Curt Weldon Press Conference, 9/17/05; Washington Times, 10/9/05; Erik Kleinsmith Statement, 9/21/05] One article on the subject will comment, “Sources familiar with Able Danger say the project was shut down because it could have led to the exposure of a separate secret data mining project focusing on US citizens allegedly transferring super-sensitive US technology illegally to the Chinese government.” [WTOP, 9/1/05] A massive destruction of data from Able Danger and LIWA's data mining efforts will follow, one month later (see May-June 2000).
People and organizations involved: Land Information Warfare Activity, Able Danger, Michael Lohr, Curt Weldon, Condoleezza Rice, William Perry
May-June 2000: Army Officer Told to Destroy Able Danger Documents
Maj. Eric Kleinsmith, chief of intelligence for the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) unit, is ordered to destroy data and documents related to a military intelligence program set up to gather information about al-Qaeda. The program, called Able Danger, has identified Mohamed Atta and three other future hijackers as potential threats (see January-February 2000). According to Kleinsmith, by April 2000 it has collected “an immense amount of data for analysis that allowed us to map al-Qaeda as a worldwide threat with a surprisingly significant presence within the United States.”(see January-February 2000) [Fox News, 9/21/05; New York Times, 9/22/05] The data is being collected on behalf of Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Lambert, the J3 at US Special Operations Command, who is said to be extremely upset when he learns that the data had been destroyed without his knowledge or consent. [Curt Weldon Statement, 9/21/05] Around this time, a separate LIWA effort showing links between prominent US citizens and the Chinese military has been causing controversy, and apparently this data faces destruction as well (see April 2000). The data and documents have to be destroyed in accordance with Army regulations prohibiting the retention of data about US persons for longer than 90 days, unless it falls under one of several restrictive categories. However, during a Senate Judiciary Committee public hearing in September 2005, a Defense Department representative admits that Mohamed Atta was not considered a US person. The representative also acknowledges that regulations would have probably allowed the Able Danger information to be shared with law enforcement agencies before its destruction. Asked why this was not done, he responds, “I can't tell you.” [CNET News, 9/21/05] The order to destroy the data and documents is given to Kleinsmith by Army Intelligence and Security Command General Counsel Tony Gentry, who jokingly tells him, “Remember to delete the data—or you'll go to jail.” [Government Executive, 9/21/05] The quantity of information destroyed is later described as “2.5 terabytes,” about as much as one-fourth of all the printed materials in the Library of Congress. [Associated Press, 9/16/05] Other records associated with the unit are allegedly destroyed in March 2001 and spring 2004 (see Spring 2004). [Associated Press, 9/21/05; Mark Zaid Statement, 9/21/05; Fox News, 9/24/05]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, al-Qaeda, Tony Gentry, Eric Kleinsmith, Land Information Warfare Activity, Able Danger, Geoffrey Lambert
May 2000-Late September 2000: Defense Agency Analyst Assembles Unheeded Attack Warning; Able Danger Information May Be One Source
Kie Fallis, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) terrorism intelligence analyst, has been gathering evidence of an upcoming al-Qaeda attack or attacks. In 2002, he will describe to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry a research process similar to what Able Danger is using at the same time: “I began to notice there was a voluminous amount of information, as others have testified, regarding al-Qaeda. Most of it appeared to be unrelated to other pieces of information. It appeared to be almost chat. By using a piece of [commercial software called ‘Analyst's Notebook’] I was able to put these small snippets of information into, and graphically represent them as well, I was able to, over a course of many months, to determine certain linkages between these items—linkages that would never be apparent without the use of this tool. It would be lost in the weeds. And there were a lot of weeds to look through.” [Washington Times, 8/26/02; 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 10/8/02] In his research, he claims to find links between al-Qaeda and Iranian intelligence. By May 2000, he writes a classified report on his conclusion that “terrorists were planning two or three major attacks against the United States. The only gaps were where and when.” Apparently, he envisions at least one of these attacks will use a small boat to blow up a US warship. However, the DIA has already issued a report concluding that such a method of attack would be impossible to carry out successfully, and the agency sticks by this assessment. A video message put out by bin Laden in mid-September convinces Fallis that an al-Qaeda attack will happen in the next month or two.(see Mid-September 2000). Shortly after learning about this message, Fallis reaches “the ‘eureka point’ ... in determining an impending terrorist attack.” This comes “from a still-classified intelligence report in September 2000, which he will not discuss.” [Washington Times, 8/26/02] This may be a reference to a lead by the Able Danger team on increased al-Qaeda activity in Yemen at this time (see Late September 2000), and/or it may refer to other intelligence leads. Fallis goes to his supervisor and asks that at least a general warning of an attack in the Middle East be issued. He hopes such a warning will at least put US military forces in the region on a higher alert. His superior turns him down, and other superiors fail to even learn of his suggested warning. The USS Cole will be successfully attacked in the port of Aden, Yemen, by a small boat of terrorists on October 12, 2000 (see October 12, 2000) . [Washington Times, 8/26/02] One day after the Cole attack, Fallis will resign in protest. According to Sen. John Warner ®,“What [Fallis] felt is that his assessment was not given that proper level of consideration by his superiors and, as such, was not incorporated in the final intelligence reports provided to military commanders in the [Middle East region].” [CNN, 10/25/00]
People and organizations involved: Kie Fallis, al-Qaeda, Iran, John W. Warner, Osama bin Laden, Able Danger
Mid-September 2000: Bin Laden Message Gives Hint of Upcoming USS Cole Attack
