http://www.irmep.org/dd_ch1.htm

Deadly Doctrine #1 Strike First
by Grant F. Smith
It is official military policy that the United States of America will prevent any challenge from rivals via limitless spending and military preemption. This relatively new and radical doctrine is a result of thirty years of behind the scenes neoconservative machinations. It provides unlimited opportunities for neocon power brokering of military spending (discussed in Chapter 2), permanent political positioning on the high strategic rhetorical ground of "defending America", and opportunities to direct and channel American military might against Israeli rivals (discussed in chapter 5).

Preemption hasn't always been embedded in US military strategy. Its inclusion is the culmination of years of efforts by Paul Wolfowitz and a constellation other neoconservative thinkers and associated cheerleaders to integrate the first strike into the formal American "defense strategy".

Each major spending element of the preemptive national security strategy, including "regime change" in Iraq, more "usable" nuclear arms , denial of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states, and deployment of exorbitantly expensive "Star Wars" missile intercept systems were promoted by neoconservative "think tanks" such as the Project for a New American Century, American Enterprise Institute, Center for Security Policy, the National Institute for Public Policy long before the current George W. Bush Administration took office.

In 2002 former Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz presented and received acceptance for a new, and fundamentally radical strategy for defending the United States. The document, titled the National Security Strategy of the United States of America is still, at the time of this writing, the country's guiding strategic military document.

A central strategy in the document is preemption, or striking at "gathering threats".

"We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, theyrely on acts of terror and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction—weapons that can be easily concealed, delivered covertly, and used without warning.

The targets of these attacks are our military forces and our civilian population, in direct violation of one of the principal norms of the law of warfare. As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists and these losses would be exponentially more severe if terrorists acquired and used weapons of mass destruction. The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."[i]

Wolfowitz' road to preemption began as a protйgй to RAND nuclear war-fighting theorist Albert Wohlstetter. Wolfowitz saw nuclear proliferation as the real global threat during his education at Chicago University. In his dissertation, Wolfowitz wrote that nuclear weapons in the Middle East would be a matter of the "gravest concern." [ii] He joined Richard Perle in the office of Washington Senator "Scoop" Jackson and entered a darker, less theoretical world involved in moving massive amounts of taxpayer dollars through hype, illusion and fear-driven defense contracts.

In 1974 Wolfowitz contrived to convince the Congress that there was a military "Spending Gap" between the US and Soviet Union, requiring the US to "catch up." His approach to comparing US military spending as a percentage of GDP in steady state, with Soviet spending rocketing off the top of the chart would be eerily reminiscent of the Project for a New American Century's similar tactic two decades later in the report "Rebuilding America's Defenses". But the similarity with later Neoconservative tactics did not end with comparative GDP charts. The "Office of Special Plans" approach to manipulating and finessing intelligence to suit predetermined goals was first championed by Paul Wolfowitz.

Wolfowitz mentor Albert Wohlstetter along with US Air Force Generals George Keegan and Daniel Graham attempted to gain access to raw CIA intelligence data covering Soviet military might and production. In a refrain that would in many ways resemble pre-invasion claims about Iraq WMD Wohlstetter and Wolfowitz claimed that the "CIA systematically underestimated the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile in its annual National Intelligence Estimates."[iii] They were quickly supported and promoted by a plethora of military contract minded legislators in Congress demanding an alternative and objective independent "threat assessment" authored by unbiased "outside experts" unafraid of revealing true threats to America.

The CIA rejected the neocons' request for raw intelligence, but was overruled in 1976 when George H.W. Bush entered as CIA director and raw intelligence was finally delivered to the outside group. The subsequent reports that Wolfowitz and his team mates then delivered were as fantastical as they were flawed.

They forecast that the Soviet Union by 1984 would deploy about 500 nuclear armed Backfire bombers. In reality, only by 1996 did Backfires number over 200.[iv] They also claimed the Soviet Union was working on a new stealth submarine. Again, reminiscent of recurring Neoconservative arguments that Iraqi WMDs must have been shipped to Syria because none could be found in Iraq, lack of evidence about the "stealth submarine" transmogrified into definitive proof of its existence and the need for countermeasures. The Neocons claimed "absence of evidence" meant that the submarine was probably already deployed.[v] The authors of the outside report imagined immense Soviet nuclear stockpiles far outnumbering US stockpiles and created what is now known to be a completely false picture of a Soviet Union armed to the teeth bent and capable of dominating the world. Most of their analysis when viewed with hindsight, was fanciful, contrived and wholly inaccurate.

There is another important parallel between the case of the missing Soviet juggernaut and the neocon case for invading Iraq. When the neocon's Soviet juggernaut reports were entirely rejected and ignored by the incoming Carter administration, members of the study group didn't give up. Rather, they took their battle to the press and mass media, ultimately calling for congressional hearings, even as the Soviet Union's economy continued to weaken, and then teeter on the brink of collapse.

