March 8, 2006
Elite Troops Get Expanded Role on Intelligence
By THOM SHANKER and SCOTT SHANE
WASHINGTON, March 7 — The military is placing small teams of Special Operations troops in a growing number of American embassies to gather intelligence on terrorists in unstable parts of the world and to prepare for potential missions to disrupt, capture or kill them.
Senior Pentagon officials and military officers say the effort is part of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld's two-year drive to give the military a more active intelligence role in the campaign against terrorism. But it has drawn opposition from traditional intelligence agencies like the C.I.A., where some officials have viewed it as a provocative expansion into what has been their turf.
Officials said small groups of Special Operations personnel, sometimes just one or two at a time, have been sent to more than a dozen embassies in Africa, Southeast Asia and South America. These are regions where terrorists are thought to be operating, planning attacks, raising money or seeking safe haven.
Their assignment is to gather information to assist in planning counterterrorism missions, and to help local militaries conduct counterterrorism missions of their own, officials said.
The new mission could become a major responsibility for the military's fast-growing Special Operations Command, which was authorized by President Bush in March 2004 to take the lead in military operations against terrorists. Its new task could give the command considerable clout in organizing the nation's overall intelligence efforts.
The Special Operations command reports to Mr. Rumsfeld, and falls outside the orbit controlled by John D. Negroponte, the newly established director of national intelligence, who oversees all the nation's intelligence agencies. An episode that took place early in the effort underscored the danger and sensitivity of the work, even for soldiers trained for secret combat missions.
In Paraguay a year and a half ago, members of one of the first of these "Military Liaison Elements" to be deployed were pulled out of the country after killing a robber armed with a pistol and a club who attacked them as they stepped out of a taxi, officials said. Though the shooting had nothing to do with their mission, the episode embarrassed senior embassy officials, who had not been told the team was operating in the country.
One official who was briefed on the events, but was not authorized to discuss them, said the soldiers were not operating out of the embassy, but out of a hotel.
Now, officials at the Special Operations Command say, no teams may arrive without the approval of the local ambassador, and the soldiers are based in embassies and are trained to avoid high-profile missteps.
Under guidelines established by Mr. Negroponte, the C.I.A. station chief assigned to most American embassies coordinates American intelligence in those countries.
Most embassies also include defense attachés, military personnel who work with foreign armed forces and report to the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. But the new special operations personnel have a more direct military role: to satisfy the military's new counterterrorism responsibilities, officials said.
Special Operations forces include the Army Green Berets and Rangers, the Navy Seals, the Marines and special Air Force crews that carry out the most specialized or secret military missions. Their skills range from quick strikes to long-range reconnaissance in hostile territory, military training and medical care.
The creation of the Military Liaison Elements, and the broader tug-of-war over the Special Operations Command's new role, appear to have exacerbated the disorganization, even distrust, that critics in Congress and the academic world have said permeates the government's counterterrorism efforts.
Officials involved in the debate say the situation may require President Bush and his senior national security and defense advisers to step in as referees, setting boundaries and clarifying the orders of the military and other intelligence agencies.
Many current and former C.I.A. officials view the plans by the Special Operations Command, or Socom, as overreaching.
"The Department of Defense is very eager to step up its involvement in counterterrorism activities, and it has set its sights on traditional C.I.A. operational responsibilities and authorities," said John O. Brennan, a 25-year C.I.A. officer who headed the National Counterterrorism Center before retiring last year. "Quite unfortunately, the C.I.A.'s important lead role in many of these areas is being steadily eroded, and the current militarization of many of the nation's intelligence functions and responsibilities will be viewed as a major mistake in the very near future."
Mr. Brennan, now president of the Analysis Corporation, an intelligence contractor in Virginia, said that if Socom operations were closely coordinated with host countries and American ambassadors, "U.S. interests could be very well served."
But, he added, "if the planned Socom presence in U.S. embassies abroad is an effort to pave the way for unilateral U.S. military operations or to enable defense elements to engage in covert action activities separate from the C.I.A., U.S. problems abroad will be certain to increase significantly."
Paul Gimigliano, a spokesman for the C.I.A., gave a measured response to the program, but emphasized the importance of the agency's station chief in each country.
"There is plenty of work to go around," he said, adding: "One key to success is that intelligence activities in a given country be coordinated, a process in which the chief of station plays a crucial role."
A State Department official said late Tuesday, "We don't have any issue with D.O.D. concerning this," using the initials for Department of Defense. The State Department official said the Military Liaison Element program was set up so that "authority is preserved" for the ambassador or the head of the embassy.
The Special Operations Command has not publicly disclosed the Military Liaison Element mission, and answered questions about the effort only after it was described by officials in other parts of the government who oppose the program.
"M.L.E.'s play a key role in enhancing military, interagency and host nation coordination and planning," said Kenneth S. McGraw, a spokesman for the Special Operations Command, based in Tampa, Fla. The special operations personnel work "with the U.S. ambassador and country team's knowledge to plan and coordinate activities," he added.
Officials involved with the program said its focus is on intelligence and planning and not on conducting combat missions. One official outside the military, who has been briefed on the work but is not authorized to discuss it publicly, said more than 20 teams have been deployed, and that plans call for the effort to be significantly expanded.
In a major shift of the military's center of gravity, the Unified Command Plan signed by President Bush in 2004 says the Special Operations Command now "leads, plans, synchronizes, and as directed, executes global operations against terrorist networks," in addition to its more traditional assignment to train, organize and equip Special Operations forces for missions under regional commanders.
Recently, Gen. Bryan D. Brown, the Socom commander, and his staff have produced a counterterrorism strategy that runs more than 600 pages. It is expected to be presented to Mr. Rumsfeld in the next few weeks for final approval.
According to civilian and military officials who have read or were briefed on the document, it sets forth specific targets, missions and deadlines for action, both immediate and long-term.
One goal of the document is to set the conditions for activity wherever the military may wish to act in the future, to make areas inhospitable to terrorists and to gather the kind of information that the Special Operations Command may need to operate.
The problem is difficult in nations where the American military is not based in large numbers, and in particular where the United States is not at war. Thus, the Military Liaison Elements may not be required in notable hot spots, like parts of the Middle East, where the American military is already deployed in large numbers.
During recent travels abroad, General Brown has sought to explain the program to C.I.A. and F.B.I. officials based at embassies. Joining him for those talks is a political adviser on full-time assignment from the State Department.
Socom also held a conference in Tampa last summer to brief Special Operations commanders from other nations, followed by a session in October for Washington-based personnel from foreign embassies on a range of counterterrorism issues.
One former Special Operations team member said the trick to making the program work is to navigate the bureaucratic rivalries within embassies — and back at the command's headquarters. "All you have to do is make the ambassador, the station chief and Socom all think you are working just for them," he said on condition of anonymity, because he was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.
Lee H. Hamilton, who served as vice chairman of the national commission on the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, said that conflict between the C.I.A. and the Defense Department over paramilitary operations has occurred periodically for decades, and that the 9/11 commission had recommended that the Defense Department be given the lead responsibility for such activity.
But he said the embassy program raised a different issue. "If you have two or three D.O.D. guys wandering around a country, it could certainly cause some problems," Mr. Hamilton said. "It raises the question of just who is in charge of intelligence collection."
The cold war presented the military with targets that were easy to find but hard to kill, like a Soviet armored division. The counterterrorism mission presents targets that are hard to find but relatively easy to kill, like a Qaeda leader.
General Brown and the Special Operations Command now work according to a concept that has become the newest Pentagon catchphrase: "find, fix, finish and follow-up" — shorthand for locating terrorist leaders, tracking them precisely, capturing or killing them, and then using the information gathered to plan another operation.
"The military is great at fixing enemies, and finishing them off, and exploiting any base of operations that we take," said one Special Operations commander on condition of anonymity, because he was not authorized to discuss the matter publicly. "But the 'find' part remains a primitive art. Socom can't kill or capture the bad guys unless the intel people can find them, and this is just not happening."
Lowell Bergman contributed reporting for this article.
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Blaming the victims as Iraq disintegrates
By Stephen Zunes
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)
The sectarian violence which has swept across Iraq following last month's terrorist bombing of the Shi'ite Golden Mosque in Samarra is yet another example of the tragic consequences of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. Until the 2003 US invasion and occupation, Iraq had maintained a longstanding history of secularism and a strong national identity among its Arab population despite its sectarian differences.
Not only has the United States failed to bring a functional democracy to Iraq, neither US forces nor the US-backed Iraqi government in Baghdad have been able to provide the Iraqi people with basic security. This has led many ordinary citizens to turn to extremist sectarian groups for protection, further undermining the Bush administration's insistence that US forces must remain in Iraq in order to prevent a civil war.
Top analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency and State Department, as well as large numbers of Middle East experts, warned that a US invasion of Iraq could result in a violent ethnic and sectarian conflict. Even some of the war's intellectual architects acknowledged as much: in a 1997 paper, prior to becoming major figures in the Bush foreign policy team, David Wurmser, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith predicted that a post-Saddam Iraq would likely be "ripped apart" by sectarianism and other cleavages but called on the US to "expedite" such a collapse anyway.
As a result, the tendency in the US to blame "sectarian conflict" and "long-simmering hatreds" for the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq is, in effect, blaming the victim.
Fostering fragmentation
One of the longstanding goals of such neo-conservative intellectuals has been to see the Middle East broken up into smaller ethnic or sectarian mini-states, which would include not only large stateless nationalities like the Kurds, but Maronite Christians, Druze, Arab Shi'ites and others.
Such a policy comes not out of respect for the right of self-determination - indeed, the neo-cons have been steadfast opponents of the Palestinians' desire for statehood, even alongside a secure Israel - but out of an imperial quest for divide-and-rule.
The division of the Middle East has long been seen as a means of countering the threat of pan-Arab nationalism and, more recently, pan-Islamist movements. Given the mosaic of ethnicities and sects in the Middle East, with various groupings having mixed together within both urban and rural settings for many generations, the establishment of such ethnic or sectarian mini-states would almost certainly result in forced population transfers, ethnic cleansing and other human suffering.
The risk of Iraq breaking up into a Sunni Kurdish state, a Sunni Arab state and a Shi'ite Arab state is now very real. And, given the intermixing of these populations in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and scores of other cities, the potential exists for the most violent breakup of a country since the partition of India 60 years ago. Recent weeks have shown ominous signs of what may be yet to come on a massive scale, as scores of Shi'ite families were forced to flee what were once mixed neighborhoods in and around Baghdad.
Even barring a formal breakup of the country, the prospects of a stable, unified country look bleak. As the Los Angeles Times reported on February 26, "The outlines of a future Iraq are emerging: a nation where power is scattered among clerics turned warlords; control over schools, hospitals, railroads, and roads is divided along sectarian lines; graft and corruption subvert good governance; and foreign powers exert influence only over a weak central government."
Much of Iraq's current divisions can be traced to the decision of US occupation authorities immediately following the conquest to abolish the Iraqi army and purge the government bureaucracy - both bastions of secularism - thereby creating a vacuum which was soon filled by sectarian parties and militias.
In addition, the US occupation authorities - in an apparent effort of divide-and-rule - encouraged sectarianism by dividing up authority based not on technical skills or ideological affiliation but ethnic and religious identity. As with Lebanon, however, such efforts have actually exacerbated divisions, with virtually every political question debated not on its merits, but on which group it potentially benefits or harms. This has led to great instability, with political parties, parliamentary blocs and government ministries breaking down along sectarian lines.
Even army divisions are separated, with parts of western Baghdad being patrolled by army units dominated by Sunnis while eastern Baghdad is being patrolled by Shi'ite-dominated units. Without unifying national institutions, the breakup of the country remains a real possibility.
Sectarian conflicts
Theologically, there are fewer differences between Sunnis and Shi'ites than there are between Catholics and Protestants. In small Iraqi towns of mixed populations with only one mosque, Sunnis and Shi'ites worship together. Intermarriage is not uncommon. This harmony is now threatening to unravel.
Shi'ite Muslims, unlike the Sunni Muslims, have a clear hierarchy. (Ayatollahs, for example, are essentially the equivalent of Catholic cardinals.) As a result, the already-existing clerical-based social structures in the Shi'ite community were among the few organizations to survive Saddam's totalitarian regime and were therefore more easily capable of organizing themselves politically when US forces overthrew the government in Baghdad in 2003. Sunni and secular groupings, then, found themselves at a relative disadvantage when they suddenly found themselves free to organize.
As a result, the US initially insisted on indefinite rule by Iraqis picked directly or indirectly by Washington. However, when hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites took to the streets in January 2004 demanding the right to choose their country's leaders, the Bush administration reluctantly agreed to hold direct elections.
Having been dominated by Sunnis under the Ba'athists, the Hashemites and the Ottomans, the Shi'ite majority was eager to rule. Not surprisingly, elections have brought Shi'ite religious parties to power which have since marginalized other groups and imposed their repressive and misogynist version of Islamic law in parts of Iraq where they dominate, particularly in the south of the country.
Sunni opposition to Shi'ite dominance does not just stem from resentment at losing their privileged position in Iraqi political life under the former dictatorship. Indeed, Saddam suppressed his fellow Sunni Arabs along with Sunni Kurds and Shi'ite Arabs.
What US officials have failed to recognize is that Iraq's Sunni Arab minority, regardless of its feelings about Saddam's regime, has long identified with Arab nationalism. Not surprisingly, the armed resistance which emerged following Saddam's removal from power three years ago has come largely from the Sunni Arab community.
The insurgency has also targeted the US-backed Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government, which came to power as a result of the US invasion and which many see as being puppets of the US occupation. They also fear that the Iraqi government may identify more with their fellow Shi'ites of Iran than with other Arabs. More radical Sunni chauvinists, many of whom are foreign Salafi extremists like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have engaged in widespread terrorist attacks again Shi'ite civilians and their holy places.
Despite its dependence on the US and ties to Iran, however, the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government has its own agenda. Culturally and linguistically, Iraq's Shi'ites are every bit as Arab as the Sunnis. Yet while the vast majority of the country's Shi'ite Arab majority has no desire to be pawns of either Iran or the US, the response by the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government and Shi'ite militias has done little to lessen Sunni fears and hostility.
Seeing their government faced with a growing insurgency and their community falling victim to terrorist violence, the Shi'ites have responded with aggressive counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations against the Sunni community. Human rights abuses by Shi'ites against the Sunni minority have increased dramatically, polarizing the country still further.
Even before the latest upsurge in sectarian violence, the Baghdad morgue was reporting that dozens of bodies of Sunni men with gunshot wounds to the back of the head would arrive at the same time every week, including scores of corpses with wrists bound by police handcuffs.
Death squads
John Pace, the outgoing head of the United Nations' human rights monitoring group in Iraq, has reported that hundreds of Sunnis are being subjected to summary execution and death from torture every month by Iraqi government death squads, primarily controlled by the Ministry of the Interior.
High-ranking American officers have reported that radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's al-Mehdi Army maintains a strong presence in the regular police force, including up to 90% of the 35,000 officers currently working in the northeastern part of Baghdad. In addition, the Iranian-trained Badr Organization dominates police commando units. A police unit known as the Punishment Committee goes after civilians believed to be flouting Islamic laws or the authority of Shi'ite militia leaders, particularly Sunnis.
The Shi'ite government of Iran, long cited for its human rights abuses by both the Bush administration and reputable human rights organizations, has actively supported Shi'ite militias within the Iraqi government and security forces. (Despite this, the Bush administration and its supporters, including many prominent Democrats, have been putting forth the ludicrous theory that Iran is actually supporting the anti-Shi'ite and anti-American Sunni insurgency.)
Iraq's former interior minister Bayan Jabr was trained by Iran's infamous Revolutionary Guards and later served as a leader of the Badr Organization, the militia of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
Americans have also trained Interior Ministry police and commandos, though - unlike some notorious cases in recent Latin American history - there is little evidence to suggest that US trainers have actively encouraged death squad activity.
Still, there is little question that actions by US occupation troops over the past three years - such as the torture of detainees, the hair-trigger response at checkpoints, the liberal use of force in heavily-populated civilian neighborhoods and the targeted assassinations of suspected insurgent leaders - have contributed to the climate of impunity exhibited by forces of the Iraqi government.
Pace has also observed how US troops are making things worse by rounding up large numbers of innocent young Sunni men and detaining them for months. Noting how such "military intervention causes serious human rights and humanitarian problems to large numbers of innocent civilians", he lamented at the fact that many of these detainees, in reaction to their maltreatment, later joined Sunni terrorist groups following their release.
Despite last month's terrorist bombing of the Shi'ite shrine and the tragic killings that followed, however, there were also impressive signs of unity. In cities throughout Iraq, Sunnis and Shi'ites mobilized to protect each other's mosques and neighborhoods.
Even the young firebrand Shi'ite cleric Muqtada emphasized to his followers, "It was not the Sunnis who attacked the shrine ... but rather the occupation [forces] and Ba'athists." He called on his followers not to attack Sunni mosques and ordered his Mehdi Army to "protect both Shi'ite and Sunni shrines". He went on to say, "My message to the Iraqi people is to stand united and bonded, and not to fall into the Western trap. The West is trying to divide the Iraqi people." In a later interview, Muqtada claimed, "We say that the occupiers are responsible for such crises [Golden Mosque bombing] ... there is only one enemy. The occupier."
Similarly, Sunnis were quick to express their solidarity with Shi'ites in a series of demonstrations in Samarra and elsewhere. Anti-American signs and slogans permeated these marches. Indeed, there is a widespread belief that it was the US, not fellow Muslims or Iraqis, which bears responsibility for the tragedy.
Even Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi claimed the US was responsible for the bombing of the Golden Mosque, "especially since occupation forces did not comply with curfew orders imposed by the Iraqi government". He added, "Evidence indicates that the occupation may be trying to undermine and weaken the Iraqi government."
Though charges of a US conspiracy are presumably groundless, it does underscore the growing opposition by both communities to the ongoing US military presence in their country and how the United States has little credibility left with either community as a mediator, peacekeeper, overseer or anything else.
And it underscores the urgency for the United States to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible.
Stephen Zunes is Middle East editor for Foreign Policy in Focus. He is a professor of politics at the University of San Francisco and the author of Tinderbox: US Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003).
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus )
Blaming the victims as Iraq disintegrates
By Stephen Zunes
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)
The sectarian violence which has swept across Iraq following last month's terrorist bombing of the Shi'ite Golden Mosque in Samarra is yet another example of the tragic consequences of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. Until the 2003 US invasion and occupation, Iraq had maintained a longstanding history of secularism and a strong national identity among its Arab population despite its sectarian differences.
Not only has the United States failed to bring a functional democracy to Iraq, neither US forces nor the US-backed Iraqi government in Baghdad have been able to provide the Iraqi people with basic security. This has led many ordinary citizens to turn to extremist sectarian groups for protection, further undermining the Bush administration's insistence that US forces must remain in Iraq in order to prevent a civil war.
Top analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency and State Department, as well as large numbers of Middle East experts, warned that a US invasion of Iraq could result in a violent ethnic and sectarian conflict. Even some of the war's intellectual architects acknowledged as much: in a 1997 paper, prior to becoming major figures in the Bush foreign policy team, David Wurmser, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith predicted that a post-Saddam Iraq would likely be "ripped apart" by sectarianism and other cleavages but called on the US to "expedite" such a collapse anyway.
As a result, the tendency in the US to blame "sectarian conflict" and "long-simmering hatreds" for the Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq is, in effect, blaming the victim.
Fostering fragmentation
One of the longstanding goals of such neo-conservative intellectuals has been to see the Middle East broken up into smaller ethnic or sectarian mini-states, which would include not only large stateless nationalities like the Kurds, but Maronite Christians, Druze, Arab Shi'ites and others.
Such a policy comes not out of respect for the right of self-determination - indeed, the neo-cons have been steadfast opponents of the Palestinians' desire for statehood, even alongside a secure Israel - but out of an imperial quest for divide-and-rule.
The division of the Middle East has long been seen as a means of countering the threat of pan-Arab nationalism and, more recently, pan-Islamist movements. Given the mosaic of ethnicities and sects in the Middle East, with various groupings having mixed together within both urban and rural settings for many generations, the establishment of such ethnic or sectarian mini-states would almost certainly result in forced population transfers, ethnic cleansing and other human suffering.
The risk of Iraq breaking up into a Sunni Kurdish state, a Sunni Arab state and a Shi'ite Arab state is now very real. And, given the intermixing of these populations in Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk and scores of other cities, the potential exists for the most violent breakup of a country since the partition of India 60 years ago. Recent weeks have shown ominous signs of what may be yet to come on a massive scale, as scores of Shi'ite families were forced to flee what were once mixed neighborhoods in and around Baghdad.
Even barring a formal breakup of the country, the prospects of a stable, unified country look bleak. As the Los Angeles Times reported on February 26, "The outlines of a future Iraq are emerging: a nation where power is scattered among clerics turned warlords; control over schools, hospitals, railroads, and roads is divided along sectarian lines; graft and corruption subvert good governance; and foreign powers exert influence only over a weak central government."
Much of Iraq's current divisions can be traced to the decision of US occupation authorities immediately following the conquest to abolish the Iraqi army and purge the government bureaucracy - both bastions of secularism - thereby creating a vacuum which was soon filled by sectarian parties and militias.
In addition, the US occupation authorities - in an apparent effort of divide-and-rule - encouraged sectarianism by dividing up authority based not on technical skills or ideological affiliation but ethnic and religious identity. As with Lebanon, however, such efforts have actually exacerbated divisions, with virtually every political question debated not on its merits, but on which group it potentially benefits or harms. This has led to great instability, with political parties, parliamentary blocs and government ministries breaking down along sectarian lines.
Even army divisions are separated, with parts of western Baghdad being patrolled by army units dominated by Sunnis while eastern Baghdad is being patrolled by Shi'ite-dominated units. Without unifying national institutions, the breakup of the country remains a real possibility.
Sectarian conflicts
Theologically, there are fewer differences between Sunnis and Shi'ites than there are between Catholics and Protestants. In small Iraqi towns of mixed populations with only one mosque, Sunnis and Shi'ites worship together. Intermarriage is not uncommon. This harmony is now threatening to unravel.
Shi'ite Muslims, unlike the Sunni Muslims, have a clear hierarchy. (Ayatollahs, for example, are essentially the equivalent of Catholic cardinals.) As a result, the already-existing clerical-based social structures in the Shi'ite community were among the few organizations to survive Saddam's totalitarian regime and were therefore more easily capable of organizing themselves politically when US forces overthrew the government in Baghdad in 2003. Sunni and secular groupings, then, found themselves at a relative disadvantage when they suddenly found themselves free to organize.
As a result, the US initially insisted on indefinite rule by Iraqis picked directly or indirectly by Washington. However, when hundreds of thousands of Shi'ites took to the streets in January 2004 demanding the right to choose their country's leaders, the Bush administration reluctantly agreed to hold direct elections.
Having been dominated by Sunnis under the Ba'athists, the Hashemites and the Ottomans, the Shi'ite majority was eager to rule. Not surprisingly, elections have brought Shi'ite religious parties to power which have since marginalized other groups and imposed their repressive and misogynist version of Islamic law in parts of Iraq where they dominate, particularly in the south of the country.
Sunni opposition to Shi'ite dominance does not just stem from resentment at losing their privileged position in Iraqi political life under the former dictatorship. Indeed, Saddam suppressed his fellow Sunni Arabs along with Sunni Kurds and Shi'ite Arabs.
What US officials have failed to recognize is that Iraq's Sunni Arab minority, regardless of its feelings about Saddam's regime, has long identified with Arab nationalism. Not surprisingly, the armed resistance which emerged following Saddam's removal from power three years ago has come largely from the Sunni Arab community.
The insurgency has also targeted the US-backed Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government, which came to power as a result of the US invasion and which many see as being puppets of the US occupation. They also fear that the Iraqi government may identify more with their fellow Shi'ites of Iran than with other Arabs. More radical Sunni chauvinists, many of whom are foreign Salafi extremists like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have engaged in widespread terrorist attacks again Shi'ite civilians and their holy places.
Despite its dependence on the US and ties to Iran, however, the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government has its own agenda. Culturally and linguistically, Iraq's Shi'ites are every bit as Arab as the Sunnis. Yet while the vast majority of the country's Shi'ite Arab majority has no desire to be pawns of either Iran or the US, the response by the Shi'ite-dominated Iraqi government and Shi'ite militias has done little to lessen Sunni fears and hostility.
Seeing their government faced with a growing insurgency and their community falling victim to terrorist violence, the Shi'ites have responded with aggressive counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations against the Sunni community. Human rights abuses by Shi'ites against the Sunni minority have increased dramatically, polarizing the country still further.
Even before the latest upsurge in sectarian violence, the Baghdad morgue was reporting that dozens of bodies of Sunni men with gunshot wounds to the back of the head would arrive at the same time every week, including scores of corpses with wrists bound by police handcuffs.
Death squads
John Pace, the outgoing head of the United Nations' human rights monitoring group in Iraq, has reported that hundreds of Sunnis are being subjected to summary execution and death from torture every month by Iraqi government death squads, primarily controlled by the Ministry of the Interior.
High-ranking American officers have reported that radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's al-Mehdi Army maintains a strong presence in the regular police force, including up to 90% of the 35,000 officers currently working in the northeastern part of Baghdad. In addition, the Iranian-trained Badr Organization dominates police commando units. A police unit known as the Punishment Committee goes after civilians believed to be flouting Islamic laws or the authority of Shi'ite militia leaders, particularly Sunnis.
The Shi'ite government of Iran, long cited for its human rights abuses by both the Bush administration and reputable human rights organizations, has actively supported Shi'ite militias within the Iraqi government and security forces. (Despite this, the Bush administration and its supporters, including many prominent Democrats, have been putting forth the ludicrous theory that Iran is actually supporting the anti-Shi'ite and anti-American Sunni insurgency.)
Iraq's former interior minister Bayan Jabr was trained by Iran's infamous Revolutionary Guards and later served as a leader of the Badr Organization, the militia of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
Americans have also trained Interior Ministry police and commandos, though - unlike some notorious cases in recent Latin American history - there is little evidence to suggest that US trainers have actively encouraged death squad activity.
Still, there is little question that actions by US occupation troops over the past three years - such as the torture of detainees, the hair-trigger response at checkpoints, the liberal use of force in heavily-populated civilian neighborhoods and the targeted assassinations of suspected insurgent leaders - have contributed to the climate of impunity exhibited by forces of the Iraqi government.
Pace has also observed how US troops are making things worse by rounding up large numbers of innocent young Sunni men and detaining them for months. Noting how such "military intervention causes serious human rights and humanitarian problems to large numbers of innocent civilians", he lamented at the fact that many of these detainees, in reaction to their maltreatment, later joined Sunni terrorist groups following their release.
Despite last month's terrorist bombing of the Shi'ite shrine and the tragic killings that followed, however, there were also impressive signs of unity. In cities throughout Iraq, Sunnis and Shi'ites mobilized to protect each other's mosques and neighborhoods.
Even the young firebrand Shi'ite cleric Muqtada emphasized to his followers, "It was not the Sunnis who attacked the shrine ... but rather the occupation [forces] and Ba'athists." He called on his followers not to attack Sunni mosques and ordered his Mehdi Army to "protect both Shi'ite and Sunni shrines". He went on to say, "My message to the Iraqi people is to stand united and bonded, and not to fall into the Western trap. The West is trying to divide the Iraqi people." In a later interview, Muqtada claimed, "We say that the occupiers are responsible for such crises [Golden Mosque bombing] ... there is only one enemy. The occupier."
Similarly, Sunnis were quick to express their solidarity with Shi'ites in a series of demonstrations in Samarra and elsewhere. Anti-American signs and slogans permeated these marches. Indeed, there is a widespread belief that it was the US, not fellow Muslims or Iraqis, which bears responsibility for the tragedy.
Even Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi claimed the US was responsible for the bombing of the Golden Mosque, "especially since occupation forces did not comply with curfew orders imposed by the Iraqi government". He added, "Evidence indicates that the occupation may be trying to undermine and weaken the Iraqi government."
Though charges of a US conspiracy are presumably groundless, it does underscore the growing opposition by both communities to the ongoing US military presence in their country and how the United States has little credibility left with either community as a mediator, peacekeeper, overseer or anything else.
And it underscores the urgency for the United States to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible.
Stephen Zunes is Middle East editor for Foreign Policy in Focus. He is a professor of politics at the University of San Francisco and the author of Tinderbox: US Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003).
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus )
March 8, 2006
C.I.A. Fights Effort by Libby's Lawyers for Bush Briefings
By DAVID JOHNSTON
WASHINGTON, March 7 — The Central Intelligence Agency objected to producing presidential briefing documents sought by lawyers for the former chief of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, according to an affidavit unsealed Tuesday in the C.I.A. leak case.
A C.I.A. official wrote in the affidavit that turning over copies of the highly classified President's Daily Brief would interfere with the agency's responsibilities to provide the president with crucial and timely intelligence.
The briefing., wrote the agency official, Marilyn A. Dorn, is "the most sensitive report" produced by the agency's Directorate of Intelligence, and it is the basis for a continuous dialogue between the president and the country's intelligence agencies.
Lawyers for I. Lewis Libby Jr., the former top Cheney aide charged in the case, requested 300 to 500 documents, related to presidential briefing material from May 2003 to March 2004, as a crucial part of his defense to perjury and obstruction charges.
In response to the agency's objections, Mr. Libby's lawyers said in a court filing on Tuesday that they needed the material to show that the issues Mr. Libby dealt with in the presidential briefs "dwarfed in importance" the matters related to the exposure of the identity of a covert C.I.A. officer, Valerie Wilson.
Ms. Dorn, an information review officer at the National Clandestine Service, wrote that it would take the C.I.A. about nine months to prepare the documents sought by Mr. Libby's lawyers, in part because Mr. Libby did not always receive the same briefing material prepared for the president and the vice president.
The presidential brief is prepared each day by a small staff at the C.I.A, Ms. Dorn wrote. "Moreover, the job would divert their precious time and effort away from their primary task: preparing breaking intelligence for the president's immediate attention," she added.
Copyright 2006The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Work for Us Site Map Back to Top
C.I.A. Fights Effort by Libby's Lawyers for Bush Briefings
By DAVID JOHNSTON
WASHINGTON, March 7 — The Central Intelligence Agency objected to producing presidential briefing documents sought by lawyers for the former chief of staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, according to an affidavit unsealed Tuesday in the C.I.A. leak case.
A C.I.A. official wrote in the affidavit that turning over copies of the highly classified President's Daily Brief would interfere with the agency's responsibilities to provide the president with crucial and timely intelligence.
The briefing., wrote the agency official, Marilyn A. Dorn, is "the most sensitive report" produced by the agency's Directorate of Intelligence, and it is the basis for a continuous dialogue between the president and the country's intelligence agencies.
Lawyers for I. Lewis Libby Jr., the former top Cheney aide charged in the case, requested 300 to 500 documents, related to presidential briefing material from May 2003 to March 2004, as a crucial part of his defense to perjury and obstruction charges.
In response to the agency's objections, Mr. Libby's lawyers said in a court filing on Tuesday that they needed the material to show that the issues Mr. Libby dealt with in the presidential briefs "dwarfed in importance" the matters related to the exposure of the identity of a covert C.I.A. officer, Valerie Wilson.
Ms. Dorn, an information review officer at the National Clandestine Service, wrote that it would take the C.I.A. about nine months to prepare the documents sought by Mr. Libby's lawyers, in part because Mr. Libby did not always receive the same briefing material prepared for the president and the vice president.
The presidential brief is prepared each day by a small staff at the C.I.A, Ms. Dorn wrote. "Moreover, the job would divert their precious time and effort away from their primary task: preparing breaking intelligence for the president's immediate attention," she added.
Copyright 2006The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Work for Us Site Map Back to Top
http://www.counterpunch.org/werther03072006.html
It's an Awful Lot of Money to Makes Us Less Safe and Less Free
Half a Trillion Dollars
By WERTHER
Ever since President Eisenhower's farewell address, there have been sporadic warnings about the Military Industrial Complex. Over the last couple of decades, critics like Ernest Fitzgerald and Chuck Spinney have performed a valuable public service by uncovering the Pentagon's lunatic potlatch schemes and dragging them before the bar of public opinion. Lately, organizations such as the Project on Government Oversight, the Center for Defense Information, and the Committee against Government Waste have been in a continuous pother about the riot of pork-barrel spending in the military budget.
These critiques, entirely accurate as far as they go, yet lull us into a false sense of security. If only we were to institute reform of the Congressional appropriations process, or ban earmarks, or establish a line-item veto, the "good" defense spending (the paean in these critiques is always to "readiness accounts") would no longer be at the mercy of the "bad" defense spending (inserted in the black of night by such felonious rogues as Duke Cunningham).
Let us be plain. Any organization that employs lethal force, operates in secrecy, always gets what it wants, and is unaccountable to the citizens is indistinguishable from a protection racket. And if, in return for surrendering their wallets, the citizenry is made less safe (as the more objective intelligence reports have repeatedly warned about the $300+ billion Iraq war), then some hole-in-corner reform is not going to get us anywhere. The Soviet Union in its senile post-Brezhnev phase had numerous anti-corruption drives, to no avail. The whole rotten edifice collapsed only when the Russian people ceased to believe in the system they had suffered under and placed such childish hopes in.
Although the Duke Cunningham saga achieved screaming headlines, one aspect of it gained almost no notice. When it did, its importance was misinterpreted: Precisely what was MZM Corp., and its spin-off ADCS, ostensibly doing when they weren't pillaging the taxpayers? According to Marcus Stern, the Copley News Service reporter who broke the corruption story, Cunningham was handing out contracts to MZM involving CIFA, the Pentagon's secretive Counterintelligence Field Activity.
Discussing this matter with Brian Lamm on C-Span's 3 March 2006 Washington Journal, Stern misconstrued the significance of the MZM-CIFA link. As Stern would have it, the connection demonstrated Cunningham's perfidy in so far as he was compromising post-9/11 national security by bestowing contracts on a corrupt business that overcharged the government for conducting activity intended to keep us safe from terrorists.
Would that it were that simple, but that would be the facile interpretation. CIFA, as we now know, is a Department of Defense organization that spies on American citizens, in violation of post-Vietnam directives prohibiting the military from conducting surveillance against U.S. citizens on American soil. Precisely replicating the abuses that instigated the ban in the first place, CIFA is collecting dossiers on citizens engaged in lawful political activity, e.g., a group of elderly Quakers in Lakeland, Florida who opposed the government's policy in Iraq.
The charitable interpretation is that a lot of shiftless bureaucrats at the Office of the Secretary of Defense have way too much time and money on their hands.[1] It's not enough that they do a miserable job at what they are constitutionally charged to do -- fight wars -- they apparently can spare the manpower to poke through people's dresser drawers even as they complain about how thin they are stretched due to the Iraq war.
But it is no coincidence that a secret organization which abuses constitutional rights would be mired in corrupt contracting. Inevitably, secrecy without accountability leads to abuse, which in turn leads to rampant corruption. It is a prevalent myth that "toughness," or, if you like, "taking the gloves off," is a sign of business-like efficiency and rectitude. A police department that routinely beats suspects and covers it up is invariably a corrupt one, with officers casually perjuring themselves in trials and valuables conveniently disappearing from evidence lockers.
Thus it is no surprise that CIFA, whose reason for being is abuse of the Constitution, is connected with criminals like Duke Cunningham and Brent Wilkes, ADCS's CEO. Nor should it surprise us that Kyle "Dusty" Foggo, the Executive Director of the CIA, is under investigation by the Pentagon's inspector general for his links to Wilkes. [2]
Is it an occasion for shocked disbelief that Halliburton, the beneficiary of billions of dollars of no-bid contracts, should charge the government (meaning you, the taxpayer) for meals never provided for U.S. troops, gouge for fuel, and simultaneously threaten employees who object to these practices? It is merely an illustration of the nexus between greed and abuse.
The people at the top who ultimately order such things are insulated from accountability by multiple layers of bureaucratic operatives. At the sharp end of the spear, unlettered lieges carry out the plans, and take the fall should anything go wrong.
While Kapos (not S.S. men, but the criminal element among prisoners) actually ran the concentration camps and squeezed the prisoners of their possessions and paid off the S.S. guards, Reinhard Heydrich played the violin (by all accounts well) and joked with his staff. While the criminal element ran the Gulag, Director of the KGB Andropov gulled the Western media with stories about his affinity for single malt Scotch and jazz.
So it is with our National Security State: poor West Virginia hillbillies in reserve units are ordered to carry out the wet work. Should plans go awry, they take the fall. A slap on the wrist, perhaps a career-killing reprimand, might be meted out to junior officers. General officers are probably secure from even a hint of opprobrium, regardless of what they ordered or knew.
Although responsibility ultimately rests with the Secretary of Defense (who in October 2001 made a big public point of saying that prisoners -- does this mean in all future wars? -- would not be treated according to the Geneva Convention), he has insulated himself, or so he thinks, by not writing down the specific orders.
Like his historical models, Secretary Rumsfeld keeps well clear of the sordid details of what trouble our half trillion dollars is buying. By choice, he would rather turn his full attention to dressing down Pentagon stewards who fail to slice the garnishes in the approved manner, or humiliate career officers who fail to grasp the crony capitalist potential of Transformation for the corporate bottom line. But the principal effect of his half trillion dollar protection racket is to make us all a little less prosperous, and to stir up such insensate hatred abroad as will trouble the sleep of our grandchildren when they are adults.
Werther is the pen name of a Northern Virginia-based defense analyst.
[1] Yes, we know they all work nominal 14-hour days. They simply do not produce anything remotely useful to the republic. Staff meetings to determine the amount of loot to pry out of a somnolent Congress, memo-writing on how to evade the Geneva Convention, and fending off tirades from the Secretary of Defense about meal presentation in the executive dining room do not count.
[2] "Exclusive: Top CIA Official Under Investigation," ABC News, 3 March 2006.
It's an Awful Lot of Money to Makes Us Less Safe and Less Free
Half a Trillion Dollars
By WERTHER
Ever since President Eisenhower's farewell address, there have been sporadic warnings about the Military Industrial Complex. Over the last couple of decades, critics like Ernest Fitzgerald and Chuck Spinney have performed a valuable public service by uncovering the Pentagon's lunatic potlatch schemes and dragging them before the bar of public opinion. Lately, organizations such as the Project on Government Oversight, the Center for Defense Information, and the Committee against Government Waste have been in a continuous pother about the riot of pork-barrel spending in the military budget.
These critiques, entirely accurate as far as they go, yet lull us into a false sense of security. If only we were to institute reform of the Congressional appropriations process, or ban earmarks, or establish a line-item veto, the "good" defense spending (the paean in these critiques is always to "readiness accounts") would no longer be at the mercy of the "bad" defense spending (inserted in the black of night by such felonious rogues as Duke Cunningham).
Let us be plain. Any organization that employs lethal force, operates in secrecy, always gets what it wants, and is unaccountable to the citizens is indistinguishable from a protection racket. And if, in return for surrendering their wallets, the citizenry is made less safe (as the more objective intelligence reports have repeatedly warned about the $300+ billion Iraq war), then some hole-in-corner reform is not going to get us anywhere. The Soviet Union in its senile post-Brezhnev phase had numerous anti-corruption drives, to no avail. The whole rotten edifice collapsed only when the Russian people ceased to believe in the system they had suffered under and placed such childish hopes in.
Although the Duke Cunningham saga achieved screaming headlines, one aspect of it gained almost no notice. When it did, its importance was misinterpreted: Precisely what was MZM Corp., and its spin-off ADCS, ostensibly doing when they weren't pillaging the taxpayers? According to Marcus Stern, the Copley News Service reporter who broke the corruption story, Cunningham was handing out contracts to MZM involving CIFA, the Pentagon's secretive Counterintelligence Field Activity.
Discussing this matter with Brian Lamm on C-Span's 3 March 2006 Washington Journal, Stern misconstrued the significance of the MZM-CIFA link. As Stern would have it, the connection demonstrated Cunningham's perfidy in so far as he was compromising post-9/11 national security by bestowing contracts on a corrupt business that overcharged the government for conducting activity intended to keep us safe from terrorists.
Would that it were that simple, but that would be the facile interpretation. CIFA, as we now know, is a Department of Defense organization that spies on American citizens, in violation of post-Vietnam directives prohibiting the military from conducting surveillance against U.S. citizens on American soil. Precisely replicating the abuses that instigated the ban in the first place, CIFA is collecting dossiers on citizens engaged in lawful political activity, e.g., a group of elderly Quakers in Lakeland, Florida who opposed the government's policy in Iraq.
The charitable interpretation is that a lot of shiftless bureaucrats at the Office of the Secretary of Defense have way too much time and money on their hands.[1] It's not enough that they do a miserable job at what they are constitutionally charged to do -- fight wars -- they apparently can spare the manpower to poke through people's dresser drawers even as they complain about how thin they are stretched due to the Iraq war.
But it is no coincidence that a secret organization which abuses constitutional rights would be mired in corrupt contracting. Inevitably, secrecy without accountability leads to abuse, which in turn leads to rampant corruption. It is a prevalent myth that "toughness," or, if you like, "taking the gloves off," is a sign of business-like efficiency and rectitude. A police department that routinely beats suspects and covers it up is invariably a corrupt one, with officers casually perjuring themselves in trials and valuables conveniently disappearing from evidence lockers.
Thus it is no surprise that CIFA, whose reason for being is abuse of the Constitution, is connected with criminals like Duke Cunningham and Brent Wilkes, ADCS's CEO. Nor should it surprise us that Kyle "Dusty" Foggo, the Executive Director of the CIA, is under investigation by the Pentagon's inspector general for his links to Wilkes. [2]
Is it an occasion for shocked disbelief that Halliburton, the beneficiary of billions of dollars of no-bid contracts, should charge the government (meaning you, the taxpayer) for meals never provided for U.S. troops, gouge for fuel, and simultaneously threaten employees who object to these practices? It is merely an illustration of the nexus between greed and abuse.
The people at the top who ultimately order such things are insulated from accountability by multiple layers of bureaucratic operatives. At the sharp end of the spear, unlettered lieges carry out the plans, and take the fall should anything go wrong.
While Kapos (not S.S. men, but the criminal element among prisoners) actually ran the concentration camps and squeezed the prisoners of their possessions and paid off the S.S. guards, Reinhard Heydrich played the violin (by all accounts well) and joked with his staff. While the criminal element ran the Gulag, Director of the KGB Andropov gulled the Western media with stories about his affinity for single malt Scotch and jazz.
So it is with our National Security State: poor West Virginia hillbillies in reserve units are ordered to carry out the wet work. Should plans go awry, they take the fall. A slap on the wrist, perhaps a career-killing reprimand, might be meted out to junior officers. General officers are probably secure from even a hint of opprobrium, regardless of what they ordered or knew.
Although responsibility ultimately rests with the Secretary of Defense (who in October 2001 made a big public point of saying that prisoners -- does this mean in all future wars? -- would not be treated according to the Geneva Convention), he has insulated himself, or so he thinks, by not writing down the specific orders.
Like his historical models, Secretary Rumsfeld keeps well clear of the sordid details of what trouble our half trillion dollars is buying. By choice, he would rather turn his full attention to dressing down Pentagon stewards who fail to slice the garnishes in the approved manner, or humiliate career officers who fail to grasp the crony capitalist potential of Transformation for the corporate bottom line. But the principal effect of his half trillion dollar protection racket is to make us all a little less prosperous, and to stir up such insensate hatred abroad as will trouble the sleep of our grandchildren when they are adults.
Werther is the pen name of a Northern Virginia-based defense analyst.
[1] Yes, we know they all work nominal 14-hour days. They simply do not produce anything remotely useful to the republic. Staff meetings to determine the amount of loot to pry out of a somnolent Congress, memo-writing on how to evade the Geneva Convention, and fending off tirades from the Secretary of Defense about meal presentation in the executive dining room do not count.
[2] "Exclusive: Top CIA Official Under Investigation," ABC News, 3 March 2006.
Volume Three can be found in the Foreign Policy Issues Forum here:
http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/for...showtopic=19894
http://www.commongroundcommonsense.org/for...showtopic=19894
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewFlash.asp?Page=...H20060308d.html
Former CIA Officer: Dubai Ports Not So Secure
By Jeff Johnson
CNSNews.com Senior Staff Writer
March 08, 2006
(CNSNews.com) - Political observers say that when two Republicans -- a liberal, New England senator and a conservative, Pacific Coast congressman -- come together to oppose a White House plan, the president had better take notice.
Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), chairwoman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, is known as one of the most liberal members of the GOP in Congress. She also serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee. Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, is known as a strong conservative and national security proponent.
While Collins and Duncan are often at odds on issues, they are united in their opposition to a proposal that would allow Dubai Ports World (DPW) -- a wholly-owned subsidiary of the government of Dubai, one of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- to manage some operations at 14 U.S. ports.
Hunter announced legislation Tuesday that would prohibit majority ownership of any U.S. "system or asset - physical or virtual - that is so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such system or asset would have a debilitating effect on national security, economic security, or public health and safety" by foreign governments or companies. The proposal would direct the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to compile a "critical infrastructure" list of assets to be protected from foreign control.
While the legislation would conceivably cover a much broader section of U.S. commerce, Hunter made it clear that his immediate intent is to block a White House-backed deal that would give DPW some measure of control over port operations in Miami and Tampa, Fla.; Beaumont, Galveston, Houston and Port Arthur, Texas; Baltimore; Camden, N.J.; Davisville, R.I.; New Orleans; Norfolk, Va.; Philadelphia; Portland, Maine and Wilmington, Del.
Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness (CMR), said Tuesday that the political differences between Hunter and Collins lend credibility to their opposition to the DPW plan and prove that it is not ideologically driven.
"The base is being fractured here. Whether it's the more liberal Republicans who would back Susan Collins, or the more conservative ones who respect Duncan Hunter a great deal, this is serious," Donnelly said. "When people of that caliber on both sides of the president's own party start raising questions, the president needs to pay attention."
Donnelly said she has not worked with Collins, who often disagrees with CMR on military issues, but she is familiar with Hunter and believes his opposition to the DPW deal is sincere.
"He must have good reasons and he may have reasons we don't even know about for doing what he's doing," Donnelly said. "He's known for doing his own investigations and he may be doing that now."
Larry Johnson, a former CIA officer who now heads the Business Exposure Reduction Group (BERG), believes he knows what could be motivating Hunter, Collins and other members of Congress to oppose the DPW deal.
"There is current intelligence that individuals with ties to jihadist terrorist groups have sought refuge in Dubai/UAE, within the last three months," from countries that are considered sympathetic to terrorists, Johnson said. "They felt more secure going to the UAE."
But President Bush has personally defended DPW, arguing that all security concerns have been addressed.
"If there was any doubt in my mind or people in my administration's mind that our ports would be less secure and the American people endangered, this deal wouldn't go forward," Bush said Feb. 28.
The president noted that DPW is purchasing a British company that currently holds the contracts to the port operations and that other U.S. ports have been managed by foreign-owned companies for years.
"What kind of signal does it send throughout the world if it's okay for a British company to manage the ports," Bush asked, "but not a company that has been secure, been cleared for security purposes from the Arab world?"
But Johnson challenged the president's assertion that DPW-run ports are secure.
"When you look at three of the top world ports for smuggling, counterfeit and contraband activity, those are, by my count, Hong Kong, Dubai and Panama. Dubai Ports World controls two of the three" Johnson said, referring to Dubai and Hong Kong.
"The White House is allowing commercial interests to trump any concern about security," Johnson said. "And I think Republicans like Collins and Hunter are smart enough to recognize that that's a non-starter."
Johnson's company has been investigating port operations in Dubai on behalf of a client as part of a federal racketeering lawsuit.
"One of the things we observed in the course of collecting evidence in that case was cigarette smuggling that started with cigarettes that would come out of Europe and the United States, go to Panama and then were shipped to ... ports in Dubai," Johnson said. "We also had evidence and saw direct evidence of other types of products being smuggled through Dubai, going into Pakistan through Afghanistan and going into Iran and going into Iraq."
Among the "other types of products" allegedly smuggled through Dubai, Johnson listed the nuclear technology now in the hands of Iran.
"If Dubai Ports World runs the smuggling operations or allows them or does not enforce any kinds of preventative measures in Dubai, just think what could happen in any of these other ports," he continued, "The techniques required to smuggle nuclear material or weapons are no different from those required to smuggle cigarettes or other less lethal, not as dangerous material."
As an example, Johnson referenced a 1992 terrorist attack in which a smuggler was led to believe he was transporting contraband cash on a flight full of Jewish merchants. Unknown to the smuggler, he was, in fact, carrying a bomb, which Johnson said, "blew the plane out of the air."
While President Bush has praised the governments of Dubai and the UAE for their cooperation in the war on terror, Johnson said Americans should listen carefully.
"It would be one thing if the owners of Dubai Ports World were the same individuals in the United Arab Emirates who are cooperating with us in the efforts to combat terrorism, but they are not," Johnson said. "There are elements in the UAE government that are helping us and there are elements that are not helpful."
Johnson believes many in Washington who tentatively support the president in the controversy could be converted into opponents if they would honestly ask themselves one question, which he calls "the gold standard."
"Would Israel allow Dubai Ports World to run its ports at Haifa? If the answer is 'yes,' then we should say 'okay,'" Johnson said. "But, you know what? The answer is 'no.'"
Former CIA Officer: Dubai Ports Not So Secure
By Jeff Johnson
CNSNews.com Senior Staff Writer
March 08, 2006
(CNSNews.com) - Political observers say that when two Republicans -- a liberal, New England senator and a conservative, Pacific Coast congressman -- come together to oppose a White House plan, the president had better take notice.
Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), chairwoman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, is known as one of the most liberal members of the GOP in Congress. She also serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee. Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, is known as a strong conservative and national security proponent.
While Collins and Duncan are often at odds on issues, they are united in their opposition to a proposal that would allow Dubai Ports World (DPW) -- a wholly-owned subsidiary of the government of Dubai, one of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- to manage some operations at 14 U.S. ports.
Hunter announced legislation Tuesday that would prohibit majority ownership of any U.S. "system or asset - physical or virtual - that is so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such system or asset would have a debilitating effect on national security, economic security, or public health and safety" by foreign governments or companies. The proposal would direct the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to compile a "critical infrastructure" list of assets to be protected from foreign control.
While the legislation would conceivably cover a much broader section of U.S. commerce, Hunter made it clear that his immediate intent is to block a White House-backed deal that would give DPW some measure of control over port operations in Miami and Tampa, Fla.; Beaumont, Galveston, Houston and Port Arthur, Texas; Baltimore; Camden, N.J.; Davisville, R.I.; New Orleans; Norfolk, Va.; Philadelphia; Portland, Maine and Wilmington, Del.
Elaine Donnelly, president of the Center for Military Readiness (CMR), said Tuesday that the political differences between Hunter and Collins lend credibility to their opposition to the DPW plan and prove that it is not ideologically driven.
"The base is being fractured here. Whether it's the more liberal Republicans who would back Susan Collins, or the more conservative ones who respect Duncan Hunter a great deal, this is serious," Donnelly said. "When people of that caliber on both sides of the president's own party start raising questions, the president needs to pay attention."
Donnelly said she has not worked with Collins, who often disagrees with CMR on military issues, but she is familiar with Hunter and believes his opposition to the DPW deal is sincere.
"He must have good reasons and he may have reasons we don't even know about for doing what he's doing," Donnelly said. "He's known for doing his own investigations and he may be doing that now."
Larry Johnson, a former CIA officer who now heads the Business Exposure Reduction Group (BERG), believes he knows what could be motivating Hunter, Collins and other members of Congress to oppose the DPW deal.
"There is current intelligence that individuals with ties to jihadist terrorist groups have sought refuge in Dubai/UAE, within the last three months," from countries that are considered sympathetic to terrorists, Johnson said. "They felt more secure going to the UAE."
But President Bush has personally defended DPW, arguing that all security concerns have been addressed.
"If there was any doubt in my mind or people in my administration's mind that our ports would be less secure and the American people endangered, this deal wouldn't go forward," Bush said Feb. 28.
The president noted that DPW is purchasing a British company that currently holds the contracts to the port operations and that other U.S. ports have been managed by foreign-owned companies for years.
"What kind of signal does it send throughout the world if it's okay for a British company to manage the ports," Bush asked, "but not a company that has been secure, been cleared for security purposes from the Arab world?"
But Johnson challenged the president's assertion that DPW-run ports are secure.
"When you look at three of the top world ports for smuggling, counterfeit and contraband activity, those are, by my count, Hong Kong, Dubai and Panama. Dubai Ports World controls two of the three" Johnson said, referring to Dubai and Hong Kong.
"The White House is allowing commercial interests to trump any concern about security," Johnson said. "And I think Republicans like Collins and Hunter are smart enough to recognize that that's a non-starter."
Johnson's company has been investigating port operations in Dubai on behalf of a client as part of a federal racketeering lawsuit.
"One of the things we observed in the course of collecting evidence in that case was cigarette smuggling that started with cigarettes that would come out of Europe and the United States, go to Panama and then were shipped to ... ports in Dubai," Johnson said. "We also had evidence and saw direct evidence of other types of products being smuggled through Dubai, going into Pakistan through Afghanistan and going into Iran and going into Iraq."
Among the "other types of products" allegedly smuggled through Dubai, Johnson listed the nuclear technology now in the hands of Iran.
"If Dubai Ports World runs the smuggling operations or allows them or does not enforce any kinds of preventative measures in Dubai, just think what could happen in any of these other ports," he continued, "The techniques required to smuggle nuclear material or weapons are no different from those required to smuggle cigarettes or other less lethal, not as dangerous material."
As an example, Johnson referenced a 1992 terrorist attack in which a smuggler was led to believe he was transporting contraband cash on a flight full of Jewish merchants. Unknown to the smuggler, he was, in fact, carrying a bomb, which Johnson said, "blew the plane out of the air."
While President Bush has praised the governments of Dubai and the UAE for their cooperation in the war on terror, Johnson said Americans should listen carefully.
"It would be one thing if the owners of Dubai Ports World were the same individuals in the United Arab Emirates who are cooperating with us in the efforts to combat terrorism, but they are not," Johnson said. "There are elements in the UAE government that are helping us and there are elements that are not helpful."
Johnson believes many in Washington who tentatively support the president in the controversy could be converted into opponents if they would honestly ask themselves one question, which he calls "the gold standard."
"Would Israel allow Dubai Ports World to run its ports at Haifa? If the answer is 'yes,' then we should say 'okay,'" Johnson said. "But, you know what? The answer is 'no.'"
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/libra...60301-voa02.htm
Congress, Legal Scholars Debate US Domestic Spying
By Jim Malone
Washington
01 March 2006
President Bush's decision to use the secretive National Security Agency to monitor some domestic communications as part of the war on terror remains the focus of intense debate in Congress and among legal scholars.
The Bush administration says the NSA program targets international calls either to or from the United States that involve people with suspected links to terrorism.
The eavesdropping effort bypasses a 1978 law that requires the government to get a warrant from a special surveillance court before phone calls and other communications involving U.S. citizens or legal residents can be monitored.
Opposition Democrats have taken the lead in questioning the legality of the domestic spying effort, which they say is a threat to civil liberties.
"I believe they are running roughshod over the Constitution and are hiding behind inflammatory rhetoric, demanding Americans blindly trust their decisions," said Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the top Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Bush administration officials contend that the president has the power to authorize the program under the general authority granted to him in the Constitution to protect the country during wartime and because Congress authorized military action against Afghanistan in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks.
