http://antiwar.com/eland/?articleid=8867
April 18, 2006
Should Retired Generals Speak Out Against Rumsfeld?
by Ivan Eland
Pro-administration pundits are trying to stifle a group of retired generals who are calling for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to resign. These pundits argue that such criticism undermines the principle of civilian control over the military. In fact, the republic benefits from such outspoken behavior.
Civilian control of the military is crucial to the preservation of a free republic. Powerful militaries that become politicized have a long history of wrecking democracies. Even in the United States, where the military has stayed, thankfully, fairly nonpolitical, President Truman properly fired the cocky Gen. Douglas MacArthur for insubordination during the Korean War. Franklin Delano Roosevelt had previously declared MacArthur to be the single most dangerous man in America.
More recently, both Gen. Richard Myers and Gen. Peter Pace acted as cheerleaders for U.S. policy in Iraq, in their consecutive roles as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the nation's most senior military advisors, they are moving from giving advice on military matters into the dangerous political realm of publicly advocating policy. Of course, Gen. Pace is unlikely to get fired over his recent comments that the Iraq intervention was going swimmingly. Putting the obvious question of credibility aside, the real question is whether Gen. Pace should be a shill for the policies of any administration. The answer should be a resounding "no."
Some may argue that as a critic of the war, I am adopting a double standard – welcoming the retired generals' advocacy of sacking Rumsfeld, yet deeming improper the "rah-rah" support of the war by generals on active duty. But just as I believe Gen. Pace should resign for his comments, I would argue that any active duty general who has the audacity to speak out against the war should also be sacked. The difference is that retired generals are, well, retired and should be allowed to express political opinions just like any other civilian citizen. The public debate benefits from their prior military expertise, whether they are for or against the continuation of the war. For example, to rebut the accusations of the critical retired generals, the now-retired Gen. Myers recently made the self-serving assertion that Rumsfeld never intimidated members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during planning for the Iraq War. Myers's comments are perfectly permissible, even if his credibility is suspect. When active generals publicly praise or criticize the policy of any presidential administration (it's OK to provide private military advice), it may also enhance public debate, but such benefit is overshadowed by the politicization of the military. That politicization undermines civilian control over the armed forces.
If active generals oppose the policy of any administration so much that they are beside themselves, they should resist going public until after they resign. As private citizens, they are no longer in the chain of military command and should be able to say anything they want.
But what if, as many believe, the retired generals are acting as a mouthpiece for the widespread dissatisfaction among active officers under Rumsfeld, because of his domineering management style and his incompetent handling of Iraq? This outcome is optimal for the republic because it alerts the public that many active military experts are critical of the administration's performance, but does not undermine civilian control over the armed forces by having active military officers publicly criticizing their civilian leadership. Active officers have no hold over the views and statements of retirees, but may very well be in agreement with them.
Perhaps one could ask why many of these retired generals have not taken a principled stand sooner. But better late than never. Maybe they should even call for their former colleague, Gen. Pace, to join Donald Rumsfeld in the unemployment line.
Full Version: Should Retired Generals Speak Out Against
Common Ground Common Sense > Issues that Affect Our Lives > U.S. Military Issues > U.S. Military Issues Archive
QUOTE(Snuffysmith @ May 2 2006, 11:00 PM)
http://antiwar.com/eland/?articleid=8867
April 18, 2006
Should Retired Generals Speak Out Against Rumsfeld?
by Ivan Eland
Pro-administration pundits are trying to stifle a group of retired generals who are calling for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to resign. These pundits argue that such criticism undermines the principle of civilian control over the military. In fact, the republic benefits from such outspoken behavior.
Civilian control of the military is crucial to the preservation of a free republic. Powerful militaries that become politicized have a long history of wrecking democracies. Even in the United States, where the military has stayed, thankfully, fairly nonpolitical, President Truman properly fired the cocky Gen. Douglas MacArthur for insubordination during the Korean War. Franklin Delano Roosevelt had previously declared MacArthur to be the single most dangerous man in America.
More recently, both Gen. Richard Myers and Gen. Peter Pace acted as cheerleaders for U.S. policy in Iraq, in their consecutive roles as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the nation's most senior military advisors, they are moving from giving advice on military matters into the dangerous political realm of publicly advocating policy. Of course, Gen. Pace is unlikely to get fired over his recent comments that the Iraq intervention was going swimmingly. Putting the obvious question of credibility aside, the real question is whether Gen. Pace should be a shill for the policies of any administration. The answer should be a resounding "no."
Some may argue that as a critic of the war, I am adopting a double standard – welcoming the retired generals' advocacy of sacking Rumsfeld, yet deeming improper the "rah-rah" support of the war by generals on active duty. But just as I believe Gen. Pace should resign for his comments, I would argue that any active duty general who has the audacity to speak out against the war should also be sacked. The difference is that retired generals are, well, retired and should be allowed to express political opinions just like any other civilian citizen. The public debate benefits from their prior military expertise, whether they are for or against the continuation of the war. For example, to rebut the accusations of the critical retired generals, the now-retired Gen. Myers recently made the self-serving assertion that Rumsfeld never intimidated members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during planning for the Iraq War. Myers's comments are perfectly permissible, even if his credibility is suspect. When active generals publicly praise or criticize the policy of any presidential administration (it's OK to provide private military advice), it may also enhance public debate, but such benefit is overshadowed by the politicization of the military. That politicization undermines civilian control over the armed forces.
If active generals oppose the policy of any administration so much that they are beside themselves, they should resist going public until after they resign. As private citizens, they are no longer in the chain of military command and should be able to say anything they want.
But what if, as many believe, the retired generals are acting as a mouthpiece for the widespread dissatisfaction among active officers under Rumsfeld, because of his domineering management style and his incompetent handling of Iraq? This outcome is optimal for the republic because it alerts the public that many active military experts are critical of the administration's performance, but does not undermine civilian control over the armed forces by having active military officers publicly criticizing their civilian leadership. Active officers have no hold over the views and statements of retirees, but may very well be in agreement with them.
Perhaps one could ask why many of these retired generals have not taken a principled stand sooner. But better late than never. Maybe they should even call for their former colleague, Gen. Pace, to join Donald Rumsfeld in the unemployment line.
April 18, 2006
Should Retired Generals Speak Out Against Rumsfeld?
by Ivan Eland
Pro-administration pundits are trying to stifle a group of retired generals who are calling for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to resign. These pundits argue that such criticism undermines the principle of civilian control over the military. In fact, the republic benefits from such outspoken behavior.
Civilian control of the military is crucial to the preservation of a free republic. Powerful militaries that become politicized have a long history of wrecking democracies. Even in the United States, where the military has stayed, thankfully, fairly nonpolitical, President Truman properly fired the cocky Gen. Douglas MacArthur for insubordination during the Korean War. Franklin Delano Roosevelt had previously declared MacArthur to be the single most dangerous man in America.
More recently, both Gen. Richard Myers and Gen. Peter Pace acted as cheerleaders for U.S. policy in Iraq, in their consecutive roles as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the nation's most senior military advisors, they are moving from giving advice on military matters into the dangerous political realm of publicly advocating policy. Of course, Gen. Pace is unlikely to get fired over his recent comments that the Iraq intervention was going swimmingly. Putting the obvious question of credibility aside, the real question is whether Gen. Pace should be a shill for the policies of any administration. The answer should be a resounding "no."
Some may argue that as a critic of the war, I am adopting a double standard – welcoming the retired generals' advocacy of sacking Rumsfeld, yet deeming improper the "rah-rah" support of the war by generals on active duty. But just as I believe Gen. Pace should resign for his comments, I would argue that any active duty general who has the audacity to speak out against the war should also be sacked. The difference is that retired generals are, well, retired and should be allowed to express political opinions just like any other civilian citizen. The public debate benefits from their prior military expertise, whether they are for or against the continuation of the war. For example, to rebut the accusations of the critical retired generals, the now-retired Gen. Myers recently made the self-serving assertion that Rumsfeld never intimidated members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during planning for the Iraq War. Myers's comments are perfectly permissible, even if his credibility is suspect. When active generals publicly praise or criticize the policy of any presidential administration (it's OK to provide private military advice), it may also enhance public debate, but such benefit is overshadowed by the politicization of the military. That politicization undermines civilian control over the armed forces.