Decades later, members of the "Project for the new American Century", a neocon think tank would also take their case for invading Iraq to the public by releasing an open letter to president William Clinton on January 26, 1998. The PNAC letter demanded that Clinton commit to "regime change" in Iraq in his upcoming state of the Union address since absence of evidence meant Saddam Hussein was up to something. "Our ability to ensure that Saddam Hussein is not producing weapons of mass destruction, therefore, has substantially diminished." The letter also frankly referenced three core Neoconservative concerns, namely troop logistics , Israel, and finally oil supplies.

"It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard."

Paul Wolfowitz had attempted to incorporate a radical new doctrine of preemption into the US National Security Strategy as a Reagan era DoD appointee, but failed. Reviewers and policymakers alike believed a core strategy based on "first strikes" against hazy threats was too blunt an instrument, would not always "fit the crime" of the target nation, and relied to heavily on sketchy intelligence to be practical.[vi] However, many neoconservatives still believe that even if a first strike is unleashed against the wrong country, it can still have benefits, no matter what the expense or damage to America's reputation.

"Every ten years or so, the United States needs to pick up some small crappy little country and throw it against the wall, just to show the world we mean business."[vii] Michael Ledeen, American Enterprise Institute

Among neoconservatives, an enduring infatuation and mythology about military preemption is based on their understanding of the "success" of the 1967 Israeli first strike against the Eqyptian Airforce. The 1967 Israeli Arab war is heralded in books such as Michael Oren's "Six Days of War" and continually on American radio talk shows as the definitive case proving that military preemption works.

"Thirty-five years ago, on June 5, 1967, war broke out between Israel and three of its Arab neighbors. In a mere six days, the Israelis captured the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank of the Jordan River from the Kingdom of Jordan. The Six Day War's outcome set the stage for all subsequent relations between Arabs and Israelis. In time for this anniversary a book has appeared that- drawing on interviews and archival research in Israel, Egypt, the United States and Russia - gives as complete an account of the 1967 war as is ever likely to be written. In addition to providing the definitive history of that conflict, Michael B. Oren's "Six Days of War" offers a valuable perspective on the current troubles in the region."[viii]

The mythology of a small, suceptible Israel, surrounded and attacked by superior and hostile foes is repeated endlessly in the US news media by pundits and supporters:

"…prior to 1967 Palestine was controlled by Great Britain, and the land was divided into Jordan and Israel, Jordan was designated as the land for the Palestinians, and all the land to the west of the Jordan River was Israel for the Jews. Let's not forget the only reason that Israel controls the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is because she was attacked by Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and confiscated the lands as spoils of the war." Radio Host Armstrong Williams[ix]

The mythology of Israel the beleaguered, scrappy and heroic little nation justified in keeping the territorial spoils of war as compensation from an unprovoked and unavoidable attack reaches up into the highest levels of the US Department of Defense.

"My feeling about the so-called occupied territories are that there was a war, Israel urged neighboring countries not to get involved in it once it started, they all jumped in, and they lost a lost of real estate to Israel because Israel prevailed in that conflict. In the intervening period, they've made some settlements in various parts of the so-called occupied area, which was the result of a war, which they won." Donald Rumsfeld, August 6, 2002[x]

What Michael B. Oren's book about the 1967 fails to mention, along with most other observers and writers, is that the Israeli attack didn't prevent conflict, but on the contrary guaranteed a war that otherwise would never have occurred. We now know this thanks to the release of previously classified Johnson administration era documentation and diplomatic cables released from the US State Department Office of the Historian. Few historians have bothered to update their work to incorporate the unpleasant realities found in the days leading up to war.

While Israel did attack Eqyptian forces, it did so in full possession of intelligence that Eqypt was attempting to wind down the crisis through shuttle diplomacy with Israel's largest foreign supporter, the United States.

The buildup to the crisis began with Palestinian militant attacks on Israel from bases located in Syria. This led to increasing Israeli insecurity, and missteps and blunders in the "fog of war" quickly escalated into a crisis. Syria believed that Israel would invade, and looked to Egypt for support. Egypt responded by moving troops into the Sinai Peninsula and ordering the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces. Amid escalating threats from both Israeli and Arab sides, Jordan then signed a mutual defense treaty with Egypt.

