- LM Completes Testing On Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Upgrade
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/LM_Complet...se_Upgrade.html

Moorestown NJ (SPX) Apr 06, 2006 - Lockheed Martin has announced the successful completion of land-based testing for the next enhancement to the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Weapon System. Completion of this testing is a key milestone to provide tactically certified capability to engage short and medium range ballistic missiles on all Aegis BMD ships.

- US Skeptical On Fajr-3 Claims
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_Skeptic...r_3_Claims.html

Washington (UPI) Apr 06, 2006 - The Pentagon is playing down Iran's claims that it has successfully tested a multiple warhead missile with stealth capabilities. The Iranian armed forces announced Friday that they had successfully test fired a Fajr-3 missile that could carry multiple warheads and that was not detectable by radar.

- Iran Test Fires Third Missile In A Week
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Iran_Test_..._In_A_Week.html

- US To Push For Asian Moratorium On Nuclear Weapons Says Rice
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_To_Push..._Says_Rice.html

Washington (AFP) Apr 06, 2006 - Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Wednesday the United States would push for a South Asian moratorium on nuclear weapons production to ease tensions between India and Pakistan.

--------------

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/na...-home-headlines

U.S. Rolls Out Nuclear Plan
The administration's proposal would modernize the nation's complex of laboratories and factories as well as produce new bombs.
By Ralph Vartabedian, Times Staff Writer
April 6, 2006


The Bush administration Wednesday unveiled a blueprint for rebuilding the nation's decrepit nuclear weapons complex, including restoration of a large-scale bomb manufacturing capacity.

The plan calls for the most sweeping realignment and modernization of the nation's massive system of laboratories and factories for nuclear bombs since the end of the Cold War.

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Until now, the nation has depended on carefully maintaining aging bombs produced during the Cold War arms race, some several decades old. The administration, however, wants the capability to turn out 125 new nuclear bombs per year by 2022, as the Pentagon retires older bombs that it says will no longer be reliable or safe.

Under the plan, all of the nation's plutonium would be consolidated into a single facility that could be more effectively and cheaply defended against possible terrorist attacks. The plan would remove the plutonium kept at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by 2014, though transfers of the material could start sooner. In recent years, concern has grown that Livermore, surrounded by residential neighborhoods in the Bay Area, could not repel a terrorist attack.

But the administration blueprint is facing sharp criticism, both from those who say it does not move fast enough to consolidate plutonium stores and from those who say restarting bomb production would encourage aspiring nuclear powers across the globe to develop weapons.

The plan was outlined to Congress on Wednesday by Thomas D'Agostino, head of nuclear weapons programs at the National Nuclear Security Administration, a part of the Energy Department. Though the weapons proposal would restore the capacity to make new bombs, D'Agostino said it was part of a larger effort to accelerate the dismantling of aging bombs left from the Cold War.

D'Agostino acknowledged in an interview that the administration was walking a fine line by modernizing the U.S. nuclear weapons program while assuring other nations that it was not seeking a new arms race. The credibility of the contention rests on the U.S. intent to sharply reduce its inventory of weapons.

The administration is also quickly moving ahead with a new nuclear bomb program known as the "reliable replacement warhead," which began last year. Originally described as an effort to update existing weapons and make them more reliable, it has been broadened and now includes the potential for new bomb designs. Weapons labs currently are engaged in a design competition.

The U.S. built its last nuclear weapon in 1989 and last tested a weapon underground in 1992. Since the Cold War, the nation has had massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons to deter potential attacks. By contrast, it would increasingly rely on the capability to build future bombs for deterrence, D'Agostino said.

The blueprint calls for a modern complex to design a new nuclear bomb and have it ready in less than four years, allowing the nation to respond to changing military requirements. Similar proposals in the past, such as for a nuclear bomb to attack underground bunkers, provoked concern that they undermined U.S. policy to stop nuclear proliferation.

The impetus for the plan is a growing belief that efforts to maintain older nuclear bombs and keep up a large nuclear weapons industrial complex are technically and financially unsustainable. Last year, a task force led by San Diego physicist David Overskei recommended that the Energy Department consolidate the system of eight existing weapons complexes into one site.

Overskei said Wednesday that the cost of security alone for the current infrastructure of plants over the next two decades was roughly $25 billion. Security costs have grown, because the Sept. 11 attacks have led the Energy Department to believe terrorists could mount a larger and better armed strike force.

Peter Stockton, a former Energy Department security consultant who is now an investigator for the Project on Government Oversight, criticized the plutonium consolidation plan in House testimony, saying it would delay the difficult work too far into the future. Stockton added in an interview that the plutonium transfer at Livermore could be accomplished in a few months.

Until now, Livermore lab officials have sharply disagreed with the idea of removing plutonium from their site, saying it was essential to their work. On Wednesday, a lab spokesman said the issue was "far less controversial" and the "decision rests in Washington."

The Bush plan, described at a hearing of the strategic subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, would consolidate much of the weapons capacity, but not as completely or quickly as outside critics would like.

The overall plan would not be fully implemented until 2030.

A crucial part of restarting U.S. nuclear bomb production involves so-called plutonium pits, hollow spheres surrounded by high explosives. The pits start nuclear fission and trigger the nuclear fusion in a bomb.

The plutonium pits were built at the Energy Department's former Rocky Flats site near Denver until the weapons plant was shut down in 1989 after it was found to have violated environmental regulations.

In recent years, Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico has tried to start limited production of plutonium pits and hopes to build a certified pit that will enter the so-called war reserve next year. Los Alamos would be producing about 30 to 50 pits per year by 2012, but the Energy Department said that was not enough to sustain the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

In his testimony, D'Agostino estimated plutonium pits would last 45 to 60 years, after which they would be unreliable and might result in an explosion smaller than intended. Critics outside the government sharply dispute that conclusion, saying there is no evidence that pits degrade over time and that the nation can keep an adequate nuclear deterrent by maintaining its existing weapons.

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N04197726.htm

US administration readying new counterterror plan
05 Apr 2006 01:36:15 GMT

Source: Reuters

By David Morgan

WASHINGTON, April 4 (Reuters) - Four and a half years after the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration is nearing completion of a government-wide strategic plan for the war on terror that would assign counterterrorism tasks to specific federal agencies and departments, officials said on Tuesday.

The plan is part of the administration's effort to bring greater integration and coordination to the counterterrorism activities of different agencies and departments including the CIA, FBI, Treasury Department, Pentagon and State Department.

Planning began late last summer under the direction of the National Counterterrorism Center, or NCTC, an entity created by the congressionally mandated intelligence reforms.

"This process is not a unilateral drafting exercise by NCTC. Instead, it is an interagency effort, involving hundreds of departmental planners working under our leadership," NCTC Director John Redd told the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee on Tuesday.

A counterterrorism official who asked not to be identified said the plan was expected to be completed by June 30.

Redd told the House hearing the plan would involve setting "discrete tasks" for agencies and departments, which would then take on lead or support roles for different counterterrorism operations. Currently, the war on terror is being fought by different government agencies according to their own varied mandates for safeguarding the nation's security.

The planning comes as the post-Sept. 11 priorities of the FBI and Pentagon have led those agencies to expand into overseas intelligence roles once filled solely by the CIA.

The Pentagon said last month it was placing special operations troops in U.S. embassies in about two dozen countries to gather information on potential terror threats.

A new strategic operational plan for the war on terror could mean a change of traditional U.S. government practices in noncombat zones overseas, where resident ambassadors have been viewed as wielding primary authority over all U.S. activities.

In combat zones such as Iraq, primary authority over counterterrorism operations rests with the Pentagon.

"There are gray areas," said Thomas O'Connell, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict. "It would be quite a different issue if you were operating, let's say, in a Jordan -- how you might deal with that particular government -- as opposed to the problems that might be posed in a Somalia where there is no viable government," he told the House panel.

But a senior State Department official said diplomats should continue to pull together counterterrorism operations in countries where U.S. troops are not deployed in combat.

"When you look at all instruments of statecraft and how that's pulled together, I think the ambassadors are uniquely poised," Henry Crumpton, the State Department's counterterrorism coordinator, told the committee.

He later told Reuters the planning discussion was "more about integration and coordination in the field than it is about basic authorities."

Weaponization Of Space Will Have Unpredictable Consequences
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Weaponizat...nsequences.html

Moscow (RIA) Apr 07, 2006 - The United States has promised to make public in the next few months its new space doctrine, which allows for the deployment of weapons in outer space. Colonel Anthony Russo, chief of the U.S. Strategic Command's space and global strike division, said the time was ripe for clearly stipulating the Pentagon's responsibility for the security of the national space group.

- Unmanned SkyTote Demonstrates Capabilities
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Unmanned_S...pabilities.html

Wright-Patterson AFB OH (SPX) Apr 07, 2006 - Air Force Research Laboratory scientists are working on a novel unmanned aerial vehicle called SkyTote that will take off and land vertically like a helicopter, but also transition into horizontal flight like a conventional aircraft.

- Boeing UUV Indicates Compatibility, Utility With US Navy Submarines
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Boeing_UUV...Submarines.html

----------

- LockMart Develops JASSM Cruise Missile Weapon Data Link
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/LockMart_D..._Data_Link.html

Orlando FL (SPX) Apr 07, 2006 - Lockheed Martin received a U.S. Air Force task order totaling more than $32 million for the development of a Weapon Data Link (WDL) capability that will enable the extended-range JASSM system to engage relocatable and time-critical targets. The JASSM air-to-surface standoff missile system is the world's first stealthy conventional cruise missile.

- US Allies Embrace BMD
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_Allies_Embrace_BMD.html

Washington (UPI) Apr 07, 2006 - A senior State Department official this week spelled out how international ballistic missile defense cooperation is reviving U.S. strategic alliances around the world.

http://www.antiwar.com/ips/lasker.php?articleid=8822
April 7, 2006
Pentagon Eyes the Ultimate High Ground

by John Lasker
After 50 years of international cooperation and peace in space, the U.S. military insists that it has no plans to usher in an age of space-based warfare.

The Pentagon's space-related research is not offensive, officials have told arms control experts and the news media, noting that the name of the branch that conducts much of this research makes it clear: the Missile Defense Agency.

They add that the Defense Department's space-related funding is too insignificant – just 3 percent of the $440 billion defense budget – to suggest the U.S. is preparing to "weaponize" earth's lower orbits.

But even if space-related research and testing now appear like a few small sparkles in a black expanse, the anxiety they're spreading glows like a full moon.

U.S.-based arms-control experts tell IPS they have seen real concern about a U.S. space weapon in the faces of Chinese scientists. Also expressing alarm is China's state-run press, which of late has reported on a future U.S. "space bomber."

Although still in the early research stages, one of several prototype U.S. military space planes might someday have the capability to strike anywhere on earth within 30 minutes, say experts.