A videotape message featuring bin Laden calling for more attacks on the US is aired on al-Jazeera. The video ends with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri saying, “Enough of words, it is time to take action against this iniquitous and faithless force [the United States], which has spread troops through Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.” DIA analyst Kie Fallis later recalls, “Every time he put out one of these videotapes, it was a signal that action was coming.” He claims that after hearing of the video, he “knew then it would be within a month or two.” But nonetheless, his suggestion to put out a general attack warning will go unheeded (see May 2000-Late September 2000). An al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole follows less than a month later (see October 12, 2000). [Washington Times, 8/26/02]
People and organizations involved: United States, Kie Fallis, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri
(Before September 2000-12 Months Later): Mohamed Atta Has Long Term Stay in Wayne, New Jersey; Other Hijackers Seen There
In 2003, New Jersey state police officials say Mohamed Atta lived in the Wayne Inn, in Wayne, New Jersey, for an unspecified 12-month period prior to 9/11. He lives with one other hijacker who is presumably his usual partner Marwan Alshehhi (Alshehhi is seen eating in nearby restaurants with Atta). [Bergen Record, 6/20/03] In 2004, an unnamed whistleblower involved in the Able Danger program will claim that prior to 9/11, Able Danger discovered that Atta and Alshehhi were renting a room at the Wayne Inn, and occasionally meeting with Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar at the inn or near it (see (Before September 2000)). From March 2001 onwards, other hijackers, including Alhazmi and Almihdhar, live in Paterson, New Jersey, only one mile away from Wayne (see March 2001-September 1, 2001). Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi rent mailboxes in Wayne at some unknown point before 9/11. Nawaf Alhazmi and Hani Hanjour rent cars from a Wayne car dealership between June and August 2001. There is also evidence Nawaf Alhazmi and Marwan Alshehhi shop in Wayne. [CNN, 9/27/01] The 9/11 Commission does not mention any hijacker connection to Wayne. This long-term stay in Wayne is surprising because Atta and Alshehhi have generally been placed in Florida most of the time from July 2000 until shortly before 9/11. However, this discrepancy may be explained by one account which states Atta had “two places he lived and 10 safe houses” in the US (see Mid-September 2001).
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi
(Before September 2000): Army Intelligence Unit Said to Discover Hijackers Renting Rooms at New Jersey Motels
According to an anonymous Able Danger official speaking to the Bergen Record, a US Army intelligence unit tasked with assembling information about al-Qaeda networks worldwide discovers that several of the 9/11 hijackers are taking rooms at motels in New Jersey and meeting together there. The intelligence unit, called Able Danger, which uses high-speed computers to analyze vast amounts of data, notices that Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi take a room at the Wayne Inn (see (Before September 2000-12 Months Later)). After the existence of the Able Danger unit comes to light in 2005, Bergen Record columnist and reporter Mike Kelly says, “The connect-the-dots tracking by the team was so good that it even knew Atta conducted meetings with the three future hijackers. One of those meetings took place at the Wayne Inn. That's how close all this was—to us and to being solved, if only the information had been passed up the line to FBI agents or even to local cops. This new piece of 9/11 history, revealed only last week by a Pennsylvania congressman and confirmed by two former members of the intelligence team, could turn out to be one of the most explosive revelations since the publication last summer of the 9/11 commission report.” [Bergen Record, 8/14/05] The other two hijackers said to be present at the meetings, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, periodically live in the town of Paterson, only one mile away from Wayne (see March 2001-September 1, 2001). However, contradicting this account, a lawyer representing members of Able Danger later testifies, “At no time did Able Danger identify Mohamed Atta as being physically present in the United States.” [CNN, 9/21/05; Mark Zaid Statement, 9/21/05] Some media accounts have stated that the Able Danger program determined Atta was in the US before 9/11. For instance, Fox News reported in August 2005, “[Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer] is standing by his claim that he told them that the lead hijacker in the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks had been identified in the summer of 2000 as an al-Qaeda operative living in the United States.” [Fox News, 8/17/05]
People and organizations involved: Able Danger, Khalid Almihdhar, Anthony Shaffer, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Nawaf Alhazmi, al-Qaeda
September 2000: Chart With Mohamed Atta's Photo Presented by Able Danger at SOCOM Headquarters; Meetings With FBI Cancelled
Members of a US Army intelligence unit tasked with assembling information about al-Qaeda have prepared a chart that includes the names and photographs of four future hijackers, who they have identified as members of an al-Qaeda cell based in Brooklyn, New York. The four hijackers in the cell are Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Nawaf Alhazmi. The members of the intelligence unit, called Able Danger, present their chart at the headquarters of the US military's Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in Tampa, Florida, with the recommendation that the FBI should be called in to take out the al-Qaeda cell. Lawyers working for SOCOM argue that anyone with a green card has to be granted the same legal protections as any US citizen, so the information about the al-Qaeda cell cannot be shared with the FBI. The legal team directs them to put yellow stickers over the photographs of Mohamed Atta and the other cell members, to symbolize that they are off limits. [Norristown Times Herald, 6/19/05; Government Security News, 8/05; New York Times, 8/9/05; St Petersburg Times, 8/10/05; New York Times, 8/17/05; Government Security News, 9/05] Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer later says that an unnamed two-star general above him is “very adamant” about not looking further at Atta. “I was directed several times [to ignore Atta], to the point where he had to remind me he was a general and I was not ... [and] I would essentially be fired.” [Fox News, 8/19/05] Military leaders at the meeting take the side of the lawyers and prohibit any sharing of information about the al-Qaeda cell. Shaffer believes that t
Project: Complete 911 Timeline
Open-Content project managed by Paul Thompson