Israel launched a preemptive strike against the three Arab states on June 5, 1967, capturing the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank of the Jordan River, Old City of Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Neoconservative and Israeli lore in most historical accounts hail this as an unavoidable and heroic response to immanent attack while discounting what was actually happening on the Arab and US diplomatic diplomatic. A typical history book of the war, "Six Days in the Sun" makes this clear:

"It is of only academic interest now whether the Eqyptian aircraft that the Israelis claim to have seen on their radar screens just before the attack was launched were really bent on aggressive moves against Israel, or whether they were the routine early morning patrols of whose timing the Israelis were fully aware from earlier intelligence missions. The Israelis had no doubts about the war of destruction that the Arabs had planned for them. They acted first---and left the questioning to the gentlemen at United Nations headquarters who had more time for such things and whose countries were not subject to daily threats of annihilation." [xi]

Figure: Greater Israel After the 1967 Six Days War



Many testosterone drenched, diplomacy shunning chronicles now have to be rewritten. Previously classified US State Department documents released by the Office of the Historian on January 12, 2004[xii] entirely refute the "heroic Israeli preemption in the face of long odds and inevitable attack" narrative. The previously classified chronology of secret Johnson Administration communications reveals laborious Eqyptian efforts to wind down the conflict and vain US attempts to retrain the Israeli "tiger" from a first strike.

June 2, 1967, Eqyptian President Nasser promised the US administration that he would not strike first, but was anxious about being overrun by Israel necessitating an Egyptian military mobilization into the Eqypt's Sinai. Nasser stated that he did not want repetition of 1956 when he was "reluctant to believe that an attack had begun and was slow in moving troops to Sinai only to be caught between the Israelis in the north and the British at Port Said." He said he had no other choice but to mobilize and send troops to Sinai in a defensive posture, but critically, that he would not begin any fight but would wait until the Israelis had moved.[xiii]

Israel was then instructed by the US to wait and not act rashly by attacking Eqypt.

On June 3, 1967 while arranging a diplomatic visit with President Johnson, Nasser again guaranteed that Eqyptian troops in the Sinai were defensive positions designed to deter an Israeli invasion. Johnson apparently believed him. On June 3 President Johnson issued a strong warning about territorial integrity to Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol.

"Our position in this crisis rests on two principles which are vital national interests of the United States. The first is that we support the territorial integrity and political independence of all of the countries of the Middle East. This principle has now been affirmed by four American Presidents. I must emphasize the necessity for Israel not to make itself responsible for the initiation of hostilities. Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone. We cannot imagine that it will make this decision."[xiv]

The US circulated a secret memorandum to US embassies in Arab states on June 3, of 1967 expressing frustration over the level of control the US could actually expect to exert over Israel.

"You should not assume that the United States can order Israel not to fight for what it considers to be its most vital interests. We have used the utmost restraint and, thus far, have been able to hold Israel back. But the 'Holy War' psychology of the Arab world is matched by an 'apocalyptic psychology' within Israel."

On June 4, 1967 Secretary Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, National Security Council Special Representative Walt Rostow, and Ambassador Thompson began preparations for the visit of the Eqyptian Vice President Mohieddin and discussed ways to "hold the Israeli 'tiger'". The Secretary of State informed the Israeli Ambassador of Mohieddin's visit.

The Israeli cabinet discussed the visit of Mohieddin, and likely fallout if Mohieddin's peace mission became public knowledge.[xv] The June 6, 1967 Israeli first strike effectively thwarted exhaustive US diplomacy and the inevitable gradual demobilization of Arab military forces. Israel's first strike created immense territorial issues and hard feelings that endure to the present day including Israel's occupation of Old Jerusalem and large portions of the West Bank. Israel's ongoing brutal occupation of these Palestinian lands is also a major generator of suicide terrorism, in retaliation against Israel and the US.[xvi]

The salient damage done to US interests is that by later enshrining and embedding the flawed strategy of the mythologized "first strike" into the US national security strategy, neocons have forced Americans to embrace the idea that first strikes actually work. 1967 is proof that first strikes rapidly and irreversibly sweep diplomatic options off the table, and though easily supported by deceptions of the day that can take decades to debunk, they limit diplomacy in crisis by reducing the amount of time available for effective negotiations.

Worse, first strike strategies increase the likelihood that disingenuous intelligence, manipulation and faulty analysis will be injected into the decision process. Wolfowitzian "stealth submarines" and other disinformation can suddenly loom large in the decision process. Unverifiable threats in the heady environment preceding a first strike suddenly become real. The 1967 Israeli first strike also provides viewed from the perspective of the newly released material helps us better understand the haste and manipulations stoking the US invasion of Iraq. Reality in both cases show a confident aggressor, sure of achieving advantage for striking first.

Israel was able to conflate a flare-up in its conflict with the PLO to seize strategic and "holy" territory it had long coveted, in a manner that guaranteed military success and strong bid for international legitimacy for annexation. To date, only the Bush administration, spurred by Israel's politically active lobbies in the US, has hinted giving any legitimacy to Israeli annexations.