"The Chinese military has enormous stress about U.S. space plans at large," said Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information, a Washington-based think-tank. "There is a debate about what they should do."

And the uneasiness over U.S. space weapons is not limited to one of the world's fastest growing economies. At the United Nations, there was a tip-off last year about Washington's near-space intentions. For the first time, the U.S. voted against a UN resolution calling for a permanent ban on deploying weapons in space.

Meanwhile, the American Civil Liberties Union in the state of Florida uncovered hundreds of government documents showing that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the U.S. Air Force collaborated to monitor and plant moles within an international space-peace activist group.

The U.S. military's renewed interest in space is on the verge of "breaking taboos," says Laura Grego, a missile defense expert with the nonpartisan Union of Concerned Scientists.

Grego and Hitchens say there are "space hawks" in the George W. Bush administration and the U.S. Air Force, most prominently Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The space hawks have made it clear in numerous planning documents, some published before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, that the U.S. needs to "protect space assets" and possibly establish "full spectrum dominance."

Then there is the Pentagon's missile defense spending, up nearly $7 billion since 1999, to $11.1 billion for 2007. In total, the U.S. has spent about $120 billion since President Ronald Reagan (1981-89) first proposed the space-based missile shield program famously dubbed "Star Wars."

But the most tangible evidence that space weapons are science fiction no more, say Grego and Hitchens, are the tests, which now occur more frequently than just several years ago.

Last year, the U.S. Air Force launched the XSS-11 satellite, which weighs no more than a large man. The U.S. military claims the micro-satellite has the potential to approach and repair larger satellites. But experts suggest the XSS-11 could also be used as a "satellite killer."

Within the next two years, the Missile Defense Agency will try to shoot down a satellite with a missile. Also on the schedule are ground-based laser tests that will determine if energy beams can disable a satellite.

"A unilateral decision to deploy anti-satellite weapons into space is provocative," says Grego. "Other countries will notice. This is a very dangerous situation."

And "once [the U.S.] starts down that road," she argues, other nations are likely to follow suit and begin developing space weapons to counter the U.S.

Space-peace activists argue that the U.S. actually started down this road long ago, at the beginning of the Cold War, when Washington first began publicly calling space and the moon "the ultimate high ground," says Bruce Gagnon, director of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space.

The Global Network, which includes well-known professors and peace activists from nearly every continent, promotes a somewhat controversial theory – one that is gaining respectability, however.

They claim that hundreds of years from now, when the moon and Mars are colonized, future generations will look upon NASA as the Christopher Columbus of their day. And much like the Spanish Queen Isabella, the U.S. not only had the money to bankroll the exploration, but also to build an "armada" to protect its newfound wealth and resources.

This theory, believes Gagnon, has earned the Global Network some unwanted attention. After doing some surveillance last year of their own, the Florida ACLU discovered that NASA and the Air Force were targeting Global Network protests and meetings near the Kennedy Space Center on Florida's mid-east coast.

Freedom of Information requests were filed, and the full extent of the operation started to unravel.

"NASA states, in these documents, that they [also] have 'confidential sources' in Britain and Belgium monitoring Global Network activities," says Florida ACLU attorney Kevin Aplin.

Why exactly are NASA and the U.S. Air Force worried about the Global Network? For now that remains a mystery. But Gagnon speculates that the Bush administration, which has called for a base on the moon by 2020 as part of its manned Mars mission, plans to monopolize the moon's resources, such as helium-3, a byproduct of solar winds.

Scientists like Apollo 17 astronaut Harrison Schmitt claim helium-3 can produce fusion. While it is rare on earth, Schmitt has said there's enough on the moon to power the earth for hundreds of years.

Russia says it too wants a permanent base on the moon by 2020. One of its main reasons: mining for helium-3. China has a manned moon mission in the works for the next decade, as well.

Gagnon says the U.S. may seek to protect financial interests on the moon, or simply cut the moon off from anyone but the U.S.

Under the guise of missile defense then, weapons-equipped satellites will be deployed to secure the earth-to-moon corridor, he says. The 1967 International Space Treaty outlawed weapons of mass destruction in space, says Gagnon, but not weapons of selective destruction.

The advent of a well-guarded moon base that's mining for the ultimate energy source may sound laughable to some, Gagnon concedes. "[But] then why is Halliburton building a drill for Mars?" he asks.

NASA, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory are also working on this project.

In 1989, the U.S. Congress commissioned a study entitled "Military Space Forces: The Next 50 Years." The study suggested that U.S. bases on the moon and armed space stations on either side of the moon will "lie in wait at that location to hijack rival shipments on return," wrote the author of the study, John Collins.

"There's going to be a scramble for the moon by the Chinese, the Russians, and the Americans," says Gagnon. "This is real. There's going to be a conflict over it."

Perhaps the roots of any future conflict over lunar resources are just starting to take hold. The Aerospace Daily & Defense Report wrote last spring that the Missile Defense Agency will begin awarding "space-based interceptor" concept design contracts to industry teams in 2008.

A decision on whether to build a constellation of 50 to 100 weapons-equipped satellites could take place in 2014, reported the paper.

(Inter Press Service)

http://www.knoxnews.com/kns/national/artic...4600907,00.html
Iraq war acts as testing lab for gee-whiz technology
By LISA HOFFMAN
April 5, 2006


In the testing laboratory that is the war in Iraq, an array of remarkable devices and technologies are making their debut in the real world of combat.
There's a "cooling" glove that, when worn on one hand, can lower a soldier's body temperature rapidly - an invaluable help in a country where summer temperatures can reach 120 degrees.

Also being tested is a super radar that can penetrate 12 inches of concrete to reveal whether anyone is hiding in a building - a potentially life-saving aid for troops hunting house-to-house for snipers or others lurking inside.

And troops are using a low-cost detector that can cut through the road noise to let soldiers in a convoy under enemy fire immediately determine where the shooting is coming from.

This is just some of the whiz-bang technology spawned by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, a Pentagon outfit famed for thinking far outside the box and, as in the case of these new products, from the front lines of war-fighting, as well.

"DARPA is designed to be the 'technological engine' for transformation, supplying advanced capabilities based on revolutionary technological options, for the entire" U.S. military, agency director Tony Tether told Congress recently.

Actual combat conditions provide an incomparable testing ground for new technology, said John Pike, director of the national-security think tank GlobalSecurity.org.

"It's the best simulation you can get, unfortunately," Pike said.

Taking advantage of that fact, the Pentagon is shipping an assortment of new equipment and technology for hands-on use by troops in Iraq. They include:

- "Command Post of the Future," a system that allows commanders and troops fielding intelligence and other information across Iraq to share data immediately. The 4th Infantry Division has been using it since late 2005 in Baghdad, and its success there has led to a clamor for the technology from other headquarters and in-the-field battalions.

- "Advanced Soldier Sensor Information System and Technology" (ASSIST), another intelligence-sharing tool that uses special sensors, networks and databases to compile the day-to-day experiences of troops on patrol to build an evolving body of knowledge about various city neighborhoods. Army units preparing for redeployment in Iraq are beginning to train with the system.

- "Combat Zones That See" program, which networks conventional video cameras into a computerized history of the color, size and number of wheels of each vehicle that passes or parks outside the perimeter of a U.S. base or camp. It is now being installed at one such Iraq base.

- Wasp Micro Air Vehicle, a drone that weighs about a half-pound and has a 14-inch wingspan and can "loiter" over an area for more than an hour, beaming back real-time images. The Marine Corps is training operators to use the device in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- Several technologies that are not yet being used on the battlefield, but which DARPA hopes will be soon. One is the "Deep Bleeder Acoustic Coagulation" system, which DARPA hopes can be sent to Iraq to stop deep internal bleeding in wounded troops. The device uses ultrasound to detect and coagulate blood and can be operated by anyone, not just medics.



(Contact Lisa Hoffman at HoffmanL(at)shns.com)

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/newspaper/0,,...2122600,00.html

In the wilderness, a computer readies a new nuclear arsenal
By Tim Reid

On a rare tour of the US nuclear laboratory in Los Alamos, our correspondent is shown a project to replace warheads that many believe Britain is not only watching but is deeply involved in

DEEP in the heart of America’s leading nuclear weapons complex sits a computer so large that it fills a room the size of a football field — a dazzling spectacle of blinking lights that churns out 20 trillion mathematical calculations a second.
Named “Q”, after the gadget-inventing boffin in the James Bond films, it is the nerve centre of the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory, a 40,000 square mile (104,000 sq km) complex deep in the wilderness of New Mexico ringed with high-security fencing and armed guards.

Here a 67m (220ft) long electron accelerator X-rays exploding uranium at a billion frames per second. Here some of the world’s most brilliant physicists operate gas guns, electron microscopes and neutron scatterers and pore over data like excited children. Here, six decades ago, the atom bomb was born when the secret Manhattan Project produced Little Boy and Fat Man, the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Today Los Alamos is focused on creating a new generation of nuclear warheads.



The Bush Administration this week revealed a plan for replacing America’s ageing nuclear weapons stockpile, under which 125 new bombs a year would be made by 2022.

And although Tony Blair says that no decision has been made on whether to replace Britain’s equally old Trident system, many suspect that Downing Street has already decided to buy into this new US weapons programme to create Britain’s next-generation nuclear deterrent. Over the past five years the British Government has spent £300 million refurbishing the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston, Berkshire. It is hiring an extra 1,000 scientists and engineers. It has bought a supercomputer capable of three trillion calculations per second and high-powered lasers.

Last month a British plutonium trigger from a Trident warhead was detonated 300m underground at the US nuclear test site in Nevada. The Ministry of Defence said that Operation Krakatau was a test to determine the health of the current British stockpile.

But many analysts say that it is inconceivable that Krakatau was not also part of the US replacement warhead plan. They say that it is further evidence that Britain is deeply involved in the US programme.

Jacob Perea, project manager at Los Alamos, told The Times that data from Krakatau, a British-US test, was being used to help the US to work out how to build its new generation of weapons. Although he said that the project was American, he added: “It would be pretty surprising if they (the British) weren’t watching this pretty closely.”

This flurry of activity stems from one problem: the generation of nuclear weapons owned by Britain and the US is getting old and has to be replaced. The US has not built a nuclear weapon since 1989 or tested one since 1992. But the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty forbids the testing of nuclear weapons, so the US wants a generation that does not require testing.

This Reliable Replacement Warhead project alarms many nuclear scientists in Britain and the US. Sidney Drell, a nuclear adviser to US governments for decades, said: “How can you have confidence in a stockpile that has never been tested?” Its critics also argue that the project sends the wrong message when the US is telling “rogue” nations not to develop nuclear weapons.

Britain’s Trident system is based on a US design. The missiles are bought from the US. The warheads are built at Aldermaston but in a replica of a processing plant at Los Alamos.