If active generals oppose the policy of any administration so much that they are beside themselves, they should resist going public until after they resign. As private citizens, they are no longer in the chain of military command and should be able to say anything they want.
But what if, as many believe, the retired generals are acting as a mouthpiece for the widespread dissatisfaction among active officers under Rumsfeld, because of his domineering management style and his incompetent handling of Iraq? This outcome is optimal for the republic because it alerts the public that many active military experts are critical of the administration's performance, but does not undermine civilian control over the armed forces by having active military officers publicly criticizing their civilian leadership. Active officers have no hold over the views and statements of retirees, but may very well be in agreement with them.
Perhaps one could ask why many of these retired generals have not taken a principled stand sooner. But better late than never. Maybe they should even call for their former colleague, Gen. Pace, to join Donald Rumsfeld in the unemployment line.
Well, only two items resonant here: 1)"Better late than than never" makes what they do purely political 2)Why didn't they say something when it counted if that is what they believed?
Sorry Ivan, you arguments still fall flat on their face.
I agree with you: where were these guys when the policies were being developed. Its a little like crying after the milk has been spilled. I don't recall any military defections during the formulation of the Iraq war planning effort. However, the article does point out the fine line between making policy and carrying it out: "As the nation's most senior military advisors, they are moving from giving advice on military matters into the dangerous political realm of publicly advocating policy." Perhaps one of the legacies of Rumsfeld's administration of DOD is the politicization of the military at the top.
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?Do..._page=index.cfm
Opinion: Not Quite a Revolt
This commentary originally appeared in Time Magazine online, www.time.com, on April 15, 2006.
In the past month, six high ranking Army and Marine Corps generals have called upon Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to resign because of his mismanagement of the planning and execution of the war in Iraq. While some view these calls by retired military officers as a "Revolt of the Generals" and a challenge to civilian control of the military, this episode pales in comparison to the 1949 Revolt of the Admirals.
The conflict between the Navy and the Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in 1949 concerned the construction of the supercarrier USS United States. Within one month of taking office, Johnson, who served as Assistant Secretary of War in the 1930s and as chief fundraiser for President Truman's successful 1948 campaign, canceled the carrier three days after the keel had been laid without consulting the military leadership, but with the support of President Truman.
The Navy, which planned to use this carrier to launch atomic bombs and thus gain a major role for itself in a potential war against the Soviet Union, viewed Johnson as a political hack with pro-Air Force leanings. Therefore, they decided not to take Johnson's decision lying down. The Secretary of the Navy resigned over Johnson's action. A special assistant to the undersecretary of the Navy began compiling negative information about Johnson and sent it to Capitol Hill and the press. When an active duty Navy captain, John Crommelin, called a press conference and accused Johnson of systematically and intentionally of nibbling the Navy to death, active and retired naval officers rallied to Crommelin's defense and his superiors tried to reward him with a favorable reassignment. Finally, the Chief of Naval Operations, Louis Denfeld, criticized Johnson before Congress for arbitrary decisions.
The current revolt of the Generals is much less serious. The complaints are coming from retired officers, who as private citizens have every right to make their opinions public. Many other generals have also served as cheerleaders for the war on cable news channels. And most importantly, these calls for Rumsfeld's resignation have not been supported by active duty Army and Marine officers.
Despite a great deal of press coverage and drawn-out Congressional hearings, the revolt of the admirals failed. Johnson remained in office, the Chief of Naval operations was fired, and the carrier was not built.
However, while President Bush might not want to cave in to pressure from these retired officers, there is one lesson he might learn from the tenure of Johnson. In September 1950, three months into the Korean War, Truman replaced Johnson with his former Secretary of State, General George Marshall. Among other reasons for relieving Johnson was the country's lack of preparedness for the Korean War and the low morale at the Pentagon. Given the challenges this country faces in Iraq and the low morale in the Pentagon because of Rumsfeld's management style, as well as his decisions, Bush might consider replacing Rumsfeld with his former Secretary of State Colin Powell.
# # #
Lawrence Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense; he is also a senior advisor for the Center for Defense Information.
Opinion: Not Quite a Revolt
This commentary originally appeared in Time Magazine online, www.time.com, on April 15, 2006.
In the past month, six high ranking Army and Marine Corps generals have called upon Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to resign because of his mismanagement of the planning and execution of the war in Iraq. While some view these calls by retired military officers as a "Revolt of the Generals" and a challenge to civilian control of the military, this episode pales in comparison to the 1949 Revolt of the Admirals.
The conflict between the Navy and the Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in 1949 concerned the construction of the supercarrier USS United States. Within one month of taking office, Johnson, who served as Assistant Secretary of War in the 1930s and as chief fundraiser for President Truman's successful 1948 campaign, canceled the carrier three days after the keel had been laid without consulting the military leadership, but with the support of President Truman.
The Navy, which planned to use this carrier to launch atomic bombs and thus gain a major role for itself in a potential war against the Soviet Union, viewed Johnson as a political hack with pro-Air Force leanings. Therefore, they decided not to take Johnson's decision lying down. The Secretary of the Navy resigned over Johnson's action. A special assistant to the undersecretary of the Navy began compiling negative information about Johnson and sent it to Capitol Hill and the press. When an active duty Navy captain, John Crommelin, called a press conference and accused Johnson of systematically and intentionally of nibbling the Navy to death, active and retired naval officers rallied to Crommelin's defense and his superiors tried to reward him with a favorable reassignment. Finally, the Chief of Naval Operations, Louis Denfeld, criticized Johnson before Congress for arbitrary decisions.
The current revolt of the Generals is much less serious. The complaints are coming from retired officers, who as private citizens have every right to make their opinions public. Many other generals have also served as cheerleaders for the war on cable news channels. And most importantly, these calls for Rumsfeld's resignation have not been supported by active duty Army and Marine officers.
Despite a great deal of press coverage and drawn-out Congressional hearings, the revolt of the admirals failed. Johnson remained in office, the Chief of Naval operations was fired, and the carrier was not built.
However, while President Bush might not want to cave in to pressure from these retired officers, there is one lesson he might learn from the tenure of Johnson. In September 1950, three months into the Korean War, Truman replaced Johnson with his former Secretary of State, General George Marshall. Among other reasons for relieving Johnson was the country's lack of preparedness for the Korean War and the low morale at the Pentagon. Given the challenges this country faces in Iraq and the low morale in the Pentagon because of Rumsfeld's management style, as well as his decisions, Bush might consider replacing Rumsfeld with his former Secretary of State Colin Powell.
# # #
Lawrence Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense; he is also a senior advisor for the Center for Defense Information.
All:
I have kept out of the debate over the “revolt of the generals until now. I decided to take the historical approach.
Bob Scales
Washington Times
May 2, 2006
Pg. 19
Binding Criticism
The generals' ill-timed revolt
By Robert H. Scales
Today I finished the book "Cobra II," written by retired Marine Gen. "Mick" Trainer and New York Times correspondent Mike Gordon. The authors chronicle in great detail the strategic and military missteps that followed the fall of Baghdad in April 2003. The book is particularly important because its publication was the catalyst that launched the "revolt of the generals" a few weeks ago.
Their book appears about three years into this war. As I read, I couldn't help but imagine (given today's political atmospherics) how a book like Messrs. Trainer and Gordon's might have read had it appeared three years after Pearl Harbor.
Such a book would have hit the bookstores at Christmas time in 1944. Messrs. Gordon and Trainer would most certainly have written about the unconstitutional arrogance of an administration that violated international neutrality laws by taking sides with Great Britain against Germany. They would have recognized that Pearl Harbor was the greatest intelligence failure in American history. We would have read the whole horrific story of the humiliating surrender at Corregidor that signaled the shameful loss of the entire American Army in the Philippines.
The condemnatory tenor of the book would continue with depictions of the useless slaughter at "Bloody Buna" in New Guinea, the humiliating loss to the German Army at Kasserine Pass in North Africa, the failure of Dwight Eisenhower to trap the retreating Germans in Sicily, the horrifically wasteful daylight bombing campaign against Germany in 1943. Messrs. Gordon and Trainer would have reserved their worst for the conduct of George C. Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in their abortive "Crusade in Europe."
