FROM DAILYKOS

WS - Thanks for posting this. My county (El Dorado) was preparing to go all mail in voting, because of the lack of certification on the Diebold machines..I actually would prefer this! Will get crackin on this one. Hope more of our CA friends see this post.

mtnmagic

Diebold machines get state approval
By Ian Hoffman, STAFF WRITER

After almost three years, Diebold Election Systems won approval Friday to sell its latest voting machines in California, despite findings by computer scientists that the software inside is probably illegal and has security holes found in earlier Diebold products.

The scientists advised Secretary of State Bruce McPherson this week that those risks were ``manageable'' and could be ``mitigated'' by tightening security around Diebold's voting machines.

McPherson gave conditional approval to Diebold's latest touchscreen voting machines and optical scanners Friday, while his staff ordered the McKinney, Texas-based company to get rid of the security holes as quickly as possible.

In a statement, McPherson said, ``after rigorous scrutiny, I have determined that these Diebold systems can be used for the 2006 elections.''

The decision is likely to set off a buying spree for as many as 21 counties, more than a third of the state, as local elections officials rush to acquire one of only two voting systems approved for use in the 2006 elections. Registrars and clerks prefer having voting systems for at least six months before conducting a statewide primary like the one in June, partly because it is California's most complicated and error-prone type of election.

``It's really late in the game and you have to have your star play in place, and if Diebold is your star play, this is good news,'' said Contra Costa County elections chief Steve Weir, vice president of the California Association of Clerks and Elections Officers.

At least three other voting-machine manufacturers still are being evaluated by state officials. For word of approval on their products, Weir said, ``you're going to wait until mid-March and for a lot of entities, it's too late.''

McPherson's approval comes just in time for San Diego County, which bought the new machines in 2003, used them once in 2004, then saw the state's approval withdrawn. The county has been warehousing 10,000 Diebold AccuVote TSx touchscreens for more than two years and withholding its $35 million payment to Diebold until approval. Now, with an election set for early April to replace Rep. Duke Cunningham, San Diego can use those machines. In June, so could San Joaquin County, which also bought and has been storing the new touchscreens trusting on approval.

Lining up as possible new buyers are Alameda, Marin, Humboldt, Alpine, Butte, Eldorado and nearly a dozen other counties. Sen. Debra Bowen, who chairs the Senate elections committee and is running for the Democratic nomination to challenge McPherson as secretary of state, criticized the approval as contrary to state and federal law.

Part of the software running in Diebold's touchscreens and optical scanners is what computer scientists call ``interpreted code'' that is loaded by memory cards or PC cards just before an election. That changes the software that private testing labs and states had tested and approved, and for that reason interpreted code is prohibited by federal 2002 voting system standards.

Last summer, a Finnish computer expert found a way to pre-load votes inside Diebold's optical scanning machines, then cover his tracks by hacking Diebold's interpreted code to print out reports showing no votes were in memory when in fact the election already was rigged.

McPherson found that private laboratories charged with testing Diebold's machines for compliance with the federal standards never examined the interpreted code and ordered Diebold back into lab testing. At the same time, he asked a team of scientific advisers from Lawrence Livermore lab, the University of California at Berkeley and UC-Davis to study the interpreted code and report back. The panel included computer scientists who have been skeptical, even critical of electronic voting systems, such as David Jefferson, Matt

Bishop and David Wagner.

The team wrote two reports, one public and one ``confidential that lays out security flaws in the Diebold system, as well as ways to attack it.

The scientists found the interpreted code was very limited in function and not particularly vulnerable, but the software that translates that code into computer instructions for the voting machine had at least 16 bugs that could be used to hack or frustrate elections, according to the team's public report.

``There are serious vulnerabilities in the AV-OS (AccuVote Optical Scanner) and AV-TSx (AccuVote TSx touchscreen) interpreter that go beyond what was previously known. If a malicious individual gets unsupervised access to a memory card, he or she could potentially exploit these vulnerabilities to modify the electronic tallies at will, change the running code on these systems, and compromise the integrity of the election arbitrarily,'' the scientists wrote.

``The attack could manipulate the electronic tallies in any way desired. These manipulations could be performed at any point during the day. For instance, the attack code could wait until the end of the day, look at the electronic tallies accumulated so far, and choose to modify them only if they are not consistent with the attacker's desired outcome,'' the report went on. `` The attack could erase all traces of the attack to prevent anyone from detecting the attack after the fact. It is conceivable that the attack might be able to propagate from machine to machine, like a computer virus.''

Yet the scientists concluded that the security holes only were exposed when someone gained unauthorized access to the memory cards or PC cards and their contents. The software on the PC cards is somewhat better protected because it is encrypted, but the scientists discovered that Diebold still is using the same encryption key in all of its software nationwide that scientists at Johns Hopkins and Rice University reported publicly in 2003. Another scientist had noted the key's use as early as 1997 and advised Diebold to change it.

``For local elections (i.e., elections that do not span the entire state), we believe there are mitigation strategies that could be viable for the short term,'' the scientists wrote.

The scientists recommended having counties change the encryption keys on all Diebold touchscreens and maintain tighter controls over the memory cards and PC cards, for example by requiring two people be present whenever the cards are moved or their contents changed. Serial numbers for the cards and the tamper-proof seals to lock them into the voting machines will have to be logged by elections officials at each polling place.

McPherson adopted those recommendations in certifying the Diebold machines for the June and November statewide elections. His staff wrote Diebold Friday urging the company to fix the bugs in its software and eventually to get rid of the interpreted code entirely.