The Reliable Replacement Warhead programme will be debated by Congress this year. If approved, the new weapon should be ready in five years.

John Reid, the British Defence Secretary, was in Washington yesterday for talks. He reiterated that a decision on Trident’s future would be made before the end of this parliament, but insisted no decision had yet been made. But Liam Fox, the Shadow Defence Secretary, said that the Reliable Replacement programme would have a direct bearing on Britain. “Once the US goes down a set route, the UK will be forced to follow.”

Mike Hancock, a Liberal Democrat member of the Commons Defence Select Committee, which is holding hearings into Trident’s future, is convinced that Downing Street is committed to replacing Trident. He said: “Blair does not want to have the debate because (Gordon) Brown does not want to have that debate, because he knows it would be unacceptable to the rank and file.”

Many US scientists and politicians fear the US Administration is using the programme to build smaller, lower-yield nuclear weapons for battlefield use without having publicly to say so. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks the White House produced a review that viewed nuclear weapons as pre-emptive weapons that might be deployed in the field of battle.

Dan Plesch, of the Foreign Policy Centre, a London think-tank, told the Defence Select Committee last month: “One conclusion is that the UK has now aligned itself with policies for fighting wars with nuclear weapons and that this is the reality of the 21st century.”
www.timesonline.co.uk/americas
Latest news from America

ARMS RACE



1905 Einstein discovers that E=mc2

July 1954 Manhattan Project in Los Alamos tests the first prototype

August A-bombs Little Boy and Fat Man dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing more than 200,000 people


1949 USSR tests first A-bomb. Work begins on H-bomb


1950 and 1960 US and Soviet Union develop intercontinental ballistic missiles

1990s US and Russia sign treaties to reduce their tens of thousands of weapons

http://www.antiwar.com/barry/?articleid=6295

June 11, 2005
Nuclear Warrior Replaces Bolton as Arms Control Chief
by Tom Barry
The top U.S. government official in charge of arms control advocates the offensive use of nuclear weapons and has deep roots in the militarist political camp.

Moving into the old job of John Bolton, the administration's hardcore unilateralist nominee to be the next U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Robert G. Joseph is the right wing's advance man for counterproliferation as the conceptual core of a new U.S. military policy.

Within the administration, he leads a band of counterproliferationists who – working closely with such militarist policy institutes as the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) and the Center for Security Policy (CSP) – have placed preemptive attacks and weapons of mass destruction at the center of U.S. national security strategy.

Joseph replaced John Bolton at the State Department as the new undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs.

U.S. security strategy, according to the new arms control chief, should "not include signing up for arms control for the sake of arms control. At best that would be a needless diversion of effort when the real threat requires all of our attention. At worst, as we discovered in the draft BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) Protocol that we inherited, an arms control approach would actually harm our ability to deal with the WMD threat."

Before the Sep. 11, 2001 attacks, proponents of national missile defense and a more "flexible" nuclear defense strategy focused almost exclusively on the WMD threat from "competitor" states such as Russia and especially China, and from "rogue" states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea.

Joseph and other hard-line strategists advocated large increases in military spending to counter these threats while paying little or no attention to the warnings that the most likely attack on the United States and its armed forces abroad would come from non-state terrorist networks.

Instead of advocating improved intelligence on such terrorist networks like al-Qaeda, which had an established record of attacking the United States, militarist policy institutes such as NIPP and CSP focused almost exclusively on proposals for high-tech, high-priced items such as space weapons, missile defense, and nuclear weapons development.

After 9/11 Joseph and other administration militarists quickly placed the threat from terrorism at the center of their threat assessments without changing their recommendations for U.S. security strategy.

Joseph points to Iran and North Korea, as well as China, as the leading post-Cold War missile threats to the U.S. homeland. Typical of strategists who identify with the neoconservative political camp, Joseph continually raises the alarm about China, alleging that China is the "country that has been most prone to ballistic missile attacks on the United States."

Joseph participated as a team member in crafting the influential 2001 report by the National Institute for Public Policy titled "Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control."

The report recommended that the U.S. government develop a new generation of "usable" lower-yield nuclear arms. The NIPP study served as the blueprint for George W. Bush's controversial Nuclear Posture Review.

Joseph was instrumental in inserting the concept of counterproliferation into the center of the Bush administration's national security strategy. Counterproliferation is the first of the three pillars of the administration's WMD defense strategy, as outlined in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction – a document that Joseph helped draft – and in the White House's National Security Strategy.

In 1999, Joseph told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the country was unprepared to defend the homeland against new WMD threats. He recommended that the "United States acquire the capabilities to deny an enemy the benefits of these weapons. These capabilities – including passive and active defenses as well as improved counterforce means such as the ability to destroy mobile missiles – offer the best chance to strengthen deterrence, and provide the best hedge against deterrence failure."

Joseph, the founder and director of the Counterproliferation Center at the National Defense University, told the Senate committee: "We are making progress in improving our ability to strike deep underground targets, as well as in protecting the release of agents [meaning radioactive fallout]. We are revising joint doctrine for the conduct of military operations in an NBC environment [meaning one in which nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are the weapons of choice], based on the assumption that chemical and biological use will be a likely condition of future warfare."

"In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action," concludes Joseph – and that action includes the U.S. preemptive use of WMDs.

Not a high-profile hardliner like John Bolton or former undersecretary of defense for policy Douglas Feith, Joseph successfully avoided the public limelight – that is until the scandal of the 16 words in Bush's 2003 State of the Union Address about Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons development program. Press reports and congressional testimony by Central Intelligence Agency officials later revealed that the CIA had vigorously protested the inclusion of any assertion that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons since their intelligence would not support such a conclusion. Alan Foley, the CIA's top expert on weapons of mass destruction, told Congress that Robert Joseph repeatedly pressed the CIA to back the inclusion in Bush's speech of a statement about Iraq's attempts to buy uranium from Niger.

The new undersecretary of state for arms control has said that his "starting point and first conclusion" in formulating national security strategy is the fact that "nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are a permanent feature of the international environment."

As his second conclusion, Joseph asserted that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons "have substantial utility," adding as a corollary that a versatile U.S. WMD capability is essential "to deny an enemy of these weapons" since "the threat of retaliation or punishment that formed the basis for our deterrent policy in the Cold War is not likely to be sufficient."

Arms control chief Joseph is a new breed of militarist who believes that in a world where weapons of mass destruction may be proliferating, it behooves the United States to bolster its own WMD arsenal and then use it against other proliferators.

http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8263

December 16, 2005
Nuclear Deployment for an Attack on Iran
And the nuclear hitmen behind it
by Jorge Hirsch
Are U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the Persian Gulf, on hair-trigger alert, and ready to be launched against Iran at a moment's notice?

The answer is contained in presidential directive NSPD 35, "Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization," issued May 2004, which is classified. Nevertheless, we can infer the answer from the fact that every other element needed for a nuclear strike on Iran is now "deployed" and ready, namely:


The nuclear hitmen: Stephen Hadley, Stephen Cambone, Robert Joseph, William Schneider Jr., J.D. Crouch II, Linton Brooks, and John Bolton are nuclear-weapons enthusiasts who advocate aggressive policies and occupy key positions in the top echelons of the Bush administration.
A nuclear doctrine that advocates nuclear strikes against non-nuclear countries that precisely fit the Iran profile: the "Nuclear Posture Review" and the "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations."
The doctrine of preemptive attack adopted by the Bush administration and already put into practice in Iraq, and the "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" (NSPD 17), which promises to respond to a WMD threat with nuclear weapons.
150,000 American soldiers in Iraq, whose lives are at risk if a military confrontation with Iran erupts, and who thus provide the administration with a strong argument for the use of nuclear weapons to defend them.
Americans' heightened state of fear of terrorist attacks and their apparent willingness to support any course of action that could potentially protect them from real or imagined terrorist threats.
The allegations of involvement of Iran in terrorist activities around the world [1], [2], including acts against America [1], [2], and its alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction.
The determination of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission that Iran has connections with al-Qaeda.
Senate Joint Resolution 23, "Authorization for Use of Military Force," which allows the president "to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States" without consulting Congress, and the War Powers Resolution [.pdf], which "allows" the president to attack anybody in the "global war on terror."
The Bush administration's willingness to use military power based on unconfirmed intelligence and defectors' fairy tales.
The fact that Iran has been declared in noncompliance [.pdf] with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which makes it "legal" for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons against Iran.
The course of action followed by the Bush administration with respect to Iran's drive for nuclear technology, which can only lead to a diplomatic impasse.
The Israel factor [1], [2] .
I have discussed many of these elements in previous columns. Here I will focus on the people, the doctrine, and the weapons.

Nuclear Hitmen

The decision to employ nuclear weapons at any level in a military conflict rests with the president. Neither Congress nor state governments nor you nor I have to be consulted. According to Robert McNamara (U.S. secretary of defense during the Cuban missile crisis), to launch a nuclear attack requires "20 minutes' deliberation by the president and his advisers."

In preparation for the nuclear strike on Iran, the Bush administration in its second term has deployed into key positions hardliners that have both expertise in nuclear weapons and a known history of advocating the aggressive use thereof. Thus the president can say, "I feel like I'm getting really good advice from very capable people" to justify nuking Iran.

National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley
Hadley is one of the coauthors of the document "Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control" [.pdf], which served as a blueprint for the " Nuclear Posture Review" of 2001. In a 1997 paper, "Policy Considerations in Using Nuclear Weapons," Hadley applauded the "many men and women" who "have devoted their professional lives" to nuclear weapons as having made "a significant contribution to our nation." Further, "It is often an unstated premise in the current debate that if nuclear weapons are needed at all, they are needed only to deter the nuclear weapons of others. I am not sure this unstated premise is true … this is not why we got into the nuclear business." He was one of the leading proponents of the claim that Iraq had a nuclear weapons program, and he was profiled in a 2004 Los Angeles Times article as "A Hawk in Bush's Inner Circle Who Flies Under the Radar."

Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone
Cambone is Rumsfeld's right-hand man, another coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements," and a longtime promoter of missile-defense systems. If there is any doubt as to whether he will promote the policies advocated in that document, let's hear his own words: "Any policymaker has certain views. Policymakers are where they are and doing what they do because they have a view." (New York Times, April 11, 2003)

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Robert Joseph
Joseph has the position formerly held by John Bolton and is another coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements." He also helped draft the document "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" (NSPD-17), which advocates the use of nuclear weapons in response to WMD and names Iran as one of the countries that are the focus of the new U.S. strategy. He is a member of the National Institute for Public Policy, which says on its Web page that Joseph is a leading promoter of counterproliferation policy ("formulation and implementation of national security strategies to counter proliferation threats") and "criminalizing proliferation activities." He was the National Security Council member supervising the portion of the 2003 State of the Union speech dealing with intelligence about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. According to Right Web, Joseph "advocates the offensive use of nuclear weapons" and advocates placing "preemptive attacks and weapons of mass destruction at the center of U.S. national security strategy."