Mid-1999-November 1999: LIWA Data Mining Study Causes Controversy After Connecting Prominent US Figures to Weapons Purchases for Chinese Military
A report commissioned in mid-1999 by Rep. Curt Weldon ® looks into possible Chinese front companies in the US seeking technology for the Chinese military. Dr. Eileen Preisser and Michael Maloof are commissioned to make the report. Dr. Preisser, who runs the Information Dominance Center at the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) and will later become closely tied to Able Danger, uses LIWA's data mining capabilities to search unclassified information. According to Maloof, their results show Chinese front companies in the US posing as US corporations that acquire technology from US defense contractors. When the study is completed in November 1999, the General Counsel's office in the Office of the Defense Secretary orders the study destroyed. Weldon complains about this to Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, and apparently delays the destruction of the report. Weldon also writes a letter to FBI Director Louis Freeh requesting an espionage investigation into these Chinese links, but Freeh never responds to this. [Washington Times, 10/9/05] As part of this report, LIWA analysts had produced a chart of Chinese strategic and business connections in the US. But this data mining effort runs into controversy when the chart apparently shows connections between future National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and other prominent US figures, and business deals benefiting the Chinese military. [New York Post, 8/27/05; Washington Times, 9/22/05] The China chart was put together by private contractor James D. Smith, who will come forward in August 2005 to corroborate revelations about the Able Danger unit and its findings (see August 22-September 1, 2005). The New York Post later says there is “no suggestion that Rice or any of the others had done anything wrong.” [New York Post, 8/27/05] However, articles first appear one month later and through 2001 in the conservative publications WorldNetDaily and NewsMax, which connect Perry and Rice to Hua Di, a Chinese missile scientist and possible spy, and question the nature of their relationship with him. [WorldNetDaily, 12/21/99; WorldNetDaily, 4/5/00; NewsMax, 1/24/01] Di defected to the US in 1989 and worked most of the 1990s at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control, which was co-directed by Perry. Di later returned to China and is subsequently sentenced to ten years in prison for writing influential articles said to reveal vital Chinese state secrets. [Stanford Report, 2/7/01] However, other accounts claim that he was in fact passing on disinformation through these articles, successfully misleading the US military for a couple of years about the abilities of certain Chinese missile programs. [WorldNetDaily, 12/21/99] Additionally, Hua Di teamed in 1994 with Stanford professor Dr. John Lewis and William Perry to buy an advanced AT&T fiber-optic communications system for “civilian” use inside China that instead is used by the Chinese army. The General Accounting Office later criticized the sale. In 1997, Stanford University investigated Dr. Lewis for his role in it, but Condoleezza Rice, serving as a Stanford provost at the time, apparently stopped the investigation. [WorldNetDaily, 4/5/00; NewsMax, 1/24/01] Able Danger and LIWA's data mining efforts will be severely proscribed in April 2000 as part of the fallout from this China controversy (see April 2000), and the destruction of their collected data will follow shortly thereafter (see May-June 2000).
People and organizations involved: China, Eric Shinseki, James D. Smith, Land Information Warfare Activity, Louis J. Freeh, Condoleezza Rice, Hua Di, William Perry, F. Michael Maloof, Eileen Preisser, Curt Weldon
Fall 1999: Army Intelligence Program Is Set Up to Gather Information on Al-Qaeda
On the orders of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the head of the military's Special Operations Command (SOCOM), sets up an intelligence program called Able Danger, to assemble information about al-Qaeda networks around the world. SOCOM, based in Tampa, Florida, is responsible for America's secret commando units. [Government Security News, 9/05] At least some of the data is collected on behalf of Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Lambert, the J3 at US Special Operations Command. [Curt Weldon Statement, 9/21/05] Mark Zaid, a lawyer for several Able Danger whistleblowers in 2005, will give this description of Able Danger: “In the most understandable and simplistic terms, Able Danger involved the searching out and compiling of open source or other publicly available information regarding specific targets or tasks that were connected through associational links. No classified information was used. No government database systems were used. In addition to examining al-Qaeda links, Able Danger also handled tasks relating to Bosnia and China. The search and compilation efforts were primarily handled by defense contractors, who did not necessarily know they were working for Able Danger, and that information was then to be utilized by the military members of Able Danger for whatever appropriate purposes.” [Mark Zaid Testimony, 9/21/05] Eleven intelligence employees are directly involved in Able Danger's work. Six are with SOCOM's Able Danger unit. Four more, including Dr. Eileen Preisser and Maj. Eric Kleinsmith, are with the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), which joins the effort in December 1999. LIWA had been conducing data mining already on a wide variety of topics, including international drug cartels, corruption in Russia and Serbia, terrorist linkages in the Far East, and the proliferation of sensitive military technology to China (see April 2000). Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer running a unit called Stratus Ivy in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) will also take part in the effort. [Norristown Times Herald, 6/19/05; Government Security News, 8/05; New York Times, 8/9/05; St Petersburg Times, 8/10/05; Bergen Record, 8/14/05; Government Security News, 9/05; Erik Kleinsmith Statement, 9/21/05; Curt Weldon Statement, 9/21/05] Using computers, the unit collects huge amounts of data in a technique called “data mining.” They get information from such sources as al-Qaeda Internet chat rooms, news accounts, web sites, and financial records. Using sophisticated software, they compare this with government records such as visa applications by foreign tourists, to find any correlations and depict these visually. [Bergen Record, 8/14/05; Government Security News, 9/05] The program lasts for 18 months, and is shut down early in 2001 (see Early 2001).
