http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=8761

March 25, 2006
More Failed Diplomacy

by Gordon Prather
Back in November, 2004, the United Kingdom, France and Germany (E3) undertook to negotiate with Iran on behalf of the European Union a mutually acceptable long-term agreement which would provide the EU "objective guarantees" that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Now, why would Iran agree to provide additional guarantees, above and beyond those required by the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons?

Well, Iran was to receive, in return, equally "firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation" with the EU as well as firm commitments on certain "security issues."

Since the Islamic revolution swept the CIA-installed Shah of Iran from power, Iran's nuclear programs and its "inalienable right" – guaranteed by the NPT – to nuclear technology had been the subject to an extensive US-led campaign of obstruction and intervention.

Valid and binding contracts to build nuclear power plants were unilaterally abrogated;
Nuclear materials rightfully purchased and owned by Iran were illegally withheld;
exercise of Iran's shareholder's right in several national and multinational nuclear power corporations were obstructed;

Hence, for more than 20 years, Iran's rights under the NPT had been grossly and systematically violated, while major state parties to the Treaty failed to meet many of their NPT obligations to Iran.

The November agreement [.pdf] declared right up front that:

"The E3/EU recognize Iran's rights under the NPT, exercised in conformity with its obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination."

Without discrimination!

Iran offered to voluntarily suspend for the duration of the negotiations certain Safeguarded activities, to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. In return:

"The E3/EU recognize that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation."

Now, Bush, Cheney, Bolton and Condi never miss an opportunity to note that the "military option" is "on the table," so the E3/EU cannot of itself provide Iran "firm commitments on security issues."

Nevertheless, other Bush-Cheney weenies argued that we must at least appear to form a united front with Europe – just as we appeared to form a united front with Europe in the months leading up to our invasion of Iraq – so as to prepare the diplomatic ground for military action in the event that "diplomacy fails."

But then, a year ago, Iran made an offer [.pdf], suggested by an advisory panel of European and US scientists and experts, voluntarily restricting certain of its alienable rights. The offer included:

Foregoing reprocessing of spent fuel and recovery of plutonium;
A low ceiling on the level of enrichment;
A limitation on the capacity of the enrichment program to that needed to meet the contingency fuel requirements of Iran's power reactors;
Immediate conversion of all enriched Uranium to fuel rods to preclude even the technical possibility of further enrichment;
Furthermore, Iran offered to allow continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at uranium conversion and enrichment facilities to provide unprecedented transparency, above and beyond even that required under the Additional Protocol.

Now this was an incredible offer by Iran. The nuclear power plant at Bushehr was nearing completion by the Russians, and as many as six more were expected to be built in Iran by someone. But it would be at least ten years before Iran would need to have its "contingency" uranium-enrichment plant fully operational. Furthermore, Russian experts who had visited existing Uranium enrichment-related activities in Iran estimated it would take the Iranians at least that long to actually build such a facility and get it operating.

All subject to continuous IAEA monitoring, of course.

Hallelujah! Dancing in the streets! Right?

Wrong.

Not only would Bush not let the EU accept the offer – which had been made in private – he wouldn’t even let them acknowledge receipt of it.

So the Iranians waited four months and when no response to their offer had been received, notified the IAEA that the Paris Agreement negotiations – and the suspensions of activities associated with them – were off.

Well, that got a an immediate response from the E3/EU.

Reinstate the suspensions – or else.

Or else what?

Well, it’s six months later and we’re about to find out.

Condi and the E3/EU have managed to get the IAEA Board to demand that Iran reinstate the suspensions. They’ve even reported their demands to the UN Security Council.

Quoth Condi:

"They [the Iranians] need to suspend the activities in which they're engaged and return to negotiations.

"People are looking to the international community to show that this can, indeed, be dealt with diplomatically."

Whatever.

DEBKAfile Exclusive: Tehran is cashing in on Hamas election victory and the US predicament in Iraq as prime strategic benefits

March 25, 2006, 10:44 AM (GMT+02:00)

A high-ranking Iranian intelligence officer expressed this view when he met an intelligence chief in a West European capital last Tuesday, March 21, DEBKAfile’s intelligence and Iranian sources reveal. As Iran involves itself increasingly in Iraq, he said, American and Israeli military options for striking its nuclear installations correspondingly shrink.

Tehran is also investing in constructing a military-intelligence network in Afghanistan on the Iraq model, the same Iranian officer disclosed. It will penetrate and work through local Afghan anti-American groups and seek to isolate the Karzai regime in preparation for its eventual downfall.

Copyright 2000-2006 DEBKAfile. All Rights Reserved.

DEBKAfile Reveals: Tehran recruits Iraq’s radical Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr and Syria for a regional project of subversion

March 25, 2006, 11:31 AM (GMT+02:00)

They have started planting a pro-Tehran clandestine front spanning a region stretching from East Afghanistan through Iraq to the Palestinian areas. Such developments are scarcely mentioned in the Israeli media, most of which are wholly absorbed in bolstering the ruling party Kadima’s campaign for election on March 28, to the exclusion of negative security events.

On a recent visit to Damascus, DEBKAfile’s Middle East sources disclose, the Iraqi Shiite cleric convened the heads of 10 Palestinian terrorist groups based in Syria to discuss the project. He then met each separately to hand out their assignments and tell them how to communicate with their Iraqi guerrilla contacts. The Shiite radical informed the Palestinian terrorist leaders that Iran and Syria are working together to form a united front of Islamic groups combining Shiite and Sunni extremist sects to wage war in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.

Copyright 2000-2006 DEBKAfile. All Rights Reserved.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...-home-headlines

Iran's Nuclear Steps Quicken, Diplomats Say
Tehran reportedly is gearing up for uranium enrichment. A split in the Security Council may impede efforts to halt the program.
By Alissa J. Rubin and Maggie Farley, Times Staff Writers
March 25, 2006


VIENNA — With efforts to halt its nuclear program at an impasse, Iran is moving faster than expected and is just days from making the first steps toward enriching uranium, said diplomats who have been briefed on the program.

If engineers encounter no major technical problems, Iran could manufacture enough highly enriched uranium to build a bomb within three years, much more quickly than the common estimate of five to 10 years, the diplomats said.


Iran insists that it is interested only in producing electricity, which requires low-grade enrichment of uranium.

New information about Iran's program came from diplomats representing countries on the United Nations Security Council. They were briefed by senior staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which maintains monitors in Iran. The diplomats spoke on condition of anonymity because the briefing was private.

Even as Iran apparently moves forward, diplomatic efforts to persuade it to halt its nuclear work appeared to be faltering in the face of distrust among powerful Security Council members and disagreements over the best strategy.

"We're getting conflicting signals from the United States; it now appears they want to escalate the situation," said a senior diplomat in Vienna. "The Russians see that as a slippery slope."

Officials said Iran was on the verge of feeding uranium gas into centrifuges, the first step toward enrichment. That move is in keeping with Iran's experience level and its previous statements, experts said.

According to one non-Western official who closely follows Iran's progress, engineers at a pilot plant in Natanz are likely to start crucial testing in the next couple of days to ensure that the centrifuges and the pipes connecting them are properly vacuum sealed. They are likely to begin feeding uranium hexafluoride gas into a series of 164 connected centrifuges within about two weeks, the official said.

Diplomats and experts say Iran has forgone usual testing periods for individual centrifuges and small series of linked centrifuges, instead apparently trying to put together as many as possible, as quickly as possible.

They said Iran also was likely to begin assembling more centrifuges in mid-April to put together additional cascades of linked centrifuges. The pilot plant can hold up to six cascades of 164 centrifuges each. It could take many months to complete that work, the diplomats said.

The U.S. and its British, French and German allies believe Iran intends to build nuclear weapons, and must be stopped before learning how to enrich uranium. They view the ability to operate a series of centrifuges as a technological tipping point.

"If you can do one centrifuge, you can do 164," said Emyr Jones Parry, British envoy to the U.N. "If you can do 164, you probably can do many more. That means you have the potential to do full-scale enrichment. If you can do enrichment up to 7%, you can do 80%. If you can do 80%, you can produce a bomb."

Policymakers watching Iran's program are making two separate assessments: a technical one based on Iran's ability to enrich uranium and a political judgment on whether Iran is attempting to make a bomb or merely trying to enrich uranium to a low level for civilian purposes, as Iranian officials insist.

The three-year time frame for Iran to produce a bomb cited by diplomats is the same as an estimate by former nuclear weapons inspector David Albright.

In a paper that will be released Monday by the Institute for Science and International Security, which Albright founded, he and a colleague give a detailed description of how, under a best-case scenario, Iran would be able to manufacture enough highly enriched uranium for a crude nuclear device in three years. Albright cautioned, however, that Iran faces many technical hurdles it might find difficult to overcome.

Gary S. Samore, a former nonproliferation expert at the National Security Council, now at the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, also said it was far more likely that the Iranians would encounter problems and that it could take them four to five years.

If Iran decides to make highly enriched uranium, it would need either to do so clandestinely, or leave the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which prohibits signatories from producing highly enriched uranium.

The IAEA board of governors reported Iran to the Security Council for failing to respond to requests from inspectors for information about its program, which it kept hidden for 18 years.

All the members of the Security Council agree that Iran should not be permitted to produce a bomb. Under an agreement with Russia and China, the council only began to discuss Tehran's case in mid-March. The next steps are hotly disputed.

The European Union and the Americans want to exert vigorous pressure on Iran. They insist on a reinstatement of a total moratorium on uranium enrichment that Iran had voluntarily put in place in late 2004 while negotiating with the EU. The U.S. and EU are willing to use a U.N. procedure that gives Security Council resolutions the force of law, and to impose sanctions.