In a recent interview, Joseph "dismissed Iran's contention it seeks only civilian nuclear power," said that "Iran is closing in on production of nuclear weapons and even UN sanctions may not deter the aggressive government in Tehran," and averred that "once they begin to enrich, that is the point of no return," echoing similar statements by Israeli officials.

National Nuclear Security Administration Director Linton Brooks
Brooks oversees the country's nuclear weapons infrastructure and is another coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements." He also served on the Pentagon's Deterrence Concepts Advisory Panel, which was charged with overseeing the production of the Nuclear Posture Review policy document. In explaining the Nuclear Posture Review to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2004, Brooks stated [.pdf]:

"The Nuclear Posture Review represented a radical departure from the past and the most fundamental rethinking of the roles and purposes of nuclear weapons in almost a quarter-century. … Instead of treating nuclear weapons in isolation, it considered them as an integrated component of American military power. … Instead of treating the future as static and predictable, it recognized that requirements could change and that U.S. nuclear forces must be prepared to respond to those changes, including by increasing the fraction of the force that is deployed. … The Nuclear Posture Review broadens our thinking to encompass a New Triad of flexible response capabilities consisting of non-nuclear and nuclear strike capabilities."

In that address, he also advocated research on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator initiative to "hold at risk hardened, deeply buried facilities that may be important to a future adversary," and repealing the prohibition on low-yield nuclear weapons to allow research in "advanced concepts" of more usable nuclear weapons. He stated, "We need to make sure our weapons will in fact be seen by other countries as a deterrent. One element of that is usability. If nobody believes there is any circumstance where you will use the weapon, it is not a deterrent."

Chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Science Board William Schneider Jr.
Schneider is another coauthor of "Rationale and Requirements." He was a staff member at the Hudson Institute between 1967 and 1971, where "he contributed to studies on strategic forces, Soviet affairs, theater nuclear force operations, and arms control." In his own words, "The leakage of nuclear weapons-design technology over time has become a flood in recent years," and "Both Iran and Iraq sought to develop their own military ballistic and cruise missiles as well as weapons of mass destruction. In conjunction with offshore procurements of conventional defense products, they produced formidable military establishments posing an overwhelming threat to U.S. allies."

Deputy National Security Advisor J.D. Crouch II
Crouch served as assistant secretary of defense from 2001 to 2003, and was the "principal advisor to the secretary of defense on the formulation and coordination of policy … for nuclear forces, missile defense, technology security policy, counterproliferation, and arms control." In a briefing he gave on the Nuclear Posture Review in 2002, he stated, "Now, we are trying to look at a number of initiatives. One would be to modify an existing weapon, to give it greater capability against deep and hardly – or hard targets and deeply-buried targets." He is characterized as a "nuclear weapons enthusiast."

Conclusion? None of these people, when asked for advice, is likely to advise against the use of nuclear weapons for reasons that you or I would find eminently reasonable [1], [2], [3], [4], [5].

Finally, there is the infamous John Bolton. While undersecretary of state, he warned that "efforts to attain nuclear weapons pose a direct and undeniable threat to the United States and its friends and allies around the world. Whether the nuclear capabilities of states like Iran, North Korea and others are threats today, or threats tomorrow, there can be no dispute that our attention is required now before the threats become reality, and tens of thousands of innocent civilians, or more, have been vaporized." Concerning Iran specifically, he stated that "Iran has a covert program to develop and stockpile chemical weapons," that "Tehran probably maintains an offensive BW program," and in this connection that the "risks to international peace and security from such programs are too great to wait for irrefutable proof of illicit activity." Concerning missiles, he said, "Iran continues its extensive efforts to develop the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction," and just like his successor, he stated categorically that "Iran has a clandestine program to produce nuclear weapons." Today, John Bolton is "deployed" as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, where he will be most effective (simply cutting and pasting from his old speeches) explaining to the world why a nuclear strike on Iran was necessary.

Note that there is no obvious reason why the national security advisor, the deputy national security advisor, the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, the chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Science Board, and the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations have to be people with experience in nuclear weapons policy. This was not the case in other administrations. That it is the case in this administration is highly unlikely to be a coincidence. Instead, it gives a strong indication that it was envisioned in advance that the use of nuclear weapons would be a central theme of the second term of the Bush administration.

Doctrine Deployment

The Bush administration has been busy in recent years "deploying" the doctrine that will underpin the upcoming nuclear strike against Iran. Some of this deployment occurred through presidential speeches, some through unclassified policy documents, and some through classified documents, parts of which were "leaked." It has been a well-orchestrated process with a clear purpose: that the more alert sectors of the public and policymakers, and in particular the arms control community, become fully aware of it, so that when nuclear weapons are used it does not come as a total surprise. At the same time, the mainstream media have provided little coverage on the radical change in the nuclear weapons doctrine (a few articles in the New York Times and Washington Post), so the issue has remained largely invisible to the general public.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America of September 2002 codifies the doctrine of preemptive attacks, with phrases such as

"We cannot let our enemies strike first…"

"We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries…"

"[E]ven if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack…"

"[T]he United States cannot remain idle while danger gathers…"

This doctrine was used with Iraq and will be used next with Iran.

The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states, "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – including potentially nuclear weapons – to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies."

The Nuclear Posture Review delivered to Congress in 2001 is classified, but portions have been made public. It substantially broadens the role of nuclear weapons from their traditional role as deterrents against nuclear countries to encompass non-nuclear "rogue" nations. It states that "U.S. nuclear forces will now be used to dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten U.S. interests or those of allies and friends," and that "Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack."

The Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations [.pdf] is the Pentagon's implementation of the new nuclear posture. According to Hans Kristensen's analysis, "Foremost among the doctrine's new features [is] the incorporation of preemption into U.S. nuclear doctrine…." It lists a variety of new conditions under which nuclear weapons will be used, including, "For rapid and favorable war termination on U.S. terms," "To demonstrate U.S. intent and capability to use nuclear weapons to deter adversary use of WMD," and against "An adversary using or intending to use WMD against U.S., multinational, or alliance forces or civilian populations."

The " Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control" [.pdf] was produced by the National Institute for Public Policy and served as a basis for the Nuclear Posture Review. Furthermore, five of its authors are in key positions in the administration today as discussed above, and as a consequence, the contents of this document are likely to reflect also the views of these policymakers and forecast the future actions of the administration. Statements in this document include:

"[A] counterforce strategy will entail more targets, including many that are harder to find and are better protected…"
"[A] larger number of weapons, weapons with varied characteristics and greater accuracy, will be needed for a counterforce strategy…"
"Hardened targets built underground and deeply buried facilities are the most difficult to destroy and will influence the required number and characteristics of nuclear weapons…"
"Examples of hardened and buried targets include missile silos, launch control centers, concrete aircraft shelters, deeply buried command posts, tunnels for missile storage and assembly, storage bunkers, and underground facilities for weapons research and production…"
"For example, although conventional weapons could be used to attack the entrances, exits, or 'umbilicals' – electrical power, air supply, and communications links – of a deeply buried facility, one or more nuclear weapons might be required to destroy the facility itself…"
"To ensure that enemy facilities or forces are knocked out and cannot be reconstituted, attacks with nuclear weapons may be necessary. Indeed, in the future the United States may need to field simple, low-yield, precision-guided nuclear weapons for possible use against select hardened targets such as underground biological weapons facilities."
In summary, the doctrines proclaimed by the administration envision preemptive nuclear attacks on enemy facilities suspected of harboring WMD and other "assets most valued" by the enemy.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Deployment

It is generally believed that the U.S. has tactical nuclear weapons deployed only in Western Europe, remnants of the Cold War. According to Hans Kristensen of the Nuclear Information Project:

"The 480 bombs deployed in Europe represent more than 80 percent of all the active B61 tactical bombs in the U.S. stockpile. No other U.S. nuclear weapons are forward-deployed (other than warheads on ballistic missile submarines)." [.pdf]

According to Kristensen, the Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorization Presidential Directive (NSPD 35) merely "authorizes the military to continue deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe." However, Kristensen himself states that the new Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations calls "for maintaining an aggressive nuclear posture with weapons on high alert to strike adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), preemptively if necessary."

The reasons listed above make it essentially certain that NSPD 35 authorizes deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf, and it is likely that such deployment has already occurred and that the weapons are there for the specific purpose of targeting Iran. The U.S. had tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea for many years to defend against a massive conventional North Korean attack. It is easy to argue that an invasion of southern Iraq by a 9-million strong Iranian Basij militia reacting to Israel's bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities cannot be stopped without nuclear weapons.

The following statements in the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations [.pdf] suggest that tactical nuclear weapons have been already deployed and are ready to be used, given that "all options are on the table" with respect to Iran and that many of Iran's facilities are underground:

"Integrating conventional and nuclear attacks will ensure the most efficient use of force and provide U.S. leaders with a broader range of strike options to address immediate contingencies. Integration of conventional and nuclear forces is therefore crucial to the success of any comprehensive strategy. This integration will ensure optimal targeting, minimal collateral damage, and reduce the probability of escalation."
"Combatant commanders may consider the following target selection factors to determine how to defeat individual targets. … 1. Time sensitivity. 2. Hardness (ability to withstand conventional strikes). 3. Size of target. 4. Surrounding geology and depth (for underground targets). 5. Required level of damage."
"Nuclear weapons and associated systems may be deployed into theaters, but combatant commanders have no authority to employ them until that authority is specifically granted by the president."
"Deployed nuclear-strike capabilities include … theater-based, nuclear-capable dual-role aircraft."
"Nuclear-capable aircraft offer a greater degree of flexibility in escalation control because they may be a highly visible sign of resolve and, once ordered to conduct a nuclear strike, are recallable, if necessary. Aircraft-delivered weapons also provide strike capability across the range of nuclear operations."
The F-16 fighter planes, of which there are many deployed in Iraq and surrounding American bases, are such dual-role aircraft, capable of delivering B61-11 earth-penetrating nuclear bombs.

The Public Has a right to know

It is likely that the administration has briefed key senators (e.g., John Warner, John McCain, Carl Levin, Dianne Feinstein, Joe Lieberman) on the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf as classified information, arguing that it is necessary to protect American troops in Iraq against an unprovoked Iranian attack, and the American people from a possible terrorist attack with WMD sponsored by Iran, and that making the information public could endanger American forces in Iraq or make a terrorist attack more likely.