But even some conservative legal scholars are raising objections to what they see as an overly broad interpretation of presidential power.
"The theory invoked by the president to justify eavesdropping by the NSA in contradiction to FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] would equally justify mail openings, burglaries, torture or internment camps, all in the name of gathering foreign intelligence," said Bruce Fein, a legal expert who worked in the Justice Department during the Reagan administration. "Unless rebuked, it will lie around like a loaded weapon, ready to be used by any incumbent who claims an urgent need." He testified at a recent Senate hearing on the domestic surveillance program.
Supporters of the domestic spying program counter that the effort is narrowly targeted and is a necessary tool in the war on terror.
James Woolsey served as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency for a time during the Clinton administration. He told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the 1978 law, known as FISA, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, is outdated.
"We are in the gun sights of more than one international terrorist Islamist organization that have ties, some of them, to states. And these are shifting alliances," he said. "This is a hard kind of thing to keep up with and trying to do it spy by spy, case by case, pleading by pleading, as one does in the FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] court, is not only difficult, it is absolutely impossible."
The White House has been focused in recent weeks on reassuring conservatives as well as liberals that the NSA monitoring program targets only those with suspected links to terrorists and does not threaten civil liberties.
"It is focused solely on international communications that involve a known al-Qaida or suspected al-Qaida terrorist or affiliated al-Qaida terrorist," said presidential spokesman Scott McClellan.
Congressional Republicans are now struggling to find a unified proposal that would allow the legislative branch to have oversight on the surveillance program.
But many legal experts believe the issue will eventually wind up before the Supreme Court, which may have to decide whether the president overstepped his authority by ignoring a law enacted by Congress. University of Virginia political analyst Larry Sabato says the debate is not a new one.
"This is an enduring controversy. We are going to see the same arguments made in 2006 that have been made repeatedly in American history. I doubt we come any closer to resolving the ultimate dispute. You have top reach some kind of reasonable balance between individual liberty and security," he said.
Professor Sabato also says the eavesdropping controversy could be an issue in the November congressional election campaign.
Congress, Legal Scholars Debate US Domestic Spying
By Jim Malone
Washington
01 March 2006
President Bush's decision to use the secretive National Security Agency to monitor some domestic communications as part of the war on terror remains the focus of intense debate in Congress and among legal scholars.
The Bush administration says the NSA program targets international calls either to or from the United States that involve people with suspected links to terrorism.
The eavesdropping effort bypasses a 1978 law that requires the government to get a warrant from a special surveillance court before phone calls and other communications involving U.S. citizens or legal residents can be monitored.
Opposition Democrats have taken the lead in questioning the legality of the domestic spying effort, which they say is a threat to civil liberties.
"I believe they are running roughshod over the Constitution and are hiding behind inflammatory rhetoric, demanding Americans blindly trust their decisions," said Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the top Democrat on the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Bush administration officials contend that the president has the power to authorize the program under the general authority granted to him in the Constitution to protect the country during wartime and because Congress authorized military action against Afghanistan in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks.
But even some conservative legal scholars are raising objections to what they see as an overly broad interpretation of presidential power.
"The theory invoked by the president to justify eavesdropping by the NSA in contradiction to FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] would equally justify mail openings, burglaries, torture or internment camps, all in the name of gathering foreign intelligence," said Bruce Fein, a legal expert who worked in the Justice Department during the Reagan administration. "Unless rebuked, it will lie around like a loaded weapon, ready to be used by any incumbent who claims an urgent need." He testified at a recent Senate hearing on the domestic surveillance program.
Supporters of the domestic spying program counter that the effort is narrowly targeted and is a necessary tool in the war on terror.
James Woolsey served as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency for a time during the Clinton administration. He told the Senate Judiciary Committee that the 1978 law, known as FISA, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, is outdated.
"We are in the gun sights of more than one international terrorist Islamist organization that have ties, some of them, to states. And these are shifting alliances," he said. "This is a hard kind of thing to keep up with and trying to do it spy by spy, case by case, pleading by pleading, as one does in the FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] court, is not only difficult, it is absolutely impossible."
The White House has been focused in recent weeks on reassuring conservatives as well as liberals that the NSA monitoring program targets only those with suspected links to terrorists and does not threaten civil liberties.
"It is focused solely on international communications that involve a known al-Qaida or suspected al-Qaida terrorist or affiliated al-Qaida terrorist," said presidential spokesman Scott McClellan.
Congressional Republicans are now struggling to find a unified proposal that would allow the legislative branch to have oversight on the surveillance program.
But many legal experts believe the issue will eventually wind up before the Supreme Court, which may have to decide whether the president overstepped his authority by ignoring a law enacted by Congress. University of Virginia political analyst Larry Sabato says the debate is not a new one.
"This is an enduring controversy. We are going to see the same arguments made in 2006 that have been made repeatedly in American history. I doubt we come any closer to resolving the ultimate dispute. You have top reach some kind of reasonable balance between individual liberty and security," he said.
Professor Sabato also says the eavesdropping controversy could be an issue in the November congressional election campaign.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/libra...0301-usia01.htm
01 March 2006
Iran, North Korea Threaten To Develop, Spread Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear proliferation second only to terrorism as danger to United States
In-Depth Coverage
Washington – Iran and North Korea continue to present the greatest challenges to international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons, say leading members of the U.S. intelligence community.
In a February 28 global threat assessment before the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Negroponte, director of national intelligence, and Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, agreed that the continuing threat of nuclear proliferation remains a clear and present danger to the United States, second only to the threat of a terrorist attack. (See related article.)
For the past 20 years, Negroponte said, Iran has conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program, a violation of its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. (See related article.)
“We believe Iran is committed to acquiring a nuclear weapon and is currently developing the infrastructure to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for that purpose,” Maples said. (See related article.)
The ascent of hardliners in the Iranian government who resumed suspicious nuclear activities in violation of its nonproliferation obligations further has heightened the U.S. intelligence community’s concern, said Negroponte. (See related article.)
“While Tehran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and probably has not yet produced or acquired the necessary fissile material, the danger that it will do so is a reason for immediate concern,” Negroponte said.
Negroponte and Maples told senators that a nuclear-armed Iran is especially dangerous, given its stockpile of ballistic missiles, believed by the intelligence community to be the largest in the Middle East.
Maples added that Iran currently is developing longer-range missile systems potentially capable of striking targets as far away as Central Europe.
In addition to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Maples also told senators that U.S. intelligence experts “believe that Iran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development as well.”
NORTH KOREA CONTINUES ITS CHALLENGE
Unlike Iran, North Korea claims already to have nuclear weapons, -- “a claim that we assess is probably true,” said Negroponte.
Negroponte did not provide further details on the projected size of North Korea’s potential inventory of nuclear weapons, but said that Pyongyang’s weapons program is seen by its leaders as a means to ensure the regime’s security, a deterrent to superior U.S. and South Korean troops and a mark of international prestige.
In addition, Maples told senators that North Korea continues to invest in the development of ballistic missiles, not only for defense but also to sell to foreign nations.
Even though the United States and North Korea’s neighbors continue to seek a solution through the Six-Party Talks, both Negroponte and Maples agreed that North Korea remains a major challenge to global nuclear nonproliferation regimes. (See related article.)
Negroponte said that the intelligence community does not know under what conditions North Korea would give up nuclear weapons; Maples gave senators an even more pessimistic assessment.
“Because of its strong security, nationalistic and economic motivations for possessing nuclear weapons, we are uncertain whether the North Korean government can be persuaded to fully relinquish its program,” he said.
Prepared remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee from Negroponte and Maples are available on the Web sites of their respective offices.
For more information, see Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
01 March 2006
Iran, North Korea Threaten To Develop, Spread Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear proliferation second only to terrorism as danger to United States
In-Depth Coverage
Washington – Iran and North Korea continue to present the greatest challenges to international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons, say leading members of the U.S. intelligence community.
In a February 28 global threat assessment before the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Negroponte, director of national intelligence, and Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, agreed that the continuing threat of nuclear proliferation remains a clear and present danger to the United States, second only to the threat of a terrorist attack. (See related article.)
For the past 20 years, Negroponte said, Iran has conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program, a violation of its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. (See related article.)
“We believe Iran is committed to acquiring a nuclear weapon and is currently developing the infrastructure to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for that purpose,” Maples said. (See related article.)
The ascent of hardliners in the Iranian government who resumed suspicious nuclear activities in violation of its nonproliferation obligations further has heightened the U.S. intelligence community’s concern, said Negroponte. (See related article.)
“While Tehran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and probably has not yet produced or acquired the necessary fissile material, the danger that it will do so is a reason for immediate concern,” Negroponte said.
Negroponte and Maples told senators that a nuclear-armed Iran is especially dangerous, given its stockpile of ballistic missiles, believed by the intelligence community to be the largest in the Middle East.
Maples added that Iran currently is developing longer-range missile systems potentially capable of striking targets as far away as Central Europe.
In addition to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, Maples also told senators that U.S. intelligence experts “believe that Iran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development as well.”
NORTH KOREA CONTINUES ITS CHALLENGE
Unlike Iran, North Korea claims already to have nuclear weapons, -- “a claim that we assess is probably true,” said Negroponte.
Negroponte did not provide further details on the projected size of North Korea’s potential inventory of nuclear weapons, but said that Pyongyang’s weapons program is seen by its leaders as a means to ensure the regime’s security, a deterrent to superior U.S. and South Korean troops and a mark of international prestige.
In addition, Maples told senators that North Korea continues to invest in the development of ballistic missiles, not only for defense but also to sell to foreign nations.
Even though the United States and North Korea’s neighbors continue to seek a solution through the Six-Party Talks, both Negroponte and Maples agreed that North Korea remains a major challenge to global nuclear nonproliferation regimes. (See related article.)
Negroponte said that the intelligence community does not know under what conditions North Korea would give up nuclear weapons; Maples gave senators an even more pessimistic assessment.
“Because of its strong security, nationalistic and economic motivations for possessing nuclear weapons, we are uncertain whether the North Korean government can be persuaded to fully relinquish its program,” he said.
Prepared remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee from Negroponte and Maples are available on the Web sites of their respective offices.
For more information, see Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/libra...0228-afps01.htm
Iran, North Korea, China Emerging as Threats
By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA
American Forces Press Service
In-Depth Coverage
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28, 2006 – After terrorism, the ongoing development of weapons of mass destruction is the second major threat to the safety of the U.S. and its allies, and Iran and North Korea are both emerging as potential dangers in that area, a top U.S. official told a Senate committee here today.
"The time when a few states had monopolies over weapons of mass destruction is fading," said John D. Negroponte, director of national intelligence, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on worldwide threats to U.S. national security.
"Technologies, often dual-use, move freely in our globalized economy, as do the scientific personnel who design them," he said. "The potential dangers of weapons of mass destruction proliferation are so grave that we must do everything possible to discover and disrupt it."
Many nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency share concerns about Iran's nuclear program, Negroponte said. Iran conducted a clandestine uranium-enrichment program for nearly two decades in violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement, he said, and despite its claims to the contrary, officials think that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Iran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon or the materials to make one, but the danger that it will acquire the materials is a reason for immediate concern, he said.
"The integration of nuclear weapons into Iran's ballistic systems would be destabilizing beyond the Middle East," he said.
Officials believe that Iran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development, Army Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said at the hearing. Also, Iran is developing ballistic missiles with the capability to strike Tel Aviv, Israel, and even central Europe, he said.
North Korea also threatens international security, but unlike Iran, North Korea claims to already have nuclear weapons, Negroponte said. U.S. officials believe this claim is true, because North Korean leaders see nuclear weapons as the best way to deter superior forces and to ensure regime security, and as a lever for economic gain and a source of prestige, he said.
Maples said that because of strong security, national and economic motivations for possessing nuclear weapons, officials are uncertain whether the North Korean government can be persuaded to fully relinquish its program.
As China upgrades its military and gains political influence, it too is emerging as a threat to U.S. national security, Negroponte said. China has seen consistently high economic growth rates, which have fueled a military modernization program and increased the country's force capabilities, he said.
China has been reaching out to its neighboring countries to make economic and political connections, Negroponte said. Also, the Chinese military is acquiring modern weapons and hardware, improving doctrine, reforming training, and making improvements in critical support functions, he said.
However, despite the improvements, China still faces a challenge in keeping unemployment and rural discontent down and maintaining increasing living standards, Negroponte said. To do this, China must solve difficult economic and legal problems, improve the education system, reduce environmental degradation, and improve governance by combating corruption, he said.
"Indeed, China's rise may be hobbled by systemic problems and the Communist Party's resistance to the demands for political participation that economic growth generates," he said. "Beijing's determination to repress real or perceived challenges - from dispossessed peasants to religious organizations - could lead to serious instability at home and less effective policies abroad."
Other issues will continue to affect national security, such as improving technology and weakly governed states throughout the world, Maples said, but the government remains vigilant to protecting the U.S. homeland, allies and interests abroad.
"Our nation is engaged in a long war against terrorism and violent extremism, and we are faced with a multitude of threats that can affect our national security," he said. "The defense intelligence professionals will continue to provide the necessary information critical to our warfighters, defense planners and national security policy makers."
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/20060228_4344.html
Iran, North Korea, China Emerging as Threats
By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA
American Forces Press Service
In-Depth Coverage
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28, 2006 – After terrorism, the ongoing development of weapons of mass destruction is the second major threat to the safety of the U.S. and its allies, and Iran and North Korea are both emerging as potential dangers in that area, a top U.S. official told a Senate committee here today.
"The time when a few states had monopolies over weapons of mass destruction is fading," said John D. Negroponte, director of national intelligence, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on worldwide threats to U.S. national security.
"Technologies, often dual-use, move freely in our globalized economy, as do the scientific personnel who design them," he said. "The potential dangers of weapons of mass destruction proliferation are so grave that we must do everything possible to discover and disrupt it."
Many nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency share concerns about Iran's nuclear program, Negroponte said. Iran conducted a clandestine uranium-enrichment program for nearly two decades in violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement, he said, and despite its claims to the contrary, officials think that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Iran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon or the materials to make one, but the danger that it will acquire the materials is a reason for immediate concern, he said.
"The integration of nuclear weapons into Iran's ballistic systems would be destabilizing beyond the Middle East," he said.
Officials believe that Iran maintains offensive chemical and biological weapons capabilities in various stages of development, Army Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said at the hearing. Also, Iran is developing ballistic missiles with the capability to strike Tel Aviv, Israel, and even central Europe, he said.
North Korea also threatens international security, but unlike Iran, North Korea claims to already have nuclear weapons, Negroponte said. U.S. officials believe this claim is true, because North Korean leaders see nuclear weapons as the best way to deter superior forces and to ensure regime security, and as a lever for economic gain and a source of prestige, he said.
Maples said that because of strong security, national and economic motivations for possessing nuclear weapons, officials are uncertain whether the North Korean government can be persuaded to fully relinquish its program.
As China upgrades its military and gains political influence, it too is emerging as a threat to U.S. national security, Negroponte said. China has seen consistently high economic growth rates, which have fueled a military modernization program and increased the country's force capabilities, he said.
China has been reaching out to its neighboring countries to make economic and political connections, Negroponte said. Also, the Chinese military is acquiring modern weapons and hardware, improving doctrine, reforming training, and making improvements in critical support functions, he said.
However, despite the improvements, China still faces a challenge in keeping unemployment and rural discontent down and maintaining increasing living standards, Negroponte said. To do this, China must solve difficult economic and legal problems, improve the education system, reduce environmental degradation, and improve governance by combating corruption, he said.
"Indeed, China's rise may be hobbled by systemic problems and the Communist Party's resistance to the demands for political participation that economic growth generates," he said. "Beijing's determination to repress real or perceived challenges - from dispossessed peasants to religious organizations - could lead to serious instability at home and less effective policies abroad."
Other issues will continue to affect national security, such as improving technology and weakly governed states throughout the world, Maples said, but the government remains vigilant to protecting the U.S. homeland, allies and interests abroad.
"Our nation is engaged in a long war against terrorism and violent extremism, and we are faced with a multitude of threats that can affect our national security," he said. "The defense intelligence professionals will continue to provide the necessary information critical to our warfighters, defense planners and national security policy makers."
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/20060228_4344.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/libra...0228-afps02.htm
Terrorism Biggest Threat to National Security, Officials Say
By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA
American Forces Press Service
In-Depth Coverage
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28, 2006 – Terrorism remains the pre-eminent threat to U.S. national security and interests abroad. But if progress continues at the current pace in Iraq, the terrorists can be defeated there and the U.S. can gain a foothold in the war on terror, a top U.S. official said here today.
Entrenched grievances such as corruption, injustice and the slow pace of economic, social and political change in many Muslim nations continue to fuel the global jihadist movement, and nowhere is that movement more acutely seen than in Iraq, said John D. Negroponte, director of national intelligence, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on worldwide threats to U.S. national security.
Sunni Arab hostility, the primary enabler of the extremist movement, is likely to remain high in 2006, he said, and Iraqi security forces need to develop better command-and-control capabilities to become more effective against the insurgents. However, encouraging developments in Iraq give hope for the defeat of the insurgents, he said.
Insurgents have been unable to consolidate gains from their attacks and haven't established any long-term territorial control in Iraq, Negroponte said. Also, they were unable to disrupt the two national elections last year, they have not developed a political strategy to gain support beyond their Sunni Arab base, and they have not been able to coordinate nationwide operations, he said.
On the contrary, the Iraqi security forces are taking on more demanding missions, becoming more independent, and providing better stability for the Iraqi economy to grow, Negroponte said. Another sign of improvement in the country is the drastic increase in Sunni participation in the political process, he said.
"I believe that if you take the overall situation in Iraq -- political and security situation - progress is being made, and if we continue to make that kind of progress, yes we can win in Iraq," he said.
The insurgency in Iraq is complex and resilient, but coalition forces have been able to significantly impact al Qaeda in Iraq by killing or capturing many of its leaders, Army Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said at the hearing. The coalition has been able to restrict the flow of personnel, money and material and degrade operations, he said.
Sunni Arabs form the core of the insurgency in Iraq, Maples said, and fewer foreign fighters are joining their ranks. Insurgent leaders exploit social, economic and historical grievances to recruit support, and are willing to use familial, tribal and professional relationships to advance their agenda, he said.
The insurgents' philosophies and actions are adding urgency to a debate within Islam about the role of religion in government, Negroponte said. As this debate evolves, Muslims are becoming more politically aware and active, he said, but the majority doesn't lean toward extremism.
"Most Muslims reject the extremist message and the violent agendas of the global jihadists," he said. "Indeed, as people of all backgrounds endorse democratic principles of freedom, equality and the rule of law, they will be able to couple these principles with their religious beliefs, whatever they may be, to build better futures for their communities."
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/20060228_4340.html
Terrorism Biggest Threat to National Security, Officials Say
By Sgt. Sara Wood, USA
American Forces Press Service
In-Depth Coverage
WASHINGTON, Feb. 28, 2006 – Terrorism remains the pre-eminent threat to U.S. national security and interests abroad. But if progress continues at the current pace in Iraq, the terrorists can be defeated there and the U.S. can gain a foothold in the war on terror, a top U.S. official said here today.
Entrenched grievances such as corruption, injustice and the slow pace of economic, social and political change in many Muslim nations continue to fuel the global jihadist movement, and nowhere is that movement more acutely seen than in Iraq, said John D. Negroponte, director of national intelligence, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on worldwide threats to U.S. national security.
Sunni Arab hostility, the primary enabler of the extremist movement, is likely to remain high in 2006, he said, and Iraqi security forces need to develop better command-and-control capabilities to become more effective against the insurgents. However, encouraging developments in Iraq give hope for the defeat of the insurgents, he said.
Insurgents have been unable to consolidate gains from their attacks and haven't established any long-term territorial control in Iraq, Negroponte said. Also, they were unable to disrupt the two national elections last year, they have not developed a political strategy to gain support beyond their Sunni Arab base, and they have not been able to coordinate nationwide operations, he said.
On the contrary, the Iraqi security forces are taking on more demanding missions, becoming more independent, and providing better stability for the Iraqi economy to grow, Negroponte said. Another sign of improvement in the country is the drastic increase in Sunni participation in the political process, he said.
"I believe that if you take the overall situation in Iraq -- political and security situation - progress is being made, and if we continue to make that kind of progress, yes we can win in Iraq," he said.
The insurgency in Iraq is complex and resilient, but coalition forces have been able to significantly impact al Qaeda in Iraq by killing or capturing many of its leaders, Army Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said at the hearing. The coalition has been able to restrict the flow of personnel, money and material and degrade operations, he said.
Sunni Arabs form the core of the insurgency in Iraq, Maples said, and fewer foreign fighters are joining their ranks. Insurgent leaders exploit social, economic and historical grievances to recruit support, and are willing to use familial, tribal and professional relationships to advance their agenda, he said.
The insurgents' philosophies and actions are adding urgency to a debate within Islam about the role of religion in government, Negroponte said. As this debate evolves, Muslims are becoming more politically aware and active, he said, but the majority doesn't lean toward extremism.
"Most Muslims reject the extremist message and the violent agendas of the global jihadists," he said. "Indeed, as people of all backgrounds endorse democratic principles of freedom, equality and the rule of law, they will be able to couple these principles with their religious beliefs, whatever they may be, to build better futures for their communities."
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2006/20060228_4340.html
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/libra...60220-voa01.htm
Controversy Deepens Over Iraq Prewar Intelligence
By Gary Thomas and John Shields
Washington, D.C.
20 February 2006
One of the puzzling questions hanging over the Iraq war is: how did the intelligence turn out to be so wrong? Critics of the Iraq policy have charged that intelligence was manipulated by Bush administration officials to win public support for going to war. It is a charge that is vehemently denied by the administration. As VOA correspondent Gary Thomas reports, a former intelligence insider has reignited that debate.
For 28 years, Paul Pillar labored deep within the Central Intelligence Agency, eventually rising to become National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. But, upon retiring recently from the CIA, he did something intelligence officers generally shy away from -- he went public.
In an article for the highly respected journal Foreign Affairs, he alleged the Bush administration had selectively chosen bits of intelligence -- "cherry-picking," in intelligence parlance -- to justify its already made decision to go to war.
The article has set off a firestorm, as the administration has repeatedly and vehemently denied manipulating intelligence. Late last year, Vice President Dick Cheney said this: "What is not legitimate, and what I will again say is dishonest and reprehensible, is the suggestion by some U.S. senators that the president of the United States or any member of his administration purposely misled the American people on prewar intelligence."
The intelligence failure on Iraq -- weapons of mass destruction that the administration insisted Saddam Hussein had turned out not to exist -- acutely embarrassed the intelligence community. Intelligence officers have insisted that they did not "cook" or distort the intelligence to satisfy the administration.
In a VOA interview, Paul Pillar says administration officials wanted to demonstrate some substantive link between Saddam Hussein's regime and al-Qaida, when in fact, he says, no such links existed.
"The main thing that happened there, particularly with reference to this issue of, was there a relationship between the Saddam regime and al-Qaida -- was a selective use of bits and pieces of reporting to try to build the case that in this case there was some kind of alliance without really reflecting the analytic judgment of the intelligence community that there was not."
In his U.N. presentation in 2003, Secretary Powell spoke of alleged contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida.
"Some believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to much,” said Mr. Powell. “They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and al-Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction."
In a speech at the American Enterprise Institute late last year, Vice President Cheney again strongly denied the intelligence had been manipulated and that any suggestion that it was a lie.
Paul Pillar says while there was no direct pressure to alter intelligence analyses on Iraq, he argues that the administration's determination to go to war created a climate that choked off objectivity and squelched dissenting views among intelligence analysts.
"If, instead, the analyst is operating in an environment in which he knows decisions have already been made, in which he knows the policymaker has a particular preference for what would suit his purposes in mustering support for that decision -- well, that's an entirely different sort of thing.” Mr. Pillar told us. “And it certainly reduces any inclination analysts may have to challenge a conventional wisdom or a consensus judgment, as we had on Iraqi W.M.D."
Pillar says he doesn't want to rehash the past, but provoke a debate on how to fix relations between the intelligence community and policy makers before the next major crisis.
"What I have in mind is looking forward and having a relationship between two parts of our government that is sound enough and healthy enough and proper enough that the next time a very difficult, sticky issue comes up like Iraq, that we will see that relationship work well."
Even now, debate is underway about the nature and extent of Iran's nuclear program. It is a debate, says Paul Pillar, that could benefit from the missteps on the road to war in Iraq.
Controversy Deepens Over Iraq Prewar Intelligence
By Gary Thomas and John Shields
Washington, D.C.
20 February 2006
One of the puzzling questions hanging over the Iraq war is: how did the intelligence turn out to be so wrong? Critics of the Iraq policy have charged that intelligence was manipulated by Bush administration officials to win public support for going to war. It is a charge that is vehemently denied by the administration. As VOA correspondent Gary Thomas reports, a former intelligence insider has reignited that debate.
For 28 years, Paul Pillar labored deep within the Central Intelligence Agency, eventually rising to become National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. But, upon retiring recently from the CIA, he did something intelligence officers generally shy away from -- he went public.
In an article for the highly respected journal Foreign Affairs, he alleged the Bush administration had selectively chosen bits of intelligence -- "cherry-picking," in intelligence parlance -- to justify its already made decision to go to war.
The article has set off a firestorm, as the administration has repeatedly and vehemently denied manipulating intelligence. Late last year, Vice President Dick Cheney said this: "What is not legitimate, and what I will again say is dishonest and reprehensible, is the suggestion by some U.S. senators that the president of the United States or any member of his administration purposely misled the American people on prewar intelligence."
The intelligence failure on Iraq -- weapons of mass destruction that the administration insisted Saddam Hussein had turned out not to exist -- acutely embarrassed the intelligence community. Intelligence officers have insisted that they did not "cook" or distort the intelligence to satisfy the administration.
In a VOA interview, Paul Pillar says administration officials wanted to demonstrate some substantive link between Saddam Hussein's regime and al-Qaida, when in fact, he says, no such links existed.
"The main thing that happened there, particularly with reference to this issue of, was there a relationship between the Saddam regime and al-Qaida -- was a selective use of bits and pieces of reporting to try to build the case that in this case there was some kind of alliance without really reflecting the analytic judgment of the intelligence community that there was not."
In his U.N. presentation in 2003, Secretary Powell spoke of alleged contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida.
"Some believe, some claim these contacts do not amount to much,” said Mr. Powell. “They say Saddam Hussein's secular tyranny and al-Qaida's religious tyranny do not mix. I am not comforted by this thought. Ambition and hatred are enough to bring Iraq and al-Qaida together, enough so al-Qaida could learn how to build more sophisticated bombs and learn how to forge documents, and enough so that al-Qaida could turn to Iraq for help in acquiring expertise on weapons of mass destruction."
In a speech at the American Enterprise Institute late last year, Vice President Cheney again strongly denied the intelligence had been manipulated and that any suggestion that it was a lie.
Paul Pillar says while there was no direct pressure to alter intelligence analyses on Iraq, he argues that the administration's determination to go to war created a climate that choked off objectivity and squelched dissenting views among intelligence analysts.
"If, instead, the analyst is operating in an environment in which he knows decisions have already been made, in which he knows the policymaker has a particular preference for what would suit his purposes in mustering support for that decision -- well, that's an entirely different sort of thing.” Mr. Pillar told us. “And it certainly reduces any inclination analysts may have to challenge a conventional wisdom or a consensus judgment, as we had on Iraqi W.M.D."
Pillar says he doesn't want to rehash the past, but provoke a debate on how to fix relations between the intelligence community and policy makers before the next major crisis.
"What I have in mind is looking forward and having a relationship between two parts of our government that is sound enough and healthy enough and proper enough that the next time a very difficult, sticky issue comes up like Iraq, that we will see that relationship work well."
Even now, debate is underway about the nature and extent of Iran's nuclear program. It is a debate, says Paul Pillar, that could benefit from the missteps on the road to war in Iraq.
Published on Thursday, January 22, 2004 by Knight-Ridder
CIA Officers Warn of Iraq Civil War, Contradicting Bush's Optimism
by Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay
WASHINGTON - CIA officers in Iraq are warning that the country may be on a path to civil war, current and former U.S. officials said Wednesday, starkly contradicting the upbeat assessment that President Bush gave in his State of the Union address.
The CIA officers' bleak assessment was delivered verbally to Washington this week, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the classified information involved.
The warning echoed growing fears that Iraq's Shiite majority, which has until now grudgingly accepted the U.S. occupation, could turn to violence if its demands for direct elections are spurned.
Tens of thousands of Shiite Muslims protest in the streets Baghdad, Iraq. The protesters are demanding a fair election process for Iraq. (Photo/ Tom Pennington)
Meanwhile, Iraq's Kurdish minority is pressing its demand for autonomy and shares of oil revenue.
"Both the Shiites and the Kurds think that now's their time," said one intelligence officer. "They think that if they don't get what they want now, they'll probably never get it. Both of them feel they've been betrayed by the United States before."
These dire scenarios were discussed at meetings this week by Bush, his top national security aides and the chief U.S. administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, said a senior administration official, who requested anonymity.
Another senior official said the concerns over a possible civil war weren't confined to the CIA but are "broadly held within the government," including by regional experts at the State Department and National Security Council.
Top officials are scrambling to save the U.S. exit strategy after concluding that Iraq's most powerful Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Husseini al Sistani, is unlikely to drop his demand for elections for an interim assembly that would choose an interim government by June 30.
Bremer would then hand over power to the interim government.
The CIA hasn't yet put its officers' warnings about a potential Iraqi civil war in writing, but the senior official said he expected a formal report "momentarily."
"In the discussion with Bremer in the last few days, several very bad possibilities have been outlined," he said.
Bush, in his State of the Union address on Tuesday, insisted that an insurgency against the U.S. occupation, conducted primarily by minority Sunni Muslims who enjoyed power under Saddam Hussein, "will fail, and the Iraqi people will live in freedom."
"Month by month, Iraqis are assuming more responsibility for their own security and their own future," the president said.
Bush didn't directly address the crisis over the Shiites' political demands.
Shiites, who dominate the regions from Baghdad south to the borders of Kuwait and Iran, comprise some 60 percent of Iraq's 25 million people.
Several U.S. officials acknowledged that Sistani is unlikely to be "rolled," as one put it, and as a result Bremer's plan for restoring Iraqi sovereignty and ending the U.S. occupation by June 30 is in peril.
The Bremer plan, negotiated with the U.S.-installed Iraqi Governing Council, calls for caucuses in each of Iraq's 18 provinces to choose the interim national assembly, which would in turn select Iraq's first post-Saddam government.
The first direct elections wouldn't be held until the end of 2005.
In an interview with Knight Ridder on Wednesday, a top cleric in the Shiite holy city of Najaf appeared to confirm the fears of potential civil war.
"Everything has its own time, but we are saying that we don't accept the occupiers getting involved with the Iraqis' affairs," said Sheikh Ali Najafi, whose father, Grand Ayatollah Bashir al Najafi, is, along with Sistani, one of the four most senior clerics. "I don't trust the Americans - not even for one blink."
If the United States went ahead with the caucus plan and ended the military occupation, the interim government wouldn't last long, he said.
"The Iraqi people would know how to deal with those people," he said, smiling. "They would kick them out."
U.S. and British officials hinted Wednesday that they might bow to the demand for some kind of elections, after saying for weeks that holding free and fair elections in time for the handover of sovereignty would be impossible.
"We've always favored elections," Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said after he and other top Bush aides briefed senators. "The only question is - the tension was, if your goal is to get sovereignty passed to the Iraqis so that they feel they have a stake in their future, can you do it faster with caucuses or can you do it faster with elections?"
Rumsfeld was responding to comments by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who opened the door Wednesday to elections in Iraq earlier than planned.
"The discussion, which has been stimulated by Ayatollah Sistani, is whether there could be an element of elections injected into the earlier part of the process," Straw said at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
"We have to work with great respect for him and similar leaders," he said. "We want elections as soon as it is feasible to hold them."
Shiite clerics have become more forceful in their denunciation of the caucus plan and have organized increasingly large, albeit peaceful, demonstrations demanding elections.
State Department officials said no changes to the Bremer plan are being formally considered. They said much depends on the findings of a U.N. assessment team that the Bush administration has asked U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to send to examine the feasibility of elections.
One option being informally discussed is to delay the transfer of power until later in 2004, which might give the United Nations time to organize some sort of elections, said one official.
But that is almost certain to be opposed by White House political aides who want the occupation over and many U.S. troops gone by this summer to bolster Bush's re-election chances, the official said.
"It's all politics right now," he said.
Other options are to go ahead with the June 30 turnover as planned, whatever the fallout, or to accelerate it by handing over power to the Iraqi Governing Council in March or April, he said.
Knight Ridder Newspapers correspondents Tom Lasseter in Najaf, Iraq, and Joseph L. Galloway and John Walcott in Washington contributed to this report.
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0122-01.htm
CIA Officers Warn of Iraq Civil War, Contradicting Bush's Optimism
by Warren P. Strobel and Jonathan S. Landay
WASHINGTON - CIA officers in Iraq are warning that the country may be on a path to civil war, current and former U.S. officials said Wednesday, starkly contradicting the upbeat assessment that President Bush gave in his State of the Union address.
The CIA officers' bleak assessment was delivered verbally to Washington this week, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the classified information involved.
The warning echoed growing fears that Iraq's Shiite majority, which has until now grudgingly accepted the U.S. occupation, could turn to violence if its demands for direct elections are spurned.
Tens of thousands of Shiite Muslims protest in the streets Baghdad, Iraq. The protesters are demanding a fair election process for Iraq. (Photo/ Tom Pennington)
Meanwhile, Iraq's Kurdish minority is pressing its demand for autonomy and shares of oil revenue.
"Both the Shiites and the Kurds think that now's their time," said one intelligence officer. "They think that if they don't get what they want now, they'll probably never get it. Both of them feel they've been betrayed by the United States before."
These dire scenarios were discussed at meetings this week by Bush, his top national security aides and the chief U.S. administrator in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, said a senior administration official, who requested anonymity.
Another senior official said the concerns over a possible civil war weren't confined to the CIA but are "broadly held within the government," including by regional experts at the State Department and National Security Council.
Top officials are scrambling to save the U.S. exit strategy after concluding that Iraq's most powerful Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al Husseini al Sistani, is unlikely to drop his demand for elections for an interim assembly that would choose an interim government by June 30.
Bremer would then hand over power to the interim government.
The CIA hasn't yet put its officers' warnings about a potential Iraqi civil war in writing, but the senior official said he expected a formal report "momentarily."
"In the discussion with Bremer in the last few days, several very bad possibilities have been outlined," he said.
Bush, in his State of the Union address on Tuesday, insisted that an insurgency against the U.S. occupation, conducted primarily by minority Sunni Muslims who enjoyed power under Saddam Hussein, "will fail, and the Iraqi people will live in freedom."
"Month by month, Iraqis are assuming more responsibility for their own security and their own future," the president said.
Bush didn't directly address the crisis over the Shiites' political demands.
Shiites, who dominate the regions from Baghdad south to the borders of Kuwait and Iran, comprise some 60 percent of Iraq's 25 million people.
Several U.S. officials acknowledged that Sistani is unlikely to be "rolled," as one put it, and as a result Bremer's plan for restoring Iraqi sovereignty and ending the U.S. occupation by June 30 is in peril.
The Bremer plan, negotiated with the U.S.-installed Iraqi Governing Council, calls for caucuses in each of Iraq's 18 provinces to choose the interim national assembly, which would in turn select Iraq's first post-Saddam government.
The first direct elections wouldn't be held until the end of 2005.
In an interview with Knight Ridder on Wednesday, a top cleric in the Shiite holy city of Najaf appeared to confirm the fears of potential civil war.
"Everything has its own time, but we are saying that we don't accept the occupiers getting involved with the Iraqis' affairs," said Sheikh Ali Najafi, whose father, Grand Ayatollah Bashir al Najafi, is, along with Sistani, one of the four most senior clerics. "I don't trust the Americans - not even for one blink."
If the United States went ahead with the caucus plan and ended the military occupation, the interim government wouldn't last long, he said.
"The Iraqi people would know how to deal with those people," he said, smiling. "They would kick them out."
U.S. and British officials hinted Wednesday that they might bow to the demand for some kind of elections, after saying for weeks that holding free and fair elections in time for the handover of sovereignty would be impossible.
"We've always favored elections," Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said after he and other top Bush aides briefed senators. "The only question is - the tension was, if your goal is to get sovereignty passed to the Iraqis so that they feel they have a stake in their future, can you do it faster with caucuses or can you do it faster with elections?"
Rumsfeld was responding to comments by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who opened the door Wednesday to elections in Iraq earlier than planned.
"The discussion, which has been stimulated by Ayatollah Sistani, is whether there could be an element of elections injected into the earlier part of the process," Straw said at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.
"We have to work with great respect for him and similar leaders," he said. "We want elections as soon as it is feasible to hold them."
Shiite clerics have become more forceful in their denunciation of the caucus plan and have organized increasingly large, albeit peaceful, demonstrations demanding elections.
State Department officials said no changes to the Bremer plan are being formally considered. They said much depends on the findings of a U.N. assessment team that the Bush administration has asked U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to send to examine the feasibility of elections.
One option being informally discussed is to delay the transfer of power until later in 2004, which might give the United Nations time to organize some sort of elections, said one official.
But that is almost certain to be opposed by White House political aides who want the occupation over and many U.S. troops gone by this summer to bolster Bush's re-election chances, the official said.
"It's all politics right now," he said.
Other options are to go ahead with the June 30 turnover as planned, whatever the fallout, or to accelerate it by handing over power to the Iraqi Governing Council in March or April, he said.
Knight Ridder Newspapers correspondents Tom Lasseter in Najaf, Iraq, and Joseph L. Galloway and John Walcott in Washington contributed to this report.
http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0122-01.htm
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/03/08...tion=cnn_latest
Alleged CIA flights landed in UK
2 U.S. planes made 14 flights; opposition suspects 'rendition'
LONDON, England (AP) -- The British government has said that private planes -- which the opposition believes were part of a CIA program to transfer terror suspects to countries where they could be tortured -- landed at military airfields.
Armed Forces Minister Adam Ingram said in a written response to a parliamentary question that two U.S. planes made 14 flights, landing at three British military airfields -- Northolt, Briz Norton and Lyneham -- between October 2002 and May 2004.
The opposition Liberal Democrats suspect the aircraft were part of the CIA's "extraordinary rendition" program, in which terror suspects are transferred to countries in which torture is known to occur.
The planes had visited destinations including Tripoli, Libya; Islamabad, Pakistan; Amman, Jordan; Doha, Qatar; Marrakech, Morocco; Luqa, Malta; Shannon, Ireland; and Washington.
"Bit by bit the jigsaw becomes clearer. But it would be a lot easier if the government would simply ask the U.S. administration some straightforward questions," Michael Moore, the foreign affairs spokesman of the Liberal Democrats, said in an interview with The Associated Press.
Moore demanded that the government reveal how many individuals had been subjected to rendition by the United States via Britain since 1998.
"Apart from Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq, how many other detention centers are operated by the USA or on its behalf, and how many people are at them?" Moore said.
"What assurances can be given that the interrogation techniques used do not amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which is illegal under international law?"
In his response to the Liberal Democrats' parliamentary question from December, Ingram wrote it would cost the government too much to check the flight records of all British military airfields over several years.
"None of this information is at odds with the foreign secretary's statements on the subject," Ingram said in the letter.
On February 23, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said U.S. President George W. Bush's administration has never requested British air space or territory for CIA flights.
Straw said two such flights were approved during the administration of former U.S. President Bill Clinton.
"Some have suggested that these might have been rendition flights. The government is giving us as little information as it can get away with," Moore said.
"We're prepared to give Blair's government the benefit of the doubt on this issue, but we need to know the questions it has asked the Bush administration and the answers it received."
Copyright 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
Alleged CIA flights landed in UK
2 U.S. planes made 14 flights; opposition suspects 'rendition'
LONDON, England (AP) -- The British government has said that private planes -- which the opposition believes were part of a CIA program to transfer terror suspects to countries where they could be tortured -- landed at military airfields.
Armed Forces Minister Adam Ingram said in a written response to a parliamentary question that two U.S. planes made 14 flights, landing at three British military airfields -- Northolt, Briz Norton and Lyneham -- between October 2002 and May 2004.
The opposition Liberal Democrats suspect the aircraft were part of the CIA's "extraordinary rendition" program, in which terror suspects are transferred to countries in which torture is known to occur.
The planes had visited destinations including Tripoli, Libya; Islamabad, Pakistan; Amman, Jordan; Doha, Qatar; Marrakech, Morocco; Luqa, Malta; Shannon, Ireland; and Washington.
"Bit by bit the jigsaw becomes clearer. But it would be a lot easier if the government would simply ask the U.S. administration some straightforward questions," Michael Moore, the foreign affairs spokesman of the Liberal Democrats, said in an interview with The Associated Press.
Moore demanded that the government reveal how many individuals had been subjected to rendition by the United States via Britain since 1998.
"Apart from Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan and Iraq, how many other detention centers are operated by the USA or on its behalf, and how many people are at them?" Moore said.
"What assurances can be given that the interrogation techniques used do not amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which is illegal under international law?"
In his response to the Liberal Democrats' parliamentary question from December, Ingram wrote it would cost the government too much to check the flight records of all British military airfields over several years.
"None of this information is at odds with the foreign secretary's statements on the subject," Ingram said in the letter.
On February 23, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said U.S. President George W. Bush's administration has never requested British air space or territory for CIA flights.
Straw said two such flights were approved during the administration of former U.S. President Bill Clinton.
"Some have suggested that these might have been rendition flights. The government is giving us as little information as it can get away with," Moore said.
"We're prepared to give Blair's government the benefit of the doubt on this issue, but we need to know the questions it has asked the Bush administration and the answers it received."
Copyright 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
March 9, 2006
Justice Dept. Report Cites F.B.I. Violations
By ERIC LICHTBLAU
WASHINGTON, March 8 — The Federal Bureau of Investigation found apparent violations of its own wiretapping and other intelligence-gathering procedures more than 100 times in the last two years, and problems appear to have grown more frequent in some crucial respects, a Justice Department report released Wednesday said.
While some of these instances were considered technical glitches, the report, from the department's inspector general, characterized others as "significant," including wiretaps that were much broader in scope than approved by a court and others that were allowed to continue for weeks or sometimes months longer than was authorized.
In one instance, the F.B.I. received the full content of 181 telephone calls as part of an intelligence investigation, instead of merely the billing and toll records as authorized, the report found. In a handful of cases, it said, the bureau conducted physical searches that had not been properly authorized.
The inspector general's findings come at a time of fierce Congressional debate over the program of wiretapping without warrants that the National Security Agency has conducted. That program, approved by President Bush, is separate from the F.B.I. wiretaps reviewed in the report, and the inspector general's office concluded that it did not have the jurisdiction to review the legality or operations of the N.S.A. effort.
But, the report disclosed, the Justice Department has opened reviews into two other controversial counterterrorism tactics that the department has widely employed since the Sept. 11 attacks.
In one, the inspector general has begun looking into the F.B.I.'s use of administrative subpoenas, known as national security letters, to demand records and documents without warrants in terror investigations. Some critics maintain that the bureau has abused its subpoena powers to demand records in thousands of cases.
In the other, the Office of Professional Responsibility, a Justice Department unit that reviews ethics charges against department lawyers, has opened inquiries related to the detention of 21 people held as material witnesses in terror investigations.
As with the F.B.I.'s use of administrative subpoenas, civil rights advocates assert that the Justice Department has abused the material witness statute by holding suspects whom it may not have enough evidence to charge. The new ethics inquiries are reviewing accusations that department officials did not take some material witnesses to court within the required time, failed to tell them the basis for the arrest or held them without any attempt to obtain their testimony as supposed witnesses in terror investigations, the inspector general said Wednesday.
Representative John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, characterized the report as "yet another vindication for those of us who have raised concerns about the administration's policies in the war on terror."
Mr. Conyers said that "despite the Bush administration's attempt to demonize critics of its antiterrorism policies as advancing phantom or trivial concerns, the report demonstrates that the independent Office of Inspector General has found that many of these policies indeed warrant full investigations."
For its part, the F.B.I. said in a statement that it had been quick to correct errors in intelligence-gathering procedures when they were discovered and that "there have been no examples by the F.B.I. of willful disregard for the law or of court orders."
The inspector general's review grew out of documents, dealing with intelligence violations, that were released last year under a Freedom of Information Act request by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a private group in Washington. The inspector general then obtained more documents on violations and included an 11-page analysis of the problem as part of a broader report Wednesday on counterterrorism measures.
The inspector general reviewed 108 instances in which the F.B.I. reported violations to an oversight board in the 2004 and 2005 fiscal years.
"We're always looking to bring the number of violations down," John Miller, chief spokesman for the bureau, said in an interview, "but given the scope and complexity of national security investigations, that's a relatively small number."
The inspector general's review found that reported violations under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which governs some federal wiretaps, accounted for a growing share of the total, having risen to 69 percent last year from 48 percent in 2004.
The duration of the violations also grew in some crucial areas, the review found. Two of those areas were the "overcollection" of intelligence — going beyond the scope approved by the court in authorizing a wiretap — and "overruns," in which a wiretap or other intelligence-gathering method was allowed to continue beyond the approved time period without an extension.
The review found that the average amount of time that overcollections and overruns were allowed before they were discovered and corrected rose to 32 days last year from 22 in 2004. In most cases, the F.B.I. was found to be at fault, while about a quarter of the time a "third party," usually a telecommunications company, was to blame, the data showed.
In taking issue with some of the findings, F.B.I. officials said the data were skewed by a number of exceptionally long violations; one wiretap lasted 373 days.
Copyright 2006The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML
Justice Dept. Report Cites F.B.I. Violations
By ERIC LICHTBLAU
WASHINGTON, March 8 — The Federal Bureau of Investigation found apparent violations of its own wiretapping and other intelligence-gathering procedures more than 100 times in the last two years, and problems appear to have grown more frequent in some crucial respects, a Justice Department report released Wednesday said.
While some of these instances were considered technical glitches, the report, from the department's inspector general, characterized others as "significant," including wiretaps that were much broader in scope than approved by a court and others that were allowed to continue for weeks or sometimes months longer than was authorized.
In one instance, the F.B.I. received the full content of 181 telephone calls as part of an intelligence investigation, instead of merely the billing and toll records as authorized, the report found. In a handful of cases, it said, the bureau conducted physical searches that had not been properly authorized.
The inspector general's findings come at a time of fierce Congressional debate over the program of wiretapping without warrants that the National Security Agency has conducted. That program, approved by President Bush, is separate from the F.B.I. wiretaps reviewed in the report, and the inspector general's office concluded that it did not have the jurisdiction to review the legality or operations of the N.S.A. effort.
But, the report disclosed, the Justice Department has opened reviews into two other controversial counterterrorism tactics that the department has widely employed since the Sept. 11 attacks.
In one, the inspector general has begun looking into the F.B.I.'s use of administrative subpoenas, known as national security letters, to demand records and documents without warrants in terror investigations. Some critics maintain that the bureau has abused its subpoena powers to demand records in thousands of cases.
In the other, the Office of Professional Responsibility, a Justice Department unit that reviews ethics charges against department lawyers, has opened inquiries related to the detention of 21 people held as material witnesses in terror investigations.
As with the F.B.I.'s use of administrative subpoenas, civil rights advocates assert that the Justice Department has abused the material witness statute by holding suspects whom it may not have enough evidence to charge. The new ethics inquiries are reviewing accusations that department officials did not take some material witnesses to court within the required time, failed to tell them the basis for the arrest or held them without any attempt to obtain their testimony as supposed witnesses in terror investigations, the inspector general said Wednesday.
Representative John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, characterized the report as "yet another vindication for those of us who have raised concerns about the administration's policies in the war on terror."
Mr. Conyers said that "despite the Bush administration's attempt to demonize critics of its antiterrorism policies as advancing phantom or trivial concerns, the report demonstrates that the independent Office of Inspector General has found that many of these policies indeed warrant full investigations."
For its part, the F.B.I. said in a statement that it had been quick to correct errors in intelligence-gathering procedures when they were discovered and that "there have been no examples by the F.B.I. of willful disregard for the law or of court orders."
The inspector general's review grew out of documents, dealing with intelligence violations, that were released last year under a Freedom of Information Act request by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a private group in Washington. The inspector general then obtained more documents on violations and included an 11-page analysis of the problem as part of a broader report Wednesday on counterterrorism measures.
The inspector general reviewed 108 instances in which the F.B.I. reported violations to an oversight board in the 2004 and 2005 fiscal years.
"We're always looking to bring the number of violations down," John Miller, chief spokesman for the bureau, said in an interview, "but given the scope and complexity of national security investigations, that's a relatively small number."
The inspector general's review found that reported violations under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which governs some federal wiretaps, accounted for a growing share of the total, having risen to 69 percent last year from 48 percent in 2004.
The duration of the violations also grew in some crucial areas, the review found. Two of those areas were the "overcollection" of intelligence — going beyond the scope approved by the court in authorizing a wiretap — and "overruns," in which a wiretap or other intelligence-gathering method was allowed to continue beyond the approved time period without an extension.
The review found that the average amount of time that overcollections and overruns were allowed before they were discovered and corrected rose to 32 days last year from 22 in 2004. In most cases, the F.B.I. was found to be at fault, while about a quarter of the time a "third party," usually a telecommunications company, was to blame, the data showed.
In taking issue with some of the findings, F.B.I. officials said the data were skewed by a number of exceptionally long violations; one wiretap lasted 373 days.
Copyright 2006The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML
March 9, 2006
Editorial
The Death of the Intelligence Panel
The wrenching debate in the 1970's over the abuse of presidential power produced two groundbreaking reforms aimed at preventing a president from using war or broader claims of national security to trample Americans' rights.
One was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which struck the proper balance between national security and bedrock civil liberties, and the other was the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a symbol of bipartisan leadership. They endured for a quarter of a century — until George W. Bush and Dick Cheney left FISA in tatters and the Senate Select Committee on its deathbed in just five years.
The Senate panel has become so paralyzingly partisan that it could not even manage to do its basic job this week and look into President Bush's warrantless spying on Americans' international e-mail and phone calls. Senator Pat Roberts, the chairman, said Tuesday that there would be no investigation. Instead, the committee's Republicans voted to create a subcommittee that is supposed to get reports from the White House on any future warrantless surveillance.
It's breathtakingly cynical. Faced with a president who is almost certainly breaking the law, the Senate sets up a panel to watch him do it and calls that control. This new Senate plan is being presented as a way to increase the supervision of intelligence gathering while giving the spies needed flexibility. But it does no such thing.
The Republicans' idea of supervision involves saying the White House should get a warrant for spying whenever possible. Currently a warrant is needed, period. And that's the right law. The White House has not offered a scrap of evidence that it interferes with antiterrorist operations. Mr. Bush simply decided the law did not apply to him.
It was no surprise that Mr. Roberts led this retreat. He's been blocking an investigation into the domestic spying operation for weeks, just as he has been stonewalling a promised investigation into how the White House hyped the intelligence on Iraq. But it was disappointing to see a principled Republican like Senator Olympia Snowe go along. The Democrats are not blameless, either. Too often, their positions seem like campaign tactics, and Senator John Rockefeller IV fumbled by not consulting Ms. Snowe, who is up for re-election and under intense White House pressure.
But the Republicans deserve the lion's share of the blame. It was Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney who hyped the intelligence on Iraq — and the Senate Republicans who helped them evade accountability. And it was Mr. Bush who approved the warrantless wiretapping, which is part of Mr. Cheney's crusade to expand presidential powers. (Unlike the rest of us, Mr. Cheney thought the lesson of Watergate was that the president was not strong enough.)
Ms. Snowe said she would still support an investigation if the new panel uncovered more wrongdoing. But that's hardly likely to happen because the Republicans on the panel are Mr. Roberts, Orrin Hatch, Mike DeWine and Christopher Bond, who march in lock step with the White House.
The Senate Judiciary Committee is still looking into the wiretapping. That committee should have plenty of incentive to go forward — its chairman, Senator Arlen Specter, was righteously angry when he received a letter in which Attorney General Alberto Gonzales implied that there was more warrantless spying we don't know about. Mr. Gonzales won't even say that Mr. Bush understands it is blatantly illegal to spy on communications within the United States without a warrant. Nevertheless, there's not much cause for hope: Mr. Specter has a sad habit of bowing to the right wing when the chips are down.
There are moments when leaders simply have to take a stand. It seems to us that one of them is when Americans are in danger of the kind of unchecked surveillance that they thought had died with J. Edgar Hoover, Watergate and spying on Vietnam protesters and civil rights leaders.
Copyright 2006The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML
Editorial
The Death of the Intelligence Panel
The wrenching debate in the 1970's over the abuse of presidential power produced two groundbreaking reforms aimed at preventing a president from using war or broader claims of national security to trample Americans' rights.
One was the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which struck the proper balance between national security and bedrock civil liberties, and the other was the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a symbol of bipartisan leadership. They endured for a quarter of a century — until George W. Bush and Dick Cheney left FISA in tatters and the Senate Select Committee on its deathbed in just five years.
The Senate panel has become so paralyzingly partisan that it could not even manage to do its basic job this week and look into President Bush's warrantless spying on Americans' international e-mail and phone calls. Senator Pat Roberts, the chairman, said Tuesday that there would be no investigation. Instead, the committee's Republicans voted to create a subcommittee that is supposed to get reports from the White House on any future warrantless surveillance.
It's breathtakingly cynical. Faced with a president who is almost certainly breaking the law, the Senate sets up a panel to watch him do it and calls that control. This new Senate plan is being presented as a way to increase the supervision of intelligence gathering while giving the spies needed flexibility. But it does no such thing.
The Republicans' idea of supervision involves saying the White House should get a warrant for spying whenever possible. Currently a warrant is needed, period. And that's the right law. The White House has not offered a scrap of evidence that it interferes with antiterrorist operations. Mr. Bush simply decided the law did not apply to him.
It was no surprise that Mr. Roberts led this retreat. He's been blocking an investigation into the domestic spying operation for weeks, just as he has been stonewalling a promised investigation into how the White House hyped the intelligence on Iraq. But it was disappointing to see a principled Republican like Senator Olympia Snowe go along. The Democrats are not blameless, either. Too often, their positions seem like campaign tactics, and Senator John Rockefeller IV fumbled by not consulting Ms. Snowe, who is up for re-election and under intense White House pressure.
But the Republicans deserve the lion's share of the blame. It was Mr. Bush and Mr. Cheney who hyped the intelligence on Iraq — and the Senate Republicans who helped them evade accountability. And it was Mr. Bush who approved the warrantless wiretapping, which is part of Mr. Cheney's crusade to expand presidential powers. (Unlike the rest of us, Mr. Cheney thought the lesson of Watergate was that the president was not strong enough.)
Ms. Snowe said she would still support an investigation if the new panel uncovered more wrongdoing. But that's hardly likely to happen because the Republicans on the panel are Mr. Roberts, Orrin Hatch, Mike DeWine and Christopher Bond, who march in lock step with the White House.
The Senate Judiciary Committee is still looking into the wiretapping. That committee should have plenty of incentive to go forward — its chairman, Senator Arlen Specter, was righteously angry when he received a letter in which Attorney General Alberto Gonzales implied that there was more warrantless spying we don't know about. Mr. Gonzales won't even say that Mr. Bush understands it is blatantly illegal to spy on communications within the United States without a warrant. Nevertheless, there's not much cause for hope: Mr. Specter has a sad habit of bowing to the right wing when the chips are down.