IRAN'S NUCLEAR STEPS QUICKEN, DIPLOMATS SAY: TEHRAN REPORTEDLY IS GEARING UP FOR URANIUM ENRICHMENT. A SPLIT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY IMPEDE EFFORTS TO HALT THE PROGRAM - ALISSA J. RUBIN AND MAGGIE FARLEY (LOS ANGELES TIMES, MARCH 25)
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/l...1,1197096.story

MISSION IMPROBABLE: EVEN THE NEOCONS, WHO LONG FOR WAR WITH IRAN, CONCEDE IT ISN?T FEASIBLE - SCOTT MCCONNELL (AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE)
http://www.amconmag.com/2006/2006_03_27/feature.html

TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR REGIME CHANGE - ALEX ALEXIEV (FOCUS NEWS, MARCH 25): What needs to be done immediately is for the United States to formulate and begin executing a comprehensive strategy that aims to prevent or delay as long as possible the acquisition of a nuclear capability by Iran as the first step and effect regime change in Tehran as the ultimate objective.
http://www.focus-fen.net/index.php?focus=a...aid=7846&acat=5

IRAN: NUKE TREATY MESS REACHES CRITICAL MASS - KAVEH L AFRASIABI (ASIA TIMES, MARCH 25): The Iran nuclear crisis carries both positive and negative potential with respect to the non-proliferation regime, and its eventual outcome is not pre-fixed; rather, it depends on the will and acumen of leaders and decision-makers who are involved in this crisis threatening the world peace.
http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HC25Ak02.html

ISRAEL, AL QAEDA AND IRAN - MARJORIE COHN (TRUTHOUT, MARCH 23): Since George W. Bush gave his "axis of evil" speech, he invaded Iraq, changed its regime, and created a quagmire reminiscent of Vietnam. His administration is now sending clear signals that Iran is next in line for regime change. The raison d'être: Iran's nuclear program, an al Qaeda connection, and protecting Israel.
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/032306Z.shtml

- Khamenei Urges Iran To Resist Threats On Nuclear
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Khamenei_U...On_Nuclear.html

Tehran (AFP) Mar 27, 2006 - Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, urged Iranians to resist "the enemy's threats" amid international warnings for Iran to halt atomic activities. "Some of these threats may also be put in practice. A nation will be able to preserve its honor and glory in this case if it resists without retreat," Khamenei told the Basij, Iran's Islamic militia force.

In the following article from the current issue of the National Interest, General Brent Scowcroft outlines a policy toward Iran that he sees as more promising than the present approach. It involves a united front between the Permanent 5 at the United Nations but also a recognition of Iran's interests on this matter.


Issue Date: Spring 2006, Posted On: 3/17/2006

A Modest Proposal
by Brent Scowcroft


ARE WE pursuing the right strategy to ensure that Iran (or, for that matter, any other aspirant nuclear power) does not cross the threshold to join the ranks of nuclear weapons states?
To deter Tehran, it is essential that there be a united front between the United States, the European Union, Russia and China to prevent Iran from exploiting any differences or finding any sort of wiggle room that would allow it to continue with its program.
The issue, of course, is that under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran--as well as any other signatory of the NPT--is entitled to a fuel cycle as part of its right to peacefully utilize nuclear energy for civilian use. The problem is that the process and equipment for enriching uranium and reprocessing spent fuel for peaceful purposes is identical to that for producing weapons-grade material.
What we need to do, therefore, is find a mechanism that will allow all NPT countries to enjoy all of the benefits of a civilian nuclear energy program while preventing the production of weapons-grade nuclear material under close supervision.
The permanent five members of the Security Council should be prepared to make the following offer to Iran. Acknowledging that Tehran has every right to exploit nuclear energy for civilian use, Iran should be guaranteed an adequate supply of nuclear fuel for its reactors (under a use-and-return system such as that proposed by Russia) in return for abiding by all IAEA regulations. This, in turn, should serve as the basis for a new international fuel-cycle regime that applies to all countries. Any approach to stemming nuclear proliferation that singles out specific countries--such as the Bush Administration is doing with Iran--is not likely to succeed.
The first step should be an immediate freeze on all new capacity for the enrichment and reprocessing of uranium anywhere in the world. I am concerned about a trend that we see reflected in the U.S.-India nuclear deal where we try to address proliferation risks by assessing the character of regimes and governments. Such an approach also opens up divisions among the world's nuclear powers, with each making a list of "friends" who can be trusted with nuclear technology and "foes" who are dangerous risks. Iran is certainly trying to capitalize on perceived disagreements between the United States, Europe, Russia and the China. Focusing on a process eliminates such loopholes--this freeze would apply equally to Iran, Brazil, South Korea, Argentina or any other state that is contemplating developing an enrichment and reprocessing capability, regardless of whether they are democracies, dictatorships or something in between.
Once the ban is in place, the next step would be to work out the mechanism, under the guidance and supervision of the IAEA, as to how enriched fuel would be delivered, utilized and returned to supervised facilities. The Bush Administration's proposal for a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (where member states of the nuclear supply group would provide enriched uranium to customers around the world) is a step in the right direction, but in its present form it lacks guarantees that all countries would have access to adequate supplies of nuclear fuel. This arrangement would still give individual suppliers the ability to arbitrarily cut off or suspend deliveries. What is needed is an international guarantor so that countries that currently lack their own indigenous fuel-enrichment cycle would always have access to nuclear fuel. Indeed, it may be in the interests of the leading nuclear states (perhaps under the auspices of the G-8) to subsidize such a program, so that no country would have an economic rationale to defy the ban and proceed with developing an indigenous fuel cycle, on the grounds that relying on the international system might prove too costly.
Could this proposal serve as the basis of a workable settlement with Iran? It could certainly take the wind out of the sails of the Ahmadinejad approach, which has relied on using the nuclear issue--and the perception that Iran is being denied its legitimate rights--to stir up Iranian nationalism in order to distract the population from the pressing domestic problems of the regime. Having the international community--and the United States in particular--take at face value Iran's claims that it needs a civilian nuclear energy program in order to reduce reliance on diminishing hydrocarbon reserves and cut down on a growing pollution problem caused by fossil fuels--places more pressure on the Iranian government to demonstrate its good intentions. A U.S.-led international front that starts out by recognizing that Iran has legitimate rights and concerns could go far in depriving the current regime of its ability to utilize Iranian nationalism in this crisis. And should the Iranian government reject an international proposal that implicitly recognizes and safeguards its rights to a nuclear energy program under the NPT, it would become easier to convince other leading states of the need for sanctioning the regime.
Iran's strategy remains predicated on the assumption that no "united front" is possible, that even if the United States, the European Union, Russia and China all agree that a nuclear-capable Iran is undesirable, disagreement over tactics will preclude any effective action. The Bush Administration needs to be prepared to find common ground with the other permanent members of the Security Council. This includes being prepared to talk to the Iranians and to put the question of security guarantees on the table. Indeed, something that might develop as a result of this process would be a move toward giving all non-nuclear states firm security guarantees about safeguarding their independence and territorial integrity as a way to further provide incentives for current non-nuclear states not to pursue a nuclear program.
I have found the Europeans and Russians that I have discussed these ideas with to be supportive of moving toward creating such an international regime to control the fuel cycle. But we also need to recognize that, in the case of Iran, we need to be prepared to strike deals with the other major powers to take their interests into account. In particular, China is caught between its stated desire not to see Iran become a nuclear weapons state and its growing energy dependence on Iran. The United States and other countries should be prepared to guarantee to China that if, as a result of pressure placed on Iran to give up its nuclear weapons program, oil and gas supplies to China are affected, all efforts will be undertaken to minimize the disruption to the Chinese economy, and at a minimum that China would suffer no more than anyone else. We should be prepared to offer similar considerations to other countries (such as Russia or European countries) who might have to put significant economic interests at risk in order to apply pressure against Iran. We should never take the stance that "virtue is its own reward" when dealing with a serious issue like nuclear non-proliferation.
Nuclear weapons technology is no longer a closely guarded secret in the possession of a handful of countries. And an approach that relies on determining the character of regimes to assess worthiness to use nuclear energy is full of loopholes. Only by creating a new international regime--and applying it without exception across the board--can we hope to guarantee that all countries can enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy without risking the spread of the world's deadliest weapons.
Brent Scowcroft is president and founder of the Scowcroft Group. He served as national security advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush.

http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/001308.php

March 26, 2006
Solving Hard Problems: Albright's "Iran Action Plan"

A while back, I sat in on a roundtable discussion with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Senator Sam Brownback to discuss a report they co-produced, "Uncommon Leadership for Common Values: Bipartisan Action on Human Rights".

At the luncheon, I asked Senator Brownback and Secretary Albright about the gap between the ideals and objectives of enhancing global human rights and the reality that there are a lot of despicable thugs in the world and that America didn't have unlimited resources. Albright's response -- which I have heard her say now several times -- was that she saw herself as a "realistic idealist" or perhaps as an "idealistic realist." I see myself as an "ethical realist".

For a while, there was a growing trend in Democratic circles to develop a neo-conservative style, muscular Wilsonianism on the left. Some of these foreign policy practitioners and Democratic party apparatchiks embraced the notion of "American empire" and saw it as a force for shaping good. Thus, the difference between them and the likes of Feith, Wolfowitz, Libby and Perle was one more of nuance and shading.

Realism has been dying in both parties since 9/11 -- but it seems to be making a comeback, though realists -- whether ethical realists, idealistic realists or neo-realists -- are still in feeble shape and not the dominant players yet in foreign policy.

But I offer the interesting action plan of Madeleine Albright that appeared in the Financial Times on 24 March as evidence of a serious pragmatism that is coming back to foreign policy.

Her advice to the G.W. Bush administration on Iran is eminently sensible. I particularly found insightful and on the mark this line:

As for Iran's choleric and anti-Semitic new president, he will be swallowed up by internal rivals if he is not unwittingly propped up by external foes.
But here is the entire Madeleine Albright "Iran Action Plan":

While this is not an administration known for taking advice, I offer three suggestions: the first is to understand that although we all want to "end tyranny in this world", that is a fantasy unless we begin to solve hard problems. Iraq is increasingly a gang war that can be solved in one of two ways: by one side imposing its will or by all the legitimate players having a piece of the power. The US is no longer able to control events in Iraq, but it can still play a useful role as referee.
Second, the US administration should disavow any plan for regime change in Iran; not because the regime should not be changed but because US endorsement of that goal only makes it less likely. In today's warped political environment, nothing strengthens a radical government more than Washington's overt antagonism. It is also common sense to presume that Iran will be less willing to co-operate in Iraq and to compromise on nuclear issues if it is being threatened with destruction. As for Iran's choleric and anti-Semitic new president, he will be swallowed up by internal rivals if he is not unwittingly propped up by external foes.

Third, the US administration must stop playing solitaire while Middle East and Persian Gulf leaders play poker. The president's "march of freedom" is not the big story in the Muslim world, where Shia Muslims suddenly have more power than they have had in 1,000 years; it is not the big story in Lebanon, where Iran is filling the vacuum left by Syria; it is not the story among Palestinians, who voted - in western eyes - freely, and wrongly; it is not even the big story in Iraq, where the top three factions in the recent elections were all supported by decidedly undemocratic militias.