However, the use of nuclear weapons by the United States is a grave decision that affects every man, woman, and child in America (not to mention the rest of the world). The American public has a right to know if its government has deployed nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf targeting Iran, because given the circumstances described above, it is highly likely that those weapons will be used. The administration has created the circumstances to make it appear that the upcoming use of nuclear weapons against Iran will be "unavoidable." The most likely (though not the only) scenario is that Israel will "pull the trigger," bombing some Iranian facilities, and that the U.S. will be dragged into the conflict to protect American, Iraqi, and Israeli lives. The use of low-yield nuclear weapons to destroy underground Iranian facilities and deter an Iranian response will appear to be the most "humane" path to achieve U.S. goals of eliminating Iran's nuclear program and destroying its military capabilities, minimizing casualties, and achieving "rapid and favorable war termination on US terms."

The American public and the rest of the world will not fall for this deception. The circumstances surrounding the nuking of Iran were created with the specific intent of making the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. "unavoidable." The real purpose of nuking Iran is to establish the credibility of U.S. nuclear weapons as a deterrent against any undesirable action by "rogue" states.

If Bush, Rumsfeld, Cheney, and the other nuclear hitmen are really convinced that this is the best course of action for America, they should make their case public now. The president should tell the American people that the exercise of "all options" against Iran will include nukes. He should allow for a democratic debate on the pros and cons of using nuclear weapons in the Iran situation, and on pursuing alternative courses of action, before it is too late.

The president was not elected on an agenda of nuking a non-nuclear country, and the radical views of the nuclear hitmen are not likely to be the views of the majority of Americans.

If the president engages in the use of nuclear weapons against Iran in the coming weeks or months, without disclosing the preparations to the American public, he will be making a mockery of the most fundamental democratic principles that America represents. And he will have provided clear evidence of duplicitous intent, no matter how many eloquent speeches he delivers afterwards.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml.../ixnewstop.html
Iran has missiles to carry nuclear warheads
By Con Coughlin
(Filed: 07/04/2006)

Iran has successfully developed ballistic missiles with the capability to carry nuclear warheads.

Detailed analysis of recent test firings of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile by military experts has concluded that Iran has been able to modify the nose cone to carry a basic nuclear bomb. The discovery will intensify international pressure on Teheran to provide a comprehensive breakdown of its nuclear research programme.


An Iranian Shahab-3 missile on parade in Teheran

Last week, the United Nations Security Council gave Iran 30 days to freeze its uranium enrichment programme that many experts believe is part of a clandestine attempt to produce nuclear weapons.

Iran denies it is trying to acquire a nuclear arsenal. But ballistic missile experts advising the United States say it has succeeded in reconfiguring the Shahab-3 to carry nuclear weapons.

The Shahab-3 is a modified version of North Korea's Nodong missile which itself is based on the old Soviet-made Scud.


Click to enlarge

The Nodong, which Iran secretly acquired from North Korea in the mid-1990s, is designed to carry a conventional warhead. But Iranian engineers have been working for several years to adapt the Shahab-3 to carry nuclear weapons.

"This is a major breakthrough for the Iranians," said a senior US official. "They have been trying to do this for years and now they have succeeded. It is a very disturbing development."

The Shahab 3 has a range of 800 miles, enabling it to hit a wide range of targets throughout the Middle East - including Israel.



Apart from modifying the nose cone, Iranian technicians are also trying to make a number of technical adjustments that will enable the missile to travel a greater distance.

Western intelligence officials believe that Iran is receiving assistance from teams of Russian and Chinese experts with experience of developing nuclear weapons. Experts who have studied the latest version of the Shahab have identified modifications to the nose cone.

Instead of the single cone normally attached to this type of missile, the new Shahab has three cones, or a triconic, warhead. A triconic warhead allows the missile to accommodate a nuclear device and this type of warhead is normally found only in nuclear weapons.

According to the new research, the Iranian warhead is designed to carry a spherical nuclear weapon that would be detonated 2,000 feet above the ground, similar to the Hiroshima bomb.

Although US defence officials believe that Iran is several years away from acquiring nuclear weapons, they point out that the warhead could hold a version of the nuclear bomb Pakistan is known to have developed. Iran has acquired a detailed breakdown of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

The development of the Shahab-3 is just one element of a wide-ranging missile development programme.

In 2003 the Iranians concluded another secret deal with North Korea to buy the Taepo Dong 2 missile, which has a range of 2,200 miles and would enable Iran to hit targets in mainland Europe.

Earlier this week the Iranians announced that they had successfully test-fired a new missile, the Fajr-3, which has the capability to evade radar systems and carry multiple warheads.

3 April 2006: US 'committed to a diplomatic solution of Iran nuclear crisis'
2 April 2006: Government in secret talks about strike against Iran
12 March 2006: 'The choice is not enrichment or not, it is enrichment or weapons'
12 February 2006: Evolution of a nuclear programme
16 October 2005: Russians help Iran with missile threat to Europe

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?Do...ge=../index.cfm
Congress Puts Brakes on Landmine Alternative Production, Pentagon Continues Procurement

An article appearing in the November/December 2005 issue of The Defense Monitor, “A Landmine By Any Other Name,” discussed the Pentagon’s 10-year-old anti-personnel landmine alternatives program. These proposed landmine alternatives (such as Spider and the Intelligent Munitions System), have been called into serious question by the U.S. Congress, because producing these weapons would prevent the United States from ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty. A decision on whether or not to begin production of Spider was slated for December 2005, but the Pentagon was forced to postpone this decision until early 2006, after Congress inserted a reporting provision into the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 Defense Appropriations conference report.

The bill requires the Secretary of the Army to provide Congress with a report on the indiscriminate effects of the proposed weapons systems before a decision can be made to go ahead with production. Although Congress is still awaiting this report, procurement of these weapons continues.

The FY 07 procurement request for Antipersonnel Landmine Alternatives in the Defense budget was up 68 percent from the FY 06 amount of $27.5 million. The $85.9 million requested for FY 07 is intended specifically for further procurement of the Spider “networked munitions” system.




Chart source: FY 2007 Budget Estimate Submission, Procurement of Ammunition, Army, available at: http://www.asafm.army.mil/budget/fybm/FY07/pforms/ammo.pdf

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?Do...ge=../index.cfm
April 3, 2006

A Smarter Military, Not a Bigger Arsenal

This article first appeared as “The US needs to build a smarter military, not a bigger arsenal: Cut missile defense and expand resources for the Army and National Guard” in the Christian Science Monitor on March 23, 2006.

WASHINGTON – As the war in Iraq enters its fourth year with no end in sight, support for the war among the American public is dropping rapidly. But more ominously, so is support for U.S. engagement in the world. President Bush is aware of this and in his State of the Union address and his recently released National Security Strategy, he warned of the attraction of isolationism in a complex and challenging time.

While this desire to be relieved of the burden of global responsibility is understandable, it is wrong. U.S. military force in conjunction with other instruments of American power will be needed to protect our security for the foreseeable future. What the president must do is lay out the circumstances for its use.

Above all, the armed forces must be ready to defend the homeland. They must also, with allies, be prepared to deter and defeat aggression, halt genocide, and share in peacekeeping.

Even homeland defense requires international collaboration in order to destroy global terrorist networks and prevent attacks. Intelligence agents, special police, and financial experts at home and abroad are as vital to this mission as the fighter pilots who fly over our capital and the Coast Guardsmen who protect our shores. The military role must expand when necessary, as in Afghanistan, to eliminate a regime that provides a haven to the terrorists. It's not enough to sweep away such a regime; the United States must also serve as midwife to a new, viable government.

To bolster homeland defense, the Army National Guard should return to its core mission as chief protector when large-scale disasters occur, its resources directed toward coping with terrorist attacks and devastating hurricanes.

Homeland defense does not, however, require National Missile Defense. North Korea is often cited as the rationale for this costly program (over $40 billion since President Bush took office). Should Pyongyang acquire a credible means of delivering nuclear weapons, the threat of U.S. retaliation would almost certainly deter a Korean attack. Missile defense, however, is powerless against hijacked airliners and smuggled bombs.

But since the potential for conventional warfare between nations still exists, the U.S. military must maintain sufficient forces to deter or defeat attacks by North Korea against South Korea, China against Taiwan, or Iran against Israel.

Deterrence and war fighting call for a flexible and agile military - but not a massive nuclear arsenal like ours. We have 5,000 deployed H-bombs, many on hair-trigger alert, and another 5,000 in reserve. In addition, 600 to 700 tactical nuclear weapons are ready for battlefield use. A nuclear arsenal of this size has no rational military purpose. By holding at risk critical military targets in a handful of countries, the United States could, and should, reduce its deployment to 600 warheads, plus another 400 in reserve.

Most military missions are geared to national security threats. We accept other missions because we're human. Such is the case with genocide. The slaughter of as many as 800,000 people in Rwanda was not a direct threat to Americans; it was a moral outrage. As a signatory to the Genocide Convention of 1948, the United States is committed "to prevent and to punish" acts intended to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Yet the United States and other nations looked away when genocide occurred in Rwanda. Today, the United Nations must scrounge for help in halting genocide in Darfur. The inadequate African Union force there must be strengthened, and U.S. military transport and communications could provide needed muscle to a new peacekeeping operation. The Pentagon is at long last working on a doctrine for U.S. participation in peacekeeping. It should have happened years ago.

These missions can be accomplished, at far lower cost than currently, by a larger Army that includes a doubling of Special Forces, a robust Coast Guard, and a somewhat smaller Air Force and Navy - provided we eliminate redundant and irrelevant weapon systems. Therefore we should shrink the nuclear arsenal and cancel missile defense, the F/A-22 fighter jet, Virginia class submarines, and the V-22 Osprey helicopter.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who took his post committed to transforming the armed forces, can't cut these major weapon systems. Like many of his predecessors, he has been stymied by the top brass, pork-hungry members of Congress, and big defense contractors. The Pentagon continues to buy everything in sight, and military spending now tops half-a-trillion dollars a year.

American military power has a job to do. But Pentagon bloat and the Iraq war weaken the public's support for its missions.

# # #

Lawrence Korb served as assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration and is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information. Sanford Gottlieb worked for 34 years in the peace movement and is the author of "Defense Addiction: Can America Kick the Habit?"

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?Do...ge=../index.cfm
April 3, 2006

CDI Missile Defense Update #4 ~ April 3, 2006

NB#1: CDI Senior Advisor Philip E. Coyle, III, points out in his op-ed, "Outside View: Flawed Missile War Game," that "the addled thinking of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency was on full display in late January when MDA officials conducted a missile defense war game on Capitol Hill." He illustrates the faulty assumptions used to justify missile defense and adds, "To get support for missile defense, the Pentagon needs a better story. But after 20 years trying, they still don't have one." First published by UPI, the op-ed is available at http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?Do...=1&ListRows=10&
appendURL=&Orderby=D.DateLastUpdated&ProgramID
=6&from_page=index.cfm.