``The report was written by some pretty heavy critics of electronic voting systems,'' said Jennifer Kerns, a McPherson spokeswoman. ``We're confident that we've gone above and beyond the call of duty to test it, and above and beyond what other evaluations would have revealed and can maintain the integrity of the vote.''

http://www.insidebayarea.com/argus/localnews/ci_3522960

One Big Electoral Mess...
As Revealed by California State Senate Hearings on Transparency in Elections
'Warts on Parade' as Voting Registrars Discuss Problems with Diebold, Sequoia, ES&S and Many Other Electronic Voting Systems...

"Turn around and look at all the people behind you," Bowen said gesturing at a gallery full of voting activists. "These are all people who care about transparency in the...

"Turn around and look at all the people behind you," Bowen said gesturing at a gallery full of voting activists. "These are all people who care about transparency in the elections process. It's not about me knowing or you knowing, it's about anybody else in the state of California who cares about elections to assess for themselves what's going on."
-- "Officials assess e-voting glitches: Confidence in electronic systems may be wavering" Oakland Tribune, 1/19/06

Such was the sometimes contentious, sometimes exasperating atmosphere, apparently, in Sacramento this week when State Senator Debra Bowen, transparent election champion and Democratic candidate for Secretary of State convened a hearing on the current electoral mess in the Golden State. The hearing was held by the Senate Elections, Reapportionment and Constitutional Amendments Committee which she chairs.

County Election Registrars from all over the state were called to give a report on how things are going (not well, apparently) and Election Integrity advocates filled the gallery to witness the goings on.

There was actually quite a bit of coverage by the media, some better than others, but overall, it's nice to see an open forum for oversight and discussion of the state of democracy in this state. All the while, so much that is involved with the most fundamental element of democracy -- the vote -- has been done in secret corridors of power, darkened Boards of Election back rooms, Private Corporation board rooms, and of course, inside the uninspected, none-of-your-business software of completely untrustworthy, unaccountable electronic voting machines.

Articles hit late this week on Wednesday's hearings in the LA Times, Oakland Tribune, San Francisco Chronicle, Vallejo Times Herald and elsewhere. While the "facts" offered by some of the reports were at times less than accurate, we note that it's remarkable how many Journalists deign to cover such issues when they are granted "legitimacy" by an officially sanctioned Government Inquiry. (Just a thought to those of you who actually get paid for this sort of thing, from someone who doesn't...but we've long advocated Journalists cover what is newsworthy. Not only what politicians have instructed them to be newsworthy.)

Let's take a look then at some of the coverage, including our own on-the-air conversation on Friday evening with Bowen...

From Ian Hoffman of Oakland Tribune who has been particularly good in reporting on all of these matters for some time:

SACRAMENTO — As virtually every county in California scrambles for new voting machinery to use in the June elections, the last thing elections officials want to talk about is flaws.

But the warts were on parade Wednesday:

-Sequoia Voting Systems' computers don't reliably add in certain rare primary votes.

-Election Systems & Software's computers sometimes count more ballots than voters and can record the wrong choice for voters with long fingernails.

-Optical scanners made by Diebold Election Systems can be hacked (and so possibly can scanners sold by other vendors.)

Hoffman goes on to suggest that some of the California registrars were less than pleased to be there, discussing their work at all, in public.

One particularly clueless registrar, Debbie Hench from San Joaquin County, made a particular ass of herself by blaming the process of fighting for transparent, reliable elections as the culprit for the plummetting confidence in elections by the electorate:

"These meetings are tearing the (voters') confidence apart. They're saying every system is bad," complained Debbie Hench, San Joaquin County registrar of voters, in a legislative hearing.

"I'm sorry you feel scrutiny and transparency is bad," said Debra Bowen, D-Marina del Rey, chairwoman of the Senate Elections and Reapportionment Committee. But, she said, making a clean breast of voting problems is essential for fixing them and regaining the voter trust that has been in decline since the 2000 presidential elections.

"If you just tell people, 'Trust us, we'll make it all go away,' that's not the way you establish confidence," said Bowen, a Democratic contender for secretary of state.

We spoke with Bowen on Christine Craft's Sacramento radio program Friday evening, and she confirmed Hench's incredibly daft comments. Here's the MP3 from the half-hour or so we did together on Craft's show if you're interested.

As well, a BRAD BLOG commenter, Paula Woodward, posted a few interesting impressions after attending the hearing, pointing out yet another county registrar, Ira Rosenthal of Solano County, who seemed to be equally clueless. Woodward quotes Rosenthal's "blame the messenger" comments aimed at Bowen during the hearings, charging her with "whipping up hysteria among the voters."

Damn that Debra Bowen and her quest for honest, transparent elections! What must she be thinking?!

The LA Times, who has failed to report almost anything on these matters, decided to get in the game this week to point out that "Electronic devices in 53 counties...are still not certified for use in the June primary."

They also point out that "Problems have arisen throughout California and across the country since electronic voting machines came into widespread use in 2004." Not that you'd know it from their coverage (or lack thereof) since 2004.

The report continues to describe the disastrous state of affairs across the entire state.

Seventeen California counties are relying on machines that proved vulnerable to computer hacking; software glitches in machines used in another 11 counties prompted McPherson's office to send a letter to a manufacturer in December threatening to pull certification if the bugs weren't fixed.

At Wednesday's hearing, officials also revealed errors in ballot counts in Solano and Merced counties during the November special election, and said Orange County's ballots contain a serial number making it possible to tie the ballot to an individual voter — a violation of privacy requirements.
...
Also discussed were Diebold voting machines already bought by 17 California counties and complaints about that system's weaknesses. The machines are still unapproved by the state.

Over at the SF Chronicle, John Wildermuth reported one registrar as saying, "At some point, some counties may have to make a decision about who they'd rather be sued by."

Indeed, that assessment be a reality for Boards of Election around the country before long. And for good reason.

