Below is a post of mine from almost two years ago. It's no longer up to date regarding the facts of the situation --things have gotten worse since then, and the rise of Shiite Islamic Fundamentalism has become much more obvious-- nevertheless, it shows the consistency in Friedman's thinking on Iraq. (Also: links may be out of date, I have not checked them).
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A Full Cup Of Wine For Tom The Optimist
By Thomas Friedman - 9/21/2003 Excerpts
http://www.getinspiredclub.com/Thomas%20Friedman.htmQUOTE
THOMAS FRIEDMAN: The big thing that has happened in Iraq, which you can really feel when you're there, is that there is a 100 percent correlation of interests between America's aspirations for Iraq and the aspirations of Iraq's silent majority. We both want the same thing for Iraq — that it not become Iran, that it not become Saddam, but that it become a decent, modern-looking Iraqi alternative. . -------------------------
The war has to be finished, but we can't be the ones to finish it. This is a purely urban fight, and if we try to finish it alone what will happen is more of what's happened in the past two weeks — fatal blunders. We just accidentally killed 10 Iraqi policemen in one town and gunned down a 14-year-old Iraqi boy in another who was part of a wedding party firing guns in celebration. Non-Arabic-speaking Americans cannot fight an urban war in Iraq. Forget it. We must get off this course immediately. If we have many more such "friendly fire" incidents, even the Iraqi silent majority will turn hostile. That is what the Saddamists want. Which is why I will stop worrying about this only when I see the new Iraqi government has formed its own robust internal security force (now being discussed), with its own intelligence assets, to fight the Saddamists by the local rules. That is the only way to root them out, and only Iraqis can fight this war.
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If Americans have to keep killing Iraqis, we're dead. The other thing that will make me stop being a worried optimist, is when I not only see Iraqis fighting for the aspirations we have in common, but when I hear them speaking out to defend those aspirations in public — in Arabic. Whenever senior U.S. officials tell me about Iraqis who thanked them, with tears in their eyes, for getting rid of Saddam, I have a simple response: Could you please ask those Iraqis to say it in public, in Arabic, on Al Jazeera TV? There's been way too little of that. In part, this is because many Iraqis are still afraid that we're going to leave and Saddam will come back and punish all who worked with us.
In part, this is because America is so radioactive in the Arab-Muslim world that even an America that has come to Iraq with the sole intention of liberating its people cannot be openly embraced.
The above is a classic example of Friedman's mix of seemingly clear-headed "realism" combined with the most unrealistic factual basis and confused logic.
He clearly sees that the US is floundering in an urban war with the Iraqi insurgents. That *realism* contrasts sharply with the Bush Administration's relentless false optimism which borders on a complete denial of reality at times.
However, the rest of his argument is a compilation of falsehoods, dangerous oversimplifications and borderline racist immorality.
1) It is utterly untrue to say that the interests and goals of the Bush Administration correspond "100%" with the vast majority of Iraqi's (Friedman's "silent majority").
From the beginning of the occupation, the Bush Administration has pursued a radical neo-conservative agenda REJECTED by the vast majority of Iraqis:The Neo-Conservative Agenda for IraqShow the world the US is serious in its doctrine of unilateral militarism, and set the stage for further US domination of the region.
Impose a pro-US-business, pro-Likudist Israel, pro-"market-fundamentalism" government.
Remove a threat to Sharon's expansionist Eretz Israel, allowing him to consolidate his annexation of land in the West Bank and rejection of the Oslo Accords and any two state solution for the Palestinian conflict.
Privatize Iraqi oil and open it up for foriegn exploitation--- and in general, gain greater control of Middle East oil resources so as to have strategic leverage against growing military rivals, especially China.
Impose radical right-wing [neo-liberal "shock therapy"] "market fundamentalist" doctrines.
Impose disastrous profit-oriented privatization program.
Administer a corrupt Halliburton-style reconstruction process
Reject any program to get Iraqis back to work, get money in THEIR hands (since
that might involve a Roosevelt public works type approach---anathema to these privatiaztion fundamentalists!)
Resist UN participation
Resist, delay, Free elections; consider martial law instead [until acceptable results can be assured]
Resist Iraqi self-determination
Use Israeli-style aggressive military tactics (closely consult with Israeli military advisors)
Build military bases throughout the country---and a huge
3,000 man embassy to house the US shadow government. Many of these policies have been abject failures resulting in turning a large portion of the Iraqi population ---originally happy to see Saddam gone---against the U.S. role in the country.
It is simply false, as Friedman asserts-- echoing the Bush Administration propaganda-- that the Bush Administration agenda in Iraq was "solely the liberation of the Iraqi people" .Friedman, of course, is hardly in a position to repudiate radical market-fundamentalist destruction of the Iraqi state, since those are policies he has promoted around the world.
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The disaster in Iraq and constructive criticism
Gabriel Ash, 23 April 2004
"The overarching goal of the U.S. in Iraq was not to establish a pluralistic, independent and stable state. These were perhaps considered good things in Washington, and especially useful for domestic consumption but they were secondary to the more important goal of keeping Iraq subservient to the U.S. The White House's vision of Iraq was of a weak state, one that would follow U.S. orders on foreign policy, help the U.S. militarily, and leave oil under control of U.S. companies.The
Pentagon wanted permanent bases in Iraq to replace the bases evacuated in Saudi Arabia. The U.S. occupation position is that no Iraqi government would have the right to request the withdrawal of the army. Nevertheless, the occupation didn't want the issue of U.S. control to be debated at all. To achieve that, the neo-cons had to bolster the power of legitimacy-challenged Pentagon favorites such as Ahmad Chalabi.