In the long term, the future of the Middle East may well be determined by those in the region dedicated to the hard work of building democracy. I certainly hope so. But hope is not a policy. In the short term, we must recognise that the region will be shaped primarily by fairly ruthless power politics in which the clash between good and evil will be swamped by differences between Sunni and Shia, Arab and Persian, Arab and Kurd, Kurd and Turk, Hashemite and Saudi, secular and religious and, of course, Arab and Jew. This is the world, the president pledges in his national security strategy, that "America must continue to lead". Actually it is the world he must begin to address -- before it is too late.


Just to be clear, what Secretary Albright has put forward is similar to what most sensible realists would suggest -- and there are far, far more realists who are Republican than Democrat.

-- Steve Clemons

UPDATE: The Financial Times piece linked above is complicated to get because of registration requirements, but a similar article by Albright also appeared in the Los Angeles Times.

http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/110605X.shtml

Bleeding Hearts of the World, Unite!
By Nicholas D. Kristof
The New York Times

Sunday 06 November 2005

In a country dispirited by political mud wrestling, there was a spark of hope the other day: a conference in which liberals discussed international issues with conservative Christians - and agreed!

The conference, sponsored by Madeleine Albright on the left and Senator Sam Brownback on the right, underscored that we now have a tantalizing opportunity. If only left and right can hold their noses and work together, we can confront some of the scourges of our time - sex trafficking, genocide, religious oppression, prison brutality - on which there is surprising agreement about what needs to be done.

Democrats have mostly watched the arrival of evangelicals on the foreign policy scene the way the Romans regarded the approach of the Visigoths and Vandals, but that's a mistake. The growing engagement of conservative Christians on international issues is welcome because for the first time it has turned the American heartland into a constituency for foreign aid and humanitarian action.

A decade ago, the heartland was a force for isolation. That's why Tom DeLay said foreign aid meant "putting Ghana over Grandma," and Jesse Helms referred to aid as "money down a rat hole."

Now, in contrast, conservatives are leading the charge on some of these issues. Regular readers know that I'm no fan of this administration, but there's no arguing with facts. President Bush has almost tripled actual spending on overseas development assistance to $19 billion last year, compared with its trough under President Clinton of less than $7 billion in 1997, according to O.E.C.D. figures. (Mr. Bush hasn't given nearly as much as he's promised, but his broken promises still amount to far more than Mr. Clinton ever gave.)

Pushed by conservative Christians, Mr. Bush is also doing more to fight both AIDS and sex trafficking than any of his predecessors did. Foreign governments are learning that the U.S. now takes the slavery of 13-year-old girls almost as seriously as the pirating of American movies, and that's a step forward.

So that's the context in which Ms. Albright and Mr. Brownback (who call themselves "the ultimate political odd couple") held their conference, under the auspices of the Aspen Institute. There was a voyeuristic thrill of spying illicit love - as when Mr. Brownback praised Hillary Clinton, who spoke on sex trafficking, for her "outstanding job."

And cooperation can achieve more than just civility. Darfur is a perfect example of left-right cooperation that has saved thousands of lives, because the leaders in Congress against the genocide are Jon Corzine, one of the most liberal members, and Mr. Brownback, one of the most conservative.

Of course, they have their work cut out for them: Congress just sent Darfur a "drop dead" message by cutting funds for African Union peacekeeping troops there. If Congressional leaders let that stand, they should just rename the bill the Genocide Enabling Act.

What next? Ms. Albright and Mr. Brownback agreed on a tentative agenda by coming up with a list of "the Top 5 worst places to wake up in the morning."

Those are Darfur, North Korea, Burma, Congo and northern Uganda. They're all neglected, brutal spots. Congo, for example, is the site of the most lethal conflict since World War II, with four million dead since 1998.

Another area ripe for cooperation would be safe maternity abroad. For all the battles over abortion and condoms, both sides can agree that half a million women shouldn't be dying unnecessarily in childbirth each year around the world, when modest investments can save their lives.

Domestically, the obvious issue is prisons, the nastiest places in America. A bipartisan coalition won a landmark law against prison rape in 2003, with evangelical leaders standing side by side with Ted Kennedy at the signing ceremony. The next step is the Second Chance Act, which aims to reduce recidivism by easing the adjustment from prisons into society. It stands a real chance of getting through this Congress.

Obviously, there are differences. As I see it, conservatives have gravely undermined the effectiveness of their programs against AIDS with their squeamishness about condoms - but there's still no doubt that the U.S. is doing far more about the disease now than it ever did under Mr. Clinton.

Look, I think that Christian leaders on the right like Senator Brownback, Frank Wolf in the House and Chuck Colson are utterly wrong on many issues. I probably wouldn't vote for them for political office. But I admire them immensely for their humanitarian efforts, and I might vote for them for sainthood.

Over the next year, Democrats and Republicans will devote millions of dollars to heap slime on each other. If they devote 1 percent as much energy to cooperating on a few of these issues, they'll make the world a much better place. Bleeding hearts of the world, unite!

-------

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions

Good versus evil isn't a strategy
Bush's worldview fails to see that in the Middle East, power politics is the key.
By Madeleine Albright
March 24, 2006


THE BUSH administration's newly unveiled National Security Strategy might well be subtitled "The Irony of Iran." Three years after the invasion of Iraq and the invention of the phrase "axis of evil," the administration now highlights the threat posed by Iran — whose radical government has been vastly strengthened by the invasion of Iraq. This is more tragedy than strategy, and it reflects the Manichean approach this administration has taken to the world.

It is sometimes convenient, for purposes of rhetorical effect, for national leaders to talk of a globe neatly divided into good and bad. It is quite another, however, to base the policies of the world's most powerful nation upon that fiction. The administration's penchant for painting its perceived adversaries with the same sweeping brush has led to a series of unintended consequences.

ADVERTISEMENT
For years, the president has acted as if Al Qaeda, Saddam Hussein's followers and Iran's mullahs were parts of the same problem. Yet, in the 1980s, Hussein's Iraq and Iran fought a brutal war. In the 1990s, Al Qaeda's allies murdered a group of Iranian diplomats. For years, Osama bin Laden ridiculed Hussein, who persecuted Sunni and Shiite religious leaders alike. When Al Qaeda struck the U.S. on 9/11, Iran condemned the attacks and later participated constructively in talks on Afghanistan. The top leaders in the new Iraq — chosen in elections that George W. Bush called "a magic moment in the history of liberty" — are friends of Iran. When the U.S. invaded Iraq, Bush may have thought he was striking a blow for good over evil, but the forces unleashed were considerably more complex.

The administration is now divided between those who understand this complexity and those who do not. On one side, there are ideologues, such as the vice president, who apparently see Iraq as a useful precedent for Iran. Meanwhile, officials on the front lines in Iraq know they cannot succeed in assembling a workable government in that country without the tacit blessing of Iran; hence, last week's long-overdue announcement of plans for a U.S.-Iranian dialogue on Iraq — a dialogue that if properly executed might also lead to progress on other issues.

Although this is not an administration known for taking advice, I offer three suggestions. The first is to understand that although we all want to "end tyranny in this world," that is a fantasy unless we begin to solve hard problems. Iraq is increasingly a gang war that can be solved in one of two ways: by one side imposing its will or by all the legitimate players having a piece of the power. The U.S. is no longer able to control events in Iraq, but it can be useful as a referee.

Second, the Bush administration should disavow any plan for regime change in Iran — not because the regime should not be changed but because U.S. endorsement of that goal only makes it less likely. In today's warped political environment, nothing strengthens a radical government more than Washington's overt antagonism. It also is common sense to presume that Iran will be less willing to cooperate in Iraq and to compromise on nuclear issues if it is being threatened with destruction. As for Iran's choleric and anti-Semitic new president, he will be swallowed up by internal rivals if he is not unwittingly propped up by external foes.

Third, the administration must stop playing solitaire while Middle East and Persian Gulf leaders play poker. Bush's "march of freedom" is not the big story in the Muslim world, where Shiite Muslims suddenly have more power than they have had in 1,000 years; it is not the big story in Lebanon, where Iran is filling the vacuum left by Syria; it is not the story among Palestinians, who voted — in Western eyes — freely, and wrongly; it is not even the big story in Iraq, where the top three factions in the recent elections were all supported by decidedly undemocratic militias.

In the long term, the future of the Middle East may well be determined by those in the region dedicated to the hard work of building democracy. I certainly hope so. But hope is not a policy. In the short term, we must recognize that the region will be shaped primarily by fairly ruthless power politics in which the clash between good and evil will be swamped by differences between Sunni and Shiite, Arab and Persian, Arab and Kurd, Kurd and Turk, Hashemite and Saudi, secular and religious and, of course, Arab and Jew. This is the world, the president pledges in his National Security Strategy, that "America must continue to lead." Actually, it is the world he must begin to address — before it is too late.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, secretary of State from 1997 to 2001, is the author of "The Mighty and the Almighty -- Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs," to be published by Harper Collins in May. This essay appears by special arrangement with the Financial Times.

http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/03/26/iraq.hakim/

http://upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/v...26-063039-4056r


3/27/2006 6:10:00 AM -0500

Intl. Intelligence
Politics & Policies: Bush's second mistake
By CLAUDE SALHANI
UPI International Editor

WASHINGTON, March 27 (UPI) -- Historians and politicians will undoubtedly argue for years to come whether the war in Iraq was worth starting or a mistake.

Despite the obvious outcome of the war -- the positive as well as the negative -- three years into the conflict is still too early to tell. The jury is still out as far as the results of the Iraq expedition is concerned and only time will tell if President George W. Bush's actions were justifiable or if he committed a major policy error.

What is clear, however, is that President Bush is about to make another policy decision that need not wait for historians to judge as a major mistake in Iraq, and that is inviting Iran to negotiate in Iraq's future.

This decision recognizes Iran as a de facto regional political power broker in the Middle East and legitimizes the theocratic regime of the mullahs. It also goes counter to the current policy of wanting to encourage a change in that direction and saps away efforts by Iranian opposition forces.

Such a move elevates the regime in Iran to the statute of being a "Potsdam-like" participant in deciding Iraq's future, even though the Islamic republic played no role in liberating Iraq from Saddam Hussein.

As Amir Taheri, a noted writer on Iranian affairs, points out, it would be equivalent to the Allies inviting Switzerland or Poland to talks on Germany's future at the end of World War II.

Taheri warns that asking Iran to such talks may be Washington's first major mistake. Of course, many would dispute that point, arguing that this is yet another of a multitude of mistakes, in a long-running series of political faux pas made by this administration in conducting the war and consequently in its efforts to establish peace in Iraq.