People and organizations involved: Special Operations Command, Mark Zaid, Hugh Shelton, China, Bosnia, Russia, Curt Weldon, al-Qaeda, Peter J. Schoomaker, Able Danger, Geoffrey Lambert, Eileen Preisser, Eric Kleinsmith, Anthony Shaffer
October 1999: CIA Does Not Share Information with Able Danger Program
Capt. Scott Phillpott, head of the Able Danger program, asks Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer to talk to a representative of CIA Director George Tenet and attempt to convince him that the new Able Danger program is not competing with the CIA. Shaffer later recalls the CIA representative replying, “I clearly understand the difference. I clearly understand. We're going after the leadership. You guys are going after the body. But, it doesn't matter. The bottom line is, CIA will never give you the best information from ‘Alex Base’ [the CIA's covert action element targeting bin Laden] or anywhere else. CIA will never provide that to you because if you were successful in your effort to target al-Qaeda, you will steal our thunder. Therefore, we will not support this.” Shaffer claims that for the duration of Able Danger's existence, “To my knowledge, and my other colleagues' knowledge, there was no information ever released to us because CIA chose not to participate in Able Danger.” [Government Security News, 9/05]
People and organizations involved: George Tenet, Able Danger, Anthony Shaffer, Central Intelligence Agency, Scott Phillpott
January-February 2000: Secret Military Unit Identifies al-Qaeda ‘Brooklyn’ Cell; Mohamed Atta is a Member
A blurry photograph of a 2005 reconstruction of the pre-9/11 Able Danger chart showing Mohamed Atta and others.
A US Army intelligence program called Able Danger identifies five al-Qaeda terrorist cells; one of them has connections to Brooklyn, New York and will become informally known as the “Brooklyn” cell by the Able Danger team. This cell includes 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta, and three other 9/11 hijackers: Marwan Alshehhi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Nawaf Alhazmi. According to a former intelligence officer who claims he worked closely with Able Danger, the link to Brooklyn is not based upon any firm evidence, but computer analysis that established patterns in links between the four men. “[T]he software put them all together in Brooklyn.” [New York Times, 8/9/05; Washington Times, 8/22/05; Fox News, 8/23/05; Government Security News, 9/05] However, that does not necessarily imply them being physically present in Brooklyn. A lawyer later representing members of Able Danger states, “At no time did Able Danger identify Mohamed Atta as being physically present in the United States.” Furthermore, “No information obtained at the time would have led anyone to believe criminal activity had taken place or that any specific terrorist activities were being planned.” [CNN, 9/21/05; Mark Zaid Statement, 9/21/05] James D. Smith, a contractor working with the unit, discovers Mohamed Atta's link to al-Qaeda. [WTOP News, 9/1/05] Smith has been using advanced computer software and analysing individuals who are going between mosques. He has made a link between Mohamed Atta and Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, ringleader of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. [Fox News, 8/28/05; Government Security News, 9/05] Atta is said to have some unspecified connection to the El Farouq mosque in Brooklyn, a hotbed of anti-American sentiment once frequented by Abdul-Rahman. [Norristown Times-Herald, 9/20/05] Smith obtained Atta's name and photograph through a private researcher in California who was paid to gather the information from contacts in the Middle East. [New York Times, 8/22/05] Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer claims the photo is not the well-known menacing Florida driver's license photo of Atta. “This is an older, more grainy photo we had of him. It was not the best picture in the world.” It is said to contain several names or aliases for Atta underneath it. [Chicago Tribune, 9/28/05; Jerry Doyle Show, 9/20/05] LIWA analysts supporting Able Danger make a chart, which Shaffer describes in a radio interview as, “A chart probably about a 2x3 which had essentially five clusters around the center point which was bin Laden and his leadership.” [Savage Nation, 9/16/05] The 9/11 Commission later claims that Atta only enters the United States for the first time several months later, in June 2000 (see June 3, 2000). [9/11 Commission Final Report, 7/24/04, p. 224] However, investigations in the months after 9/11 find that Mohamed Atta and another of the hijackers rented rooms in Brooklyn around this time (see Spring 2000). Other newspaper accounts have the CIA monitoring Atta starting in January 2000, while he is living in Germany (see January-May 2000).
