http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/nucl...-animation.html

Animation
The Nuclear Bunker Buster
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?con...&articleId=2281

Explanatory Note on the Simulation of the Consequences of a Nuclear Bunker Buster Bomb Attack on Iran

by Michel Chossudovsky

The simulation in the Flash Animation pertains to a one megaton bunker buster thermonuclear bomb with an explosive capacity of 60 times a Hiroshima bomb.


Military documents distinguish between the NEP as in the case of the simulation, and the "mini-nuke" which are nuclear weapons with a yield of less than 10 kilotons (two thirds of a Hiroshima bomb). The NEP can have a yield of up to a 1000 kilotons, or 60 times a Hiroshima bomb.

In the showdown with Tehran over its alleged nuclear weapons program, the Pentagon is contemplating the launching of punitive bombings using "mini-nukes" or tactical thermonuclear weapons. While the "guidelines" do not exclude other (more deadly) categories of nukes in the US and/or Israeli nuclear arsenal, as envisaged in the simulation, Pentagon "scenarios" in the Middle East tend to favor the use of tactical nuclear weapons including the B61-11 bunker buster bomb with a yield of 10 kt.

This distinction between mini-nukes and larger NEPs is in many regard misleading. In practice there is no dividing line. We are broadly dealing with the same type of weaponry: the B61-11 has several "available yields", ranging from "low yields" of less than one kiloton, to mid-range and up to the 1000 kiloton bomb. In all cases, the radioactive fallout is devastating. Moreover, the B61 series of thermonuclear weapons includes several models with distinct specifications: the B61-11, the B61-3, B61- 4, B61-7 and B61-10. Each of these bombs has several "available yields".

What is contemplated for theater use is the "low yield" 10 kt bomb, two thirds of a Hiroshima bomb. The impacts in terms of deaths and radioactive fallout would be less dramatic than that contemplated in the simulation. It would nonetheless result in the deaths of tens of thousands of men, women and children

"The earth-penetrating capability of the B61-11 is fairly limited. ... Tests show it penetrates only 20 feet or so into dry earth when dropped from an altitude of 40,000 feet. ... Any attempt to use it in an urban environment would result in massive civilian casualties. Even at the low end of its 0.3-300 kiloton yield range, the nuclear blast will simply blow out a huge crater of radioactive material, creating a lethal gamma-radiation field over a large area " (Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons by Robert W. Nelson,Federation of American Scientists, 2001 ).

According to GlobalSecurity.org , the use of the B61-11 against North Korea would result in extensive radioactive fallout over nearby countries, thereby triggering a nuclear holocaust.

"... In tests the bomb penetrates only 20 feet into dry earth,... But even this shallow penetration before detonation allows a much higher proportion of the explosion to be transferred into ground shock relative to a surface burst. It is not able to counter targets deeply buried under granite rock. Moreover, it has a high yield, in the hundreds of kilotons. If used in North Korea, the radioactive fallout could drift over nearby countries such as Japan" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b61.htm )

If it were to be launched against Iran, it would result in radioactive contamination over a large part of the Middle East - Central Asian region, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths, including US troops stationed in Iraq:

"The use of any nuclear weapon capable of destroying a buried target that is otherwise immune to conventional attack will necessarily produce enormous numbers of civilian casualties. No earth-burrowing missile can penetrate deep enough into the earth to contain an explosion with a nuclear yield [of a low yield B61-11] even as small as 1 percent of the 15 kiloton Hiroshima weapon. The explosion simply blows out a massive crater of radioactive dirt, which rains down on the local region with an especially intense and deadly fallout."(Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons, by Robert W. Nelson, op cit )

At present, the B61-11 is slated for use in war theaters together with conventional weapons. (Congressional Report“ Bunker Busters”: Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues , Congressional Research Service March 2005). (Other versions of the B61, namely mod 3, 4, 7 and 10, which are part of the US arsenal, involve nuclear bunker buster bombs with a lower yield to that of B61-11).

For further details, see
The Dangers of a Middle East Nuclear War
New Pentagon Doctrine: Mini-Nukes are "Safe for the Surrounding Civilian Population"
by Michel Chossudovsky



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http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/20/opinion/edlevi.php

Going nuclear: Iran's sitting duck
By Michael Levi The New York Times

NEW YORK There has been a lot of debate over reports that the United States is exploring the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Iran. Setting aside the question of whether military action is wise - and there are strong arguments for focusing on nonmilitary options - one thing is clear: The nuclear option makes little sense.