NB#2: After spending two decades and $92.5 billion on a flawed national ballistic missile defense program, the Defense Department is now paying some attention to "asymmetric missile defense" to defend against cruise or ballistic missiles launched off the U.S. coast. CDI Research Analyst Victoria Samson explains in her analysis "What if by sea?" why the technologies being proffered for asymmetric missile defense will not work. Published in the March/April 2006 issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the piece is available at http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=ma06samson.

NB#3: Two new reports by the Pentagon's Inspector General's office have pointed out serious deficiencies in the U.S. missile defense system. The first, "Select Controls for the Information Security of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense Communications Network (D-2006-53)," Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Feb. 24, 2006, has been taken down from the IG's website, but thanks to Federal Computer Weekly, electronic copies remain and are available at http://www.fcw.com/images/st_images/MDADODIGReport.pdf.

The second, "System Engineering Planning for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (D-2006-60)," Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, March 2, 2006, is available at http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/FY06/06-060.pdf.

NB#4: A new GAO report is out which may be of interest. "Missile Defense Agency Fields Initial Capability but Falls Short of Original Goals (GAO-06-327)," Government Accountability Office, March 15, 2006, is available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06327.pdf.


1. GAO is accused of missile defense cover-up
2. MIT cedes investigation to DOD
3. Who is in charge of missile defense?
4. Britain , Czech Republic , Poland possible hosts for MD interceptors
5. Missile defense reportedly to work in a pinch
6. Obering downplays missile defense criticism and critics
7. U.S. missile defense "robust and significant" despite the lack of a successful test
8. MDA considering move of Ground-Based Radar Prototype
9. Missile defense creating executive board
10. MDA diminishes potential for Space Test Bed
11. MDA and Inspector General's office in a battle of wills
12. Patriot fixes being carried out
13. United States and Japan hold successful sea-based missile defense flight mission
14. Stalemate in Taiwan weapons deal causes unease in United States


1. GAO is accused of missile defense cover-up

Subrata Ghoshroy, a senior analyst with the Government Accountability Office (GAO), has accused his organization of ignoring missile defense contractors' fraud in a February 2002 GAO report. This report was to look into allegations that TRW made up flight data about the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system's first flight test, IFT-1A, which was held June 24, 1997; it was to answer questions first raised by then-TRW employee Nira Schwartz. An early GAO draft summary of its analysis indicated that yes, the contractors had "excluded some data and modified statistical techniques;" furthermore, it was unclear as to whether "the Boeing sensor could distinguish a warhead from decoys," something that had been brought into question by Schwartz. Subsequently, the GAO investigative team was told to change its inquiry from fraud to whether the contractors had owned up to their problems. While some of the contractors' claims of admissions of failure could be backed up with evidence, not all of them could be. Yet the GAO included the admissions in its final report. Ghoshroy later spoke about the GAO investigation's weaknesses; and three internal reports have exonerated the GAO. The head of the GAO, David M. Walker, said that Ghoshroy was "a relatively low-level, disgruntled employee," and averred, "We don't pull any punches."

(New York Times, April 2, 2006)



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2. MIT cedes investigation to DOD

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) is under fire for agreeing to allow its attempted investigation into a possible fraudulent missile defense test to instead be carried out by the Department of Defense (DOD). In the first flight test of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, IFT-1A, held June 24, 1997, the Pentagon announced that the infrared missile censor tested had performed successfully. The results were evaluated by a team that included two scientists at the MIT-run Lincoln Lab. However, Theodore Postol, a professor at MIT, conducted his own analysis and concluded that the results were so flawed that the MIT scientists could not have agreed with the data. Since 2003, the university attempted to conduct an investigation based on Postol's claims but were refused access to materials by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). After three years of delay, MIT agreed to allow Norman Augustine, a Pentagon employee with no affiliation with MDA, to conduct the investigation. However Postol (who labels Augustine as "biased"), along with other scientists within and outside of MIT, disagree with MIT labeling the decision as appeasement to the DOD. MIT officials say the Pentagon will share its conclusions with the university. According to Postol, by agreeing to this arrangement, "What MIT is in effect doing is turning over responsibilities for oversight of its own academic operations to the Department of Defense."

( Boston Globe, March 4, 2006)

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3. Who is in charge of missile defense?

Even as missile defense officials proclaim in public that the system is developing and capable of providing an emergency defense for the United States , there are some who are still trying to figure out the chain of command should the system ever be activated. According to Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, one of the big questions which has not yet been answered is, "How do we do global command and control?" He pointed out that missile defense runs through various branches of the U.S. military and across several commands, so determining who should make the firing decision is dicey. As he said, "If we do all this by committee, it won't be successful." This comes at the same time Lt. Gen. Trey Obering, head of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), is asserting that missile defense "turned a major corner this past year." Obering has also given a broad outline of the near future for the fledgling missile defense system. By the end of this calendar year, 22 interceptors are to be installed in Alaska and California ; 50 should be fielded by 2010, 10 of which are to be in a European site.
(Defense News, March 27, 2006)

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4. Britain , Czech Republic , Poland possible hosts for MD interceptors

Defense Agency (MDA)'s annual conference, held the week of March 20, 2006, the agency tipped its hand as to which countries may be chosen to host a third missile defense interceptor site. This would be part of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, which already has missile fields in Alaska and California . While the United Kingdom , the Czech Republic and Poland were all listed as potential hosts, British officials adamantly avowed that they had never been officially asked to do so. According to a spokesperson at the British Ministry of Defense, " America has not yet decided to place interceptors in Europe, has not yet asked for further British participation and the government has not yet decided whether or not to pursue missile defense for the UK ." The United Kingdom already is involved, as the radar in Fylingdales is being upgraded to develop an early warning capability that would be tied into the U.S. missile defense network. A decision is expected within a year or so for the third site, as MDA officials hope to begin work on it in early 2008 with the goal of bringing it online around 2010.

( London Daily Telegraph, March 24, 2006)

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5. Missile defense reportedly to work in a pinch

Despite the lack of a successful intercept flight test since October 2002, Lt. Gen. Trey Obering, head of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), believes that the system deployed in Alaska and California could work if it had to. He announced, "We could certainly shoot down an incoming missile if we needed to." This makes one wonder why they haven't done it then, considering how expensive each flight intercept test is ($100 million) and how much political pressure is on the system to prove itself during testing. Despite this confidence in the system, Obering has not given a date for when missile defense, which is still being developed, could be considered fully operational.
(Dow Jones Newswires, March 21, 2006)



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6. Obering downplays missile defense criticism and critics

In an attempt to discredit criticism of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, Lt. Gen. Trey Obering, head of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), likened some prominent missile defense critics to earlier naysayers who were later proved wrong. One of the critics was CDI Senior Advisor Philip E. Coyle, III, who was quoted as saying missile defense is "incredibly expensive, and it doesn't work;" the other critic was MIT's Theodore Postol, who has said that the GMD interceptor "cannot tell the difference between warheads and the simplest of balloon decoys. This means the national missile defense system can simply not work." Obering equated their criticisms of missile defense to critics who said that man would never fly, the nuclear bomb would never go off, and man would never make it to the moon. Coyle, however, pointed out that he had never said missile defense could never work, but that it does not work and is not being tested or developed in a way that will allow it to be proven to be reliable. Said Coyle, "I think what Gen. Obering is doing is blaming the mirror for the Missile Defense Agency's poor image...The reason the Missile Defense Agency has a poor image is because it keeps breaking its promises." Furthermore, Obering stated in the same speech that GMD had proven itself by making four intercepts in five attempts from 1999 to 2002; however, Coyle pointed out that missile defense had made intercepts in five out of eight attempts during that time. See http://www.cdi.org/news/missile-defense/gmd.pdf for more information. Rick Lehner, MDA spokesperson, admitted that Coyle was right, but argued that two of the failures did not count because the kill vehicle failed to work properly during the test, so an intercept could not be attempted and therefore the test should not be counted as an intercept failure; he added that another flight test failure occurred in December 2002, outside of the 2002 fiscal year, and thus could not be included in Coyle's accounting.
(Space News, March 27, 2006)

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7. U.S. missile defense "robust and significant" despite the lack of a successful test

Adm. Timothy Keating of U.S. Northern Command expressed his confidence in U.S. missile defense at a March 14, 2006, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. When asked about the system's success if a single ballistic missile were launched against the western United States , Keating could not give specific numbers but described the systems capabilities as "robust and significant" and added: "I'm very confident in the efficacy of that system." However, when asked if an actual successful intercept test has been completed, Keating responded that while several successful tests of different parts of the system have been conducted, a test involving all systems has yet to have been carried out successfully.

(Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, March 15, 2006)

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8. MDA considering move of Ground-Based Radar Prototype

The Raytheon-built Ground-Based Radar-Prototype (GBR-P) is being usurped by its larger cousin, the Sea-Based X-band Radar (SBX), also of Raytheon. The SBX is twice as tall and has a range 2.5 times greater than the GBR-P and can accommodate more transmit/receive modules. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is considering relocating the GBR-P, as its current status of testing for U.S. missile defense against growing threats from North Korea is being overridden by SBX's capability. GBR-P will support future missile defense tests or serve in an operational mode in its new location or, according to MDA, hopefully both.