Starting with the reason given for the invasion of Iraq, the mismanagement during the immediate aftermath of initial combat operations, and leading right up to the current running of affairs that has brought Iraq to the brink of civil war, and allowed Iran to establish a foothold in Iraq, it is reasonable to question where the first error lies.

Again, historians might well argue that the first mistake was made by Bush 41, the father of the incumbent, Bush 43, when the perfect opportunity to oust Saddam Hussein arose during the 1990-91 Gulf War and he chose not to follow through.

At the time all the elements were in place for Saddam to fall. All that was needed was a little more pressure, along with a little push from the U.S.-led coalition.

However, in retrospect, it is quite possible that history is not being kind enough to Bush 41, and not crediting him enough for his clairvoyance. It may just be that he realized what kind of mayhem would be unleashed once the Iraqi Pandora's box was thrown open by the removal of Saddam. Bush 41 chose to let things stand and allowed Saddam to remain in power. Of course an unpleasant result from that decision was the senseless slaughter of some 200,000 Iraqi Shiites by Saddam's goons as revenge for their uprising. Once again, history will be the judge of that decision.

Given recent history, and the maltreatment of Iraq's Shiites, it is quite understandable that Iran would want to play a role in Iraq's future. Iran sees itself as the protector of Muslim Shiites. And since the Islamic revolution in 1979, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew the shah and installed the Islamic republic, Iran has tried -- without success -- to export its revolution to other countries in the region. Until now.

The war in Iraq, accompanied by the void of authority that ensued, has allowed Iran to establish an influential beachhead in Iraq via its client parties and militias. Inviting Tehran to negotiate in Iraq's future will further strengthen Iran's position.

Taheri points out this will allow Iran a strategic corridor "through which it can communicate with Syria and Lebanon, which it considers as part of its broader glacis." Once Tehran establishes its power in Iraq as it has in Syria and Lebanon, Taheri states, "it would be able to project power in the Levant for the first time since the early 7th century when the Persian Empire under Khosrow Parviz drove the Byzantines out of Mesopotamia and what is now Syria."

Tehran would very much like to see history repeat itself and see the new Byzantines -- the Americans -- repelled from Mesopotamia. The mystery, as writes Taheri, is "why Washington wants to give Tehran a place at the high table in Iraq."

Once more, the answer may be found one day in the history books.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HC29Ak01.html
Talking to the enemy
By Iason Athanasiadis

BAGHDAD - The press conference room inside Baghdad's Green Zone is an improvised tangle of television wires snaking along the floor of the trailer. At the far end of the room, nine US senators led by Vietnam War veteran and presidential hopeful John McCain stand in front of the made-for-TV background featuring American and Iraqi flags abutting a State Department logo.



"We have conveyed to them [Iraqi politicians] a sense of urgency," McCain announces. McCain is alluding to the underlying concerns bedeviling negotiations between the American occupying authority and Iraq's politicians to form a government, that a stable national unity government must be put in place if the country is not to fall further apart.

The US's position has been complicated by the killing of at least 40 worshipers in a Shi'ite community hall near a mosque in Sadr City, a large Shi'ite ghetto in Baghdad and support base for powerful Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mehdi Army. The US has repeatedly urged the government to disband militias linked to political parties. The victims are believed to have been killed in an operation involving combined US and Iraqi forces.

The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), the Shi'ite bloc with the largest number of seats in parliament, promptly called for the US occupation to turn over control of all security operations to the Iraqi government. Some UIA politicians also indicated that they now wanted to pull out of the protracted talks to form a government that have dragged on since elections in January.

Increasingly, it is dawning on Washington that the US must leave Iraq sooner rather than later. "I think they want us out, but not now," McCain says. "And we want out."

And to do this, the US has had to turn to Iran, with which it has had no diplomatic relations since 1979, which it accuses of developing a nuclear weapons program and which it consistently accuses of meddling in Iraqi affairs.

Stepping out of the press conference in Baghdad, one of the senators told Asia Times Online that talks with Iran "have been ongoing for some time and I feel that they've reached some tentative agreement". This confirms an earlier comment by a European diplomat in Tehran who told Asia Times Online that the "talks have been going on for some time through the Iranian and US embassies in Kabul".

The US Embassy in Baghdad, however, denies that the talks have begun.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi was quoted on Monday by the official IRNA news agency as saying that Iran would talk with the US to pave the way for the withdrawal of US forces from the country.

"Although Tehran does not trust Washington, it is seriously concerned about the repercussions of wrong US policies in Iraq, which is the main reason it has accepted Iraqi officials' request that it hold negotiations with the US," Asefi said.

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has confirmed that the US will talk to Iran about Washington's accusations of Iranian destabilization of Iraq.

The political deadlock and rising violence that prompted the Bush administration to open talks with Tehran have also deepened the rift between Shi'ite prime minister-elect Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani.

Talabani, a Kurd, was angered by a trip by Jaafari to Ankara to meet arch-rival Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Turkey's diplomats have increasingly sought to build an alliance with Iraq's Shi'ite community as they have seen traditional allies such as the Turkmens failing to project their power at the ballot box.

"I hope the US and Iran will start their meetings and talks as soon as possible and the knot in relations between the two countries would be untied through the negotiations," Jaafari was reported by IRNA as saying.

But on Sunday, Talabani demanded that no negotiations take place over his head, according to American officials in Baghdad. His objection centered on the absence of an Iraqi government. Talabani's Kurdish constituency has increasingly accused Tehran of hiding behind attempts to destabilize the north, such as the recent riots in a small town called Halabjah that was the target of a gas-attack by former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

These allegations mirror similar charges made by Iranian officials in the aftermath of the rumbling ethnic violence that has plagued Iran's western Kurdistan and Khuzestan regions, along the long border with Iraq.

Despite being Iranian citizens, the Arab and Kurdish inhabitants of these provinces have been accused by Tehran of receiving aid from the British Army occupying southern Iraq. Halabjah could be an example of Iran demonstrating that it can hit back, not only in Shi'ite southern Iraq, but also in the till now peaceful north. On Monday, more than 40 people were killed by a bomb explosion set of by a suicide attacker inside a joint US-Iraqi military base in the northern city of Mosul.

An emerging alliance between Iraq's Kurdish political elite and Sunni politicians has not gone unnoticed in Tehran, which - other than supporting Iraq's majority Shi'ite community - has also cultivated both sides of the Kurdish leadership.

The Kurdish "defection" and Iran's search for new strategic partners may have been part of the reason why Tehran is now talking with US Ambassador to Baghdad Zalmay Khalilzad. These follow negotiations conducted between Tehran and Washington in the run-up and aftermath of the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that were kept secret at the time.

"Informally they are cooperating with each other," an Iranian academic told Asia Times Online. "It's better for Iran to see a balanced government than a Shi'ite state which could cause instability in the region. Even Iran is happy to see some important Sunnis taking key posts. It's not good that we put all our eggs into one basket."

While Tehran publicly complains about the US presence in Iraq, the Bush administration-led war against Saddam toppled Iran's bitterest adversary, against which it fought a bloody eight-year war in the 1980s that claimed the lives of an estimated million soldiers on both sides.

Historically, Iran has never managed to expand its influence in the region without the support of foreign powers. The Shah's closest ally was the US. Before that, the Safavid ruler Shah Abbas allowed the British Empire into his sphere of influence so they could expel the Portuguese from the strategic Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. As current allies Russia and China become decreasingly supportive of Tehran, it appears to be turning towards Washington.

Speaking to the Asia Times Online last year, a former deputy foreign minister said that it is "neither in Iran's interest to have a stable Iraq, nor do we want a fragmented Iraq. Ambiguity is the cornerstone of the policy."

Iason Athanasiadis is an Iran-based correspondent.

(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing

March 28, 2006
Arab Nations Urged to Enter Nuclear Club
By THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
Filed at 8:33 a.m. ET

KHARTOUM, Sudan (AP) -- Secretary-General Amr Moussa called on Arab leaders Tuesday to move toward a goal of ''entering the nuclear club'' and making use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

The absence of at least 10 heads of state, including President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah, raised concerns of a lackluster summit in a year where many had hoped to see serious efforts at dealing with regional troubles.

The 22-member Arab League is contending with complex issues involving Iraq's future and how to deal with a Hamas-led government in the Palestinian territories.

The U.S. State Department has urged Arab leaders to ''be as supportive as possible of the new Iraqi government'' by sending ambassadors and providing economic assistance to Baghdad.

For their part, Arab governments -- already suspicious of non-Arab Iran -- have been irritated by plans for talks on Iraq between Iranian and U.S. officials.

Moussa was particularly emphatic about Iraq in his address.

''Any solution for the Iraqi problem cannot be reached without Arabs, and Arab participation,'' he said. ''Any result of consultations without Arab participation will be considered insufficient and will not lead to a solution.''

Moussa called on Arabs ''to enter into the nuclear club and make use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,'' a plea that comes as the world is wary about nearby Iran's nuclear ambitions.

In his opening speech, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, host of last year's summit, called on Iraqis to close ranks to avoid a sectarian conflict pitting the country's Shiite majority against the once-dominant Sunni Arab minority.

Iraq's neighbors, he said, should ''honestly cooperate with the Iraqi people to preserve the country's integrity and unity.''

The host, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, used his opening speech to praise Palestinian elections and denounce Israel and Western countries that have threatened to cut off aid in response to the victory of the militant Hamas.

''We say no to robbing the Palestinian people of their democratic choice, no to punishing the Palestinian people for exercising their right to choose who rules, and no to succumbing to Israel's violations of all the promises it made,'' he said, winning the applause of the audience of heads of state and delegates.

Hamas' landslide election victory in January has raised fears of a halt in the Mideast peace process. The United States and European Union have threatened to cut direct financial aid vital to keeping the Palestinian Authority running, and Washington has pressed its Arab allies to follow suit.

However, a resolution to be adopted by the leaders meeting in Khartoum will pledge continued Arab funding for the Palestinian Authority.

Al-Bashir also condemned ''terrorism in all its forms'' and called for the use of all means to fight it. But he asked for an international conference to ''agree on an objective definition of terrorism'' -- a long-standing demand by several Arab nations.

Sudan is also hoping to win Arab backing for its position on the conflict in its Darfur region, where it is resisting Western pressure -- and a U.N. resolution -- for the African Union peacekeeping force there to be replaced by a bigger U.N. force.



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March 29, 2006
New U.N. Draft on Iran Softens Condemnation
By WARREN HOGE
UNITED NATIONS, March 28 — European and American diplomats circulated a new draft statement to the Security Council on Tuesday evening that weakens language condemning Iran's nuclear program but still calls on Tehran to abandon uranium enrichment activities, which the West believes are intended to make weapons.