We would have read about an Army unprepared to meet the Germans in the hedgerows of Normandy. Operation Market Garden would be depicted as a foolish "bridge too far" that left our bravest soldiers to die for a few square miles of Dutch territory. The useless slaughter in the dank wilderness of the Huertgen Forest would have shocked us. And of course the book would have appeared just at the time the folks back home got word of Hitler's greatest defeat of the Americans at the Battle of the Bulge, evidence of another grand failure of intelligence and a testament to the genius of German arms.
Of course there was no such book written at the time. There were no calls for impeachment, dismissal or relief. None of this happened because military men of that age understood war as the most unpredictable of all human endeavors. Our grandfathers realized that unlike lawyers or doctors, soldiers practice their craft infrequently and often get it wrong at first. Thus, even the greatest military men make mistakes that all too often cost lives.
Sure, soldiers of that era carped about the human shortcomings of their leaders but they kept their own counsel because they realized that there was, first and foremost, a war to be won. They forgave the difficulties experienced by an army that had no choice but to learn to fight by fighting, the most wasteful form of education in the art of war. And they came home to a grateful nation sure in the confidence that they had done their part to destroy a great evil.
The imagination of historians like me can wander and take analogies too far. Al Qaeda isn't the Wehrmacht. World War II was indeed a great crusade consuming two thirds of the nation's production and twelve million of its young. Today the Army and Marine Corps, less than three quarters of a million, shoulder the burden for this war at a cost of less than 1 percent of GDP. Perhaps the American population is more willing to listen to criticism of their wartime leaders because they fail to accept that the stakes in this war are as great (or perhaps even greater) than those in World War II.
But before we become too cavalier about events in the Middle East, remember that Hitler didn't have nuclear weapons and Germany didn't sit astride most of the world's fossil fuel supply. Hitler never came to hate the United States with the mindless imbecility of radical Islamists nor was his anti-Semitic ranting any more threatening than those spouted by the likes of Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Ahmedinejad.
Let's take a page out of the book not written by the greatest generation. Pull some punches and breathe into a bag for awhile. I believe that it's OK for commentators to challenge general defense policies and programs in wartime. I do that quite often. But just as a book written at Christmas time in 1944 might not have offered a meaningful picture of the course of World War II, any commentary on the course of this war might be off the mark just now.
In the interest of winning this war we all must defer judgments about the efficacy of our wartime leaders to the wisdom of the American voters and the 20-20 hindsight of historians like me...after our soldiers and Marines come home.
Retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales is a former commander of the Army War College.
I have kept out of the debate over the “revolt of the generals until now. I decided to take the historical approach.
Bob Scales
Washington Times
May 2, 2006
Pg. 19
Binding Criticism
The generals' ill-timed revolt
By Robert H. Scales
Today I finished the book "Cobra II," written by retired Marine Gen. "Mick" Trainer and New York Times correspondent Mike Gordon. The authors chronicle in great detail the strategic and military missteps that followed the fall of Baghdad in April 2003. The book is particularly important because its publication was the catalyst that launched the "revolt of the generals" a few weeks ago.
Their book appears about three years into this war. As I read, I couldn't help but imagine (given today's political atmospherics) how a book like Messrs. Trainer and Gordon's might have read had it appeared three years after Pearl Harbor.
Such a book would have hit the bookstores at Christmas time in 1944. Messrs. Gordon and Trainer would most certainly have written about the unconstitutional arrogance of an administration that violated international neutrality laws by taking sides with Great Britain against Germany. They would have recognized that Pearl Harbor was the greatest intelligence failure in American history. We would have read the whole horrific story of the humiliating surrender at Corregidor that signaled the shameful loss of the entire American Army in the Philippines.
The condemnatory tenor of the book would continue with depictions of the useless slaughter at "Bloody Buna" in New Guinea, the humiliating loss to the German Army at Kasserine Pass in North Africa, the failure of Dwight Eisenhower to trap the retreating Germans in Sicily, the horrifically wasteful daylight bombing campaign against Germany in 1943. Messrs. Gordon and Trainer would have reserved their worst for the conduct of George C. Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in their abortive "Crusade in Europe."
We would have read about an Army unprepared to meet the Germans in the hedgerows of Normandy. Operation Market Garden would be depicted as a foolish "bridge too far" that left our bravest soldiers to die for a few square miles of Dutch territory. The useless slaughter in the dank wilderness of the Huertgen Forest would have shocked us. And of course the book would have appeared just at the time the folks back home got word of Hitler's greatest defeat of the Americans at the Battle of the Bulge, evidence of another grand failure of intelligence and a testament to the genius of German arms.
Of course there was no such book written at the time. There were no calls for impeachment, dismissal or relief. None of this happened because military men of that age understood war as the most unpredictable of all human endeavors. Our grandfathers realized that unlike lawyers or doctors, soldiers practice their craft infrequently and often get it wrong at first. Thus, even the greatest military men make mistakes that all too often cost lives.
Sure, soldiers of that era carped about the human shortcomings of their leaders but they kept their own counsel because they realized that there was, first and foremost, a war to be won. They forgave the difficulties experienced by an army that had no choice but to learn to fight by fighting, the most wasteful form of education in the art of war. And they came home to a grateful nation sure in the confidence that they had done their part to destroy a great evil.
The imagination of historians like me can wander and take analogies too far. Al Qaeda isn't the Wehrmacht. World War II was indeed a great crusade consuming two thirds of the nation's production and twelve million of its young. Today the Army and Marine Corps, less than three quarters of a million, shoulder the burden for this war at a cost of less than 1 percent of GDP. Perhaps the American population is more willing to listen to criticism of their wartime leaders because they fail to accept that the stakes in this war are as great (or perhaps even greater) than those in World War II.
But before we become too cavalier about events in the Middle East, remember that Hitler didn't have nuclear weapons and Germany didn't sit astride most of the world's fossil fuel supply. Hitler never came to hate the United States with the mindless imbecility of radical Islamists nor was his anti-Semitic ranting any more threatening than those spouted by the likes of Zawahiri, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Ahmedinejad.
Let's take a page out of the book not written by the greatest generation. Pull some punches and breathe into a bag for awhile. I believe that it's OK for commentators to challenge general defense policies and programs in wartime. I do that quite often. But just as a book written at Christmas time in 1944 might not have offered a meaningful picture of the course of World War II, any commentary on the course of this war might be off the mark just now.
In the interest of winning this war we all must defer judgments about the efficacy of our wartime leaders to the wisdom of the American voters and the 20-20 hindsight of historians like me...after our soldiers and Marines come home.
Retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales is a former commander of the Army War College.
Well, I hope it doen't politicize the military; I'd hate to be seeing a coup every four years.
QUOTE(Snuffysmith @ May 3 2006, 05:08 AM)
I agree with you: where were these guys when the policies were being developed. Its a little like crying after the milk has been spilled. I don't recall any military defections during the formulation of the Iraq war planning effort. However, the article does point out the fine line between making policy and carrying it out: "As the nation's most senior military advisors, they are moving from giving advice on military matters into the dangerous political realm of publicly advocating policy." Perhaps one of the legacies of Rumsfeld's administration of DOD is the politicization of the military at the top.
I might note, that in view of the poor planing that was done in Iraq by the civilian controllers, I might be persuaded to get the civilians out of the hair of the military and let the military do what it does best. They know how to plan and execute the manpower requirements and the tactical operations for conducting a war. That didn't happen in Iraq. It was Rumsfeld's Shock and Awe. And now we are faced with the results of his poor approach
From: http://www.nosi.org/
http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_4_27_06.htm
Off With His Head!
Willaim S. Lind
http://www.d-n-i.net/lind/lind_4_27_06.htm
Off With His Head!
Willaim S. Lind
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6042501587.html
Behind the Revolt
The Generals' View: To the Micromanager Goes the Blame
By Max Hastings
Wednesday, April 26, 2006; Page A25
The "generals' revolt" against Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has provoked debate on both sides of the Atlantic about the proper boundaries of military protest. Many people who oppose the Iraq war and deplore Rumsfeld are nonetheless troubled by the notion of senior officers, even retired ones, openly criticizing political leadership.
But in truth, retired soldiers have always been outspoken about the alleged blunders of successor warlords, uniformed and otherwise. During Britain's colonial conflicts and in both world wars, through Korea and Vietnam, hoary old American and British warriors wrote frequently to newspapers, deploring this decision or that, exploiting their credentials to criticize governments and commanders.
