This is the first of several articles by columnists representing the viewpoints of other governments who have a stake in the U.S. presence in Iraq.

A.B.


|| A South Korean withdrawal

by Sawsan Assaf
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The possibility and timing of any US withdrawal from Iraq is contingent on the US achieving its strategic aims for the country.

The aim of the war on Iraq waged by the US-led coalition forces was clear before it even broke out. Most importantly, the war was fought in the service of US and British military superiority in the region, and initially this was achieved faster than even most military or strategic analysts predicted.

In addition to overthrowing Saddam Hussein and his regime and meeting the objectives of the Iraqi opposition, the war was aimed at entrenching US and allied countries' economic and geo-strategic control of the Middle East while building up a deterrent power in the heart of the region. These strategic aims were coupled with the claim that allied forces were in the process of reconstructing Iraq politically, socially and economically into a prototype for democracy and freedom in this vital part of the world.

As such, a comparison with Japan after World War II was often mooted, where an almost completely destroyed state was rebuilt and remolded by the US. But the American ability to turn its military victory into a political victory has been stunted by the armed resistance against the occupation, an occupation that in its practices and arrogance belittled the values and traditions of Iraqi society and thus encouraged support for the resistance from all quarters.

Thus was created the multifaceted resistance we see today; the religious Sunni Iraqi bloc, religious Sunni foreign bloc (al-Qaeda), religious Shi'ite bloc (Sidr movement), religious Salafi Kurdish bloc (Ansar al-Salam), the political bloc affiliated with the former regime, the political bloc affiliated with the Syrian-backed Baath party (al-Qawmiyoun), not to mention the mercenary forces (we will fight in exchange for benefits at any given place and time).

Thus too, the conditions for a US withdrawal changed. Rather than pursue the grandiose Japan model, South Korea is now seen as the model to follow. In line with overall strategy, any "withdrawal" would in any case be illusory, because the US would operate and retain large military bases in the country. Before any such "withdrawal", however, the US must first try to calm the situation on the ground to avoid being seen as having been embroiled in a Vietnam-like situation, where the US has effectively lost control.

The way to do so is not straightforward. If Washington wants to implement a South Korea model in Iraq, it must first make the country militarily and politically dependent on the US. According to the political realities of Iraq, such a model would necessitate, 1) an unprotected Iraqi federation--i.e., support for the effective division of Iraq and a dissipation of national unity between Sunnis, Shi'ites, Kurds, Turkmans, etc., coupled with a military force with capabilities insufficient for protecting Iraqi security as we see today--and, 2) the creation of an illusory enemy that has the ability and intent to deny any Iraqi identity if the United States is not deterring it. Iran and its extensions in Iraq serve this role well.

In the short term, Washington must convince the world that the departure of American troops from Iraq would lead to a civil war on the one hand and a return of dictatorship on the other. This necessitates a focus on the slogan that "we must remain at the will and need of the people." Meanwhile, the US will work to achieve economic prosperity in some parts of Iraq to lay the foundations of a federation, as it is already doing in the southern part of the country in Basra, al-Amara, etc.

The policy of shaking up internal factors as well as external factors is directed at frustrating any form of national unity from emerging; that is, to move people away from seeking the liberation of Iraq as long as putting the Iraqi house in order is still a long way off. This will mean a continuation of the prevailing social conditions (violence, Abu Musab Zarqawi, military militias, etc), economic deterioration, struggle over seats and the division of booty to divert any attention away from creating unified determination and a united Iraqi state.

Thus, in the short term, the US must create the opposite conditions to lay the foundations for a South Korean model that in the long-term will enable it to "withdraw" by endorsing the principles of dictatorship that Washington will bring back, only this time in "new clothes".- Published 26/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Sawsan Assaf is a lecturer at the Center for International Studies at the University of Baghdad.