The new draft, written by Britain and France and supported by the United States, eliminates or softens elements in earlier drafts that had raised objections from China and Russia.

The three Western nations hope the new version can be adopted Wednesday, a day before the foreign ministers of the five permanent Council members and Germany meet in Berlin to discuss strategy on Iran.

"We feel a sense of urgency," said John R. Bolton, the American ambassador, pointing out that it has been three weeks since Iran's case was delivered to the Council by the International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations nuclear watchdog based in Vienna.

Negotiations to reach consensus on the relatively mild Security Council action of a nonbinding presidential statement have faltered over Chinese and Russian objections to language that they argue lays the groundwork for taking tougher action like sanctions, which they both oppose.

One of the changes in the text is a watering down of a phrase calling Iran's actions a possible "threat to international peace and security," a term that Beijing and Moscow said established a pretext for sanctions.

The new version simply notes the Council's "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."

The revised text also drops any mention of specific charges and demands against Iran, and instead refers to resolutions of the nuclear agency that incorporate them.

In another modification, it now requests a report back from the director of the nuclear agency on Iran's compliance with the Security Council statement in 30 days instead of the 14 days in the original text.

China had suggested a time frame of four to six weeks, and Russia had spoken of more than two months.

Mr. Bolton acknowledged that the wording disagreements might be difficult for most people to understand. "But they are important points about the role of the Security Council and the I.A.E.A., and it's important to get it right because we want to send a clear message to Iran," he said.



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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HC30Ak01.html
Neo-con cabal blocked 2003 nuclear talks
By Gareth Porter

WASHINGTON - The George W Bush administration failed to enter into negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program in May 2003 because neo-conservatives who advocated destabilization and regime change were able to block any serious diplomatic engagement with Tehran, according to former administration officials.

The same neo-conservative veto power also prevented the administration from adopting any official policy statement on Iran, those same officials said.

Lawrence Wilkerson, then chief of staff to secretary of state Colin
Powell, said the failure to adopt a formal Iran policy in 2002-03 was the result of obstruction by a "secret cabal" of neo-conservatives in the administration, led by Vice President Dick Cheney.

"The secret cabal got what it wanted: no negotiations with Tehran," Wilkerson wrote in an e-mail to Inter Press Service (IPS).
The Iranian negotiating offer, transmitted to the State Department in early May 2003 by the Swiss ambassador in Tehran, acknowledged that Iran would have to address US concerns about its nuclear program, although it made no specific concession in advance of the talks, according to Flynt Leverett, then the National Security Council's senior director for Middle East Affairs.

Iran's offer also raised the possibility of cutting off Iran's support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad and converting Hezbollah into a purely socio-political organization, according to Leverett. That was an explicit response to Powell's demand in late March that Iran "end its support for terrorism".

In return, Leverett recalls, the Iranians wanted the US to address security questions, the lifting of economic sanctions and normalization of relations, including support for Iran's integration into the global economic order.

Leverett also recalls that the Iranian offer was drafted with the blessing of all the major political players in the Iranian regime, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khomeini.

Realists, led by Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, were inclined to respond positively to the Iranian offer. Nevertheless, within a few days of its receipt, the State Department had rebuked the Swiss ambassador for having passed on the offer.

Exactly how the decision was made is not known. "As with many of these issues of national security decision-making, there are no fingerprints," Wilkerson told IPS. "But I would guess Dick Cheney with the blessing of George W Bush."

As Wilkerson observes, however, the mysterious death of what became known among Iran specialists as Iran's "grand bargain" initiative was a result of the administration's inability to agree on a policy toward Tehran.

A draft National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) on Iran calling for diplomatic engagement had been in the process of interagency coordination for more than a year, according to a source who asked to remain unidentified.

But it was impossible to get formal agreement on the NSPD, the source recalled, because officials in Cheney's office and in under secretary of defense for policy Douglas Feith's Office of Special Plans wanted a policy of regime change and kept trying to amend it.

Opponents of the neo-conservative policy line blame Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, for the failure of the administration to override the extremists in the administration. The statutory policymaker process on Iran, Wilkerson told IPS in an e-mail, was "managed by a national security adviser incapable of standing up to the cabal ..."

In the absence of an Iran policy, the two contending camps struggled in 2003 over a proposal by realists in the administration to reopen the Geneva channel with Iran that had been used successfully on Afghanistan in 2001-02. They believed Iran could be helpful in stabilizing post-conflict Iraq, because the Iraqi Shi'ite militants whom they expected to return from Iran after Saddam Hussein's overthrow owed some degree of allegiance to Iran.

The neo-conservatives tried to block those meetings on tactical policy grounds, according to Leverett. "They were saying we didn't want to engage with Iran because we didn't want to owe them," he recalled.

Nevertheless, US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad (now envoy in Iraq) was authorized to begin meeting secretly in Geneva with Iranian officials to discuss Iraq. The neo-conservatives then tried to sandbag the talks by introducing a demand for full information on any high-ranking al-Qaeda cadres who might be detained by the Iranians.

Iran regarded that information as a bargaining chip to be given up only for a quid pro quo from Washington. The Bush administration, however, had adopted a policy in early 2002 of refusing to share any information with Iran on al-Qaeda or other terrorist organizations.

On May 3, 2003, as the Iranian "grand bargain" proposal was on its way to Washington, Tehran's representative in Geneva, Javad Zarif, offered a compromise on the issue, according to Leverett: if the US gave Iran the names of the cadres of the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) who were being held by US forces in Iraq, Iran would give the US the names of the al-Qaeda operatives they had detained.

The MEK had carried out armed attacks against Iran from Iraqi territory during the Hussein regime and had been named a terrorist organization by the US. But it had capitulated to US forces after the invasion, and the neo-conservatives now saw the MEK as a potential asset in an effort to destabilize the Iranian regime.

The MEK had already become a key element in the alternative draft NSPD drawn up by neo-conservatives in the administration.

The indictment of Iran analyst Larry Franklin on Feith's staff last year revealed that, by February 2003, Franklin had begun sharing a draft NSPD that he knew would be to the liking of the Israeli Embassy.

(Franklin eventually pleaded guilty to passing classified information to two employees of an influential pro-Israel lobbying group and was sentenced to 12 and a half years in prison.)

Reflecting the substance of that draft policy, ABC News reported on May 30, 2003, that the Pentagon was calling for the destabilization of the Iranian government by "using all available points of pressure on the Iranian regime, including backing armed Iranian dissidents and employing the services of the Mujahideen-e Khalq ..."

Nevertheless, Bush apparently initially saw nothing wrong with trading information on MEK, despite arguments that MEK should not be repatriated to Iran. "I have it on good authority," Leverett told IPS, "that Bush's initial reaction was, 'But we say there is no such thing as a good terrorist.'" Nevertheless, Bush finally rejected the Iranian proposal.

By the end of May, the neo-conservatives had succeeded in closing down the Geneva channel for good. They had hoped to push through their own NSPD on Iran, but according to the Franklin indictment, Franklin told an Israeli Embassy officer in October that work on the NSPD had been stopped.

But the damage had been done. With no direct diplomatic contact between Iran and the US, the neo-conservatives had a clear path to raising tensions and building political support for regarding Iran as the primary enemy of the United States.

Gareth Porter is a historian and national security policy analyst. His latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published last June.

(Inter Press Service)

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HC30Ak03.html
Different beat to Iran war drums
By Ehsan Ahrari

A newly leaked confidential British memorandum is important not only for what was discussed between London and Washington over Iraq, but the insight it provides about the ongoing conflict between the US and Iran over Tehran's nuclear program.

The memorandum, according to the The New York Times this week, details conversations during a private two-hour meeting between President George W Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the Oval Office on January 31, 2003.



Damning memo
The memo, penned by David Manning, Blair's chief foreign policy adviser at the time, provides a rare insight into the state of mind of the two leaders, who were ready to go war and expected a quick victory. They were right in that judgment. However, they were sadly wrong in dismissing the possibility of "internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups".

Bush reportedly discussed "three possible ways" to provoke confrontation with the Saddam Hussein regime. His first suggestion was to fly U-2 spy aircraft over Iraq painted in United Nations colors. The memo reports Bush as saying, "If Saddam fired on them he would be in breach." His second suggestion was to bring out Iraqi defectors, who would give public testimony about Saddam's supposed weapons of mass destruction. His third proposal was to assassinate the Iraqi dictator.

Where the British premier differed from Bush, according to the memo, was on the necessity of getting a second UN resolution. Bush made it clear to Blair that he was determined to invade Iraq without a UN resolution.

And the memo shows that the president and the prime minister acknowledged that no unconventional weapons had been found inside Iraq, and this just days before then US secretary of state Colin Powell was scheduled to appear before the UN to present evidence that Iraq posed a threat to world security by having unconventional weapons.

Further, the US did not have a post-conflict plan for Iraq, a reality that appears to have contributed to the present imbroglio in the country.

Implications for Iran
In the ongoing rift between the US and Iran over the latter's nuclear program, the Bush administration has frequently used the diplomatic version of threats by stating that "all options are on the table". What is working for Iran is that Washington has been much discredited and ridiculed over its unilateral decision to invade Iraq. What is especially favoring Iran is that the Bush administration is finding out each day of its occupation of Iraq is that it is easy to invade a Muslim state, but not ruling it.

Perhaps given the Iraqi experience, Bush is showing restraint in threatening Iran. However, no one should be surprised if contingency plans are already in preparation for possible military action. In short, the Bush administration could pursue the following options.

First, it would work hard to persuade China and Russia to go along with some punitive economic sanctions. Iran is hoping that neither of those two countries will go along with the US. But it is also conducting its own behind-the-scenes canvassing with these countries. Even if Beijing and Moscow were to go along with Washington's desire for imposing economic sanctions, they would still want ironclad guarantees that the Bush administration would not use that as UN "endorsement" of military action against Iran, as it did in the case of Iraq.

Second, the US is likely to seek some sort of a unified stand from the Gulf States against Iran's nuclear program, even though it has repeatedly said that its ambitions are for civil, not military power. These states have adopted a measured reaction on the issue thus far. But no one should underestimate what the US can achieve when it applies ample pressure on Gulf monarchies. Iran is fully aware of this reality and might be doing its own bidding, using back channels.

Third, the US has not entirely given up on using the EU-3 (France, Germany and Britain) card. There is some chance that the EU-3 might be able to persuade Iran to give up its uranium enrichment program. Talks between Tehran and the EU-3 have stalled after many months of negotiations.