However, Wildermuth errantly forwards the impression that the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 now requires at least one electronic voting machine in every precinct when he writes, "the law also requires states to provide, by this year, at least one voting machine in every polling place that could be used by disabled voters and non-English speakers."

That's simply not true. Had Wildermuth said "at least one voting device" or "system" we might have let it slide, as Greg Moberly's report for Vallejo Times Herald was much more egregiously incorrect. He reported "Federal standards set under the Help America Vote Act require a touch-screen voting machine this year for disabled voters at all polling places."

While we're pleased to see Moberly covering the topic (and it's not the first time he's done so), it would be nice if he got such an important fact straight before reporting it to readers. Moberly can be emailed here: GMoberly@thnewsnet.com or called here: 707-553-6833, if you'd like to report to him (politely please) so he is clear on this important matter for any future reports.

http://www.bradblog.com/archives/00002311.htm

BOWEN ON SECRETARY OF STATE’S DECISION TO RE-CERTIFY DIEBOLD MACHINES FOR USE IN CALIFORNIA
California Political Desk

By California Political Desk
February 17, 2006

SACRAMENTO – “How the Secretary can re-certify the Diebold machines when they don’t comply with California law, they violate the standards set by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) that the Secretary said he intended to follow, and he still doesn’t have the report back from the ITAs that he said he was waiting for is beyond me.”

That’s how Senator Debra Bowen (D-Redondo Beach), the chairwoman of the Senate Elections, Reapportionment, & Constitutional Amendments Committee, reacted to today’s decision by the Secretary of State to re-certify Diebold’s electronic voting machines for the 2006 elections.

“Last December, the Secretary announced with great fanfare that he was sending the Diebold machines back for review by the Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs) because the memory cards those machines rely on hadn’t been reviewed,” continued Bowen. “Now, contrary to what he said two months ago, he’s approving the Diebold machines without waiting for the report from the ITAs. Instead, he’s basing his decision on a supposedly ‘independent state audit’ that no one has seen before today. There’s a March 1 public hearing for four other voting machine vendors before their machines can be certified for use in California, so what was the rush to certify Diebold and side-step a public hearing on this issue?”

Seventeen California counties rely on the Diebold optical scan machines and a number of other counties have bought or are planning to buy the Diebold TSx touch-screen machines to use in the 2006 elections in order to comply with the federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA). The Secretary’s decision is only good for the 2006 elections and comes with a number of conditions.

“In August, the Secretary said any machine approved in California would have to comply with all federal standards and regulations, yet the EAC bans machines that contain interpreted code and these Diebold machines rely on that type of code to operate, so he’s gone back on that commitment,” continued Bowen. “In December, he said he’d wait for a report from the ITAs before acting on the Diebold re-certification request, yet now he’s re-certified the Diebold machines without hearing from the ITAs. He says he’s acting based on the recommendations of an ‘independent state audit’ that came out on Tuesday, but the California State Auditor hasn’t issued any reports on this issue and hasn’t been asked to do a report. Asking a board appointed by the Secretary to make recommendations doesn’t constitute an ‘independent state audit’ in my book.

“The other thing that no one has mentioned is the fact that the Diebold machines don’t comply with the state’s paper trail law because they don’t provide blind or visually impaired voters with a ‘read-back’ of what the paper trail recorded, they only read back what the machine recorded electronically,” noted Bowen. “That’s not what the law requires, yet the Secretary has decided to go ahead and approve these machines for use anyway. If the Secretary wants to say he’s changing his mind and lowering the safeguards California voters are entitled to have to ensure their votes are accurately counted, that’s certainly his decision to make, but saying these Diebold machines comply with state law and with all federal regulations and requirements simply isn’t accurate.”

Under Elections Code Sections 19250 and 19251, all direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems have to come with an accessible voter verified paper audit trail (AVVPAT). The AVVPAT must be “provided or conveyed to voters via both a visual and a nonvisual method, such as through an audio component.” The Diebold TSx doesn’t contain that feature, therefore making the AVVPAT that all DREs are required to have as of January 1, 2006, useless for blind or visually-impaired voters.

http://www.californiachronicle.com/article...?articleID=6013

This is a very important news post, with national implications because -- with YOUR help -- today's miscarriage of democracy will give you the first good shot at subpoena-induced sworn testimony from voting machine makers and testing labs. Vendors and voting machine examiners: Enjoy the reprieve that McPherson just handed you, because the American citizenry -- with the help of some California senators -- is about to make sure it stops right now.

Citizens: Instructions are provided in this article.

http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/bo...1954/19353.html

(there is much more to this article and supporting thread... well worth the read... - vmaus)

California holds hearing on Voting Machines

Posted on Thursday, February 16, 2006 - 04:31 pm:

Today California Senator Debra Brown held a hearing on California's Voting System and Federal Test and Certification Process. The hearing took place in Menlo Park this afternoon.

Four computer security experts gave testimony on their view on the securities of current voting system and their recommendations. These four experts are:
1.Aviel Rubin, Professor Computer Science, John Hopkins University;
2.Dan Wallach, Professor of Computer Science, Rice University;
3.David Dill, Professor of Computer Science, Stanford University and Founder of VerifiedVoting.org;
4.Peter Neumann, Computer Scientist, SRI International.

The first question asked by Brown was: What's the difference between electronic voting machines and other public machines such ATM, Slot Machine? If those machines can be made reliable (you always got correct dollar bills from ATM, and you trust the winning odds in a slot machine), then why is it hard to make electronic voting machine reliable?
Here are the answers from the panel:
1. ATM machines are subject to the scrutiny of the users. The Bank has incentive to make it right. If not, the user can switch bank right away.
2. The Gambling company has the incentive to maintain certain incentive in slot machines. Otherwise they cannot get customers.
3. It's much harder to know what the check and balance of a voting machine. There is no incentive for the manufactures to be accountable to the users. Therefore it is much harder to have reliable machines.
4. A machine is not trustable in the way that a human is not trustable. This is why we have a democratic system that allow different parties monitor each other, thus providing check and balance.
5. Machine are built by humans. We need to scrutinize a machine as much as we scrutinize humans. All parties who are involved in building, shipping, operating the machine should be subject to each other's monitoring.