Discussion focuses on Natanz, where Iran is building laboratories to enrich uranium, ostensibly for nuclear energy but also useful for making a nuclear bomb. Those plants are buried underground, leading many to conclude that only a nuclear weapon could destroy them. That conclusion is wrong.

In general, there are three intertwined reasons military planners might consider using nuclear weapons against an underground target: uncertainty about the target's location, concern that the depth makes conventional weapons impotent, and a need to destroy the target near-instantaneously. None of these apply in the case of Iran.

If an underground lab were bored into a mountain, or involved a labyrinthine tunnel system, its location may not be well known. Military planners might then argue - as some did in considering a tactical nuclear attack on the Libyan chemical weapons facility at Tarhuna in 1996 - that only the broad blast of a nuclear weapon could guarantee destruction.

But the precise locations of the underground chambers at Natanz are well known - they were built in open pits, visible to American satellites, before being covered with concrete, rock and dirt. (And the only building at Natanz where we know Iran has enriched uranium thus far is above ground.) If anyone wants to bomb Natanz, they will know where to aim.

The second concern is that if an underground laboratory is deeply buried, that can also confound conventional weapons. But the depth of the Natanz facility - reports place the ceiling roughly 30 feet underground - is not prohibitive. The American GBU-28 weapon - the so-called bunker buster - can pierce about 23 feet of concrete and 100 feet of soil. Unless the cover over the Natanz lab is almost entirely rock, bunker busters should be able to reach it. That said, some chance remains that a single strike would fail.

That leads to the third factor. Advocates of nuclear weapons normally plan on using them in a time-sensitive scenario: An enemy is about to launch an attack on the United States, and the only way to immediately stop it is to employ nuclear arms, taking out the enemy base in a single strike.

This is weak as a generic argument, and it is patently unsound in the case of Iran. Natanz poses no imminent threat - the worst-case prediction is that, in several years, the Iranians might produce enough material for a nuclear bomb, but we Americans do not worry that any weapons there endanger us now. The United States could repeatedly bomb the plant, if it wished, drilling down until it reached the underground chambers. Even if that took days, it would set back the Iranian program just as decisively as a nuclear attack.

In the end, the nuclear option makes little sense - and flirting with it undermines the U.S. stance against nuclear proliferation. Taking nuclear weapons decisively off the table would reinforce the taboo against the bomb, and make American actions to oppose proliferation more effective.

Michael Levi, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is a co-author of "The Future of Arms Control."
NEW YORK There has been a lot of debate over reports that the United States is exploring the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Iran. Setting aside the question of whether military action is wise - and there are strong arguments for focusing on nonmilitary options - one thing is clear: The nuclear option makes little sense.

Discussion focuses on Natanz, where Iran is building laboratories to enrich uranium, ostensibly for nuclear energy but also useful for making a nuclear bomb. Those plants are buried underground, leading many to conclude that only a nuclear weapon could destroy them. That conclusion is wrong.

In general, there are three intertwined reasons military planners might consider using nuclear weapons against an underground target: uncertainty about the target's location, concern that the depth makes conventional weapons impotent, and a need to destroy the target near-instantaneously. None of these apply in the case of Iran.

If an underground lab were bored into a mountain, or involved a labyrinthine tunnel system, its location may not be well known. Military planners might then argue - as some did in considering a tactical nuclear attack on the Libyan chemical weapons facility at Tarhuna in 1996 - that only the broad blast of a nuclear weapon could guarantee destruction.

But the precise locations of the underground chambers at Natanz are well known - they were built in open pits, visible to American satellites, before being covered with concrete, rock and dirt. (And the only building at Natanz where we know Iran has enriched uranium thus far is above ground.) If anyone wants to bomb Natanz, they will know where to aim.

The second concern is that if an underground laboratory is deeply buried, that can also confound conventional weapons. But the depth of the Natanz facility - reports place the ceiling roughly 30 feet underground - is not prohibitive. The American GBU-28 weapon - the so-called bunker buster - can pierce about 23 feet of concrete and 100 feet of soil. Unless the cover over the Natanz lab is almost entirely rock, bunker busters should be able to reach it. That said, some chance remains that a single strike would fail.