People and organizations involved: Marwan Alshehhi, Able Danger, Mohamed Atta, Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman, al-Qaeda, Khalid Almihdhar, Nawaf Alhazmi, El Farouq
Mid-1999-November 1999: LIWA Data Mining Study Causes Controversy After Connecting Prominent US Figures to Weapons Purchases for Chinese Military
A report commissioned in mid-1999 by Rep. Curt Weldon ® looks into possible Chinese front companies in the US seeking technology for the Chinese military. Dr. Eileen Preisser and Michael Maloof are commissioned to make the report. Dr. Preisser, who runs the Information Dominance Center at the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) and will later become closely tied to Able Danger, uses LIWA's data mining capabilities to search unclassified information. According to Maloof, their results show Chinese front companies in the US posing as US corporations that acquire technology from US defense contractors. When the study is completed in November 1999, the General Counsel's office in the Office of the Defense Secretary orders the study destroyed. Weldon complains about this to Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, and apparently delays the destruction of the report. Weldon also writes a letter to FBI Director Louis Freeh requesting an espionage investigation into these Chinese links, but Freeh never responds to this. [Washington Times, 10/9/05] As part of this report, LIWA analysts had produced a chart of Chinese strategic and business connections in the US. But this data mining effort runs into controversy when the chart apparently shows connections between future National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and other prominent US figures, and business deals benefiting the Chinese military. [New York Post, 8/27/05; Washington Times, 9/22/05] The China chart was put together by private contractor James D. Smith, who will come forward in August 2005 to corroborate revelations about the Able Danger unit and its findings (see August 22-September 1, 2005). The New York Post later says there is “no suggestion that Rice or any of the others had done anything wrong.” [New York Post, 8/27/05] However, articles first appear one month later and through 2001 in the conservative publications WorldNetDaily and NewsMax, which connect Perry and Rice to Hua Di, a Chinese missile scientist and possible spy, and question the nature of their relationship with him. [WorldNetDaily, 12/21/99; WorldNetDaily, 4/5/00; NewsMax, 1/24/01] Di defected to the US in 1989 and worked most of the 1990s at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control, which was co-directed by Perry. Di later returned to China and is subsequently sentenced to ten years in prison for writing influential articles said to reveal vital Chinese state secrets. [Stanford Report, 2/7/01] However, other accounts claim that he was in fact passing on disinformation through these articles, successfully misleading the US military for a couple of years about the abilities of certain Chinese missile programs. [WorldNetDaily, 12/21/99] Additionally, Hua Di teamed in 1994 with Stanford professor Dr. John Lewis and William Perry to buy an advanced AT&T fiber-optic communications system for “civilian” use inside China that instead is used by the Chinese army. The General Accounting Office later criticized the sale. In 1997, Stanford University investigated Dr. Lewis for his role in it, but Condoleezza Rice, serving as a Stanford provost at the time, apparently stopped the investigation. [WorldNetDaily, 4/5/00; NewsMax, 1/24/01] Able Danger and LIWA's data mining efforts will be severely proscribed in April 2000 as part of the fallout from this China controversy (see April 2000), and the destruction of their collected data will follow shortly thereafter (see May-June 2000).
People and organizations involved: China, Eric Shinseki, James D. Smith, Land Information Warfare Activity, Louis J. Freeh, Condoleezza Rice, Hua Di, William Perry, F. Michael Maloof, Eileen Preisser, Curt Weldon
January-May 2000: CIA Has Atta Under Surveillance
Hijacker Mohamed Atta is put under surveillance by the CIA while living in Germany. [Agence France-Presse, 9/22/01; Focus, 9/24/01; Berliner Zeitung, 9/24/01] He is “reportedly observed buying large quantities of chemicals in Frankfurt, apparently for the production of explosives [and/or] for biological warfare.” “The US agents reported to have trailed Atta are said to have failed to inform the German authorities about their investigation,” even as the Germans are investigating many of his associates. “The disclosure that Atta was being trailed by police long before 11 September raises the question why the attacks could not have been prevented with the man's arrest.” [Observer, 9/30/01] A German newspaper adds that Atta is able to get a visa into the US on May 18. According to some reports, the surveillance stops when he leaves for the US at the start of June. However, “experts believe that the suspect [remains] under surveillance in the United States.” [Berliner Zeitung, 9/24/01] A German intelligence official also states, “We can no longer exclude the possibility that the Americans wanted to keep an eye on Atta after his entry in the US” [Focus, 9/24/01] This correlates with a Newsweek claim that US officials knew Atta was a “known [associate] of Islamic terrorists well before [9/11].” [Newsweek, 9/20/01] However, a congressional inquiry later reports that the US “intelligence community possessed no intelligence or law enforcement information linking 16 of the 19 hijackers [including Atta] to terrorism or terrorist groups.” [9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 9/20/02] In 2005, after accounts of the Able Danger program learning Atta's name become news, newspaper account will neglect to mention this prior report about Atta being known by US intelligence. For instance, the New York Times will report, “The account [about Able Danger] is the first assertion that Mr. Atta, an Egyptian who became the lead hijacker in the plot, was identified by any American government agency as a potential threat before the Sept. 11 attacks”(see August 9, 2005) . [New York Times, 8/9/05]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Central Intelligence Agency