Senator Brown asked: Is it possible to build a reliable program like those running in airplanes? How much does Boeing spend on their software testing?
David Dill answered: Boeing spent hundred of millions of dollar on their software testing. This cost is too high for an election software. The more fundamental problem is: No matter how much we spend in testing or certifying a program, we cannot trust that it will not be tampered after testing. Therefore an auditing process has to be in place. Having an auditing process allows us to have cheaper software and deliver it in time for election, and still ensure the integrity of voting.

At the end of the session, Brown asked each expert to give us their take-home messages.
Aviel Rubin: 1. A system has to be auditable so that we don't rely on testing or
certification.
2. It is very easy to put a bug in a computer program without being detected by others. Therefore testing or certification of a program is not effective in the sense it is hard to find problems there.
3. Auditing (such as paper printout) or parallel testing (doing mock election on the real machine when the actual election is going on) is far more effective.

Dan Wallach:
1. Voting integrity is about the process: Every step from manufacturing, to deploying, to counting the vote has to be checked.
2. Transparency is critical. The computer source code has to be open to the public. Therefore should not be any trade secret. The company can have copyrights, but no trade secret.

David Dill:
1. The Federal certification guideline for E-machines is too weak and allows many loopholes.
2. We need to have auditing for machines.

Peter Neumann:
1. The assumption that electronic voting machines are safer than punch-card machines is flawed. E-voting machines is no safer, and can be more dangerous.
2. All the source code for voting should be made public.
3. Every link involving the voting machines is weak. Therefore we must look at each link. The system can be tampered when creating the code, shipping the machine, operating the machine, or counting the vote.

In the end, Brown thanked the panel of experts. Next week, California will hold a hearing on Audit process for electronic voting machines.

http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/8...html?1140192289

I'm going to get involved with the movement for my county to insist on mail in voting at this point. While I realize there are disadvantages...since work has started to put it in place in El Dorado County, I think it is the way to go..anybody have any ideas as to continue to push rejecting Diebold (other then writing my Reps. & Sen.?) A fair vote in CA is crucial in 2006. Looking for ideas...
Diebold and Die, I say!

California Scheming: The Illegal and Inexplicable Re-Certification of Diebold

by Brad Friedman

02.21.2006

FEATURING: An EXCLUSIVE Video Tape Interview with CA's Clueless SoS Stating 'We'll Wait to Hear from the Feds About Diebold' (apparently, he was just kidding)

ALSO: Action Items for Americans Who Care About Democracy -- Five Phone Calls is All We Ask Right Now to Force E-Voting Vendors to Answer Questions Under Oath!

Inveterate Huff Po contributor, R.J. Eskow picks up on our coverage of the latest mind-blowing Dieboldery by California Sec. of State Bruce McPherson and what it may bode for the Golden State as the GOP sets their sights on political manifest destiny.



Connecting a few dots, and noting big Bush Adminstration gunslingers, like Steve Schmidt, who are roving their way westward to help shore up the Governator's re-elect prospects out here, Eskow concludes:

So what does this all mean? It suggests that California, with its treasure trove of congressional seats and 2008 electoral votes, is the next battleground. Yes, Gov. Schwarzenegger is wildly unpopular now. But, as the GOP proved in the 2004 Presidential race, unpopularity need not be a barrier to re-election - especially when Diebold machines are counting the votes.
All the 'heavy hitters' are coming into town, their shiny cars pulling up to the curb. You've seen the movie. You know what happens next. If you live in California, my friend and blog-comrade skippy has a suggestion for how you can help.


Note: Eskow's appropriate concerns about McPherson's inexplicable Diebold double-cross don't even mention the Dept. of Homeland Security's warning about their hackable tabulator software, the recently flipped-without-a-trace-left-behind mock election in Leon County, FL, the GAO Report confirming the dangers of electronic voting, and his link to a page describing the failure rate of Diebold machines in a massive election test last summer pins the percentage of failed Diebold touch-screen machines at just 10% (a later report confirmed the number was more like 20%, and a later one still pegged it at 30%.)

It also still remains unexplained why McPherson didn't wait to hear back from the federal "Independent Testing Authority" (ITA) -- which isn't actually independent, as it's created and funded by the Voting Machine Company's themselves -- to whom McPherson had sent back the Diebold memory cards after the Leon County hack test revealed their machines employed hackable "interpreted code" which is expressly banned by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) guidelines for software used in electronic voting machines.

Back in December, McPherson's office sent a letter to Diebold explaining that they would not re-certify Diebold in California until the ITA completed their re-examination of the code in light of the hack test discovery:

We require this additional review before proceeding with further consideration of your application for certification in California. Once we have received a report from the federal ITA adequately analyzing this source code, in addition to the technical and operational specifications relating to the memory card and interpreter, we will expeditiously proceed with our comprehensive review of your application.
Apparently, the SoS's office was just kidding.

They went ahead and re-certified Diebold out here last week without waiting to hear back. They announced their decision late on Friday, at the start of the long holiday weekend and in apparent defiance of state election law and McPherson's own "10 Strict Standards" [PDF] which include "State certification testing does not begin until the federal qualification testing is successfully completed."

Apparently, he was just kidding about that as well.