The EU-3 may have to rethink the size of the economic payoffs for Iran if it agrees to go along. In addition, Iran would want security guarantees from the US, which the EU-3 might be able to persuade Washington to offer. The trans-Atlantic relationship between the US and Western European countries has come a long way from the dark days following the US invasion of Iraq.

Finally, if all else fails, the Bush administration might rely on Israeli willingness to carry out a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. Here also, what favors Iran is the fact that its nuclear facilities are purposely built in heavily populated areas. Israel would thus have to think long and hard about "collateral damage" before carrying out attacks.

Conclusion
The fact that the US has not already rushed into a war with Iran shows that the cavalier approach used in Iraq has been tempered. The Iraqi adventure has taught one cruel lesson: the US's military capabilities to create a quick victory have very little stabilizing effect in a conquered land. This reality might be serving as the most constraining factor on Bush as he contemplates Iran.

Nevertheless, one has no real idea on how serious the Bush administration really is about closing the nuclear option for Iran, and that the measured steps now being taken diplomatically might simply be a response to the headlong rush to war in Iraq, but with the same end result as the objective.

Ehsan Ahrari is the CEO of Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria, Virginia-based defense consultancy. He can be reached at eahrari@cox.net or stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.

(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)

http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/world/14205757.htm

Tehran calls for nuclear facility in Iran
JUDITH INGRAM
Associated Press
MOSCOW - Iran has proposed setting up a nuclear fuel production facility within its borders with international help, the Iranian Embassy said Tuesday, as diplomats reported that the U.N. Security Council was "very close" to an agreement on how to confront Tehran's suspect program.

The new Iranian proposal is an alternative to Russia's offer to host Iran's nuclear fuel production as a way to ease concerns that enrichment conducted in Iran could be used to develop weapons. Iran maintains its atomic program is for generating electricity.

Russia said its enrichment offer was contingent on Iran resuming a moratorium on domestic enrichment, but the Iranians rejected that link.

"In terms of satisfying its needs, Tehran cannot remain dependent on international suppliers," the Iranian government said in the statement.

"Iran would welcome the creation of an international nuclear fuel center on its territory with the participation of other countries and in the framework of an international consortium."

It was not clear whether the offer differed from one that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made before the U.N. General Assembly last September. At that time, he offered foreign countries and companies a role in uranium enrichment inside Iran.

Iran also reiterated that Security Council intervention in the dispute would "escalate tensions, entailing negative consequences that would be of benefit to no party."

Nonetheless, the five veto-wielding members of the Security Council said Tuesday they were nearing a deal on a proposed statement addressing Iran. Russia and China have so far opposed a proposal from Britain, France and the United States that would demand Iran comply with demands that it suspend uranium enrichment.

"We have reached agreement on the bulk of the text, so there was movement on all sides, and now we need to see whether we can cross this last bridge but we're very close," U.S. Ambassador John Bolton said after the permanent five held three meetings Tuesday.

Britain and France circulated the text of a proposed statement later Tuesday to the rest of the 15-nation Security Council. Diplomats said that was a sign that divisions with China and Russia had narrowed after three meetings in eight hours, though they said differences remained.

The five permanent members of the council have struggled for three weeks to come up with a written rebuke that would urge Iran to comply with demands from the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, that it suspend uranium enrichment.

Several diplomats said the five nations want a deal before a meeting of their foreign ministers in Berlin on Thursday. Germany, which has also been involved in negotiations over Iran, will also be there.

The new text makes a significant concession to Russia and China. It removes language labelling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a "threat to international peace and security."

That is significant because the Security Council's chief responsibility is addressing such threats.

Including that language could be seen as an acknowledgment that the council must play a key role in confronting Iran. And that, Russia and China fear, could lead the West to push for stronger council action, possibly including sanctions, down the road.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said Tuesday his nation's offer to host Iranian enrichment remains on the table, but "Iran should say unambiguously whether it is planning to accept or reject the offer in order to allay the international community's concerns," the Interfax news agency reported.

Britain, France and Germany broke off more than two years of talks with Iran in January, saying there was no point in continuing to negotiate after Tehran said it would restart enrichment.

---

Associated Press reporter Nick Wadhams at the United Nations contributed to this story.

March 29, 2006
U.N. Security Council Members Agree on Iran Statement
By REUTERS

UNITED NATIONS, March 29 (Reuters) - The U.N. Security Council agreed on Wednesday on a statement that would call on Iran to suspend parts of its nuclear program that could be used to build weapons, Britain announced.


The new text, which makes concessions to Russia and China, is being referred to the full council for formal approval only hours before foreign ministers of the five powers and Germany meet in Berlin on Thursday to map out strategy on Iran.


The five veto-holding nations -- the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China -- have been negotiating for three weeks to complete the draft statement on how to rein in Iran's suspect programs.


"Our colleagues in the P-5 (permanent five) have reached an agreement on a text," Britain's U.N. ambassador, Emyr Jones Parry, announced to reporters.


Britain and France, backed by the United States, distributed a revised text late on Tuesday to all 15 Security Council members that made concessions to Russia and China. But it still called on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment efforts, which the West believes are a cover for bomb making.


Iran restarted its nuclear enrichment program earlier this year but insists its aim is to develop nuclear energy rather than weapons.


Jones Parry and French ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sabliere, who drafted the text, backed by the United States, said one of Russia's key objections had been removed from the statement.


This was a provision, saying the council was responsible for international peace and security. Russia, in particular, fears such a statement may later be used as a basis for tougher action against Iran, including sanctions.


Negotiations have stretched over three weeks on the statement, which is nonbinding and threatens no punitive measures. But Russia, backed by China, is determined to prevent the possibility of future sanctions or other punitive measures against Iran and wants the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna to control the issue.


The IAEA referred the Iranian issue to the council on March 8 after Tehran resumed nuclear fuel work. This prompted European negotiators -- Germany, France and Britain -- to break off 2-1/2 years of talks.


The statement calls on IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei to report back on Iran's compliance within 30 days instead of the 14 days in the original text.




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http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hadar.php?articleid=8780

March 30, 2006
'Democratizing' Iran:
A Case of Déjà Vu
The guys who brought you the liberation of Iraq are at it again
by Leon Hadar
In the 1993 movie comedy Groundhog Day, Bill Murray plays a weatherman who is reluctantly sent to cover a story about the rodent whose internal clock is believed to be affected by annual changes in the amount of daylight and who is supposed to start ending its hibernation on the second of February (marking the midpoint of winter).

This is the weatherman's fourth year on the story, and he makes no effort to hide his frustration. On awaking the following day, he discovers that it's Groundhog Day again, and again, and again. First he uses this to his advantage, but then comes the realization that he is doomed to spend the rest of eternity in the same place, seeing the same people do the same thing EVERY day. In short, he is having the worst day of his life… over and over…

I was reminded of that movie during a lunch with an old friend who works on Capitol Hill and who insisted on using Yogi Berra's famous line: "It's like déjà vu all over again" when discussing the Bush administration's evolving strategy to do a "regime change" in Iran, ranging from the recent announced plans to spend $75 million to "support the cause of freedom in Iran this year" to the proposals to impose economic sanctions against Iran and perhaps even to bomb its nuclear facilities.

My friend told me that he was starting to feel indeed like the weatherman in Groundhog Day, as though he had been transported back in time to the period in 2003 that preceded the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the ousting of Saddam Hussein.

"Once again, we are having the same kind of secret briefings, based on mysterious documents and CIA sources that should convince us that Iran is a potential nuclear military threat," he noted. "Then there are all these shady figures representing Iranian 'exile groups' who show up on Capitol Hill and who are ready to go and 'liberate' their country, that is, with just a little help from us, and all the many lobbyists for pro-democracy-in-Iran front organizations who are asking us for our U.S. dollars to pay for their propaganda campaign against the ayatollahs in Tehran.'

Repeat Performance

And of course, there is Vice President Dick Cheney, who in a repeat performance of his role in the pre-Iraq war Be-Afraid-Very-Very-Afraid blitz has already appeared before an audience in Washington threatening Iran with American action. "The Iranian regime needs to know that if it stays on its present course, the international community is prepared to impose meaningful consequences," Mr. Cheney said in a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. "We join other nations in sending that regime a clear message: we will not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons."

Then there is the U.S.-led effort to get the United Nations Security Council to adopt a resolution calling on Iran to suspend it nuclear enrichment efforts, or else. And I suppose that based on the script of the old regime-change movie, we should get ready for an appearance by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice before the UN Security Council in which she reveals the "intelligence" collected by the U.S., British, and Italian agencies about Iran's weapons of mass destruction.

Iranian exiles, not unlike Iraqi exiles before the invasion of Iraq, are positioning themselves to get support from the Bush administration in the hopes of being able to fill any ensuing power vacuum in the wake of a possible regime change in Tehran, according to an article by Connie Bruck [.pdf] in a recent issue of The New Yorker.

Ms. Bruck also reports that the man being groomed by the neocons to lead the March to Freedom in Iran is Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and that one of the Iranian exile organizations that enjoys the support of Capitol Hill is the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (People's Mujahedin), or MEK. It is the best-funded and best-organized of the groups – and has been on the State Department's Foreign Terrorist Organization list since 1997.

Then they said "Chalabi," and now they say "Pahlavi." Indeed, those neoconservative operators who persuaded President George W. Bush to buy a used rug from Mr. Ahmed Chalabi and the rest of the crew of Iraqi con-men are now certain that Mr. Pahlavi and his potential allies will soon establish democracy in Iran.

In a way, as we listen to what the former fans of Mr. Chalabi are saying about their new man, Mr. Pahlavi, one can paraphrase Karl Marx, add that Yogi Berra touch, and conclude: Déjà vu repeats itself all over again: first as tragedy, second as farce.

Copyright © 2005 Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. All rights reserved.

Fool Me Twice

By Joseph Cirincione


Posted March 27, 2006

I used to think that the Bush administration wasn’t seriously considering a military strike on Iran, because it would only accelerate Iran’s nuclear program. But what we're seeing and hearing on Iran today seems awfully familiar. That may be because some U.S. officials have already decided they want to hit Iran hard.

Does this story line sound familiar? The vice president of the United States gives a major speech focused on the threat from an oil-rich nation in the Middle East. The U.S. secretary of state tells congress that the same nation is our most serious global challenge. The secretary of defense calls that nation the leading supporter of global terrorism. The president blames it for attacks on U.S. troops. The intelligence agencies say the nuclear threat from this nation is 10 years away, but the director of intelligence paints a more ominous picture. A new U.S. national security strategy trumpets preemptive attacks and highlights the country as a major threat. And neoconservatives beat the war drums, as the cable media banner their stories with words like “countdown” and “showdown.”