Correction
At the end of his April 26 op-ed, "Behind the Revolt,"we cited Max Hastings as the author of "Warriors: the Korean War." In fact those are two separate books: "Warriors" and "The Korean War."
During the Iraq campaigns of 1991 and 2003, I heard British chiefs of staff express their fervent desire for veterans to get themselves off television screens. We may assume that, as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff today, Gen. Peter Pace feels the same way.
Winston Churchill's wartime chief of staff, Gen. Hastings "Pug" Ismay, charmingly described in his memoirs how, in 1940, lunches at his old army club in London became intolerable because at every mouthful, he was beset by veterans explaining how his master should properly be running the war. In self-defense, Ismay resorted to lunching at White's, a venerable aristocratic institution where few members had noticed that a conflict was taking place.
In the past, however, there was a clear demarcation between those issues for which governments were responsible in war -- high policy and the appointment of commanders -- and those of which generals were in charge: field operations. Administrations in the United States and Britain sometimes perished for starting the wrong wars or mismanaging the big issues -- Lyndon Johnson over Vietnam, Britain's Asquith government in 1916. When battles were lost, however, it was generals' heads that rolled, not politicians'.
The great progressive change since 1945 is that the conduct of limited wars has become intensely political. The interventions of civilian leaders are ever more detailed and explicit in matters that were once deemed military turf. Gen. Douglas MacArthur was sacked in Korea in 1951 for conduct no more imperious than his World War II norm in the Pacific. The general failed to understand that the principle on which he had always justified his own mandate -- when wars start, politicians must leave soldiers to run them -- was a dead letter in the nuclear age.
Yet how far should the process go of political engagement in military operations? This issue lies at the heart of the tensions between senior U.S. soldiers and Rumsfeld, and it will persist through all wars. The military -- and there is no doubt that many serving officers share the unhappiness voiced by retired colleagues -- does not question the government's prerogative to make policy. It is dismayed, however, by attempts to second-guess Iraqi battles out of Washington.
Modern communications make feasible a high degree of micromanagement. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's interventions in Vietnam are well known and were bitterly unpopular with soldiers at the time. A notable example of the new relationship between field commanders and governments was seen during the Falklands War in May 1982. The British senior officer on the spot, Brig. Julian Thompson, wanted simply to keep an eye on the Argentine garrison at Goose Green settlement rather than attack it, and to advance toward Port Stanley.
In London, however, it was deemed vital to secure a quick, conspicuous military success to forestall stalemate and a U.S.-imposed cease-fire. Thompson was ordered to attack Goose Green immediately or be sacked. The British got their little victory, but it was a battle fought in deference to perceived political necessity, not military judgment. Thompson afterward lamented the countless hours he was obliged to spend arguing by satellite link with a headquarters 8,000 miles away, rather than directing his troops. This is what is new. Technology empowers political leaders to intervene in even local, small-unit actions.
There is another strand. The post-Vietnam generation of U.S. generals is much more cautious about overseas operations, especially against insurgencies, than were their predecessors of the Westmoreland -- never mind MacArthur -- eras. Once, generals were notoriously gung-ho. Today they are haunted by fear of failure. By a notable historical irony, enthusiasm for using troops is far more prevalent among civilian ideologues than among professional warriors.
It is unlikely that field commanders will ever again enjoy the operational latitude they once possessed. In his book "Supreme Command," Eliot Cohen eloquently argues that civilian leaders -- he cites Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion -- have sometimes provided a vital impetus for military operations when soldiers proved incapable. Yet his thesis supposes a level of civilian genius that is often absent, as the military believes it to be in Iraq today.
If commanders are denied the power to manage campaigns as they think right, it is unjust to allow them to accept blame when these go awry. In the new world, the generals' revolt seems a legitimate response to political mismanagement of operations. If a civilian such as Donald Rumsfeld seeks to exercise from Washington functions that were traditionally those of soldiers, he should take the customary consequences. The most conspicuous historical example of a politician presiding over a military fiasco was that of Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty. He sponsored the 1915 Dardanelles campaign -- and was forced to quit.
Max Hastings, a British journalist and historian, is the author of "Warriors: The Korean War" and "Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944."
Behind the Revolt
The Generals' View: To the Micromanager Goes the Blame
By Max Hastings
Wednesday, April 26, 2006; Page A25
The "generals' revolt" against Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has provoked debate on both sides of the Atlantic about the proper boundaries of military protest. Many people who oppose the Iraq war and deplore Rumsfeld are nonetheless troubled by the notion of senior officers, even retired ones, openly criticizing political leadership.
But in truth, retired soldiers have always been outspoken about the alleged blunders of successor warlords, uniformed and otherwise. During Britain's colonial conflicts and in both world wars, through Korea and Vietnam, hoary old American and British warriors wrote frequently to newspapers, deploring this decision or that, exploiting their credentials to criticize governments and commanders.
Correction
At the end of his April 26 op-ed, "Behind the Revolt,"we cited Max Hastings as the author of "Warriors: the Korean War." In fact those are two separate books: "Warriors" and "The Korean War."
During the Iraq campaigns of 1991 and 2003, I heard British chiefs of staff express their fervent desire for veterans to get themselves off television screens. We may assume that, as chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff today, Gen. Peter Pace feels the same way.
Winston Churchill's wartime chief of staff, Gen. Hastings "Pug" Ismay, charmingly described in his memoirs how, in 1940, lunches at his old army club in London became intolerable because at every mouthful, he was beset by veterans explaining how his master should properly be running the war. In self-defense, Ismay resorted to lunching at White's, a venerable aristocratic institution where few members had noticed that a conflict was taking place.
In the past, however, there was a clear demarcation between those issues for which governments were responsible in war -- high policy and the appointment of commanders -- and those of which generals were in charge: field operations. Administrations in the United States and Britain sometimes perished for starting the wrong wars or mismanaging the big issues -- Lyndon Johnson over Vietnam, Britain's Asquith government in 1916. When battles were lost, however, it was generals' heads that rolled, not politicians'.
The great progressive change since 1945 is that the conduct of limited wars has become intensely political. The interventions of civilian leaders are ever more detailed and explicit in matters that were once deemed military turf. Gen. Douglas MacArthur was sacked in Korea in 1951 for conduct no more imperious than his World War II norm in the Pacific. The general failed to understand that the principle on which he had always justified his own mandate -- when wars start, politicians must leave soldiers to run them -- was a dead letter in the nuclear age.
Yet how far should the process go of political engagement in military operations? This issue lies at the heart of the tensions between senior U.S. soldiers and Rumsfeld, and it will persist through all wars. The military -- and there is no doubt that many serving officers share the unhappiness voiced by retired colleagues -- does not question the government's prerogative to make policy. It is dismayed, however, by attempts to second-guess Iraqi battles out of Washington.
Modern communications make feasible a high degree of micromanagement. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's interventions in Vietnam are well known and were bitterly unpopular with soldiers at the time. A notable example of the new relationship between field commanders and governments was seen during the Falklands War in May 1982. The British senior officer on the spot, Brig. Julian Thompson, wanted simply to keep an eye on the Argentine garrison at Goose Green settlement rather than attack it, and to advance toward Port Stanley.
In London, however, it was deemed vital to secure a quick, conspicuous military success to forestall stalemate and a U.S.-imposed cease-fire. Thompson was ordered to attack Goose Green immediately or be sacked. The British got their little victory, but it was a battle fought in deference to perceived political necessity, not military judgment. Thompson afterward lamented the countless hours he was obliged to spend arguing by satellite link with a headquarters 8,000 miles away, rather than directing his troops. This is what is new. Technology empowers political leaders to intervene in even local, small-unit actions.
There is another strand. The post-Vietnam generation of U.S. generals is much more cautious about overseas operations, especially against insurgencies, than were their predecessors of the Westmoreland -- never mind MacArthur -- eras. Once, generals were notoriously gung-ho. Today they are haunted by fear of failure. By a notable historical irony, enthusiasm for using troops is far more prevalent among civilian ideologues than among professional warriors.