With all of that in mind, readers of this blog would be remiss if they failed to take the actions described in Eskow's link to Skippy. Five phone-calls and/or emails this week are all that may be needed to finally see representatives from these unpatriotic Voting Machine firms subpeonaed and forced to answer questions -- under oath -- in a public hearing before elected officials concerning their secret software, shitty machines and under-the-table efforts to work around state and federal election laws. Hit that link, and call the five members of the California legislature's Rules Committee now!

It should also be noted that Diebold is not the only bad player here. Add ES&S, Hart-Intercivic, Sequoia and several others to the list of cowardly unAmerican firms who recently refused the invitation to show up to testify before the California State Senate's Election Committee last week. All of those companies, apparently, believe it's none of our damned business how they count the votes (or not) in our American democracy.

Take action.

For full disclosure, we should also mention that we had the privilege of meeting both R.J. and Skippy in person over the weekend in an L.A. Blogger's get together out here. Good folks all of them, and we're delighted to see them jump into this most important game of all.

And finally -- since we've been looking for a good excuse to post this video -- we'll take this opportunity to give you an exclusive peek inside the "brain" of the man whose perplexing decision to re-certify voting machines and software known to be flawed and hackable may well effect similar decisions by Elections Officials around the entire country.

The following short Q&A with CA's SoS was video-taped by Dave Berman of GuvWurld about two weeks prior to the recent about face by McPherson. It's somewhat revealing -- particularly in the last couple of minutes where Dave gets to ask the questions -- as to the mindset and intellectual capabilities of the man currently appointed by Arnold to oversee free and fair elections in the country's largest "voting market" (as Diebold refers to it).

At one point in the questioning, when asked about the re-examination of Diebold software by the ITA, McPherson says, "If they're going to be certified, they're going to have to meet those levels of satisfactions to me...We, uh, we've, uh, just said that, uh, you have to meet these strict requirements and if they do, we'll consider it."

Apparently, McPherson was just kidding there as well....Since he recertified them without, apparently, waiting to hear back from the ITA.

Without further ado then, we give you the man, the myth, the elusive and rarely seen genius that is California Sec. of State Bruce McPherson -- as videotaped exclusively about two weeks ago in Humboldt County, just prior to his re-certification of Diebold voting machines in this state.


http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brad-friedma...e-_b_16115.html

Reach out and 'touch" someone -
senator don perata (chair) d
(916) 651-4009
district office (510) 286-1333
senator.perata@sen.ca.gov

senator jim battin (vice-chair) r
(916) 651-4037
jim.battin@sen.ca.gov

senator roy ashburn r
(916) 651-4018
senator.ashburn@sen.ca.gov

senator debra bowen d
email only debra@debrabowen.com - (ms. bowen is mounting this case and will be busy preparing, emails are welcomed)