There are moments when leaders simply have to take a stand. It seems to us that one of them is when Americans are in danger of the kind of unchecked surveillance that they thought had died with J. Edgar Hoover, Watergate and spying on Vietnam protesters and civil rights leaders.
Copyright 2006The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML
http://www.counterpunch.org/
Karmilowicz's Story
Ex-State Department Security Officer Charges Pre-9/11 Cover-Up
By ALEXANDER COCKBURN
A former State Department security officer has given CounterPunch a detailed memoir and documents that point to very curious conduct by the CIA, Secret Service and FBI in the Philippines following warnings of an assassination bid on President Clinton during his November 12/13, 1994 visit to Manila.
The bid was organized by the 1993 WTC bomber Ramzi Yousef, at the direction of, and with financial support from, Osama bin Laden (who was indicted for the plot by a federal grand jury in August 1998).
A Pakistani linked to that Manila plot, and also to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency may still be at large. The security officer charges a U.S. cover-up of possible involvement by the Pakistani ISI in the 9/11/01 attack on the Trade Towers. Although given these same leads, the Official 9/11 Commission failed to investigate them.
This past December, Sam Karmilowicz finished a 21-year career as an officer in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Back in 1994 he was working as an Assistant Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Manila, when John D. Negroponte was the ambassador. These days, Negroponte is the U.S. Director of National Intelligence.
On the morning of September 18, 1994, Karmilowicz recalls, "the U.S. embassy received a telephone call from an anonymous person (who spoke with a distinct middle eastern accent) concerning his knowledge of an assassination plot against President William Clinton, who was scheduled to visit Manila that coming November."
The embassy switchboard relayed that and a subsequent call to Karmilowicz, and the caller provided him the name of a Pakistani businessman, Tariq Javed Rana, as being one of the leaders of the plot. The source told Karmilowicz that Rana was facilitating the importation of explosives and operatives into the Philippines to complete the mission by paying bribes to Philippine government officials of the Immigration and Customs bureaus. He said the bribes were paid in counterfeit U.S. currency.
The first call was promptly reviewed in the embassy that same day by members of the embassy emergency action committee (EAC) chaired by Raymond Burghardt, the Deputy in Charge of Mission under Negroponte. The FBI, Secret Service, CIA, DEA, and DIA were all members of the committee. At the conclusion of the EAC meeting, embassy law enforcement and intelligence officials were instructed to inform the Philippine authorities and to initiate an investigation to determine the credibility of the threat. (Burghardt went on to become US ambassador to Vietnam and now heads the East-West Center, based in Honolulu.)
"A few weeks afterwards", Karmilowicz says, " high ranking officers of the CIA and Secret Service came into my office and informed me that they had conducted an investigation concerning the threat and concluded that the allegations against the Pakistani, Rana, were a hoax in order to have the police harass him. They offered no motive or information as to why such a 'hoax' would be perpetrated or who might be behind it.
"While all this was going on, I was supervising and managing the embassy's surveillance detection unit responsible for the security of our housing compounds and annexes, including looking for suspicious persons or activity. I was also assigned the task of coordinating and providing protective security arrangements for visiting dignitaries and VIPs. As such, I had a professional responsibility to know whether the Pakistani suspect, and or any of his accomplices, was a credible threat against U.S. persons and/or interests in the Philippines. "The U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies may have dismissed this intelligence data as a hoax while secretly following up the leads ... or they may just have been incompetent and let the future 9-11 terrorist masterminds slip through their fingers. Either way, they seem to have been incompetent because, if they were secretly monitoring these suspected (later confirmed) terrorists, then they obviously did a poor job of it."
A few days before that first call, the Pakistani man named in the plot, Tariq Rana, had been featured in the Philippine press, which reported that he was a suspect in an illegal drug manufacturing ring. In response to these allegations, the public affairs section of the Pakistani embassy in Manila issued a number of statements vigorously denying the allegations against their national, claiming that he was a law-abiding citizen and a close relative of members of Pakistan's parliament and military establishment. Shortly after he issued these statements the Pakistani public affairs officer was recalled to Pakistan.
President Clinton arrived in Manila on November 12, 1994, and his two-day visit passed without incident. Then, one week before Pope John Paul II's visit to Manila in mid-January, 1995, police claimed a fire occurred in Room 603 of the Dona Josefa apartment building in Manila and that they discovered bomb-making chemicals and other evidence during a search of the apartment. Several people of Middle Eastern origin were staying in the apartment at the time of the fire and one of these persons was later identified as Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 World Trade Center bomber. Yousef is the nephew of Khaled Shaikh Muhammad, who was arrested in 2003. Muhammad subsequently disclosed under interrogation that he had planned the 9/11 attacks with Yousef in Manila at that time.
Ramzi Yousef fled the Philippines immediately after the apartment fire, and was arrested in Pakistan a month later. In 1998, Agence France Press (AFP) reported that Yousef confessed to federal authorities while in prison that he had in fact planned to assassinate Clinton when the president was visiting the Philippines but gave up because of tight security. Secret Service sources also report that large sums of counterfeit U.S. currency were entering the Philippines during the time of the plot. Clearly, the information passed to Karmilowicz was accurate and not a hoax as claimed by the CIA and Secret Service.
In conjunction with the fire at Yousef's apartment, the Philippine press also reported that a similar fire occurred at the business establishment of Tariq Rana. An article in the Manila Chronicle indicated that the police found the same chemicals in both fires - chemicals that are used to make nitroglycerin. Yousef used nitroglycerin to bomb Philippines Airlines Flight 434 on December 11, 1994 as a test run for the so-called "Bojinka"plot. The explosion tore out a two square foot portion of the fuselage and ripped almost in half the body of 24-year old Haruki Ikegami, a Japanese businessman occupying the seat under which the bomb was placed. The bomb used on Flight 434 had one-tenth the power of the bombs he planned to use in the first phase of his Bojinka project, which was to simultaneously bomb 11 American aircraft over the Pacific Ocean.
Rana was arrested in April 1995 by Philippine authorities and charged with business fraud, although his current whereabouts are unknown.
Not all the Al Qaeda operatives successfully escaped arrest following the January 6, 1995 fire at the Dona Josefa apartment building.
According to Peter Lance's book Cover Up, Ramzi Yousef instructed one of his accomplices, Abdul Hakim Murad, to return to Dona Josefa during the early morning hours on the day of the fire to retrieve his laptop computer, which contained all the details of the Bojinka plot, plus other incriminating information. The Philippine police, who had staked out the building, subsequently arrested Murad and transported him to Camp Crame, the headquarters of the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group (PNP). During the period of Murad's captivity, Lance says Murad "was harshly treated, perhaps even tortured, forced to ingest massive quantities of water".
Murad remained in Philippine custody until on or about May 11, 1995, when he was rendered to the U.S. to face criminal charges. However, before the rendition, the U.S. embassy sent Karmilowicz to Camp Crame to pick-up an envelope containing evidence that the PNP had collected from Murad. Upon his return to the embassy, Karmilowicz was instructed to transcribe the chain of evidence and to express mail the materials to a U.S. Justice Department Office in New York City. Mike Garcia and Dietrich Snell, the Assistant U.S. Attorneys who prosecuted Murad, almost certainly had access to the materials that Agent Karmilowicz sent to the Justice Department, although it is unknown what, if anything, was done with the evidence.
Pakistan's ISI and, indirectly, the CIA had much closer ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda than the American public was allowed to know. It is common knowledge that Osama bin Laden may be hiding in the rugged Pakistani mountains bordering Afghanistan. However, most Americans probably are not aware or do not remember that major al Qaeda players Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaik Mohammed were both hiding in Pakistan when they were captured in 1995 and 2003, respectively, as was Mir Aimal Kasi, the assassin who attacked CIA employees in their cars outside CIA headquarters in Langley, VA in 1993.
Pakistan had been playing a double game until the events of September 11 forced the situation. Pakistan had supported the rise of the Taliban in the power vacuum left by the departure of the Soviet occupation army at the end of the 1980s. Pakistan supported and even used al Qaeda terrorist training camps to train its own operatives for use in the Kashmir dispute. There are other examples of Pakistan's possible links to terrorism and infiltration of the ISI by al Qaeda, such as the alleged funneling of money from ISI director General Ahmad Mehmoud to 9/11's Mohammed Atta. The Wall Street Journal reporter, Daniel Pearl, was kidnapped and murdered in Karachi, Pakistan while he was investigating these al Qaeda-ISI links.
Karmilowicz went on from his tour of duty on Manila to Washington, then Beirut, and a later posting in Quito, Ecuador, where he was involved in a fracas which resulted in the death of an Ecuadorian national. Exonerated after a State Department investigation he served in Washington, finally leaving the service at the end of 2005.
During the spring of 2004, Karmilowicz says, "I contacted Maria Ressa, the CNN Jakarta Bureau Chief after I read a book that she published in December 2003 entitled Seeds of Terror. According to her research, the Pakistani suspected of plotting to kill President Clinton was a close associate of Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed during the time that these persons were hatching the plot to use airline carriers as missiles to attack the U.S." Ressa also told Karmilowicz that her sources in the Philippine intelligence and police bureaus suspected that this Pakistani was an associate of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency. The story has often been told of how a smoky accident in Yousef's apartment happened to draw police attention, and though Yousef escaped, his laptop provided disclosed that this attacks were nearly ready for execution.
The story is true as far as it goes, she told Karmilowicz, but the Philippine authorities were not quite so asleep at the wheel. The explosion aboard Philippine Airlines flight 434 had placed the police on heightened alert with the pope's visit just a few weeks away. Yousef had called the Associated Press, claiming that Abu Sayyaf was responsible, which suggests Filipino suspects, but Avelino "Sonny" Razon of the Presidential Security Group (PSG) tasked with security for the pope's visit was tipped to watch for Middle Easterners. "The PNP (Philippine National Police), particularly the PSG ,was on heightened alert because in December 1994, we received reports that a group of Middle Eastern personalities would be coming over to the Philippines to assassinate the Pope," Razon said. "The PSG had one man in particular under surveillance -- Tareq Javed Rana, a Pakistani suspected of supporting international terrorists with drug money. They were on the right track. He was a close associate of Ramzi Yousef. While under surveillance, Rana's house in Paranque, a suburb of Manila, burned down. An official police report would later say the PSG believed the "conflagration was caused by combustible chemicals such as those used for making an improvised explosive device [IED]."
Ressa's book suggested that the PNP did not begin its surveillance of Rana until December 1994, several months after the U.S. embassy had alerted the Philippine authorities that Rana was named as a suspect to assassinate President Clinton. This raises the question: why wasn't Rana investigated earlier; or, if he was investigated, why do certain people now want to deny this?
In 2004, Karmilowicz and his attorney contacted Richard Ben-Veniste of the official 9/11 Commission, suggesting that the leads from 1994 about Rana pointed to possible ISI complicity and that these leads be followed up. But the Commission never called him to testify.
These days, Karmilowicz (living in Alexandria, VA, and seeking a security job in a Fortune 500 firm), is scathing about the conduct of the interagency taskforce in the U.S. embassy in Manila.
What I think this story reveals is that the 9-11 Commission and the U.S. government deliberately withheld information from the U.S. public (and everyone else for that matter) that linked Al Qaeda operatives to persons who had close ties to Pakistani government officials, including members of Pakistan's ISI. One can only guess whether that was to save embarrassment or to hide illegal conduct.
One thing is for certain, i.e., the FBI, Secret Service, and CIA have deceived, and continue to deceive, the public concerning Rana's connection to Al Qaeda and the facts regarding the 9-11 attack.
One of the standouts in this spin of lies is Neil Herman, a former FBI official who was involved in the Bojinka investigation and a former supervisor of the FBI's Joint Terrorist Task Force in New York. Herman was quoted in an August 5, 2004 New York Times article entitled, Qaeda Strategy is Called Cause for New Alarm by Eric Lipton and Benjamin Weiser, which reported:
Even though the large-scale jetliner attack over the Pacific never happened, it is clear that the elaborate planning was an unappreciated warning of the sophistication and determination of the terrorists.
"It showed the government back in the mid-1990's how detail-oriented these individuals were," said Mr. Herman, the former FBI official, who was involved in the Bojinka investigation. "It also showed that there was an active network, although, of course, we were unable to determine the extent of the network back then."
Another prominent figure suspected of quashing the truth is Dietrich L. Snell, the Senior Counsel and Team Leader of the Official 9-11 Commission. Peter Lance writes extensively in his books Cover Up and 1000 Years for Revenge about Snell's shenanigans in cherry-picking evidence and excluding credible witness testimony, including information collected by the Defense Department's Able Danger Unit concerning pre-9/11 sightings of Mohammed Atta, one of the nineteen suspected hijackers. These allegations are now resurfacing in the news. The Associated Press (AP) reported on February 15, 2005 that U.S. Representative Curt Weldon, the vice Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee advised the public that the Able Danger Unit had identified Atta more than a dozen times before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Weldon also reportedly said the secret team found "a problem" in Yemen two weeks before the deadly Al Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in 2000, of which the ship commander was not told. Former (unidentified) members of the 9/11 Commission reportedly dismissed Weldon's findings.
My experience in the Philippines also appears to overlap Snell's involvement in the Murad case that Snell prosecuted. The Cooperative Research 9-11 Timeline (www.cooperativeresearch.org) contains a very peculiar account entitled: Early 1998:Prosecutors Turn Down Deal That Could Reveal Bojinka Third Plot.
The entry said: "Abdul Hakim Murad, a conspirator in the 1995 Bojinka plot with Ramzi Yousef, Khalid Shaik Mohammed, and others, was convicted in 1996 of his role in the Bojinka plot. He is about to be sentenced for that crime. He offers to cooperate with federal prosecutors in return for a reduction in his sentence, but prosecutors turn down his offer. Dietrich Snell, the prosecutor who convicted Murad, says after 9-11 that he doesn't remember any such offer. But court papers and others familiar with the case later confirmed that Murad does offer to cooperate at this time. Snell claimed he only remembers hearing that Murad had described an intention to hijack a plan and fly it into the CIA headquarters. However, in 1995 Murad had confessed to Philippine investigators that this would have been only one part of a larger plot to crash a number of airplanes into prominent U.S. buildings, including the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a plot that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed later adjusts and turns in the 9-11 plot. While Philippine investigators claim this information was passed on to U.S. intelligence, it's not clear just which U.S. officials may have learned this information and what they did with it, if anything. [New York Daily News, 9/25/01] Murad is sentenced in May 1998 and given life in prison plus 60 years. [Albany Times Union, 9/22/02] After 9-11, Snell goes on to become Senior Counsel and a team leader for the 9-11 Commission. Author Peter Lance later calls Snell "one of the fixers, hired early on to sanitize the Commission's final report." Lance says Snell ignored evidence presented to the Commission that shows direct ties between the Bojinka plot and 9-11, and in so doing covers up Snell's own role in the failure to make use of evidence learned from Murad and other Bojinka plotters. [FrontPage Magazine, 1/27/05].
I know who the intelligence officials were at the U.S. embassy at the time of Murad's arrest and interrogation. These are the same officials who discounted the threat information I received about Rana. Do these people have something to hide? You bet they do!
Peter Lance was entirely correct when he told CNN anchor Lou Dobbs in a December 5, 2005 interview that the 9-11 Commission was essentially "a whitewash" and that it intentionally limited its investigation to 1996-forward. He said the Commission moved the plot's origin "to 1996 from 1994"and in so doing omitted information that linked Mohammed Atta to the terrorists responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Lance said Congress should put Dietrich Snell under oath to find out why the 9-11 staffer prevented the Able Danger information from getting to the 9-11 Commission.
Clearly, the 9-11 Commission's decision to use 1996 as the date that the 9-11 plot originated was also designed to omit the information that I obtained concerning Tariq Rana, and the connection he had with the Al Qaeda operatives who conceived the 9-11 plot.
Given these revelations, how can the American public trust a government that has rationalized its own failure to protect this nation by implementing draconian measures (e.g. the Patriot Act, illegal wiretapping, and abductions and torture) - measures that have stripped its citizens of the rights and protections for which this country was founded. And what have these measures bought us but a seemingly endless war of attrition with an adversary that grows stronger and more lethal everyday.
Karmilowicz says, "my experience in the Philippines shows the U.S. government has compartmentalized information, not so much to protect sources and methods of an investigation or intelligence operation, but in order to cover-up its gross incompetence or its complicity in illegal and questionable activities conducted by, or against, foreign powers."
At some point, (most likely after President Clinton concluded his visit to the Philippines) the CIA and Secret Service realized that Rana and his associates were a threat after all, but they kept this information from Agent Karmilowicz.
Karmilowicz says, "Keeping that information to themselves is a breach of the no-double-standard policy [where one agency can't respond to a perceived threat without notifying the other agencies and the American public]."
And even worse, Karmilowicz believes, "this breach of policy has now become the norm in the post 9-11 world, whereby the State Department has now been co-opted by CIA and the Defense Department to allow people to be abducted and killed rather than apprehended. In one case I suspect that because information was compartmentalized, an attack may have been allowed to proceed in Jeddah in December 2004, and five people were killed." [See Counter Punch 'The Origins of the Rendition Program: Does the CIA Have the Right to Break Any Law, January 2006]. Karmilowicz likes to remind us how John Negroponte, the former Chief of Mission in the Philippines, who directed and approved the efforts of the various agencies at post, "was rewarded for his complicity in this cover-up, appointed the Director of National Intelligence, the person who approves secret renditions, eavesdropping, and the abduction and assassination of terrorist suspects".
Karmilowicz cites AP's Mathew Barakat and Peter Yost as reporting that Rob Spencer, the U.S. prosecutor in the Moussaoui trial in federal court in Alexandria, gave an opening statement to the jury in which he claimed that if Moussaoui had come clean -- i.e., informed the law enforcement establishment of his knowledge of the 9-11 plot -- in 2001, the FBI would have been able to use his records to locate 11 of the 19 September 11 hijackers, including all four pilots. Spencer also said the government would have kept those conspirators off airplanes and would have altered airport screeners to confiscate small knives and boxcutters. "Who in their right mind", Karmilowicz says, "would believe such a statement given what I observed and experienced in the Philippines?"
Sam Karmilowicz can be reached at skarmilo1@yahoo.com
Karmilowicz's Story
Ex-State Department Security Officer Charges Pre-9/11 Cover-Up
By ALEXANDER COCKBURN
A former State Department security officer has given CounterPunch a detailed memoir and documents that point to very curious conduct by the CIA, Secret Service and FBI in the Philippines following warnings of an assassination bid on President Clinton during his November 12/13, 1994 visit to Manila.
The bid was organized by the 1993 WTC bomber Ramzi Yousef, at the direction of, and with financial support from, Osama bin Laden (who was indicted for the plot by a federal grand jury in August 1998).
A Pakistani linked to that Manila plot, and also to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency may still be at large. The security officer charges a U.S. cover-up of possible involvement by the Pakistani ISI in the 9/11/01 attack on the Trade Towers. Although given these same leads, the Official 9/11 Commission failed to investigate them.
This past December, Sam Karmilowicz finished a 21-year career as an officer in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Back in 1994 he was working as an Assistant Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Manila, when John D. Negroponte was the ambassador. These days, Negroponte is the U.S. Director of National Intelligence.
On the morning of September 18, 1994, Karmilowicz recalls, "the U.S. embassy received a telephone call from an anonymous person (who spoke with a distinct middle eastern accent) concerning his knowledge of an assassination plot against President William Clinton, who was scheduled to visit Manila that coming November."
The embassy switchboard relayed that and a subsequent call to Karmilowicz, and the caller provided him the name of a Pakistani businessman, Tariq Javed Rana, as being one of the leaders of the plot. The source told Karmilowicz that Rana was facilitating the importation of explosives and operatives into the Philippines to complete the mission by paying bribes to Philippine government officials of the Immigration and Customs bureaus. He said the bribes were paid in counterfeit U.S. currency.
The first call was promptly reviewed in the embassy that same day by members of the embassy emergency action committee (EAC) chaired by Raymond Burghardt, the Deputy in Charge of Mission under Negroponte. The FBI, Secret Service, CIA, DEA, and DIA were all members of the committee. At the conclusion of the EAC meeting, embassy law enforcement and intelligence officials were instructed to inform the Philippine authorities and to initiate an investigation to determine the credibility of the threat. (Burghardt went on to become US ambassador to Vietnam and now heads the East-West Center, based in Honolulu.)
"A few weeks afterwards", Karmilowicz says, " high ranking officers of the CIA and Secret Service came into my office and informed me that they had conducted an investigation concerning the threat and concluded that the allegations against the Pakistani, Rana, were a hoax in order to have the police harass him. They offered no motive or information as to why such a 'hoax' would be perpetrated or who might be behind it.
"While all this was going on, I was supervising and managing the embassy's surveillance detection unit responsible for the security of our housing compounds and annexes, including looking for suspicious persons or activity. I was also assigned the task of coordinating and providing protective security arrangements for visiting dignitaries and VIPs. As such, I had a professional responsibility to know whether the Pakistani suspect, and or any of his accomplices, was a credible threat against U.S. persons and/or interests in the Philippines. "The U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies may have dismissed this intelligence data as a hoax while secretly following up the leads ... or they may just have been incompetent and let the future 9-11 terrorist masterminds slip through their fingers. Either way, they seem to have been incompetent because, if they were secretly monitoring these suspected (later confirmed) terrorists, then they obviously did a poor job of it."
A few days before that first call, the Pakistani man named in the plot, Tariq Rana, had been featured in the Philippine press, which reported that he was a suspect in an illegal drug manufacturing ring. In response to these allegations, the public affairs section of the Pakistani embassy in Manila issued a number of statements vigorously denying the allegations against their national, claiming that he was a law-abiding citizen and a close relative of members of Pakistan's parliament and military establishment. Shortly after he issued these statements the Pakistani public affairs officer was recalled to Pakistan.
President Clinton arrived in Manila on November 12, 1994, and his two-day visit passed without incident. Then, one week before Pope John Paul II's visit to Manila in mid-January, 1995, police claimed a fire occurred in Room 603 of the Dona Josefa apartment building in Manila and that they discovered bomb-making chemicals and other evidence during a search of the apartment. Several people of Middle Eastern origin were staying in the apartment at the time of the fire and one of these persons was later identified as Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 World Trade Center bomber. Yousef is the nephew of Khaled Shaikh Muhammad, who was arrested in 2003. Muhammad subsequently disclosed under interrogation that he had planned the 9/11 attacks with Yousef in Manila at that time.
Ramzi Yousef fled the Philippines immediately after the apartment fire, and was arrested in Pakistan a month later. In 1998, Agence France Press (AFP) reported that Yousef confessed to federal authorities while in prison that he had in fact planned to assassinate Clinton when the president was visiting the Philippines but gave up because of tight security. Secret Service sources also report that large sums of counterfeit U.S. currency were entering the Philippines during the time of the plot. Clearly, the information passed to Karmilowicz was accurate and not a hoax as claimed by the CIA and Secret Service.
In conjunction with the fire at Yousef's apartment, the Philippine press also reported that a similar fire occurred at the business establishment of Tariq Rana. An article in the Manila Chronicle indicated that the police found the same chemicals in both fires - chemicals that are used to make nitroglycerin. Yousef used nitroglycerin to bomb Philippines Airlines Flight 434 on December 11, 1994 as a test run for the so-called "Bojinka"plot. The explosion tore out a two square foot portion of the fuselage and ripped almost in half the body of 24-year old Haruki Ikegami, a Japanese businessman occupying the seat under which the bomb was placed. The bomb used on Flight 434 had one-tenth the power of the bombs he planned to use in the first phase of his Bojinka project, which was to simultaneously bomb 11 American aircraft over the Pacific Ocean.
Rana was arrested in April 1995 by Philippine authorities and charged with business fraud, although his current whereabouts are unknown.
Not all the Al Qaeda operatives successfully escaped arrest following the January 6, 1995 fire at the Dona Josefa apartment building.
According to Peter Lance's book Cover Up, Ramzi Yousef instructed one of his accomplices, Abdul Hakim Murad, to return to Dona Josefa during the early morning hours on the day of the fire to retrieve his laptop computer, which contained all the details of the Bojinka plot, plus other incriminating information. The Philippine police, who had staked out the building, subsequently arrested Murad and transported him to Camp Crame, the headquarters of the Philippine National Police Intelligence Group (PNP). During the period of Murad's captivity, Lance says Murad "was harshly treated, perhaps even tortured, forced to ingest massive quantities of water".
Murad remained in Philippine custody until on or about May 11, 1995, when he was rendered to the U.S. to face criminal charges. However, before the rendition, the U.S. embassy sent Karmilowicz to Camp Crame to pick-up an envelope containing evidence that the PNP had collected from Murad. Upon his return to the embassy, Karmilowicz was instructed to transcribe the chain of evidence and to express mail the materials to a U.S. Justice Department Office in New York City. Mike Garcia and Dietrich Snell, the Assistant U.S. Attorneys who prosecuted Murad, almost certainly had access to the materials that Agent Karmilowicz sent to the Justice Department, although it is unknown what, if anything, was done with the evidence.
Pakistan's ISI and, indirectly, the CIA had much closer ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda than the American public was allowed to know. It is common knowledge that Osama bin Laden may be hiding in the rugged Pakistani mountains bordering Afghanistan. However, most Americans probably are not aware or do not remember that major al Qaeda players Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaik Mohammed were both hiding in Pakistan when they were captured in 1995 and 2003, respectively, as was Mir Aimal Kasi, the assassin who attacked CIA employees in their cars outside CIA headquarters in Langley, VA in 1993.
Pakistan had been playing a double game until the events of September 11 forced the situation. Pakistan had supported the rise of the Taliban in the power vacuum left by the departure of the Soviet occupation army at the end of the 1980s. Pakistan supported and even used al Qaeda terrorist training camps to train its own operatives for use in the Kashmir dispute. There are other examples of Pakistan's possible links to terrorism and infiltration of the ISI by al Qaeda, such as the alleged funneling of money from ISI director General Ahmad Mehmoud to 9/11's Mohammed Atta. The Wall Street Journal reporter, Daniel Pearl, was kidnapped and murdered in Karachi, Pakistan while he was investigating these al Qaeda-ISI links.
Karmilowicz went on from his tour of duty on Manila to Washington, then Beirut, and a later posting in Quito, Ecuador, where he was involved in a fracas which resulted in the death of an Ecuadorian national. Exonerated after a State Department investigation he served in Washington, finally leaving the service at the end of 2005.
During the spring of 2004, Karmilowicz says, "I contacted Maria Ressa, the CNN Jakarta Bureau Chief after I read a book that she published in December 2003 entitled Seeds of Terror. According to her research, the Pakistani suspected of plotting to kill President Clinton was a close associate of Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed during the time that these persons were hatching the plot to use airline carriers as missiles to attack the U.S." Ressa also told Karmilowicz that her sources in the Philippine intelligence and police bureaus suspected that this Pakistani was an associate of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency. The story has often been told of how a smoky accident in Yousef's apartment happened to draw police attention, and though Yousef escaped, his laptop provided disclosed that this attacks were nearly ready for execution.
The story is true as far as it goes, she told Karmilowicz, but the Philippine authorities were not quite so asleep at the wheel. The explosion aboard Philippine Airlines flight 434 had placed the police on heightened alert with the pope's visit just a few weeks away. Yousef had called the Associated Press, claiming that Abu Sayyaf was responsible, which suggests Filipino suspects, but Avelino "Sonny" Razon of the Presidential Security Group (PSG) tasked with security for the pope's visit was tipped to watch for Middle Easterners. "The PNP (Philippine National Police), particularly the PSG ,was on heightened alert because in December 1994, we received reports that a group of Middle Eastern personalities would be coming over to the Philippines to assassinate the Pope," Razon said. "The PSG had one man in particular under surveillance -- Tareq Javed Rana, a Pakistani suspected of supporting international terrorists with drug money. They were on the right track. He was a close associate of Ramzi Yousef. While under surveillance, Rana's house in Paranque, a suburb of Manila, burned down. An official police report would later say the PSG believed the "conflagration was caused by combustible chemicals such as those used for making an improvised explosive device [IED]."
Ressa's book suggested that the PNP did not begin its surveillance of Rana until December 1994, several months after the U.S. embassy had alerted the Philippine authorities that Rana was named as a suspect to assassinate President Clinton. This raises the question: why wasn't Rana investigated earlier; or, if he was investigated, why do certain people now want to deny this?
In 2004, Karmilowicz and his attorney contacted Richard Ben-Veniste of the official 9/11 Commission, suggesting that the leads from 1994 about Rana pointed to possible ISI complicity and that these leads be followed up. But the Commission never called him to testify.
These days, Karmilowicz (living in Alexandria, VA, and seeking a security job in a Fortune 500 firm), is scathing about the conduct of the interagency taskforce in the U.S. embassy in Manila.
What I think this story reveals is that the 9-11 Commission and the U.S. government deliberately withheld information from the U.S. public (and everyone else for that matter) that linked Al Qaeda operatives to persons who had close ties to Pakistani government officials, including members of Pakistan's ISI. One can only guess whether that was to save embarrassment or to hide illegal conduct.
One thing is for certain, i.e., the FBI, Secret Service, and CIA have deceived, and continue to deceive, the public concerning Rana's connection to Al Qaeda and the facts regarding the 9-11 attack.
One of the standouts in this spin of lies is Neil Herman, a former FBI official who was involved in the Bojinka investigation and a former supervisor of the FBI's Joint Terrorist Task Force in New York. Herman was quoted in an August 5, 2004 New York Times article entitled, Qaeda Strategy is Called Cause for New Alarm by Eric Lipton and Benjamin Weiser, which reported:
Even though the large-scale jetliner attack over the Pacific never happened, it is clear that the elaborate planning was an unappreciated warning of the sophistication and determination of the terrorists.
"It showed the government back in the mid-1990's how detail-oriented these individuals were," said Mr. Herman, the former FBI official, who was involved in the Bojinka investigation. "It also showed that there was an active network, although, of course, we were unable to determine the extent of the network back then."
Another prominent figure suspected of quashing the truth is Dietrich L. Snell, the Senior Counsel and Team Leader of the Official 9-11 Commission. Peter Lance writes extensively in his books Cover Up and 1000 Years for Revenge about Snell's shenanigans in cherry-picking evidence and excluding credible witness testimony, including information collected by the Defense Department's Able Danger Unit concerning pre-9/11 sightings of Mohammed Atta, one of the nineteen suspected hijackers. These allegations are now resurfacing in the news. The Associated Press (AP) reported on February 15, 2005 that U.S. Representative Curt Weldon, the vice Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee advised the public that the Able Danger Unit had identified Atta more than a dozen times before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Weldon also reportedly said the secret team found "a problem" in Yemen two weeks before the deadly Al Qaeda attack on the USS Cole in 2000, of which the ship commander was not told. Former (unidentified) members of the 9/11 Commission reportedly dismissed Weldon's findings.
My experience in the Philippines also appears to overlap Snell's involvement in the Murad case that Snell prosecuted. The Cooperative Research 9-11 Timeline (www.cooperativeresearch.org) contains a very peculiar account entitled: Early 1998:Prosecutors Turn Down Deal That Could Reveal Bojinka Third Plot.
The entry said: "Abdul Hakim Murad, a conspirator in the 1995 Bojinka plot with Ramzi Yousef, Khalid Shaik Mohammed, and others, was convicted in 1996 of his role in the Bojinka plot. He is about to be sentenced for that crime. He offers to cooperate with federal prosecutors in return for a reduction in his sentence, but prosecutors turn down his offer. Dietrich Snell, the prosecutor who convicted Murad, says after 9-11 that he doesn't remember any such offer. But court papers and others familiar with the case later confirmed that Murad does offer to cooperate at this time. Snell claimed he only remembers hearing that Murad had described an intention to hijack a plan and fly it into the CIA headquarters. However, in 1995 Murad had confessed to Philippine investigators that this would have been only one part of a larger plot to crash a number of airplanes into prominent U.S. buildings, including the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, a plot that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed later adjusts and turns in the 9-11 plot. While Philippine investigators claim this information was passed on to U.S. intelligence, it's not clear just which U.S. officials may have learned this information and what they did with it, if anything. [New York Daily News, 9/25/01] Murad is sentenced in May 1998 and given life in prison plus 60 years. [Albany Times Union, 9/22/02] After 9-11, Snell goes on to become Senior Counsel and a team leader for the 9-11 Commission. Author Peter Lance later calls Snell "one of the fixers, hired early on to sanitize the Commission's final report." Lance says Snell ignored evidence presented to the Commission that shows direct ties between the Bojinka plot and 9-11, and in so doing covers up Snell's own role in the failure to make use of evidence learned from Murad and other Bojinka plotters. [FrontPage Magazine, 1/27/05].
I know who the intelligence officials were at the U.S. embassy at the time of Murad's arrest and interrogation. These are the same officials who discounted the threat information I received about Rana. Do these people have something to hide? You bet they do!
Peter Lance was entirely correct when he told CNN anchor Lou Dobbs in a December 5, 2005 interview that the 9-11 Commission was essentially "a whitewash" and that it intentionally limited its investigation to 1996-forward. He said the Commission moved the plot's origin "to 1996 from 1994"and in so doing omitted information that linked Mohammed Atta to the terrorists responsible for the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. Lance said Congress should put Dietrich Snell under oath to find out why the 9-11 staffer prevented the Able Danger information from getting to the 9-11 Commission.
Clearly, the 9-11 Commission's decision to use 1996 as the date that the 9-11 plot originated was also designed to omit the information that I obtained concerning Tariq Rana, and the connection he had with the Al Qaeda operatives who conceived the 9-11 plot.
Given these revelations, how can the American public trust a government that has rationalized its own failure to protect this nation by implementing draconian measures (e.g. the Patriot Act, illegal wiretapping, and abductions and torture) - measures that have stripped its citizens of the rights and protections for which this country was founded. And what have these measures bought us but a seemingly endless war of attrition with an adversary that grows stronger and more lethal everyday.
Karmilowicz says, "my experience in the Philippines shows the U.S. government has compartmentalized information, not so much to protect sources and methods of an investigation or intelligence operation, but in order to cover-up its gross incompetence or its complicity in illegal and questionable activities conducted by, or against, foreign powers."
At some point, (most likely after President Clinton concluded his visit to the Philippines) the CIA and Secret Service realized that Rana and his associates were a threat after all, but they kept this information from Agent Karmilowicz.
Karmilowicz says, "Keeping that information to themselves is a breach of the no-double-standard policy [where one agency can't respond to a perceived threat without notifying the other agencies and the American public]."
And even worse, Karmilowicz believes, "this breach of policy has now become the norm in the post 9-11 world, whereby the State Department has now been co-opted by CIA and the Defense Department to allow people to be abducted and killed rather than apprehended. In one case I suspect that because information was compartmentalized, an attack may have been allowed to proceed in Jeddah in December 2004, and five people were killed." [See Counter Punch 'The Origins of the Rendition Program: Does the CIA Have the Right to Break Any Law, January 2006]. Karmilowicz likes to remind us how John Negroponte, the former Chief of Mission in the Philippines, who directed and approved the efforts of the various agencies at post, "was rewarded for his complicity in this cover-up, appointed the Director of National Intelligence, the person who approves secret renditions, eavesdropping, and the abduction and assassination of terrorist suspects".
Karmilowicz cites AP's Mathew Barakat and Peter Yost as reporting that Rob Spencer, the U.S. prosecutor in the Moussaoui trial in federal court in Alexandria, gave an opening statement to the jury in which he claimed that if Moussaoui had come clean -- i.e., informed the law enforcement establishment of his knowledge of the 9-11 plot -- in 2001, the FBI would have been able to use his records to locate 11 of the 19 September 11 hijackers, including all four pilots. Spencer also said the government would have kept those conspirators off airplanes and would have altered airport screeners to confiscate small knives and boxcutters. "Who in their right mind", Karmilowicz says, "would believe such a statement given what I observed and experienced in the Philippines?"
Sam Karmilowicz can be reached at skarmilo1@yahoo.com
The following article from Congressional Quarterly presents a picture of a somewhat disengaged John Negroponte and of a neutered Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Negroponte Makes the Most of His Post as Minister Without Portfolio
By Jeff Stein, CQ Staff
On many a workday lunchtime, the nominal boss of U.S. intelligence, John D. Negroponte, can be found at a private club in downtown Washington, getting a massage, taking a swim, and having lunch, followed by a good cigar and a perusal of the daily papers in the club’s library.
“He spends three hours there [every] Monday through Friday,” gripes a senior counterterrorism official, noting that the former ambassador has a security detail sitting outside all that time in chase cars. Others say they’ve seen the Director of National Intelligence at the University Club, a 100-year-old mansion-like redoubt of dark oak panels and high ceilings a few blocks from the White House, only “several” times a week.
Surely Negroponte needs a comfort zone, forced as he is to spends hours in the witness chair in front of congressional committees, fielding hot potatoes on subjects over which he has no control — the NSA’s warrantless surveillance, domestic spying by secret military intelligence units, paying newspapers in Iraq to run pro-U.S. stories.
Lacking control must be a new experience for Negroponte. In the 1980s he was ambassador to Honduras, base camp for U.S.-backed attacks on left-wing Nicaragua. More recently, he was the U.S. proconsul in Baghdad. Negroponte’s reputation as a very demanding boss, in fact, preceded him to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), where aides fretted at the prospect of 15-hour days and memos thrown back in their faces by this disciple of Henry A. Kissinger.
But there seems to be a new, relaxed John Negroponte. And some close observers think they know why. He’s figured out the job. Which is to say, he really doesn’t have much control over the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies. So why not hang at the University Club? Negroponte spokesman Carl Kroft takes serious issue with that portrayal. “He’s the hardest working person in U.S. intelligence,” Kroft said. “He’s hard at work from the early hours of the morning to late every night. The job never ends.”
On the Hot Seat
“We appointed you to be the person to (run) all intelligence,” Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., lectured Negroponte at a Feb. 28 hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee. (CQ Transcripts: Senate Select Intelligence Committee hearing, Feb. 28, 2006) Feinstein asked Negroponte about “recent media reports [that] have spotlighted a number of activities that appear to be related to intelligence collection or covert action, but that well may be outside of the official intelligence community’s channels. “For example,” Feinstein continued, “military databases of suspicious activity reports . . .by the (domestic military) counterintelligence field activity, or CIFA; and, secondly, a Pentagon program to secretly pay Iraqi newspapers to run pro-American articles.
“Were these activities subject to your approval and oversight?”
Negroponte’s answer was short-circuited by an unidentified voice, according to the CQ transcript, quite possibly his deputy, former Air Force general and NSA chief Michael Hayden. “Ma’am, I don’t believe that either of those activities would fall into Mr. Negroponte’s area. They are Department of Defense programs, I believe.” “Now, let me raise this problem then,” Feinstein continued. “Now, I know how tough it is. But if you didn’t know and you didn’t give a go-ahead [to domestic military spying], it indicates to me that, for 85 percent of the budget, which is defense-related, that you’re not going to have the controls that you should have,” Feinstein said. “You want to comment?”
Negroponte, who not long ago in Baghdad was dismissing senior military officers with the wave of his hand, had to be feeling an acute wave of heartburn. The Director of National Intelligence was forced to concede that the U.S. intelligence activities Feinstein was asking him about had “not risen to the level of my office.” In any event, they came “under the direction of the undersecretary of defense for intelligence” — a pipsqueak, relatively speaking. Negroponte said he “understood” that the Pentagon was doing an internal review of spying programs because of a congressional uproar. “But will you get the results of that review?” Feinstein asked.
“Yes,” promised Negroponte, dismissed like a schoolboy, “I will get those results.”
How Many Divisions?
Washington’s conventional wisdom these days is that ODNI is a joke. The main reason is that Negroponte’s group has little power over the Pentagon’s covert actions. It’s not his fault. Congress set it up that way after Rumsfeld and company worked the rooms of the House and Senate office buildings. The noted intelligence historian Lock K. Johnson worries that Negroponte could end up like the National Drug Czar, “with no real power” over U.S. spy agencies. Or the Pope, whose political powers Josef Stalin dismissed with a laugh to worried aides: “The Pope? How many divisions has he got?”
Kroft, Negroponte’s spokesman, said in an e-mailed response to a question that his boss “determines and presents to the President the full U.S. National Intelligence Program budget.” As for Negroponte’s lunches at the University Club, he responded, “As a matter of policy we do not discuss the Director of National Intelligence’s schedule.”
Backchannel Chatter
Fire when ready: Clark Kent Ervin, the former DHS Inspector General, is not going to make many friends — or maybe he will — with sentences like these from his forthcoming book, Open Target, an advance copy of which just arrived on SpyTalk’s desk: “From the very beginning, the Information Analysis (IA) unit of the Department of Homeland Security proved to be a bad, bad joke.” Ervin describes both understaffing and empty desks at DHS’s intelligence wing. Eventually, “word got around the tight-knit and hyper-status-conscious intelligence community that taking a job (there) was not” — his emphasis — “a career-enhancing move,” writes Ervin, a Texas protege of the Bush family. Wonder what President Bush thinks of that (our emphasis).
Landing more gently on the SpyTalk bookshelf recently: Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study, an inside look at the people who connect the dots, by anthropologist Dr. Rob Johnson. This is of more than passing interest because it is published by the CIA’s own Center for the Study of Intelligence. Political Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Peter Lang Books), by the Canadian intelligence expert Jeffrey Ian Ross, ruminates on the the origins of terrorism or, put more simply, he asks: What does Osama bin Laden want?
Source: CQ Homeland Security
© 2006 Congressional Quarterly Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Negroponte Makes the Most of His Post as Minister Without Portfolio
By Jeff Stein, CQ Staff
On many a workday lunchtime, the nominal boss of U.S. intelligence, John D. Negroponte, can be found at a private club in downtown Washington, getting a massage, taking a swim, and having lunch, followed by a good cigar and a perusal of the daily papers in the club’s library.
“He spends three hours there [every] Monday through Friday,” gripes a senior counterterrorism official, noting that the former ambassador has a security detail sitting outside all that time in chase cars. Others say they’ve seen the Director of National Intelligence at the University Club, a 100-year-old mansion-like redoubt of dark oak panels and high ceilings a few blocks from the White House, only “several” times a week.
Surely Negroponte needs a comfort zone, forced as he is to spends hours in the witness chair in front of congressional committees, fielding hot potatoes on subjects over which he has no control — the NSA’s warrantless surveillance, domestic spying by secret military intelligence units, paying newspapers in Iraq to run pro-U.S. stories.
Lacking control must be a new experience for Negroponte. In the 1980s he was ambassador to Honduras, base camp for U.S.-backed attacks on left-wing Nicaragua. More recently, he was the U.S. proconsul in Baghdad. Negroponte’s reputation as a very demanding boss, in fact, preceded him to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), where aides fretted at the prospect of 15-hour days and memos thrown back in their faces by this disciple of Henry A. Kissinger.
But there seems to be a new, relaxed John Negroponte. And some close observers think they know why. He’s figured out the job. Which is to say, he really doesn’t have much control over the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies. So why not hang at the University Club? Negroponte spokesman Carl Kroft takes serious issue with that portrayal. “He’s the hardest working person in U.S. intelligence,” Kroft said. “He’s hard at work from the early hours of the morning to late every night. The job never ends.”
On the Hot Seat
“We appointed you to be the person to (run) all intelligence,” Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., lectured Negroponte at a Feb. 28 hearing of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee. (CQ Transcripts: Senate Select Intelligence Committee hearing, Feb. 28, 2006) Feinstein asked Negroponte about “recent media reports [that] have spotlighted a number of activities that appear to be related to intelligence collection or covert action, but that well may be outside of the official intelligence community’s channels. “For example,” Feinstein continued, “military databases of suspicious activity reports . . .by the (domestic military) counterintelligence field activity, or CIFA; and, secondly, a Pentagon program to secretly pay Iraqi newspapers to run pro-American articles.
“Were these activities subject to your approval and oversight?”
Negroponte’s answer was short-circuited by an unidentified voice, according to the CQ transcript, quite possibly his deputy, former Air Force general and NSA chief Michael Hayden. “Ma’am, I don’t believe that either of those activities would fall into Mr. Negroponte’s area. They are Department of Defense programs, I believe.” “Now, let me raise this problem then,” Feinstein continued. “Now, I know how tough it is. But if you didn’t know and you didn’t give a go-ahead [to domestic military spying], it indicates to me that, for 85 percent of the budget, which is defense-related, that you’re not going to have the controls that you should have,” Feinstein said. “You want to comment?”
Negroponte, who not long ago in Baghdad was dismissing senior military officers with the wave of his hand, had to be feeling an acute wave of heartburn. The Director of National Intelligence was forced to concede that the U.S. intelligence activities Feinstein was asking him about had “not risen to the level of my office.” In any event, they came “under the direction of the undersecretary of defense for intelligence” — a pipsqueak, relatively speaking. Negroponte said he “understood” that the Pentagon was doing an internal review of spying programs because of a congressional uproar. “But will you get the results of that review?” Feinstein asked.
“Yes,” promised Negroponte, dismissed like a schoolboy, “I will get those results.”
How Many Divisions?
Washington’s conventional wisdom these days is that ODNI is a joke. The main reason is that Negroponte’s group has little power over the Pentagon’s covert actions. It’s not his fault. Congress set it up that way after Rumsfeld and company worked the rooms of the House and Senate office buildings. The noted intelligence historian Lock K. Johnson worries that Negroponte could end up like the National Drug Czar, “with no real power” over U.S. spy agencies. Or the Pope, whose political powers Josef Stalin dismissed with a laugh to worried aides: “The Pope? How many divisions has he got?”
Kroft, Negroponte’s spokesman, said in an e-mailed response to a question that his boss “determines and presents to the President the full U.S. National Intelligence Program budget.” As for Negroponte’s lunches at the University Club, he responded, “As a matter of policy we do not discuss the Director of National Intelligence’s schedule.”
Backchannel Chatter
Fire when ready: Clark Kent Ervin, the former DHS Inspector General, is not going to make many friends — or maybe he will — with sentences like these from his forthcoming book, Open Target, an advance copy of which just arrived on SpyTalk’s desk: “From the very beginning, the Information Analysis (IA) unit of the Department of Homeland Security proved to be a bad, bad joke.” Ervin describes both understaffing and empty desks at DHS’s intelligence wing. Eventually, “word got around the tight-knit and hyper-status-conscious intelligence community that taking a job (there) was not” — his emphasis — “a career-enhancing move,” writes Ervin, a Texas protege of the Bush family. Wonder what President Bush thinks of that (our emphasis).
Landing more gently on the SpyTalk bookshelf recently: Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study, an inside look at the people who connect the dots, by anthropologist Dr. Rob Johnson. This is of more than passing interest because it is published by the CIA’s own Center for the Study of Intelligence. Political Terrorism: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Peter Lang Books), by the Canadian intelligence expert Jeffrey Ian Ross, ruminates on the the origins of terrorism or, put more simply, he asks: What does Osama bin Laden want?
Source: CQ Homeland Security
© 2006 Congressional Quarterly Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Judge Says Libby Can See Bush Briefings
By TONI LOCY, Associated Press Writer
A federal judge ordered the CIA on Friday to turn over highly classified intelligence briefings to Vice President Dick Cheney's former top aide to use in the aide's defense against perjury charges.
U.S. District Judge Reggie B. Walton rejected CIA warnings that the nation's security would be imperiled if the presidential-level documents were disclosed to lawyers for I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Cheney's former chief of staff.
The judge said the CIA can either delete highly classified information from the briefing material and provide copies of what Libby received six days a week, often with Cheney. Or, Walton said, the CIA can produce "topic overviews" of the matters covered in the briefings.
The judge also ordered the CIA to give Libby an index of the topics covered in follow-up questions that the former White House aide asked intelligence officers who conducted the briefings.
In seeking CIA input late last month, Walton appeared to have been trying to broker a compromise between defense attorneys and prosecutors to avoid a lengthy court battle with the Bush administration over the briefing material.
The judge's order indicates he is ready for such a fight. He set a schedule for the Bush administration to file any objections by March 24.
The charges against Libby — perjury, obstruction of justice and lying to FBI agents — grew out of an investigation into the leak of a CIA operative's identity.
Copyright © 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of The Associated Press.
Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Questions or Comments
Privacy Policy -Terms of Service - Copyright/IP Policy - Ad Feedback
By TONI LOCY, Associated Press Writer
A federal judge ordered the CIA on Friday to turn over highly classified intelligence briefings to Vice President Dick Cheney's former top aide to use in the aide's defense against perjury charges.
U.S. District Judge Reggie B. Walton rejected CIA warnings that the nation's security would be imperiled if the presidential-level documents were disclosed to lawyers for I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Cheney's former chief of staff.
The judge said the CIA can either delete highly classified information from the briefing material and provide copies of what Libby received six days a week, often with Cheney. Or, Walton said, the CIA can produce "topic overviews" of the matters covered in the briefings.
The judge also ordered the CIA to give Libby an index of the topics covered in follow-up questions that the former White House aide asked intelligence officers who conducted the briefings.
In seeking CIA input late last month, Walton appeared to have been trying to broker a compromise between defense attorneys and prosecutors to avoid a lengthy court battle with the Bush administration over the briefing material.
The judge's order indicates he is ready for such a fight. He set a schedule for the Bush administration to file any objections by March 24.
The charges against Libby — perjury, obstruction of justice and lying to FBI agents — grew out of an investigation into the leak of a CIA operative's identity.
Copyright © 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of The Associated Press.
Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Questions or Comments
Privacy Policy -Terms of Service - Copyright/IP Policy - Ad Feedback
http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/wo...y-top-headlines
Official: Iraq may still seek WMDs
BY TIMOTHY M. PHELPS
WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF
March 10, 2006
WASHINGTON -- A former top CIA official said Thursday that despite the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq is likely to be looking for weapons of mass destruction within the next five to 10 years.
Paul Pillar, who until last year was in charge of intelligence assessments for the Middle East, said the CIA warned the Bush administration before the Iraq invasion in 2003 that a change of regimes would not necessarily solve any WMD problem.
In a speech at the Middle East Institute here, Pillar said Iraqis live in "a dangerous neighborhood," with rival countries pursuing weapons of mass destruction. So the CIA had warned that a future Iraqi government would likely want the very weapons Hussein was (wrongly) suspected of hiding, including nuclear weapons, he said.
"Iraq may turn once again to ... a WMD program," Pillar, who is retired from the CIA, said Thursday. "And wouldn't that be ironic?"
Pillar recently published an article in Foreign Affairs magazine that for the first time fully laid out the CIA's side of the battle with the Bush administration over Iraq intelligence.
Pillar charges that the administration never sought strategic assessments from the CIA about Iraq. He said in his article that the Bush administration made its decision to go to war and then "cherry-picked" items from intelligence assessments in an effort to justify the decision to the public.
The biggest discrepancy between the CIA's intelligence and the administration's line on Iraq was the claim by Bush that there was a relationship between Hussein and al-Qaida, Pillar wrote. There was no intelligence supporting that theory, Pillar said, but the administration wanted to capitalize on "the country's militant post-9/11 mood," he wrote.
Pillar wrote that the intelligence community, on its own initiative, warned the administration before the war that there was a significant chance of violent conflict in Iraq and that the war would likely boost radical Islam throughout the Middle East.
In his speech, Pillar said Iraq is serving the same purpose that Afghanistan once did, as an inspiration and a base for radical Islam.
Official: Iraq may still seek WMDs
BY TIMOTHY M. PHELPS
WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF
March 10, 2006
WASHINGTON -- A former top CIA official said Thursday that despite the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq is likely to be looking for weapons of mass destruction within the next five to 10 years.
Paul Pillar, who until last year was in charge of intelligence assessments for the Middle East, said the CIA warned the Bush administration before the Iraq invasion in 2003 that a change of regimes would not necessarily solve any WMD problem.
In a speech at the Middle East Institute here, Pillar said Iraqis live in "a dangerous neighborhood," with rival countries pursuing weapons of mass destruction. So the CIA had warned that a future Iraqi government would likely want the very weapons Hussein was (wrongly) suspected of hiding, including nuclear weapons, he said.
"Iraq may turn once again to ... a WMD program," Pillar, who is retired from the CIA, said Thursday. "And wouldn't that be ironic?"
Pillar recently published an article in Foreign Affairs magazine that for the first time fully laid out the CIA's side of the battle with the Bush administration over Iraq intelligence.
Pillar charges that the administration never sought strategic assessments from the CIA about Iraq. He said in his article that the Bush administration made its decision to go to war and then "cherry-picked" items from intelligence assessments in an effort to justify the decision to the public.
The biggest discrepancy between the CIA's intelligence and the administration's line on Iraq was the claim by Bush that there was a relationship between Hussein and al-Qaida, Pillar wrote. There was no intelligence supporting that theory, Pillar said, but the administration wanted to capitalize on "the country's militant post-9/11 mood," he wrote.
Pillar wrote that the intelligence community, on its own initiative, warned the administration before the war that there was a significant chance of violent conflict in Iraq and that the war would likely boost radical Islam throughout the Middle East.
In his speech, Pillar said Iraq is serving the same purpose that Afghanistan once did, as an inspiration and a base for radical Islam.
How the Central Intelligence Agency Played Dirty Tricks With Our Culture :
The C.I.A., it seems, was worried that the public might be too influenced by Orwell's pox-on-both-their-houses critique of the capitalist humans and Communist pigs. So after his death in 1950, agents were dispatched (by none other than E. Howard Hunt, later of Watergate fame) to buy the film rights to "Animal Farm" from his widow to make its message more overtly anti-Communist.
http://informationclearinghouse.info/article12302.htm
The C.I.A., it seems, was worried that the public might be too influenced by Orwell's pox-on-both-their-houses critique of the capitalist humans and Communist pigs. So after his death in 1950, agents were dispatched (by none other than E. Howard Hunt, later of Watergate fame) to buy the film rights to "Animal Farm" from his widow to make its message more overtly anti-Communist.
http://informationclearinghouse.info/article12302.htm
Internet blows CIA cover:
When the Tribune searched a commercial online data service, the result was a virtual directory of more than 2,600 CIA employees, 50 internal agency telephone numbers and the locations of some two dozen secret CIA facilities around the United States.
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews...cs/14076456.htm
When the Tribune searched a commercial online data service, the result was a virtual directory of more than 2,600 CIA employees, 50 internal agency telephone numbers and the locations of some two dozen secret CIA facilities around the United States.
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews...cs/14076456.htm
SECRECY NEWS
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2006, Issue No. 33
March 13, 2006
Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
Support Secrecy News:
http://www.fas.org/static/contrib_sec.jsp
** DNI NEGROPONTE ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING
** INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
** SOME NEW INTELLIGENCE-RELATED PUBLICATIONS
** US NEWS: SECRECY UNDER SCRUTINY
DNI NEGROPONTE ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING
In an effort to improve the sharing of intelligence information, the
Director of National Intelligence last year authorized the use of a
new marking for intelligence documents: RELIDO, or Releasable by
Information Disclosure Official.
RELIDO is intended "to facilitate information sharing through
streamlined, rapid release decisions by authorized disclosure
officials," DNI John D. Negroponte wrote in a June 2005 memo.
Essentially, the RELIDO marking permits authorized officials to release
documents (on a need-to-know basis, of course) without consulting the
originators of the documents.
This is a step forward since originator controls on the dissemination
of intelligence are one of the major bottlenecks that impede
intelligence information sharing.