It is unlikely that field commanders will ever again enjoy the operational latitude they once possessed. In his book "Supreme Command," Eliot Cohen eloquently argues that civilian leaders -- he cites Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion -- have sometimes provided a vital impetus for military operations when soldiers proved incapable. Yet his thesis supposes a level of civilian genius that is often absent, as the military believes it to be in Iraq today.
If commanders are denied the power to manage campaigns as they think right, it is unjust to allow them to accept blame when these go awry. In the new world, the generals' revolt seems a legitimate response to political mismanagement of operations. If a civilian such as Donald Rumsfeld seeks to exercise from Washington functions that were traditionally those of soldiers, he should take the customary consequences. The most conspicuous historical example of a politician presiding over a military fiasco was that of Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty. He sponsored the 1915 Dardanelles campaign -- and was forced to quit.
Max Hastings, a British journalist and historian, is the author of "Warriors: The Korean War" and "Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944."
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/16/opinion/edoped.php
A general misunderstanding
Michael Delong The New York Times
MONDAY, APRIL 17, 2006
TAMPA, Florida
As the No. 2 at U.S. Central Command from the Sept. 11 attacks through the Iraq war, I was the daily "answer man" to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I briefed him twice a day; few people had as much interaction with him as I did during those two years. In light of the recent calls for his resignation by several retired generals, I would like to set the record straight on what he was really like to work with.
When I was at Centcom, the people who needed to have access to Rumsfeld got it, and he carefully listened to our arguments. That is not to say that he is not tough in terms of his convictions (he is) or that he will make it easy on you (he will not). If you approach him unprepared, or if you don't have the full courage of your convictions, he will not give you the time of day.
Rumsfeld does not give in easily in disagreements, either, and he will always force you to argue your point thoroughly. This can be tough for some people to deal with. I witnessed many heated but professional conversations between my immediate commander, General Tommy Franks, and Rumsfeld - but the secretary always deferred to the general on war-fighting issues.
Ultimately, I believe that a tough defense secretary makes commanders tougher in their convictions. Was Donald Rumsfeld a micromanager? Yes. Did he want to be involved in all of the decisions? Yes. But Rumsfeld never told people in the field what to do. It all went through Franks.
Rumsfeld did not like waste, which caused some grumbling among the military leadership even before Sept. 11. He knew that many of the operational plans we had on the books dated back to the 1990s (some even to the late '80s), and he wanted them updated for an era of a more streamlined, technological force. He asked us all: "Can we do it better, and can we do it with fewer people?"
Sometimes Franks and I answered yes, other times we answered no. When we said no, there was a discussion; but when we told him what we truly needed, we got it. I never saw him endangering troops by insisting on replacing manpower with technology. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we always got what we, the commanders, thought we needed.
This is why the much-repeated claims that Rumsfeld didn't "give us enough troops" in Iraq ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.
The outcome and ramifications of a war, however, are impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein had twice opened his jails, flooding the streets with criminals. The Iraqi police walked out of their uniforms in the face of the invasion, compounding domestic chaos. We did not expect these developments.
We also - collectively - made some decisions in the wake of the war that could have been better. We banned the entire Baath Party, which ended up slowing reconstruction (we should probably have banned only high-level officials); we dissolved the entire Iraqi army (we probably should have retained a small cadre help to rebuild it more quickly). We relied too much on the supposed expertise of the Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi who assured us that once Saddam was gone, Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds would unite in harmony.
But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. Franks drafted it, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.
Thus, for distinguished officers to step forward and, in retrospect, pin blame on one person is wrong. And when they do so in a time of war, the rest of the world watches.
(Michael DeLong, a retired Marine lieutenant general, is the author, with Noah Lukeman, of "Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.")
TAMPA, Florida
As the No. 2 at U.S. Central Command from the Sept. 11 attacks through the Iraq war, I was the daily "answer man" to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I briefed him twice a day; few people had as much interaction with him as I did during those two years. In light of the recent calls for his resignation by several retired generals, I would like to set the record straight on what he was really like to work with.
When I was at Centcom, the people who needed to have access to Rumsfeld got it, and he carefully listened to our arguments. That is not to say that he is not tough in terms of his convictions (he is) or that he will make it easy on you (he will not). If you approach him unprepared, or if you don't have the full courage of your convictions, he will not give you the time of day.
Rumsfeld does not give in easily in disagreements, either, and he will always force you to argue your point thoroughly. This can be tough for some people to deal with. I witnessed many heated but professional conversations between my immediate commander, General Tommy Franks, and Rumsfeld - but the secretary always deferred to the general on war-fighting issues.
Ultimately, I believe that a tough defense secretary makes commanders tougher in their convictions. Was Donald Rumsfeld a micromanager? Yes. Did he want to be involved in all of the decisions? Yes. But Rumsfeld never told people in the field what to do. It all went through Franks.
Rumsfeld did not like waste, which caused some grumbling among the military leadership even before Sept. 11. He knew that many of the operational plans we had on the books dated back to the 1990s (some even to the late '80s), and he wanted them updated for an era of a more streamlined, technological force. He asked us all: "Can we do it better, and can we do it with fewer people?"
Sometimes Franks and I answered yes, other times we answered no. When we said no, there was a discussion; but when we told him what we truly needed, we got it. I never saw him endangering troops by insisting on replacing manpower with technology. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we always got what we, the commanders, thought we needed.
This is why the much-repeated claims that Rumsfeld didn't "give us enough troops" in Iraq ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.
The outcome and ramifications of a war, however, are impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein had twice opened his jails, flooding the streets with criminals. The Iraqi police walked out of their uniforms in the face of the invasion, compounding domestic chaos. We did not expect these developments.
We also - collectively - made some decisions in the wake of the war that could have been better. We banned the entire Baath Party, which ended up slowing reconstruction (we should probably have banned only high-level officials); we dissolved the entire Iraqi army (we probably should have retained a small cadre help to rebuild it more quickly). We relied too much on the supposed expertise of the Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi who assured us that once Saddam was gone, Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds would unite in harmony.
But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. Franks drafted it, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.
Thus, for distinguished officers to step forward and, in retrospect, pin blame on one person is wrong. And when they do so in a time of war, the rest of the world watches.
(Michael DeLong, a retired Marine lieutenant general, is the author, with Noah Lukeman, of "Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.")
TAMPA, Florida
As the No. 2 at U.S. Central Command from the Sept. 11 attacks through the Iraq war, I was the daily "answer man" to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I briefed him twice a day; few people had as much interaction with him as I did during those two years. In light of the recent calls for his resignation by several retired generals, I would like to set the record straight on what he was really like to work with.
When I was at Centcom, the people who needed to have access to Rumsfeld got it, and he carefully listened to our arguments. That is not to say that he is not tough in terms of his convictions (he is) or that he will make it easy on you (he will not). If you approach him unprepared, or if you don't have the full courage of your convictions, he will not give you the time of day.
Rumsfeld does not give in easily in disagreements, either, and he will always force you to argue your point thoroughly. This can be tough for some people to deal with. I witnessed many heated but professional conversations between my immediate commander, General Tommy Franks, and Rumsfeld - but the secretary always deferred to the general on war-fighting issues.
Ultimately, I believe that a tough defense secretary makes commanders tougher in their convictions. Was Donald Rumsfeld a micromanager? Yes. Did he want to be involved in all of the decisions? Yes. But Rumsfeld never told people in the field what to do. It all went through Franks.
Rumsfeld did not like waste, which caused some grumbling among the military leadership even before Sept. 11. He knew that many of the operational plans we had on the books dated back to the 1990s (some even to the late '80s), and he wanted them updated for an era of a more streamlined, technological force. He asked us all: "Can we do it better, and can we do it with fewer people?"
Sometimes Franks and I answered yes, other times we answered no. When we said no, there was a discussion; but when we told him what we truly needed, we got it. I never saw him endangering troops by insisting on replacing manpower with technology. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we always got what we, the commanders, thought we needed.
This is why the much-repeated claims that Rumsfeld didn't "give us enough troops" in Iraq ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.
The outcome and ramifications of a war, however, are impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein had twice opened his jails, flooding the streets with criminals. The Iraqi police walked out of their uniforms in the face of the invasion, compounding domestic chaos. We did not expect these developments.
We also - collectively - made some decisions in the wake of the war that could have been better. We banned the entire Baath Party, which ended up slowing reconstruction (we should probably have banned only high-level officials); we dissolved the entire Iraqi army (we probably should have retained a small cadre help to rebuild it more quickly). We relied too much on the supposed expertise of the Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi who assured us that once Saddam was gone, Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds would unite in harmony.