(Defense Daily, March 20, 2006)

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9. Missile defense creating executive board

The Fiscal Year 2007 budget request included funding for a "Ballistic Missile Defense Executive Board" that Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials hope will overhaul the way missile defense is managed. According to budget documents, this executive board would "recommend and oversee implementation of strategic policies and plans, program priorities, and investment options to protect our nation and our allies from any form of ballistic missile attack," as well as "incorporate evolving requirements into a comprehensive acquisition strategy to develop and field operational missile defense capability." It would become the primary oversight organization for missile defense activities, replacing the Senior Executive Council (SEC), but it would not have the decision authority granted to the SEC. That authority would be given to "the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics (USD/AT&L), and with the director of the Missile Defense Agency as designated by USD/AT&L." The board is supposed to help smooth out technological development of the various missile defense programs by marshalling "new ideas and technologies as they develop into initial capabilities, and subsequently into fully mature solutions ready for fielding and inclusion into the missile defense system. The board will also consider the evolving priorities and requirements of the war-fighting community as it formulates recommendations on the way forward." However, MDA still speaks of using spiral development and what it calls "knowledge-based decision making," and doesn't seem to be truly changing any of its operating modes.
(Inside Missile Defense, March 1, 2006)

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10. MDA diminishes potential for Space Test Bed

In testimony to the House Armed Services Committee's Strategic Forces subcommittee on March 9, 2006, Lt. Gen. Trey Obering, head of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), sought to reassure members vis-à-vis MDA's intentions for its Space Test Bed. In downplaying the significance of the program, which is planning on starting initial studies on it in Fiscal Year 2007, Obering stated, "It is a test bed just for experimental purposes." Of course, in 2001, his predecessor, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, was saying the same thing about the Ft. Greely test-bed, which is now where 10 interceptors have been fielded as part of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system.
(Defense Daily, March 10, 2006)

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11. MDA and Inspector General's office in a battle of wills

The Pentagon's Inspector General's office has released two reports in two months that were harshly critical of the Missile Defense Agency (see NB#3, above, for the links). The first report indicated that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system had such shoddy computer network security that it could, in effect, get hacked. It was discovered that MDA and Boeing (the lead system integrator for the GMD system) were following security protocols that were 20 years old; technically, these were the only protocols that they had to follow, but it seems strange that they would not take every available measure to protect the safety of the computer network linking together the U.S. missile defense programs. As a result, the IG report says, program officials "may not be able to reduce the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from misuse or unauthorized access or modification of information [on the network] and ensure the continuity of the system in the event of an interruption." First reported on by Federal Computer Weekly on March 16, 2006, the report was yanked off of the IG's website the following weekend. The second report was perhaps even more devastating, as it illustrated that MDA has failed to develop a solid systems engineering plan for its missile defense systems, noting that because of this, MDA "is at risk of not successfully developing an integrated ballistic missile defense system." Programs highlighted as "problematic" were: the Airborne Laser, the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. Finally, the IG reports pointedly commented on the slow delivery of documents from MDA officials. In the course of doing the report on network security, MDA officials were so tardy in sending over required documents that the audit was suspended for over three weeks; while doing the report on systems engineering, the IG's office reported it received 49 out of 245 requested documents (roughly 20 percent) within five business days. (FederalComputerWeekly.com, March 16, 2006; March 20, 2006)

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12. Patriot fixes being carried out

Three years after the Patriot missile defense system's technological problems caused the deaths of one American and two British pilots during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Patriot is alleged to be close to being fixed. Lt. Gen. Larry Dodgen, commander of Army Space and Missile Defense Command, told the House Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2006, that crew training and upgrades to the Patriot's software should give the system the capabilities to distinguish friends from foes on a cluttered battlefield and thus prevent future fratricides. In a serious understatement, Dodgen informed the committee, "The battlefield is now far more complex now than it was during 1990." In Fiscal Year 2006, $43 million was shifted over to fix the Patriot's shortcomings. However, the Pentagon has never officially indicated what those problems were, but instead has kept serious discussion of the issue largely classified. Meanwhile, 313 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 interceptors were part of the U.S. arsenal by the end of 2005. It is unclear whether the old and existing Patriots are being included in this upgrading of capabilities.
(DefenseNews.com, March 9, 2006)

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13. United States and Japan hold successful sea-based missile defense flight mission

A modified version of the U.S. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) system flew successfully on March 8, 2006. It was a joint effort between the United States and Japan , where the U.S.-created Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptor flew with a modified nosecone. The joint work on the nosecone was evenly split between the United States ' Raytheon and Japan 's Mitsubishi. No intercept was attempted; one is planned for later this year. Joint Control Test Vehicle 1 (JCTV-1) was part of an effort that was begun in August 1991. The U.S.-Japan Cooperative Research Project aims to experiment with the SM-3 interceptor. In JCTV-1, the modified nosecone opened without requiring any missile maneuvers, as the SM-3 normally would need (known as the "pitch and ditch"). The nosecone is what releases the kinetic kill vehicle.

(Defense Daily, March 9, 2006; March 14, 2006)

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14. Stalemate in Taiwan weapons deal causes unease in United States

To contain the growing power and influence of China, President George W. Bush agreed to pump new blood into Taiwan 's military defense with an $18.8 billion arms sale in 2001. However, the current political and cultural climate in Taiwan has caused a recent refusal to release present funds for the weapons. Questions about the deal, from whether the United States is over-charging, to whether an arms race is an appropriate reaction, have caused a political stalemate that has blocked a procurement bill for the weapons. The United States has scaled back the arms deal to $14.8, but to no avail.

(International Herald Tribune, March 21, 2006)

GAO Report: Assessments of selected major weapons programs
April 6, 2006

"Assessments of Selected Major Weapons Programs," GAO Report GAO-06-391, March 31, 2006. To access report: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06391.pdf
Author(s): Victoria Samson

http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printve...documentID=3146
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September 19, 2005
Iran and the Rogues: America’s Nuclear Obsession


Nuclear weapons are supposedly making a comeback after fading from prominence following the end of the Cold War. Nukes are seen as assuming newfound significance as the rogue states Iran and North Korea move closer to acquiring them, and as the United States looks to its own nuclear arsenal for a solution. Among other voices heard sounding the tocsin is the Bush administration’s, which is making a real fuss over the efforts by those nations to go nuclear, as it did over the nuclear program imputed to Iraq before the war. And much clamor is being stirred by the Pentagon’s plans to develop specially designed nukes to use preemptively to neutralize the emerging rogue nuclear threats. While diplomatic pressure, coupled with economic incentives, has been exerted to arrest the momentum of rogue proliferation, President George W. Bush repeatedly refers to the possible necessity of military action, possibly involving U.S. nuclear strikes. Without saying so explicitly, nuking Iran or North Korea is one of the options on the table that he insists will remain there.

It seems as though a rather volatile new situation has descended on the world, but history tells a different story. In fact, neither the perception of a rogue nuclear threat nor the idea of resorting to U.S. nuclear weapons to suppress it is new to Pentagon planners. On the contrary, a nascent nuclear threat was attributed to these very same countries over 20 years ago, and nuclear strike plans were devised to suppress it. These early plans were as unsound, extreme, and surreal as the preemptive plans being drawn up today.

Twenty years ago, Iran and North Korea (along with China, Syria, and Iraq) were minor nuclear nuisances compared to the Soviet Union, whose huge nuclear arsenal posed a threat of apocalyptic proportions to the United States and U.S. allies. The main U.S. nuclear strike plan, known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP, envisioned rapid strikes by U.S. strategic forces against a Soviet target set consisting of some 16,000 targets. Since the U.S. strategic arsenal was brimming over at the time with upwards of 13,000 nuclear weapons, a full-scale assault on the Soviet Union would have left it a smoking, radiating ruin with over one-hundred million dead and at least as many wounded and sick. The comparably over-sized Soviet strategic arsenal would have inflicted even greater destruction on the United States, Western Europe and Japan. The collective overkill in the two arsenals would have left their respective countries and much of the rest of the northern hemisphere in total ruins and agony.

So the nascent nuclear powers such as Iran and North Korea, along with the others states mentioned above, including China which had been removed from the U.S. strategic war plan in 1981 following the normalization of Sino-American relations in 1979, were sideshows in the grand game of nuclear brinkmanship between the Americans and Soviets. But these sideshows were still seriously factored into U.S. nuclear planning. War gamers argued that Iran or one of the other putative nuclear rogues or China might emerge from the ashes of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange and exploit U.S. weakness using nuclear blackmail. In their imaginations, the United States stood to be defeated by upstart nuclear powers such as Iran in the wake of a cataclysmic strike by Russia that utterly devastated the United States. And therefore it was imperative in their estimation for the United States to organize its war plans to ensure that a counter-rogue nuclear expeditionary force composed of surviving U.S. nuclear forces would be able to destroy the nuclear infrastructure -- reactors and nuclear-related facilities, as well as nuclear command and control and the means of delivering them -- in Iran and other countries that sat out the opening salvos between the Cold War adversaries.

This scenario of post-World War III strikes against Iran or others obviously rested on flimsy evidence of the actual nuclear weapons threat that these countries could have posed at the time. In the case of Iran, U.S. strategic forces were assigned to attack the country’s incipient nuclear threat that in the mid-1980s was still at least 23 to 34 years from realization. Hard intelligence was far more elusive then than today, and evidence was immaterial anyway. U.S. planners simply assumed the extreme worst-case for both the capabilities and the intentions of the inscrutable and angry regimes in Iran and elsewhere. That the imagined context of the post-World War III conflict between the United States and Iran was utter non-sense was lost on the war gamers.

Now that the U.S.-Soviet nuclear rivalry has become the side-show and nuclear proliferators have stolen the limelight, U.S. nuclear planners enjoy new license to conceive scenarios for using U.S. nukes against the rogue states and China. They have restored China as a major target of the U.S. strategic war plan, and are drawing up nuclear strike options to neutralize the still uncertain nuclear threats posed by the rogue states. Preventive and preemptive nuclear strikes are among the military options that the Bush administration does not want to take off the table.

America’s and the world’s concern over Iran’s future nukes and North Korea’s virtual small arsenal of nukes is warranted, but the solution to this proliferation will not be found in the U.S. nuclear planners’ kitbag. The war gamers lost their credibility and perspective on the utility of U.S. nukes in dealing with nuclear rogue states over two decades ago. They are still living in that strange dreamland. We can only hope that enlightened national leadership will bring them down to Earth.


Author(s): Bruce Blair

http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/index.cfm...ID=6&issueid=78

News and Opinion

What If By Sea?
March 20, 2006

After spending two decades and $92.5 billion on a flawed national ballistic missile defense program, the Defense Department is now paying some attention to "asymmetric missile defense" to defend against cruise or ballistic missiles launched off the U.S. coast. CDI Research Analyst Victoria Samson explains in her analysis "What if by sea?" why the technologies being proferred for asymmetric missile defense will not work. Published in the March/April 2006 issue of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, click "here" to read the article on The Bulletin's website.