"In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949." [xvii]

Before the first strike, Israeli intelligence analysts and government officials funneled a constant stream of disinformation to the Johnson Administration which grossly inflated the military superiority of its Arab neighbors in order to secure more military funding and equipment from the United States. CIA analysts debunked Israel's analysis and relayed corrected information to the Johnson administration, which allowed it to dismiss and ignore false Israeli claims.[xviii]

Israeli seized the moment to launch the war in a way that allowed it to market the land captures within the framework of an "embattled valiant nation fighting for survival in the face of long odds" myth that endures to this day. The Johnson administration was not politically able to restrain Israel, implement US policy, or explain its true reservations about Israeli aggression to the American public. Israel then mined audiences persuaded by the embattled nation mythology for additional charitable donations, political support for military aid that the false Israeli intelligence could not secure from Johnson, and propagation of an attractive strategic myth about the glories of military preemption in books and policy circles.

In the US, neocon enshrinement of 1967 has buttressed the doctrine of striking first but does more than pull the American six-shooter out of its holster: Preemption doctrine installs a hair trigger on the entire US military. This multiplies the probability that we will fire on the wrong enemy in the fog before due consideration and deliberation.

Most Americans would consider the US invasion of Iraq, executed on the pretext of disarming a country stockpiled with weapons of mass destruction, is a case against preemption. In the twisted logic of neoconservatives, even the monumental folly of Iraq is evidence of the need to shave down the hair trigger further. Richard Perle, a key architect of the war in Iraq explained the perils of waiting to a journalist.

"If you want to try to wait until the very last minute, you'd better be very confident of your intelligence because if you're not, you won't know when the last minute is. And so, ironically, one of the lessons of the inadequate intelligence of Iraq is you'd better be careful how long you choose to wait. I can't tell you when we may face a similar choice with Iran. But it's either take action now or lose the option of taking action," Richard Perle, 2/4/2006[xix]

Taking options off the table and "throwing a country against the wall" by mistake are certainly in line with overall neoconservative sloganeering and punditry. However, they are inimical to a nation founded on the principles of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Adopting such cynical and deception prone policies would reshackle the American people to the monarchial tyranny of following unelected despots, endlessly plotting wars of aggression for their own purposes, and selling them as vital for the defense of the nation.

Ultimately, Israel will have to come to grips with the reality that no nation will ever accept annexation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, in spite of recent press statements by the acting head of Likud..

"Even though we’re talking about a security fence, my instructions are that Gush Etzion and Maale Adumim remain an inseparable part of the State of Israel," Ehud Ohlmert, Acting Prime Minister, 2/7/2006

Ill gotten gains, conquered on whatever deceptive preemptive pretext, are still ill-gotten gains.

Excerpt from "Deadly Doctrine: Objectives and Operations of America's Neoconservative Mafia", available in bookstores March 15, 2006. ISBN # 09764437-4-0

Notes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[i] National Security Strategy page 15



[ii] "Neocons: The men behind the curtain," Khurram Husain. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Chicago:Nov/Dec 2003. Vol. 59, Iss. 6, p. 62-71

[iii] Ibid

[iv] "Estimated Russian stockpile, September 1996", By Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September/October 1996 pp. 62-63 http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php?art_ofn=so96norris


[v] Ibid

[vi] Frontline, the War Behind Closed Doors

[vii] "Baghdad Delenda Est, Part Two, Get On with it" Johan Goldberg, National Review, 4/23/2002

[viii] http://www.cfr.org/publication/4635/hot_wa...adcrumb=default

[ix] "Mythologies of the Gaza Withdrawal and 1967 War", WWRL AM New York Drive Time Dialogue with Armstrong Williams and Sam Greenfield

8/15/2005 Radio Interview Transcript http://www.irmep.org/armstrong.htm

[x] Excerpt from United States Department of Defense News Transcript

Comments by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, August 6, 2002

[xi] "The Time Of The Burning Sun: Six Days of War, Twelve Weeks of Hope" page 2,
by Michael Bernet, Chester and West, NY, copyright 2004

[xii] Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

[xiii] Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

[xiv] Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

[xv] "Preempting What?" Speech, U.S. State Department 1/12/2004 Charles Smith, University of Arizona, Near Eastern Studies Professor rtsp://cspanrm.fplive.net/cspan/archive/iraq/iraq011204_statedept.rm

[xvi] "Dying to Win: the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism" Robert Pape, University of Chicago

[xvii] White House Transcript of Bush-Sharon press conference regarding Sharon's Gaza "Disengagement" plan (14 April 2004)"http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/historicalspeeches/262.shtml

[xviii] "Preempting What?" Speech, U.S. State Department 1/12/2004 Charles Smith, University of Arizona, Near Eastern Studies Professor rtsp://cspanrm.fplive.net/cspan/archive/iraq/iraq011204_statedept.rm

[xix] "Iraq errors show West must act fast on Iran: Perle" Reuters, Sat Feb 4, 2006


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