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May 26, 2006
Assessment of the War in Iraq



Col. Chet Richards is a retired Air Force intelligence and Middle East expert. He has written extensively on the thinking of the American strategist John Boyd, especially in two monographs published by the Straus Military Reform Project and the Center for Defense Information (The Swift Elusive Sword and Neither Shall the Sword). On May 25, 2006, Richards presented to the press his analysis of why the war in Iraq continues to go so poorly, and why the war is now lost, and – indeed – has been lost from the start. In summary, Richards points out that President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld have addressed every element of what constitutes “grand strategy,” but, unfortunately, for each component, they got it exactly wrong: their actions have weakened, not built up, American morale and support for the war; they have helped enemies pump up their own morale and motivation; they have fractured the alliances of the United States with traditional partners while at the same time facilitating the enemies’ cohesion, and they have failed to win over, if not actually alienate, many of those who were neutral to America’s cause - while in some respects making all too many of the uncommitted sympathetic to elements of the enemies’ cause.

Col. Douglas Macgregor is a decorated veteran of the first Gulf War in 1991 and the author of Breaking the Phalanx and Transformation Under Fire, which many in the Army have adopted as a guidebook for meaningful reform. In his presentation, Macgregor argued that the American failures in Iraq have been at both the strategic and operational levels. Both Rumsfeld and Bush failed to recognize or act on realities in Iraq and instead acted based on ill-informed, preconceived notions – a finding
Richards shares. Moreover, the U.S. Army’s leadership failed to oppose fundamentally unrealistic directives, and it did not carry out operations in a manner optimized for strategic and operational success. Indeed, the very nature of the American occupation of Iraq has become the primary source of the opposition to it and the very reason why it will fail. Macgregor concludes that it seems both the Army and America’s political leaders have learned nothing from their failures and remain poised to repeat the experience in a future conflict – whether initiated by the United States or others.

Both of these unhappy, professional assessments observe – contrary to prevailing conventional wisdom among critics – which a larger American military presence in Iraq now or in 2003 would certainly not have avoided the problems the United States encountered, and both imply a continuation of all the undesirable trends – not a graceful exit – as long as the American occupation of Iraq continues.

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Author(s): Winslow Wheeler

http://www.cdi.org/
Assessment of the War in Iraq
(Briefing)
At the May 25 briefing sponsored by the Straus Military Reform Project, retired U.S. Air Force Col. Chet Richards and retired U.S. Army Col. Douglas Macgregor, presented two different perspectives on the war in Iraq, and yet came to the same conclusion: the occupation in Iraq is the source of the opposition against it; it is doomed to failure, and continuing it only makes America’s position in the region, and the world, weaker. These two separate presentations are summarized and their briefing slides are made available

http://www.cdi.org/

May 25, 2006

Retired Army Leadership Blames Rumsfeld, Not Itself for War Failures (Opinion)

The retired Army generals who have so heavily criticized – for good reason – Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for his decisions regarding the war in Iraq also happen to bear a large share of the responsibility for the many serious mistakes that have been made. A heretofore unpublished article by retired Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor explains why the Army’s leadership “owns” much of the responsibility. The article and a summary of it are available.

http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?Do...ge=../index.cfm
May 25, 2006

Retired Army Leadership Blames Rumsfeld, Not Itself for War Failures

“American failures in Iraq are often laid at the feet of the White House and the civilian leadership of the Pentagon. The top military leadership deserves just as much of the blame.”

The Pentagon’s civilian leaders do not execute the plans for fighting wars; they don’t even do a major part of the planning. The uniformed military leadership is responsible for execution, and it also bears responsibility for informing the civilian leaders when the civilians’ strategy and planning cannot be executed, or should not be because they will create problems that the Army’s leaders know – or should know – are unavoidable. Citing all too many painful specifics, retired Army Col. Douglas Macgregor (a decorated Desert Storm combat veteran and author of three books on Army reform) indicts the professional and ethical performance of specific Army generals before and during the ongoing war in Iraq. Today, some of these same generals purport to cast all blame for the failures in Iraq at the feet of Donald Rumsfeld and hold themselves harmless. As Col. Macgregor points out, it is a contention that could only be accepted by those with little or no knowledge of how the American military system works, or should work.

Col. Macgregor also compares America’s contemporary civilian leaders with examples from the past who were able to identify military incompetence and had the political spine to do something about it.

Macgregor argues compellingly that there are no Pershings or Pattons in today’s Army, and there are no Lincolns or Marshalls above them in the civilian leadership.

The text of this important and controversial unpublished article is available by clicking here. Please go directly to the link for the article.