The nation making headlines today, of course, is Iran, not Iraq. But the parallels are striking. Three years after senior administration officials systematically misled the nation into a disastrous war, they could well be trying to do it again.

Nothing is clear, yet. For months, I have told interviewers that no senior political or military official was seriously considering a military attack on Iran. In the last few weeks, I have changed my view. In part, this shift was triggered by colleagues with close ties to the Pentagon and the executive branch who have convinced me that some senior officials have already made up their minds: They want to hit Iran.

I argued with my friends. I pointed out that a military strike would be disastrous for the United States. It would rally the Iranian public around an otherwise unpopular regime, inflame anti-American anger around the Muslim world, and jeopardize the already fragile U.S. position in Iraq. And it would accelerate, not delay, the Iranian nuclear program. Hard-liners in Tehran would be proven right in their claim that the only thing that can deter the United States is a nuclear bomb. Iranian leaders could respond with a crash nuclear program that could produce a bomb in a few years.

My friends reminded me that I had said the same about Iraq—that I was the last remaining person in Washington who believed President George W. Bush when he said that he was committed to a diplomatic solution. But this time, it is the administration’s own statements that have convinced me. What I previously dismissed as posturing, I now believe may be a coordinated campaign to prepare for a military strike on Iran.

The unfolding administration strategy appears to be an effort to repeat its successful campaign for the Iraq war. It is now trying to link Iran to the 9/11 attacks by repeatedly claiming that Iran is the main state sponsor of terrorism in the world (though this suggestion is highly questionable). It is also attempting to make the threat urgent by arguing that Iran might soon pass a “point of no return” if it can perfect the technology of enriching uranium, even though many other nations have gone far beyond Iran’s capabilities and stopped their programs short of weapons. And, of course, it is now publicly linking Iran to the Iraqi insurgency and the improvised explosive devices used to kill and maim U.S. troops in Iraq, though Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Peter Pace admitted there is no evidence to support this claim.

If diplomacy fails, the administration might be able to convince leading Democrats to back a resolution for the use of force against Iran. Many Democrats have been trying to burnish a hawkish image and place themselves to the right of the president on this issue. They may find themselves trapped by their own rhetoric, particularly those with presidential ambitions.

The factual debate during the next six months will revolve around the threat assessment. How close is Iran to developing the ability to enrich uranium for fuel or bombs? Is there a secret weapons program? Are there secret underground facilities? What would it mean if small-scale enrichment experiments succeed?

Fortunately, we know more about Iran’s nuclear program now than we ever knew about Iraq’s (or, for that matter, those of India, Israel, and Pakistan). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors have been in Iran for more than 3 years investigating all claims of weapons-related work. The United States has satellite reconnaissance, covert programs, and Iranian dissidents providing further information. The key now is to get all this information on the table for an open debate.

The administration should now declassify the information it used to estimate how long it will be until Iran has the capability to make a bomb. The Washington Post reported last August that this national intelligence estimate says Iran is a decade away. We need to see the basis for this judgment and all, if any, dissenting opinions. The congressional intelligence committees should be conducting their own reviews of the assessments, including open hearings with independent experts and IAEA officials. Influential groups, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, should conduct their own sessions and studies.

An accurate and fully understood assessment of the status and potential of Iran’s nuclear program is the essential basis for any policy. We cannot let the political or ideological agenda of a small group determine a national security decision that could create havoc in a critical area of the globe. Not again.


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3416

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HC31Ak03.html
THE ROVING EYE
The ultimate martyr
By Pepe Escobar

TEHRAN and QOM, Iran - Mahmud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, has been very quiet lately - at least for his standards. But may no outside observers doubt his popular appeal.

After last Friday's prayers at the University of Tehran, he chose not to use the VIP exit and decided to mingle with the crowd, surrounded by only a few bodyguards. There was nothing to disguise him from the sartorial shabbiness of his audience, except that his face was beaming like a saint's. There was bread for the famished, and an old gentleman on a soapbox was spraying perfumed water over the masses. In these biblical circumstances the president was so enthusiastic that he almost boarded one of the lime-green buses available free of charge for the faithful, until someone in the security detail reminded him that he, after all, was the president.

Behesht-a Sahra, the "Paradise of Sahra", the largest martyr cemetery in the whole of Islam, southeast of Tehran near the highway to Qom, ranks as one the most extraordinary sights in the world: hectares and hectares of tombs of martyrs, or "barefoot soldiers" who reached eternal glory in the name of the Islamic Revolution, now enveloped in an eerie silence barely disturbed by the whistle of the desert winds. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's enormous mausoleum - a sort of Shi'ite cathedral now being renovated into a revolutionary theme park - is only a few minutes away.

No wonder virtually every visitor to the Paradise of Sahra nowadays is an Ahmadinejad supporter. In the Islamic Revolution scale of values, to die as a martyr is an even greater honor than to live as a good, practicing - and in most cases poor - Muslim. The president himself might have yearned to die as a martyr; but now he'd rather bask in worldly glory, as the beggars in the (oil and gas) banquet still regard the 49-year-old son of a blacksmith, self-described "street cleaner of the people" as the true believer who keeps the flame of Khomeini.

It was not by accident that the first thing Ahmadinejad did after he won the presidency was to pay his respects to the martyrs at Behesht-e Sahra, and then to Khomeini's shrine. The ultra-pious double act was complemented with a first cabinet meeting - photo opportunity included - staged at the tomb of Imam Reza, the fourth Shi'ite imam, and the only one buried in Iran, in a spectacular shrine in the holy city of Mashhad.

The theocratic nationalism power play
Ahmadinejad, the former Revolutionary Guard, may reach passionate outbursts ayatollahs can only dream of, but the fact of the matter is that ultimate power in Iran's theocratic nationalism will always lie firmly in the hands of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. And the supreme leader, Tehran insiders confirm, has in fact downgraded the president from first-class to economy. Ahmadinejad is now a so-called "domestic" affair.

It was the supreme leader who proclaimed Iran's nuclear program "irreversible". Ahmadinejad only assented - later on. In the past few days, the supreme leader has multiplied public references to the "hard as steel" resolve of the Iranian nation against "global arrogance". Ahmadinejad, who is currently on his 10th provincial visit - in the southwest - after he launched a campaign of "bringing the government closer to the people", just sticks to vague accusations against "enemies" who should "apologize to Iran for their insults. They accuse the Iranian nation of warmongering, and this is the biggest insult."

It is the anointed prince (who could not win an election), secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Ali Larijani, who's in charge of defining the scope of the upcoming US-Iran negotiations on Iraq. Foreign policy - and a "consultant" role in the nuclear negotiations - is the domain of former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, the pragmatic darling of quite a few in the West who nonetheless lost the June 2005 elections to Ahmadinejad.

Rafsanjani is now being rewarded for his own version of martyrdom-lite - to the benefit, of course, of the Islamic Republic. In the second round of the June elections, all classified government polls were declaring Rafsanjani would lose. He was tempted to withdraw. But he didn't. The White House and the US State Department were on overdrive spinning mode, branding the Iranian elections a sham.

Rafsanjani played the part of loser to perfection. When the supreme leader upgraded even more the already-powerful role of the Expediency Council, which oversees every government action, Rafsanjani became the ultimate winner; after all, he is the chairman of the council. It was Rafsanjani who publicly announced that Iran would "break down the colonial taboos against using nuclear energy peacefully" - a unanimous decision made by the council.

As an indication of how north Tehran's Western-educated upper middle class, as well as diplomatic circles and foreign observers, were detached from the real sentiment in Iran, nobody saw it coming - the pious, the apolitical and the downtrodden voting en masse for Ahmadinejad. But a few cynical Tehran-based analysts have an alternative take. According to them, Ahmadinejad was destined to win from the start, even before the first round.

The clerical oligarchy knew how unpopular they were. So why not facilitate the emergence of a populist - so the excluded could vent their anger and renew their faith in the revolution? It was a question of renewing the faith in the concept of velayat-e-faqih - the ruling of the jurisprudent - according to which government by the pious and for the pious is nothing but an expression of the will of God; thus it must be isma (infallible). Ahmadinejad's pious credentials were beyond doubt; and better yet, he was a "street cleaner of the people".

Take me to the Mahdi on time
Contrary to Western perceptions, the upper echelons of the Islamic Republic dabble in a very complex game involving various competing circles or power.

Ahmadinejad may be the perfect embodiment of the militaristic strand of the theocracy. His military background in the Revolutionary Guards formed his world view. He lived the eight-year hell of the Iran-Iraq War in full. He deeply believed that the Islamic Revolution was fighting for its life against the "apostate" Saddam Hussein. At the same time, he is fundamentally a believer in the Mahdi - the 12th hidden Shi'ite imam whose Great Occultation began in the 10th century and whose return is imminent to, in essence, save mankind from itself.

It was a rainy Tuesday night in Qom, but the sprawling Jamkaran Mosque in the outskirts of town was absolutely packed with tens of thousands of pilgrims from all over Iran, many of them camping out on the cold concrete with little to no infrastructure. According to Shi'ite tradition, if you come to Jamkaran 40 Tuesdays in a row, with no interruption, you will "see" the Mahdi. This particular Tuesday was more special than others; it fell one day before a holy day, the anniversary of the death of the Prophet Muhammad (in the officially proclaimed "Year of the Prophet", according to the Iranian government) and two days before the anniversary of the death of Imam Reza, the one buried in Mashhad.

So no wonder Jamkaran was at fever pitch. The mosque dates from the year 1050, after a very poor farmer claimed he had seen Imam Mahdi and envisaged a mosque built in his honor at the site. Behind the mosque there is a well. Most Shi'ites believe the Mahdi is hiding at the bottom of the well. The well is surmounted by a box over a pillar encased in metal protection. An endless stream of pilgrims bursting into tears write their vows or requests, attach a written supplication and drop them to the bottom of the well while feverishly kissing the square metal protection. The atmosphere is solemn and reverential. But before the Islamic Revolution, not many people came to the well.

The president reportedly made a state donation of US$14 million to the holy well. Tehran cynics swear - and theological students in Qom deny - that the president also told his cabinet members to sign a declaration of loyalty to the Mahdi that was duly dropped to the bottom of the well, as millions of pilgrims have done for centuries. Ahmadinejad even has his own roadmap for the return of the Mahdi; he drew it himself. According to Shi'ite tradition, the Mahdi will rise in Mecca - not in Qom - where he will preach to his close followers (Jesus Christ puts on a guest appearance), draw up the armies of Islam and finally settles down in Kufa, Iraq.