senator gilbert cedillo d
(916) 651-4022

STATE OF MARYLAND
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, JR.
GOVERNOR
STATE HOUSE
100 STATE CIRCLE
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 21401-1925
(410) 974-3901
(TOLL FREE) 1-800-811-8336
TTY USERS CALL VIA MD RELAY
February 15, 2006
Chairman Gilles Burger
Maryland State Board of Elections
P. O. Box 6486
151 West Street, Suite 200
Annapolis, MD 21401-0486
Dear Chairman Burger:
As you are aware, there has been widespread national concern about the reliability
and security of electronic voting systems. Many states have decertified Diebold voting
machines, including those similar to the ones used in Maryland, because certain
components were never subjected to federal testing. In light of these recent national
decertifications and the Maryland General Assembly’s decision to override my vetoes of
bills implementing early voting and allowing voters to cast ballots anywhere in the state,
I no longer have confidence in the State Board of Elections’ ability to conduct fair and
accurate elections in 2006.
California, Pennsylvania, and dozens of local jurisdictions recently have
decertified or denied certification to the Diebold voting machines pending further testing
by federal authorities, citing, among other concerns, the potential for manipulation of
election results due to the susceptibility to tampering of the vote-counting memory cards.
In response, the Independent Testing Authority (ITA) has been reviewing Diebold voting
systems and their electronic components for almost two months and has not released any
findings. The State Administrator issued a letter to Diebold requesting daily status
reports on the testing, but to my knowledge, no information has been shared with the
State Board of Elections members, the Administration or the General Assembly about the
implications for Maryland with regard to this testing.
It is imperative that I receive accurate information on the potential consequences
that these test results may have on Maryland’s ability to conduct fair and accurate
elections this year. In discussions with my staff, you have stated that members of the
State Board of Elections have not received regular updates on the testing controversy. I
believe that it is time for the Board to get aggressive in responding to citizens’ concerns
over public confidence in the elections system.
I am also disheartened by the unresponsiveness of the State Administrator to the
issue of voter verification. It is my personal belief that the voters of Maryland should be
allowed to vote a paper ballot or have a voter verification paper-trail to electronic voting
as reassurance to voters that their votes are being accurately cast. Therefore, I had
requested that the Commission on the Administration of Elections chaired by George
Beall, evaluate the potential for the introduction of this technology in Maryland. The
Commission intended to rely on the report commissioned by the State Board of Elections
and being compiled by Dr. Donald Norris of UMBC. That report was due to be
completed in early December. I am sure that you share my disappointment that Dr.
Norris’ report still has not yet been released and that the Beall Commission has been
unable to complete its work.
I also continue to be troubled by the rapidly escalating costs of election
administration in Maryland, especially in comparison to fiscal estimates that were
prepared for the General Assembly. In 2001, Governor Glendening signed House Bill
1457 requiring the State Board of Elections to select and implement a uniform statewide
voting system. At that time, the General Assembly’s fiscal note for House Bill 1457
estimated that the total cost would be $36,890,000. The actual cost, which has been
financed by the State Treasurer was $65,564,674 – an almost 78 % increase from the
original cost estimate. However, this misjudgment pales in comparison to the 1000%
increase for estimates of the annual maintenance costs for this system. The 2001 fiscal
note estimated such maintenance would be $858,000. For the upcoming fiscal year, the
State Board of Elections requested $9,528,597 for these costs. The cost of Maryland’s
Diebold voting machines has skyrocketed as our confidence in the system has
plummeted.
In 2005, the State Board of Elections provided a fiscal estimate of $175,000 for
the State costs associated with an early voting program, which will now be implemented
because the General Assembly overrode my veto. Astonishingly, the State Administrator
recently submitted a supplemental budget request that increases these statewide costs
from $175,000 to $11.5 million. Ironically, the supplemental budget justification
provided by the State Administrator focuses on the potential for voter fraud and strikingly
echoes the findings of the Beall Commission and the concerns raised in the floor debate
by those opposed to the legislation.
These repeated instances of inaccurate fiscal estimates damage the credibility of
the State Board of Elections and makes an informed judgment by the General Assembly
of the fiscal implications of electronic voting and early voting impossible. The State
Board of Elections continues to pursue an electronic fix at a time when electronic
technology for voter registration is untested in Maryland and could create more problems
than it solves. I do not want to repeat the mistakes made in 2001 when Maryland adopted
emerging technology without understanding fully the potential consequences of a new era
of electronics in election administration.
At the least, we should re-evaluate our position as of February 2006 – just a mere
seven months before the primary election. It is essential the State Board of Elections
aggressively advocate its previously adopted position before the General Assembly that
any early voting program be deferred until the 2008 election and that legislation be
passed to enact this deferral.
I also direct the State Board of Elections provide me with a written report by
February 28th that addresses each of the issues cited below:
Diebold Voting Systems
1. What specific electronic components are being tested by the ITA and how does it
relate to the Diebold voting systems used in Maryland?
2. Have other jurisdictions decertified or failed to certify any version of the Diebold
Optical Scan or Touch Screen (DRE) systems used in Maryland?
3. What does the Maryland Election Law statute provide regarding the certification
of election systems? Under what circumstances does it require the State to
decertify an elections system?
4. What is the State Board of Elections’ contingency plan if the current voting
system is decertified, or otherwise found to be incapable of administering a 2006
election free of any charges of compromise?
5. Can new machines be successfully procured for use in the 2006 elections?
6. What are the likely mitigation steps necessary to ensure public confidence in our
elections system?
Voter Verification Systems
1. When will the Voter Verification Study conducted by UMBC be available for
review?
2. What is the State Board of Elections’ plan if the General Assembly requires the
Board to purchase a voter verified paper audit trail or optical scan machines to
replace the current system in time for the 2006 elections?
3. What voter verification system technologies are compatible with our current
voting system?
4. Could we acquire and implement a statewide voter verification system for the
2006 elections?
5. What is the estimated cost to the State to acquire a voter verification system for
the 2006 elections?
6. How do the costs of a statewide voter verification system compare to the costs of
implementing a statewide optical scan system?
Early Voting
1. What is the State Board of Elections’ plan for implementing Early Voting for the
2006 elections?
2. What is the position of the county and local boards of election on the
implementation of early voting for the 2006 election?
3. What is the State Board of Elections’ plan for administering early voting in a
secure manner if the State is unable to purchase electronic pollbooks for the 2006
elections?
Finally, I want to express my disappointment with the State Board of Elections’
staff. The State Board of Elections is intended to be an independent, non-partisan agency
and should not take positions on partisan election law issues. While I expect the
Elections Administrator and her staff to testify on all issues relating to the administration
of elections as directed by their Board, it has become evident that they have been working
primarily on behalf of partisan legislators and their interests and not on the interests of
the citizens of Maryland. A recent legislative briefing revealed actions by a staff member
of the Board of Elections where he was surreptitiously advocating to override the
Governor’s veto in direct opposition with the Board’s position. The recurring lack of
judgment by the State Board of Elections’ staff cannot not be tolerated. I urge the State
Board of Elections to restore the independence and fairness of the elections office;
otherwise we risk losing public confidence in Maryland's election processes.
Very truly yours,
Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.
Governor
cc: The Honorable William Donald Schaefer, Comptroller
The Honorable Nancy K. Kopp, State Treasurer
The Honorable Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr., President of the Senate
The Honorable Michael E. Busch, Speaker of the House
Members, Governor’s Commission on the Administration of Elections
Cecilia Januszkiewicz, Secretary of Budget and Management

http://www.bradblog.com/docs/EhrlichLetter_021506.pdf

Thanks for all the info wunder - it is much appreciated.

FYI - (it's a$$ kicking time)
black box voting -
http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/discus.cgi

Posted on Tuesday, February 21, 2006 - 07:13 pm by Bev Harris
As California goes, so goes the nation. While a $4 billion company and the California secretary of state flaunt the law, an honest citizen is charged with a felony and may face jail time. His crime? Releasing documents describing Diebold's criminal acts.

We will release a full story on the courageous Steve Heller shortly. You could not ask for a more pure and honest whistleblower. This is a man who saw something that he knew was wrong, and made sure it got to authorities. Soon after his documents got to the California secretary of state and to the California attorney general, then-sec. state Kevin Shelley decertified Diebold and recommended criminal prosecution of Diebold.

THE ONLY PERSON PROSECUTED, HOWEVER...

The only one who was prosecuted is a quiet honest citizen who made sure the documents reached authorities. It is now two years later. The Los Angeles County District Attorney has waited until the attention was off the election to quietly prosecute Steve Heller.

While Steve Heller is charged with felonies for (a) looking at a computer screen [no kidding, that's the charge] and (B) making a copy, and © having said copy delivered to the authorities, the new Calif. secretary of state is engaging in a frightening pattern of ignoring the law.