Spring 2000: Atta and Alshehhi Rent Rooms in Brooklyn and the Bronx
Mohamed Atta and another of the 9/11 hijackers (presumably Marwan Alshehhi) rent rooms in New York City, according to a federal investigator. These rooms are in the Bronx and Brooklyn. Following 9/11, Atta is traced back to Brooklyn by a parking ticket issued to a rental car he was driving. However, immigration records have Mohamed Atta entering the US for the first time on June 3, 2000 (see June 3, 2000). The Associated Press article on this subject does not specify if Atta first stayed in New York before or after that date. [Associated Press, 12/8/01] According to a brief mention in the 9/11 Commission's final report, in the month of June, “As [Atta and Marwan Alshehhi] looked at flight schools on the East Coast, [they] stayed in a series of short-term rentals in New York City.” [9/11 Commission Final Report, 7/24/04, p. 224; Washington Post, 8/13/05] Earlier in 2000, a US Army intelligence program called Able Danger identified an al-Qaeda terrorist cell based in Brooklyn, of which Atta is a member (see January-February 2000). Also, a number of eyewitnesses later report seeing Atta in Maine and Florida before this official arrival date (see April 2000; Late April-Mid-May 2000).
People and organizations involved: Able Danger, Marwan Alshehhi, Mohamed Atta, al-Qaeda
April 2000: LIWA Support For Able Danger Program Ends; It Later Restarts
Four analysts from the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) unit are forced to stop their work supporting the Able Danger program. At the same time, private contractors working for Able Danger are fired. This occurs around the time that it becomes known by some inside the military that LIWA had identified future National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and other prominent Americans as potential security risks (see April 2000). It was apparently these LIWA analysts (such as Dr. Eileen Preisser) and contractors (such as James D. Smith) who conducted most of the data mining and analysis of al-Qaeda in the preceding months. One of the four LIWA analysts, Maj. Erik Kleinsmith, will later be ordered to destroy all the data collected (see May-June 2000). LIWA's support for Able Danger will resume a few months later (see Late September 2000). [Erik Kleinsmith Statement, 9/21/05; Washington Times, 9/22/05; New York Post, 8/27/05]
People and organizations involved: William Perry, Able Danger, James D. Smith, Eileen Preisser, Condoleezza Rice, Land Information Warfare Activity
April 2000: LIWA and Able Danger Face Trouble After LIWA Connects Prominent US Figures to Chinese Military
A 1999 study by the US Army's Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) to look into possible Chinese front companies in the US seeking technology for the Chinese military created controversy and was ordered destroyed in November 1999 (see Mid-1999-November 1999). However, apparently Rep. Curt Weldon ® protests, and the issue finally comes to a head during this month. One result of this controversy will be what Maj. Erik Kleinsmith will later call “severely restricted” support for Able Danger, including a temporary end to LIWA support (see April 2000) In an April 14, 2000 memorandum from the legal counsel in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capt. Michael Lohr writes that the concern over the LIWA data mining study raises privacy concerns: “Preliminary review of subject methodology raised the possibility that LIWA ‘data mining’ would potentially access both foreign intelligence (FI) information and domestic information relating to US citizens (i.e. law enforcement, tax, customs, immigration, etc... ... I recognize that an argument can be made that LIWA is not ‘collecting’ in the strict sense (i.e. they are accessing public areas of the Internet and non-FI federal government databases of already lawfully collected information). This effort would, however, have the potential to pull together into a single database a wealth of privacy-protected US citizen information in a more sweeping and exhaustive manner than was previously contemplated.” Additionally, the content of the study is another reason why it caused what Weldon calls a “wave of controversy.” The study had connected future National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, former Defense Secretary William Perry, and other prominent US citizens to business transactions with Chinese military officials.(see Mid-1999-November 1999). [New York Post, 8/27/05; Washington Times, 9/22/05; Curt Weldon Press Conference, 9/17/05; Washington Times, 10/9/05; Erik Kleinsmith Statement, 9/21/05] One article on the subject will comment, “Sources familiar with Able Danger say the project was shut down because it could have led to the exposure of a separate secret data mining project focusing on US citizens allegedly transferring super-sensitive US technology illegally to the Chinese government.” [WTOP, 9/1/05] A massive destruction of data from Able Danger and LIWA's data mining efforts will follow, one month later (see May-June 2000).