That leads to the third factor. Advocates of nuclear weapons normally plan on using them in a time-sensitive scenario: An enemy is about to launch an attack on the United States, and the only way to immediately stop it is to employ nuclear arms, taking out the enemy base in a single strike.

This is weak as a generic argument, and it is patently unsound in the case of Iran. Natanz poses no imminent threat - the worst-case prediction is that, in several years, the Iranians might produce enough material for a nuclear bomb, but we Americans do not worry that any weapons there endanger us now. The United States could repeatedly bomb the plant, if it wished, drilling down until it reached the underground chambers. Even if that took days, it would set back the Iranian program just as decisively as a nuclear attack.

In the end, the nuclear option makes little sense - and flirting with it undermines the U.S. stance against nuclear proliferation. Taking nuclear weapons decisively off the table would reinforce the taboo against the bomb, and make American actions to oppose proliferation more effective.

Michael Levi, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is a co-author of "The Future of Arms Control."

Talking Points for a Nuclear Strike
Nicholas von Hoffman

The Nation -- Seymour Hersh's news that the United States is readying to drop an atom bomb or two on Iran was received with relief and satisfaction by thinking people everywhere. That excludes knee-jerkers of various persuasions who are back in the paleolithic Dr. Strangelove era, when people joked about loving the bomb but did not mean it.

Dropping a nuclear device on Iran means war. Need you be reminded that America has been without a new war for three years now? The Afghanistan war is so unimportant you rarely hear it mentioned these days. Iraqis, except when they do those really disgusting things to each other with long knives, are a back-of-the-book item.

As a nation we have lost our fighting edge and need a new conflict to freshen us up. Hollywood liberals and their confederates may object on the grounds of tidiness--finish one war before you start another--but that is lame thinking.

Three wars are good. Think about the triangle. There is nothing in mathematics, engineering or nature stronger and more aesthetically pleasing than a triangle. Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, it's a natural. We may not get a chance to wage a three-sided war again for eons.

War is good in that it unites people. It will certainly unite the country, which is good because we are the "united" states, if you catch my drift. The Iranians, if news reports are right, could stand a little uniting themselves. They have ethnicity issues, poor things.

Here's another argument for bomb droppage. It's a historical fact that every people subjected to heavy aerial bombardment has come together, usually in a common hatred of their tormentors--which might mean that Iranians would hate us, even though they secretly yearn for democracy and would like to copy ours.

But those who hate us on Monday love us on Tuesday. After the war we come in with our "public diplomacy," as we call it, to help the natives build a "civil society," and we give them chocolate bars and tell them we are going to give them economic aid and pep up their infrastructures. This makes them love us.

You can do those things faster with a nuclear device than you can with the old-fashioned boots-on-the-ground approach, which Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld does not think much of. To understand the beauty of bombing Iran, you have to think twenty-first century. You have to open yourself to new ideas.

Another important reason for letting go with a radioactive bunker-buster or two is that there are fewer and fewer people around who are old enough to remember the last time we dropped an atom bomb on somebody. Without firsthand experience, how are people going to react to endless talk about "should we do it or shouldn't we do it"?

Who is there to make the thing come alive and personalize it? There are still a few of those elderly Japanese who were at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They trot out for the cameras every so often, but they are a poor advertisement for nuclear action.

Our new devices are nothing like that. They just go right down where we want them to go, and they don't hurt anybody--not really, just bad guys, who the Iranians actually want to get rid of themselves. It's humane, it's modern and when they do it everybody in the world can watch it on their cell phones.

Cool, huh?

Copyright © 2006 The Nation


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Wow- very disturbing video animation in the first post of this thread.
Also some good alternative strategies.

Info available about the group of concerned scientists:
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backgrounder
Summary of the Text
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full text of the Treaty


The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty contains a preamble, 17 treaty articles, two annexes, and a protocol on verification.
Preamble
Scope
Implementing Organization
Steps to Carry Out Treaty Obligations
Verification and Compliance
Punitive Measures and Disputes
Amendment Process
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Duration and Withdrawal
Miscellaneous Provisions
Entry into Force
Other Provisions
Annexes




Preamble
The preamble puts the treaty into a broader political context. It underlines the need for the continued reduction of nuclear arsenals with the goal of eliminating them. The preamble also notes that the treaty will be an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation by "constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons." It also states that the treaty will be a "meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament."