This situation, as well as the situation that follows, has implications for all of America. If these behaviors -- and retaliatory consequences -- are allowed to stand, our nation will, sooner or later, be torn apart at the seams.

An open letter from Black Box Voting to Bruce McPherson

Dear Secretary McPherson,

On March 1st your office will hold hearings on new or revised voting systems.

We cannot comment on those specific systems because your staff did not do timely release of the staff reports as promised.

But it hardly matters in this instance. The process by which your agency certifies voting machines is dysfunctional and illegal under California law. Your willingness to tolerate this disregard for the law and basic democratic principles shocks and disheartens us.

We write today to provide documented examples of unfair and illegal processes.

At present your certification process operates according to your published "10 steps":

http://ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/...rtification.pdf

It is devoid of details and is being ignored by your agency whenever convenient.

It is also illegal on its face.

California Election Code 19205 reads:

19205. The Secretary of State shall establish the specifications for and the regulations governing voting machines, voting devices, vote tabulating devices, and any software used for each, including the programs and procedures for vote tabulating and testing. The criteria for establishing the specifications and regulations shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) The machine or device and its software shall be suitable for the purpose for which it is intended.
(B) The system shall preserve the secrecy of the ballot.
© The system shall be safe from fraud or manipulation.

As your office is fully aware, you've established no such regulations. Your office was notified of this legal requirement almost a year ago by the activist community but you've ignored it. So far as we can tell there isn't even a published draft regulation, never mind a public commentary process.

This isn't a technicality. It is the difference between a democratic process and autocracy.

Worse, with no standards "cast in stone" your various underlings can make up the rules as they go along. For years now smaller companies with fewer political connections have been stymied by the constantly shifting and conflicting nature of your agency’s certification program. Without the required regulations, companies without political connections cannot ascertain the actual rules from the agency insiders who are making them up as they go along.

If we look at the recent certification of Diebold's latest products the problems are obvious:

1) Public commentary ran 100% against Diebold. It was ignored. The meeting was run in an autocratic fashion, limiting public input by banning "time waiving" by groups wanting to put their best speakers forward. Questions from the public to vendor and certification staff were banned with no explanation. Questions of this nature are common practice among water boards, the Public Utilities Commission and other democratic bodies. Contrary to past practices, your agency has so far not published the meeting transcripts or written public testimony from the Diebold hearing on your website. To what lengths will you and your staff (particularly Bruce McDannold) go to protect Diebold Election Systems Inc?!

2) By late December of 2005 your office after much weirdness finally put questions to the Federal ITA (Wyle) regarding the memory cards and interpreted code. This was at least an acknowledgement that the initial Federal certification process failed, given that interpreted code is flat banned under the 2002 FEC standards that are legally mandated in California.

3) Your report dated Feb. 14th makes it dead clear that the interpreted code issue is real. Therefore Diebold’s Federal certification is fraudulent. If the factual foundation of an argument is proven flawed, the argument must be scrapped if no remaining support exists.

http://ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/...e_diebold_accub asic_interpreter.pdf

The so-called "mitigations" in the Berkeley Report won't work.

It's worth noting that many of the "mitigation steps" are complex enough, costly enough or require enough extra manpower that the odds of the "mitigations" being fully implemented in all Diebold customer counties borders on zero.

4) Wyle has done nothing so far with your requested overview of memory card and interpreted code structures. No shock there; if they comment negatively about the interpreted code and glaring security holes regarding the memory cards, somebody might ask how they missed it the first time. If they gloss it over they’ll get fired as the issues are obvious enough that a quick review by the team you selected caught the problems right away.

5) Despite the "Federal certification required" language of California law, the failure of the federal labs to respond to you and your own "10 steps" requiring Federal certification, you certified Diebold last week.

Your agency under your administration doesn't treat the rule of law or democratic principles with any semblance of respect.

Your office is apparently ignoring the public records request for certification-related documents put to you by the Senate Elections committee.

You've done one thing right. Your Berkeley team has proven that the Federal certification process is broken. That is your salvation; it’s what will keep the US-DOJ at bay from enforcing the purchasing deadlines in HAVA without having enforced either the deadlines or effective process in Federal certification to provide good systems to purchase. Your office has confirmed that the Federal certification process is broken. Your office must take the position that this broken process cannot be used to force noncompliant products down the throats of the California citizenry.

Secretary McPherson, put it on hold.

Cancel the hearing.

Hold a hearing on the certification process instead, or at least start cooperating with the Senate Election Committee hearings.

Bring democracy into your agency. Entrenched forces among the California registrars led by Conny McCormack will pitch a fit. Your responsibility is to the letter of the law and to the people of this state.

Stand up for California or step down and let somebody else do so.


CITIZENS: MAKE FIVE CONTACTS TO GET SUBPOENAS

The message is simple:

Support subpoenas for the elections committee.

The target audience is just five senators: The California Senate Rules Committee.

Contact list: Email, Fax, Call -- Senate rules committee to issue subpoenas:

Senator Don Perata (Chair) - may want to call him as well as email. California citizens, use the form at his site to send messages also.
(916) 651-4009 mailto:Senator.Perata@sen.ca.gov
(510) 286-1333

Senator Jim Battin (Vice-Chair)
(916) 651-4037
mailto:Jim.Battin@sen.ca.gov

Senator Roy Ashburn
(916) 651-4018
mailto:senator.ashburn@sen.ca.gov

Senator Debra Bowen
(916) 651-4028 (Prefers email: mailto:Debra@debrabowen.comYes, call her too so she can log the support calls, it's important since it allows her to back her position from the grassroots.)

Senator Gilbert Cedillo
(916) 651-4022
Call and, California citizens - use the form at his site to send your message as well.