People and organizations involved: Land Information Warfare Activity, Able Danger, Michael Lohr, Curt Weldon, Condoleezza Rice, William Perry
May-June 2000: Army Officer Told to Destroy Able Danger Documents
Maj. Eric Kleinsmith, chief of intelligence for the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) unit, is ordered to destroy data and documents related to a military intelligence program set up to gather information about al-Qaeda. The program, called Able Danger, has identified Mohamed Atta and three other future hijackers as potential threats (see January-February 2000). According to Kleinsmith, by April 2000 it has collected “an immense amount of data for analysis that allowed us to map al-Qaeda as a worldwide threat with a surprisingly significant presence within the United States.”(see January-February 2000) [Fox News, 9/21/05; New York Times, 9/22/05] The data is being collected on behalf of Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Lambert, the J3 at US Special Operations Command, who is said to be extremely upset when he learns that the data had been destroyed without his knowledge or consent. [Curt Weldon Statement, 9/21/05] Around this time, a separate LIWA effort showing links between prominent US citizens and the Chinese military has been causing controversy, and apparently this data faces destruction as well (see April 2000). The data and documents have to be destroyed in accordance with Army regulations prohibiting the retention of data about US persons for longer than 90 days, unless it falls under one of several restrictive categories. However, during a Senate Judiciary Committee public hearing in September 2005, a Defense Department representative admits that Mohamed Atta was not considered a US person. The representative also acknowledges that regulations would have probably allowed the Able Danger information to be shared with law enforcement agencies before its destruction. Asked why this was not done, he responds, “I can't tell you.” [CNET News, 9/21/05] The order to destroy the data and documents is given to Kleinsmith by Army Intelligence and Security Command General Counsel Tony Gentry, who jokingly tells him, “Remember to delete the data—or you'll go to jail.” [Government Executive, 9/21/05] The quantity of information destroyed is later described as “2.5 terabytes,” about as much as one-fourth of all the printed materials in the Library of Congress. [Associated Press, 9/16/05] Other records associated with the unit are allegedly destroyed in March 2001 and spring 2004 (see Spring 2004). [Associated Press, 9/21/05; Mark Zaid Statement, 9/21/05; Fox News, 9/24/05]
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, al-Qaeda, Tony Gentry, Eric Kleinsmith, Land Information Warfare Activity, Able Danger, Geoffrey Lambert
May 2000-Late September 2000: Defense Agency Analyst Assembles Unheeded Attack Warning; Able Danger Information May Be One Source
Kie Fallis, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) terrorism intelligence analyst, has been gathering evidence of an upcoming al-Qaeda attack or attacks. In 2002, he will describe to the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry a research process similar to what Able Danger is using at the same time: “I began to notice there was a voluminous amount of information, as others have testified, regarding al-Qaeda. Most of it appeared to be unrelated to other pieces of information. It appeared to be almost chat. By using a piece of [commercial software called ‘Analyst's Notebook’] I was able to put these small snippets of information into, and graphically represent them as well, I was able to, over a course of many months, to determine certain linkages between these items—linkages that would never be apparent without the use of this tool. It would be lost in the weeds. And there were a lot of weeds to look through.” [Washington Times, 8/26/02; 9/11 Congressional Inquiry, 10/8/02] In his research, he claims to find links between al-Qaeda and Iranian intelligence. By May 2000, he writes a classified report on his conclusion that “terrorists were planning two or three major attacks against the United States. The only gaps were where and when.” Apparently, he envisions at least one of these attacks will use a small boat to blow up a US warship. However, the DIA has already issued a report concluding that such a method of attack would be impossible to carry out successfully, and the agency sticks by this assessment. A video message put out by bin Laden in mid-September convinces Fallis that an al-Qaeda attack will happen in the next month or two.(see Mid-September 2000). Shortly after learning about this message, Fallis reaches “the ‘eureka point’ ... in determining an impending terrorist attack.” This comes “from a still-classified intelligence report in September 2000, which he will not discuss.” [Washington Times, 8/26/02] This may be a reference to a lead by the Able Danger team on increased al-Qaeda activity in Yemen at this time (see Late September 2000), and/or it may refer to other intelligence leads. Fallis goes to his supervisor and asks that at least a general warning of an attack in the Middle East be issued. He hopes such a warning will at least put US military forces in the region on a higher alert. His superior turns him down, and other superiors fail to even learn of his suggested warning. The USS Cole will be successfully attacked in the port of Aden, Yemen, by a small boat of terrorists on October 12, 2000 (see October 12, 2000) . [Washington Times, 8/26/02] One day after the Cole attack, Fallis will resign in protest. According to Sen. John Warner ®,“What [Fallis] felt is that his assessment was not given that proper level of consideration by his superiors and, as such, was not incorporated in the final intelligence reports provided to military commanders in the [Middle East region].” [CNN, 10/25/00]
People and organizations involved: Kie Fallis, al-Qaeda, Iran, John W. Warner, Osama bin Laden, Able Danger
Mid-September 2000: Bin Laden Message Gives Hint of Upcoming USS Cole Attack