Doubling in seven years: Unless the Pentagon drastically changes missile defense priorities, investment will double by 2013
January 17, 2006

A recent report by the Congressional Budgetary Office (CBO) put the annual cost of missile defense peaking at $19 billion by 2013. Examining future expenditures if current rates continue, the CBO instead proposed an alternative of stopping missile defense deployment entirely and holding R&D steady at $3 billion annually. CDI Research Analyst Victoria Samson explains how "the United States cannot afford to have the cost of missile defense double," particularly when "CBO shows us that this spending is not necessary."
Author(s): Victoria Samson

Remember the anti-missile missile? Forget it
January 4, 2006

On Dec. 17, the Missile Defense Agency put its 10th interceptor rocket in the ground as part of the ballistic missile defense system that the Bush administration has claimed would offer a limited defense against a rogue ICBM attack. CDI Research Analyst Victoria Samson explains in her op-ed that, "Unfortunately for U.S. national security, and for those who care about where our tax dollars go, it does nothing of the sort."
Author(s): Victoria Samson

Safety in Numbers?
October 18, 2005

The Missile Defense Agency is touting Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) technology as one solution to the challenge which the use of decoys would pose to Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. In “Safety in Numbers?” CDI Research Assistant Haninah Levine examines the fundamentals of MKV technology and weighs the program’s potential impact on National Ballistic Missile Defense.
Author(s): Haninah Levine

A Tale of Two Missile Defense Systems
October 11, 2005

In her Space News op-ed Victoria Samson, CDI Research Analyst, comments that while much has been made of the U.S. fledgling missile defense system, it is often forgotten that another country already has deployed a layered national missile defense system. Israel’s Arrow Weapon System has been fielded in two batteries and provides one tier of its hoped-for defense against tactical ballistic missiles (an older version of the Patriot missile defense system provides the second tier)...
Author(s): Victoria Samson

When do we say when?
August 12, 2005

In July, Lt. Gen. Trey Obering, head of the Missile Defense Agency, stated that there is a “better-than-zero chance of successfully intercepting, I believe, an inbound warhead.” This contrasts with earlier official statements that predicted an effectiveness rate of over 90 percent. CDI Research Analyst Victoria Samson points out in her analysis, “When do we say when?”, that despite the setbacks during testing, the Pentagon is still requesting funding for more unproven interceptors. She asks, “Why the unbridled enthusiasm when it comes to funding – missile defense overall is the single most expensive weapon system in this year’s budget request – and yet such cautious backpedaling when speaking on record?”
Author(s): Victoria Samson

The Independent Review Team’s Report on the GMD Program: A Rush to Failure, Redux
June 28, 2005

A independent review team investigated the most recent flight test failures of the Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense (GMD) program and has some solid recommendations for strengthening the system. However, the primary cause for the system’s failures – a rush to deploy in order to meet an unnecessary political deadline – is glossed over in a report released to the Missile Defense Agency on March 31, 2005. CDI Research Analyst Victoria Samson explains how until the powers-that-be take a realistic look at what their pressure has done to this system and change accordingly, any fixes to GMD’s test program will be temporary.
Author(s): Victoria Samson

Threat to Jets from Small Missiles
May 26, 2005

In her Op-Ed in the Providence Journal, CDI Research Analyst Victoria Samson argues that the real threat of a missile attack against the United States comes not from a ballistic missile, but from shoulder-launched missiles’ menacing commercial aircraft.
Author(s): Victoria Samson

Space-Based Interceptors: Still Not a Good Idea
October 7, 2004

In “Space-Based Interceptors: Still Not a Good Idea,” CDI Vice President Theresa Hitchens and Research Analyst Victoria Samson argue that the United States is “ready to abandon its decades-long policy of restraint regarding the weaponization of space.” They argue further that “the current U.S. administration is pursuing the elusive and dangerous policy goal of dominating space in the absence of a serious policy debate about the ramifications for U.S. security and global stability.” The analysis was first published in the Summer/Fall 2004 issue of the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. (PDF)
Author(s): Theresa Hitchens , Victoria Samson

Fact sheet on the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)’s Draft Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)
September 29, 2004

The Missile Defense Agency recently released its draft Ballistic Missile Defense System Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (BMDS PEIS), dated Sept. 1, 2004. This document details the environmental costs of the Bush administration’s plans for a layered missile defense. The draft BMDS PEIS is open to the public for comments, which are supposed to then be incorporated in the final version of the document. CDI Research Analyst Victoria Samson summarizes what is included in the draft BMDS PEIS and how it downplays the threat of orbital debris.
Author(s): Victoria Samson

http://www.dodig.mil/audit/reports/FY06/06-060.pdf.

"System Engineering Planning for the Ballistic Missile Defense System (D-2006-60)," Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, March 2, 2006.

http://www.counterpunch.org/

Outsourcing US Missile Technology to China

The Saga of Magnequench

By JEFFREY ST. CLAIR

Magnequench is an Indianapolis-based company. It specializes in the obscure field of sintered magnetics. Essentially, it makes tiny, high-tech magnets from rare-earth minerals ground down into a fine powder. The magnets are highly prized by electronics and aviation companies. But Magnequench's biggest client has been the Pentagon.

The neodymium-iron-boron magnets made by Magnequench are a crucial component in the guidance system of cruise missiles and the Joint Direct Attack Munition or JDAM bomb, which is made by Boeing and had a starring role in the spring bombing of Baghdad. Indeed, Magnequench enjoys a near monopoly on this market niche, supplying 85 percent of the rare-earth magnets that are used in the servo motors of these guided missiles and bombs.

But the Pentagon may soon be sending its orders for these parts to China, instead of Indiana. On September 15, 2004 Magnequench shuttered its last plant in Indiana, fired its 450 workers and began shipping its machine tools to a new plant in China. "We're handing over to the Chinese both our defense technology and our jobs in the midst of a deep recession," says Rep. Peter Visclosky, a Democrat from northern Indiana.

It gets stranger. Magnequench is not only moving its defense plants to China, it's actually owned by Chinese companies with close ties to the Chinese government.

Magnequench began its corporate life back in 1986 as a subsidiary of General Motors. Using Pentagon grants, GM had developed a new kind of permanent magnet material in the early 1980s. It began manufacturing the magnets in 1987 at the Magnequench factory in Anderson, Indiana.

In 1995, Magnequench was purchased from GM by Sextant Group, an investment company headed by Archibald Cox, Jr-the son of the Watergate prosecutor. After the takeover, Cox was named CEO. What few knew at the time was that Sextant was largely a front for two Chinese companies, San Huan New Material and the China National Non-Ferrous Metals Import and Export Corporation. Both of these companies have close ties to the Chinese government. Indeed, the ties were so intimate that the heads of both companies were in-laws of the late Chinese premier Deng Xiaopeng.

At the time of the takeover, Cox pledged to the workers that Magnequench was in it for the long haul, intending to invest money in the plants and committed to keeping the production line going for at least a decade.

Three years later Cox shut down the Anderson plant and shipped its assembly line to China. Now Cox is presiding over the closure of Magnequench's last factory in the US, the Valparaiso, Indiana plant that manufactures the magnets for the JDAM bomb. Most of the workers have already been fired.

"Archie Cox and his company are committing a criminal act," says Mike O'Brien, an organizer with the UAW in Indiana. "He's a traitor to his country."

It's clear that Cox and Sextant were acting as a front for some unsavory interests. For example, only months prior to the takeover of Magnequench San Huan New Materials was cited by US International Trade Commission for patent infringement and business espionage. The company was fined $1.5 million. Foreign investment in American high-tech and defense companies is regulated by the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS). It is unlikely that CFIUS would have approved San Huan's purchase of Magnequench had it not been for the cover provided by Cox and his Sextant Group.

One of Magnequench's subsidiaries is a company called GA Powders, which manufactures the fine granules used in making the mini-magnets. GA Powders was originally a Department of Energy project created by scientists at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Lab. It was spun off to Magnequench in 1998, after Lockheed Martin took over the operations at INEEL.

In June 2000, Magnequench uprooted the production facilities for GA Powders from Idaho Falls to a newly constructed plant in Tianjin, China. This move followed the transfer to China of high-tech computer equipment from Magnequench's shuttered Anderson plant. According to a report in Insight magazine, these computers could be used to facilitate the enrichment of uranium for nuclear warheads.

GA Powders isn't the only business venture between a Department of Energy operation and Magnequench. According to a news letter produced by the Sandia Labs in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Sandia is working on a joint project with Magnequench involving "the development of advanced electronic controls and new magnet technology".

Dr. Peter Leitner is an advisor to the Pentagon on matters involving trade in strategic materials. He says that the Chinese targeted Magnequench in order to advance their development of long-range Cruise missiles. China now holds a monopoly on the rare-earth minerals used in the manufacturing of the missile magnets. The only operating rare-earth mine is located in Batou, China.

"By controlling access to the magnets and the raw materials they are composed of, US industry can be held hostage to Chinese blackmail and extortion," Leitner told Insight magazine last year. "This highly concentrated control-one country, one government-will be the sole source of something critical to the US military and industrial base."

Visclosky and Senator Evan Bayh asked the Bush administration to intervene using the Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Defense Appropriation Act to pry the Chinese money out of the company and force Magnequench to keep its factories in Indiana.

There was precedent for just such a presidential move. In 1990, George H.W. Bush ordered the state-owned China National Aerospace and Export Company to divest its interest in Mamco Manufacturing of Seattle, reportedly because of concern that the Chinese firm could have use Mamco to acquire jet fighter engine technology. The directive came from Bush three months after CATIC had seized control of Mamco. When after six months the Chinese company refused to relinquish its interest in Mamco, Bush ordered the Treasury Department to place the company in receivership and barred the Chinese officials from having any access to its facilities.

Unlike his father, Bush 2 declined to respond to the pleas from Visclosky and Bayh. The Treasury Department, which could have intervened to stop the move, also refused to act. Visclosky says that he also contacted the Pentagon. Its procurement officials admitted to him that Magnequench was the only domestic supplier of the smart bomb magnets (Hitachi holds the other contract), but that it had no idea that company was owned by the Chinese or that it was packing up for Tianjin.

As the doors closed on its Valparaiso plant, a memo came from Magnequench executives advising that its HQ will be soon be relocated from Indianapolis to Singapore. No word on yet whether Cox is moving too.

And yes, when the Republicans made a mountain out of what turned out in the end to be a pretty small molehill concerning transfers of satellite technology to China in Clinton time, they said it might be grounds for impeachment. William Safire wrote lots of columns on the matter. Not a bleat from Safire now.

This article is excerpted from Jeffrey St. Clair's new book, Grand Theft Pentagon.

http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20...12126-3779r.htm

Nuclear warhead update developed
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
April 7, 2006


The Bush administration is designing a new nuclear warhead that will replace aging stockpiles of weapons and counter emerging threats, according to Energy Department officials.
The Reliable Replacement Warhead is being drawn up at two Energy Department nuclear weapons laboratories and, if produced, would be the first new strategic warhead in more than a decade.
The warhead is part of a nuclear modernization program revealed Wednesday before the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces by Thomas P. D'Agostino, deputy administrator for defense programs in the department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
"It will improve the performance of individual warheads, and it will let us transform the infrastructure to be much more responsive, and because it does these things, it will allow us to keep far fewer warheads ...," NNSA Director Linton Brooks said in an interview yesterday.
Mr. Brooks said the warhead has very good support in Congress, which must fund the program. If the design is approved in November, it could be developed and produced by 2012, he said.
Mr. Brooks said the warhead is in many ways a "component replacement" program but that so many replacements and upgrades will be made that it could be considered new. It will be easier to build, use less dangerous materials and will involve new designs for greater safety, security and greater performance margins, he said.
The warhead has been described by U.S. officials as having a "modular" design that will allow it to be adapted to various delivery systems, including missiles, bombers or submarines.
"These replacement warheads have the same military characteristics, are carried on the same types of delivery systems and hold at risk the same targets as the warheads they replaced, but they have been redesigned for reliability, security and ease of maintenance," Mr. D'Agostino said.
Modernizing the U.S. nuclear weapons complex is needed to counter "unanticipated events or emerging threats,"