PERMISSION TO REPRINT GRANTED WITH LINK TO http://www.blackboxvoting.org

THIS IS IMPORTANT STUFF!

Skippy the Bush Kangaroo has some important information concerning the Diebold machines. Go to the page and call McPherson's number.

Thank you, VMaus! Done!

Thank you..Done!

Blogged by Brad on 2/23/2006 @ 11:36pm PT...

Incredibly Bad Press for Diebold...From Coast to Coast...
No, Seriously, Really Bad...
PLUS: Skippy Calls the Secretary of State!

Diebold continues to run their previously good name into the ground, as the Mainstream Media finally begins to notice what's been going on around here...Finally, the unAmerican Voting Machine Company...

Diebold continues to run their previously good name into the ground, as the Mainstream Media finally begins to notice what's been going on around here...Finally, the unAmerican Voting Machine Company who originally brung you the War on Democracy, seems to be getting the incredibly bad press they've always deserved...Now from coast to coast...

In today's LA Times (in the Business section, because your elections are big business!) Michael Hiltzik condemns the recent inexplicable re-certification of Diebold in California:

[T]here's no excuse for exposing the integrity of our election system to computer hackers. Yet that's what California Secretary of State Bruce McPherson may have done last week by approving electronic voting machines from Diebold Election Systems for use in California elections through the end of this year.
...
As the last two presidential elections demonstrate, ballot results are of profound interest to everybody — including determined hackers with partisan agendas. Therefore, it's proper to demand of the high-tech machines replacing the paper ballots and punch cards of yore that they be technologically bulletproof. The Diebold systems certified by McPherson — an optical scanner that reads hand-marked ballots and a touch screen that totes up votes directly — fall well short of that standard.

And there's much more...This in regard to the panel assembled by McPherson to study the issue, after whose brutal report, he went ahead and -- incredibly -- re-certified the machines anyway!

The panel found 16 software bugs that could cede "complete control" of the system to hackers who might then "change vote totals, modify reports, change the names of candidates, change the races being voted on," and even crash the machines, bringing an election to a halt. Hackers wouldn't need to know passwords or cryptographic keys, or have access to any other part of the system, to do their dirty work. Voters, candidates and election monitors wouldn't necessarily know they'd been rooked.

The bugs lead some computer professionals to believe that Diebold's software designers never treated security as a high priority. "It's like they were making a mechanical device, and never heard of computer security," says David Dill, an expert in electronic voting at Stanford University who wasn't on the panel.

And then there was Tom Elias in today's column for Torrance Daily Breeze (syndicated in many other papers, as well):

You can call it capitulation to local election officials likely to be called on the carpet if it turned out they had wasted tens of millions of dollars. You can call it practicality, assuring that California counties can put the most modern election equipment into use this year.

But the undeniable fact is that millions of voters in as many as 21 counties will be voting this year on machines that can be hacked to alter election results.
...
Although an evaluation by University of California, Berkeley computer experts concluded that hackers can easily change election results on them, thousands of Diebold machines will be in place for the June primary.
...
"We found a number of security vulnerabilities," said that study, whose authors include some of America's most determined critics of electronic voting. "We determined that anyone who has access to a memory card ... and can (modify its contents) ... can indeed modify the election results from that machine in a number of ways."

Well, heck, with rave reviews like that, no wonder McPherson re-certified 'em!

Speaking of which, our new pal Skippy the Bush Kangaroo called the Secretary of State today to register his complaint about recertification. Guess what Skippy found out?

Meanwhile, on the other coast, out in Diebold's one-time "showcase state" of Maryland where the Republican Governor recently declared he "no longer [has] confidence in the State Board of Elections’ ability to conduct fair and accurate elections in 2006" on Diebold's machinery, Mike Himowitz in the Baltimore Sun rages against the machines and the pitfalls of secret software used to count our votes:

With every jurisdiction in Maryland now using the same system, all it takes to ruin an entire statewide election is a single glitch in a single line of that secret code.

In the systems business, this is known as a computer monoculture. It's a term borrowed from agriculture to describe a large area planted in a single crop - and hence vulnerable to devastating damage from a single source. Maryland is completely planted with Diebold's electronic cotton - all it needs for disaster is one electronic boll weevil.

To all of this criticism, Linda H. Lamone, the state election administrator has had one response: "Trust us."

Well, I don't and you shouldn't. Elections aren't based on trust. They're based on verifiable results. You can't throw technology at a problem and throw common sense out the window. There's no way to fix this system. I don't care how much we've spent on it.

Ouch. We suppose the boyz in North Canton, OH, would be wise to find a buyer soon...before the lawsuits start hittin'.

http://www.bradblog.com/archives/00002465.htm

If you follow some of the BradBlog links, you'll eventually end up with the Sec of State's phone number. I could post it here but you'll miss too much fun information if I make it easy for you. The best place to end up is at Skippy

Anyhow, I called S of S yesterday; lady was real nice and, apparently, has been receiving a ton of calls. The number to which she forwarded my call was an answering machine- can you guess why?

Hope all of this is going to make a difference...

Thank you all for following up on this. Keep them calls and letters goin'; tell your friends...

WS

looks like we posted this about the same time, if they need to be merged it's ok with me

http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/for...=0&#entry498761

As California goes, so goes the nation

Well it certainly didn't work with Bush!

Thanks for the site vet65/69!

cynic...

thanks for the letter template... I was having trouble saying what needed to be said in a way that makes sense.

By the way, even if you're not from California, you can still e-mail or snail mail. Say what needs to be said.

I wanted to run this up the flag pole again!

KT

and I'm saluting.

i sent my emails, and that Gilbert Cedillo web site wouldn't let me post a email i think i will use maybe arnolds address

Remember Vet: There's always snailmail, and it works, too.