I will only settle for a caliphate
Ahmadinejad's ultimate spiritual mentor remains Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, who is the dean of the Educational and Research Institute of Imam Khomeini, a very influential hawza (theological school) in Qom. It's impossible to interview Ayatollah Yazdi - officially because of "new government rules", unofficially of his own volition.

The crucial election of the Council of Experts (86 clerics only; no women; no non-clergy) will take place this coming summer, by universal vote. It's the Council of Experts that chooses the all-powerful supreme leader. Influential people such as former presidential candidate Hojatoleslam Mehdi Mahdavi-Karrubi and former imprisoned philosopher Shoroush are terrified: according to them, Ayatollah Yazdi is trying to influence the outcome of the elections to take over power.

"You see, it's a circle," said a ministry official insisting on anonymity. "The people elect the Council of Experts, but only religious people can run. The Council of Experts elects the leader. The leader elects the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council filters the presidential and the parliamentary elections. And people believe they are electing somebody."

In the event of taking over power, Yazdi would implement "real Islam", as he sees it. He does not believe in Western democracy. He wants a kelafat - a caliphate. Ayatollahs like Yazdi are simply not concerned with worldly matters, foreign policy or geopolitical games; the only thing that matters is work for the arrival of the Mahdi. The ayatollah is on record saying he could convert all of America to Shi'ism. Some of his critics accuse him of claiming a direct link to the Mahdi, which in the Shi'ite tradition would qualify him as a false prophet.

US researcher Dr Muhammad Legenhausen, who has lived and taught in Qom for more than a decade, speaks fluent Farsi and is married to an Iranian, is one of the top scholars at Yazdi's hawza. By telephone, he declined an interview, saying he's "not interested".

Ayatollah Yazdi is also the spiritual mentor of the Hojjatieh, a sort of ultra-fundamentalist sect whose literal reading of Shi'ite tradition holds that chaos in mankind is a necessary precondition for the imminent arrival of the Mahdi. Ahmadinejad may not be a Hojjatieh himself, but he totally understands where they are coming from.

Ahmadinejad's slightly more worldly mentor is Mojtaba Hashemi Samareh - his closest adviser. Samareh, also a former Revolutionary Guard, met the president during the Iran-Iraq War, in Khuzestan. Then he came under the wing of, once again, Ayatollah Yazdi, who sponsored him for entering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (one of his jobs was to teach the "psychology of infidels"). He has also spent many years at the Intelligence Ministry.

Samareh's allegiance is first and foremost to Ayatollah Yazdi - not to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. He's always right behind Ahmadinejad - a sword of Damocles over every minister, ambassador or high official. Every day they pray together at the mosque at the presidential palace.

Hail against the infidels
Ahmadinejad, a second-generation revolutionary, ruffled some very powerful, first-generation clerical feathers - extremely zealous of their power bases - when he embarked on some sort of pogrom at the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of Finance and the provincial governorship level. Most of these key posts were handed over to former Revolutionary Guards - his old mates. That was a bad diplomatic move.

A dinner last weekend in north Tehran's Zafar neighborhood drew in filmmakers, urban planners, businesswomen, economic analysts. There was not a single reference to Ahmadinejad politics. The conversation centered on what's going on in the great world cities, on poetry, film and literature, and on how Iran looked and felt during the 1970s. Books on Persian art and architecture were carefully reviewed.

These men and women are part of the new worldly Iranian elite - the quintessential Islamic Republic version of a "leftist". Iranian "leftists" are US- or Canada-educated, in favor of total freedom of speech, liberal democracy, deregulated economy, a strong role for private enterprise and foreign investment, a strong voice for women and a strong civil society. In sum, they embody post-modernist Islam. They go on with their lives in spite of Ahmadinejad.

Well-connected intellectuals and businessmen in north Tehran cannot help but mock his accent, mock his shabby suits, and even swear Ahmadinejad was personally responsible, in the early 1980s, for summary executions of political prisoners in Evin prison - Iran's version of Abu Ghraib. But as the Revolutionary Guards' press office in Tehran is more than happy to acknowledge, his countrywide popular base of support remains undiminished, in the tens of millions, from the Pasdaran - the Revolutionary Guards - to the Bassijis, the hardcore paramilitary militia, also known as "the army of 20 million", and expanding to the pious, apolitical, downtrodden masses, mostly rural but also urban (in sprawling south Tehran, for instance).

There's one huge problem, though. He's not delivering - in economic terms. As a ministerial government official put it, visibly anguished, "of course he is an honest man. In his declaration of assets, mandatory in our constitution, he put only his old car [a rickety Paykan from the 1970s] and a small house. But he does not have the personality for the job."

The masses were totally excluded from the late shah's secular, Westernized, petrodollar banquet. They kept getting nothing under the revolutionary, clerical oligarchy that never implemented in practice the rhetorical slogans of Islamic solidarity. Former president Mohammad Khatami, for all the appreciation of his "dialogue of civilizations", did nothing to put more mutton kebab on people's plates. Every major decision - even in domestic policy - remains with the supreme leader.

The economy remains atrophied, dependent on bazaaris and bonyads (foundations) that ultimately respond to the supreme leader. According to a US-educated economic analyst, who insists on anonymity for his own protection, income tax accounts for less than 7% of the state's budget, deficits are underestimated, inflation could easily spin out of control and the private sector is atrophied compared with the omnipresent state.

Ahmadinejad's much-taunted plan last year to "put oil revenues on people's plates" was ditched: it would lead to an explosion of inflation. He couldn't even place his own man at the crucial Ministry of Petroleum. As another government official put it, "It's hard to believe we have to import 60% of our gasoline from abroad. The previous governments built too many mosques and not enough refineries."

The worldly, secular Ebrahim Yazdi, former Iranian foreign minister (under Khomeini) and current secretary general of the Freedom Movement of Iran - an opposition party banned from contesting the latest elections - tries to sum it up. "Ahmadinejad has failed his promises of economic justice. Under Khatami, at least we had long-range planning and investment in the private industrial sector. Ahmadinejad is in favor of the welfare state, a 19th-century idea. We have a proverb in Persian: 'A good year could be judged by the spring.' Ahmadinejad's 'spring' says it all."

Nine months into the Ahmadinejad administration, Iran's political apartheid is still more than evident. For all of the president's populist rhetoric and his outsider posture, it remains a case of the khodiah (our people) against the gheyreh kodiah (the others), insiders against outsiders. In many aspects, foreign outsiders cannot shake the impression of an austere, melancholic, suffocating society carrying the weight of 27 years of a historical, sociopolitical and religious experiment gone wrong.

The majlis (parliament) could invoke its constitutional powers and sack the president before this coming summer. Tehran insiders say there's no evidence of a white coup - at least not yet. The outspoken president may persist - in his own mind - in a battle against infidels, while personifying to the letter the prized Shi'ite cosmology of suffering as the only way to reach paradise. The last thing Iran's clerical-political establishment need at this delicate moment is for the ultimate "martyr president" to martyr the nation into the status of ultimate global outcast.

But it all goes way beyond Ahmadinejad. It's as if Iran as a whole needed someone to deliver the nation from its current plight. That certainly won't be Imam Mahdi.

(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)

http://today.reuters.co.uk/misc/PrinterFri...UCLEAR-IRAN.xml

Iran rejects UN demand for halt to enrichment
Thu Mar 30, 2006 2:08 PM GMT

By Louis Charbonneau and Sue Pleming

BERLIN (Reuters) - Iran rejected on Thursday a U.N. Security Council demand that it halt uranium enrichment to reassure the world that its nuclear programme is peaceful.

"We will not, definitely, suspend again the enrichment," Iran's ambassador to the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Aliasghar Soltaniyeh, told Reuters.

Soltaniyeh spoke as Germany and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council were meeting in Berlin to discuss their next steps on Iran, with Russia and China seeking assurances that force would not be used.

After the talks, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said the participants had agreed Iran must heed the U.N. demand to halt enrichment, adding that the international community still sought a diplomatic solution to the stand-off.

On Wednesday, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a "presidential statement" calling on Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment work, which can produce fuel for power plants or atom bombs. It also asked the U.N. nuclear watchdog in Vienna to report in 30 days on Iranian cooperation with agency demands.

Oil held above $66 a barrel, in sight of its $70 record, after the U.N. statement. "There's got to be a crunch point over Iran," said oil analyst Geoff Pyne. "At the end of the day Iran is intent on uranium enrichment and the West won't allow it."

The council statement was the product of three weeks of negotiations among the five veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council -- Britain, France, China, Russia and the United States. The final text was softened to remove language Moscow and Beijing feared could lead to punitive measures.

Germany and the five big powers had agreed on January 31 to report Iran to the Security Council over its nuclear activities.

Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, speaking at the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, said that decision was evidence of "political manoeuvring by some Western countries".

Mottaki said the IAEA should be left to handle the dossier and criticised the council's demand for a report from the U.N. nuclear watchdog on Iranian compliance in 30 days as "nothing short of injustice, double standards and power politics".

The Islamic republic says it only wants civilian nuclear power, not atomic bombs as the West believes.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said neither Moscow nor Beijing would tolerate the use of force against Iran. "Any ideas of resolving the matter by compulsion and force are extremely counter-productive," Interfax news agency quoted him as saying.

DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION

China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang said Beijing believed a diplomatic solution remained possible.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told reporters en route to Berlin that the world must keep up pressure on Iran.

"The presidential statement is an international voice to the Iranians that they need to suspend their (uranium enrichment) activities, return to negotiations and that they continue to be isolated," said Rice.

She urged the other permanent council members and Germany to take into account Iran's calls for Israel to be "wiped off the map", as well as its support for Syria and Hizbollah in Lebanon.

An EU diplomat said before the talks that participants would discuss a strategy outlined in a letter sent by senior British diplomat John Sawers to his Western counterparts this month.

Sawers said the non-binding presidential statement should be followed by a binding resolution based on Chapter VII of the U.N. charter, which deals with "action with respect to threats to peace". Adoption of such a resolution would make compliance enforceable with economic sanctions or other measures.

Iran's decision to resume uranium enrichment in January prompted Britain, France and Germany to break off 2-1/2 years of EU talks with Iran and to back a U.S. demand to refer the Iranian nuclear dossier to the Security Council.

The EU trio has offered to resume talks with Iran on condition that it re-suspend all enrichment-related activities.

(Additional reporting by Francois Murphy in Vienna, Madeline Chambers in London, Evelyn Leopold at the United Nations, Chris Buckley in Beijing and Richard Waddington in Geneva)



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