A copy of the DNI memo, marked For Official Use Only (not RELIDO), was
obtained by Secrecy News.
See "Intelligence Community Implementation of Releasable by Information
Disclosure Official (RELIDO) Dissemination Marking," DCID 8 Series
Policy Memoranda 1, June 9, 2005:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid8-memo.html
No one should mistake the recent focus on intelligence information
sharing for greater openness or public disclosure. To the contrary,
"information sharing" has been accompanied by increased secrecy in
intelligence.
In 2004, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency decided that it
would no longer release unclassified intelligence directives under the
Freedom of Information Act. Though such directives had previously
been released, the CIA now claimed that they were exempt from FOIA as
internal agency records (exemption 2) and as intelligence sources and
methods information (exemption 3).
Consequently, Americans who are interested in such things are obliged
to seek out alternate sources of information.
Among the directives that CIA refused to release under the FOIA is
Director of Central Intelligence Directive 8/1, the last Directive
issued by former DCI George Tenet, on the subject of intelligence
information sharing.
That DCI directive was hailed enthusiastically but perhaps prematurely
by some officials.
It "changed the sharing paradigm from 'need to know' as determined by
the information collector to 'share at the first point of usability'
as determined by intelligence users across our community," wrote Maj.
Gen. John F. Kimmons, commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command, in INSCOM Journal last year.
A copy of the directive, marked For Official Use Only, was obtained by
Secrecy News.
See "Intelligence Community Policy on Intelligence Information
Sharing," DCID 8/1, June 4, 2004:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid8-1.html
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
Democratic proposals to initiate a congressional investigation of the
National Security Agency warrantless surveillance program have been
repeatedly rebuffed by Republican leaders in Congress.
This month, House Committees have produced no fewer than four adverse
reports on Democratic "resolutions of inquiry," which sought executive
branch records on domestic intelligence surveillance.
In the Senate, a proposal by Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) to investigate
the NSA program was voted down on party lines in the Senate
Intelligence Committee on March 7.
See the reports of the House Intelligence Committee, the House Armed
Services Committee, and the House Judiciary Committee (two) here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/index.html
Some background on the use of resolutions of inquiry as an instrument
of oversight can be found in "House Resolutions of Inquiry" by Louis
Fisher (who is now with the Law Library of Congress), Congressional
Research Service, May 12, 2003:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31909.pdf
Sen. Russ Feingold announced yesterday that he would introduce a
resolution to censure President Bush for "authorizing the illegal
wiretapping program and then misleading the country about the
existence and legality of the program." See:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/feingold031206.html
SOME NEW INTELLIGENCE-RELATED PUBLICATIONS
"Sources and Methods of Foreign Nationals Engaged in Economic and
Military Espionage" is the title of a September 15, 2005 hearing of a
House Judiciary Subcommittee which has just been published. See:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/hhrg109-58.html
Defense Department policy on Operations Security has been updated in a
new directive. Operations Security (OPSEC) refers to the
identification and reduction of tell-tale signs of military operations
that could be exploited by an adversary.
See "DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program," DoD Directive 5205.02,
March 6, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5205_02.pdf
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen A. Cambone has
reissued the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual
(NISPOM), which "provides baseline standards for the protection of
classified information released or disclosed to industry."
See the updated NISPOM, DoD Manual 5220.22, February 28, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/nispom.htm
US NEWS: SECRECY UNDER SCRUTINY
The latest issue of U.S. News and World Report (March 20) features an
interview with me on the subject of government secrecy.
It is part of the observance of Sunshine Week, which is a nationwide
effort to focus public attention on the virtues of open government.
My not-so-smiling face can also be seen in light and shadow cast by
window blinds ("It's not cliche," the photographer explained, "it's
classic.").
See "Secrecy Under Scrutiny" by David E. Kaplan, U.S. News and World
Report, March 20:
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060320/20qa.htm
A sidebar takes a look at Freedom of Information Act policy. See
"Finding out what Uncle Sam has on you" also by David E. Kaplan:
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060310/10foia.htm
For more on Sunshine Week go to www.sunshineweek.org.
_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2006, Issue No. 33
March 13, 2006
Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
Support Secrecy News:
http://www.fas.org/static/contrib_sec.jsp
** DNI NEGROPONTE ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING
** INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
** SOME NEW INTELLIGENCE-RELATED PUBLICATIONS
** US NEWS: SECRECY UNDER SCRUTINY
DNI NEGROPONTE ON INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING
In an effort to improve the sharing of intelligence information, the
Director of National Intelligence last year authorized the use of a
new marking for intelligence documents: RELIDO, or Releasable by
Information Disclosure Official.
RELIDO is intended "to facilitate information sharing through
streamlined, rapid release decisions by authorized disclosure
officials," DNI John D. Negroponte wrote in a June 2005 memo.
Essentially, the RELIDO marking permits authorized officials to release
documents (on a need-to-know basis, of course) without consulting the
originators of the documents.
This is a step forward since originator controls on the dissemination
of intelligence are one of the major bottlenecks that impede
intelligence information sharing.
A copy of the DNI memo, marked For Official Use Only (not RELIDO), was
obtained by Secrecy News.
See "Intelligence Community Implementation of Releasable by Information
Disclosure Official (RELIDO) Dissemination Marking," DCID 8 Series
Policy Memoranda 1, June 9, 2005:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid8-memo.html
No one should mistake the recent focus on intelligence information
sharing for greater openness or public disclosure. To the contrary,
"information sharing" has been accompanied by increased secrecy in
intelligence.
In 2004, for example, the Central Intelligence Agency decided that it
would no longer release unclassified intelligence directives under the
Freedom of Information Act. Though such directives had previously
been released, the CIA now claimed that they were exempt from FOIA as
internal agency records (exemption 2) and as intelligence sources and
methods information (exemption 3).
Consequently, Americans who are interested in such things are obliged
to seek out alternate sources of information.
Among the directives that CIA refused to release under the FOIA is
Director of Central Intelligence Directive 8/1, the last Directive
issued by former DCI George Tenet, on the subject of intelligence
information sharing.
That DCI directive was hailed enthusiastically but perhaps prematurely
by some officials.
It "changed the sharing paradigm from 'need to know' as determined by
the information collector to 'share at the first point of usability'
as determined by intelligence users across our community," wrote Maj.
Gen. John F. Kimmons, commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command, in INSCOM Journal last year.
A copy of the directive, marked For Official Use Only, was obtained by
Secrecy News.
See "Intelligence Community Policy on Intelligence Information
Sharing," DCID 8/1, June 4, 2004:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid8-1.html
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD NOT TAKEN
Democratic proposals to initiate a congressional investigation of the
National Security Agency warrantless surveillance program have been
repeatedly rebuffed by Republican leaders in Congress.
This month, House Committees have produced no fewer than four adverse
reports on Democratic "resolutions of inquiry," which sought executive
branch records on domestic intelligence surveillance.
In the Senate, a proposal by Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) to investigate
the NSA program was voted down on party lines in the Senate
Intelligence Committee on March 7.
See the reports of the House Intelligence Committee, the House Armed
Services Committee, and the House Judiciary Committee (two) here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/index.html
Some background on the use of resolutions of inquiry as an instrument
of oversight can be found in "House Resolutions of Inquiry" by Louis
Fisher (who is now with the Law Library of Congress), Congressional
Research Service, May 12, 2003:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31909.pdf
Sen. Russ Feingold announced yesterday that he would introduce a
resolution to censure President Bush for "authorizing the illegal
wiretapping program and then misleading the country about the
existence and legality of the program." See:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/feingold031206.html
SOME NEW INTELLIGENCE-RELATED PUBLICATIONS
"Sources and Methods of Foreign Nationals Engaged in Economic and
Military Espionage" is the title of a September 15, 2005 hearing of a
House Judiciary Subcommittee which has just been published. See:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_hr/hhrg109-58.html
Defense Department policy on Operations Security has been updated in a
new directive. Operations Security (OPSEC) refers to the
identification and reduction of tell-tale signs of military operations
that could be exploited by an adversary.
See "DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program," DoD Directive 5205.02,
March 6, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5205_02.pdf
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen A. Cambone has
reissued the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual
(NISPOM), which "provides baseline standards for the protection of
classified information released or disclosed to industry."
See the updated NISPOM, DoD Manual 5220.22, February 28, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/nispom.htm
US NEWS: SECRECY UNDER SCRUTINY
The latest issue of U.S. News and World Report (March 20) features an
interview with me on the subject of government secrecy.
It is part of the observance of Sunshine Week, which is a nationwide
effort to focus public attention on the virtues of open government.
My not-so-smiling face can also be seen in light and shadow cast by
window blinds ("It's not cliche," the photographer explained, "it's
classic.").
See "Secrecy Under Scrutiny" by David E. Kaplan, U.S. News and World
Report, March 20:
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060320/20qa.htm
A sidebar takes a look at Freedom of Information Act policy. See
"Finding out what Uncle Sam has on you" also by David E. Kaplan:
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/060310/10foia.htm
For more on Sunshine Week go to www.sunshineweek.org.
_______________________________________________
Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the
Federation of American Scientists.
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
http://www.antiwar.com/pena/?articleid=8707
March 16, 2006
Fixing Intelligence
Charles Peña
It is fashionable to believe that the intelligence community "failed" on 9/11 and that if it is "fixed," future terrorist attacks can be prevented – and by implication, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks could have been prevented. Such thinking assumes that intelligence can be perfect, but as James W. Harris – former chief of the Strategic Assessments Group, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency – makes clear, "intelligence cannot achieve omniscience." And it is important to point out that the intelligence community has been successful in preventing terrorist attacks, including planned attacks against the Lincoln and Holland tunnels in New York in 1993 and against airports on the West Coast on the eve of the millennium. The reality is that the intelligence community will have its share of successes and failures – hopefully more of the former than the latter – in preventing terrorism. But it is quixotic to believe that America's intelligence apparatus will be able to uncover every terrorist plot and thwart every attack.
This is not to say that there is no room for improvement and that the intelligence community can't do a better job. Indeed, the community must do a better job – but even at its best, it will not be perfect. The question is: What should be done? The Bush administration's answer has been to reorganize the intelligence community, largely by putting the 15 separate agencies with intelligence responsibilities – including the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency – under the operational and budgetary control of a newly created national intelligence director. Such a reorganization may address some important issues – for example, fostering more joint action among the 15 intelligence agencies via the creation of a National Counter-Terrorism Center that is modeled after the Pentagon's Joint Staff – although it's worth noting that turf battles still exist between the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. And vesting budgetary control in a national intelligence director is one way to more rationally allocate spending and resources. For example, about 85 percent of the estimated $40 billion spent on intelligence activities goes to the Defense Department, only about 10 percent is for the CIA, and the remainder is spread among the other intelligence agencies. If the war on terrorism is not primarily a military war, perhaps the intelligence budget could be reallocated among the Defense Department and other intelligence agencies – with less emphasis on nation-state military threats, since the conventional military threat environment is less severe than during the Cold War, and more emphasis on terrorist threats to the United States.
But real change and reform is about what the intelligence community does, not how it is organized or budgeted. And perhaps the biggest and most important needed change for the intelligence community is cultural. According to Harris, "The U.S. intelligence community remains handicapped by internal barriers and walls meant to protect intelligence sources and methods." While the "need-to-know" principle cannot be completely discarded, the intelligence paradigm must shift from a "need-to-know" to a "need-to-share" because no single intelligence analyst or agency has a monopoly on knowing everything or being right all the time about the al-Qaeda terrorist threat. Put simply, that means better communication and information-sharing – which does not require a massive overhaul or reorganization of the intelligence community as recommended by the 9/11 Commission and currently being done by the Bush administration.
The irony is that practically the whole world already knows how to communicate and share information – and does so every day via the Internet and Worldwide Web. Pick almost any subject – however arcane – and most likely a user group, forum, or electronic bulletin board about it exists in cyberspace. Moreover, these user groups, forums, and electronic bulletin boards are often created spontaneously – either by someone seeking information or someone wanting to share information. If the rest of the world can do this with minimal direction and supervision, certainly the U.S. intelligence community can find a way to do so also.
Ultimately, just as people are the driving force behind creating the new digital culture of the Internet, Worldwide Web, and instant messaging, people will be the key to change in the intelligence community. New people at the top level – a national intelligence director and four new deputies for analysis, collection, customer service, and management – don't eliminate the many layers of bureaucracy that control the flow of information. And if the people who staff the bureaucracy haven't changed the way they do business in the more than four years since the Sept. 11 attacks, then the likelihood that an FBI field agent's memo raising questions about Arab students at U.S. flight schools is distributed and read in a timely fashion isn't any better than it was before – when it was not even seen by managers of the bin Laden and Radical Fundamentalist units until after Sept. 11. Whether the memo would have made a difference is unknowable – according to the 9/11 Commission, "If the memo had been distributed in a timely fashion and its recommendations acted on promptly, we do not believe it would have uncovered the plot." But certainly if such information is not made available, it is not possible to act on it and have a chance of preventing a terrorist attack.
Yet even if all the problems in the intelligence community are fixed – perhaps most glaringly transforming the FBI from a criminal investigation agency that goes after Mafia dons, brothel madams, and Olympic ice-skating judges into one that puts the highest priority on finding al-Qaeda cells and operatives in the United States – it will still be far from perfect and unable to prevent every possible attack. Better intelligence is a prerequisite but not a panacea – according to Harris, "it is impossible to preempt a threat without knowledge of the specific plot or plots, and it is almost impossible to unearth all of them." Or as the Irish Republican Army stated after a failed attempt to kill British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in October 1984: "Remember, we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Thus, if we do not address the underlying reasons why some Muslims become terrorists – including U.S. foreign policy – then eventually our luck will run out, regardless of how much or how well we fix the intelligence community.
March 16, 2006
Fixing Intelligence
Charles Peña
It is fashionable to believe that the intelligence community "failed" on 9/11 and that if it is "fixed," future terrorist attacks can be prevented – and by implication, the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks could have been prevented. Such thinking assumes that intelligence can be perfect, but as James W. Harris – former chief of the Strategic Assessments Group, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency – makes clear, "intelligence cannot achieve omniscience." And it is important to point out that the intelligence community has been successful in preventing terrorist attacks, including planned attacks against the Lincoln and Holland tunnels in New York in 1993 and against airports on the West Coast on the eve of the millennium. The reality is that the intelligence community will have its share of successes and failures – hopefully more of the former than the latter – in preventing terrorism. But it is quixotic to believe that America's intelligence apparatus will be able to uncover every terrorist plot and thwart every attack.
This is not to say that there is no room for improvement and that the intelligence community can't do a better job. Indeed, the community must do a better job – but even at its best, it will not be perfect. The question is: What should be done? The Bush administration's answer has been to reorganize the intelligence community, largely by putting the 15 separate agencies with intelligence responsibilities – including the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency – under the operational and budgetary control of a newly created national intelligence director. Such a reorganization may address some important issues – for example, fostering more joint action among the 15 intelligence agencies via the creation of a National Counter-Terrorism Center that is modeled after the Pentagon's Joint Staff – although it's worth noting that turf battles still exist between the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. And vesting budgetary control in a national intelligence director is one way to more rationally allocate spending and resources. For example, about 85 percent of the estimated $40 billion spent on intelligence activities goes to the Defense Department, only about 10 percent is for the CIA, and the remainder is spread among the other intelligence agencies. If the war on terrorism is not primarily a military war, perhaps the intelligence budget could be reallocated among the Defense Department and other intelligence agencies – with less emphasis on nation-state military threats, since the conventional military threat environment is less severe than during the Cold War, and more emphasis on terrorist threats to the United States.
But real change and reform is about what the intelligence community does, not how it is organized or budgeted. And perhaps the biggest and most important needed change for the intelligence community is cultural. According to Harris, "The U.S. intelligence community remains handicapped by internal barriers and walls meant to protect intelligence sources and methods." While the "need-to-know" principle cannot be completely discarded, the intelligence paradigm must shift from a "need-to-know" to a "need-to-share" because no single intelligence analyst or agency has a monopoly on knowing everything or being right all the time about the al-Qaeda terrorist threat. Put simply, that means better communication and information-sharing – which does not require a massive overhaul or reorganization of the intelligence community as recommended by the 9/11 Commission and currently being done by the Bush administration.
The irony is that practically the whole world already knows how to communicate and share information – and does so every day via the Internet and Worldwide Web. Pick almost any subject – however arcane – and most likely a user group, forum, or electronic bulletin board about it exists in cyberspace. Moreover, these user groups, forums, and electronic bulletin boards are often created spontaneously – either by someone seeking information or someone wanting to share information. If the rest of the world can do this with minimal direction and supervision, certainly the U.S. intelligence community can find a way to do so also.
Ultimately, just as people are the driving force behind creating the new digital culture of the Internet, Worldwide Web, and instant messaging, people will be the key to change in the intelligence community. New people at the top level – a national intelligence director and four new deputies for analysis, collection, customer service, and management – don't eliminate the many layers of bureaucracy that control the flow of information. And if the people who staff the bureaucracy haven't changed the way they do business in the more than four years since the Sept. 11 attacks, then the likelihood that an FBI field agent's memo raising questions about Arab students at U.S. flight schools is distributed and read in a timely fashion isn't any better than it was before – when it was not even seen by managers of the bin Laden and Radical Fundamentalist units until after Sept. 11. Whether the memo would have made a difference is unknowable – according to the 9/11 Commission, "If the memo had been distributed in a timely fashion and its recommendations acted on promptly, we do not believe it would have uncovered the plot." But certainly if such information is not made available, it is not possible to act on it and have a chance of preventing a terrorist attack.
Yet even if all the problems in the intelligence community are fixed – perhaps most glaringly transforming the FBI from a criminal investigation agency that goes after Mafia dons, brothel madams, and Olympic ice-skating judges into one that puts the highest priority on finding al-Qaeda cells and operatives in the United States – it will still be far from perfect and unable to prevent every possible attack. Better intelligence is a prerequisite but not a panacea – according to Harris, "it is impossible to preempt a threat without knowledge of the specific plot or plots, and it is almost impossible to unearth all of them." Or as the Irish Republican Army stated after a failed attempt to kill British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in October 1984: "Remember, we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Thus, if we do not address the underlying reasons why some Muslims become terrorists – including U.S. foreign policy – then eventually our luck will run out, regardless of how much or how well we fix the intelligence community.
Armitage may come under scrutiny in CIA leak trial
By Andy Sullivan
A former top State Department official suspected of being the first person to discuss the identity of a CIA official with reporters is expected to testify in the perjury trial of ex-vice presidential aide Lewis "Scooter" Libby, a court motion says.
The filing by Libby's defense team late on Friday asks Judge Reggie Walton to force prosecutors to turn over material they have about likely witnesses including former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.
Others who are expected to testify include White House deputy chief of staff Karl Rove, former CIA director George Tenet and former Secretary of State Colin Powell, the document says.
It suggests Libby's team may try to pin blame on the State Department for the leak of Valerie Plame's identity to the public after her husband criticized the Bush administration's Iraq policy.
Former Washington Post editor Ben Bradlee told Vanity Fair magazine this week that it is reasonable to assume that Armitage told Post reporter Bob Woodward about Plame's identity before other Bush administration officials mentioned her name to reporters.
Knowingly disclosing the identity of a covert CIA agent is against the law. But so far no officials have been charged with leaking Plame's identity to the news media in 2003.
Libby, set to go on trial in January 2007, faces charges of lying to the FBI and a federal grand jury during the investigation. Rove remains under investigation for making false statements.
Libby's lawyers noted that there has been speculation that Armitage might also have told syndicated columnist Robert Novak, who was the first to make Plame's identity public in a July 14, 2003, column.
"If the facts ultimately show that Mr. Armitage or someone else from the State Department was also Mr. Novak's primary source, then the State Department (and certainly not Mr. Libby) bears responsibility for the 'leak' that led to the public disclosure of Ms. Wilson's CIA identity," Libby's defense team wrote, referring to Plame by her married name.
Libby's lawyers hope to demonstrate that he was too preoccupied with national security matters to accurately remember his conversations with reporters about Plame, and have sought access to reporters' notes and top-secret security briefings to bolster their case.
Copyright © 2006 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved. Republication or redistribution of Reuters content is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Reuters. Reuters shall not be liable for any errors or delays in the content, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon.
Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Questions or Comments
Privacy Policy -Terms of Service - Copyright/IP Policy - Ad Feedback
By Andy Sullivan
A former top State Department official suspected of being the first person to discuss the identity of a CIA official with reporters is expected to testify in the perjury trial of ex-vice presidential aide Lewis "Scooter" Libby, a court motion says.
The filing by Libby's defense team late on Friday asks Judge Reggie Walton to force prosecutors to turn over material they have about likely witnesses including former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.
Others who are expected to testify include White House deputy chief of staff Karl Rove, former CIA director George Tenet and former Secretary of State Colin Powell, the document says.
It suggests Libby's team may try to pin blame on the State Department for the leak of Valerie Plame's identity to the public after her husband criticized the Bush administration's Iraq policy.
Former Washington Post editor Ben Bradlee told Vanity Fair magazine this week that it is reasonable to assume that Armitage told Post reporter Bob Woodward about Plame's identity before other Bush administration officials mentioned her name to reporters.
Knowingly disclosing the identity of a covert CIA agent is against the law. But so far no officials have been charged with leaking Plame's identity to the news media in 2003.
Libby, set to go on trial in January 2007, faces charges of lying to the FBI and a federal grand jury during the investigation. Rove remains under investigation for making false statements.
Libby's lawyers noted that there has been speculation that Armitage might also have told syndicated columnist Robert Novak, who was the first to make Plame's identity public in a July 14, 2003, column.
"If the facts ultimately show that Mr. Armitage or someone else from the State Department was also Mr. Novak's primary source, then the State Department (and certainly not Mr. Libby) bears responsibility for the 'leak' that led to the public disclosure of Ms. Wilson's CIA identity," Libby's defense team wrote, referring to Plame by her married name.
Libby's lawyers hope to demonstrate that he was too preoccupied with national security matters to accurately remember his conversations with reporters about Plame, and have sought access to reporters' notes and top-secret security briefings to bolster their case.
Copyright © 2006 Reuters Limited. All rights reserved. Republication or redistribution of Reuters content is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Reuters. Reuters shall not be liable for any errors or delays in the content, or for any actions taken in reliance thereon.
Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Questions or Comments
Privacy Policy -Terms of Service - Copyright/IP Policy - Ad Feedback
Increase in Contracting Intelligence Jobs Raises Concerns
By Walter Pincus
AllWorld Language Consultants Inc., a Rockville firm, is seeking experienced military interrogators to work in Iraq for $153,500 a year plus bonuses, with proficiency in Arabic "preferred but not required," according to Yahoo's Hot Jobs listings.
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
By Walter Pincus
AllWorld Language Consultants Inc., a Rockville firm, is seeking experienced military interrogators to work in Iraq for $153,500 a year plus bonuses, with proficiency in Arabic "preferred but not required," according to Yahoo's Hot Jobs listings.
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
DEBKAfile adds: Various intelligence and other informants encountered the same Washington unresponsiveness as did FBI agent Samit prior to 9/11
March 21, 2006, 4:09 PM (GMT+02:00)
From early 1997 up until mid-2000, certain intelligence agencies and private individuals, including Israelis, tried to bring relevant information of the coming al Qaeda attack in New York to the attention of security authorities in Washington. Most were general in nature, but in at least one instance, specific data was put before Clinton administration officials and the FBI of a possible air attack by hijacked airliners against the Twin Towers. They encountered a wall of resistance. At that time, the Clinton White House was deeply engaged in a bid for a breakthrough in Israel-Palestinian peacemaking. Washington then believed that an American strike against al Qaeda would provoke anti-US demonstrations across the Muslim world and disrupt the American mediation effort in the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
The Bush administration took office in January 2001. Eight months later, FBI agent Harry Samit arrested Zacarias Moussaoui. He tried in vain to persuade his superiors to take seriously and investigate his findings about an Islamic fundamentalist who took flight training and was interested in Osama bin Laden. The new administration, which had no knowledge of the previous president’s motives in setting aside the al Qaeda inquiry, saw no reason to change standing directives for the CIA and FBI on the subject. So Samit’s warnings went unheeded by default.
The situation in Jerusalem today strongly recalls Washington’s heedlessness in the years before the Sept. 11, 2001 to attacks that cost more than 3,000 lives. Al Qaeda lurks on Israel’s doorstep in the Gaza Strip and more recently the West Bank, but the current Israeli government has no time to address the danger.
Copyright 2000-2006 DEBKAfile. All Rights Reserved.
March 21, 2006, 4:09 PM (GMT+02:00)
From early 1997 up until mid-2000, certain intelligence agencies and private individuals, including Israelis, tried to bring relevant information of the coming al Qaeda attack in New York to the attention of security authorities in Washington. Most were general in nature, but in at least one instance, specific data was put before Clinton administration officials and the FBI of a possible air attack by hijacked airliners against the Twin Towers. They encountered a wall of resistance. At that time, the Clinton White House was deeply engaged in a bid for a breakthrough in Israel-Palestinian peacemaking. Washington then believed that an American strike against al Qaeda would provoke anti-US demonstrations across the Muslim world and disrupt the American mediation effort in the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
The Bush administration took office in January 2001. Eight months later, FBI agent Harry Samit arrested Zacarias Moussaoui. He tried in vain to persuade his superiors to take seriously and investigate his findings about an Islamic fundamentalist who took flight training and was interested in Osama bin Laden. The new administration, which had no knowledge of the previous president’s motives in setting aside the al Qaeda inquiry, saw no reason to change standing directives for the CIA and FBI on the subject. So Samit’s warnings went unheeded by default.
The situation in Jerusalem today strongly recalls Washington’s heedlessness in the years before the Sept. 11, 2001 to attacks that cost more than 3,000 lives. Al Qaeda lurks on Israel’s doorstep in the Gaza Strip and more recently the West Bank, but the current Israeli government has no time to address the danger.
Copyright 2000-2006 DEBKAfile. All Rights Reserved.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11927856
Iraqi diplomat gave U.S. prewar WMD details
Saddam’s foreign minister told CIA the truth, so why didn’t agency listen?
NBC VIDEO
• CIA's secret Iraqi source
March 20: The CIA once boasted of having a secret Iraqi source. NBC News reveals which member of Saddam Hussein’s Cabinet became a paid source of the CIA. NBC's Lisa Myers reports.
Nightly News
By Aram Roston, Lisa Myers
& the NBC Investigative Unit
Updated: 7:36 p.m. ET March 20, 2006
In the period before the Iraq war, the CIA and the Bush administration erroneously believed that Saddam Hussein was hiding major programs for weapons of mass destruction. Now NBC News has learned that for a short time the CIA had contact with a secret source at the highest levels within Saddam Hussein’s government, who gave them information far more accurate than what they believed. It is a spy story that has never been told before, and raises new questions about prewar intelligence.
What makes the story significant is the high rank of the source. His name, officials tell NBC News, was Naji Sabri, Iraq’s foreign minister under Saddam. Although Sabri was in Saddam's inner circle, his cosmopolitan ways also helped him fit into diplomatic circles.
In September 2002, at a meeting of the U.N.’s General Assembly, Sabri came to New York to represent Saddam. In front of the assembled diplomats, he read a letter from the Iraqi leader. "The United States administration is acting on behalf of Zionism," he said. He announced that there were no weapons of mass destruction and that the U.S. planned war in Iraq because it wanted the country’s oil.
But on that very trip, there was also a secret contact made. The contact was brokered by the French intelligence service, sources say. Intelligence sources say that in a New York hotel room, CIA officers met with an intermediary who represented Sabri. All discussions between Sabri and the CIA were conducted through a "cutout," or third party. Through the intermediary, intelligence sources say, the CIA paid Sabri more than $100,000 in what was, essentially, "good-faith money." And for his part, Sabri, again through the intermediary, relayed information about Saddam’s actual capabilities.
The sources spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the case.
The sources say Sabri’s answers were much more accurate than his proclamations to the United Nations, where he demonized the U.S. and defended Saddam. At the same time, they also were closer to reality than the CIA's estimates, as spelled out in its October 2002 intelligence estimate.
For example, consider biological weapons, a key concern before the war. The CIA said Saddam had an "active" program for "R&D, production and weaponization" for biological agents such as anthrax. Intelligence sources say Sabri indicated Saddam had no significant, active biological weapons program. Sabri was right. After the war, it became clear that there was no program.
Another key issue was the nuclear question: How far away was Saddam from having a bomb? The CIA said if Saddam obtained enriched uranium, he could build a nuclear bomb in "several months to a year." Sabri said Saddam desperately wanted a bomb, but would need much more time than that. Sabri was more accurate.
On the issue of chemical weapons, the CIA said Saddam had stockpiled as much as "500 metric tons of chemical warfare agents" and had "renewed" production of deadly agents. Sabri said Iraq had stockpiled weapons and had "poison gas" left over from the first Gulf War. Both Sabri and the agency were wrong.
In the weeks following September 2002, after first contact with Sabri was made in New York, the agency kept much of his information concealed within its ranks. Sabri would have been a potential gold mine of information, according to NBC News analyst retired Gen. Wayne Downing.
"I think it’s very significant that the CIA would have someone who could tell them what’s on the dictator’s mind," says Downing.
But, intelligence sources say, the CIA relationship with Sabri ended when the CIA, hoping for a public relations coup, pressured him to defect to the U.S. The U.S. hoped Sabri would leave Iraq and publicly renounce Saddam. He repeatedly refused, sources say, and contact was broken off.
When war broke out, Sabri was defiant and outspoken. "Those aggressors are war criminals, colonialist war criminals. Crazy people led by a crazy, drunken, ignorant president," he said.
After the war, former CIA director George Tenet once boasted of a secret Iraqi source.
"A source," he said in a speech on Feb. 5, 2004, "who had direct access to Saddam and his inner circle." Sources tell NBC News Tenet was alluding to Sabri. Tenet said that the source — meaning Sabri — had said Iraq was stockpiling chemical weapons and that equipment to produce insecticides, under the oil-for-food program, had been diverted to covert chemical weapons production. However, in that speech, Tenet also laid out what Sabri had disclosed: that there was no biological program, that Saddam wanted nuclear weapons but had none.
Read Tenet's speech from Feb. 5, 2004
Former CIA director Tenet's remarks at Georgetown Univ.
Go to link to read this.
After the war, Sabri was not arrested or put on the notorious "deck of cards." He lives in the Middle East and NBC News is not revealing his location for security reasons. According to Downing, that he is living in the Middle East may be significant.
"The fact that he was there, that he was able to get out, live openly, like he is, says that for some reason he received some special status," says Downing.
NBC News repeatedly requested comments about this report from Sabri, either in written form, by telephone or in person. NBC News contacted Sabri several times by phone, and hand delivered a letter to a representative of his, explaining in detail the substance of this report, including the details about weapons of mass destruction. Sabri confirmed he received the letter, but repeatedly refused to comment in any way, neither confirming nor denying any of the information in this report.
So did the CIA. The agency also would not comment on Sabri, or answer why it discounted or ignored Sabri's assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.
Iraqi diplomat gave U.S. prewar WMD details
Saddam’s foreign minister told CIA the truth, so why didn’t agency listen?
NBC VIDEO
• CIA's secret Iraqi source
March 20: The CIA once boasted of having a secret Iraqi source. NBC News reveals which member of Saddam Hussein’s Cabinet became a paid source of the CIA. NBC's Lisa Myers reports.
Nightly News
By Aram Roston, Lisa Myers
& the NBC Investigative Unit
Updated: 7:36 p.m. ET March 20, 2006
In the period before the Iraq war, the CIA and the Bush administration erroneously believed that Saddam Hussein was hiding major programs for weapons of mass destruction. Now NBC News has learned that for a short time the CIA had contact with a secret source at the highest levels within Saddam Hussein’s government, who gave them information far more accurate than what they believed. It is a spy story that has never been told before, and raises new questions about prewar intelligence.
What makes the story significant is the high rank of the source. His name, officials tell NBC News, was Naji Sabri, Iraq’s foreign minister under Saddam. Although Sabri was in Saddam's inner circle, his cosmopolitan ways also helped him fit into diplomatic circles.
In September 2002, at a meeting of the U.N.’s General Assembly, Sabri came to New York to represent Saddam. In front of the assembled diplomats, he read a letter from the Iraqi leader. "The United States administration is acting on behalf of Zionism," he said. He announced that there were no weapons of mass destruction and that the U.S. planned war in Iraq because it wanted the country’s oil.
But on that very trip, there was also a secret contact made. The contact was brokered by the French intelligence service, sources say. Intelligence sources say that in a New York hotel room, CIA officers met with an intermediary who represented Sabri. All discussions between Sabri and the CIA were conducted through a "cutout," or third party. Through the intermediary, intelligence sources say, the CIA paid Sabri more than $100,000 in what was, essentially, "good-faith money." And for his part, Sabri, again through the intermediary, relayed information about Saddam’s actual capabilities.
The sources spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the case.
The sources say Sabri’s answers were much more accurate than his proclamations to the United Nations, where he demonized the U.S. and defended Saddam. At the same time, they also were closer to reality than the CIA's estimates, as spelled out in its October 2002 intelligence estimate.
For example, consider biological weapons, a key concern before the war. The CIA said Saddam had an "active" program for "R&D, production and weaponization" for biological agents such as anthrax. Intelligence sources say Sabri indicated Saddam had no significant, active biological weapons program. Sabri was right. After the war, it became clear that there was no program.
Another key issue was the nuclear question: How far away was Saddam from having a bomb? The CIA said if Saddam obtained enriched uranium, he could build a nuclear bomb in "several months to a year." Sabri said Saddam desperately wanted a bomb, but would need much more time than that. Sabri was more accurate.
On the issue of chemical weapons, the CIA said Saddam had stockpiled as much as "500 metric tons of chemical warfare agents" and had "renewed" production of deadly agents. Sabri said Iraq had stockpiled weapons and had "poison gas" left over from the first Gulf War. Both Sabri and the agency were wrong.
In the weeks following September 2002, after first contact with Sabri was made in New York, the agency kept much of his information concealed within its ranks. Sabri would have been a potential gold mine of information, according to NBC News analyst retired Gen. Wayne Downing.
"I think it’s very significant that the CIA would have someone who could tell them what’s on the dictator’s mind," says Downing.
But, intelligence sources say, the CIA relationship with Sabri ended when the CIA, hoping for a public relations coup, pressured him to defect to the U.S. The U.S. hoped Sabri would leave Iraq and publicly renounce Saddam. He repeatedly refused, sources say, and contact was broken off.
When war broke out, Sabri was defiant and outspoken. "Those aggressors are war criminals, colonialist war criminals. Crazy people led by a crazy, drunken, ignorant president," he said.
After the war, former CIA director George Tenet once boasted of a secret Iraqi source.
"A source," he said in a speech on Feb. 5, 2004, "who had direct access to Saddam and his inner circle." Sources tell NBC News Tenet was alluding to Sabri. Tenet said that the source — meaning Sabri — had said Iraq was stockpiling chemical weapons and that equipment to produce insecticides, under the oil-for-food program, had been diverted to covert chemical weapons production. However, in that speech, Tenet also laid out what Sabri had disclosed: that there was no biological program, that Saddam wanted nuclear weapons but had none.
Read Tenet's speech from Feb. 5, 2004
Former CIA director Tenet's remarks at Georgetown Univ.
Go to link to read this.
After the war, Sabri was not arrested or put on the notorious "deck of cards." He lives in the Middle East and NBC News is not revealing his location for security reasons. According to Downing, that he is living in the Middle East may be significant.
"The fact that he was there, that he was able to get out, live openly, like he is, says that for some reason he received some special status," says Downing.
NBC News repeatedly requested comments about this report from Sabri, either in written form, by telephone or in person. NBC News contacted Sabri several times by phone, and hand delivered a letter to a representative of his, explaining in detail the substance of this report, including the details about weapons of mass destruction. Sabri confirmed he received the letter, but repeatedly refused to comment in any way, neither confirming nor denying any of the information in this report.
So did the CIA. The agency also would not comment on Sabri, or answer why it discounted or ignored Sabri's assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.
Saddam's FM was on CIA payroll Tue Mar 21, 9:57 AM ET
Iraq's foreign minister under Saddam Hussein spied for the CIA before the US-led invasion in 2003 in return for a 100,000 dollar payment, a US television station reported.
In September 2002, Iraq's top diplomat Naji Sabri traded information on Hussein's alleged weapons program for cash in a French-sponsored New York City hotel room meeting, NBC reported, citing intelligence sources.
US intelligence agents believe Sabri was fully aware he was selling information to the CIA, it said.
During the cloak-and-dagger meeting, Sabri told the CIA's middleman that Saddam possessed chemical weapons and wanted a nuclear bomb but needed much more time to build one than the CIA estimate of several months to a year.
He also denied Saddam had any biological weapons.
Sabri's tips were thought to be more accurate than the CIA's own guesses on Saddam's arsenal, NBC said.
However, the foreign minister broke off his contacts weeks later after he repeatedly resisted CIA pressures to defect to the United States and publicly renounce Saddam, the sources told NBC.
After the US invasion of March 2003, Sabri was not arrested or included in the notorious "deck of cards" of the US military's most wanted Iraqi suspects.
Sabri, who now teaches journalism in Qatar, has turned down repeated requests for comments, NBC said.
Saddam's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs were revealed to be non-existent after the war.
A new US military study, based on interviews with jailed members of Saddam's regime, revealed that Saddam had tricked even his inner circle to believe he had weapons of mass destruction until shortly before the US-led invasion.
Sabri, fluent in English, was one of Iraq's public faces in the West.
The former English literature professor at Baghdad university was recalled from Iraq's London embassy in 1980 after two of his brothers were arrested for plotting against the regime. One of them later died in prison.
For the next decade, Sabri edited an English language newspaper and translated English books into Arabic, including a biography of George Bernard Shaw.
He returned to prominence ahead of the 1991 Gulf War as Iraq's deputy information minister. He was later appointed Iraq's ambassador to Austria in 1998 before being named foreign minister in 2001.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
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Iraq's foreign minister under Saddam Hussein spied for the CIA before the US-led invasion in 2003 in return for a 100,000 dollar payment, a US television station reported.
In September 2002, Iraq's top diplomat Naji Sabri traded information on Hussein's alleged weapons program for cash in a French-sponsored New York City hotel room meeting, NBC reported, citing intelligence sources.
US intelligence agents believe Sabri was fully aware he was selling information to the CIA, it said.
During the cloak-and-dagger meeting, Sabri told the CIA's middleman that Saddam possessed chemical weapons and wanted a nuclear bomb but needed much more time to build one than the CIA estimate of several months to a year.
He also denied Saddam had any biological weapons.
Sabri's tips were thought to be more accurate than the CIA's own guesses on Saddam's arsenal, NBC said.
However, the foreign minister broke off his contacts weeks later after he repeatedly resisted CIA pressures to defect to the United States and publicly renounce Saddam, the sources told NBC.
After the US invasion of March 2003, Sabri was not arrested or included in the notorious "deck of cards" of the US military's most wanted Iraqi suspects.
Sabri, who now teaches journalism in Qatar, has turned down repeated requests for comments, NBC said.
Saddam's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs were revealed to be non-existent after the war.
A new US military study, based on interviews with jailed members of Saddam's regime, revealed that Saddam had tricked even his inner circle to believe he had weapons of mass destruction until shortly before the US-led invasion.
Sabri, fluent in English, was one of Iraq's public faces in the West.
The former English literature professor at Baghdad university was recalled from Iraq's London embassy in 1980 after two of his brothers were arrested for plotting against the regime. One of them later died in prison.
For the next decade, Sabri edited an English language newspaper and translated English books into Arabic, including a biography of George Bernard Shaw.
He returned to prominence ahead of the 1991 Gulf War as Iraq's deputy information minister. He was later appointed Iraq's ambassador to Austria in 1998 before being named foreign minister in 2001.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
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Questions or Comments
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Saddam's FM gave CIA information on WMD Tue Mar 21, 8:34 AM ET
Months before the Iraq war, Iraq's foreign minister gave the CIA more accurate information about Saddam Hussein's alleged unconventional weapons program than the US agency had, for which he was paid more than 100,000 dollars, a news report said.
Naji Sabri, for a short time beginning with a UN General Assembly in September 2002, was the highest-ranking Iraqi informant on the CIA's payroll. He communicated with CIA officials through an intermediary at a New York hotel room, intelligence sources said to NBC News.
In exchange for 100,000 dollars in "good-faith money," Sabri relayed information about Saddam's actual capabilities that was far more accurate than the proclamations he made at the United Nations and closer to reality than the CIA's estimates.
According to the sources, all of whom requested anonymity, Sabri said Saddam had no significant biological weapons program, wanted a nuclear bomb but needed much more time to build one than the several months the CIA had estimated, and had poison gas left over from the Gulf War.
On the biological and nuclear weapons program, Sabri was more accurate than CIA, but on chemical weapons he was as wrong as the US agency, since none were found after the US invasion, NBC News said quoting its sources.
Sabri broke off his contacts weeks after he repeatedly resisted CIA pressures to defect to the United States and publicly renounce Saddam, the sources said.
After the US invasion three years ago, Sabri was not arrested or included in the notorious "deck of cards" of the US military's most wanted Iraqi suspects.
He now resides in an undisclosed location in the Middle East and has turned down repeated requests for comments on the report, much the same as the CIA, NBC News said.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
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Months before the Iraq war, Iraq's foreign minister gave the CIA more accurate information about Saddam Hussein's alleged unconventional weapons program than the US agency had, for which he was paid more than 100,000 dollars, a news report said.
Naji Sabri, for a short time beginning with a UN General Assembly in September 2002, was the highest-ranking Iraqi informant on the CIA's payroll. He communicated with CIA officials through an intermediary at a New York hotel room, intelligence sources said to NBC News.
In exchange for 100,000 dollars in "good-faith money," Sabri relayed information about Saddam's actual capabilities that was far more accurate than the proclamations he made at the United Nations and closer to reality than the CIA's estimates.
According to the sources, all of whom requested anonymity, Sabri said Saddam had no significant biological weapons program, wanted a nuclear bomb but needed much more time to build one than the several months the CIA had estimated, and had poison gas left over from the Gulf War.
On the biological and nuclear weapons program, Sabri was more accurate than CIA, but on chemical weapons he was as wrong as the US agency, since none were found after the US invasion, NBC News said quoting its sources.
Sabri broke off his contacts weeks after he repeatedly resisted CIA pressures to defect to the United States and publicly renounce Saddam, the sources said.
After the US invasion three years ago, Sabri was not arrested or included in the notorious "deck of cards" of the US military's most wanted Iraqi suspects.
He now resides in an undisclosed location in the Middle East and has turned down repeated requests for comments on the report, much the same as the CIA, NBC News said.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
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March 22, 2006
Iraqi Official, Paid by C.I.A., Gave Account of Weapons
By SCOTT SHANE
WASHINGTON, March 21 — Saddam Hussein's foreign minister was paid for information he supplied to the Central Intelligence Agency, through the French intelligence agency, that raised questions about the scale of Iraq's weapons programs, former intelligence officials said Tuesday.
The role of Naji Sabri, Iraq's foreign minister from 2001 until the America-led invasion began in 2003, was first described publicly in a 2004 speech by George J. Tenet, the former director of central intelligence, but Mr. Tenet did not give the Iraqi's name.
NBC News reported on Monday night that Mr. Sabri had been the man Mr. Tenet described as "a source who had direct access to Saddam and his inner circle," and two former intelligence officials confirmed the identification.
Mr. Sabri did not meet directly with C.I.A. officers, but spoke with intermediaries in meetings arranged by the French intelligence agency, which passed the information on, the officials said.
One official said Mr. Sabri may not have known for certain that his information was going to the United States government or that the money he received — reported by NBC as more than $100,000 — came from the C.I.A.
The officials were granted anonymity because of the importance of the secret intelligence relationship they had described. Mr. Sabri, who is teaching at a university in the Middle East outside Iraq, declined to discuss the report, NBC reported. A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment Tuesday.
According to Mr. Tenet's account, which is generally in accord with that of NBC and the former intelligence officials, the source now identified as Mr. Sabri gave a mixed account of Iraq's weapons programs when he spoke with French intelligence officers in the fall of 2002.
Mr. Tenet said in his speech, at Georgetown University in February 2004, that a source who had direct access to Mr. Hussein had said that Iraq had no nuclear weapons but was "aggressively and covertly" seeking to develop them. Mr. Tenet said the source had also reported that the Hussein government was "dabbling" with biological weapons but had no "real weapons program."
By comparison, an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, representing the views of American intelligence agencies, said Iraq had "reconstituted its nuclear weapons program" and it had an active biological weapons program that had produced some germ weapons.
On chemical arms, Mr. Sabri's information seems to be closer to the American estimate, which had said Iraq was producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. Mr. Sabri told French intelligence officers that Iraq had stockpiled chemical weapons and might use them against invading troops or Israel, according to Mr. Tenet.
Extensive searches by American troops and weapons specialists after the fall of Mr. Hussein found no unconventional weapons of any kind.
A worldly diplomat and former editor of an English-language Iraqi newspaper, Mr. Sabri was recalled from the Iraqi Embassy in London in 1980 after his two brothers were arrested by Mr. Hussein's agents and jailed on conspiracy charges. They were tortured, and one died in prison, while the other was freed after six years, according to a biography of Mr. Sabri compiled by the BBC.
Mr. Sabri lived quietly as an editor and literary translator for a decade before being given a new government post at the time of the Persian Gulf war in 1991. He worked at the Ministry of Information, as an adviser to Mr. Hussein and as ambassador to Austria before becoming foreign minister in April 2001.
In September 2002, in a speech to the United Nations, Mr. Sabri declared that "Iraq is free of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons."
The Bush administration has been accused by some former officials and members of Congress of deliberately skewing prewar intelligence to make the case for war.
Last month, Paul R. Pillar, a former C.I.A. official who oversaw intelligence assessments on the Middle East before the war, charged in an article in Foreign Affairs that "intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions that had already been made."
Copyright 2006The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Work for Us Site Map Back to Top
Iraqi Official, Paid by C.I.A., Gave Account of Weapons
By SCOTT SHANE
WASHINGTON, March 21 — Saddam Hussein's foreign minister was paid for information he supplied to the Central Intelligence Agency, through the French intelligence agency, that raised questions about the scale of Iraq's weapons programs, former intelligence officials said Tuesday.
The role of Naji Sabri, Iraq's foreign minister from 2001 until the America-led invasion began in 2003, was first described publicly in a 2004 speech by George J. Tenet, the former director of central intelligence, but Mr. Tenet did not give the Iraqi's name.
NBC News reported on Monday night that Mr. Sabri had been the man Mr. Tenet described as "a source who had direct access to Saddam and his inner circle," and two former intelligence officials confirmed the identification.
Mr. Sabri did not meet directly with C.I.A. officers, but spoke with intermediaries in meetings arranged by the French intelligence agency, which passed the information on, the officials said.
One official said Mr. Sabri may not have known for certain that his information was going to the United States government or that the money he received — reported by NBC as more than $100,000 — came from the C.I.A.
The officials were granted anonymity because of the importance of the secret intelligence relationship they had described. Mr. Sabri, who is teaching at a university in the Middle East outside Iraq, declined to discuss the report, NBC reported. A C.I.A. spokesman declined to comment Tuesday.
According to Mr. Tenet's account, which is generally in accord with that of NBC and the former intelligence officials, the source now identified as Mr. Sabri gave a mixed account of Iraq's weapons programs when he spoke with French intelligence officers in the fall of 2002.
Mr. Tenet said in his speech, at Georgetown University in February 2004, that a source who had direct access to Mr. Hussein had said that Iraq had no nuclear weapons but was "aggressively and covertly" seeking to develop them. Mr. Tenet said the source had also reported that the Hussein government was "dabbling" with biological weapons but had no "real weapons program."
By comparison, an October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, representing the views of American intelligence agencies, said Iraq had "reconstituted its nuclear weapons program" and it had an active biological weapons program that had produced some germ weapons.
On chemical arms, Mr. Sabri's information seems to be closer to the American estimate, which had said Iraq was producing and stockpiling chemical weapons. Mr. Sabri told French intelligence officers that Iraq had stockpiled chemical weapons and might use them against invading troops or Israel, according to Mr. Tenet.
Extensive searches by American troops and weapons specialists after the fall of Mr. Hussein found no unconventional weapons of any kind.
A worldly diplomat and former editor of an English-language Iraqi newspaper, Mr. Sabri was recalled from the Iraqi Embassy in London in 1980 after his two brothers were arrested by Mr. Hussein's agents and jailed on conspiracy charges. They were tortured, and one died in prison, while the other was freed after six years, according to a biography of Mr. Sabri compiled by the BBC.
Mr. Sabri lived quietly as an editor and literary translator for a decade before being given a new government post at the time of the Persian Gulf war in 1991. He worked at the Ministry of Information, as an adviser to Mr. Hussein and as ambassador to Austria before becoming foreign minister in April 2001.
In September 2002, in a speech to the United Nations, Mr. Sabri declared that "Iraq is free of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons."
The Bush administration has been accused by some former officials and members of Congress of deliberately skewing prewar intelligence to make the case for war.
Last month, Paul R. Pillar, a former C.I.A. official who oversaw intelligence assessments on the Middle East before the war, charged in an article in Foreign Affairs that "intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions that had already been made."
Copyright 2006The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Work for Us Site Map Back to Top
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11927856
Iraqi diplomat gave US prewar MWD details
Saddam's foreign minister told CIA the truth, so why didn't agency listen?
Iraqi diplomat gave US prewar MWD details
Saddam's foreign minister told CIA the truth, so why didn't agency listen?
http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york200603200927.asp
March 20, 2006, 9:27 a.m.
Libby to Fitzgerald: If You Won’t Name the CIA Leaker, I Will
And what was that Colin Powell said in September 2003?
It's sometimes difficult to remember, given the legal twists and turns it has taken, that the CIA leak investigation was begun to find out who exposed the identity of CIA employee Valerie Wilson to columnist Robert Novak and whether that person violated the Intelligence Identities Protection Act in doing so. After more than two years of investigating, prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald has not charged anyone with that crime — if indeed it was a crime — nor has he publicly answered either question. Fitzgerald has even refused to provide lawyers for the only person indicted in the case, former Cheney chief of staff Lewis Libby, with evidence that Wilson was indeed a covert agent at the time of the July 14, 2003, Novak column, or that the exposure of her identity did any damage to national security, arguing that that information — the very heart of the CIA leak case — is not relevant to the perjury and obstruction charges against Libby.
But now the Libby defense team is attempting to return the case to first things. In an extraordinary 35-page motion filed with Judge Reggie Walton late Friday, Libby's lawyers lay the groundwork for a plan to use his perjury trial as a way to find what happened in the CIA leak affair. After all, just what is it that Libby is accused of lying about? Why was it that all the conversations in question were taking place? Who said what to whom? If Libby's lawyers persuade Judge Walton to order Fitzgerald to turn over some of the reams of information he has gathered in the case, we might finally found out — most likely over the prosecutor's vigorous objections — what actually happened in the CIA leak case.
Libby's motion is, formally, a request for documents relating to the expected testimony of an imposing roster of current and former government officials likely to be called as witnesses in the trial. In the motion, they are listed together (at least publicly) for the first time:
1. Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State
2. Ari Fleischer, former White House Press Secretary
3. Marc Grossman, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
4. Stephen Hadley, former Deputy National Security Advisor
5. Bill Harlow, former CIA Spokesman
6. Colin Powell, former Secretary of State
7. Karl Rove, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
8. George Tenet, former Director of Central Intelligence
9. The CIA Briefer referred to in paragraph 11 of the indictment (Craig Schmall, Peter Clement or Matt Barrett)
10. The Senior CIA Official referred to in paragraph 7 of the indictment, who may be either Robert Grenier or John McLaughlin
11. Joseph Wilson
12. Valerie Plame Wilson
[Libby's lawyers also say they expect Vice President Cheney to testify, but his name is not on the list because Fitzgerald has already turned over documents from Cheney's office, and thus Libby is not requesting any new evidence from that source.]
Some of the witnesses are expected to testify that they told Libby that former ambassador Joseph Wilson's wife worked for the CIA, or that Libby told them that — accounts Fitzgerald believes will help him make the case that Libby lied to the grand jury about how he learned about Valerie Wilson. But in the new motion, Libby argues, in effect, that these people also know the larger story of the CIA leak. And knowing that larger story is necessary to understand Libby's testimony; for Libby's lawyers to question the witnesses about his allegedly false testimony, the lawyers will have to know what was going on at the time. Is one of the witnesses himself Novak's source? Does anyone have a motive to shade his testimony against Libby? And what was the context in which all the talking was taking place? In the court papers, Libby's lawyers suggest that the answers to those questions will demolish Fitzgerald's interpretation of events.
The indictment against Libby contains a series of statements which strongly suggest that the White House's desire to retaliate against Joseph Wilson led to a scheme to expose his wife's identity. But Libby's lawyers say Fitzgerald, tightly focused on Valerie Wilson, missed the big picture of what was happening in May, June, and July 2003. During that time, the motion argues, Libby was preoccupied with the now-famous "16 words" in the president's State of the Union address concerning Iraq's alleged attempts to purchase yellowcake uranium in Niger, and also with parrying ferocious Democratic attacks on the administration's case for the war. In addition, the lawyers say, Libby was fighting a rear-guard action against other officials of the Bush administration, specifically those in the CIA and the State Department, who were trying to blame the White House for the Iraq intelligence debacle. Compared to that — in what was surely one of the most intense periods in an administration filled with intense periods — the identity of Valerie Wilson, Libby argues, was small potatoes. "The indictment presents a distorted picture of the relevant events," the motion says,
by exaggerating the importance government officials, including Mr. Libby, attributed to Ms. Wilson’s employment status prior to July 14, 2003. The prosecution has an interest in continuing to overstate the significance of Ms. Wilson’s affiliation with the CIA. Doing so makes it easier to suggest that Mr. Libby would not have forgotten or confused his conversations concerning Ms. Wilson and has therefore intentionally lied. In contrast, the defense intends to present a more complete and accurate narrative. The defense will show that during the controversy about the “sixteen words” in the President’s 2003 State of the Union address and about Ambassador Wilson’s criticism of the Bush Administration, government officials, including Mr. Libby, viewed Ms. Wilson’s identity as at most a peripheral issue. To the extent that these officials were focused on Mr. Wilson, they were concerned with publicly disputing mistaken or misleading reports about his trip [to Niger] and his findings, not with where his wife worked.
In another part of the motion, the Libby defense team refers to Valerie Wilson's role in the matter as "minor" and "not important" and also refers to the "falsity" of some of Joseph Wilson's statements. Specifically, the motion says, "Contrary to Mr. Wilson's claims, he did not debunk as forgeries documents suggesting that Iraq was attempting to purchase uranium from Africa." It was claims like that, which received extensive coverage in the press and cried out for rebuttal, the lawyers argue, that demanded Libby's attention — not the place of Wilson's wife's employment.
"If the jury learns this background information," the Libby motion continues, "and also understands Mr. Libby’s additional focus on urgent national security matters, the jury will more easily appreciate how Mr. Libby may have forgotten or misremembered the snippets of conversation the government alleges were so memorable."
And who actually leaked Valerie Wilson's identity to Robert Novak, and was it a crime? The Libby defense team writes that it expects "witness testimony that within the government Ms. Wilson’s employment status was not regarded as classified, sensitive or secret, contrary to the allegations in the indictment." And the motion states flatly that "the primary source for Mr. Novak's article" was not only not Lewis Libby but was "an official from outside the White House." [emphasis in the original] As for who that might be, the Libby team points the finger toward the State Department.