Scope
Article I states that all parties are prohibited from conducting "any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion." This prohibition is the heart of the treaty, with all other articles relating to it. Yet it is vague. Negotiators carefully avoided trying to define "nuclear weapon" or "test explosion," preferring to rely on the notion that a nuclear test is hard to define but anyone will recognize one if he or she sees one.

The US interpretation of the scope was articulated in President Clinton's "zero-yield" test ban policy announced in August 1995. This policy bans all nuclear tests. Interestingly, the US definition is based not on the size of the explosion (the nuclear yield), but on whether the explosion creates an uncontrolled chain reaction (becomes critical). Thus the United States can conduct any experiment with high explosives and fissile materials as long as the experiment does not achieve criticality, i.e., an uncontrolled chain reaction. One such "subcritical" experiment was conducted in July 1997 and others are planned for the Nevada Test Site in 1997 and 1998. It is not clear whether Russia and China have agreed to this interpretation.



Implementing Organization
Article II establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, which will implement the treaty and provide a forum for consultation and cooperation. This organization will consist of a Conference of States Parties, an executive council, and a technical secretariat. The organization will be located in Vienna to benefit from the information resources of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is also located there.

The Conference of States Parties will act as the overall governing body of the organization and will oversee the treaty's implementation. The conference will meet once a year.

The executive council will act as the treaty's principle decisionmaking body, consisting of 51 members. To distribute membership equally on a geographical basis, the council will include ten states from Africa, seven from Eastern Europe, nine from Latin America and the Caribbean, seven from the Middle East and South Asia, ten from North America and Western Europe, and eight from Southeast Asia, the Pacific and Far East. The members of the council will be elected by the Conference.

The technical secretariat will implement the verification procedures of the treaty. It will supervise the operation of the international monitoring system and receive, process, analyze, and report on the data collected. It will also manage the international data center and be involved in on-site inspections.



Steps to Carry Out Treaty Obligations
Article III requires each state to take necessary steps to carry out its treaty obligations.



Verification and Compliance
Article IV and the verification protocol indicate how compliance with the treaty will be verified. It will consist of four elements: the international monitoring system, consultation and clarification, on-site inspections, and confidence-building measures. The verification process cannot become operational until the treaty enters into force.

International monitoring system. The purpose of the international monitoring system is to detect and identify any activity prohibited under Article I. The monitoring system will include a network of 50 primary and 120 auxiliary seismic stations. These stations will be designed to distinguish between nuclear explosions and natural events such as earthquakes. The monitoring system will also include 80 radionuclide stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories to detect radioactive particles released during a nuclear test. In addition, 60 infrasound and 11 hydroacoustic stations will be used to detect the sound of a nuclear explosion either under ground or under water.

International data center. All the data collected by the monitoring system will be transferred to the international data center for storage and processing. The center will screen out non-nuclear events and provide states with summaries of information picked up by the monitoring system, as well as providing raw and processed data.

Consultation and clarification. The consultation and clarification process encourages states to resolve possible violations before requesting an on-site inspection. Either a state or the executive council can ask for clarification. States asked for such clarification must explain the ambiguous event within 48 hours.

On-site inspection. If consultation and clarification fails to resolve the ambiguity, each state has the right to request an on-site inspection. The inspection request must be based on information collected from the monitoring system or from some national technical means of verification, such as satellites. It cannot be based on information collected through espionage. The request must be specific in terms of the state to be inspected, the geographical coordinates, the estimated depth, the area to be inspected, and the environment and time of the event. It must also include all evidence on which the request is based, the identity of the observer (if possible), and the results of the consultation and clarification process.

The executive council will decide on the inspection request within 96 hours. The inspection will be authorized if at least 30 of the council's 51 members approve it. An inspection team will arrive at the state in question within six days of the request. The team may request drilling during the inspection, which must be approved by a majority (26) of the council. The inspection should not take longer than 60 days, but may be extended by up to 70 days with council approval if necessary.