A videotape message featuring bin Laden calling for more attacks on the US is aired on al-Jazeera. The video ends with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri saying, “Enough of words, it is time to take action against this iniquitous and faithless force [the United States], which has spread troops through Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.” DIA analyst Kie Fallis later recalls, “Every time he put out one of these videotapes, it was a signal that action was coming.” He claims that after hearing of the video, he “knew then it would be within a month or two.” But nonetheless, his suggestion to put out a general attack warning will go unheeded (see May 2000-Late September 2000). An al-Qaeda attack on the USS Cole follows less than a month later (see October 12, 2000). [Washington Times, 8/26/02]
People and organizations involved: United States, Kie Fallis, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri
(Before September 2000-12 Months Later): Mohamed Atta Has Long Term Stay in Wayne, New Jersey; Other Hijackers Seen There
In 2003, New Jersey state police officials say Mohamed Atta lived in the Wayne Inn, in Wayne, New Jersey, for an unspecified 12-month period prior to 9/11. He lives with one other hijacker who is presumably his usual partner Marwan Alshehhi (Alshehhi is seen eating in nearby restaurants with Atta). [Bergen Record, 6/20/03] In 2004, an unnamed whistleblower involved in the Able Danger program will claim that prior to 9/11, Able Danger discovered that Atta and Alshehhi were renting a room at the Wayne Inn, and occasionally meeting with Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar at the inn or near it (see (Before September 2000)). From March 2001 onwards, other hijackers, including Alhazmi and Almihdhar, live in Paterson, New Jersey, only one mile away from Wayne (see March 2001-September 1, 2001). Nawaf Alhazmi and Salem Alhazmi rent mailboxes in Wayne at some unknown point before 9/11. Nawaf Alhazmi and Hani Hanjour rent cars from a Wayne car dealership between June and August 2001. There is also evidence Nawaf Alhazmi and Marwan Alshehhi shop in Wayne. [CNN, 9/27/01] The 9/11 Commission does not mention any hijacker connection to Wayne. This long-term stay in Wayne is surprising because Atta and Alshehhi have generally been placed in Florida most of the time from July 2000 until shortly before 9/11. However, this discrepancy may be explained by one account which states Atta had “two places he lived and 10 safe houses” in the US (see Mid-September 2001).
People and organizations involved: Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi
(Before September 2000): Army Intelligence Unit Said to Discover Hijackers Renting Rooms at New Jersey Motels
According to an anonymous Able Danger official speaking to the Bergen Record, a US Army intelligence unit tasked with assembling information about al-Qaeda networks worldwide discovers that several of the 9/11 hijackers are taking rooms at motels in New Jersey and meeting together there. The intelligence unit, called Able Danger, which uses high-speed computers to analyze vast amounts of data, notices that Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi take a room at the Wayne Inn (see (Before September 2000-12 Months Later)). After the existence of the Able Danger unit comes to light in 2005, Bergen Record columnist and reporter Mike Kelly says, “The connect-the-dots tracking by the team was so good that it even knew Atta conducted meetings with the three future hijackers. One of those meetings took place at the Wayne Inn. That's how close all this was—to us and to being solved, if only the information had been passed up the line to FBI agents or even to local cops. This new piece of 9/11 history, revealed only last week by a Pennsylvania congressman and confirmed by two former members of the intelligence team, could turn out to be one of the most explosive revelations since the publication last summer of the 9/11 commission report.” [Bergen Record, 8/14/05] The other two hijackers said to be present at the meetings, Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, periodically live in the town of Paterson, only one mile away from Wayne (see March 2001-September 1, 2001). However, contradicting this account, a lawyer representing members of Able Danger later testifies, “At no time did Able Danger identify Mohamed Atta as being physically present in the United States.” [CNN, 9/21/05; Mark Zaid Statement, 9/21/05] Some media accounts have stated that the Able Danger program determined Atta was in the US before 9/11. For instance, Fox News reported in August 2005, “[Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer] is standing by his claim that he told them that the lead hijacker in the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks had been identified in the summer of 2000 as an al-Qaeda operative living in the United States.” [Fox News, 8/17/05]
People and organizations involved: Able Danger, Khalid Almihdhar, Anthony Shaffer, Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Nawaf Alhazmi, al-Qaeda
September 2000: Chart With Mohamed Atta's Photo Presented by Able Danger at SOCOM Headquarters; Meetings With FBI Cancelled
Members of a US Army intelligence unit tasked with assembling information about al-Qaeda have prepared a chart that includes the names and photographs of four future hijackers, who they have identified as members of an al-Qaeda cell based in Brooklyn, New York. The four hijackers in the cell are Mohamed Atta, Marwan Alshehhi, Khalid Almihdhar, and Nawaf Alhazmi. The members of the intelligence unit, called Able Danger, present their chart at the headquarters of the US military's Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in Tampa, Florida, with the recommendation that the FBI should be called in to take out the al-Qaeda cell. Lawyers working for SOCOM argue that anyone with a green card has to be granted the same legal protections as any US citizen, so the information about the al-Qaeda cell cannot be shared with the FBI. The legal team directs them to put yellow stickers over the photographs of Mohamed Atta and the other cell members, to symbolize that they are off limits. [Norristown Times Herald, 6/19/05; Government Security News, 8/05; New York Times, 8/9/05; St Petersburg Times, 8/10/05; New York Times, 8/17/05; Government Security News, 9/05] Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer later says that an unnamed two-star general above him is “very adamant” about not looking further at Atta. “I was directed several times [to ignore Atta], to the point where he had to remind me he was a general and I was not ... [and] I would essentially be fired.” [Fox News, 8/19/05] Military leaders at the meeting take the side of the lawyers and prohibit any sharing of information about the al-Qaeda cell. Shaffer believes that t