Specifically, the top of the State Department. The motion says, "The defense may call Mr. Powell to testify about a September 2003 meeting at the White House during which he is reported to have commented that everyone knows that Mr. Wilson's wife works at the CIA. At the same meeting, Mr. Powell also reportedly mentioned a 2002 meeting during which Ms. Wilson suggested her husband for the CIA mission to Niger." Later, the motion requests "Any notes from the September 2003 meeting in the Situation Room at which Colin Powell is reported to have said that (a) everyone knows that Mr. Wilson's wife worked at the CIA and that (
it was Mr. Wilson's wife who suggested that the CIA send her husband on a mission to Niger."
In other parts of the motion, the Libby team, echoing recent media reports, suggests that the trio of Powell, his former deputy Richard Armitage, and former top State Department official Marc Grossman knew about Valerie Wilson's job and talked to reporters about it:
Documents pertaining to Mr. Wilson’s trip from Mr. Grossman’s files must also be examined carefully by the defense because Mr. Grossman may not be a disinterested witness. This week, Vanity Fair, the Washington Post and The New York Times, as well as other media outlets, reported that Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, told Bob Woodward of the Washington Post that Ms. Wilson worked for the CIA. There has been media speculation that Mr. Woodward’s source and Mr. Novak’s source are the same person. If the facts ultimately show that Mr. Armitage or someone else from the State Department was also Mr. Novak’s primary source, then the State Department (and certainly not Mr. Libby) bears responsibility for the "leak" that led to the public disclosure of Ms. Wilson’s CIA identity.
As for the CIA, Libby contends that the agency, once the Wilson matter blew up, did its best to undercut Libby and the vice president's office. It appears that Libby believes strongly, but does not have any proof, that the CIA was out to get Libby and his colleagues, and that therefore the testimony of any CIA officials might be suspect. "If CIA officials perceived that Mr. Tenet or the Agency were being unfairly criticized or scapegoated, these officials likely expressed their discontent about this bureaucratic infighting in email messages and other documents," the Libby motion says. "The defense is entitled to review any such documents because they bear directly on potential bias against Mr. Libby by CIA witnesses."
In the end, if Libby's version of events is correct, not only did he not commit any crimes in the Wilson matter, but no one at the State Department or the CIA committed any crimes, either. All anyone is guilty of is cutthroat bureaucratic infighting — and having the misfortune of seeing that cutthroat bureaucratic infighting become the subject of a special prosecutor's attention.
Fitzgerald will no doubt work hard to keep these issues out of the courtroom during what he contends is a straightforward perjury case. But surely what Libby is accused of lying about will ultimately be part of the trial. And it is in that way that Fitzgerald may have backed himself into a corner. Throughout the pre-trial motions in the case, he has argued, over and over, that it doesn't matter who leaked Valerie Wilson's identity, or why. It doesn't matter if Wilson was covert. It doesn't matter if the leak did any damage. In other words, the CIA leak is not relevant to the CIA leak case. Surely he will continue to argue that throughout the trial itself. But is that what his investigation — now in its third year — was really about?
— Byron York, NR's White House correspondent, is the author of The Vast Left Wing Conspiracy: The Untold Story of How Democratic Operatives, Eccentric Billionaires, Liberal Activists, and Assorted Celebrities Tried to Bring Down a President — and Why They'll Try Even Harder Next Time.
March 20, 2006, 9:27 a.m.
Libby to Fitzgerald: If You Won’t Name the CIA Leaker, I Will
And what was that Colin Powell said in September 2003?
It's sometimes difficult to remember, given the legal twists and turns it has taken, that the CIA leak investigation was begun to find out who exposed the identity of CIA employee Valerie Wilson to columnist Robert Novak and whether that person violated the Intelligence Identities Protection Act in doing so. After more than two years of investigating, prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald has not charged anyone with that crime — if indeed it was a crime — nor has he publicly answered either question. Fitzgerald has even refused to provide lawyers for the only person indicted in the case, former Cheney chief of staff Lewis Libby, with evidence that Wilson was indeed a covert agent at the time of the July 14, 2003, Novak column, or that the exposure of her identity did any damage to national security, arguing that that information — the very heart of the CIA leak case — is not relevant to the perjury and obstruction charges against Libby.
But now the Libby defense team is attempting to return the case to first things. In an extraordinary 35-page motion filed with Judge Reggie Walton late Friday, Libby's lawyers lay the groundwork for a plan to use his perjury trial as a way to find what happened in the CIA leak affair. After all, just what is it that Libby is accused of lying about? Why was it that all the conversations in question were taking place? Who said what to whom? If Libby's lawyers persuade Judge Walton to order Fitzgerald to turn over some of the reams of information he has gathered in the case, we might finally found out — most likely over the prosecutor's vigorous objections — what actually happened in the CIA leak case.
Libby's motion is, formally, a request for documents relating to the expected testimony of an imposing roster of current and former government officials likely to be called as witnesses in the trial. In the motion, they are listed together (at least publicly) for the first time:
1. Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State
2. Ari Fleischer, former White House Press Secretary
3. Marc Grossman, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
4. Stephen Hadley, former Deputy National Security Advisor
5. Bill Harlow, former CIA Spokesman
6. Colin Powell, former Secretary of State
7. Karl Rove, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
8. George Tenet, former Director of Central Intelligence
9. The CIA Briefer referred to in paragraph 11 of the indictment (Craig Schmall, Peter Clement or Matt Barrett)
10. The Senior CIA Official referred to in paragraph 7 of the indictment, who may be either Robert Grenier or John McLaughlin
11. Joseph Wilson
12. Valerie Plame Wilson
[Libby's lawyers also say they expect Vice President Cheney to testify, but his name is not on the list because Fitzgerald has already turned over documents from Cheney's office, and thus Libby is not requesting any new evidence from that source.]
Some of the witnesses are expected to testify that they told Libby that former ambassador Joseph Wilson's wife worked for the CIA, or that Libby told them that — accounts Fitzgerald believes will help him make the case that Libby lied to the grand jury about how he learned about Valerie Wilson. But in the new motion, Libby argues, in effect, that these people also know the larger story of the CIA leak. And knowing that larger story is necessary to understand Libby's testimony; for Libby's lawyers to question the witnesses about his allegedly false testimony, the lawyers will have to know what was going on at the time. Is one of the witnesses himself Novak's source? Does anyone have a motive to shade his testimony against Libby? And what was the context in which all the talking was taking place? In the court papers, Libby's lawyers suggest that the answers to those questions will demolish Fitzgerald's interpretation of events.
The indictment against Libby contains a series of statements which strongly suggest that the White House's desire to retaliate against Joseph Wilson led to a scheme to expose his wife's identity. But Libby's lawyers say Fitzgerald, tightly focused on Valerie Wilson, missed the big picture of what was happening in May, June, and July 2003. During that time, the motion argues, Libby was preoccupied with the now-famous "16 words" in the president's State of the Union address concerning Iraq's alleged attempts to purchase yellowcake uranium in Niger, and also with parrying ferocious Democratic attacks on the administration's case for the war. In addition, the lawyers say, Libby was fighting a rear-guard action against other officials of the Bush administration, specifically those in the CIA and the State Department, who were trying to blame the White House for the Iraq intelligence debacle. Compared to that — in what was surely one of the most intense periods in an administration filled with intense periods — the identity of Valerie Wilson, Libby argues, was small potatoes. "The indictment presents a distorted picture of the relevant events," the motion says,
by exaggerating the importance government officials, including Mr. Libby, attributed to Ms. Wilson’s employment status prior to July 14, 2003. The prosecution has an interest in continuing to overstate the significance of Ms. Wilson’s affiliation with the CIA. Doing so makes it easier to suggest that Mr. Libby would not have forgotten or confused his conversations concerning Ms. Wilson and has therefore intentionally lied. In contrast, the defense intends to present a more complete and accurate narrative. The defense will show that during the controversy about the “sixteen words” in the President’s 2003 State of the Union address and about Ambassador Wilson’s criticism of the Bush Administration, government officials, including Mr. Libby, viewed Ms. Wilson’s identity as at most a peripheral issue. To the extent that these officials were focused on Mr. Wilson, they were concerned with publicly disputing mistaken or misleading reports about his trip [to Niger] and his findings, not with where his wife worked.
In another part of the motion, the Libby defense team refers to Valerie Wilson's role in the matter as "minor" and "not important" and also refers to the "falsity" of some of Joseph Wilson's statements. Specifically, the motion says, "Contrary to Mr. Wilson's claims, he did not debunk as forgeries documents suggesting that Iraq was attempting to purchase uranium from Africa." It was claims like that, which received extensive coverage in the press and cried out for rebuttal, the lawyers argue, that demanded Libby's attention — not the place of Wilson's wife's employment.
"If the jury learns this background information," the Libby motion continues, "and also understands Mr. Libby’s additional focus on urgent national security matters, the jury will more easily appreciate how Mr. Libby may have forgotten or misremembered the snippets of conversation the government alleges were so memorable."
And who actually leaked Valerie Wilson's identity to Robert Novak, and was it a crime? The Libby defense team writes that it expects "witness testimony that within the government Ms. Wilson’s employment status was not regarded as classified, sensitive or secret, contrary to the allegations in the indictment." And the motion states flatly that "the primary source for Mr. Novak's article" was not only not Lewis Libby but was "an official from outside the White House." [emphasis in the original] As for who that might be, the Libby team points the finger toward the State Department.
Specifically, the top of the State Department. The motion says, "The defense may call Mr. Powell to testify about a September 2003 meeting at the White House during which he is reported to have commented that everyone knows that Mr. Wilson's wife works at the CIA. At the same meeting, Mr. Powell also reportedly mentioned a 2002 meeting during which Ms. Wilson suggested her husband for the CIA mission to Niger." Later, the motion requests "Any notes from the September 2003 meeting in the Situation Room at which Colin Powell is reported to have said that (a) everyone knows that Mr. Wilson's wife worked at the CIA and that (
it was Mr. Wilson's wife who suggested that the CIA send her husband on a mission to Niger."In other parts of the motion, the Libby team, echoing recent media reports, suggests that the trio of Powell, his former deputy Richard Armitage, and former top State Department official Marc Grossman knew about Valerie Wilson's job and talked to reporters about it:
Documents pertaining to Mr. Wilson’s trip from Mr. Grossman’s files must also be examined carefully by the defense because Mr. Grossman may not be a disinterested witness. This week, Vanity Fair, the Washington Post and The New York Times, as well as other media outlets, reported that Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, told Bob Woodward of the Washington Post that Ms. Wilson worked for the CIA. There has been media speculation that Mr. Woodward’s source and Mr. Novak’s source are the same person. If the facts ultimately show that Mr. Armitage or someone else from the State Department was also Mr. Novak’s primary source, then the State Department (and certainly not Mr. Libby) bears responsibility for the "leak" that led to the public disclosure of Ms. Wilson’s CIA identity.
As for the CIA, Libby contends that the agency, once the Wilson matter blew up, did its best to undercut Libby and the vice president's office. It appears that Libby believes strongly, but does not have any proof, that the CIA was out to get Libby and his colleagues, and that therefore the testimony of any CIA officials might be suspect. "If CIA officials perceived that Mr. Tenet or the Agency were being unfairly criticized or scapegoated, these officials likely expressed their discontent about this bureaucratic infighting in email messages and other documents," the Libby motion says. "The defense is entitled to review any such documents because they bear directly on potential bias against Mr. Libby by CIA witnesses."
In the end, if Libby's version of events is correct, not only did he not commit any crimes in the Wilson matter, but no one at the State Department or the CIA committed any crimes, either. All anyone is guilty of is cutthroat bureaucratic infighting — and having the misfortune of seeing that cutthroat bureaucratic infighting become the subject of a special prosecutor's attention.
Fitzgerald will no doubt work hard to keep these issues out of the courtroom during what he contends is a straightforward perjury case. But surely what Libby is accused of lying about will ultimately be part of the trial. And it is in that way that Fitzgerald may have backed himself into a corner. Throughout the pre-trial motions in the case, he has argued, over and over, that it doesn't matter who leaked Valerie Wilson's identity, or why. It doesn't matter if Wilson was covert. It doesn't matter if the leak did any damage. In other words, the CIA leak is not relevant to the CIA leak case. Surely he will continue to argue that throughout the trial itself. But is that what his investigation — now in its third year — was really about?
— Byron York, NR's White House correspondent, is the author of The Vast Left Wing Conspiracy: The Untold Story of How Democratic Operatives, Eccentric Billionaires, Liberal Activists, and Assorted Celebrities Tried to Bring Down a President — and Why They'll Try Even Harder Next Time.
http://chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=19943
March 22, 2006
By Gregory Meyer
CIA invests venture capital in Chicago technology firm
(Crain’s) — A Chicago technology company known for software that merges customer data has obtained venture capital from a fund backed by the CIA.
Initiate Systems Inc. said Wednesday it received fourth-round funding from In-Q-Tel Inc., formed by the agency in 1999 to spur private sector innovation and develop technology for the intelligence community.
In-Q-Tel’s prior investments, totaling about 90 companies, have supported research into technologies such as 3-D facial recognition, automated language translation and “text extraction for threat detection,” according to the fund.
The Initiate investment could help the company apply its “Identity Hub” software to national security uses. The software builds quick files on people, organizations, objects or events from disparate databases.
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Related Article Topics | Related Industry News
Choice Hotels International Inc., the franchisor whose hotel brands include Comfort Inn and Econo Lodge, uses Initiate software to identify guests in its loyalty program when they show up for a room, said Gina Sandon, vice-president of marketing at Initiate. Albertson’s Inc. pharmacies – including Osco drug stores in Illinois – use the software to pull up customer prescription histories, she said.
Exactly how the CIA or other agencies might deploy the software was unclear.
“We wish we knew,” said Ronald Galowich, the Chicago lawyer who is the company’s founder and chairman. “But we are very happy that they have an interest.”
The software uses algorithms to weed out useless information and reduce the number of false positives and negatives, which “frees up investigative resources to focus on real leads,” a company press release said.
In 2004, Initiate licensed its software to Northrop Grumman Mission Systems in a project that linked twelve databases, including those of the Naval Criminal Investigative Services, the FBI, and ten state and local law enforcement agencies, to track down criminals and homeland security threats, the company said at the time.
In-Q-Tel, whose main address is a post office box in Arlington, Va. did not immediately return calls.
The parties did not disclose terms, but Mr. Galowich said In-Q-Tel has a minority stake. In a fact sheet, In-Q-Tel says it generally invests between $1 million and $3 million.
Initiate executives would not disclose its annual revenues, but Chief Financial Officer Mark Iserloth said bookings grew 50% in 2004 and 70% in 2005. “We should do more than half of last year’s bookings in the first quarter of 2006 alone,” he said.
March 22, 2006
By Gregory Meyer
CIA invests venture capital in Chicago technology firm
(Crain’s) — A Chicago technology company known for software that merges customer data has obtained venture capital from a fund backed by the CIA.
Initiate Systems Inc. said Wednesday it received fourth-round funding from In-Q-Tel Inc., formed by the agency in 1999 to spur private sector innovation and develop technology for the intelligence community.
In-Q-Tel’s prior investments, totaling about 90 companies, have supported research into technologies such as 3-D facial recognition, automated language translation and “text extraction for threat detection,” according to the fund.
The Initiate investment could help the company apply its “Identity Hub” software to national security uses. The software builds quick files on people, organizations, objects or events from disparate databases.
Advertisement
Related Article Topics | Related Industry News
Choice Hotels International Inc., the franchisor whose hotel brands include Comfort Inn and Econo Lodge, uses Initiate software to identify guests in its loyalty program when they show up for a room, said Gina Sandon, vice-president of marketing at Initiate. Albertson’s Inc. pharmacies – including Osco drug stores in Illinois – use the software to pull up customer prescription histories, she said.
Exactly how the CIA or other agencies might deploy the software was unclear.
“We wish we knew,” said Ronald Galowich, the Chicago lawyer who is the company’s founder and chairman. “But we are very happy that they have an interest.”
The software uses algorithms to weed out useless information and reduce the number of false positives and negatives, which “frees up investigative resources to focus on real leads,” a company press release said.
In 2004, Initiate licensed its software to Northrop Grumman Mission Systems in a project that linked twelve databases, including those of the Naval Criminal Investigative Services, the FBI, and ten state and local law enforcement agencies, to track down criminals and homeland security threats, the company said at the time.
In-Q-Tel, whose main address is a post office box in Arlington, Va. did not immediately return calls.
The parties did not disclose terms, but Mr. Galowich said In-Q-Tel has a minority stake. In a fact sheet, In-Q-Tel says it generally invests between $1 million and $3 million.
Initiate executives would not disclose its annual revenues, but Chief Financial Officer Mark Iserloth said bookings grew 50% in 2004 and 70% in 2005. “We should do more than half of last year’s bookings in the first quarter of 2006 alone,” he said.
http://www.counterpunch.org/macmichael03222006.html
An Unnecessary Crisis
The Iranian Nuclear Showdown
By DAVID MacMICHAEL
Former CIA analyst
(Author's note: As a member of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, an organization of former US intellligence officers from the CIA, DIA, Department of State and Department of Defense, I took part in 2002 in the preparation of a series of public statements countering the Bush administration's alleged intelligence behind its rationale for the invasion of Iraq. These statements were based not only on our past experience with presidential manipulation of intelligence in Vietnam and the Iran-Contra era but with information we received from alarmed former colleagues still within the intelligence services. We warned that not only was the information about supposed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, particularly nuclear weapons, suspect and more than likely false, but that the overall strategy behind the invasion plan overrated prospects of success and vastly underestimated the probable cost to the United States in lives and money.
Our misgivings, we now know, were all too correct. That is why we look with growing alarm at the manner in which the administration has approached the problem-if, in fact, it is a problem-posed by Iran's long-established program of developing a nuclear energy system, a program which could eventually give the country the ability to produce a nuclear weapon. This Iran, as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, pledges not to do. It has submitted to the regular inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency which has found no evidence of a weapons program.
In my belief, as the writer of the following analysis, the Bush administration representation of Iran, unarguably a conservative Shiite Islamic state supportive of Shiite minorities in Iraq and Lebanon, among other countries, as a reckless and aggressive nation, a danger to the region or even to the United States, has no grounding in history. My analysis demonstrates that Iran, on the contrary, has over the past half century been the victim of both covert and overt aggression-in much of which the US has been involved.
It is difficult for me to understand not only why the Bush administration is pursuing its aggressive policy against Iran, especially at a time when its position in Iraq is crumbling toward utter failure, but how it has been able to enlist much of the European Union countries in its support. The analysis explores the issue.--DM)
For almost a half century Iran, both under the government of Shah Reza Pahlavi and the succeeding Islamic governments after the Shah's overthrow in 1978, has had a policy of developing nuclear plants for electric power generation. Prior to 1978 the policy had the full support and encouragement of the United States and other western governments which used Iran as a major Middle Eastern ally against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For example, in 1974 Iran contracted with the American research firm SRI International (the former Stanford Research Institute) for assistance in the design and construction of such plants.
Things changed after the overthrow of the Shah and the subsequent US Embassy hostage crisis, during the course of which American Army Special Forces attempted a military rescue raid in Iran which proved an embarrassing failure.. Not only were diplomatic relations between Teheran and Washington broken and never restored, but the US prohibited all direct trade between US business and Iran and sequestered all Iranian assets in the US, including some $18 billion in deposits in American banks, assets which the US government still holds. Admittedly, the ban was covertly lifted during the Reagan presidency when advanced US weapons were sold, through Israeli channels, to Iran and the proceeds diverted to the support of US-directed forces (the "Contras") seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government-thus, the "Iran-Contra" scandal. However, this was a momentary digression from the policy, partly rationalized as a means of restoring US influence in Iran's military or establishing links with "moderate elements in Iran" with an eye toward repeating the pro-US military coup of 1953 which ousted Iran's elected government of Mohammed Mossadeq and established the essentially US-controlled monarchy of the Shah. (It might be noted in the context of the present US effort to have Iran sanctioned by the UN Security Council, that prior to the 1953 coup Great Britain, furious at Mossadeq because of his nationalization of British-owned oil fields, unsuccessfully attempted to have the Security Council punish Iran).
Indeed, such was US hostility toward the post-Shah government and its Islamic fundamentalist religious leader, the Ayatolla Khomeini-despite the fact that it was by any definition anti-communist, possibly even more so than the also fundamentalist mujahaddin rebellion the US organized and supported in neighboring Afghanistan-that Washington and its western allies to greater or lesser degrees encouraged, financed, armed, provided intelligence to, and even directly participated in the war of aggression which Iraq launched against Iran in 1980. This participation climaxed in 1988 when a US cruiser operating in Iranian national waters mistakenly shot down an Iranian civil airliner, killing the 100 plus passengers aboard.
Ironically, this western aid included scientific and industrial support for Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. This support proved critical because it was only by resort to massive use of chemical weapons that Iraq-which had disastrously underestimated Iran's ability to rebuild its armed forces following 1978 when most of the pro-Shah senior officer corps left the country-was able to prevent Iran's enthusiastic Islamic volunteers from routing Saddam Hussein's secular baathist regulars. In any event, the war was a disaster for both countries with deaths in the hundreds of thousands and huge economic losses. Less noticed then, but a major factor in current US strategic calculations, was the fact that Iraq's very large Shia Muslim population tended to a great degree to identify with largely Shia Iran and to reject their own secular government whose popular support base, insofar as it was religious, was drawn from Sunni Muslims, traditionally foes of the Shiites they regard as heretics.
When the war ended in 1988, with the United Nations negotiating a ceasefire and then supervising withdrawal of both sides to pre-war borders and repatriation of prisoners, Iran turned its energies to restoring its economy. Iraq, on the other hand, feeling betrayed by its Arab neighbors, particularly Kuwait which Baghdad believed had not only failed to provide promised financial assistance but had actually taken advantage of the war to steal oil from Iraqi fields, committed the extraordinary error of launching its August 1990 attack on Kuwait. Admittedly, Saddam had some reason to believe that his old allies in Washington would tolerate his assault. US Ambassador April Glaspie in Baghdad famously told him on July 25 that the United States "had no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait.The issue is not associated with America."
How wrong was Saddam's belief, because the George H.W. Bush administration seized the opportunity to lead an international coalition to war against Iraq-the Gulf War--; totally crush his painfully reconstructed military forces; and usher in the decade-long era of brutal United Nations economic sanctions that almost completely destroyed what was left of Iraq's once thriving economy and social structure. Saddam and the Baath Party remained in control of the government, somehow retaining the capability of bloodily suppressing a major Shiite rebellion in the southern third of the country and maintaining tenuous control over the Kurdish provinces in the north despite British and US-imposed "no fly regions"-non-UN-authorized activities which prevented the Iraqi air force from supporting Baghdad's military operations there.
While Iraq sank deeper into misery-an impoverished international outcast-Iran, although still seen by the US as an enemy, made a relatively rapid recovery. It continued satisfactory trade relations with everyone but the US and, after the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, experienced social and political moderation. Certainly, the Shia religious leaders who succeeded Khomeini retained an effective veto over the elected civil government, but by and large Iran's large and cosmopolitan middle and upper classes were not subjected to any Taliban-like repression or even the severe life style restrictions of Saudi Arabia. Compared to many other nations of the Middle East Iran's political system was relatively open. The result of the 2005 national elections which confounded most observers by giving the presidential office to Mahmoud Ahmajinedad, the populist and religiously conservative mayor of Baghdad over much better known and wealthier candidates from the Iranian elite is evidence of that.
Iran's conduct of its foreign affairs following the war with Iraq shows no record of disruptive international or regional behavior. As a member of OPEC it has cooperated with that body's policies. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union Teheran quickly established cordial political and economic relationships with the new Russian Federation as well as with the new Near Eastern states formed from the old USSR-the so-called 'Stans. Trade with western Europe has continued; Germany, for instance, exports about $5 billion worth of products annually to Iran. Likewise, Tehran has worked diligently to improve its diplomatic and economic relationships with the rising Asian economic powers of China and India as well as with Japan, which gets over 15 per cent of its petroleum from Iran. Fully conscious of the dangers posed by the Taliban regime in its eastern neighbor of Afghanistan to its own relatively moderate Islamism and comparatively open political system, Iran worked closely with others in the region to counter the efforts of the mujaheddin and, after, 2001 cooperated with the United States in suppressing alQuaeda's activities in the region. Iran, with a significant drug abuse problem among its population, has also been active in efforts to stop the opium and heroin traffic emanating from Afghanistan. Indeed, Iran was notably cooperative with the anti-Iraq coalition during the Gulf War.
THE NUCLEAR ISSUE
More to the point here is that Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 by which, while having the right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it pledged not to make nuclear weapons and to submit to the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN body established in 1957, to ensure that it was not doing so. Indeed, Iran has allowed these inspections over the years, and, following the US invasion of Iraq, partly rationalized by charges that Iraq-also an NPT signatory-had or was developing nuclear weapons, went beyond what the NPT required it to do by accepting a so-called "additional protocol" proposed by the European Union. Under this it agreed to suspend its NPT-authorized right to enrich uranium for its nuclear power plants, currently under construction with Russian assistance, while the IAEA conducted detailed investigations to ascertain that Iran was not, as the United States was openly accusing it of doing, using its nuclear power program as a cover for weapons manufacture. After an extraordinary examination, in which Iran cooperated fully, IAEA chief Mohammed Al Baradei, issued a report in November 2004, stating that Iran was in "substantive compliance" not only with its NPT obligations but with those of the "additional protocol" as well.
He did point out, it should be noted, that Iran had previously not reported on or completely explained some activities and possession of traces of some materials. However, having said this, he went on to state that he had found "no indication" that Iran had ever diverted any "special nuclear materials" to a military purpose.A fairminded observer, especially in light of renewed nuclear weapons design work in the United States-also an NPT signatory-might say that since Iran has been engaged in nuclear energy work for over 30 years and during much of that time under threat or actual attack by enemies possessing nuclear weapons-among them the US and Israel-it would be surprising if there had not from time to time been discussion or actual planning for nuclear weapons development in Teheran. Al Baradei's finding of "substantial compliance" probably means that whatever the Iranians had done in this way had not, in fact, been "substantial" in the sense of establishing a meaningful weapons production capability.
However much or little credit one gives to official Iranian statements of policy on nuclear weapons, it is worth recalling that at his inauguration President Aboudinejad made a point of denouncing them and promised that Iran would remain a non-nuclear weapons state. Of equal, if not greater, significance is the fact that the real power in Iran, the man who, among other things, controls its armed forces, is the head of the Shiite clergy, Supreme Jurisprudent Ali Khamenei. He has issued a fatwa-a religious ruling-against nuclear weapons.
Granted, Iran, like every other Islamic nation, sees Israel as an enemy, something, as its current president has unwisely said, that should be wiped off the map. It also sponsors the armed Lebanese Shiite group, Hizbollah, which has commited the crime of effectively defending Lebanese territory against Israeli incursions. However, everything taken into consideration, one could make the case that Iran over the years has been a very respectable global citizen and, indeed, if anything has been more sinned against than sinning.
WHAT LIES BEHIND US POLICY
It is against this background that one has to try to explain why the United States ignores, indeed, denounces, the IAEA report's conclusion that Iran is today in "substantial compliance" and instead seizes on its note of possible prior incomplete reporting to charge Iran with being "a threat to peace and security" to be referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctioning or other action. Indeed, when other permanent members of the Security Council, such as Russia and China, question the need for even economic sanctions, senior Bush administration officials, especially Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and UN Ambassador John Bolton, echoed by Israeli government spokesmen, mutter darkly that the use of military force against Iran "remains on the table" as an option. It is even more of a question as to why this issue of possible past Iranian incomplete reporting-and the emphasis here is on "possible"-that both the European Union and the majority of the 39 member countries on the IAEA board-have elevated this to a major international crisis.
It may be that the US and EU intelligence services have more convincing evidence about Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programs and intentions than they have revealed to date. If so, it is puzzling that they have not gone beyond broad accusations and seem to rely on allegations by Iranian exile organizations seeking to restore the monarchy. All this is unhappily reminiscent of the run up to the invasion of Iraq with charges of WMD. Indeed, given the total discrediting of the charges made by US and UK intelligence agencies about Iraq, supported by politically motivated ?migr? groups, it is astonishing that the accusations are not laughed out of the court of world public opinion.
Nevertheless, a US Congress-so badly stung only three years ago by accepting the false representations of the Bush administration about Iraq-snaps eagerly at the Iran bait. Moreover, this time it is the Congress that takes the initiative, rejecting White House cautions about taking unilateral action that would hinder administration efforts to build an international consensus against Iran. On March 15, the House International Relations Committee in a bipartisan 35 to 3 vote, endorsed legislation that would deny US economic assistance to any country that invested in Iran's energy sector or allowed a private entity to do so. Democratic hawk Tom Lantos argued that this would inflict "economic pain on Tehran" and "starve" it of the resources needed to fund its nuclear program. The resolution will probably pass in the House, but indications are that the Senate will reject it. One cannot resist the temptation of saying to the Congress, "Fool me once; shame on you. Fool me twice; shame on me."
As of now, the matter is before the Security Council, the IAEA accepting Rice's demand that its whole dossier on Iran's nuclear power program be sent there. It is not clear what will be the result of the Council's consideration of the dossier. As noted, IAEA's documentation is far more exculpatory of Iran than otherwise. Moreover, the presidency of the Council has passed from the aggressive, to say the least, US Ambassador Bolton to the Argentine Ambassador Cesar Mayoral who is certainly unlikely to push hard for sanctions. Moreover, permanent Council members China and Russia, both having veto power, are opposed to any punitive action. Granted, both are not completely happy with Iran for not accepting the proposal for abandoning uranium enrichment activities on its own soil and working in partnership with Russia in a Russian plant. Both of them, while accepting that Iran is within its treaty rights in demanding that it have the capability for producing fuel for its nuclear power plants, clearly wish that Iran would compromise on this point, defusing the crisis and, importantly, not forcing them into a confrontation with the US and the EU. That said, in the final analysis it is clear that neither China nor Russia, especially the former, will endorse or take part in any economic or security measures directed against Iran and they will, if necessary, veto any such measures should they come to a vote.
Of all the questions about the "Iranian nuclear crisis" surely the most basic one is why has the United States made it such a major issue? Secondarily, but surely even more puzzling is why has the European Union shown itself so willing to carry Bush administration water in what is by any measure a very dubious cause?
With regard to the US, a factor, ridiculous as it sounds, is desire to punish Iran for overthrowing the Shah and the taking of the embassy hostages twenty-eight years ago. More important is the underlying longterm policy of wanting direct control over the oil resources of the Middle East. This policy, despite the fact that there is little evidence of any inability of the US to access oil in the global market, is intensified by the growingly recognized fact that China and India are becoming ever more powerful competitors for the oil of the region. It is hard to take really seriously Washington claims that Iran-a country of 70 million people, industrially underdeveloped, with no modern record of military adventurism-represents a threat to either the US or its neighbors, with or without a nuclear capability. However, that is not the way the Bush administration, which interprets anything other than total subservience as a threat to US national interests, sees it.
As for the Europeans, it can be argued that, with the exception of the UK and Italy, having taken a principled but totally ineffectual stand against the US aggression in Iraq, they fear that if the US somehow does succeed in its goal of turning Iraq into a quasi-US colony and then is able somehow to subdue Iran, that they will be frozen out of Middle Eastern picture in the future. Perhaps their governing elites worry that failure to join in will mean they will no longer be taken seriously.
Certainly there has been not entirely unfounded speculation that Germany's new Chancellor, Angela Merkel, sees herself in the role of Margaret Thatcher to George Bush's Ronald Reagan. Certainly France's political leadership, shocked by the rejection of the EU constitution and uncertain about how to deal with its growing and restive Islamic immigrant population, has lost the confidence it showed when it opposed the Iraq invasion. Certainly also there can be no real belief in either Berlin or Paris that Iran, whether it enriches its own uranium or not, poses any "threat" to them now or in the foreseeable future.
What they must know, as the King of Jordan warned this week, is that any military attack on Iran, by either the US or Israel, will send the smouldering Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world up in flames, with tragic consequences for the planet. Even the establishment of a sanctions regimen against Iran for, essentially, the crime of insisting on its treaty rights, while Israel holds its several hundred nuclear weapons and the US, while blatantly announcing the modernization of its own nuclear bomb stocks and, in its just-issued strategic doctrine paper, announces that it will use nuclear weapons in any future conflicts when and how it wishes, is likely to have very negative results.
It is a good sign that the UK's foreign minister, Jack Straw, has recently very pointedly distanced himself and his country from Washington on the Iran strategy by saying that the use of military force to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue has been ruled out. Russia and China, as emphasized here, definitely oppose either sanctions or armed force. The rest of the EU, having shown solidarity to this point, appears ready to draw back. The United States, even as Iraq descends into civil war and where the Shiite majority of its population identifies with Iran, is increasingly isolated.
Will Washington, regardless of the weakness of its case and its limited international support, still press on? If it fails to carry the Security Council, as it probably will, will it then take unilateral military or economic action? Military action is madness; unilateral economic sanctions are basically cutting of the American nose to spite the American face.
The Iran nuclear issue. An unnecessary crisis, totally manufactured and fatuously pursued. Just one more Bush administration fiasco.
David MacMichael is a former CIA analyst and a member of the Steering Group of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity.
An Unnecessary Crisis
The Iranian Nuclear Showdown
By DAVID MacMICHAEL
Former CIA analyst
(Author's note: As a member of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity, an organization of former US intellligence officers from the CIA, DIA, Department of State and Department of Defense, I took part in 2002 in the preparation of a series of public statements countering the Bush administration's alleged intelligence behind its rationale for the invasion of Iraq. These statements were based not only on our past experience with presidential manipulation of intelligence in Vietnam and the Iran-Contra era but with information we received from alarmed former colleagues still within the intelligence services. We warned that not only was the information about supposed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, particularly nuclear weapons, suspect and more than likely false, but that the overall strategy behind the invasion plan overrated prospects of success and vastly underestimated the probable cost to the United States in lives and money.
Our misgivings, we now know, were all too correct. That is why we look with growing alarm at the manner in which the administration has approached the problem-if, in fact, it is a problem-posed by Iran's long-established program of developing a nuclear energy system, a program which could eventually give the country the ability to produce a nuclear weapon. This Iran, as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, pledges not to do. It has submitted to the regular inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency which has found no evidence of a weapons program.
In my belief, as the writer of the following analysis, the Bush administration representation of Iran, unarguably a conservative Shiite Islamic state supportive of Shiite minorities in Iraq and Lebanon, among other countries, as a reckless and aggressive nation, a danger to the region or even to the United States, has no grounding in history. My analysis demonstrates that Iran, on the contrary, has over the past half century been the victim of both covert and overt aggression-in much of which the US has been involved.
It is difficult for me to understand not only why the Bush administration is pursuing its aggressive policy against Iran, especially at a time when its position in Iraq is crumbling toward utter failure, but how it has been able to enlist much of the European Union countries in its support. The analysis explores the issue.--DM)
For almost a half century Iran, both under the government of Shah Reza Pahlavi and the succeeding Islamic governments after the Shah's overthrow in 1978, has had a policy of developing nuclear plants for electric power generation. Prior to 1978 the policy had the full support and encouragement of the United States and other western governments which used Iran as a major Middle Eastern ally against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For example, in 1974 Iran contracted with the American research firm SRI International (the former Stanford Research Institute) for assistance in the design and construction of such plants.
Things changed after the overthrow of the Shah and the subsequent US Embassy hostage crisis, during the course of which American Army Special Forces attempted a military rescue raid in Iran which proved an embarrassing failure.. Not only were diplomatic relations between Teheran and Washington broken and never restored, but the US prohibited all direct trade between US business and Iran and sequestered all Iranian assets in the US, including some $18 billion in deposits in American banks, assets which the US government still holds. Admittedly, the ban was covertly lifted during the Reagan presidency when advanced US weapons were sold, through Israeli channels, to Iran and the proceeds diverted to the support of US-directed forces (the "Contras") seeking to overthrow the Nicaraguan government-thus, the "Iran-Contra" scandal. However, this was a momentary digression from the policy, partly rationalized as a means of restoring US influence in Iran's military or establishing links with "moderate elements in Iran" with an eye toward repeating the pro-US military coup of 1953 which ousted Iran's elected government of Mohammed Mossadeq and established the essentially US-controlled monarchy of the Shah. (It might be noted in the context of the present US effort to have Iran sanctioned by the UN Security Council, that prior to the 1953 coup Great Britain, furious at Mossadeq because of his nationalization of British-owned oil fields, unsuccessfully attempted to have the Security Council punish Iran).
Indeed, such was US hostility toward the post-Shah government and its Islamic fundamentalist religious leader, the Ayatolla Khomeini-despite the fact that it was by any definition anti-communist, possibly even more so than the also fundamentalist mujahaddin rebellion the US organized and supported in neighboring Afghanistan-that Washington and its western allies to greater or lesser degrees encouraged, financed, armed, provided intelligence to, and even directly participated in the war of aggression which Iraq launched against Iran in 1980. This participation climaxed in 1988 when a US cruiser operating in Iranian national waters mistakenly shot down an Iranian civil airliner, killing the 100 plus passengers aboard.
Ironically, this western aid included scientific and industrial support for Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. This support proved critical because it was only by resort to massive use of chemical weapons that Iraq-which had disastrously underestimated Iran's ability to rebuild its armed forces following 1978 when most of the pro-Shah senior officer corps left the country-was able to prevent Iran's enthusiastic Islamic volunteers from routing Saddam Hussein's secular baathist regulars. In any event, the war was a disaster for both countries with deaths in the hundreds of thousands and huge economic losses. Less noticed then, but a major factor in current US strategic calculations, was the fact that Iraq's very large Shia Muslim population tended to a great degree to identify with largely Shia Iran and to reject their own secular government whose popular support base, insofar as it was religious, was drawn from Sunni Muslims, traditionally foes of the Shiites they regard as heretics.
When the war ended in 1988, with the United Nations negotiating a ceasefire and then supervising withdrawal of both sides to pre-war borders and repatriation of prisoners, Iran turned its energies to restoring its economy. Iraq, on the other hand, feeling betrayed by its Arab neighbors, particularly Kuwait which Baghdad believed had not only failed to provide promised financial assistance but had actually taken advantage of the war to steal oil from Iraqi fields, committed the extraordinary error of launching its August 1990 attack on Kuwait. Admittedly, Saddam had some reason to believe that his old allies in Washington would tolerate his assault. US Ambassador April Glaspie in Baghdad famously told him on July 25 that the United States "had no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait.The issue is not associated with America."
How wrong was Saddam's belief, because the George H.W. Bush administration seized the opportunity to lead an international coalition to war against Iraq-the Gulf War--; totally crush his painfully reconstructed military forces; and usher in the decade-long era of brutal United Nations economic sanctions that almost completely destroyed what was left of Iraq's once thriving economy and social structure. Saddam and the Baath Party remained in control of the government, somehow retaining the capability of bloodily suppressing a major Shiite rebellion in the southern third of the country and maintaining tenuous control over the Kurdish provinces in the north despite British and US-imposed "no fly regions"-non-UN-authorized activities which prevented the Iraqi air force from supporting Baghdad's military operations there.
While Iraq sank deeper into misery-an impoverished international outcast-Iran, although still seen by the US as an enemy, made a relatively rapid recovery. It continued satisfactory trade relations with everyone but the US and, after the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini, experienced social and political moderation. Certainly, the Shia religious leaders who succeeded Khomeini retained an effective veto over the elected civil government, but by and large Iran's large and cosmopolitan middle and upper classes were not subjected to any Taliban-like repression or even the severe life style restrictions of Saudi Arabia. Compared to many other nations of the Middle East Iran's political system was relatively open. The result of the 2005 national elections which confounded most observers by giving the presidential office to Mahmoud Ahmajinedad, the populist and religiously conservative mayor of Baghdad over much better known and wealthier candidates from the Iranian elite is evidence of that.
Iran's conduct of its foreign affairs following the war with Iraq shows no record of disruptive international or regional behavior. As a member of OPEC it has cooperated with that body's policies. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union Teheran quickly established cordial political and economic relationships with the new Russian Federation as well as with the new Near Eastern states formed from the old USSR-the so-called 'Stans. Trade with western Europe has continued; Germany, for instance, exports about $5 billion worth of products annually to Iran. Likewise, Tehran has worked diligently to improve its diplomatic and economic relationships with the rising Asian economic powers of China and India as well as with Japan, which gets over 15 per cent of its petroleum from Iran. Fully conscious of the dangers posed by the Taliban regime in its eastern neighbor of Afghanistan to its own relatively moderate Islamism and comparatively open political system, Iran worked closely with others in the region to counter the efforts of the mujaheddin and, after, 2001 cooperated with the United States in suppressing alQuaeda's activities in the region. Iran, with a significant drug abuse problem among its population, has also been active in efforts to stop the opium and heroin traffic emanating from Afghanistan. Indeed, Iran was notably cooperative with the anti-Iraq coalition during the Gulf War.
THE NUCLEAR ISSUE
More to the point here is that Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 by which, while having the right to develop peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it pledged not to make nuclear weapons and to submit to the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN body established in 1957, to ensure that it was not doing so. Indeed, Iran has allowed these inspections over the years, and, following the US invasion of Iraq, partly rationalized by charges that Iraq-also an NPT signatory-had or was developing nuclear weapons, went beyond what the NPT required it to do by accepting a so-called "additional protocol" proposed by the European Union. Under this it agreed to suspend its NPT-authorized right to enrich uranium for its nuclear power plants, currently under construction with Russian assistance, while the IAEA conducted detailed investigations to ascertain that Iran was not, as the United States was openly accusing it of doing, using its nuclear power program as a cover for weapons manufacture. After an extraordinary examination, in which Iran cooperated fully, IAEA chief Mohammed Al Baradei, issued a report in November 2004, stating that Iran was in "substantive compliance" not only with its NPT obligations but with those of the "additional protocol" as well.
He did point out, it should be noted, that Iran had previously not reported on or completely explained some activities and possession of traces of some materials. However, having said this, he went on to state that he had found "no indication" that Iran had ever diverted any "special nuclear materials" to a military purpose.A fairminded observer, especially in light of renewed nuclear weapons design work in the United States-also an NPT signatory-might say that since Iran has been engaged in nuclear energy work for over 30 years and during much of that time under threat or actual attack by enemies possessing nuclear weapons-among them the US and Israel-it would be surprising if there had not from time to time been discussion or actual planning for nuclear weapons development in Teheran. Al Baradei's finding of "substantial compliance" probably means that whatever the Iranians had done in this way had not, in fact, been "substantial" in the sense of establishing a meaningful weapons production capability.
However much or little credit one gives to official Iranian statements of policy on nuclear weapons, it is worth recalling that at his inauguration President Aboudinejad made a point of denouncing them and promised that Iran would remain a non-nuclear weapons state. Of equal, if not greater, significance is the fact that the real power in Iran, the man who, among other things, controls its armed forces, is the head of the Shiite clergy, Supreme Jurisprudent Ali Khamenei. He has issued a fatwa-a religious ruling-against nuclear weapons.
Granted, Iran, like every other Islamic nation, sees Israel as an enemy, something, as its current president has unwisely said, that should be wiped off the map. It also sponsors the armed Lebanese Shiite group, Hizbollah, which has commited the crime of effectively defending Lebanese territory against Israeli incursions. However, everything taken into consideration, one could make the case that Iran over the years has been a very respectable global citizen and, indeed, if anything has been more sinned against than sinning.
WHAT LIES BEHIND US POLICY
It is against this background that one has to try to explain why the United States ignores, indeed, denounces, the IAEA report's conclusion that Iran is today in "substantial compliance" and instead seizes on its note of possible prior incomplete reporting to charge Iran with being "a threat to peace and security" to be referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctioning or other action. Indeed, when other permanent members of the Security Council, such as Russia and China, question the need for even economic sanctions, senior Bush administration officials, especially Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and UN Ambassador John Bolton, echoed by Israeli government spokesmen, mutter darkly that the use of military force against Iran "remains on the table" as an option. It is even more of a question as to why this issue of possible past Iranian incomplete reporting-and the emphasis here is on "possible"-that both the European Union and the majority of the 39 member countries on the IAEA board-have elevated this to a major international crisis.
It may be that the US and EU intelligence services have more convincing evidence about Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programs and intentions than they have revealed to date. If so, it is puzzling that they have not gone beyond broad accusations and seem to rely on allegations by Iranian exile organizations seeking to restore the monarchy. All this is unhappily reminiscent of the run up to the invasion of Iraq with charges of WMD. Indeed, given the total discrediting of the charges made by US and UK intelligence agencies about Iraq, supported by politically motivated ?migr? groups, it is astonishing that the accusations are not laughed out of the court of world public opinion.
Nevertheless, a US Congress-so badly stung only three years ago by accepting the false representations of the Bush administration about Iraq-snaps eagerly at the Iran bait. Moreover, this time it is the Congress that takes the initiative, rejecting White House cautions about taking unilateral action that would hinder administration efforts to build an international consensus against Iran. On March 15, the House International Relations Committee in a bipartisan 35 to 3 vote, endorsed legislation that would deny US economic assistance to any country that invested in Iran's energy sector or allowed a private entity to do so. Democratic hawk Tom Lantos argued that this would inflict "economic pain on Tehran" and "starve" it of the resources needed to fund its nuclear program. The resolution will probably pass in the House, but indications are that the Senate will reject it. One cannot resist the temptation of saying to the Congress, "Fool me once; shame on you. Fool me twice; shame on me."
As of now, the matter is before the Security Council, the IAEA accepting Rice's demand that its whole dossier on Iran's nuclear power program be sent there. It is not clear what will be the result of the Council's consideration of the dossier. As noted, IAEA's documentation is far more exculpatory of Iran than otherwise. Moreover, the presidency of the Council has passed from the aggressive, to say the least, US Ambassador Bolton to the Argentine Ambassador Cesar Mayoral who is certainly unlikely to push hard for sanctions. Moreover, permanent Council members China and Russia, both having veto power, are opposed to any punitive action. Granted, both are not completely happy with Iran for not accepting the proposal for abandoning uranium enrichment activities on its own soil and working in partnership with Russia in a Russian plant. Both of them, while accepting that Iran is within its treaty rights in demanding that it have the capability for producing fuel for its nuclear power plants, clearly wish that Iran would compromise on this point, defusing the crisis and, importantly, not forcing them into a confrontation with the US and the EU. That said, in the final analysis it is clear that neither China nor Russia, especially the former, will endorse or take part in any economic or security measures directed against Iran and they will, if necessary, veto any such measures should they come to a vote.
Of all the questions about the "Iranian nuclear crisis" surely the most basic one is why has the United States made it such a major issue? Secondarily, but surely even more puzzling is why has the European Union shown itself so willing to carry Bush administration water in what is by any measure a very dubious cause?
With regard to the US, a factor, ridiculous as it sounds, is desire to punish Iran for overthrowing the Shah and the taking of the embassy hostages twenty-eight years ago. More important is the underlying longterm policy of wanting direct control over the oil resources of the Middle East. This policy, despite the fact that there is little evidence of any inability of the US to access oil in the global market, is intensified by the growingly recognized fact that China and India are becoming ever more powerful competitors for the oil of the region. It is hard to take really seriously Washington claims that Iran-a country of 70 million people, industrially underdeveloped, with no modern record of military adventurism-represents a threat to either the US or its neighbors, with or without a nuclear capability. However, that is not the way the Bush administration, which interprets anything other than total subservience as a threat to US national interests, sees it.
As for the Europeans, it can be argued that, with the exception of the UK and Italy, having taken a principled but totally ineffectual stand against the US aggression in Iraq, they fear that if the US somehow does succeed in its goal of turning Iraq into a quasi-US colony and then is able somehow to subdue Iran, that they will be frozen out of Middle Eastern picture in the future. Perhaps their governing elites worry that failure to join in will mean they will no longer be taken seriously.
Certainly there has been not entirely unfounded speculation that Germany's new Chancellor, Angela Merkel, sees herself in the role of Margaret Thatcher to George Bush's Ronald Reagan. Certainly France's political leadership, shocked by the rejection of the EU constitution and uncertain about how to deal with its growing and restive Islamic immigrant population, has lost the confidence it showed when it opposed the Iraq invasion. Certainly also there can be no real belief in either Berlin or Paris that Iran, whether it enriches its own uranium or not, poses any "threat" to them now or in the foreseeable future.
What they must know, as the King of Jordan warned this week, is that any military attack on Iran, by either the US or Israel, will send the smouldering Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world up in flames, with tragic consequences for the planet. Even the establishment of a sanctions regimen against Iran for, essentially, the crime of insisting on its treaty rights, while Israel holds its several hundred nuclear weapons and the US, while blatantly announcing the modernization of its own nuclear bomb stocks and, in its just-issued strategic doctrine paper, announces that it will use nuclear weapons in any future conflicts when and how it wishes, is likely to have very negative results.
It is a good sign that the UK's foreign minister, Jack Straw, has recently very pointedly distanced himself and his country from Washington on the Iran strategy by saying that the use of military force to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue has been ruled out. Russia and China, as emphasized here, definitely oppose either sanctions or armed force. The rest of the EU, having shown solidarity to this point, appears ready to draw back. The United States, even as Iraq descends into civil war and where the Shiite majority of its population identifies with Iran, is increasingly isolated.
Will Washington, regardless of the weakness of its case and its limited international support, still press on? If it fails to carry the Security Council, as it probably will, will it then take unilateral military or economic action? Military action is madness; unilateral economic sanctions are basically cutting of the American nose to spite the American face.
The Iran nuclear issue. An unnecessary crisis, totally manufactured and fatuously pursued. Just one more Bush administration fiasco.
David MacMichael is a former CIA analyst and a member of the Steering Group of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity.
Torture and Task Force 121 :
The CIA Paramilitary are not considered as ‘part of the armed forces,’ are therefore exempt from the Geneva conventions,” i.e. not governed by the laws of war. “The Special Activities Staff (SAS) is one of the least known covert units operating on behalf of the US Government.”
http://indexresearch.blogspot.com/2006/03/...-force-121.html
The CIA Paramilitary are not considered as ‘part of the armed forces,’ are therefore exempt from the Geneva conventions,” i.e. not governed by the laws of war. “The Special Activities Staff (SAS) is one of the least known covert units operating on behalf of the US Government.”
http://indexresearch.blogspot.com/2006/03/...-force-121.html
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/032806Z.shtml
Fitzgerald Will Seek New White House Indictments
By Jason Leopold
t r u t h o u t | Report
Tuesday 28 March 2006
It may seem as though it's been moving along at a snail's pace, but the second part of the federal investigation into the leak of covert CIA agent Valerie Plame Wilson is nearly complete, with attorneys and government officials who have remained close to the probe saying that a grand jury will likely return an indictment against one or two senior Bush administration officials.
These sources work or worked at the State Department, the CIA and the National Security Council. Some of these sources are attorneys close to the case. They requested anonymity because they were not permitted to speak publicly about the details of the investigation.
In lengthy interviews over the weekend and on Monday, they said that Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald has started to prepare the paperwork to present to the grand jury seeking an indictment against White House Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove or National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley.
Although the situation remains fluid, it's possible, these sources said, that Fitzgerald may seek to indict both Rove and Hadley, charging them with perjury, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy related to their roles in the leak of Plame Wilson's identity and their effort to cover up their involvement following a Justice Department investigation.
The sources said late Monday that it may take more than a month before Fitzgerald presents the paperwork outlining the government's case against one or both of the officials and asks the grand jury to return an indictment, because he is currently juggling quite a few high-profile criminal cases and will need to carve out time to write up the indictment and prepare the evidence.
In addition to responding to discovery requests from Libby's defense team and appearing in court with his attorneys, who are trying to obtain additional evidence, such as top-secret documents, from Fitzgerald's probe, the special prosecutor is also prosecuting Lord Conrad Black, the newspaper magnate, has recently charged numerous individuals in a child pornography ring, and is wrestling with other lawsuits in his home city of Chicago.
Details about the latest stage of the investigation began to take shape a few weeks ago when the lead FBI investigator on the leak case, John C. Eckenrode, retired from the agency and indicated to several colleagues that the investigation is about to wrap up with indictments handed up by the grand jury against Rove or Hadley or both officials, the sources said.
The Philadelphia-based Eckenrode is finished with his work on the case; however, he is expected to testify as a witness for the prosecution next year against I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's former chief of staff who was indicted in October on five counts of perjury, obstruction of justice, and lying to investigators regarding his role in the leak.
Hadley and Rove remain under intense scrutiny, but sources said Fitzgerald has not yet decided whether to seek charges against one or both of them.
Libby and other officials in Cheney's office used the information they obtained about Plame Wilson to undermine the credibility of her husband, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson. Wilson was an outspoken critic of the Iraq war. He had alleged that President Bush misspoke when he said, in his January 2003 State of the Union address, that Iraq had tried to acquire yellow-cake uranium, the key component used to build a nuclear bomb, from Niger.
The uranium claim was the silver bullet in getting Congress to support military action two months later. To date, no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq, and the country barely had a functional weapons program, according to a report from the Iraq Survey Group.
Wilson had traveled to Niger more than a year earlier to investigate the yellow-cake claims and reported back to the CIA that intelligence reports saying Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger were false.
On Monday, though, attorneys close to the leak case confirmed that Fitzgerald had met with the grand jury half a dozen times since January and recently told the jurors that he planned to present them with the government's case against Rove or Hadley, which stems from an email Rove had sent to Hadley in July of 2003 indicating that he had a conversation about Plame Wilson with Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper.
Neither Hadley nor Rove disclosed the existence of the email when they were questioned by FBI investigators or when they testified before a grand jury, the sources said, adding that Rove testified he found out about Plame Wilson from reporters and Hadley testified that he recalled learning about Plame Wilson when her name was published in a newspaper column.
Rove testified before the grand jury four times. He did not disclose the existence of the email during the three previous times he testified, claiming he simply forgot about it because he was enmeshed with the 2004 Presidential election, traveling around the country attending fundraisers and meetings, working more than 15 hours a day on the campaign, and just forgot that he spoke with Cooper three months earlier, sources familiar with his testimony said.
But Rove and Libby had been the subject of dozens of news stories about the possibility that they played a role in the leak, and had faced dozens of questions as early as August 2003 - one month after Plame Wilson was outed - about whether they were the administration officials responsible for leaking her identity.
The story Rove and his attorney, Robert Luskin, provided to Fitzgerald in order to explain why Rove did not disclose the existence of the email is "less than satisfactory and entirely unconvincing to the special counsel," one of the attorneys close to the case said.
Luskin did not return numerous calls for comment. A spokeswoman for the National Security Council said she could not comment on an ongoing investigation and has vehemently denied that Hadley was involved in the leak "because Mr. Hadley told us he wasn't involved."
In December, Luskin made a desperate attempt to keep his client out of Fitzgerald's crosshairs.
Luskin had revealed to Fitzgerald that Viveca Novak - a reporter working for Time magazine who wrote several stories about the Plame Wilson case - inadvertently tipped him off in early 2004 that her colleague at the magazine, Matt Cooper, would be forced to testify that Rove was his source who told him about Plame Wilson's CIA status.
Novak - who bears no relation to syndicated columnist Robert Novak, the journalist who first published Plame Wilson's name and CIA status in a July 14, 2003, column - met Luskin in Washington DC in the summer of 2004, and over drinks, the two discussed Fitzgerald's investigation into the Plame Wilson leak.