But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. Franks drafted it, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.
Thus, for distinguished officers to step forward and, in retrospect, pin blame on one person is wrong. And when they do so in a time of war, the rest of the world watches.
(Michael DeLong, a retired Marine lieutenant general, is the author, with Noah Lukeman, of "Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.")
TAMPA, Florida
As the No. 2 at U.S. Central Command from the Sept. 11 attacks through the Iraq war, I was the daily "answer man" to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I briefed him twice a day; few people had as much interaction with him as I did during those two years. In light of the recent calls for his resignation by several retired generals, I would like to set the record straight on what he was really like to work with.
When I was at Centcom, the people who needed to have access to Rumsfeld got it, and he carefully listened to our arguments. That is not to say that he is not tough in terms of his convictions (he is) or that he will make it easy on you (he will not). If you approach him unprepared, or if you don't have the full courage of your convictions, he will not give you the time of day.
Rumsfeld does not give in easily in disagreements, either, and he will always force you to argue your point thoroughly. This can be tough for some people to deal with. I witnessed many heated but professional conversations between my immediate commander, General Tommy Franks, and Rumsfeld - but the secretary always deferred to the general on war-fighting issues.
Ultimately, I believe that a tough defense secretary makes commanders tougher in their convictions. Was Donald Rumsfeld a micromanager? Yes. Did he want to be involved in all of the decisions? Yes. But Rumsfeld never told people in the field what to do. It all went through Franks.
Rumsfeld did not like waste, which caused some grumbling among the military leadership even before Sept. 11. He knew that many of the operational plans we had on the books dated back to the 1990s (some even to the late '80s), and he wanted them updated for an era of a more streamlined, technological force. He asked us all: "Can we do it better, and can we do it with fewer people?"
Sometimes Franks and I answered yes, other times we answered no. When we said no, there was a discussion; but when we told him what we truly needed, we got it. I never saw him endangering troops by insisting on replacing manpower with technology. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we always got what we, the commanders, thought we needed.
This is why the much-repeated claims that Rumsfeld didn't "give us enough troops" in Iraq ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.
The outcome and ramifications of a war, however, are impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein had twice opened his jails, flooding the streets with criminals. The Iraqi police walked out of their uniforms in the face of the invasion, compounding domestic chaos. We did not expect these developments.
We also - collectively - made some decisions in the wake of the war that could have been better. We banned the entire Baath Party, which ended up slowing reconstruction (we should probably have banned only high-level officials); we dissolved the entire Iraqi army (we probably should have retained a small cadre help to rebuild it more quickly). We relied too much on the supposed expertise of the Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi who assured us that once Saddam was gone, Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds would unite in harmony.
But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. Franks drafted it, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.
Thus, for distinguished officers to step forward and, in retrospect, pin blame on one person is wrong. And when they do so in a time of war, the rest of the world watches.
(Michael DeLong, a retired Marine lieutenant general, is the author, with Noah Lukeman, of "Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.")
A general misunderstanding
Michael Delong The New York Times
MONDAY, APRIL 17, 2006
TAMPA, Florida
As the No. 2 at U.S. Central Command from the Sept. 11 attacks through the Iraq war, I was the daily "answer man" to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I briefed him twice a day; few people had as much interaction with him as I did during those two years. In light of the recent calls for his resignation by several retired generals, I would like to set the record straight on what he was really like to work with.
When I was at Centcom, the people who needed to have access to Rumsfeld got it, and he carefully listened to our arguments. That is not to say that he is not tough in terms of his convictions (he is) or that he will make it easy on you (he will not). If you approach him unprepared, or if you don't have the full courage of your convictions, he will not give you the time of day.
Rumsfeld does not give in easily in disagreements, either, and he will always force you to argue your point thoroughly. This can be tough for some people to deal with. I witnessed many heated but professional conversations between my immediate commander, General Tommy Franks, and Rumsfeld - but the secretary always deferred to the general on war-fighting issues.
Ultimately, I believe that a tough defense secretary makes commanders tougher in their convictions. Was Donald Rumsfeld a micromanager? Yes. Did he want to be involved in all of the decisions? Yes. But Rumsfeld never told people in the field what to do. It all went through Franks.
Rumsfeld did not like waste, which caused some grumbling among the military leadership even before Sept. 11. He knew that many of the operational plans we had on the books dated back to the 1990s (some even to the late '80s), and he wanted them updated for an era of a more streamlined, technological force. He asked us all: "Can we do it better, and can we do it with fewer people?"
Sometimes Franks and I answered yes, other times we answered no. When we said no, there was a discussion; but when we told him what we truly needed, we got it. I never saw him endangering troops by insisting on replacing manpower with technology. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we always got what we, the commanders, thought we needed.
This is why the much-repeated claims that Rumsfeld didn't "give us enough troops" in Iraq ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.
The outcome and ramifications of a war, however, are impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein had twice opened his jails, flooding the streets with criminals. The Iraqi police walked out of their uniforms in the face of the invasion, compounding domestic chaos. We did not expect these developments.
We also - collectively - made some decisions in the wake of the war that could have been better. We banned the entire Baath Party, which ended up slowing reconstruction (we should probably have banned only high-level officials); we dissolved the entire Iraqi army (we probably should have retained a small cadre help to rebuild it more quickly). We relied too much on the supposed expertise of the Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi who assured us that once Saddam was gone, Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds would unite in harmony.
But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. Franks drafted it, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.
Thus, for distinguished officers to step forward and, in retrospect, pin blame on one person is wrong. And when they do so in a time of war, the rest of the world watches.
(Michael DeLong, a retired Marine lieutenant general, is the author, with Noah Lukeman, of "Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.")
TAMPA, Florida
As the No. 2 at U.S. Central Command from the Sept. 11 attacks through the Iraq war, I was the daily "answer man" to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I briefed him twice a day; few people had as much interaction with him as I did during those two years. In light of the recent calls for his resignation by several retired generals, I would like to set the record straight on what he was really like to work with.
When I was at Centcom, the people who needed to have access to Rumsfeld got it, and he carefully listened to our arguments. That is not to say that he is not tough in terms of his convictions (he is) or that he will make it easy on you (he will not). If you approach him unprepared, or if you don't have the full courage of your convictions, he will not give you the time of day.
Rumsfeld does not give in easily in disagreements, either, and he will always force you to argue your point thoroughly. This can be tough for some people to deal with. I witnessed many heated but professional conversations between my immediate commander, General Tommy Franks, and Rumsfeld - but the secretary always deferred to the general on war-fighting issues.
Ultimately, I believe that a tough defense secretary makes commanders tougher in their convictions. Was Donald Rumsfeld a micromanager? Yes. Did he want to be involved in all of the decisions? Yes. But Rumsfeld never told people in the field what to do. It all went through Franks.
Rumsfeld did not like waste, which caused some grumbling among the military leadership even before Sept. 11. He knew that many of the operational plans we had on the books dated back to the 1990s (some even to the late '80s), and he wanted them updated for an era of a more streamlined, technological force. He asked us all: "Can we do it better, and can we do it with fewer people?"
Sometimes Franks and I answered yes, other times we answered no. When we said no, there was a discussion; but when we told him what we truly needed, we got it. I never saw him endangering troops by insisting on replacing manpower with technology. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we always got what we, the commanders, thought we needed.
This is why the much-repeated claims that Rumsfeld didn't "give us enough troops" in Iraq ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.
The outcome and ramifications of a war, however, are impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein had twice opened his jails, flooding the streets with criminals. The Iraqi police walked out of their uniforms in the face of the invasion, compounding domestic chaos. We did not expect these developments.
We also - collectively - made some decisions in the wake of the war that could have been better. We banned the entire Baath Party, which ended up slowing reconstruction (we should probably have banned only high-level officials); we dissolved the entire Iraqi army (we probably should have retained a small cadre help to rebuild it more quickly). We relied too much on the supposed expertise of the Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi who assured us that once Saddam was gone, Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds would unite in harmony.
But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. Franks drafted it, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.
Thus, for distinguished officers to step forward and, in retrospect, pin blame on one person is wrong. And when they do so in a time of war, the rest of the world watches.