That necessitated marginalizing and weakening groups that might refuse to accept his leadership, especially legitimate Shi'a leaders such as Sistani. Hence, the unbelievable display of hypocrisy of the U.S. occupation resisting calls for elections and reacting with hostility to democratic processes.
In helping to consolidate Chalabi's position, the U.S. occupation was also busy promoting corrupt privatization schemes. According to
Bremer's edicts, the
privatization of Iraq is not subject to revision by a future legitimate Iraqi government. This
permanent change to the ownership of national assets is a serious breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The result of this
corruption is that very little of the reconstruction money approved by Congress ended up in Iraqi pockets. Most of it went back to
ENRICH FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. The failure of economic improvement and the stubborn above 50% unemployment rate is a leading cause of the general disenchantment with the occupation.
Part of the problem is that Iraq is ruled today by
fanatic MARKET FUNDAMENTALISTS who believe in counterfactual, "trickle down," economic theories. A little Keynesian-paying people to drill holes and others to fill them would have improved things a lot more than billions in reconstruction extravaganza. But public work is anathema to the neo-con religion.
PRIVATIZATION, of course, was supposed to be a boon to many U.S. corporations, including good friends of the President and Vice-President such as Halliburton. But that, too, was only a fringe benefit. There is strategic logic behind U.S. desire to put the new Iraqi economy beyond democratic control.
The goal is a weak state, which can be remote controlled by U.S.-led institutions such as the IMF and through the strings attached to U.S. aid. Privatization also creates a system of corrupt patronage centered on U.S. stooges .
This is the policy that Clinton used with such brutal success in Russia, a policy that is only now beginning to unravel with Putin's assault on the "oligarchs."
The primary reason for the current level of resistance is that the U.S. project of "exporting democracy" was conceived and administered in bad faith.
The mess in Iraq may be a matter of excess optimism. But it wasn't optimism about Iraqi readiness for democracy. The neo-cons were perhaps too optimistic in believing they could pull the wool over the eyes of Iraqis the way they did it at home. Unfortunately for them, the docility and media-induced stupor of the American electorate is rather unique. Exporting that stupor to the Middle East was perhaps the biggest neo-con pipe dream.
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Cf.
http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0423-01.htmWhat Went Wrong?by Paul Krugman
http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cf...=15&ItemID=4568The War on Iraq's Workers===================================
2) Friedman then asserts that Iraqi's do not want to return to Saddam nor create a theocratic state along the lines of Iran.
Then he goes on to completely ignore all the complexity of the situation, the conflicting aspirations of Sunni, Shia, and Kurds, and blames the entire insurgency on "Saddamists". He doesn't even mention al Sadr or al Sistani! Not even a word on the SHIA resistance to the US led neo-conservative driven occupation.
This is a completely oversimplified, and basically FALSE, understanding of the situation.As a
starting point for understanding the true complexity of the insurgency, I suggest the following articles:
http://www.occupationwatch.org/article.php?id=7164#FNR4Iraq’s Chaos by Ahmed S. Hashim, Boston Review
October 1st, 2004
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/17406Iraq: The Bungled TransitionBy Peter W. Galbraith
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/18B...C717E6BEAD0.htmShia demands may lead to Iraq break-upBy Ahmed Janabi
http://www.idao.org/shiristani.htmlDemocracy Delayed Is Democracy DeniedBY HUSSAIN AL-SHAHRISTANI
http://www.idao.org/crippled-democracy.htmlCrippled DemocracySabah Jawad
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3) Having identified the problem as simply one of Saddamists who must be crushed, but cannot be by the US military because of the nature of urban warfare,
what does he suggest? Brutal repressionQUOTE
: "A new Iraqi government [with] its own robust internal security force (now being discussed), with its own intelligence assets, to fight the Saddamists by the local rules. "
Read that closely.
He's calling for Saddam Hussein-style murderous suppression of the insurgents (falsely identified as only "Saddamists"). "Robust internal security" is a code word for secret police, death squads (Negroponte-style), torture, dissappearances and so on.
Several points on this suggestion:
1) It won't work. Brutal repression will not solve the root problems leading to the insurgency.
2) Creating a repressive Iraqi police apparatus to crush "Saddamists" does not address the problems of the Shia insurgency or the whole complex questions of Kurdish autonomy and so on. [nor the problem of resurgent Shia Islamic Fundamentalism]
3) A reborn Hussein-style repressive police state would hardly dissappear after crushing the "Saddamists", assuming that was possible, and would hardly provide the foundation for a "decent, modern-looking" Iraqi state.
4) The suggestion that Arabs must be treated "by the local rules" --
meaning their human rights must be violated, norms of civilized goverment ignored and so on-- verges on a racist view of Arabs/Muslims. Would Friedman suggest such a approach be used on Israeli occupiers?