Luskin had assured Novak that Rove learned Plame Wilson's name and CIA status after it was published in news accounts and that only then did he phone other journalists to draw their attention to it. But Novak told Luskin that everyone in the Time newsroom knew Rove was Cooper's source and that he would testify to that in an upcoming grand jury appearance, these sources said.
According to Luskin's account, after he met with Viveca Novak he contacted Rove and told him about his conversation with her. The two of them then began an exhaustive search through White House phone logs and emails for any evidence that proved that Rove had spoken with Cooper. Luskin said that during this search an email was found that Rove had sent to then-Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley immediately after Rove's conversation with Cooper, and it was subsequently turned over to Fitzgerald.
"I didn't take the bait," Rove wrote in the email to Hadley immediately following his conversation with Cooper on July 11, 2003. "Matt Cooper called to give me a heads-up that he's got a welfare reform story coming. When he finished his brief heads-up he immediately launched into Niger. Isn't this damaging? Hasn't the president been hurt? I didn't take the bait, but I said if I were him I wouldn't get Time far out in front on this."
Luskin wound up becoming a witness in the case and testified about his conversation with Viveca Novak that Luskin said would prove his client didn't knowingly lie to FBI investigators when he was questioned about the leak in October 2003, just three months after Rove told Cooper that Wilson's wife worked for the CIA.
The email Rove sent to Hadley, which Luskin said he found, helped Rove recall his conversation with Cooper a year earlier. Rove then returned to the grand jury to clarify his previous testimonies in which he did not disclose that he spoke with journalists.
Still, Rove's account of his conversation with Cooper went nothing like he had described in his email to Hadley, according to an email Cooper sent to his editor at Time magazine following his conversation with Rove in July 2003.
"It was, KR said, [former Ambassador Joseph] Wilson's wife, who apparently works at the agency on wmd [weapons of mass destruction] issues who authorized [Wilson's] trip," Cooper's July 11, 2003, email to his editor said. "Wilson's wife is Plame, then an undercover agent working as an analyst in the CIA's Directorate of Operations counterproliferation division. (Cooper later included the essence of what Rove told him in an online story.) The email characterizing the conversation continues: "not only the genesis of the trip is flawed an[d] suspect but so is the report. he [Rove] implied strongly there's still plenty to implicate iraqi interest in acquiring uranium fro[m] Niger... "
It is unclear whether Rove was misleading Hadley about his conversation with Cooper, perhaps, because White House officials told their staff not to engage reporters in any questions posed about Wilson's Niger claims.
But Fitzgerald's investigation has turned up additional evidence over the past few months that convinced him that Luskin's eleventh-hour revelation about the chain of events that led to the discovery of the email is not credible. Fitzgerald believes that Rove changed his story once it became clear that Cooper would be compelled to testify about the source - Rove - who revealed Plame Wilson's CIA status to him, sources close to the case said.
If any of the people named in this story believe they have been unfairly portrayed or that what was written in this story is untrue, they will have an opportunity to respond in this space.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Leopold spent two years covering California's electricity crisis as Los Angeles bureau chief of Dow Jones Newswires. Jason has spent the last year cultivating sources close to the CIA leak investigation, and is a regular contributor to t r u t h o u t.
Fitzgerald Will Seek New White House Indictments
By Jason Leopold
t r u t h o u t | Report
Tuesday 28 March 2006
It may seem as though it's been moving along at a snail's pace, but the second part of the federal investigation into the leak of covert CIA agent Valerie Plame Wilson is nearly complete, with attorneys and government officials who have remained close to the probe saying that a grand jury will likely return an indictment against one or two senior Bush administration officials.
These sources work or worked at the State Department, the CIA and the National Security Council. Some of these sources are attorneys close to the case. They requested anonymity because they were not permitted to speak publicly about the details of the investigation.
In lengthy interviews over the weekend and on Monday, they said that Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald has started to prepare the paperwork to present to the grand jury seeking an indictment against White House Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove or National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley.
Although the situation remains fluid, it's possible, these sources said, that Fitzgerald may seek to indict both Rove and Hadley, charging them with perjury, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy related to their roles in the leak of Plame Wilson's identity and their effort to cover up their involvement following a Justice Department investigation.
The sources said late Monday that it may take more than a month before Fitzgerald presents the paperwork outlining the government's case against one or both of the officials and asks the grand jury to return an indictment, because he is currently juggling quite a few high-profile criminal cases and will need to carve out time to write up the indictment and prepare the evidence.
In addition to responding to discovery requests from Libby's defense team and appearing in court with his attorneys, who are trying to obtain additional evidence, such as top-secret documents, from Fitzgerald's probe, the special prosecutor is also prosecuting Lord Conrad Black, the newspaper magnate, has recently charged numerous individuals in a child pornography ring, and is wrestling with other lawsuits in his home city of Chicago.
Details about the latest stage of the investigation began to take shape a few weeks ago when the lead FBI investigator on the leak case, John C. Eckenrode, retired from the agency and indicated to several colleagues that the investigation is about to wrap up with indictments handed up by the grand jury against Rove or Hadley or both officials, the sources said.
The Philadelphia-based Eckenrode is finished with his work on the case; however, he is expected to testify as a witness for the prosecution next year against I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney's former chief of staff who was indicted in October on five counts of perjury, obstruction of justice, and lying to investigators regarding his role in the leak.
Hadley and Rove remain under intense scrutiny, but sources said Fitzgerald has not yet decided whether to seek charges against one or both of them.
Libby and other officials in Cheney's office used the information they obtained about Plame Wilson to undermine the credibility of her husband, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson. Wilson was an outspoken critic of the Iraq war. He had alleged that President Bush misspoke when he said, in his January 2003 State of the Union address, that Iraq had tried to acquire yellow-cake uranium, the key component used to build a nuclear bomb, from Niger.
The uranium claim was the silver bullet in getting Congress to support military action two months later. To date, no weapons of mass destruction have been found in Iraq, and the country barely had a functional weapons program, according to a report from the Iraq Survey Group.
Wilson had traveled to Niger more than a year earlier to investigate the yellow-cake claims and reported back to the CIA that intelligence reports saying Iraq attempted to purchase uranium from Niger were false.
On Monday, though, attorneys close to the leak case confirmed that Fitzgerald had met with the grand jury half a dozen times since January and recently told the jurors that he planned to present them with the government's case against Rove or Hadley, which stems from an email Rove had sent to Hadley in July of 2003 indicating that he had a conversation about Plame Wilson with Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper.
Neither Hadley nor Rove disclosed the existence of the email when they were questioned by FBI investigators or when they testified before a grand jury, the sources said, adding that Rove testified he found out about Plame Wilson from reporters and Hadley testified that he recalled learning about Plame Wilson when her name was published in a newspaper column.
Rove testified before the grand jury four times. He did not disclose the existence of the email during the three previous times he testified, claiming he simply forgot about it because he was enmeshed with the 2004 Presidential election, traveling around the country attending fundraisers and meetings, working more than 15 hours a day on the campaign, and just forgot that he spoke with Cooper three months earlier, sources familiar with his testimony said.
But Rove and Libby had been the subject of dozens of news stories about the possibility that they played a role in the leak, and had faced dozens of questions as early as August 2003 - one month after Plame Wilson was outed - about whether they were the administration officials responsible for leaking her identity.
The story Rove and his attorney, Robert Luskin, provided to Fitzgerald in order to explain why Rove did not disclose the existence of the email is "less than satisfactory and entirely unconvincing to the special counsel," one of the attorneys close to the case said.
Luskin did not return numerous calls for comment. A spokeswoman for the National Security Council said she could not comment on an ongoing investigation and has vehemently denied that Hadley was involved in the leak "because Mr. Hadley told us he wasn't involved."
In December, Luskin made a desperate attempt to keep his client out of Fitzgerald's crosshairs.
Luskin had revealed to Fitzgerald that Viveca Novak - a reporter working for Time magazine who wrote several stories about the Plame Wilson case - inadvertently tipped him off in early 2004 that her colleague at the magazine, Matt Cooper, would be forced to testify that Rove was his source who told him about Plame Wilson's CIA status.
Novak - who bears no relation to syndicated columnist Robert Novak, the journalist who first published Plame Wilson's name and CIA status in a July 14, 2003, column - met Luskin in Washington DC in the summer of 2004, and over drinks, the two discussed Fitzgerald's investigation into the Plame Wilson leak.
Luskin had assured Novak that Rove learned Plame Wilson's name and CIA status after it was published in news accounts and that only then did he phone other journalists to draw their attention to it. But Novak told Luskin that everyone in the Time newsroom knew Rove was Cooper's source and that he would testify to that in an upcoming grand jury appearance, these sources said.
According to Luskin's account, after he met with Viveca Novak he contacted Rove and told him about his conversation with her. The two of them then began an exhaustive search through White House phone logs and emails for any evidence that proved that Rove had spoken with Cooper. Luskin said that during this search an email was found that Rove had sent to then-Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley immediately after Rove's conversation with Cooper, and it was subsequently turned over to Fitzgerald.
"I didn't take the bait," Rove wrote in the email to Hadley immediately following his conversation with Cooper on July 11, 2003. "Matt Cooper called to give me a heads-up that he's got a welfare reform story coming. When he finished his brief heads-up he immediately launched into Niger. Isn't this damaging? Hasn't the president been hurt? I didn't take the bait, but I said if I were him I wouldn't get Time far out in front on this."
Luskin wound up becoming a witness in the case and testified about his conversation with Viveca Novak that Luskin said would prove his client didn't knowingly lie to FBI investigators when he was questioned about the leak in October 2003, just three months after Rove told Cooper that Wilson's wife worked for the CIA.
The email Rove sent to Hadley, which Luskin said he found, helped Rove recall his conversation with Cooper a year earlier. Rove then returned to the grand jury to clarify his previous testimonies in which he did not disclose that he spoke with journalists.
Still, Rove's account of his conversation with Cooper went nothing like he had described in his email to Hadley, according to an email Cooper sent to his editor at Time magazine following his conversation with Rove in July 2003.
"It was, KR said, [former Ambassador Joseph] Wilson's wife, who apparently works at the agency on wmd [weapons of mass destruction] issues who authorized [Wilson's] trip," Cooper's July 11, 2003, email to his editor said. "Wilson's wife is Plame, then an undercover agent working as an analyst in the CIA's Directorate of Operations counterproliferation division. (Cooper later included the essence of what Rove told him in an online story.) The email characterizing the conversation continues: "not only the genesis of the trip is flawed an[d] suspect but so is the report. he [Rove] implied strongly there's still plenty to implicate iraqi interest in acquiring uranium fro[m] Niger... "
It is unclear whether Rove was misleading Hadley about his conversation with Cooper, perhaps, because White House officials told their staff not to engage reporters in any questions posed about Wilson's Niger claims.
But Fitzgerald's investigation has turned up additional evidence over the past few months that convinced him that Luskin's eleventh-hour revelation about the chain of events that led to the discovery of the email is not credible. Fitzgerald believes that Rove changed his story once it became clear that Cooper would be compelled to testify about the source - Rove - who revealed Plame Wilson's CIA status to him, sources close to the case said.
If any of the people named in this story believe they have been unfairly portrayed or that what was written in this story is untrue, they will have an opportunity to respond in this space.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Leopold spent two years covering California's electricity crisis as Los Angeles bureau chief of Dow Jones Newswires. Jason has spent the last year cultivating sources close to the CIA leak investigation, and is a regular contributor to t r u t h o u t.
http://www.rawstory.com/news/2006/Roves_co...quiry_0327.html
Rove said cooperating in CIA leak inquiry
Larisa Alexandrovna
Published: Monday March 27, 2006
Karl Rove, Deputy White House Chief of Staff and special adviser to President George W. Bush, has recently been providing information to special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald in the ongoing CIA leak investigation, sources close to the investigation say.
According to several Pentagon sources close to Rove and others familiar with the inquiry, Bush's senior adviser tipped off Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald to information that led to the recent "discovery" of 250 pages of missing email from the office of Vice President Dick Cheney.
Rove has been in the crosshairs of Fitzgerald's investigation into the outing of covert CIA officer Valerie Plame Wilson for what some believe to be retaliation against her husband, former U.S. Ambassador to Gabon, Joseph Wilson. Wilson had been an ardent critic of pre-war Iraq intelligence.
While these sources did not provide any details regarding what type of arrangements Rove's attorney Robert Luskin may have made with the special prosecutor's office, if any, they were able to provide some information regarding what Rove imparted to Fitzgerald's team. The individuals declined to go on the record out of concern for their jobs.
According to one source close to the case, Rove is providing information on deleted emails, erased hard drives and other types of obstruction by staff and other officials in the Vice President's office. Pentagon sources close to Rove confirmed this account.
None would name the staffers and/or officials whom Rove is providing information about. They did, however, explain that the White House computer system has "real time backup" servers and that while emails were deleted from computers, they were still retrievable from the backup system. By providing the dates and recipient information of the deleted emails, sources say, Rove was able to chart a path for Fitzgerald directly into the office of the Vice President.
In a comment to RAW STORY late Sunday evening, Robert Luskin denied any deal between Rove and Fitzgerald's office.
"Mr. Rove has cooperated fully with Mr. Fitzgerald's investigation," Rove's attorney said. "We have not and will not comment on the nature or substance of any communications with the office of the special counsel."
"That said, there is no basis whatsoever to the matters you allege that Mr. Rove has related," Luskin added.
One senior White House official is already under indictment in the leak case. Cheney's former chief of staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby was indicted on five counts of obstruction and false statements to investigators in October of last year.
Rove eluded indictment late last fall after his lawyer said he recalled a conversation with Time reporter Viveca Novak that he alleged would vindicate his client. Sources say that while the defense was able to parlay Luskin's revelation into postponing Rove's indictment, ultimately a deal would likely have to be cut.
The sources did not say a deal had been reached, but did assert that Rove pointed Fitzgerald to Cheney's office for the missing emails.
Asked about allegations that Rove is providing Fitzgerald's office with key information and if his status had changed as a result, Luskin provided a vehement denial.
"Your story is false and utterly without foundation," he said. "There has never been any discussion of any deal of any kind involving Mr. Rove. His cooperation has at all times been voluntary and unconditional."
One of the sources close to the investigation said he was not surprised by Luskin's response.
"That would be difficult for Rove to admit," the source said. "I think Rove is now considered a special cooperating witness."
The White House was ordered to turn over all emails by then-White House Counsel and current Attorney General Alberto Gonzales in 2003, after the Administration received word the Justice Department had launched an investigation into the CIA outing. According to newspaper reports, Gonzales waited twelve hours to inform White House staff after he had received an order from the Justice Department to surrender materials relating to the case.
In a January letter to Libby's defense team, Fitzgerald expressed concern that some emails might be missing.
"Some e-mails might be missing because the White House's archiving system had failed," he said.
Sources say that the missing emails, which surfaced only a month later were not really "missing." Rather, they had been deleted by White House staff. Fitzgerald may have been aware of this at the time of his January letter when he cited the missing emails.
Fitzgerald's spokesman, Randall Samborn, was unavailable for comment Monday.
A White House divided
Sources say the rift between Rove and the Vice President's office crystallized when Rove quietly attempted to gauge the temperature for replacing Cheney on the 2004 Presidential ballot last year.
"Rove was the source of 'feelers' put out before the last presidential election in which he was suggesting that Cheney could be replaced on the ticket with someone who had better poll ratings," said one of the former experts approached who wished to remain anonymous.
"White House polls were showing that Cheney was a drag on the reelection ticket and that the Iraq war issue might be responsible for about a three percent drop, with Cheney the principal object of voter hostility in this percentage of anti-war sentiment among the general public," the source added.
Cheney, the source said, got wind of "Rove's political soundings" and the already tense relationship between the Bush and Cheney camps became almost impossible.
Whether or not Rove's recent cooperation will spare him an indictment and a Fitzgerald probe remains unclear. But according to last week's New York Times, associates say Rove is "increasingly certain" he will not be indicted in the case.
Rove said cooperating in CIA leak inquiry
Larisa Alexandrovna
Published: Monday March 27, 2006
Karl Rove, Deputy White House Chief of Staff and special adviser to President George W. Bush, has recently been providing information to special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald in the ongoing CIA leak investigation, sources close to the investigation say.
According to several Pentagon sources close to Rove and others familiar with the inquiry, Bush's senior adviser tipped off Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald to information that led to the recent "discovery" of 250 pages of missing email from the office of Vice President Dick Cheney.
Rove has been in the crosshairs of Fitzgerald's investigation into the outing of covert CIA officer Valerie Plame Wilson for what some believe to be retaliation against her husband, former U.S. Ambassador to Gabon, Joseph Wilson. Wilson had been an ardent critic of pre-war Iraq intelligence.
While these sources did not provide any details regarding what type of arrangements Rove's attorney Robert Luskin may have made with the special prosecutor's office, if any, they were able to provide some information regarding what Rove imparted to Fitzgerald's team. The individuals declined to go on the record out of concern for their jobs.
According to one source close to the case, Rove is providing information on deleted emails, erased hard drives and other types of obstruction by staff and other officials in the Vice President's office. Pentagon sources close to Rove confirmed this account.
None would name the staffers and/or officials whom Rove is providing information about. They did, however, explain that the White House computer system has "real time backup" servers and that while emails were deleted from computers, they were still retrievable from the backup system. By providing the dates and recipient information of the deleted emails, sources say, Rove was able to chart a path for Fitzgerald directly into the office of the Vice President.
In a comment to RAW STORY late Sunday evening, Robert Luskin denied any deal between Rove and Fitzgerald's office.
"Mr. Rove has cooperated fully with Mr. Fitzgerald's investigation," Rove's attorney said. "We have not and will not comment on the nature or substance of any communications with the office of the special counsel."
"That said, there is no basis whatsoever to the matters you allege that Mr. Rove has related," Luskin added.
One senior White House official is already under indictment in the leak case. Cheney's former chief of staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby was indicted on five counts of obstruction and false statements to investigators in October of last year.
Rove eluded indictment late last fall after his lawyer said he recalled a conversation with Time reporter Viveca Novak that he alleged would vindicate his client. Sources say that while the defense was able to parlay Luskin's revelation into postponing Rove's indictment, ultimately a deal would likely have to be cut.
The sources did not say a deal had been reached, but did assert that Rove pointed Fitzgerald to Cheney's office for the missing emails.
Asked about allegations that Rove is providing Fitzgerald's office with key information and if his status had changed as a result, Luskin provided a vehement denial.
"Your story is false and utterly without foundation," he said. "There has never been any discussion of any deal of any kind involving Mr. Rove. His cooperation has at all times been voluntary and unconditional."
One of the sources close to the investigation said he was not surprised by Luskin's response.
"That would be difficult for Rove to admit," the source said. "I think Rove is now considered a special cooperating witness."
The White House was ordered to turn over all emails by then-White House Counsel and current Attorney General Alberto Gonzales in 2003, after the Administration received word the Justice Department had launched an investigation into the CIA outing. According to newspaper reports, Gonzales waited twelve hours to inform White House staff after he had received an order from the Justice Department to surrender materials relating to the case.
In a January letter to Libby's defense team, Fitzgerald expressed concern that some emails might be missing.
"Some e-mails might be missing because the White House's archiving system had failed," he said.
Sources say that the missing emails, which surfaced only a month later were not really "missing." Rather, they had been deleted by White House staff. Fitzgerald may have been aware of this at the time of his January letter when he cited the missing emails.
Fitzgerald's spokesman, Randall Samborn, was unavailable for comment Monday.
A White House divided
Sources say the rift between Rove and the Vice President's office crystallized when Rove quietly attempted to gauge the temperature for replacing Cheney on the 2004 Presidential ballot last year.
"Rove was the source of 'feelers' put out before the last presidential election in which he was suggesting that Cheney could be replaced on the ticket with someone who had better poll ratings," said one of the former experts approached who wished to remain anonymous.
"White House polls were showing that Cheney was a drag on the reelection ticket and that the Iraq war issue might be responsible for about a three percent drop, with Cheney the principal object of voter hostility in this percentage of anti-war sentiment among the general public," the source added.
Cheney, the source said, got wind of "Rove's political soundings" and the already tense relationship between the Bush and Cheney camps became almost impossible.
Whether or not Rove's recent cooperation will spare him an indictment and a Fitzgerald probe remains unclear. But according to last week's New York Times, associates say Rove is "increasingly certain" he will not be indicted in the case.
http://upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/view.php?...28-120147-7881r
UPI Intelligence Watch
By JOHN C.K. DALY
UPI International Correspondent
WASHINGTON, March 28 (UPI) -- Amid rising tensions between Israel and the newly elected Hamas-led Palestinian government, Hamas has warned Israel against any provocative actions against the al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem.
Alarab Online reported on Monday that Hamas issued a statement in which an an official accused Israel of wanting to "divide" the al-Aqsa Mosque. The official called on Palestinians to gather at the mosque courtyards to thwart the purported Israeli intentions.
The Hamas statement stressed that protecting Islamic religious sites was both a religious and national duty of the Palestinian people.
Alarab Online reported the Hamas statement was a response to media comments by several extremists declaring they intended to attack the al-Aqsa Mosque the day before the Israeli legislative elections scheduled for Tuesday.
Hamas urged Arab leaders at the Khartoum Summit, also scheduled for Tuesday, and the leaders of the Organization of Islamic Conference to assume their responsibilities towards the mosque, which is the third holiest site in Islam, and protect it against attack.
-0-
n April the Pakistani Navy will assume command of multinational U.S.-led Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan Task Force-150,patrolling in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.
Pakiistan will be the first non-NATO country to take over the command. Pakistani Rear Adm. Shahid Iqbal will command Task Force-150. Iqbal will lead the force for one year from the Naval Central Command headquartered in Bahrain.
The squadron was created in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to interdict terrorists and arms and human smuggling in the northern Arabian Sea south of the Strait of Hormuz.
The Pakistani navy has been an active participant in Task Force-150 since April 2004, when it announced its participation under a United Nations resolution. When Naval Staff chief Adm. Shahid Karimullah announced that Pakistan would join the anti-terrorist efforts he explicitly stated that Pakistan's navy would not participate in any blockade by the coalition against any regional country and that only the Pakistani navy would be allowed to conduct interdiction operations within Pakistan's territorial waters.
At the time the Pakistani navy had already participated in U.N.-led peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Sierra Leone and East Timor.
The task force is the maritime component of "Operation Enduring Freedom," the U.S.-led coalition launched in November 2001 against Taliban and al-Qaida. It operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea and off Horn of Africa in the Indian Ocean.
The Pakistani navy's Babur frigate has been conducting joint operations with the USS The Sullivans destroyer and the French FS Surcouf frigate in the Gulf of Oman.
Other Task Force members include Britain, France, Australia, Italy, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain.
-0-
Turkey since March 2003 has pressured the Bush administration to deal decisively with the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK. Ankara maintains that the PKK is a terrorist organization. The PKK has also been blacklisted as a terrorist group by the United States and the European Union.
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 Turkey has repeatedly asked the Bush administration to move against PKK guerrillas operating from northern Iraq.
Hurriyet reported Tuesday the new Turkish ambassador to Washington, Nabi Sensoy, received a lengthy and detailed response to his formal letter of introduction, which he had presented to U.S. President George W. Bush at a ceremony on March 13. In the letter Bush promised to assist Turkey in its struggle against the PKK.
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace delivered a different message about U.S. forces in Iraq moving against PKK elements in the north of the country. Pace attended the two-day Global Terrorism and International Cooperation symposium in Ankara. During an interview with the NTV news channel Pace said, "Any kind of attack against the PKK inside northern Iraq will have to wait until we are able to get the security situation throughout Iraq to a level at which the Iraqi government can function. We should understand that the best way to deal with the PKK is from a position of strength. Your country is strong ... We need to strengthen Iraq so it too can deal with (the PKK) from a position of strength."
Ankara has been frustrated by Washington's reluctance to act against PKK, which fled to northern Iraq from Turkey after declaring a unilateral ceasefire in 1999 following the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.
In June 2004 the PKK unilaterally called off its truce and its militants began infiltrating back into southeastern Turkey, where the level of violence began again to rise.
Given the difficulties of its occupation of Iraq the Bush administration has been wary of committing itself to direct military confrontation with the PKK, arguing instead for crippling the group by undercutting it's financial resources.
-0-
The Pakistani army had deployed more than 70,000 troops into the country's troubled North West Frontier Province in a bid to quash Taliban and al-Qaida militants sheltering there.
Authorities are stepping up railway security after a number of incidents occurred targeting the province's track lines. Dawn reported on March 25 that railway officials have enhanced security along a 44-mile-long section of railway track which includes the Attock bridge over the Indus river, which links Punjab with the NWFP.
Pakistan Railway management has developed a security plan to prevent terrorism, dividing the strategic line into seven-mile sections, each with its own police patrol. Pakistan Railway personnel will also carry out random inspections of the track.
The increased security measures follow the March 25 discovery of uprooted fishplates on the Attock-Sanjwal rail track shortly before the Peshawar-bound 13-UP Awam express train was scheduled to pass. Pakistan Railway patrolling staff detected the fault and informed the authorities concerned, preventing an accident.
UPI Intelligence Watch
By JOHN C.K. DALY
UPI International Correspondent
WASHINGTON, March 28 (UPI) -- Amid rising tensions between Israel and the newly elected Hamas-led Palestinian government, Hamas has warned Israel against any provocative actions against the al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem.
Alarab Online reported on Monday that Hamas issued a statement in which an an official accused Israel of wanting to "divide" the al-Aqsa Mosque. The official called on Palestinians to gather at the mosque courtyards to thwart the purported Israeli intentions.
The Hamas statement stressed that protecting Islamic religious sites was both a religious and national duty of the Palestinian people.
Alarab Online reported the Hamas statement was a response to media comments by several extremists declaring they intended to attack the al-Aqsa Mosque the day before the Israeli legislative elections scheduled for Tuesday.
Hamas urged Arab leaders at the Khartoum Summit, also scheduled for Tuesday, and the leaders of the Organization of Islamic Conference to assume their responsibilities towards the mosque, which is the third holiest site in Islam, and protect it against attack.
-0-
n April the Pakistani Navy will assume command of multinational U.S.-led Coalition Maritime Campaign Plan Task Force-150,patrolling in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.
Pakiistan will be the first non-NATO country to take over the command. Pakistani Rear Adm. Shahid Iqbal will command Task Force-150. Iqbal will lead the force for one year from the Naval Central Command headquartered in Bahrain.
The squadron was created in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to interdict terrorists and arms and human smuggling in the northern Arabian Sea south of the Strait of Hormuz.
The Pakistani navy has been an active participant in Task Force-150 since April 2004, when it announced its participation under a United Nations resolution. When Naval Staff chief Adm. Shahid Karimullah announced that Pakistan would join the anti-terrorist efforts he explicitly stated that Pakistan's navy would not participate in any blockade by the coalition against any regional country and that only the Pakistani navy would be allowed to conduct interdiction operations within Pakistan's territorial waters.
At the time the Pakistani navy had already participated in U.N.-led peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Sierra Leone and East Timor.
The task force is the maritime component of "Operation Enduring Freedom," the U.S.-led coalition launched in November 2001 against Taliban and al-Qaida. It operates in the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea and off Horn of Africa in the Indian Ocean.
The Pakistani navy's Babur frigate has been conducting joint operations with the USS The Sullivans destroyer and the French FS Surcouf frigate in the Gulf of Oman.
Other Task Force members include Britain, France, Australia, Italy, Japan, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain.
-0-
Turkey since March 2003 has pressured the Bush administration to deal decisively with the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK. Ankara maintains that the PKK is a terrorist organization. The PKK has also been blacklisted as a terrorist group by the United States and the European Union.
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 Turkey has repeatedly asked the Bush administration to move against PKK guerrillas operating from northern Iraq.
Hurriyet reported Tuesday the new Turkish ambassador to Washington, Nabi Sensoy, received a lengthy and detailed response to his formal letter of introduction, which he had presented to U.S. President George W. Bush at a ceremony on March 13. In the letter Bush promised to assist Turkey in its struggle against the PKK.
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace delivered a different message about U.S. forces in Iraq moving against PKK elements in the north of the country. Pace attended the two-day Global Terrorism and International Cooperation symposium in Ankara. During an interview with the NTV news channel Pace said, "Any kind of attack against the PKK inside northern Iraq will have to wait until we are able to get the security situation throughout Iraq to a level at which the Iraqi government can function. We should understand that the best way to deal with the PKK is from a position of strength. Your country is strong ... We need to strengthen Iraq so it too can deal with (the PKK) from a position of strength."
Ankara has been frustrated by Washington's reluctance to act against PKK, which fled to northern Iraq from Turkey after declaring a unilateral ceasefire in 1999 following the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan.
In June 2004 the PKK unilaterally called off its truce and its militants began infiltrating back into southeastern Turkey, where the level of violence began again to rise.
Given the difficulties of its occupation of Iraq the Bush administration has been wary of committing itself to direct military confrontation with the PKK, arguing instead for crippling the group by undercutting it's financial resources.
-0-
The Pakistani army had deployed more than 70,000 troops into the country's troubled North West Frontier Province in a bid to quash Taliban and al-Qaida militants sheltering there.
Authorities are stepping up railway security after a number of incidents occurred targeting the province's track lines. Dawn reported on March 25 that railway officials have enhanced security along a 44-mile-long section of railway track which includes the Attock bridge over the Indus river, which links Punjab with the NWFP.
Pakistan Railway management has developed a security plan to prevent terrorism, dividing the strategic line into seven-mile sections, each with its own police patrol. Pakistan Railway personnel will also carry out random inspections of the track.
The increased security measures follow the March 25 discovery of uprooted fishplates on the Attock-Sanjwal rail track shortly before the Peshawar-bound 13-UP Awam express train was scheduled to pass. Pakistan Railway patrolling staff detected the fault and informed the authorities concerned, preventing an accident.
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/2004...35041-4967r.htm
July 29, 2004
Embarassed Rumsfeld fired CIA official
By Richard Sale
UPI Intelligence Correspondent
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld played a key role in the 2002 firing of the
CIA's chief of counter-terrorism after a Washington Post story appeared exposing Pentagon military blunders that allowed al-Qaida mastermind Osama bin Laden to escape from Afghanistan in December 2001, according to six serving and former U.S. intelligence officials.
Cofer Black, then chief of the agency's counter-terrorism effort, seething with dissatisfaction was determined to go public, former very senior CIA officials said.
Black was described as "very aggressive, very knowledgeable," on the subject of bin Laden and his mode of operation, these sources said.
According to an account by the Washington Post's assistant managing editor, Bob Woodward, in his book "Bush at War," Black became a star briefer for the Bush Cabinet after the 9/11 attacks. By 9:30 a.m., Thursday, Sept. 13, Tenet, Bush and the National Security Council were meeting in the Situation Room in the White House in the southwest corner of the West Wing, just one floor below the chief of staff's office.
Black, the agency's counter-terrorism chief, accompanied Tenet.
A former colleague said of Black: "He was like a boxer. His manner was
always very aggressive, always straight to the point, no nonsense."
Black's gift was his ability to see into the heart of matters, and he had little patience with those who could not see as clearly or as quickly as he did, former colleagues said. He was one of the few in the room who knew his facts on bin Laden.
According to information first published by Steve Coll in "Ghost Wars," but
confirmed for United Press International by U.S. intelligence officials, in 1994 bin Laden had been in Khartoum, the dusty capital of Sudan, and so had Black, working in a position that disguised his CIA affiliation. According to Coll's account, bin Laden was living in a three-story compound.
Soon the CIA in Khartoum knew bin Laden had terrorist training camps in
northern Sudan and that he was getting cooperation and weapons from the Sudanese intelligence service. They also knew he was developing a multinational army, U.S. officials said.
But then U.S. officials discovered bin Laden planned to kill Black. CIA
watchers noticed that Black was trailed as he went to and from the American Embassy each day. Near the embassy, CIA analysts saw bin Laden operatives were setting up a "kill zone" -- an area where firing coming from different quarters converges and traps a subject in many streams of bullets.
The CIA watchers were able to stealthily work in to be able to
observe Black's supposed killers practice parts of their operation on a quiet
city side street, according to Coll's account.
Only after CIA operatives leveled loaded shotguns in the faces of Arabs
trailing Black, and Black officially complained to the Sudanese government, did all bin Laden activity against Black suddenly ceased, according to Coll and other sources.
When Tenet finished his briefing, it was Black's turn. According to Woodward's account, which has been confirmed for UPI by several sources, Black got up to make a power-point presentation, and when he finished, Black looked up at the president and said: "When we're through with (al-Qaida), they will have flies walking across their eyeballs."
On Oct. 7, military operations began against the Taliban. By late November,
the Taliban were defeated and a new Afghan President Harmid Karzai
was installed. But in the last days of November, intelligence from all sources, including National Security Agency intercepts, indicated clearly that the Taliban and al-Qaida were massing near the Tora Bora cave complex close to Pakistan's border about 25 miles southwest of Jalalabad way to the south, sources told UPI.
Americans were flooded with reports that bin Laden was present, including an eyewitness report of seeing a man "well over 6 feet tall." Bin Laden is 6 feet 5 inches, said U.S. intelligence officials.
Then abruptly there was a breakthrough on the battlefield.
U.S. intelligence officials told UPI that cell phone intercepts had identified bin Laden's voice. He had taken personal command of the battle that included between 1,000 and 2,000 of the dregs of al-Qaida and the Taliban forces. Disagreements had broken out between Taliban leader Mullah Omar and bin Laden about the conduct of the battle. Amazed, National Security Agency analysts listened to the squabbling, U.S. government officials said.
U.S. intelligence officials felt it was only a matter of time before the
ring closed tight on bin Laden, several U.S. intelligence officials said.
But, amazingly, the U.S. response was slow and inadequate. Instead of
quickly piling in crack troops, the U.S. military at first allowed the Pashtuns, many purchased by U.S. intelligence, to fill the front ranks and do the main fighting.
This move was partly political, an effort to reduce American casualties, but only when U.S. military leadership saw this was fizzling into flat failure, did they try a classic encirclement and frontal assault. It was too little too late, U.S. officials said.
According to these sources, bin Laden escaped on Dec. 16 into Pakistan.
Shocked indignation swept through itself on many inside the intelligence
community, several sources said.
But by studying intercepted communications, after-action reports and
interrogations, administration officials declared that bin Laden had been there but had slipped away, former CIA officials said. They branded it a "significant defeat" for the United States, in the words of one.
Many of the local Pashtun groups who have been showered with so much
American money, simply cynically pocketed it and vanished into the void, serving and former CIA officials said.
According to these sources, the mood of Black when he heard the news was one of wrath. When the dimensions of the blunder began to emerge, Rumsfeld,
never one to validate a criticism, said in the spring of 2002 that he "had
not seen enough "solid evidence" that bin Laden escaped to believe the story.
But information first revealed in the Christian Science Monitor and
confirmed for UPI by several serving U.S. intelligence officials said that bin Laden appeared in Tora Bora before followers on at least two occasions, complete with 15 bodyguards.
UPI's calls to Rumsfeld's chief of staff and other Pentagon officials were not returned.
Black, always a man tempted to say more than he should, spoke on deep
background to two reporters at the Washington Post. On April 17 there appeared a story on the defeat at Tora Bora, bitterly critical of bin Laden's escape. The opening paragraph said it "was the gravest error in the war against al-Qaida."
"The problem with Cofer was that he talked about it afterwards," said former
CIA counter-terrorism chief Vince Cannistraro.
Perhaps Black thought his career and outstanding talents made him invulnerable. Black had served six foreign tours in field management positions at the agency, a career of 28 years.
But on May 17, the Washington Post printed a bland notice on one of its back
pages: "In other developments yesterday, CIA officials said Cofer Black,
head of the agency's Counter-terrorism Division for the last three years, has
been assigned to another position."
A CIA spokesman described the move as "part of the normal turnover of the agency."
The announcement was bland, harmless, routine and utterly false, several
serving and former U.S. intelligence officials claimed.
A shocked former senior CIA official called up this reporter in a mood of
grim and furious outrage: "Black was fired. He was kicked out," he said.
Someone should have stood up to Rumsfeld," said former senior CIA analyst
Stanley Bedlington.
Not only was Black fired, but he was barred from entering CIA headquarters.
"That's standard procedure if you've been fired," former CIA Iraq analyst
Judith Yaphe told UPI.
Humiliated, Black was restricted to an agency satellite location at Tyson's
Corner, which separated him from old, trusted colleagues and the comfort of
familiar surroundings.
Rumsfeld may not have been able to destroy Osama bin Laden, but he had managed to derail the CIA career of Cofer Black.
July 29, 2004
Embarassed Rumsfeld fired CIA official
By Richard Sale
UPI Intelligence Correspondent
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld played a key role in the 2002 firing of the
CIA's chief of counter-terrorism after a Washington Post story appeared exposing Pentagon military blunders that allowed al-Qaida mastermind Osama bin Laden to escape from Afghanistan in December 2001, according to six serving and former U.S. intelligence officials.
Cofer Black, then chief of the agency's counter-terrorism effort, seething with dissatisfaction was determined to go public, former very senior CIA officials said.
Black was described as "very aggressive, very knowledgeable," on the subject of bin Laden and his mode of operation, these sources said.
According to an account by the Washington Post's assistant managing editor, Bob Woodward, in his book "Bush at War," Black became a star briefer for the Bush Cabinet after the 9/11 attacks. By 9:30 a.m., Thursday, Sept. 13, Tenet, Bush and the National Security Council were meeting in the Situation Room in the White House in the southwest corner of the West Wing, just one floor below the chief of staff's office.
Black, the agency's counter-terrorism chief, accompanied Tenet.
A former colleague said of Black: "He was like a boxer. His manner was
always very aggressive, always straight to the point, no nonsense."
Black's gift was his ability to see into the heart of matters, and he had little patience with those who could not see as clearly or as quickly as he did, former colleagues said. He was one of the few in the room who knew his facts on bin Laden.
According to information first published by Steve Coll in "Ghost Wars," but
confirmed for United Press International by U.S. intelligence officials, in 1994 bin Laden had been in Khartoum, the dusty capital of Sudan, and so had Black, working in a position that disguised his CIA affiliation. According to Coll's account, bin Laden was living in a three-story compound.
Soon the CIA in Khartoum knew bin Laden had terrorist training camps in
northern Sudan and that he was getting cooperation and weapons from the Sudanese intelligence service. They also knew he was developing a multinational army, U.S. officials said.
But then U.S. officials discovered bin Laden planned to kill Black. CIA
watchers noticed that Black was trailed as he went to and from the American Embassy each day. Near the embassy, CIA analysts saw bin Laden operatives were setting up a "kill zone" -- an area where firing coming from different quarters converges and traps a subject in many streams of bullets.
The CIA watchers were able to stealthily work in to be able to
observe Black's supposed killers practice parts of their operation on a quiet
city side street, according to Coll's account.
Only after CIA operatives leveled loaded shotguns in the faces of Arabs
trailing Black, and Black officially complained to the Sudanese government, did all bin Laden activity against Black suddenly ceased, according to Coll and other sources.
When Tenet finished his briefing, it was Black's turn. According to Woodward's account, which has been confirmed for UPI by several sources, Black got up to make a power-point presentation, and when he finished, Black looked up at the president and said: "When we're through with (al-Qaida), they will have flies walking across their eyeballs."
On Oct. 7, military operations began against the Taliban. By late November,
the Taliban were defeated and a new Afghan President Harmid Karzai
was installed. But in the last days of November, intelligence from all sources, including National Security Agency intercepts, indicated clearly that the Taliban and al-Qaida were massing near the Tora Bora cave complex close to Pakistan's border about 25 miles southwest of Jalalabad way to the south, sources told UPI.
Americans were flooded with reports that bin Laden was present, including an eyewitness report of seeing a man "well over 6 feet tall." Bin Laden is 6 feet 5 inches, said U.S. intelligence officials.
Then abruptly there was a breakthrough on the battlefield.
U.S. intelligence officials told UPI that cell phone intercepts had identified bin Laden's voice. He had taken personal command of the battle that included between 1,000 and 2,000 of the dregs of al-Qaida and the Taliban forces. Disagreements had broken out between Taliban leader Mullah Omar and bin Laden about the conduct of the battle. Amazed, National Security Agency analysts listened to the squabbling, U.S. government officials said.
U.S. intelligence officials felt it was only a matter of time before the
ring closed tight on bin Laden, several U.S. intelligence officials said.
But, amazingly, the U.S. response was slow and inadequate. Instead of
quickly piling in crack troops, the U.S. military at first allowed the Pashtuns, many purchased by U.S. intelligence, to fill the front ranks and do the main fighting.
This move was partly political, an effort to reduce American casualties, but only when U.S. military leadership saw this was fizzling into flat failure, did they try a classic encirclement and frontal assault. It was too little too late, U.S. officials said.
According to these sources, bin Laden escaped on Dec. 16 into Pakistan.
Shocked indignation swept through itself on many inside the intelligence
community, several sources said.
But by studying intercepted communications, after-action reports and
interrogations, administration officials declared that bin Laden had been there but had slipped away, former CIA officials said. They branded it a "significant defeat" for the United States, in the words of one.
Many of the local Pashtun groups who have been showered with so much
American money, simply cynically pocketed it and vanished into the void, serving and former CIA officials said.
According to these sources, the mood of Black when he heard the news was one of wrath. When the dimensions of the blunder began to emerge, Rumsfeld,
never one to validate a criticism, said in the spring of 2002 that he "had
not seen enough "solid evidence" that bin Laden escaped to believe the story.
But information first revealed in the Christian Science Monitor and
confirmed for UPI by several serving U.S. intelligence officials said that bin Laden appeared in Tora Bora before followers on at least two occasions, complete with 15 bodyguards.
UPI's calls to Rumsfeld's chief of staff and other Pentagon officials were not returned.
Black, always a man tempted to say more than he should, spoke on deep
background to two reporters at the Washington Post. On April 17 there appeared a story on the defeat at Tora Bora, bitterly critical of bin Laden's escape. The opening paragraph said it "was the gravest error in the war against al-Qaida."
"The problem with Cofer was that he talked about it afterwards," said former
CIA counter-terrorism chief Vince Cannistraro.
Perhaps Black thought his career and outstanding talents made him invulnerable. Black had served six foreign tours in field management positions at the agency, a career of 28 years.
But on May 17, the Washington Post printed a bland notice on one of its back
pages: "In other developments yesterday, CIA officials said Cofer Black,
head of the agency's Counter-terrorism Division for the last three years, has
been assigned to another position."
A CIA spokesman described the move as "part of the normal turnover of the agency."
The announcement was bland, harmless, routine and utterly false, several
serving and former U.S. intelligence officials claimed.
A shocked former senior CIA official called up this reporter in a mood of
grim and furious outrage: "Black was fired. He was kicked out," he said.
Someone should have stood up to Rumsfeld," said former senior CIA analyst
Stanley Bedlington.
Not only was Black fired, but he was barred from entering CIA headquarters.
"That's standard procedure if you've been fired," former CIA Iraq analyst
Judith Yaphe told UPI.
Humiliated, Black was restricted to an agency satellite location at Tyson's
Corner, which separated him from old, trusted colleagues and the comfort of
familiar surroundings.
Rumsfeld may not have been able to destroy Osama bin Laden, but he had managed to derail the CIA career of Cofer Black.
Intelligence Redo Is Harshly Judged
By Walter Pincus
U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Richard A. Posner sharply criticized the restructuring of U.S. intelligence agencies last week, telling CIA lawyers that the overhaul has done nothing to rectify flaws exposed by al-Qaeda's Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and that the changes "in the end . . . will amount to...
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
By Walter Pincus
U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Richard A. Posner sharply criticized the restructuring of U.S. intelligence agencies last week, telling CIA lawyers that the overhaul has done nothing to rectify flaws exposed by al-Qaeda's Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and that the changes "in the end . . . will amount to...
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
March 31, 2006
CIA Leak Figure Armitage Joins ConocoPhillips Board
By REUTERS
Filed at 8:46 p.m. ET
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Oil major ConocoPhillips said on Friday that former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a likely witness in the CIA leak case, has joined its board.
Armitage, former Secretary of State Colin Powell's deputy, has been under scrutiny in connection with the trial of ex-vice presidential aide Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby, over the leak of a CIA operative's name to the press.
A filing by Libby's defense team this month asked Judge Reggie Walton to force prosecutors to turn over material they have about likely witnesses, including Armitage.
The former State Department official, suspected of being the first person to discuss the identity of CIA official Valerie Plame with reporters, is expected to testify in the perjury trial.
The court filing suggests Libby's team may try to pin blame on the State Department for the leak of Plame's identity to the public after her husband. U.S. Ambassador Joseph Wilson, criticized the Bush administration's Iraq policy.
Powell and Armitage resisted the administration's push to invade Iraq more than other senior officials and left their posts after President Bush's 2004 reelection.
Armitage ran an international consulting company before joining Powell in the Bush administration in 2001.
His name came up on Friday in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in which ConocoPhillips said its board was expanded from 15 to 18 members as a result of its $33.9 billion acquisition of natural gas producer Burlington Resources.
In addition to Armitage, who becomes a Class I director effective immediately, the company said its board also elected Burlington's former President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman Bobby Shackouls to the board, as well as William Wade, Jr., who was on the board of Burlington.
ConocoPhillips earlier on Friday said it had closed the acquisition. Burlington shareholders will receive $46.50 in cash and 0.7214 shares of ConocoPhillips common stock for each Burlington share.
Copyright 2006 Reuters Ltd. Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Work for Us Site Map Back to Top
CIA Leak Figure Armitage Joins ConocoPhillips Board
By REUTERS
Filed at 8:46 p.m. ET
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Oil major ConocoPhillips said on Friday that former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, a likely witness in the CIA leak case, has joined its board.
Armitage, former Secretary of State Colin Powell's deputy, has been under scrutiny in connection with the trial of ex-vice presidential aide Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby, over the leak of a CIA operative's name to the press.
A filing by Libby's defense team this month asked Judge Reggie Walton to force prosecutors to turn over material they have about likely witnesses, including Armitage.
The former State Department official, suspected of being the first person to discuss the identity of CIA official Valerie Plame with reporters, is expected to testify in the perjury trial.
The court filing suggests Libby's team may try to pin blame on the State Department for the leak of Plame's identity to the public after her husband. U.S. Ambassador Joseph Wilson, criticized the Bush administration's Iraq policy.
Powell and Armitage resisted the administration's push to invade Iraq more than other senior officials and left their posts after President Bush's 2004 reelection.
Armitage ran an international consulting company before joining Powell in the Bush administration in 2001.
His name came up on Friday in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, in which ConocoPhillips said its board was expanded from 15 to 18 members as a result of its $33.9 billion acquisition of natural gas producer Burlington Resources.
In addition to Armitage, who becomes a Class I director effective immediately, the company said its board also elected Burlington's former President, Chief Executive Officer and Chairman Bobby Shackouls to the board, as well as William Wade, Jr., who was on the board of Burlington.
ConocoPhillips earlier on Friday said it had closed the acquisition. Burlington shareholders will receive $46.50 in cash and 0.7214 shares of ConocoPhillips common stock for each Burlington share.
Copyright 2006 Reuters Ltd. Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Work for Us Site Map Back to Top
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-fidere...-d_b_18283.html
Whatever Bush Knew, the Dispute Over the Aluminum Tubes was No "Professional Disagreement" (5 comments )
A few minutes of fact checking, or a basic knowledge of the subject, would have alerted Judith Miller and Michael Gordon to a basic flaw in their reporting - and to the deception underlying White House claims.
The topic: Aluminum tubes. Miller and Gordon's front-page scoop in The New York Times, published on September 8, 2002, was cited by Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice on the Sunday morning talk shows.
According to the Times:
"The diameter, thickness and other technical specifications of the aluminum tubes had persuaded American intelligence experts that they were meant for Iraq's nuclear program."
Within days, word got out that the Department of Energy disagreed. In fact, a DOE analysis discrediting the nuclear hypothesis had been disseminated one year earlier. Still, in their follow-up piece, Miller and Gordon wrote, "George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, has been adamant that tubes recently intercepted en route to Iraq were intended for use in a nuclear program, [administration] officials said." These senior administration officials also claimed "the best technical experts and nuclear scientists at laboratories like Oak Ridge supported the C.I.A. assessment."
The obvious disconnect: Experts at Oak Ridge National Laboratory don't speak for C.I.A., only the Department of Energy, which controls the Tennessee research facility.
(Miller's lapse went beyond her reliance on White House sources. Before her September 13, 2002 article came out, nuclear arms expert David Albright thoroughly briefed her on the internal criticism undercutting the centrifuge hypothesis. However, "the article was heavily slanted to the CIA's position, and the views of the other side were trivialized.")
The second disconnect (revealed by Tenet in his later congressional testimony): The C.I.A. Director remained unaware of the aluminum tubes debate until "mid-September 2002," leaving him scant time to take an "adamant" position.
In all fairness to the White House sources, several professionals with ties to Oak Ridge did support the C.I.A. position. They were Joe T., a centrifuge analyst at the C.I.A. who had previously worked at Oak Ridge, and Andrew Szady and Joseph Dooley, two consulting engineers with "ties to Oak Ridge", whom Joe T. had hired to test the aluminum tubes. Szady and Dooley supported the C.I.A. assessment based on tests they conducted on September 16 - three days after Miller and Gordon's story came out.
Why Were the Aluminum Tubes Special?
Before reviewing the test results, let's consider how such tubes are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Each tube would be an individual gas centrifuge. A centrifuge is a cylinder that operates in a continuous circular rotation Gas centrifuges separate molecules from uranium the same way your washing machine's spin cycle separates water molecules from your towels. When a tube rotates continuously at high speeds, the centrifugal force creates a vacuum pushing heavier molecules towards the outside of the tube, while the lighter molecules remain in the center.
The goal is to separate and concentrate the lighter explosive isotope, uranium-235 or U-235, from the rest of the uranium. Natural uranium has a 0.7% concentration of U-235. Fuel for a nuclear power plant has a 3% concentration of U-235. An atomic bomb has a 90% concentration of U-235.
To obtain the increased concentration of U-235, uranium hexafluoride gas is drawn through a sequence of different centrifuges that are interconnected with pipes to form trains or cascades. The uranium hexafluoride gas is placed in the first centrifuge, which is rotated at about 90,000 revolutions per minute, close to the speed of sound. From the rotation, centrifugal force moves the heavier gas molecules toward the outside of the cylinder and the lighter gas molecules, the U-235, collect near the center. These lighter gas molecules are withdrawn and fed into the next spinning centrifuge, where the process is repeated, so that the lighter U-235 is withdrawn into the next centrifuge, and on and on. With about 1,000 centrifuges rotating perfectly and continuously at 90,000 rpm for about one year, Iraq could have produced enough enriched uranium for about 1-1/2 nuclear bombs.
Uranium enrichment is not as easy as it sounds.
For a few years prior to the Kuwait invasion in 1990, Iraq had attempted to build a gas centrifuge system using European equipment and European technicians. By 1990, only two centrifuges had been tested, and only one was demonstrably workable with uranium hexafluoride. Any prototype cascade was far, far off.
Back then, Iraq's centrifuges were made with materials that are much more durable than aluminum - specifically maraging steel and carbon fiber. Aluminum centrifuges had been out of date since the 1950's, since continuous spinning at such high speeds causes weaker metals, such as aluminum, to fall apart.
The C.I.A. Test Results
On September 17, 2002, one day after they performed tests on the aluminum tubes, Szady and Dooley presented their report to Joe T. at the C.I.A. They concluded the tubes were well-suited as centrifuge rotors.
How could a test period of less than 24 hours demonstrate that the tubes would spin perfectly at 90,000 rpm for 12 months? One accepted testing method is to see if the tubes could spin properly at speeds 20% higher than necessary, or at about 110,000 rpm. Dooley and Szady's testing protocol worked the other way. They tried spinning the tubes at 60,000 rpm for a very short period, and then asserted that the tubes met the performance standards of nuclear gas centrifuges. They excluded the fact that the spin tests caused most of the aluminum tubes to fail.
As you would imagine, tubes that spin continuously for 90,000 rpm for over one year must meet very tight specifications. These tubes, purchased for $17.50 each, lacked the precision specs you'd find on an aluminum beer can.
Joe T.'s analysis also had a problem with dimensions. In his highly classified memos, he claimed that the aluminum tubes had approximately the same wall thickness as found in Zippe-type centrifuges. (Dr. Gernot Zippe had designed the world standard for gas centrifuges.) The aluminum tubes had a wall thickness of 3 mm, which, according to Joe T., was close to 2.8 mm thickness found in Zippe-type centrifuges. Except Zippe centrifuges never had a wall thickness greater than 1 mm.
Over an 18-month period, Department of Energy repeatedly informed Joe T. that his dimensions were just plain wrong. But Joe T. persisted in his claims. It was as if an "expert" said that the aluminum siding on a house had the same thickness as the aluminum foil used in a kitchen. Does that strike you as an honest difference of opinion between professionals?
Joe T.'s expertise came from his experience working with centrifuges for a few years in the early 1980s, soon after he got his bachelors in mechanical engineering from the University of Kentucky in the late 1970s.
Over at the Energy Department, Joe T.'s findings were reviewed, and discredited, by Dr. Jon A. Kreykes, head of Oak Ridge's national security advanced technology group, and Professor Houston G. Wood III from the University of Virginia. Dr. Wood, who had founded the Oak Ridge centrifuge physics department and had consulted with Gernot Zippe, was widely recognized as one of the most eminent experts on centrifuge separation technology.
In retrospect, the White House claim that the "the best technical experts and nuclear scientists at laboratories like Oak Ridge supported the C.I.A. assessment," seems, shall we say, ironic.
The National Intelligence Estimate Turned Upside Down
By refuting Joe T., in late 2001, the Energy Department had ostensibly settled the matter, as evidenced by the December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate, which stated:
"Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program."
But ten months later, on September 8, 2002, Miller and Gordon's White House sources gave a different story. And a few days after that, on September 12, 2002, the administration released white paper on Iraq called "A Decade of Deception and Defiance." It stated:
"Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes which officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium."
But as for Energy Department's dissenting opinion, Miller and Gordon wrote, "The C.I.A. position appears to be the dominant view."
The debate itself was an institutional red flag. Since Energy had been kept unaware during 2002 of C.I.A. memos touting the tubes as nuclear components, it never appealed to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), a secret body of experts drawn from across the federal government to resolve such high level technical disputes.
The JAEIC was first asked to consider the aluminum tubes dispute in July 2002. But by then it, was too late. The committee's first formal session, attended by experts on both sides, took place in early August. A second meeting, scheduled for later in August, was postponed. A third meeting was set for early September. But before the September meeting, on August 26, 2002, Dick Cheney announced:
''We now know Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon."
The third JAEIC meeting, like the second meeting, never happened. And then "A Decade of Deception and Defiance," was published on September 12.
By mid-September 2002, Tenet and others in the intelligence community were scrambling. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Senator Bob Graham, unwilling to rely on the administration's white paper, had insisted that a formal National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD be prepared for Congress prior to any vote authorizing Bush to take military action against Saddam. The deadline for the finished NIE product was October 1, 2002. The Senate vote was scheduled for October 10, a few weeks before the mid-term elections.