(Michael DeLong, a retired Marine lieutenant general, is the author, with Noah Lukeman, of "Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.")
TAMPA, Florida
As the No. 2 at U.S. Central Command from the Sept. 11 attacks through the Iraq war, I was the daily "answer man" to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I briefed him twice a day; few people had as much interaction with him as I did during those two years. In light of the recent calls for his resignation by several retired generals, I would like to set the record straight on what he was really like to work with.
When I was at Centcom, the people who needed to have access to Rumsfeld got it, and he carefully listened to our arguments. That is not to say that he is not tough in terms of his convictions (he is) or that he will make it easy on you (he will not). If you approach him unprepared, or if you don't have the full courage of your convictions, he will not give you the time of day.
Rumsfeld does not give in easily in disagreements, either, and he will always force you to argue your point thoroughly. This can be tough for some people to deal with. I witnessed many heated but professional conversations between my immediate commander, General Tommy Franks, and Rumsfeld - but the secretary always deferred to the general on war-fighting issues.
Ultimately, I believe that a tough defense secretary makes commanders tougher in their convictions. Was Donald Rumsfeld a micromanager? Yes. Did he want to be involved in all of the decisions? Yes. But Rumsfeld never told people in the field what to do. It all went through Franks.
Rumsfeld did not like waste, which caused some grumbling among the military leadership even before Sept. 11. He knew that many of the operational plans we had on the books dated back to the 1990s (some even to the late '80s), and he wanted them updated for an era of a more streamlined, technological force. He asked us all: "Can we do it better, and can we do it with fewer people?"
Sometimes Franks and I answered yes, other times we answered no. When we said no, there was a discussion; but when we told him what we truly needed, we got it. I never saw him endangering troops by insisting on replacing manpower with technology. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we always got what we, the commanders, thought we needed.
This is why the much-repeated claims that Rumsfeld didn't "give us enough troops" in Iraq ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.
The outcome and ramifications of a war, however, are impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein had twice opened his jails, flooding the streets with criminals. The Iraqi police walked out of their uniforms in the face of the invasion, compounding domestic chaos. We did not expect these developments.
We also - collectively - made some decisions in the wake of the war that could have been better. We banned the entire Baath Party, which ended up slowing reconstruction (we should probably have banned only high-level officials); we dissolved the entire Iraqi army (we probably should have retained a small cadre help to rebuild it more quickly). We relied too much on the supposed expertise of the Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi who assured us that once Saddam was gone, Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds would unite in harmony.
But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. Franks drafted it, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.
Thus, for distinguished officers to step forward and, in retrospect, pin blame on one person is wrong. And when they do so in a time of war, the rest of the world watches.
(Michael DeLong, a retired Marine lieutenant general, is the author, with Noah Lukeman, of "Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.")
TAMPA, Florida
As the No. 2 at U.S. Central Command from the Sept. 11 attacks through the Iraq war, I was the daily "answer man" to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I briefed him twice a day; few people had as much interaction with him as I did during those two years. In light of the recent calls for his resignation by several retired generals, I would like to set the record straight on what he was really like to work with.
When I was at Centcom, the people who needed to have access to Rumsfeld got it, and he carefully listened to our arguments. That is not to say that he is not tough in terms of his convictions (he is) or that he will make it easy on you (he will not). If you approach him unprepared, or if you don't have the full courage of your convictions, he will not give you the time of day.
Rumsfeld does not give in easily in disagreements, either, and he will always force you to argue your point thoroughly. This can be tough for some people to deal with. I witnessed many heated but professional conversations between my immediate commander, General Tommy Franks, and Rumsfeld - but the secretary always deferred to the general on war-fighting issues.
Ultimately, I believe that a tough defense secretary makes commanders tougher in their convictions. Was Donald Rumsfeld a micromanager? Yes. Did he want to be involved in all of the decisions? Yes. But Rumsfeld never told people in the field what to do. It all went through Franks.
Rumsfeld did not like waste, which caused some grumbling among the military leadership even before Sept. 11. He knew that many of the operational plans we had on the books dated back to the 1990s (some even to the late '80s), and he wanted them updated for an era of a more streamlined, technological force. He asked us all: "Can we do it better, and can we do it with fewer people?"
Sometimes Franks and I answered yes, other times we answered no. When we said no, there was a discussion; but when we told him what we truly needed, we got it. I never saw him endangering troops by insisting on replacing manpower with technology. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, we always got what we, the commanders, thought we needed.
This is why the much-repeated claims that Rumsfeld didn't "give us enough troops" in Iraq ring hollow. First, such criticisms ignore that the agreed-upon plan was for a lightning operation into Baghdad. In addition, logistically it would have been well nigh impossible to bring many more soldiers through the bottleneck in Kuwait. And doing so would have carried its own risk: you cannot sustain a fighting force of 300,000 or 500,000 men for long, and it would have left us with few reserves, putting our troops at risk in other parts of the world. Given our plan, we thought we had the right number of troops to accomplish our mission.
The outcome and ramifications of a war, however, are impossible to predict. Saddam Hussein had twice opened his jails, flooding the streets with criminals. The Iraqi police walked out of their uniforms in the face of the invasion, compounding domestic chaos. We did not expect these developments.
We also - collectively - made some decisions in the wake of the war that could have been better. We banned the entire Baath Party, which ended up slowing reconstruction (we should probably have banned only high-level officials); we dissolved the entire Iraqi army (we probably should have retained a small cadre help to rebuild it more quickly). We relied too much on the supposed expertise of the Iraqi exiles like Ahmad Chalabi who assured us that once Saddam was gone, Sunni Arabs, Shiites and Kurds would unite in harmony.
But that doesn't mean that a "What's next?" plan didn't exist. It did; it was known as Phase IV of the overall operation. Franks drafted it, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Pentagon, the Treasury Department and all members of the Cabinet had input. It was thoroughly "war-gamed" by the Joint Chiefs.
Thus, for distinguished officers to step forward and, in retrospect, pin blame on one person is wrong. And when they do so in a time of war, the rest of the world watches.
(Michael DeLong, a retired Marine lieutenant general, is the author, with Noah Lukeman, of "Inside Centcom: The Unvarnished Truth About the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.")
Steve Clemons of the Washington Note and the New American Foundation weighs in:
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/
Archive
April 21, 2006
Bush: "I'm the Decider" on Rumsfeld
President Bush is rebuffing the nation in clinging to Rumsfeld.
Someone remind the President that his Secretary of Defense presided over behaviors that led to the image below, and to far worse:
The calls for Rumsfeld to depart will only intensify now. Unity among the ranks of active duty and retired generals can't be re-established under current management.
The President should give Rumsfeld a big party, a medal or two, and send him off -- with a successor who will re-establish confidence in defense decision-making.
The President should dust off his MBA work and realize that if he wants to send a signal of change, he must dump at least three of five people: his chief of staff, his vice president, his closest political advisor, his national security advisor, and his defense secretary.
So far, Andy Card is gone. To fill out the "I'm a new and different Bush" card, Bush must distance himself from some combination of Rove, Hadley, Cheney, and/or Rumsfeld.
I'm guessing that "the decider" changes his mind soon. If I'm wrong, Democrats running in 2006 are getting a huge gift.
-- Steve Clemons
"Shock and Awe" Strategist Harlan Ullman Says Buck Bush, Not Rumsfeld
Defense strategist Harlan Ullman writes a regular "Owls and Eagles" column for the Washington Times, and I frequently learn a great deal from it.
I have come by an early draft of what will appear in his column tomorrow -- titled tentatively "It is Bush's War, Not Rumsfeld's".
I won't print the whole article, but I will post some of it and add the link to the Washington Times when it is up tomorrow.
Ullman makes a compelling case that the zealotry to unseat Rumsfeld should be focused on the President and the many other institutions and players who had a hand in the reckless way this war was pursued. Ullman is interesting because he is the person credited with coining the "shock and awe" strategy for military invasions, but he has been a strong and consistent critic of the Bush White House and the Pentagon for the manner in which "shock and awe" was applied.
Just to be clear about my own views, I disagree with Harlan Ullman and think that Rumsfeld is a titan in these matters and that responsibility for many of the errors and misdeeds of this war needs to be fixed, to a significant degree, on him. One must begin somewhere, and it's not enough to argue a defense of Rumsfeld that others should be held accountable as well.
