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Outside View: Iraq army making major progress
By Anthony H. Cordesman
UPI Outside View Commentator
Published February 17, 2006
WASHINGTON -- Iraq forces are making major progress that should provide a new degree of legitimacy and popularity to the Iraqi government and allow the Coalition to reduce its forces.
There are, however, still many problems in Iraqi force development, particularly in the security forces in the Ministry of the Interior and in the police forces. Outside aid will still be needed for some years.
Equally important, political and military success are interdependent. The new Iraqi forces can only success if the Iraqi political process succeeds. Political success requires security. At the same time, if a government does not emerge that cannot include a large number of Sunnis, and undercuts popular and political support for the insurgency, the efforts to develop Iraqi forces may be in vain. An Iraqi government that is Shiite and Kurdish dominated, uses its forces against Sunnis and not simply the insurgents, is a recipe for civil war.
In spite of the problems facing Iraqi forces, they have made major progress. Changes in the U.S.-led Coalition advisory effort have led to steadily higher selection and training standards and better equipment and facilities. Embedding U.S. training teams in each new Iraqi unit, and pairing them with U.S. combat units until they could operate on their own, has made a major qualitative difference in the field. More and more Iraqi units have come on-line.
The end result is that the Coalition now sees three pillars for the successful ISF development. The first is proper training and equipping of the ISF. The second is the assignment of transition teams; third is the partnership with coalition forces. The corresponding development of fully effective Ministries of Defense and Interior may well be becoming a fourth.
As of late January 2006, Iraqi forces already totaled some 227,300 personnel. These included 106,900 in the armed forces under the Ministry of Defense: 105,600 army, some 500 air force, and some 800 navy. They included 120,400 in the police and security forces under the Ministry of Interior: 82,400 police and highway patrol, and 38,000 other MOI forces.
A total of some 130 army and special police battalions, with some 500-800 men each, were fighting in the insurgency. This was seven more battalions than in late October. The army alone had built up to 102 battalions, approach a current goal of 110 combat battalions.
By early December, a total of 50 battalions were at Level 1-3 readiness and active in dealing with the insurgency. In March 2005, there were only three battalions manning their own areas --all in Baghdad, 24 battalions were in charge of their own battle space in October and 33 in late December. In January 2006, the U.S. Army transferred an area of operation to an entire Iraqi army division for the first time in Qadissiya and Wassit provinces, an active combat area south of Baghdad. In early February 2006, 40 of the army's 102 battalions had taken over security in the areas where they operated, and in contested areas, such as parts of Fallujah, Ramadi and Samarra.
This progress occurred in spite of the fact that the Sunni Arab insurgents focused their attacks on fellow Iraqis and hit hard at every element of Iraqi forces. The insurgents also struck at virtually every other element of Iraqi society, and attacked Shi'ite Arab and Kurdish political leaders, religious figures and journalists, other members of the Iraqi elite, and ordinary citizens -- often in the form of suicide bombings that created mass casualties. The most extreme Sunni Islamists clearly had the goal of paralyzing the Iraqi political process, and such extremist groups attacked Shi'ite and Kurds in a way that seemed designed to provoke a major civil conflict.
Such progress, however, is not yet sufficient to guarantee either any meaningful force of Iraqi victory.
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(Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair of Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. This article is extracted from the executive summary to his February study on Iraqi force development and is reprinted with permission.)
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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of World Peace Herald or United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)