Lacking time, Joe T. streamlined the process for testing the aluminum tubes, which, as noted above, must spin continuously and perfectly at 90,000 rpm for 12-months in order to be effective. Joe T. decided that a one-day test at 60,000 rpm was sufficient, and instructed Szady and Dooley to conceal their work from the Oak Ridge Field Intelligence Element, a center of expertise on Iraq's nuclear infrastructure. Again, information on the tube failures was also concealed.
On September 25, 2002, eight days after Szady and Dooley presented their test report, the different agencies met to discuss their collective drafting of the National Intelligence Estimate. Without the JAEIC decision, there was no consensus. Two groups, the C.I.A. and the Defense Intelligence Agency, claimed the tubes were for nuclear weapons. Two groups, the Energy and State Departments, maintained that the tubes were for conventional rocket use. The one group responsible for evaluating conventional ground weapons systems, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), did not attend the meeting. Instead, the Defense Intelligence Agency acted on behalf of the NGIC. So the "majority" view in the NIE - that the tubes were most likely used for nuclear weapons - validated the claims made in administration's white paper. The NIE stated,
"Most agencies assess that Iraq's aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes provides compelling evidence that Saddam is attempting to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort."
And Who Is to Blame?
"Are they guilty of manipulating intelligence on WMD? That, I think, is the thing they are least guilty of. .. the Robb report, which showed there was no political pressure .there was a Senate intelligence report; there was a Butler report. There were all of these reports. None of them found manipulation of intelligence." David Brooks on The NewsHour, November 4, 2005
The Senate Intelligence Committee made twenty conclusions regarding the intelligence of Iraq's nuclear effort. Each conclusion cited a failure to properly evaluate the evidence available at the time.
Today, the conventional spin is that Joe T.'s crackpot theory about aluminum tubes took on a life of its own because of bureaucratic infighting, incompetence and/or groupthink. Excepting the Department of Energy, and the State Department, everybody, including the White House, failed to perform the proper due diligence.
Please. People weren't born yesterday. Where I come from, the corporate and financial world, some things are ambiguous, and some things are clear cut. This is very clear cut.
Suppose instead that Joe T. were testing an axel for Chevrolet or a painkiller for Merck. He'd be in jail for fraud and possibly manslaughter, along with his managers who chose to look the other way. As the Intelligence Committee report makes clear, almost every claim made by the C.I.A. regarding the tubes was either a lie or was supported by fraud. Take two assertions lifted from the National Intelligence Estimate:
"The composition, dimensions and extremely tight manufacturing tolerances of the tubes far exceed the requirements for non-nuclear applications but make them suitable for use as rotors in gas centrifuges."
· Joe T. said told the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee that, "Almost every country [the Iraqis] approached has told them we cannot make tubes to these specifications." Joe T.'s backup: six intelligence reports. Five of those reports, mentioned nothing to indicate that any company in any country suggested it lacked the capability to fabricate those tubes. The sixth report mentioned one manufacturer who gave an incomplete response, but no indication that tolerances were a deciding factor.
· In January 2003, C.I.A. analysts asked Department of Defense rocket engineers if the aluminum tubes were excessively toleranced for use in conventional rocket launcher. The rocket engineers said the tubes exceeded the minimum tolerances necessary, but nothing prevented their use in conventional rocket launchers. They said if you're an inexperienced engineer, you go for more tightly toleranced systems. Again, bicycle seat posts or aluminum cans are fabricated to stricter tolerances. At the time, a Defense engineer suggested to the C.I.A. analysts that they contact a "foreign government service" since the tubes were very similar to those used in an Italian rocket design. The C.I.A.'s response: that was not an option.
"Iraqi agents agreed to pay up to $17.50 for each 7075-T6 aluminum tube. Their willingness to pay such costs suggests the tubes are intended for a special project of national interest."
· But some intelligence reports showed the Iraqis had often bargained down the price to under $16, and once as low as $10. The NIE claimed that aluminum was "considerably more expensive than other more readily available materials" and "materials or tubes meeting conventional rocket requirements could be acquired at much lower prices." Later, Department of Defense engineers refuted that claim, noting that aluminum is one of the cheapest materials. For the same tubes, a US manufacturer quoted $19.27 per unit. And $17.50, on an inflation adjusted basis, was less than what Iraq paid for the same tubes in the 1980's.
Murray Waas broke the story that Bush, who received his one-page classified summary of the National Intelligence Estimate, was informed about the doubts concerning the tubes' nuclear application. The scandal inside of that scandal is that this was no bona fide professional disagreement, only a conflict between professional honesty and fraud. And we know which side won.
Note: The passages about Joe T. relied in substantial part on reporting from The Washington Post
and The New York Times. The remainder was based on the "Report on The U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq" and other sources in the
Whatever Bush Knew, the Dispute Over the Aluminum Tubes was No "Professional Disagreement" (5 comments )
A few minutes of fact checking, or a basic knowledge of the subject, would have alerted Judith Miller and Michael Gordon to a basic flaw in their reporting - and to the deception underlying White House claims.
The topic: Aluminum tubes. Miller and Gordon's front-page scoop in The New York Times, published on September 8, 2002, was cited by Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice on the Sunday morning talk shows.
According to the Times:
"The diameter, thickness and other technical specifications of the aluminum tubes had persuaded American intelligence experts that they were meant for Iraq's nuclear program."
Within days, word got out that the Department of Energy disagreed. In fact, a DOE analysis discrediting the nuclear hypothesis had been disseminated one year earlier. Still, in their follow-up piece, Miller and Gordon wrote, "George J. Tenet, the director of central intelligence, has been adamant that tubes recently intercepted en route to Iraq were intended for use in a nuclear program, [administration] officials said." These senior administration officials also claimed "the best technical experts and nuclear scientists at laboratories like Oak Ridge supported the C.I.A. assessment."
The obvious disconnect: Experts at Oak Ridge National Laboratory don't speak for C.I.A., only the Department of Energy, which controls the Tennessee research facility.
(Miller's lapse went beyond her reliance on White House sources. Before her September 13, 2002 article came out, nuclear arms expert David Albright thoroughly briefed her on the internal criticism undercutting the centrifuge hypothesis. However, "the article was heavily slanted to the CIA's position, and the views of the other side were trivialized.")
The second disconnect (revealed by Tenet in his later congressional testimony): The C.I.A. Director remained unaware of the aluminum tubes debate until "mid-September 2002," leaving him scant time to take an "adamant" position.
In all fairness to the White House sources, several professionals with ties to Oak Ridge did support the C.I.A. position. They were Joe T., a centrifuge analyst at the C.I.A. who had previously worked at Oak Ridge, and Andrew Szady and Joseph Dooley, two consulting engineers with "ties to Oak Ridge", whom Joe T. had hired to test the aluminum tubes. Szady and Dooley supported the C.I.A. assessment based on tests they conducted on September 16 - three days after Miller and Gordon's story came out.
Why Were the Aluminum Tubes Special?
Before reviewing the test results, let's consider how such tubes are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. Each tube would be an individual gas centrifuge. A centrifuge is a cylinder that operates in a continuous circular rotation Gas centrifuges separate molecules from uranium the same way your washing machine's spin cycle separates water molecules from your towels. When a tube rotates continuously at high speeds, the centrifugal force creates a vacuum pushing heavier molecules towards the outside of the tube, while the lighter molecules remain in the center.
The goal is to separate and concentrate the lighter explosive isotope, uranium-235 or U-235, from the rest of the uranium. Natural uranium has a 0.7% concentration of U-235. Fuel for a nuclear power plant has a 3% concentration of U-235. An atomic bomb has a 90% concentration of U-235.
To obtain the increased concentration of U-235, uranium hexafluoride gas is drawn through a sequence of different centrifuges that are interconnected with pipes to form trains or cascades. The uranium hexafluoride gas is placed in the first centrifuge, which is rotated at about 90,000 revolutions per minute, close to the speed of sound. From the rotation, centrifugal force moves the heavier gas molecules toward the outside of the cylinder and the lighter gas molecules, the U-235, collect near the center. These lighter gas molecules are withdrawn and fed into the next spinning centrifuge, where the process is repeated, so that the lighter U-235 is withdrawn into the next centrifuge, and on and on. With about 1,000 centrifuges rotating perfectly and continuously at 90,000 rpm for about one year, Iraq could have produced enough enriched uranium for about 1-1/2 nuclear bombs.
Uranium enrichment is not as easy as it sounds.
For a few years prior to the Kuwait invasion in 1990, Iraq had attempted to build a gas centrifuge system using European equipment and European technicians. By 1990, only two centrifuges had been tested, and only one was demonstrably workable with uranium hexafluoride. Any prototype cascade was far, far off.
Back then, Iraq's centrifuges were made with materials that are much more durable than aluminum - specifically maraging steel and carbon fiber. Aluminum centrifuges had been out of date since the 1950's, since continuous spinning at such high speeds causes weaker metals, such as aluminum, to fall apart.
The C.I.A. Test Results
On September 17, 2002, one day after they performed tests on the aluminum tubes, Szady and Dooley presented their report to Joe T. at the C.I.A. They concluded the tubes were well-suited as centrifuge rotors.
How could a test period of less than 24 hours demonstrate that the tubes would spin perfectly at 90,000 rpm for 12 months? One accepted testing method is to see if the tubes could spin properly at speeds 20% higher than necessary, or at about 110,000 rpm. Dooley and Szady's testing protocol worked the other way. They tried spinning the tubes at 60,000 rpm for a very short period, and then asserted that the tubes met the performance standards of nuclear gas centrifuges. They excluded the fact that the spin tests caused most of the aluminum tubes to fail.
As you would imagine, tubes that spin continuously for 90,000 rpm for over one year must meet very tight specifications. These tubes, purchased for $17.50 each, lacked the precision specs you'd find on an aluminum beer can.
Joe T.'s analysis also had a problem with dimensions. In his highly classified memos, he claimed that the aluminum tubes had approximately the same wall thickness as found in Zippe-type centrifuges. (Dr. Gernot Zippe had designed the world standard for gas centrifuges.) The aluminum tubes had a wall thickness of 3 mm, which, according to Joe T., was close to 2.8 mm thickness found in Zippe-type centrifuges. Except Zippe centrifuges never had a wall thickness greater than 1 mm.
Over an 18-month period, Department of Energy repeatedly informed Joe T. that his dimensions were just plain wrong. But Joe T. persisted in his claims. It was as if an "expert" said that the aluminum siding on a house had the same thickness as the aluminum foil used in a kitchen. Does that strike you as an honest difference of opinion between professionals?
Joe T.'s expertise came from his experience working with centrifuges for a few years in the early 1980s, soon after he got his bachelors in mechanical engineering from the University of Kentucky in the late 1970s.
Over at the Energy Department, Joe T.'s findings were reviewed, and discredited, by Dr. Jon A. Kreykes, head of Oak Ridge's national security advanced technology group, and Professor Houston G. Wood III from the University of Virginia. Dr. Wood, who had founded the Oak Ridge centrifuge physics department and had consulted with Gernot Zippe, was widely recognized as one of the most eminent experts on centrifuge separation technology.
In retrospect, the White House claim that the "the best technical experts and nuclear scientists at laboratories like Oak Ridge supported the C.I.A. assessment," seems, shall we say, ironic.
The National Intelligence Estimate Turned Upside Down
By refuting Joe T., in late 2001, the Energy Department had ostensibly settled the matter, as evidenced by the December 2001 National Intelligence Estimate, which stated:
"Iraq did not appear to have reconstituted its nuclear weapons program."
But ten months later, on September 8, 2002, Miller and Gordon's White House sources gave a different story. And a few days after that, on September 12, 2002, the administration released white paper on Iraq called "A Decade of Deception and Defiance." It stated:
"Iraq has sought to buy thousands of specially designed aluminum tubes which officials believe were intended as components of centrifuges to enrich uranium."
But as for Energy Department's dissenting opinion, Miller and Gordon wrote, "The C.I.A. position appears to be the dominant view."
The debate itself was an institutional red flag. Since Energy had been kept unaware during 2002 of C.I.A. memos touting the tubes as nuclear components, it never appealed to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC), a secret body of experts drawn from across the federal government to resolve such high level technical disputes.
The JAEIC was first asked to consider the aluminum tubes dispute in July 2002. But by then it, was too late. The committee's first formal session, attended by experts on both sides, took place in early August. A second meeting, scheduled for later in August, was postponed. A third meeting was set for early September. But before the September meeting, on August 26, 2002, Dick Cheney announced:
''We now know Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon."
The third JAEIC meeting, like the second meeting, never happened. And then "A Decade of Deception and Defiance," was published on September 12.
By mid-September 2002, Tenet and others in the intelligence community were scrambling. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Senator Bob Graham, unwilling to rely on the administration's white paper, had insisted that a formal National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's WMD be prepared for Congress prior to any vote authorizing Bush to take military action against Saddam. The deadline for the finished NIE product was October 1, 2002. The Senate vote was scheduled for October 10, a few weeks before the mid-term elections.
Lacking time, Joe T. streamlined the process for testing the aluminum tubes, which, as noted above, must spin continuously and perfectly at 90,000 rpm for 12-months in order to be effective. Joe T. decided that a one-day test at 60,000 rpm was sufficient, and instructed Szady and Dooley to conceal their work from the Oak Ridge Field Intelligence Element, a center of expertise on Iraq's nuclear infrastructure. Again, information on the tube failures was also concealed.
On September 25, 2002, eight days after Szady and Dooley presented their test report, the different agencies met to discuss their collective drafting of the National Intelligence Estimate. Without the JAEIC decision, there was no consensus. Two groups, the C.I.A. and the Defense Intelligence Agency, claimed the tubes were for nuclear weapons. Two groups, the Energy and State Departments, maintained that the tubes were for conventional rocket use. The one group responsible for evaluating conventional ground weapons systems, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), did not attend the meeting. Instead, the Defense Intelligence Agency acted on behalf of the NGIC. So the "majority" view in the NIE - that the tubes were most likely used for nuclear weapons - validated the claims made in administration's white paper. The NIE stated,
"Most agencies assess that Iraq's aggressive pursuit of high-strength aluminum tubes provides compelling evidence that Saddam is attempting to reconstitute a uranium enrichment effort."
And Who Is to Blame?
"Are they guilty of manipulating intelligence on WMD? That, I think, is the thing they are least guilty of. .. the Robb report, which showed there was no political pressure .there was a Senate intelligence report; there was a Butler report. There were all of these reports. None of them found manipulation of intelligence." David Brooks on The NewsHour, November 4, 2005
The Senate Intelligence Committee made twenty conclusions regarding the intelligence of Iraq's nuclear effort. Each conclusion cited a failure to properly evaluate the evidence available at the time.
Today, the conventional spin is that Joe T.'s crackpot theory about aluminum tubes took on a life of its own because of bureaucratic infighting, incompetence and/or groupthink. Excepting the Department of Energy, and the State Department, everybody, including the White House, failed to perform the proper due diligence.
Please. People weren't born yesterday. Where I come from, the corporate and financial world, some things are ambiguous, and some things are clear cut. This is very clear cut.
Suppose instead that Joe T. were testing an axel for Chevrolet or a painkiller for Merck. He'd be in jail for fraud and possibly manslaughter, along with his managers who chose to look the other way. As the Intelligence Committee report makes clear, almost every claim made by the C.I.A. regarding the tubes was either a lie or was supported by fraud. Take two assertions lifted from the National Intelligence Estimate:
"The composition, dimensions and extremely tight manufacturing tolerances of the tubes far exceed the requirements for non-nuclear applications but make them suitable for use as rotors in gas centrifuges."
· Joe T. said told the staff of the Senate Intelligence Committee that, "Almost every country [the Iraqis] approached has told them we cannot make tubes to these specifications." Joe T.'s backup: six intelligence reports. Five of those reports, mentioned nothing to indicate that any company in any country suggested it lacked the capability to fabricate those tubes. The sixth report mentioned one manufacturer who gave an incomplete response, but no indication that tolerances were a deciding factor.
· In January 2003, C.I.A. analysts asked Department of Defense rocket engineers if the aluminum tubes were excessively toleranced for use in conventional rocket launcher. The rocket engineers said the tubes exceeded the minimum tolerances necessary, but nothing prevented their use in conventional rocket launchers. They said if you're an inexperienced engineer, you go for more tightly toleranced systems. Again, bicycle seat posts or aluminum cans are fabricated to stricter tolerances. At the time, a Defense engineer suggested to the C.I.A. analysts that they contact a "foreign government service" since the tubes were very similar to those used in an Italian rocket design. The C.I.A.'s response: that was not an option.
"Iraqi agents agreed to pay up to $17.50 for each 7075-T6 aluminum tube. Their willingness to pay such costs suggests the tubes are intended for a special project of national interest."
· But some intelligence reports showed the Iraqis had often bargained down the price to under $16, and once as low as $10. The NIE claimed that aluminum was "considerably more expensive than other more readily available materials" and "materials or tubes meeting conventional rocket requirements could be acquired at much lower prices." Later, Department of Defense engineers refuted that claim, noting that aluminum is one of the cheapest materials. For the same tubes, a US manufacturer quoted $19.27 per unit. And $17.50, on an inflation adjusted basis, was less than what Iraq paid for the same tubes in the 1980's.
Murray Waas broke the story that Bush, who received his one-page classified summary of the National Intelligence Estimate, was informed about the doubts concerning the tubes' nuclear application. The scandal inside of that scandal is that this was no bona fide professional disagreement, only a conflict between professional honesty and fraud. And we know which side won.
Note: The passages about Joe T. relied in substantial part on reporting from The Washington Post
and The New York Times. The remainder was based on the "Report on The U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq" and other sources in the
Attacking Iran May Trigger Terrorism
By Dana Priest
As tensions increase between the United States and Iran, U.S. intelligence and terrorism experts say they believe Iran would respond to U.S. military strikes on its nuclear sites by deploying its intelligence operatives and Hezbollah teams to carry out terrorist attacks worldwide.
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
By Dana Priest
As tensions increase between the United States and Iran, U.S. intelligence and terrorism experts say they believe Iran would respond to U.S. military strikes on its nuclear sites by deploying its intelligence operatives and Hezbollah teams to carry out terrorist attacks worldwide.
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
http://www.reason.com/links/links033006.shtml
How the FBI Let 9/11 Happen
Never mind Moussaoui, the smoldering gun was right there all the time
Jeff A. Taylor
Anyone paying attention to the Zacarias Moussaoui trial gets it now. All the 9/11 blanks are filled in, and the picture is complete. Sorry, conspiracy freaks and blind partisan hacks. Dull, common, gross incompetence is again at the heart of a deadly government cluster-hump.
Do not linger on Moussaoui's bizarre suicide-by-testimony or the literal cheerleading for his execution—He knew. He lied. And 2,749 people died.
Neither of these is the real story of this case. Rather, the story is the definitive proof Moussaoui's case provides that the U.S. government—pre-PATRIOT Act, pre-NSA wiretaps and all—had and missed clear opportunities to stop 9/11. The FBI uniquely and repeatedly punted carefully gathered evidence of an attack in favor of adherence to bureaucratic hierarchies and power trips.
The testimony of FBI agent Harry Samit forever buries the quaint notion that 9/11 was unforeseen and unpreventable. Beginning with Moussaoui's August 16, 2001 arrest Samit mounted a global and indefatigable investigation of the man and concluded that an attack involving hijacked airplanes was imminent.
The flipside of Samit is Michael Rolince, former head of the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Section. Rolince is the man who previously deflected questions about the FBI's pursuit, or lack thereof, of pre-9/11 terror suspects with the line, "Would CNN have really aired their photos if we'd asked them?"
Rolince smugly insisted at trial that Samit's "suppositions, hunches and suspicions were one thing and what we knew" was another. Yet Rolince, in service of the government's desire to link Moussaoui to 9/11 and trigger the death penalty, also tried to argue that, had Moussaoui spilled his guts, everything would have changed. 9/11 might have been prevented. In short, Samit's investigation and leads were not enough; Moussaoui had to speak up for the FBI brass to hear anything.
When defense lawyer Edward MacMahon cross-examined Rolince, possibly the first and only time a government security official has been so challenged on 9/11, the disconnect between the official story and reality was plain. Rolince knew nothing of the August 18, 2001 memo Samit had sent to his office warning of terror links. In that memo, Samit warned that Moussaoui wanted to hijack a plane and had the weapons to do it. Samit also warned that Moussaoui "believes it is acceptable to kill civilians" and that he approved of martyrdom. Rolince testified he never read the memo.
On August 17 Samit sent an e-mail to his direct superiors at FBI headquarters recounting Moussaoui's training on 747 simulators. "His excuse is weak, he just wants to learn how to do it... That's pretty ominous and obviously suggests some sort of hijacking plan," Samit wrote.
Rebuffed by his superiors and ignored by Rolince, Samit still sought out more info worldwide and from sources as diverse as the FBI's London, Paris, and Oklahoma City offices, FBI headquarters files, the CIA's counterterrorism center, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, probably the National Security Agency, and the FBI's Iran and OBL offices.
He was sufficiently alarmed by what he heard that Samit sent an August 21 e-mail requesting that the Secret Service be informed about Moussaoui's intentions to see the White House and that he was interested in flight training.
Samit testified that on August 22 he had learned from the French—the French!—that Moussaoui had recruited a fighter to go to Chechnya in 2000 to fight with Islamic radicals with previous links, so the CIA told Samit, to Osama bin Laden. The FBI brass remained unmoved.
Defense attorney MacMahon then displayed an August 30, 2001 communication addressed to Samit and FBI headquarters agent Mike Maltbie from a Bureau agent in Paris. It passed along that French intelligence thought Moussaoui was "very dangerous" and had soaked up radical views at London's infamous Finnsbury Park mosque. The French also said Moussaoui was "completely devoted" to bin Laden-style jihadism and, significantly, had traveled to Afghanistan.
Yet on August 31 Maltbie stopped Samit from sending a letter to FAA headquarters in Washington advising them of "a potential threat to security of commercial aircraft" based on the Moussaoui case. Maltbie said he would handle that, but it is not clear if he ever did.
"Minneapolis believes Moussaoui, [Moussaoui's roommate Hussein] Al Attas and others not yet known were...engaged in preparing to seize 747s," the aborted warning said.
Samit did directly tell FAA officials in Minneapolis of his concerns on September 5.
In total, the information Samit pulled together dovetailed with his belief that, based on interviews with the suspect, Moussaoui had been to Afghan terror training camps. Because he did not have proof of the suspected terror camp connection, however, Samit never passed this hunch on to the FBI headquarters. Maltbie and Maltbie's boss, David Frasca, chief of the radical fundamentalist unit at headquarters, were clearly pressing Samit for facts only, as Rolince's disdain for "suppositions" from far-off Minneapolis confirms.
So? The 9/11 Commission investigation detailed that British intelligence directly told U.S. officials on September 13, 2001, that Moussaoui had attended a training camp in Afghanistan. "Had this information been available in late August 2001, the Moussaoui case would almost certainly have received intense, high-level attention," the commission concluded. As it turns out, Samit had that info in late August 2001 and nobody cared. CIA Director George Tenet was briefed on the Moussaoui threat on August 23. The case received intense, high-level attention. Nobody cared.
Back in 2004, Thomas Kean, the chairman of the 9/11 commission, said he was troubled that Moussaoui's arrest never made it up to the top of the FBI hierarchy.
"If it had maybe there would have been some action taken and things could have been different," Kean was quoted by The New York Times.
Yet now it is clear that senior FBI officials Maltbie and Frasca did know about Moussaoui's arrest. In fact, they knew the case so well that they denied Samit's request for a warrant to search Moussaoui's computer and belongings. Samit also testified that he was told pressing too hard to obtain a warrant on Moussaoui would hurt his career.
This decision to deny a warrant gave rise to the myth that "The Wall" between overseas intelligence and criminal investigations made the PATRIOT Act necessary. To this day this myth is cherished among right-wing radio talkers and has, just now, morphed into a clumsy justification for the White House's sidestepping the FISA court and directing its own wiretap frenzy via the NSA. This is all pure fantasy.
Instead of clueless Carter-era restrictions on domestic spying or insufficient distrust of civil liberties, Samit cited "obstructionism, criminal negligence and careerism" by top FBI officials as what stopped his investigation.
There is also the curious Bureau flip-flopping on Moussaoui and his laptop. Back in November 2001 the FBI dropped Moussaoui from the 9/11 plot. In his place the Bureau put Ramsi Binalshibh, as part of the hijacking team that crashed United Airlines Flight 93 into a field in Pennsylvania.
FBI Director Robert Mueller back then also told prosecutors that there was no information on the computer seized from Moussaoui that linked him to the September 11 attacks. At that same time, Rolince himself was not convinced that Moussaoui was tied to 9/11, saying "Whoever that fifth person was is probably still alive. Clearly we are looking into the pool of people who crossed paths with the hijackers." Only sometime later did that someone become Moussaoui and his un-searched info.
While Samit was spending a solid three weeks trying to get Washington to act on his pre-9/11 terror fears, future 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour was raising suspicions with his flight training in Phoenix (suspicions Samit was not told about until after 9/11). Margaret Chevrette of the Pan Am International Flight Academy reported her worries to the FAA and somehow those concerns also made their way to CIA chief Tenet and into CIA memos of August 2001, but the FBI never acted on them. Yet on September 12, FBI agents interviewed Chevrette for more information on Hanjour—reflecting the fact that another local FBI agent (Arizona-based Kenneth Williams, author of the July 2001 Phoenix memo) had notified FBI headquarters of the danger posed by Middle Eastern terrorists training at U.S. flight schools.
There were also repeated attempts by the New York City FBI office to get follow-up on Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi and an August 2001 request from a New York FBI agent who warned that "someday someone will die" if New York did not win approval to launch a criminal investigation of al-Mihdhar. Al-Mihdhar was on American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon.
Minneapolis, Phoenix, New York. Three different Bureau offices were hot on the terror plot in the days leading up to 9/11 and all were stiffed by Washington. If that is not institutional incompetence, Stalin purge-worthy stuff, heaven help the next 3,000 martyrs to J. Edgar Hoover's über-suits.
One exchange from the Moussaoui trial makes clear what happened in the weeks running up to 9/11:
"You tried to move heaven and earth to get a search warrant to search this man's belongings and you were obstructed," MacMahon said to Samit.
"Yes sir, I was obstructed." Samit replied.
No disaster, it seems, can force reform on the Bureau. The same people are still manning the posts at the FBI and Main Justice. They are going to miss the next terror attack because they are dead-certain to stop the last one. That's what bureaucracies do: cover ass. The Bureau's poisonous Andersen Consulting–with-arrest-powers culture remains unreformed and dangerously low-tech. New York City agents do not have enough e-mail addresses to go around, for example.
Instead of an effective anti-terror agency, the Bureau is morphing into a kind of Stasi Lite, keeping tabs on domestic subversives: assorted peaceniks, communists in Texas, and the League of Women Voters in Michigan, who had the gall to invite a critic of the PATRIOT Act to a panel discussion. There is a sort of logic to such surveillance: This what the FBI is good at, so this is what it does. Kinda of like looking for your car keys under a street light because the rest of the street is dark.
Still, for all the bungling in the dark the FBI has nothing to fear, not from a complicit Bush administration, not from a prostrate Congress, not from a bamboozled public. An e-mail sent to Agent Harry Samit on September 10, 2001 from a CIA Counterterrorism Center official identified only as "Cathy" points the way: "God help us all if the next terrorist attacks involves this same type of plane."
God? Cathy, dear, the FBI is God. Just look around.
Jeff A. Taylor writes the weekly Reason Express.
How the FBI Let 9/11 Happen
Never mind Moussaoui, the smoldering gun was right there all the time
Jeff A. Taylor
Anyone paying attention to the Zacarias Moussaoui trial gets it now. All the 9/11 blanks are filled in, and the picture is complete. Sorry, conspiracy freaks and blind partisan hacks. Dull, common, gross incompetence is again at the heart of a deadly government cluster-hump.
Do not linger on Moussaoui's bizarre suicide-by-testimony or the literal cheerleading for his execution—He knew. He lied. And 2,749 people died.
Neither of these is the real story of this case. Rather, the story is the definitive proof Moussaoui's case provides that the U.S. government—pre-PATRIOT Act, pre-NSA wiretaps and all—had and missed clear opportunities to stop 9/11. The FBI uniquely and repeatedly punted carefully gathered evidence of an attack in favor of adherence to bureaucratic hierarchies and power trips.
The testimony of FBI agent Harry Samit forever buries the quaint notion that 9/11 was unforeseen and unpreventable. Beginning with Moussaoui's August 16, 2001 arrest Samit mounted a global and indefatigable investigation of the man and concluded that an attack involving hijacked airplanes was imminent.
The flipside of Samit is Michael Rolince, former head of the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Section. Rolince is the man who previously deflected questions about the FBI's pursuit, or lack thereof, of pre-9/11 terror suspects with the line, "Would CNN have really aired their photos if we'd asked them?"
Rolince smugly insisted at trial that Samit's "suppositions, hunches and suspicions were one thing and what we knew" was another. Yet Rolince, in service of the government's desire to link Moussaoui to 9/11 and trigger the death penalty, also tried to argue that, had Moussaoui spilled his guts, everything would have changed. 9/11 might have been prevented. In short, Samit's investigation and leads were not enough; Moussaoui had to speak up for the FBI brass to hear anything.
When defense lawyer Edward MacMahon cross-examined Rolince, possibly the first and only time a government security official has been so challenged on 9/11, the disconnect between the official story and reality was plain. Rolince knew nothing of the August 18, 2001 memo Samit had sent to his office warning of terror links. In that memo, Samit warned that Moussaoui wanted to hijack a plane and had the weapons to do it. Samit also warned that Moussaoui "believes it is acceptable to kill civilians" and that he approved of martyrdom. Rolince testified he never read the memo.
On August 17 Samit sent an e-mail to his direct superiors at FBI headquarters recounting Moussaoui's training on 747 simulators. "His excuse is weak, he just wants to learn how to do it... That's pretty ominous and obviously suggests some sort of hijacking plan," Samit wrote.
Rebuffed by his superiors and ignored by Rolince, Samit still sought out more info worldwide and from sources as diverse as the FBI's London, Paris, and Oklahoma City offices, FBI headquarters files, the CIA's counterterrorism center, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, probably the National Security Agency, and the FBI's Iran and OBL offices.
He was sufficiently alarmed by what he heard that Samit sent an August 21 e-mail requesting that the Secret Service be informed about Moussaoui's intentions to see the White House and that he was interested in flight training.
Samit testified that on August 22 he had learned from the French—the French!—that Moussaoui had recruited a fighter to go to Chechnya in 2000 to fight with Islamic radicals with previous links, so the CIA told Samit, to Osama bin Laden. The FBI brass remained unmoved.
Defense attorney MacMahon then displayed an August 30, 2001 communication addressed to Samit and FBI headquarters agent Mike Maltbie from a Bureau agent in Paris. It passed along that French intelligence thought Moussaoui was "very dangerous" and had soaked up radical views at London's infamous Finnsbury Park mosque. The French also said Moussaoui was "completely devoted" to bin Laden-style jihadism and, significantly, had traveled to Afghanistan.
Yet on August 31 Maltbie stopped Samit from sending a letter to FAA headquarters in Washington advising them of "a potential threat to security of commercial aircraft" based on the Moussaoui case. Maltbie said he would handle that, but it is not clear if he ever did.
"Minneapolis believes Moussaoui, [Moussaoui's roommate Hussein] Al Attas and others not yet known were...engaged in preparing to seize 747s," the aborted warning said.
Samit did directly tell FAA officials in Minneapolis of his concerns on September 5.
In total, the information Samit pulled together dovetailed with his belief that, based on interviews with the suspect, Moussaoui had been to Afghan terror training camps. Because he did not have proof of the suspected terror camp connection, however, Samit never passed this hunch on to the FBI headquarters. Maltbie and Maltbie's boss, David Frasca, chief of the radical fundamentalist unit at headquarters, were clearly pressing Samit for facts only, as Rolince's disdain for "suppositions" from far-off Minneapolis confirms.
So? The 9/11 Commission investigation detailed that British intelligence directly told U.S. officials on September 13, 2001, that Moussaoui had attended a training camp in Afghanistan. "Had this information been available in late August 2001, the Moussaoui case would almost certainly have received intense, high-level attention," the commission concluded. As it turns out, Samit had that info in late August 2001 and nobody cared. CIA Director George Tenet was briefed on the Moussaoui threat on August 23. The case received intense, high-level attention. Nobody cared.
Back in 2004, Thomas Kean, the chairman of the 9/11 commission, said he was troubled that Moussaoui's arrest never made it up to the top of the FBI hierarchy.
"If it had maybe there would have been some action taken and things could have been different," Kean was quoted by The New York Times.
Yet now it is clear that senior FBI officials Maltbie and Frasca did know about Moussaoui's arrest. In fact, they knew the case so well that they denied Samit's request for a warrant to search Moussaoui's computer and belongings. Samit also testified that he was told pressing too hard to obtain a warrant on Moussaoui would hurt his career.
This decision to deny a warrant gave rise to the myth that "The Wall" between overseas intelligence and criminal investigations made the PATRIOT Act necessary. To this day this myth is cherished among right-wing radio talkers and has, just now, morphed into a clumsy justification for the White House's sidestepping the FISA court and directing its own wiretap frenzy via the NSA. This is all pure fantasy.
Instead of clueless Carter-era restrictions on domestic spying or insufficient distrust of civil liberties, Samit cited "obstructionism, criminal negligence and careerism" by top FBI officials as what stopped his investigation.
There is also the curious Bureau flip-flopping on Moussaoui and his laptop. Back in November 2001 the FBI dropped Moussaoui from the 9/11 plot. In his place the Bureau put Ramsi Binalshibh, as part of the hijacking team that crashed United Airlines Flight 93 into a field in Pennsylvania.
FBI Director Robert Mueller back then also told prosecutors that there was no information on the computer seized from Moussaoui that linked him to the September 11 attacks. At that same time, Rolince himself was not convinced that Moussaoui was tied to 9/11, saying "Whoever that fifth person was is probably still alive. Clearly we are looking into the pool of people who crossed paths with the hijackers." Only sometime later did that someone become Moussaoui and his un-searched info.
While Samit was spending a solid three weeks trying to get Washington to act on his pre-9/11 terror fears, future 9/11 hijacker Hani Hanjour was raising suspicions with his flight training in Phoenix (suspicions Samit was not told about until after 9/11). Margaret Chevrette of the Pan Am International Flight Academy reported her worries to the FAA and somehow those concerns also made their way to CIA chief Tenet and into CIA memos of August 2001, but the FBI never acted on them. Yet on September 12, FBI agents interviewed Chevrette for more information on Hanjour—reflecting the fact that another local FBI agent (Arizona-based Kenneth Williams, author of the July 2001 Phoenix memo) had notified FBI headquarters of the danger posed by Middle Eastern terrorists training at U.S. flight schools.
There were also repeated attempts by the New York City FBI office to get follow-up on Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi and an August 2001 request from a New York FBI agent who warned that "someday someone will die" if New York did not win approval to launch a criminal investigation of al-Mihdhar. Al-Mihdhar was on American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon.
Minneapolis, Phoenix, New York. Three different Bureau offices were hot on the terror plot in the days leading up to 9/11 and all were stiffed by Washington. If that is not institutional incompetence, Stalin purge-worthy stuff, heaven help the next 3,000 martyrs to J. Edgar Hoover's über-suits.
One exchange from the Moussaoui trial makes clear what happened in the weeks running up to 9/11:
"You tried to move heaven and earth to get a search warrant to search this man's belongings and you were obstructed," MacMahon said to Samit.
"Yes sir, I was obstructed." Samit replied.
No disaster, it seems, can force reform on the Bureau. The same people are still manning the posts at the FBI and Main Justice. They are going to miss the next terror attack because they are dead-certain to stop the last one. That's what bureaucracies do: cover ass. The Bureau's poisonous Andersen Consulting–with-arrest-powers culture remains unreformed and dangerously low-tech. New York City agents do not have enough e-mail addresses to go around, for example.
Instead of an effective anti-terror agency, the Bureau is morphing into a kind of Stasi Lite, keeping tabs on domestic subversives: assorted peaceniks, communists in Texas, and the League of Women Voters in Michigan, who had the gall to invite a critic of the PATRIOT Act to a panel discussion. There is a sort of logic to such surveillance: This what the FBI is good at, so this is what it does. Kinda of like looking for your car keys under a street light because the rest of the street is dark.
Still, for all the bungling in the dark the FBI has nothing to fear, not from a complicit Bush administration, not from a prostrate Congress, not from a bamboozled public. An e-mail sent to Agent Harry Samit on September 10, 2001 from a CIA Counterterrorism Center official identified only as "Cathy" points the way: "God help us all if the next terrorist attacks involves this same type of plane."
God? Cathy, dear, the FBI is God. Just look around.
Jeff A. Taylor writes the weekly Reason Express.
http://upi.com/InternationalIntelligence/v...31-051353-3671r
U.S. choices in Iraq civil war
By MARK N. KATZ
WASHINGTON, March 31 (UPI) -- Many observers believe that Iraq is about to be engulfed in a sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. Some think that this has already begun. If this civil war does indeed occur, it will present difficult choices for the United States.
If there is to be any hope of salvaging President Bush's plan for the democratization of Iraq, America must back the majority Shiites. This is because the victory of the minority Sunnis will necessarily result in a dictatorship since they cannot retain dominance democratically. The Shiites, though, could rule democratically if they choose to do so.
The U.S., of course, does not want a democracy which is a tyranny of the majority where minority rights are trampled on, and conflict continues. The U.S. wants a tolerant democracy, so lately it has been trying to reach out to the Sunni minority.
The problem with this, as the U.S. has discovered, is that Shiites unhappy with this can turn to Iran for support -- which would prefer to see a Shiite-dominated authoritarian regime like itself in Iraq, and not a democracy there which would inspire and perhaps even support Iran's own democratic opposition.
America, then, now finds itself in competition with Iran for influence among Iraqi Shiites. The more America does to reach out to the Sunnis, the more the Shiites are likely to turn to Iran.
America could, of course, abandon the Sunni minority and do everything it can to help the Shiites so that if they win the civil war, they will rule democratically and be pro-American, and not establish an Islamic republic and be pro-Iranian.
But if the U.S. does this, the Sunnis are likely to turn more and more to Sunni extremists such as Zarqawi.
Sunni-dominated authoritarian regimes in the Arab world may also help Iraqi Sunnis both to prevent Iranian-backed Shiites from gaining control of Iraq and threatening them, and to undercut the influence of Zarqawi and others linked to al Qaida.
One must not forget the Kurds either. They might well fear that no matter who wins a Sunni-Shiite war, the victor will then suppress them. The development of such a war, though, will give them the best chance possible of finally achieving independence -- de facto if not de jure.
If a full-fledged civil war does develop in Iraq that American forces cannot control, Congress and the next president (if not this one) may conclude that the most prudent, as well as politically popular, course of action would be for the U.S. to withdraw from Iraq. But if America leaves Iraq, a civil war could turn into a regional war if the Iranians intervene to help Iraqi Shiites, the Saudis facilitate the intervention of Egyptian and other Sunni-dominated Arab states to help Iraqi Sunnis, and the Turks intervene to suppress the Kurds. What is important to realize is that each of these interventions might occur not so much for offensive reasons, but because each of the intervening parties fears what might happen to it if its regional opponents become powerful in Iraq.
Obviously, the best thing America could do is to prevent a civil war from occurring and all these problems from arising. Many, though, believe that it is now too late to achieve this.
Considering that the U.S. has not been able to suppress Iraq's many armed movements, preventing not just these but entire communities determined to fight each other from doing so may well be impossible.
It appears that Pandora's Box has been well and truly opened in Iraq, and that there may no way to get the lid back on before the forces that have been unleashed destroy the box that once contained them all.
U.S. choices in Iraq civil war
By MARK N. KATZ
WASHINGTON, March 31 (UPI) -- Many observers believe that Iraq is about to be engulfed in a sectarian civil war between Sunnis and Shiites. Some think that this has already begun. If this civil war does indeed occur, it will present difficult choices for the United States.
If there is to be any hope of salvaging President Bush's plan for the democratization of Iraq, America must back the majority Shiites. This is because the victory of the minority Sunnis will necessarily result in a dictatorship since they cannot retain dominance democratically. The Shiites, though, could rule democratically if they choose to do so.
The U.S., of course, does not want a democracy which is a tyranny of the majority where minority rights are trampled on, and conflict continues. The U.S. wants a tolerant democracy, so lately it has been trying to reach out to the Sunni minority.
The problem with this, as the U.S. has discovered, is that Shiites unhappy with this can turn to Iran for support -- which would prefer to see a Shiite-dominated authoritarian regime like itself in Iraq, and not a democracy there which would inspire and perhaps even support Iran's own democratic opposition.
America, then, now finds itself in competition with Iran for influence among Iraqi Shiites. The more America does to reach out to the Sunnis, the more the Shiites are likely to turn to Iran.
America could, of course, abandon the Sunni minority and do everything it can to help the Shiites so that if they win the civil war, they will rule democratically and be pro-American, and not establish an Islamic republic and be pro-Iranian.
But if the U.S. does this, the Sunnis are likely to turn more and more to Sunni extremists such as Zarqawi.
Sunni-dominated authoritarian regimes in the Arab world may also help Iraqi Sunnis both to prevent Iranian-backed Shiites from gaining control of Iraq and threatening them, and to undercut the influence of Zarqawi and others linked to al Qaida.
One must not forget the Kurds either. They might well fear that no matter who wins a Sunni-Shiite war, the victor will then suppress them. The development of such a war, though, will give them the best chance possible of finally achieving independence -- de facto if not de jure.
If a full-fledged civil war does develop in Iraq that American forces cannot control, Congress and the next president (if not this one) may conclude that the most prudent, as well as politically popular, course of action would be for the U.S. to withdraw from Iraq. But if America leaves Iraq, a civil war could turn into a regional war if the Iranians intervene to help Iraqi Shiites, the Saudis facilitate the intervention of Egyptian and other Sunni-dominated Arab states to help Iraqi Sunnis, and the Turks intervene to suppress the Kurds. What is important to realize is that each of these interventions might occur not so much for offensive reasons, but because each of the intervening parties fears what might happen to it if its regional opponents become powerful in Iraq.
Obviously, the best thing America could do is to prevent a civil war from occurring and all these problems from arising. Many, though, believe that it is now too late to achieve this.
Considering that the U.S. has not been able to suppress Iraq's many armed movements, preventing not just these but entire communities determined to fight each other from doing so may well be impossible.
It appears that Pandora's Box has been well and truly opened in Iraq, and that there may no way to get the lid back on before the forces that have been unleashed destroy the box that once contained them all.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk/4869094.stm
Published: 2006/04/02 05:03:51 GMT
MoD denies Iran military meeting
Reports that military officers will meet government officials on Monday to discuss possible US-led military action against Iran have been denied.
A Ministry of Defence spokesman said there was no truth whatsoever in the claims, made in the Sunday Telegraph.
BBC Defence Correspondent Paul Wood said US plans for a possible strike are thought to be at an advanced stage.
But US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the US was "committed" to dealing with Iran diplomatically.
She told ITV1's Jonathan Dimbleby programme: "We believe that diplomacy has a chance to work but we are going to work with whomever we can, in whatever form we can, diplomatically, to try and bring the Iranians around.
There is well sourced and persistent speculation that American covert activities aimed at Iran are already underway
Paul Wood
"Iran is not Iraq. I know that's what's on people's minds. The circumstances are different."
She added: "However, the president of the United States doesn't take his options off the table."
UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who was also interviewed on the programme, said: "We are working very hard to resolve this by diplomatic means."
He conceded UN Security Council member Russia was "anxious" about Iran.
"They are worried about the possibility of the Iranians stirring up trouble for them, but they also share our high suspicions that Iran may be using its civil nuclear capability to develop a nuclear weapon and they do not want that," he said.
'No briefing'
The BBC's Paul Wood pointed out that many defence analysts expected that British military officials would have a wide range of contingency plans available including one for a possible US air strike on Iran.
"There is no sense that such a strike is imminent, however there is well sourced and persistent speculation that American covert activities aimed at Iran are already underway," he said.
The Sunday Telegraph reported that "a high-level meeting will take place on Monday in the Ministry of Defence at which senior defence chiefs and government officials will consider the consequences of an attack on Iran."
The newspaper stated that senior military officials would attend the meeting, along with officials from the Foreign Office and Downing Street.
Deadline
In addition to denying that there would be any such meeting, the MoD said: "There will be no briefing of the prime minister and the Cabinet office in this regard, nor are there any plans for such a briefing."
Last week the five permanent members of the UN Security Council gave Iran 30 days to suspend uranium enrichment or face isolation.
According to the newspaper report, "an American-led attack, designed to destroy Iran's ability to develop a nuclear bomb, is 'inevitable' if Tehran's leaders fail to comply with United Nations demands".
Tehran insists its nuclear activities are peaceful and has rejected the council's demand.
Published: 2006/04/02 05:03:51 GMT
MoD denies Iran military meeting
Reports that military officers will meet government officials on Monday to discuss possible US-led military action against Iran have been denied.
A Ministry of Defence spokesman said there was no truth whatsoever in the claims, made in the Sunday Telegraph.
BBC Defence Correspondent Paul Wood said US plans for a possible strike are thought to be at an advanced stage.
But US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the US was "committed" to dealing with Iran diplomatically.
She told ITV1's Jonathan Dimbleby programme: "We believe that diplomacy has a chance to work but we are going to work with whomever we can, in whatever form we can, diplomatically, to try and bring the Iranians around.
There is well sourced and persistent speculation that American covert activities aimed at Iran are already underway
Paul Wood
"Iran is not Iraq. I know that's what's on people's minds. The circumstances are different."
She added: "However, the president of the United States doesn't take his options off the table."
UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, who was also interviewed on the programme, said: "We are working very hard to resolve this by diplomatic means."
He conceded UN Security Council member Russia was "anxious" about Iran.
"They are worried about the possibility of the Iranians stirring up trouble for them, but they also share our high suspicions that Iran may be using its civil nuclear capability to develop a nuclear weapon and they do not want that," he said.
'No briefing'
The BBC's Paul Wood pointed out that many defence analysts expected that British military officials would have a wide range of contingency plans available including one for a possible US air strike on Iran.
"There is no sense that such a strike is imminent, however there is well sourced and persistent speculation that American covert activities aimed at Iran are already underway," he said.
The Sunday Telegraph reported that "a high-level meeting will take place on Monday in the Ministry of Defence at which senior defence chiefs and government officials will consider the consequences of an attack on Iran."
The newspaper stated that senior military officials would attend the meeting, along with officials from the Foreign Office and Downing Street.
Deadline
In addition to denying that there would be any such meeting, the MoD said: "There will be no briefing of the prime minister and the Cabinet office in this regard, nor are there any plans for such a briefing."
Last week the five permanent members of the UN Security Council gave Iran 30 days to suspend uranium enrichment or face isolation.
According to the newspaper report, "an American-led attack, designed to destroy Iran's ability to develop a nuclear bomb, is 'inevitable' if Tehran's leaders fail to comply with United Nations demands".
Tehran insists its nuclear activities are peaceful and has rejected the council's demand.
How We've Improved Intelligence
By John A. Kringen
Nearly one year ago, President Bush's commission on weapons of mass destruction released its report identifying shortcomings in the intelligence community. Many of the commission's judgments dealt with analysis, the discipline I lead at the CIA. The primary criticism was that our analysts were "too...
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
By John A. Kringen
Nearly one year ago, President Bush's commission on weapons of mass destruction released its report identifying shortcomings in the intelligence community. Many of the commission's judgments dealt with analysis, the discipline I lead at the CIA. The primary criticism was that our analysts were "too...
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/040306Z.shtml
Fitzgerald Knew Identity of Leaker From Start
By Jason Leopold
t r u t h o u t | Report
Monday 03 April 2006
The special counsel appointed in late December 2003 to investigate the leak of covert CIA operative Valerie Plame Wilson found out the identity of the Bush administration official who disclosed her undercover status to syndicated columnist Robert Novak just two months after the probe began.
But in early February 2004, a month after he started the investigation, Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald shifted gears and started to build a perjury and obstruction of justice case against White House Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove and Vice President Dick Cheney's former Chief of Staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby according to several attorneys close to the investigation.
That month, Justice Department investigators working on the leak case approached a senior official in the Office of Vice President Dick Cheney who had been identified by witnesses as having played a major role in the Plame Wilson leak.
The Bush administration official was given an ultimatum: either cooperate with the special counsel's probe or face criminal charges for his involvement in the leak, attorneys close to the case said.
The senior official decided to cooperate with the investigation and told Fitzgerald that Libby and Rove spoke to reporters about Plame Wilson, the attorneys said.
The official has been identified by attorneys and four current and former White House officials as John Hannah, a senior national security aide on loan to Vice President Dick Cheney from then-Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John Bolton.
Hannah worked with Libby on the issue of weapons of mass destruction as part of an informal team known as the "White House Iraq Group." Hannah told friends last year that he was worried he might be implicated by the investigation, according to a report in the Washington Post.
Libby was indicted on five counts of perjury, obstruction of justice, and lying to investigators related to his role in the leak. Hannah was named Cheney's national security adviser the day Libby was indicted.
Hannah's cooperation early on in the leak investigation ultimately helped Fitzgerald and his staff discover the identity of the Bush administration official who leaked information about Plame Wilson's work with the CIA to Novak, these sources said.
The identity of the individual is still unknown. No one in the White House was aware that Hannah was cooperating with the special counsel, the sources said, adding that information Hannah provided to Fitzgerald was instrumental in securing a perjury indictment against Libby. Hannah's attorney did not return numerous calls for comment.
The disclosure of Plame Wilson's identity and CIA status was an attempt by White House officials to discredit Plame Wilson's husband, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, a critic of the administration's pr-war Iraq intelligence.
Wilson wrote an editorial in the New York Times on July 6, 2003, accusing President Bush of knowingly "twisting" Iraq intelligence by citing bogus claims in his January 2003 State of the Union address about Iraq's attempt to acquire yellow-cake uranium from Niger. Wilson revealed that he had personally traveled to Niger a year earlier on behalf of the CIA to check out the uranium allegations and had reported back that it was untrue.
A week after Wilson's editorial was published, Novak printed the identity of Wilson's wife and said she worked at the CIA. He said two White House officials told him the trip was a boondoggle because Plame Wilson had recommended her husband to check out the Niger claims.
Fitzgerald was tapped by the Department of Justice in December 2003 to investigate whether White House officials violated a 1982 federal law making it a felony to knowingly disclose the identity of an undercover CIA officer.
A month or so after obtaining testimony from Hannah and more than a dozen other senior White House officials who may have been involved in the leak, Fitzgerald sent a letter to his boss, then-acting Attorney General James Comey, seeking confirmation that he had the authority to investigate and prosecute individuals for additional crimes that may have been committed during the probe.
Comey responded to Fitzgerald in writing on February 6, 2004, confirming that the special prosecutor had the authority to prosecute "perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses."
It was the conflicting testimony Fitzgerald obtained from I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby and Karl Rove that prompted Fitzgerald to send a letter to Comey, attorneys and current and former administration officials close to the probe said.
From the moment Fitzgerald received Comey's response, the investigation changed course and moved to an obstruction of justice and perjury probe against Rove and Libby, the sources close to the investigation said.
Rove was questioned by FBI investigators at least five times between October 2003 and February 2004. Libby was questioned by investigators at least twice during that time, according to attorneys familiar with Rove and Libby's interviews with investigators.
Libby and Rove said in interviews with FBI investigators that they found out about Plame Wilson's identity from reporters. Rove testified that he couldn't recall who in the media told him that Plame Wilson worked for the CIA and was married to the former ambassador.
Rove told FBI investigators on five occasions and testified twice before a grand jury that he distributed damaging information about Plame to the Republican National Committee, outside political consultants and the media after Novak had disclosed her identity, according to the attorneys who are familiar with Rove's testimony.
However, Rove was actually a source for Novak and another reporter who wrote about Plame Wilson but failed to disclose that fact in nearly a dozen times he was questioned about his role in the leak.
Sources said that Fitzgerald is now preparing the paperwork to present to a grand jury outlining the charges against Rove in hopes of securing an indictment.
The attorneys close to the case said that in order to build a rock-solid perjury and obstruction case against Libby, Fitzgerald needed to secure the testimony of the journalists Libby spoke to about Plame Wilson.
The investigation surely would have ended in 2004, the attorneys said, but journalists Fitzgerald subpoenaed went to court to fight the subpoena and the legal challenge delayed the case for nearly a year.
In the end, the testimony of Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper and New York Times reporter Judith Miller - both of whom identified Libby as their source of information on Plame Wilson - convinced the grand jury that Libby lied about his role in the leak.
In the interest of fairness, any person identified in this story who believes he has been portrayed unfairly or that the information about him is untrue will have the opportunity to respond in this space.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Leopold spent two years covering California's electricity crisis as Los Angeles bureau chief of Dow Jones Newswires. Jason has spent the last year cultivating sources close to the CIA leak investigation, and is a regular contributor to t r u t h o u t.
-------
Fitzgerald Knew Identity of Leaker From Start
By Jason Leopold
t r u t h o u t | Report
Monday 03 April 2006
The special counsel appointed in late December 2003 to investigate the leak of covert CIA operative Valerie Plame Wilson found out the identity of the Bush administration official who disclosed her undercover status to syndicated columnist Robert Novak just two months after the probe began.
But in early February 2004, a month after he started the investigation, Special Prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald shifted gears and started to build a perjury and obstruction of justice case against White House Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove and Vice President Dick Cheney's former Chief of Staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby according to several attorneys close to the investigation.
That month, Justice Department investigators working on the leak case approached a senior official in the Office of Vice President Dick Cheney who had been identified by witnesses as having played a major role in the Plame Wilson leak.
The Bush administration official was given an ultimatum: either cooperate with the special counsel's probe or face criminal charges for his involvement in the leak, attorneys close to the case said.
The senior official decided to cooperate with the investigation and told Fitzgerald that Libby and Rove spoke to reporters about Plame Wilson, the attorneys said.
The official has been identified by attorneys and four current and former White House officials as John Hannah, a senior national security aide on loan to Vice President Dick Cheney from then-Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs John Bolton.
Hannah worked with Libby on the issue of weapons of mass destruction as part of an informal team known as the "White House Iraq Group." Hannah told friends last year that he was worried he might be implicated by the investigation, according to a report in the Washington Post.
Libby was indicted on five counts of perjury, obstruction of justice, and lying to investigators related to his role in the leak. Hannah was named Cheney's national security adviser the day Libby was indicted.
Hannah's cooperation early on in the leak investigation ultimately helped Fitzgerald and his staff discover the identity of the Bush administration official who leaked information about Plame Wilson's work with the CIA to Novak, these sources said.
The identity of the individual is still unknown. No one in the White House was aware that Hannah was cooperating with the special counsel, the sources said, adding that information Hannah provided to Fitzgerald was instrumental in securing a perjury indictment against Libby. Hannah's attorney did not return numerous calls for comment.
The disclosure of Plame Wilson's identity and CIA status was an attempt by White House officials to discredit Plame Wilson's husband, former Ambassador Joseph Wilson, a critic of the administration's pr-war Iraq intelligence.
Wilson wrote an editorial in the New York Times on July 6, 2003, accusing President Bush of knowingly "twisting" Iraq intelligence by citing bogus claims in his January 2003 State of the Union address about Iraq's attempt to acquire yellow-cake uranium from Niger. Wilson revealed that he had personally traveled to Niger a year earlier on behalf of the CIA to check out the uranium allegations and had reported back that it was untrue.