If the executive council rejects the inspection request and finds it to be frivolous or abusive, or if the inspection is cancelled for the same reasons, the council may punish the requesting state. Such punishment may include requiring the state to pay costs for inspection preparations and suspending the state's right to request inspections and serve on the council.

Confidence-building measures. To promote compliance, the verification procedure includes confidence-building measures. In order to reduce the number of ambiguous events, each state will voluntarily notify the technical secretariat of any chemical explosion of 300 tons for more. States can also help calibrate monitoring stations.



Punitive Measures and Disputes
Article V empowers the conference to revoke a state's rights and privileges under the treaty, recommend punitive measures such as sanctions, and bring the case to the United Nations. Article VI describes how disputes about the treaty may be settled.



Amendment Process
Article VII indicates that each state has the right to propose amendments to the treaty after entry into force. Such amendments are approved by a majority of states-parties at an amendment conference with no party casting a negative vote.



Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Under Article VIII, a conference will be held ten years after the treaty enters into force to review the treaty's implementation. At this time, any state may request that the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions be raised. The treaty assumes that such explosions will be banned unless significant obstacles are overcome. First, a unanimous decision that peaceful nuclear explosions may be permitted would be necessary. Then the treaty would have to be amended as outlined in the article. This provision was included to appease China; it is unlikely that peaceful nuclear explosions could ever be approved under these conditions.



Duration and Withdrawal
Article IX states that the treaty will continue indefinitely, and that each state has the right to withdraw if it decides that "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Six months' notice of intent to withdraw must be given.



Miscellaneous Provisions
Under Article X, the treaty's annexes, protocol, and annexes to the protocol are made a formal part of the treaty. Article XI opens the treaty for signature to all states prior to entry into force. Article XII states that each signatory will ratify the treaty according to its own laws. Article XIII specifies that any state that has not signed before entry into force may do so at any time.



Entry into Force
Article XIV states that the treaty will not enter into force until 180 days after it has been ratified by 44 states listed by name. (These states are members of the Conference on Disarmament and have nuclear research facilities or power reactors.) This list includes the five nuclear weapons states and the three threshold states. The treaty is prohibited from entering into force sooner than two years after signature.

If the treaty has not entered into force three years after the anniversary of the date on which it became available for signature (September 1996), the states that have ratified it can hold a conference in September 1999 to decide how to speed up ratification. This conference can meet annually until the treaty enters into force. But because the treaty cannot be amended before it enters into force, this conference cannot change the original 44-state requirement.



Other Provisions
Article XV states that the treaty's provisions are not subject to reservations. Article XVI establishes the UN secretary-general as the treaty's depository. Article XVII designates six authentic treaty languages.



Annexes
Annex 1 lists the six geographical regions (Africa; Eastern Europe; Latin America and the Caribbean; Middle East and South Asia; North America and Western Europe; and South Asia, the Pacific and the Far East) used for the purposes of the treaty and the nations belonging to each region.

Annex 2 lists the 44 states that must ratify before the treaty can enter into force: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, North Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, South Korea, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, Zaire.

Only India, Pakistan and North Korea have yet to sign.


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Contents
New & Proposed U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear Bunker Buster (RNEP) Animation
The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Dangerous and Counterproductive
The Spratt-Furse Law on Mini-Nuke Development
Experts Letter to President Bush: the NPR
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Dangerous and Counterproductive
Nuclear Posture Review
Toward True Security: An Alternative NPR
Toward Nuclear Sanity
more...
Nuclear Weapons Testing
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Nonproliferation
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Summary
Indian & Pakistani Tests
CTBT Ratification Failure
In Support of the CTBT
more...
Nuclear Weapons & Technical Issues
Nuclear Bunker Buster (RNEP) Animation
Earth-Penetrating Weapons
Fissile Materials Basics
Gamma Ray Weapons? A Premature Speculation
A History of China's Plutonium Production
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy: Dangerous and Counterproductive
Nuclear Weapons & Arms Control
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Deal
The Moscow Treaty
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Summary
CTBT Ratification Failure
NPT Review Process: A Tool for Disarmament
NPT Anniversary
Resources
Arms Control & Nonproliferation: Gov. Sources
Arms Control & Nonproliferation: NGO Sources


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