Nonetheless, Ullman makes several points that should be considered -- - particularly that that this was a Bush/Cheney war:
Last week's political sandstorm in Washington swirled around Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld's future. A handful of retired general officers, though no admirals yet, called for the secretary to go on the grounds of mishandling the war in Iraq. President Bush predictably offered strong support for Mr. Rumsfeld as did a handful of other retired flag officers.
In this brouhaha, three important ingredients are so far missing in action. First is recognizing that the war in Iraq is Mr. Bush's, not Mr. Rumsfeld's. Second, accountability for the errors, misjudgments and mistakes in conducting that war and its aftermath cannot responsibly be laid at the feet of only one person. Third, we continue to ignore what lies ahead in Iraq, an ignorance that could prove fatal to the entire endeavor.
A disclosure is in order. Recall that as the summer of 2001 passed into autumn, the drumbeat for Mr. Rumsfeld's resignation was building. Sometime after September 11th, in opposition to this clamor, this column called for the secretary to "press on" in his quest to transform the department of defense. He did.
Now, nearly five years later, the nation must appreciate that American policy and actions in Iraq and the Middle East have been defined, approved and authorized by the president. While Rumsfeld was a principal architect, the responsibility for the war rests above the secretary's pay grade. The buck does stop at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
Second, a good number of other people were intimately involved in the take-off that led to the invasion of Iraq. If Rumsfeld should go, what about the vice president or the current secretary of state, national security advisor and the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff? As key members of the team closest to the president, have they no responsibility or accountability here? And what about other members of the cabinet? If the nation is at war, why is the defense department the only agency acting that way? Why should other cabinet secretaries not be held accountable for demanding similar levels of commitment from their departments?
There is also the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. If Rumsfeld becomes the lightning rod for failed policy, surely Congress cannot be absolved of responsibility. By decisive majorities, both parties authorized the war as well the nearly half a trillion dollars of funding so far spent on Iraq. And what about holding really substantive hearings? So shouldn't the Speaker, majority and minority leaders of both houses and committee chairmen and ranking members have their feet metaphorically held closely to the accountability fires?
Ullman is absolutely correct that there is a long list of co-conspirators and collaborators who bear responsibility for America's crappy plight -- many of them Democrats in fact.
However, an important point that I think my friend Harlan Ullman glosses over is that the military is seriously fractured right now. There are few times in history where the officer corps has been so divided between what course the nation should go -- and regarding what shape the military itself is in.
I do hold Donald Rumsfeld responsible for much of our current mess, but whether others agree or not with that view, few can argue that there is a crisis in confidence in Pentagon management.
When that happens -- no matter who is right and who is wrong -- management needs to be shaken up. Confidence and stability can be re-established with a new team at the helm.
While Democrats would do better electorally with a continuation of the the Cheney-Rumsfeld cabal, the nation itself will suffer significantly with two and a half more years of what we are seeing unfold today.
While the buck should stop with the President, Bush and Cheney are likely to keep their positions until the end of their terms, but Rumsfeld is not only expendable -- he should be jettisoned, yesterday.
-- Steve Clemons
http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/
Archive
April 21, 2006
Bush: "I'm the Decider" on Rumsfeld
President Bush is rebuffing the nation in clinging to Rumsfeld.
Someone remind the President that his Secretary of Defense presided over behaviors that led to the image below, and to far worse:
The calls for Rumsfeld to depart will only intensify now. Unity among the ranks of active duty and retired generals can't be re-established under current management.
The President should give Rumsfeld a big party, a medal or two, and send him off -- with a successor who will re-establish confidence in defense decision-making.
The President should dust off his MBA work and realize that if he wants to send a signal of change, he must dump at least three of five people: his chief of staff, his vice president, his closest political advisor, his national security advisor, and his defense secretary.
So far, Andy Card is gone. To fill out the "I'm a new and different Bush" card, Bush must distance himself from some combination of Rove, Hadley, Cheney, and/or Rumsfeld.
I'm guessing that "the decider" changes his mind soon. If I'm wrong, Democrats running in 2006 are getting a huge gift.
-- Steve Clemons
"Shock and Awe" Strategist Harlan Ullman Says Buck Bush, Not Rumsfeld
Defense strategist Harlan Ullman writes a regular "Owls and Eagles" column for the Washington Times, and I frequently learn a great deal from it.
I have come by an early draft of what will appear in his column tomorrow -- titled tentatively "It is Bush's War, Not Rumsfeld's".
I won't print the whole article, but I will post some of it and add the link to the Washington Times when it is up tomorrow.
Ullman makes a compelling case that the zealotry to unseat Rumsfeld should be focused on the President and the many other institutions and players who had a hand in the reckless way this war was pursued. Ullman is interesting because he is the person credited with coining the "shock and awe" strategy for military invasions, but he has been a strong and consistent critic of the Bush White House and the Pentagon for the manner in which "shock and awe" was applied.
Just to be clear about my own views, I disagree with Harlan Ullman and think that Rumsfeld is a titan in these matters and that responsibility for many of the errors and misdeeds of this war needs to be fixed, to a significant degree, on him. One must begin somewhere, and it's not enough to argue a defense of Rumsfeld that others should be held accountable as well.
Nonetheless, Ullman makes several points that should be considered -- - particularly that that this was a Bush/Cheney war:
Last week's political sandstorm in Washington swirled around Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld's future. A handful of retired general officers, though no admirals yet, called for the secretary to go on the grounds of mishandling the war in Iraq. President Bush predictably offered strong support for Mr. Rumsfeld as did a handful of other retired flag officers.
In this brouhaha, three important ingredients are so far missing in action. First is recognizing that the war in Iraq is Mr. Bush's, not Mr. Rumsfeld's. Second, accountability for the errors, misjudgments and mistakes in conducting that war and its aftermath cannot responsibly be laid at the feet of only one person. Third, we continue to ignore what lies ahead in Iraq, an ignorance that could prove fatal to the entire endeavor.
A disclosure is in order. Recall that as the summer of 2001 passed into autumn, the drumbeat for Mr. Rumsfeld's resignation was building. Sometime after September 11th, in opposition to this clamor, this column called for the secretary to "press on" in his quest to transform the department of defense. He did.
Now, nearly five years later, the nation must appreciate that American policy and actions in Iraq and the Middle East have been defined, approved and authorized by the president. While Rumsfeld was a principal architect, the responsibility for the war rests above the secretary's pay grade. The buck does stop at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.
Second, a good number of other people were intimately involved in the take-off that led to the invasion of Iraq. If Rumsfeld should go, what about the vice president or the current secretary of state, national security advisor and the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff? As key members of the team closest to the president, have they no responsibility or accountability here? And what about other members of the cabinet? If the nation is at war, why is the defense department the only agency acting that way? Why should other cabinet secretaries not be held accountable for demanding similar levels of commitment from their departments?
There is also the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. If Rumsfeld becomes the lightning rod for failed policy, surely Congress cannot be absolved of responsibility. By decisive majorities, both parties authorized the war as well the nearly half a trillion dollars of funding so far spent on Iraq. And what about holding really substantive hearings? So shouldn't the Speaker, majority and minority leaders of both houses and committee chairmen and ranking members have their feet metaphorically held closely to the accountability fires?
Ullman is absolutely correct that there is a long list of co-conspirators and collaborators who bear responsibility for America's crappy plight -- many of them Democrats in fact.
However, an important point that I think my friend Harlan Ullman glosses over is that the military is seriously fractured right now. There are few times in history where the officer corps has been so divided between what course the nation should go -- and regarding what shape the military itself is in.
I do hold Donald Rumsfeld responsible for much of our current mess, but whether others agree or not with that view, few can argue that there is a crisis in confidence in Pentagon management.
When that happens -- no matter who is right and who is wrong -- management needs to be shaken up. Confidence and stability can be re-established with a new team at the helm.
While Democrats would do better electorally with a continuation of the the Cheney-Rumsfeld cabal, the nation itself will suffer significantly with two and a half more years of what we are seeing unfold today.
While the buck should stop with the President, Bush and Cheney are likely to keep their positions until the end of their terms, but Rumsfeld is not only expendable -- he should be jettisoned, yesterday.
-- Steve Clemons
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