A week after Wilson's editorial was published, Novak printed the identity of Wilson's wife and said she worked at the CIA. He said two White House officials told him the trip was a boondoggle because Plame Wilson had recommended her husband to check out the Niger claims.
Fitzgerald was tapped by the Department of Justice in December 2003 to investigate whether White House officials violated a 1982 federal law making it a felony to knowingly disclose the identity of an undercover CIA officer.
A month or so after obtaining testimony from Hannah and more than a dozen other senior White House officials who may have been involved in the leak, Fitzgerald sent a letter to his boss, then-acting Attorney General James Comey, seeking confirmation that he had the authority to investigate and prosecute individuals for additional crimes that may have been committed during the probe.
Comey responded to Fitzgerald in writing on February 6, 2004, confirming that the special prosecutor had the authority to prosecute "perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses."
It was the conflicting testimony Fitzgerald obtained from I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby and Karl Rove that prompted Fitzgerald to send a letter to Comey, attorneys and current and former administration officials close to the probe said.
From the moment Fitzgerald received Comey's response, the investigation changed course and moved to an obstruction of justice and perjury probe against Rove and Libby, the sources close to the investigation said.
Rove was questioned by FBI investigators at least five times between October 2003 and February 2004. Libby was questioned by investigators at least twice during that time, according to attorneys familiar with Rove and Libby's interviews with investigators.
Libby and Rove said in interviews with FBI investigators that they found out about Plame Wilson's identity from reporters. Rove testified that he couldn't recall who in the media told him that Plame Wilson worked for the CIA and was married to the former ambassador.
Rove told FBI investigators on five occasions and testified twice before a grand jury that he distributed damaging information about Plame to the Republican National Committee, outside political consultants and the media after Novak had disclosed her identity, according to the attorneys who are familiar with Rove's testimony.
However, Rove was actually a source for Novak and another reporter who wrote about Plame Wilson but failed to disclose that fact in nearly a dozen times he was questioned about his role in the leak.
Sources said that Fitzgerald is now preparing the paperwork to present to a grand jury outlining the charges against Rove in hopes of securing an indictment.
The attorneys close to the case said that in order to build a rock-solid perjury and obstruction case against Libby, Fitzgerald needed to secure the testimony of the journalists Libby spoke to about Plame Wilson.
The investigation surely would have ended in 2004, the attorneys said, but journalists Fitzgerald subpoenaed went to court to fight the subpoena and the legal challenge delayed the case for nearly a year.
In the end, the testimony of Time magazine reporter Matthew Cooper and New York Times reporter Judith Miller - both of whom identified Libby as their source of information on Plame Wilson - convinced the grand jury that Libby lied about his role in the leak.
In the interest of fairness, any person identified in this story who believes he has been portrayed unfairly or that the information about him is untrue will have the opportunity to respond in this space.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jason Leopold spent two years covering California's electricity crisis as Los Angeles bureau chief of Dow Jones Newswires. Jason has spent the last year cultivating sources close to the CIA leak investigation, and is a regular contributor to t r u t h o u t.
-------
http://www.counterpunch.org/thieme04032006.html
The CIA: Cowboys, Indians and Whistleblowers
By RICHARD THIEME
David MacMichael is a former CIA Analyst, US Marine and historian. He was a senior estimates officer with special responsibility for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the CIA's National Intelligence Council from 1981 to 1983. He resigned from the CIA rather than falsify reports for political reasons and testified at the World Court on the illegalities of Iran-Contra.
MacMichael started The Association of National Security Alumni, an organization to expose and curtail covert actions, and is a steering committee member of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).
We met at an Intelligence Ethics Conference that gathered nearly two hundred professionals from a broad spectrum of perspectives to discuss the impact of a career in intelligence on the moral and ethical life of the intelligence professional.
MacMichael discusses his background, ethical issues in intelligence, and the relevance of Iran-Contra to current national security issues.
RT: David, we discussed technology and the intelligence community
DM: That's a term I hate! It sounds so warm and fuzzy.
RT: What do you prefer?
DM: Intelligence system.
RT: OK. Technology and the intelligence system.
DM: For years I worked at SRI (Stanford Research Institute) and Uri Geller and people like that were always floating through. I was supposed to be a voice of sanity but they did get me thinking about certain things that show up in your piece on technology (MacMichael reviewed my essay, The Changing Context of Intelligence and Ethics:
Enabling Technologies as Transformational Engines) and what is happening there in the intelligence community. Jacques Ellul wrote of how technology defines the way the world operates and if it has an evil purpose or one that is wrong by previous standards, it will be used anyway.
I was a history professor, and I think of Diderot in the 18th century France. The Encyclopedia was really a technical manual that exposed what had previously been referred to as "the mysteries" of the craft guilds. Transforming mystery into knowledge became a basis for the industrial revolution. That kind of change is significant and impacts the issues you raise on the ethical side about the intelligence system.
Which brings me to an important question: What has all of that got to do with "intelligence?" I think of all the crazy science they did in MKULTRA and MKSEARCH and programs like that. How did that relate to gathering intelligence in order to inform policies?
Another point you make is that transformation imposed by global multi-national corporations that transcend all national boundaries make the concept of nation states in conflict highly questionable. In the 19th and 20th centuries, conflicts were between nation states. But even so, you can go back through any historical atlas and look at the post-Roman empire and its like a kaleidoscope as you turn through the maps as the borders and shapes of geographical structures change.
RT: The maps in people's minds are more permanent than the territories represented by the maps. Now neuro-science is mapping regions of the brain-
DM: Yes, and from Ellul's perspective, that translates into control. Control is what programs like MK Ultra were about and that raises critical ethical issues.
I worked at Stanford with Harvey Weinstein a psychiatrist who headed student psychiatric services for the university. Harvey became a psychiatrist because his father was a victim of MKULTRA experimentation. His father deteriorated into depression and worse as a consequence of Ewen Cameron's crazy science, but the family was told his father was going through this because he was not sufficiently cooperative with his treatment. That pushed Harvey into psychiatry. In the late seventies, after the revelations of the Church and Pike Committee hearings, he became aware of the real causes.
Why are those devastating techniques lumped in with intelligence at all? That goes to the more basic question of why are intelligence and covert operations lumped together? Intelligence is about information. The rule of thumb for covert operations is that there is 75% disinformation. The ethical issues are difficult to reconcile. One is based on truth and other on its opposite.
RT: Friends in one of the agencies complain of the hubris that blinds people inside to a sense of accountability toward the people i.e. citizens like us, who pay their salaries. Disinformation coming out of the agencies directed toward enemies can not be distinguished from disinformation directed toward the population. In addition, propaganda is impossible to protect from blowback because of network of the information systems we all inhabit. How do we seek the larger truth and articulate it in order to inform responsible policy discussions. Is it even possible?
DM: I like to go back before the Neocons with their Machiavellian intellectual base and quote Walter Lippman who made the same point. Matters of foreign affairs and international policy are too far beyond the ability of the populace to understand, he said, so they have to be conducted in secret and there must be no transparency.
RT: Tell me more about your background.
DM: I was not a professional intelligence officer. I had ten years in the US Marine Corps, resigned my commission in 1959, and went back to grad school. I was an NDEA fellow at the U of Oregon and received advanced degrees in history. I taught for a few years and because of my military background and because I specialized in military history with a focus on Latin America I was contacted by SRI which had a lot of DOD contracts. Counter insurgency was the new thing. In the Corps, I went to Special Forces School. We always prepare for the last war and the whole focus was to repeat the OSS experience in the event of war with the Soviet Union. Special Forces was created because the military never wanted to see anything like OSS again. The plan was, teams would go into eastern Europe to create insurgencies, but in a few years it became obvious that the insurgencies in the colonies of post-war allies had to be "countered"--so counter insurgency was developed. DOD was letting contracts like crazy. SRI hired me to go to Central America and do classified work. They had gotten a big contract from ARPA (later DARPA) for a counter insurgency center in Thailand and I worked on that.
There was a battle going on in Thailand between the Ambassador Graham Martin and military advisors headed by Richard Stillwell. They were battling for control of our major aid programs which had to be justified in terms of security. Martin and Stillwell hated each other so the White House of course chose someone who hated both of them and was hated by them, Peer De Silva, who wrote a memoir ( Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence. New York: New York Times Books, 1978). He was security officer on the Manhattan Project and transferred into the new CIA.
He was restricted in terms of how many people he could take to Thailand so he had to staff from what was there. My colleague. John Huxley, had been station chief in Pakistan, and told him to get me and I worked for him for four years in the US Embassy. That where I made my contacts with the agency and the branch office of the station and when I returned to the USA I did contract work for them. Then, as a consultant, I worked with John Nesbitt the technologist during the last years of Stan Turners control of the agency, when they were trying to reconstruct the old Board of National Estimates type of operation.
They wanted outside people with background and reputation to head the Analytic Group at the National Intelligence Council to be responsible for writing national intelligence estimates. I went to work for Harold Ford. I was responsible for western hemisphere estimates along with another and the focus came to be on the Contra war.
I was diligent. No matter who I talked to, who I pumped, I was unable to come up with anything in support of the main rationale for the Contra operation. I had serious problems with the characterization of the Sandinista government.
This tells you how the system actually works. This is relevant to what's happening now. I was asked to do an estimate on the Sandinista government and I did an assessment and a projection which all came true but did not fit the policy makers' desires. That's why it resonates with the WMD controversy. Ford backed me up but William Casey (Director of the CIA) said no, this can not go out as a special estimate. It was published as an intelligence research memorandum and went into the file and that was that.
After two years with the analytic group, I could not continue. I did not want anything else in the agency. Instead I traveled at my own expense in Central America and the more I learned the more clear it became that the operation was whacko. If I was going to speak out I had better do it because I knew of well developed US plans for an invasion of Nicaragua. I was well aware of what we had done elsewhere and if I was going to speak out it should be before the fact instead of after.
At the 1985 elections in Nicaragua, I was an observer; it was going to be verified as a fair and open election but right before the election this is how disinformation is fed to the press news was broken that Nicaragua was going to receive a big shipment of MIG aircraft.
RT: Was the relationship between the CIA and the media as subtle then as it is now?
DM: It was very subtle over that entire long period. The operational role of opinion control came directly out of the Second World War. It applies to any war time situation; war requires you to enlist the media to push in the best sense of the word war propaganda. This is what you want out, and you're part of the war effort, you're supporting your country, and in the Cold War, the same rationale was invoked. You have to understand that many people were involved who had been intellectually attracted to an alternative of what was seen as destructive and failed capitalism and were working with the Communist Party and were then disillusioned by events in eastern Europe. They were brought in and did this in the momentum of World War 2. They believed they were supporting our country and you had to conceal their activity--now this is very powerful, this idea of being on the inside of that effort, it is so attractive, so powerful. A big threat to any who wanted to speak up was that you would lose access, and you want so much to be on the inside. This keeps many people in the intelligence system, besides the usual reasons like salary, pension, and the like. They're afraid that if they speak up, they will lose their access.
RT: Shunning is a primitive and powerful reinforcement.
DM: You'll see this in the hearings coming up on whistle blowers. I know many of these people and what fractures a lot of them and makes them so upset is that when they raise concerns, not so much about policy but about the way it is carried out, they lose their security clearance. You have to understand how critical this is. It means everything to a person. Everything.
RT: The consequences are so serious.
DM: Oh, they are. I know prominent whistle blowers who still deal with this after many years. "These were my colleagues," they say. "These were my friends. But suddenly I am not a colleague or a friend." It's like the clubbiness of the Foreign Service; when you're no longer welcome at certain parties or in certain houses, it's a serious blow.
Now, I had gotten some good press and I hired a lawyer, Melvin Wolfe, who was chief counsel of the ACLU and had worked with Victor Marchetti on publishing his CIA memoirs. I did not want to be prosecuted and I did not wish to go to jail. Mel said he would be able to defend me. I reviewed the form I had signed with the agency. The story was going to go out and I gave Wolfe a magazine article I wanted to publish in which I said everything I felt I had to say as well as some things I was certain they would block. I said, Mel, take this to the publications review board at the agency--and it worked out exactly as I anticipated. They passed through what I believed was necessary for me to say, who I was, the critical evidence, and blocked out the other stuff which I was certain they would not let me say. Now I had a guideline for the rest of the eighties, for speaking and helping to organize the Association of National Security Alumni. I used that action as my guideline. Occasionally Wolfe would check--there was a lot of surveillance on me as well--and the word he got was, that son of a bitch keeps going right up to the line but he never goes over.
I was not heroic or seeking martyrdom and it seemed to work. I testified at the World Court which was very important to me--that was an important event and had an impact on foreign policy. We evolved a growing community even then of former intelligence officers, John Stockwell and others who put the association together, and I became the Washington representative. We published our magazine Unclassified bimonthly for 5-6 years. It was a good magazine and attacked a lot of these issues and had a reasonable circulation. Lots of media people used it.
RT: Can you evaluate the impact of what you did?
DM: In terms of impact, timing is important. We broadened the conversation on the use of intelligence. The slogan I devised was: we are not opposed to intelligence but we are opposed to covert paramilitary operations which by definition are violations of international law. The timing was important because of the Iran-Contra hearings--but in fact, in terms of impact, it was discouraging to see how Congress dealt with it. It was the most significant constitutional scandal we had had and they pushed it under the rug. The facts cried out for impeachment. The emotional quality of words is important when you get involved at this level and impeachment is one of those words. The use of those words climaxed or I should say anti-climaxed with eleventh hour pardons from George Bush the First. It left a bad feeling, to say the least.
What was the use? What did it matter, everything we did?
RT: It creates cynicism.
DM: Oh, did it ever.
It's an old story. In the Book of Samuel, the people said they wanted a King. Samuel said, I'll tell you what will happen if you have a King: he'll take your young men and send them to war, take your money to build himself houses, take your women for his own projects, and he'll put incredible taxes on you.
And the people of Israel said, We want a King! and that was that.
How much has changed?
RT: The conference on Intelligence and Ethics is an attempt to build a context for examining these issues and what it does to intelligence professionals over a lifetime to do, to know, to hear about what you describe. Do you think the project is viable?
DM: In the most brutal organizations--in the Gestapo, for example--a miniscule proportion of the people in the organization participate in the worst barbarities. Most go home, play with their kids, are nice to their neighbors, and can deal with it. The further you are away from actually doing it,the less problems you have. Firing a Tomahawk missile is not hand-to-hand combat.
But we can talk about this in terms of war crimes. Attacks on civilian population centers are prohibited but in WWI we were ready to do it and then, in WW2, none of the aerial attacks in violation of those norms like incendiary bombings in Japan were ever brought up. Is that the American way of war or simply the industrial way of war? I don't know.
My background gave me some credibility when I spoke out and I hope it had some impact on members of Congress. Did that effect policy? I can't say. My greatest disappointment was in 1988 when I was asked by the Dukakis campaign and the Democratic National Committee to make presentations on how to use this issue and I was so disappointed by their response. I had been speaking all around the country and said, if you take on this issue in 1988 and say, if I'm elected, the Contra program is over, there are groups all over the country that will respond, but my God, the waffling! Oh well, they said, well, yes, but you know, and all that. The inability of people to grasp these particular nettles is one reason their campaigns deflate. Talk about impact, you can generate ten thousand letters to the editor but it does not have political impact. In those dreadful hearings, the expose went on and on--but for what?
RT: Well? Was it worth it?
DM: You find yourself in this situation maybe once in a lifetime. You only come to the plate once and had better take your swings. I took my swings. That was my one ethical plus in a lifetime of unethical behavior.
RT: You distinguish covert operations from gathering intelligence. Doesn't that go back to how the law creating the CIA was interpreted?
DM: The specific law establishing the CIA, the National Security Act of 1947, directed the CIA to carry out other activities of an intelligence nature as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.What the hell did that mean? The first General Counsel of the CIA, asked if it meant the behind-the-lines kinds of operations the OSS had carried out, said, Absolutely not.But Frank Wisner and others grabbed onto the language;, Wisner with his mighty Wurlitzercranking out propaganda, went adventuring. Yet you know most of those early escapades were total disasters.
RT: So much was ill-conceived
DM: Yes, but oh, the glamour of doing it
RT: The Oliver North syndrome.
DM: The attraction of playing cowboys and Indians is so great. So you have to question whether we can even discuss ethics and intelligence in the same breath. The New York Times wrote an article about our conference and quoted Dewey Claridge. "Ethics? Are you crazy? You go into this line of business, you're expected to do this."
I recall when the General Counsel for the CIA let down her guard in an interview with AP and said, yes, we lie cheat steal and occasionally kill but overall, the people in the CIA are as fine a bunch as you'll ever find anywhere!
RT: I am told that EO 12333 (Executive Order 12333 prohibits assassinations and other specific activities) is being rewritten. "Stand by," were the final words of General Hayden as to whether current NSA activities were covered. But my sense is that it was always being rewritten.
DM: Of course it was. I think of the law professor at the University of Virginia who was heading a panel of the law association on ethics and intelligence in the early nineties and said, on the matter of assassination, well, that term is not really correctly used, it should not be directed at every intent to kill someone.
RT: What drove all this, David? What compelled intelligent people to get so wild?
DM: Like so much in the intelligence system, it looked sexy to some people and above all, THE MONEY WAS THERE. That drives all of this. People will do what they can fund. The lines between organizations and proprietaries and contractors and agencies are very blurred and the money is more like a transmission belt than a revolving door. When I did contract work, I did some projects I was not all that proud of, some of the work was questionablelike various interrogation technologies that have been worked on for thirty years, measuring changes in the size of the pupil of the eye to see if someone's lying--I tend to be dismissive of those efforts but when you're looking for "capabilities and intentions," there is a whole lot of road to look at and not a lot of rubber. The faintest skid marks are supposed to tell you significant things but interpreting the marks is not easy. Intelligence is divided into two parts: one is Tactical Intelligence and Related Activity (TIARA). TIARA is usually pretty good and you have the ability to know through surveillance or interceptions where various enemy units are, that's what I used and looked at in the Marine Corps. That's hard enough in the well-known fog of war. But when you take it to this other level where you're fumbling with intentions, industrial capabilities, etc. it's useful for discussion but is it really useful for immediate action and decision making? It's questionable. The intelligence is several steps removed the real. So how useful is it? You have to understand that once the analytic side, not the operational side, is wedded to using these techniques, you're like a tenured professor working in your area of specialty, you get enormous satisfaction from doing so, and you get funded. But how useful is it?
The only time I ever heard ethical issues raised in relationship to our work came when someone stood back and looked at what they were doing and said: what am I doing? what am I really doing?
RT: Is there realistic accountability to the citizens of the country and the Constitution? Is meaningful transparency possible?
DM: I know someone who sued the CIA because he said they did not meet the terms of their contract with him. He operated a proprietary or front organization for them and shipped various things around the world. When he told them he wanted to stop, they said he couldn't. He sued the agency under a law that applied to law enforcement and the agency actually informed the court that the individual he named in his suit was a CIA officer and therefore the case should be dismissed since they were not law enforcement.
You'll hear it said that intelligence professionals can not operate outside the law. But Lawrence Welch said, there IS a class of people who can not be held accountable under the law.
The issue of transparency raises another issue: when is it ethical to speak out? They use "national security" to cover everything now. The state secrecy issue is completely out of hand. If you accept that the citizen has a right to know information that directly impacts him, does the person who has that knowledge have the requirement to inform him? The same applies to classification and compartmentalization.
Remember how all intelligence systems operate. The operations officer in the CIA station has one primary responsibility: to recruit agents. Agents, by definition, are citizens of the government of the country in which the station chief operates. An agent is someone who provides information or services FOR A CONSIDERATION--this is important, we don't let people volunteer to work for us--and therefore is a traitor to his own country. We are in the business of soliciting people to betray their loyalties. Thats the nature of the business.
So how can we discuss these critical ethical issues in that context?. Those early fiascoes came to a head with the Korean effort. We had an elaborate network out of Seoul reporting exact and precise information about North Korea but when it was reviewed, we learned that 90% of the agents running out of Seoul were doubled by the North Koreans. An enormous fiasco. Beetle Smith, CIA director at the time, said, we're not going to write a report on this because if it ever gets out, it would be the end of the CIA.
The question is: given that the mission of the CIA station is to recruit agents, why would a country knowingly allow a CIA station to be established? As we said, the record of the agency in the first years was a fiasco--forget about the Italian election, that was just a good Bronx-style election that we bought.
RT: After the Italian election and the demise of Arbenz in Guatemala, they said, this is easy. It went to their heads.
DM: The penetration in hard targets, the Soviet Union, eastern Europe, and after 1949, China--that did not happen. In the fifties and sixties, at the height of the post-colonial period, the CIA turned its attention to Latin America and that's where they had success because those targets are so soft, the societies are so corrupt, and the guys in the security agencies lined up--believe me--and said, sign me up! It's a good payday. That's where so many careers were made. I saw many of these operations going on in Africa, Latin America, and in Bangkok where I worked--this in itself is an "ethical issue." You are persuading people to do this.
RT: In and of itself, you are saying, the nature of the work breaks ethical norms as we understand them in other contexts. It's about control by nearly any means.
DM: Yes. My late colleague, Diane Kuntz, served in the station in Lima Peru. A junior officer at the Chinese embassy requested a particular prostitute. So they got the cameras in there and filmed, that was always fun, but what ticked Diane off is that all the other officers at the station watched the films on a weekly basis but they wouldn't let her watch.
After they had enough stuff on the guy, they arranged for an agency officer to storm in and see this guy, shrieking that this woman is his daughter and bad things will happen and they have these films and then they make the pitch. This guy did what any sensible person would do. He went to his superiors and told them what happened, this is what they asked, and he was on the next plane back to Beijing and went on with his career.
The point is, they're always looking for things like that to trap people, and you rationalize it, you justify it, you say, this is my job and were obtaining information that we need, and if your skin isn't thick enough to do it--then get a different job.
Richard Thieme is an author and speaker focused on the deeper implications of technology, religion, and science. He also writes fiction and his short story, Gibby the Sit-down King, was recently nominated for a Pushcart Prize. He can be reached at: rthieme@thiemeworks.com
The CIA: Cowboys, Indians and Whistleblowers
By RICHARD THIEME
David MacMichael is a former CIA Analyst, US Marine and historian. He was a senior estimates officer with special responsibility for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the CIA's National Intelligence Council from 1981 to 1983. He resigned from the CIA rather than falsify reports for political reasons and testified at the World Court on the illegalities of Iran-Contra.
MacMichael started The Association of National Security Alumni, an organization to expose and curtail covert actions, and is a steering committee member of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).
We met at an Intelligence Ethics Conference that gathered nearly two hundred professionals from a broad spectrum of perspectives to discuss the impact of a career in intelligence on the moral and ethical life of the intelligence professional.
MacMichael discusses his background, ethical issues in intelligence, and the relevance of Iran-Contra to current national security issues.
RT: David, we discussed technology and the intelligence community
DM: That's a term I hate! It sounds so warm and fuzzy.
RT: What do you prefer?
DM: Intelligence system.
RT: OK. Technology and the intelligence system.
DM: For years I worked at SRI (Stanford Research Institute) and Uri Geller and people like that were always floating through. I was supposed to be a voice of sanity but they did get me thinking about certain things that show up in your piece on technology (MacMichael reviewed my essay, The Changing Context of Intelligence and Ethics:
Enabling Technologies as Transformational Engines) and what is happening there in the intelligence community. Jacques Ellul wrote of how technology defines the way the world operates and if it has an evil purpose or one that is wrong by previous standards, it will be used anyway.
I was a history professor, and I think of Diderot in the 18th century France. The Encyclopedia was really a technical manual that exposed what had previously been referred to as "the mysteries" of the craft guilds. Transforming mystery into knowledge became a basis for the industrial revolution. That kind of change is significant and impacts the issues you raise on the ethical side about the intelligence system.
Which brings me to an important question: What has all of that got to do with "intelligence?" I think of all the crazy science they did in MKULTRA and MKSEARCH and programs like that. How did that relate to gathering intelligence in order to inform policies?
Another point you make is that transformation imposed by global multi-national corporations that transcend all national boundaries make the concept of nation states in conflict highly questionable. In the 19th and 20th centuries, conflicts were between nation states. But even so, you can go back through any historical atlas and look at the post-Roman empire and its like a kaleidoscope as you turn through the maps as the borders and shapes of geographical structures change.
RT: The maps in people's minds are more permanent than the territories represented by the maps. Now neuro-science is mapping regions of the brain-
DM: Yes, and from Ellul's perspective, that translates into control. Control is what programs like MK Ultra were about and that raises critical ethical issues.
I worked at Stanford with Harvey Weinstein a psychiatrist who headed student psychiatric services for the university. Harvey became a psychiatrist because his father was a victim of MKULTRA experimentation. His father deteriorated into depression and worse as a consequence of Ewen Cameron's crazy science, but the family was told his father was going through this because he was not sufficiently cooperative with his treatment. That pushed Harvey into psychiatry. In the late seventies, after the revelations of the Church and Pike Committee hearings, he became aware of the real causes.
Why are those devastating techniques lumped in with intelligence at all? That goes to the more basic question of why are intelligence and covert operations lumped together? Intelligence is about information. The rule of thumb for covert operations is that there is 75% disinformation. The ethical issues are difficult to reconcile. One is based on truth and other on its opposite.
RT: Friends in one of the agencies complain of the hubris that blinds people inside to a sense of accountability toward the people i.e. citizens like us, who pay their salaries. Disinformation coming out of the agencies directed toward enemies can not be distinguished from disinformation directed toward the population. In addition, propaganda is impossible to protect from blowback because of network of the information systems we all inhabit. How do we seek the larger truth and articulate it in order to inform responsible policy discussions. Is it even possible?
DM: I like to go back before the Neocons with their Machiavellian intellectual base and quote Walter Lippman who made the same point. Matters of foreign affairs and international policy are too far beyond the ability of the populace to understand, he said, so they have to be conducted in secret and there must be no transparency.
RT: Tell me more about your background.
DM: I was not a professional intelligence officer. I had ten years in the US Marine Corps, resigned my commission in 1959, and went back to grad school. I was an NDEA fellow at the U of Oregon and received advanced degrees in history. I taught for a few years and because of my military background and because I specialized in military history with a focus on Latin America I was contacted by SRI which had a lot of DOD contracts. Counter insurgency was the new thing. In the Corps, I went to Special Forces School. We always prepare for the last war and the whole focus was to repeat the OSS experience in the event of war with the Soviet Union. Special Forces was created because the military never wanted to see anything like OSS again. The plan was, teams would go into eastern Europe to create insurgencies, but in a few years it became obvious that the insurgencies in the colonies of post-war allies had to be "countered"--so counter insurgency was developed. DOD was letting contracts like crazy. SRI hired me to go to Central America and do classified work. They had gotten a big contract from ARPA (later DARPA) for a counter insurgency center in Thailand and I worked on that.
There was a battle going on in Thailand between the Ambassador Graham Martin and military advisors headed by Richard Stillwell. They were battling for control of our major aid programs which had to be justified in terms of security. Martin and Stillwell hated each other so the White House of course chose someone who hated both of them and was hated by them, Peer De Silva, who wrote a memoir ( Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence. New York: New York Times Books, 1978). He was security officer on the Manhattan Project and transferred into the new CIA.
He was restricted in terms of how many people he could take to Thailand so he had to staff from what was there. My colleague. John Huxley, had been station chief in Pakistan, and told him to get me and I worked for him for four years in the US Embassy. That where I made my contacts with the agency and the branch office of the station and when I returned to the USA I did contract work for them. Then, as a consultant, I worked with John Nesbitt the technologist during the last years of Stan Turners control of the agency, when they were trying to reconstruct the old Board of National Estimates type of operation.
They wanted outside people with background and reputation to head the Analytic Group at the National Intelligence Council to be responsible for writing national intelligence estimates. I went to work for Harold Ford. I was responsible for western hemisphere estimates along with another and the focus came to be on the Contra war.
I was diligent. No matter who I talked to, who I pumped, I was unable to come up with anything in support of the main rationale for the Contra operation. I had serious problems with the characterization of the Sandinista government.
This tells you how the system actually works. This is relevant to what's happening now. I was asked to do an estimate on the Sandinista government and I did an assessment and a projection which all came true but did not fit the policy makers' desires. That's why it resonates with the WMD controversy. Ford backed me up but William Casey (Director of the CIA) said no, this can not go out as a special estimate. It was published as an intelligence research memorandum and went into the file and that was that.
After two years with the analytic group, I could not continue. I did not want anything else in the agency. Instead I traveled at my own expense in Central America and the more I learned the more clear it became that the operation was whacko. If I was going to speak out I had better do it because I knew of well developed US plans for an invasion of Nicaragua. I was well aware of what we had done elsewhere and if I was going to speak out it should be before the fact instead of after.
At the 1985 elections in Nicaragua, I was an observer; it was going to be verified as a fair and open election but right before the election this is how disinformation is fed to the press news was broken that Nicaragua was going to receive a big shipment of MIG aircraft.
RT: Was the relationship between the CIA and the media as subtle then as it is now?
DM: It was very subtle over that entire long period. The operational role of opinion control came directly out of the Second World War. It applies to any war time situation; war requires you to enlist the media to push in the best sense of the word war propaganda. This is what you want out, and you're part of the war effort, you're supporting your country, and in the Cold War, the same rationale was invoked. You have to understand that many people were involved who had been intellectually attracted to an alternative of what was seen as destructive and failed capitalism and were working with the Communist Party and were then disillusioned by events in eastern Europe. They were brought in and did this in the momentum of World War 2. They believed they were supporting our country and you had to conceal their activity--now this is very powerful, this idea of being on the inside of that effort, it is so attractive, so powerful. A big threat to any who wanted to speak up was that you would lose access, and you want so much to be on the inside. This keeps many people in the intelligence system, besides the usual reasons like salary, pension, and the like. They're afraid that if they speak up, they will lose their access.
RT: Shunning is a primitive and powerful reinforcement.
DM: You'll see this in the hearings coming up on whistle blowers. I know many of these people and what fractures a lot of them and makes them so upset is that when they raise concerns, not so much about policy but about the way it is carried out, they lose their security clearance. You have to understand how critical this is. It means everything to a person. Everything.
RT: The consequences are so serious.
DM: Oh, they are. I know prominent whistle blowers who still deal with this after many years. "These were my colleagues," they say. "These were my friends. But suddenly I am not a colleague or a friend." It's like the clubbiness of the Foreign Service; when you're no longer welcome at certain parties or in certain houses, it's a serious blow.
Now, I had gotten some good press and I hired a lawyer, Melvin Wolfe, who was chief counsel of the ACLU and had worked with Victor Marchetti on publishing his CIA memoirs. I did not want to be prosecuted and I did not wish to go to jail. Mel said he would be able to defend me. I reviewed the form I had signed with the agency. The story was going to go out and I gave Wolfe a magazine article I wanted to publish in which I said everything I felt I had to say as well as some things I was certain they would block. I said, Mel, take this to the publications review board at the agency--and it worked out exactly as I anticipated. They passed through what I believed was necessary for me to say, who I was, the critical evidence, and blocked out the other stuff which I was certain they would not let me say. Now I had a guideline for the rest of the eighties, for speaking and helping to organize the Association of National Security Alumni. I used that action as my guideline. Occasionally Wolfe would check--there was a lot of surveillance on me as well--and the word he got was, that son of a bitch keeps going right up to the line but he never goes over.
I was not heroic or seeking martyrdom and it seemed to work. I testified at the World Court which was very important to me--that was an important event and had an impact on foreign policy. We evolved a growing community even then of former intelligence officers, John Stockwell and others who put the association together, and I became the Washington representative. We published our magazine Unclassified bimonthly for 5-6 years. It was a good magazine and attacked a lot of these issues and had a reasonable circulation. Lots of media people used it.
RT: Can you evaluate the impact of what you did?
DM: In terms of impact, timing is important. We broadened the conversation on the use of intelligence. The slogan I devised was: we are not opposed to intelligence but we are opposed to covert paramilitary operations which by definition are violations of international law. The timing was important because of the Iran-Contra hearings--but in fact, in terms of impact, it was discouraging to see how Congress dealt with it. It was the most significant constitutional scandal we had had and they pushed it under the rug. The facts cried out for impeachment. The emotional quality of words is important when you get involved at this level and impeachment is one of those words. The use of those words climaxed or I should say anti-climaxed with eleventh hour pardons from George Bush the First. It left a bad feeling, to say the least.
What was the use? What did it matter, everything we did?
RT: It creates cynicism.
DM: Oh, did it ever.
It's an old story. In the Book of Samuel, the people said they wanted a King. Samuel said, I'll tell you what will happen if you have a King: he'll take your young men and send them to war, take your money to build himself houses, take your women for his own projects, and he'll put incredible taxes on you.
And the people of Israel said, We want a King! and that was that.
How much has changed?
RT: The conference on Intelligence and Ethics is an attempt to build a context for examining these issues and what it does to intelligence professionals over a lifetime to do, to know, to hear about what you describe. Do you think the project is viable?
DM: In the most brutal organizations--in the Gestapo, for example--a miniscule proportion of the people in the organization participate in the worst barbarities. Most go home, play with their kids, are nice to their neighbors, and can deal with it. The further you are away from actually doing it,the less problems you have. Firing a Tomahawk missile is not hand-to-hand combat.
But we can talk about this in terms of war crimes. Attacks on civilian population centers are prohibited but in WWI we were ready to do it and then, in WW2, none of the aerial attacks in violation of those norms like incendiary bombings in Japan were ever brought up. Is that the American way of war or simply the industrial way of war? I don't know.
My background gave me some credibility when I spoke out and I hope it had some impact on members of Congress. Did that effect policy? I can't say. My greatest disappointment was in 1988 when I was asked by the Dukakis campaign and the Democratic National Committee to make presentations on how to use this issue and I was so disappointed by their response. I had been speaking all around the country and said, if you take on this issue in 1988 and say, if I'm elected, the Contra program is over, there are groups all over the country that will respond, but my God, the waffling! Oh well, they said, well, yes, but you know, and all that. The inability of people to grasp these particular nettles is one reason their campaigns deflate. Talk about impact, you can generate ten thousand letters to the editor but it does not have political impact. In those dreadful hearings, the expose went on and on--but for what?
RT: Well? Was it worth it?
DM: You find yourself in this situation maybe once in a lifetime. You only come to the plate once and had better take your swings. I took my swings. That was my one ethical plus in a lifetime of unethical behavior.
RT: You distinguish covert operations from gathering intelligence. Doesn't that go back to how the law creating the CIA was interpreted?
DM: The specific law establishing the CIA, the National Security Act of 1947, directed the CIA to carry out other activities of an intelligence nature as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.What the hell did that mean? The first General Counsel of the CIA, asked if it meant the behind-the-lines kinds of operations the OSS had carried out, said, Absolutely not.But Frank Wisner and others grabbed onto the language;, Wisner with his mighty Wurlitzercranking out propaganda, went adventuring. Yet you know most of those early escapades were total disasters.
RT: So much was ill-conceived
DM: Yes, but oh, the glamour of doing it
RT: The Oliver North syndrome.
DM: The attraction of playing cowboys and Indians is so great. So you have to question whether we can even discuss ethics and intelligence in the same breath. The New York Times wrote an article about our conference and quoted Dewey Claridge. "Ethics? Are you crazy? You go into this line of business, you're expected to do this."
I recall when the General Counsel for the CIA let down her guard in an interview with AP and said, yes, we lie cheat steal and occasionally kill but overall, the people in the CIA are as fine a bunch as you'll ever find anywhere!
RT: I am told that EO 12333 (Executive Order 12333 prohibits assassinations and other specific activities) is being rewritten. "Stand by," were the final words of General Hayden as to whether current NSA activities were covered. But my sense is that it was always being rewritten.
DM: Of course it was. I think of the law professor at the University of Virginia who was heading a panel of the law association on ethics and intelligence in the early nineties and said, on the matter of assassination, well, that term is not really correctly used, it should not be directed at every intent to kill someone.
RT: What drove all this, David? What compelled intelligent people to get so wild?
DM: Like so much in the intelligence system, it looked sexy to some people and above all, THE MONEY WAS THERE. That drives all of this. People will do what they can fund. The lines between organizations and proprietaries and contractors and agencies are very blurred and the money is more like a transmission belt than a revolving door. When I did contract work, I did some projects I was not all that proud of, some of the work was questionablelike various interrogation technologies that have been worked on for thirty years, measuring changes in the size of the pupil of the eye to see if someone's lying--I tend to be dismissive of those efforts but when you're looking for "capabilities and intentions," there is a whole lot of road to look at and not a lot of rubber. The faintest skid marks are supposed to tell you significant things but interpreting the marks is not easy. Intelligence is divided into two parts: one is Tactical Intelligence and Related Activity (TIARA). TIARA is usually pretty good and you have the ability to know through surveillance or interceptions where various enemy units are, that's what I used and looked at in the Marine Corps. That's hard enough in the well-known fog of war. But when you take it to this other level where you're fumbling with intentions, industrial capabilities, etc. it's useful for discussion but is it really useful for immediate action and decision making? It's questionable. The intelligence is several steps removed the real. So how useful is it? You have to understand that once the analytic side, not the operational side, is wedded to using these techniques, you're like a tenured professor working in your area of specialty, you get enormous satisfaction from doing so, and you get funded. But how useful is it?
The only time I ever heard ethical issues raised in relationship to our work came when someone stood back and looked at what they were doing and said: what am I doing? what am I really doing?
RT: Is there realistic accountability to the citizens of the country and the Constitution? Is meaningful transparency possible?
DM: I know someone who sued the CIA because he said they did not meet the terms of their contract with him. He operated a proprietary or front organization for them and shipped various things around the world. When he told them he wanted to stop, they said he couldn't. He sued the agency under a law that applied to law enforcement and the agency actually informed the court that the individual he named in his suit was a CIA officer and therefore the case should be dismissed since they were not law enforcement.
You'll hear it said that intelligence professionals can not operate outside the law. But Lawrence Welch said, there IS a class of people who can not be held accountable under the law.
The issue of transparency raises another issue: when is it ethical to speak out? They use "national security" to cover everything now. The state secrecy issue is completely out of hand. If you accept that the citizen has a right to know information that directly impacts him, does the person who has that knowledge have the requirement to inform him? The same applies to classification and compartmentalization.
Remember how all intelligence systems operate. The operations officer in the CIA station has one primary responsibility: to recruit agents. Agents, by definition, are citizens of the government of the country in which the station chief operates. An agent is someone who provides information or services FOR A CONSIDERATION--this is important, we don't let people volunteer to work for us--and therefore is a traitor to his own country. We are in the business of soliciting people to betray their loyalties. Thats the nature of the business.
So how can we discuss these critical ethical issues in that context?. Those early fiascoes came to a head with the Korean effort. We had an elaborate network out of Seoul reporting exact and precise information about North Korea but when it was reviewed, we learned that 90% of the agents running out of Seoul were doubled by the North Koreans. An enormous fiasco. Beetle Smith, CIA director at the time, said, we're not going to write a report on this because if it ever gets out, it would be the end of the CIA.
The question is: given that the mission of the CIA station is to recruit agents, why would a country knowingly allow a CIA station to be established? As we said, the record of the agency in the first years was a fiasco--forget about the Italian election, that was just a good Bronx-style election that we bought.
RT: After the Italian election and the demise of Arbenz in Guatemala, they said, this is easy. It went to their heads.
DM: The penetration in hard targets, the Soviet Union, eastern Europe, and after 1949, China--that did not happen. In the fifties and sixties, at the height of the post-colonial period, the CIA turned its attention to Latin America and that's where they had success because those targets are so soft, the societies are so corrupt, and the guys in the security agencies lined up--believe me--and said, sign me up! It's a good payday. That's where so many careers were made. I saw many of these operations going on in Africa, Latin America, and in Bangkok where I worked--this in itself is an "ethical issue." You are persuading people to do this.
RT: In and of itself, you are saying, the nature of the work breaks ethical norms as we understand them in other contexts. It's about control by nearly any means.
DM: Yes. My late colleague, Diane Kuntz, served in the station in Lima Peru. A junior officer at the Chinese embassy requested a particular prostitute. So they got the cameras in there and filmed, that was always fun, but what ticked Diane off is that all the other officers at the station watched the films on a weekly basis but they wouldn't let her watch.
After they had enough stuff on the guy, they arranged for an agency officer to storm in and see this guy, shrieking that this woman is his daughter and bad things will happen and they have these films and then they make the pitch. This guy did what any sensible person would do. He went to his superiors and told them what happened, this is what they asked, and he was on the next plane back to Beijing and went on with his career.
The point is, they're always looking for things like that to trap people, and you rationalize it, you justify it, you say, this is my job and were obtaining information that we need, and if your skin isn't thick enough to do it--then get a different job.
Richard Thieme is an author and speaker focused on the deeper implications of technology, religion, and science. He also writes fiction and his short story, Gibby the Sit-down King, was recently nominated for a Pushcart Prize. He can be reached at: rthieme@thiemeworks.com
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5675992/site/newsweek/from/RSS/
Goss’s Wish List
Bush’s CIA nominee has alarmed civil libertarians with a plan that would authorize the agency to arrest U.S. citizens. Plus, the real threat to the Olympic games
WEB EXCLUSIVE
By Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball
Newsweek
Updated: 6:39 p.m. ET Aug. 11, 2004
Aug. 11 - Rep. Porter Goss, President Bush’s nominee to head the CIA, recently introduced legislation that would give the president new authority to direct CIA agents to conduct law-enforcement operations inside the United States—including arresting American citizens.
The legislation, introduced by Goss on June 16 and touted as an “intelligence reform” bill, would substantially restructure the U.S. intelligence community by giving the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) broad new powers to oversee its various components scattered throughout the government.
But in language that until now has not gotten any public attention, the Goss bill would also redefine the authority of the DCI in such a way as to substantially alter—if not overturn—a 57-year-old ban on the CIA conducting operations inside the United States.
The language contained in the Goss bill has alarmed civil-liberties advocates. It also today prompted one former top CIA official to describe it as a potentially “dramatic” change in the guidelines that have governed U.S. intelligence operations for more than a half century.
“This language on its face would have allowed President Nixon to authorize the CIA to bug the Democratic National Committee headquarters,” Jeffrey H. Smith, who served as general counsel of the CIA between 1995 and 1996, told NEWSWEEK. “I can’t imagine what Porter had in mind.”
Goss himself could not be reached for comment today. But a congressional source familiar with the drafting of Goss’s bill said the language reflects a concern that he and others in the U.S. intelligence community share—that the lines between foreign and domestic intelligence have become increasingly blurred by the war on terrorism.
At the time he introduced the bill, Goss thought the 9/11 commission might recommend the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency patterned after Britain’s M.I.5. The commission ended up rejecting such a proposal on civil-liberties grounds. But in his bill Goss wanted to give the DCI and a newly empowered CIA the “flexibility”—if directed by the president—to oversee and even conduct whatever domestic intelligence and law-enforcement operations might be needed to combat the terrorism threat, the congressional official said.
“This is just a proposal,” said the congressional official familiar with the drafting of Goss’s bill. “It was designed as a point of discussion, a point of debate. It’s not carved in stone.”
But other congressional staffers predicted that the Goss bill, even if it has little chance of passage, is likely to get substantial scrutiny at his upcoming confirmation hearings—in part as an opportunity to explore his own attitudes toward civil liberties.
Those hearings are already expected to be unusually contentious—partly because of concerns among Democrats that the Florida Republican, a former CIA officer himself who has chaired the House Intelligence Committee, has been too partisan and too close to the Bush White House. But so far, most staffers expect Goss to be confirmed eventually—if only because Democrats are loath to appear overly obstructionist on a matter that might be portrayed as central to national security.
The Goss bill tracks current law by stating that the DCI shall “collect, coordinate and direct” the collection of intelligence by the U.S. government—except that the CIA “may not exercise police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers within the United States.”
The bill then adds new language after that clause, however, saying that the ban on domestic law-enforcement operations applies “except as otherwise permitted by law or as directed by the president.”
In effect, one former top U.S. intelligence community official told NEWSWEEK, the language in the Goss bill would enable the president to issue secret findings allowing the CIA to conduct covert operations inside the United States—without even any notification to Congress. The former official said the proposal appeared to have been generated by Goss’s staff on the House Intelligence Committee, adding that the language raises the question: “If you can’t control a staff of dozens, how are you going to control the tens of thousands of people who work for the U.S. intelligence community?”
A CIA spokeswoman said today that, while familiar with the provision, she was not aware of any agency official seeking such a modification to the longstanding ban on the CIA from conducting domestic law-enforcement operations. (Ever since the creation of the CIA in 1947, the agency has been excluded from federal law-enforcement within the United States. That function was left to the FBI—which must operate in conformity to domestic laws and, in more recent years, under guidelines promulgated by the attorney general designed to insure protection of the rights of citizens.)
Sean McCormack, a White House spokesman, said the president’s own proposal for the creation of a national intelligence director—separate from the director of the CIA—to oversee the entire U.S. intelligence community does not envision any change along the lines called for in the Goss bill. “I have not heard any discussion of that,” said McCormack about the idea of allowing the CIA to operate domestically.
Some congressional staffers speculated today that Goss most likely had reached an understanding with President Bush that, if Congress does create the new position of a national intelligence director, he would move into that position rather than serve in the No. 2 position of CIA director. Asked if such a deal had been reached, McCormack responded: “Nothing has been ruled in or out.”
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Goss introduced his legislation, H.R. 4584, on June 16—before the September 11 commission issued its own recommendations for the creation of a national intelligence director as well as a new National Counterterrorism Center that would conduct “joint operational planning” of counterterrorism operations involving both the FBI inside the United States and the CIA abroad. The congressional official familiar with the Goss bill pointed to that proposal as a recognition of the increasingly fuzzy lines between foreign intelligence operations and domestic law enforcement.
The proposal comes at a time when the Pentagon is also seeking new powers to conduct intelligence operations inside the United States. A proposal, adopted last spring by the Senate Intelligence Committee at the request of the Pentagon, would eliminate a legal barrier that has sharply restricted the Defense Intelligence Agency and other Pentagon intelligence agencies from recruiting sources inside the United States.
That restriction currently requires that Pentagon agencies be covered by the Privacy Act, meaning that they must notify any individual they contact as to who they are talking to and what the agency is talking to them about—and then keep records of any information they collect about U.S. citizens. These are then subject to disclosure to those citizens. Pentagon officials say this has made it all but impossible for them to recruit intelligence sources and conduct covert operations inside the country—intelligence gathering, they say, that is increasingly needed to protect against any potential terror threats to U.S. military bases and even contractors. But critics have charged the new provision could open the door for the Pentagon to spy on U.S. citizens—a concern that some said today is only amplified by the language in the Goss bill.
Olympic Threats
How serious is the terror threat to the Olympics? Because Greece has a long and intricate coastline with dozens of islands, the country is viewed as relatively vulnerable to infiltration. And while security for Olympic venues is tight, Athens presents a whole range of civilian "soft targets" that are less well protected.
Nevertheless, U.S. intelligence officials tell NEWSWEEK, it’s not Al Qaeda they are most worried about. Instead, officials say the most imminent threat to the peace of the games is anarchist and antiglobalization activists of the type who caused significant violence and property damage at a summit several years ago in Seattle. Officials believe such protestors plan to swarm Athens and conduct a campaign of disruption and vandalism.
It’s not that officials are complacent. But sources say that the “chatter” they are picking up on Al Qaeda-linked Web sites is focused more on targeting the United States mainland and American interests abroad than on possible threats against the Olympics.
Specific Al Qaeda threats to the U.S., to U.S. interests abroad and to countries working with Washington in Iraq are regarded by American intelligence as more foreboding than possible threats to the Olympics. Several months ago, Osama bin Laden issued a message threatening to attack countries which did not withdraw from Iraq within 90 days, a deadline which expired in July. "I think we will be seeing some serious attempts to make good on that promise," a senior U.S. counterterror official told NEWSWEEK. But the official said he was unaware of any more specific threat that bin Laden made against the Olympics.
© 2005 Newsweek, Inc.
Goss’s Wish List
Bush’s CIA nominee has alarmed civil libertarians with a plan that would authorize the agency to arrest U.S. citizens. Plus, the real threat to the Olympic games
WEB EXCLUSIVE
By Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball
Newsweek
Updated: 6:39 p.m. ET Aug. 11, 2004
Aug. 11 - Rep. Porter Goss, President Bush’s nominee to head the CIA, recently introduced legislation that would give the president new authority to direct CIA agents to conduct law-enforcement operations inside the United States—including arresting American citizens.
The legislation, introduced by Goss on June 16 and touted as an “intelligence reform” bill, would substantially restructure the U.S. intelligence community by giving the director of Central Intelligence (DCI) broad new powers to oversee its various components scattered throughout the government.
But in language that until now has not gotten any public attention, the Goss bill would also redefine the authority of the DCI in such a way as to substantially alter—if not overturn—a 57-year-old ban on the CIA conducting operations inside the United States.
The language contained in the Goss bill has alarmed civil-liberties advocates. It also today prompted one former top CIA official to describe it as a potentially “dramatic” change in the guidelines that have governed U.S. intelligence operations for more than a half century.
“This language on its face would have allowed President Nixon to authorize the CIA to bug the Democratic National Committee headquarters,” Jeffrey H. Smith, who served as general counsel of the CIA between 1995 and 1996, told NEWSWEEK. “I can’t imagine what Porter had in mind.”
Goss himself could not be reached for comment today. But a congressional source familiar with the drafting of Goss’s bill said the language reflects a concern that he and others in the U.S. intelligence community share—that the lines between foreign and domestic intelligence have become increasingly blurred by the war on terrorism.
At the time he introduced the bill, Goss thought the 9/11 commission might recommend the creation of a new domestic intelligence agency patterned after Britain’s M.I.5. The commission ended up rejecting such a proposal on civil-liberties grounds. But in his bill Goss wanted to give the DCI and a newly empowered CIA the “flexibility”—if directed by the president—to oversee and even conduct whatever domestic intelligence and law-enforcement operations might be needed to combat the terrorism threat, the congressional official said.
“This is just a proposal,” said the congressional official familiar with the drafting of Goss’s bill. “It was designed as a point of discussion, a point of debate. It’s not carved in stone.”
But other congressional staffers predicted that the Goss bill, even if it has little chance of passage, is likely to get substantial scrutiny at his upcoming confirmation hearings—in part as an opportunity to explore his own attitudes toward civil liberties.
Those hearings are already expected to be unusually contentious—partly because of concerns among Democrats that the Florida Republican, a former CIA officer himself who has chaired the House Intelligence Committee, has been too partisan and too close to the Bush White House. But so far, most staffers expect Goss to be confirmed eventually—if only because Democrats are loath to appear overly obstructionist on a matter that might be portrayed as central to national security.
The Goss bill tracks current law by stating that the DCI shall “collect, coordinate and direct” the collection of intelligence by the U.S. government—except that the CIA “may not exercise police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers within the United States.”
The bill then adds new language after that clause, however, saying that the ban on domestic law-enforcement operations applies “except as otherwise permitted by law or as directed by the president.”
In effect, one former top U.S. intelligence community official told NEWSWEEK, the language in the Goss bill would enable the president to issue secret findings allowing the CIA to conduct covert operations inside the United States—without even any notification to Congress. The former official said the proposal appeared to have been generated by Goss’s staff on the House Intelligence Committee, adding that the language raises the question: “If you can’t control a staff of dozens, how are you going to control the tens of thousands of people who work for the U.S. intelligence community?”
A CIA spokeswoman said today that, while familiar with the provision, she was not aware of any agency official seeking such a modification to the longstanding ban on the CIA from conducting domestic law-enforcement operations. (Ever since the creation of the CIA in 1947, the agency has been excluded from federal law-enforcement within the United States. That function was left to the FBI—which must operate in conformity to domestic laws and, in more recent years, under guidelines promulgated by the attorney general designed to insure protection of the rights of citizens.)
Sean McCormack, a White House spokesman, said the president’s own proposal for the creation of a national intelligence director—separate from the director of the CIA—to oversee the entire U.S. intelligence community does not envision any change along the lines called for in the Goss bill. “I have not heard any discussion of that,” said McCormack about the idea of allowing the CIA to operate domestically.
Some congressional staffers speculated today that Goss most likely had reached an understanding with President Bush that, if Congress does create the new position of a national intelligence director, he would move into that position rather than serve in the No. 2 position of CIA director. Asked if such a deal had been reached, McCormack responded: “Nothing has been ruled in or out.”
TERROR WATCH Current Column | Archives
• Terror Watch: Obstacles in Oil-for-Food Query
Investigators are struggling to find concrete evidence of fraud and corruption in the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food program in Iraq
• Did Saudis Deceptively Finance Ad Campaign?
The Justice Department is investigating whether a Washington PR firm violated federal law on foreign-sponsored propaganda. The politically sensitive probe could embarrass the Saudi government and the White House
Goss introduced his legislation, H.R. 4584, on June 16—before the September 11 commission issued its own recommendations for the creation of a national intelligence director as well as a new National Counterterrorism Center that would conduct “joint operational planning” of counterterrorism operations involving both the FBI inside the United States and the CIA abroad. The congressional official familiar with the Goss bill pointed to that proposal as a recognition of the increasingly fuzzy lines between foreign intelligence operations and domestic law enforcement.
The proposal comes at a time when the Pentagon is also seeking new powers to conduct intelligence operations inside the United States. A proposal, adopted last spring by the Senate Intelligence Committee at the request of the Pentagon, would eliminate a legal barrier that has sharply restricted the Defense Intelligence Agency and other Pentagon intelligence agencies from recruiting sources inside the United States.
That restriction currently requires that Pentagon agencies be covered by the Privacy Act, meaning that they must notify any individual they contact as to who they are talking to and what the agency is talking to them about—and then keep records of any information they collect about U.S. citizens. These are then subject to disclosure to those citizens. Pentagon officials say this has made it all but impossible for them to recruit intelligence sources and conduct covert operations inside the country—intelligence gathering, they say, that is increasingly needed to protect against any potential terror threats to U.S. military bases and even contractors. But critics have charged the new provision could open the door for the Pentagon to spy on U.S. citizens—a concern that some said today is only amplified by the language in the Goss bill.
Olympic Threats
How serious is the terror threat to the Olympics? Because Greece has a long and intricate coastline with dozens of islands, the country is viewed as relatively vulnerable to infiltration. And while security for Olympic venues is tight, Athens presents a whole range of civilian "soft targets" that are less well protected.
Nevertheless, U.S. intelligence officials tell NEWSWEEK, it’s not Al Qaeda they are most worried about. Instead, officials say the most imminent threat to the peace of the games is anarchist and antiglobalization activists of the type who caused significant violence and property damage at a summit several years ago in Seattle. Officials believe such protestors plan to swarm Athens and conduct a campaign of disruption and vandalism.
It’s not that officials are complacent. But sources say that the “chatter” they are picking up on Al Qaeda-linked Web sites is focused more on targeting the United States mainland and American interests abroad than on possible threats against the Olympics.
Specific Al Qaeda threats to the U.S., to U.S. interests abroad and to countries working with Washington in Iraq are regarded by American intelligence as more foreboding than possible threats to the Olympics. Several months ago, Osama bin Laden issued a message threatening to attack countries which did not withdraw from Iraq within 90 days, a deadline which expired in July. "I think we will be seeing some serious attempts to make good on that promise," a senior U.S. counterterror official told NEWSWEEK. But the official said he was unaware of any more specific threat that bin Laden made against the Olympics.
© 2005 Newsweek, Inc.
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