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|| The bloody cost of hugging "good intentions"

by Alastair Crooke
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Having recently participated in two public debates on the issue of whether the United States should withdraw now from Iraq or stay the course, I understand only too well that western audiences are not listening to the arguments. It is not cool rationality that sways the audience, but the play upon their anxieties that gives the outcome. Yes, they are worried about what is happening--otherwise it is hardly likely that 750 persons would turn out on a cold London night to listen--but they are there mainly to have their anxieties allayed.

In this conflict of feelings, the warm embrace of that presumption of western "good intentions" always will trump the argument that leaving as soon as possible actually might improve the prospects for a political solution. They hear; but they want assurances--assurances you can touch--that a better outcome can be guaranteed by leaving early.

The truth is that both courses of action carry risk, and both, almost certainly, would be accompanied by a level of violence. The question is, what level of violence? Western audiences wriggle at this point, and sink into the embrace of the mantra that "surely the US and the UK presence must be beneficial?" The intentions are good; but they cannot accept that intentions are not enough; that even such a well-intentioned western presence might in itself inhibit or prevent any prospect of an early solution.

In some ways, as is also claimed for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, we can all see the shape of the likely long-term arrangement. The key internal parties--meaning those who have real influence on the ground, the Sunni resistance leaders and the Shi'ite leadership--will need to sit with the others who hold influence in Iraq, the Kurds, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia, to find a power-sharing outcome. This outcome is likely to provide a form of governance that gives more weight to Sunni interests than is available under the present dispensation. Many in Iraq now believe that any political solution, however, must be preceded by some trial of strength between the parties. The hope is that this will not escalate into civil war, but who can offer such assurances?

The US presence prevents such a solution: all in the region are aware that the US, slowly or less slowly, is on its way out. We can all observe too that the election outcome has shifted the locus of influence over the internal political process from Washington to Tehran. The problem is that that such a solution cannot begin to emerge until the occupiers go. The longer they continue with their military suppression of mainly Sunni central Iraq, the more it aggravates sectarian tensions and the greater the prospect for civil war.

The US occupation, in its focus on militarily suppressing central Iraq, itself gives rise to large numbers of Iraqi civilian and innocent casualties. This creates the atmosphere of Sunni victimhood that the small minority "Zarqawi" and Takfiri groups exploit in order to try to create the civil tensions that might lead to a true revolutionary process. The overwhelming majority of Sunni insurgents are fighting for a seat at the table of power--they are not fighting to create a new revolution.

The US domestic imperative to have an exit strategy in time for the mid-term congressional elections means that, politically, the US is in a jam in Iraq: the elections have given the Shi'ite parties a dominant position, and these parties are warning the US that the elections are over, that they won, and that the US must stop trying to appease the Sunnis or risk the Shi'ites turning on the US. For the Sunnis, the elections yielded zero in terms of real political clout. They are angry and alienated. The Americans now risk both communities turning on them: their ultimate dread. At the same time, they can neither address the political impasse nor correct the sectarian flaws in the make-up of the security forces without returning them both to the drawing board. And that would terminate their exit strategy just in the run up to congressional elections.In the face of diminishing US room for maneuver, what can staying achieve? No one in the US seriously advocates getting in the middle of sectarian conflict; and if the object is to strengthen the militia-based security forces, then we are largely engaged in preparing the Peshmerga and the Shi'ite militia for the confrontation with the Sunnis. Is that what we want? As matters stand, without US fire and airpower the Shi'ites would probably have little option but to negotiate with the Sunnis. But if we stay to build up further the strength of the Kurdish and Shi'ite militias within the so-called "national" security forces, we will only prolong and intensify the ensuing struggle.

These options may make western audiences who yearn for a "democratic" solution queasy; but this is the reality. The US should go, the sooner the better, and allow a real political process--one that will involve those to whom the US will not speak--to sort out an accommodation.- Published 26/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Alastair Crooke is a director of Conflicts Forum. He was formerly a European Union mediator with Islamist movements and continues to link with Islamists widely.

A.B.