http://www.aljazeerah.info/News%20archives...20In%20Iraq.htm

US Marines in Fallujah Having Doubts About Their Countries Role In Iraq

See Al-Jazeerah Editor's note below with regard to the purported Iraqi Shi'i-Sunni civil war.

AP Headline: General Hears Marines' Concerns in Iraq

By ROBERT BURNS AP Military Writer

Aug 13, 11:58 AM EDT
FALLUJAH, Iraq (AP) --

The top U.S. general dropped into the city of Fallujah Sunday to hear what was on the minds of Marines doing battle daily with a resilient and deadly Iraqi resistance. Some of what he heard sounded like a sign of creeping doubt - not about the Marines' mission but about the wider purpose it is supposed to be serving as the U.S. war death count tops 2,600.

On his first visit to Fallujah as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Gen. Peter Pace stood before 1,300 troops - mostly Marines - and assured them that the American public supports them. And he predicted that Americans would continue to support the war.

"I think sometimes when you are out here at the tip of the spear, you wonder what's going on back in the United States and do you all still have the support of your fellow citizens," Pace said. "The answer is, yes, you do."

Public support for the troops doesn't extend to the Iraq war itself, however. More than half, 58 percent, said in a Newsweek poll out this weekend that the United States is losing ground in Iraq and opposition to the war has been growing.


During his meeting with the troops, the general also took questions.

How much more time, one Marine asked, should the Iraqi government be given to achieve the political unity necessary to stabilize the country?

"I guess they have as long as it takes," Pace replied, quickly adding, "Which is not forever."

Pace argued that setting a deadline by which the United States would withdraw its support would risk pushing the Iraqis into political decisions that are unviable. On the other hand, he said, "You do not want to leave it open ended."


Another Marine wanted to know if U.S. troops would stay in Iraq in the event of an all-out civil war. Pace repeated what he told a Senate committee last week: a civil war is possible, but not expected. He did not say what the United States would do if it actually happened.

Another asked what the United States would do if the Iraqi government did not support extending the U.N. resolution that authorizes the presence of American and other foreign troops in Iraq. Pace said the Iraqis already have said they favor extending the U.S. mandate, which expires in December.

One Marine wound up his question about the pace of U.S. troop deployments to Iraq by asking, "Is the war coming to an end?"

Pace didn't answer directly. He said Pentagon officials and military leaders are trying to keep enough troops in Iraq to achieve the mission of training Iraqi troops to take over the security mission, while avoiding having so many that it creates an Iraqi dependency.

There are now about 133,00 U.S. troops in Iraq.

At each stop on Pace's two-day visit to Iraq, which included Baghdad and Mosul as well as Fallujah, he thanked troops for their service and assured them that the American public still supports them.

Pace did not explicitly mention the political debate in Washington over when to withdraw from Iraq, but the senior commander of U.S. forces in western Iraq, Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, said in an interview Sunday that he is concerned about the effects of that debate.

Asked about the tenor of some of the questions put to Pace by Marines who seemed to harbor doubts about the long-term viability of the U.S. military mission, Zilmer said he is confident that virtually every Marine here is satisfied that their work is noble and just.

"But they are not immune to the discussions they see in public communications," Zilmer said. "Like all of us, they want to be assured that what we're doing is the right thing for the nation. Watching the Iraqi national government develop here has not been easy."

Zilmer noted the calls by some in Congress for a U.S. troop withdrawal to begin this year.

"That plays back here," he said. "People hear that. It does create the question: Is there the national commitment behind what we're doing over here?"



Al-Jazeerah editorial note regarding the purported Iraqi Shi'i-Sunni civil war:

It is inaccurate to describe the war in Iraq as if it is fought between Muslim Shi'is and Muslim Sunnis, as the US corporate media have been trying hard to do.

It is more accurate to describe it as fought between US-led forces and Iraqi resistance fighters. Even killing civilians is part of the war, as the evidence earlier demonstrated that Interior Ministry death squads and British soldiers were caught either targeting or attempting to target civilians to make the war appear as if it is between Shi'is and Sunnis.

This purported Shi'i-Sunni civil war in Iraq aims at distracting Iraqis and dividing their country into three regions, in preparation for a final partition and dismemberment of Iraq. Previous statements of Iraqi elected officials pointed fingers to death squads of the Interior Ministry.

(41 Iraqi Sunni Pedestrians Massacred in a Baghdad Street, 17 Shi'is Killed in Car Bombs, Interior Ministry Death Squads are Blamed).

Moreover, on September 19, 2005, two British soldiers were arrested by Iraqi police for driving a car bomb in a Basra street. They were freed by British forces before being interrogated by Iraqi police. This incident sheds some light on who might be behind car bomb explosions in Iraq.

(British Terrorist Operation in Basra, Tanks on Fire, Four Iraqis Killed, Two Captured British Undercover Soldiers Freed After Demolishing Prison Hollywood Style).

(British Occupation Forces Suspected Behind Sectarian Terrorism in Southern Iraq: The Two British Soldiers Drove a Car Bomb in Basra)

Anyone see any implications here for what Iraq is doing to our armed forces?

What the hell has happened to the army?

By Uri Avnery

August 12, 2006

http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/channe...nery/1155419483

SO WHAT has happened to the Israeli army?

This question is now being raised not only around the world, but also in Israel itself. Clearly, there is a huge gap between the army's boastful arrogance, on which generations of Israelis have grown up, and the picture presented by this war.

Before the choir of generals utters their expected cries of being stabbed in the back - "The government has shackled our hands! The politicians did not allow the army to win! The political leadership is to blame for everything!" - it is worthwhile to examine this war from a professional military point of view.

(It is, perhaps, appropriate to interject at this point a personal remark. Who am I to speak about strategic matters? What am I, a general? Well - I was 16 years old when World War II broke out. I decided then to study military theory in order to be able to follow events. I read a few hundred books - from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz to Liddel-Hart and on. Later, in the 1948 war, I saw the other side of the medal, as a soldier and squad-leader. I have written two books on the war. That does not make me a great strategist, but it does allow me to voice an informed opinion.)

The facts speak for themselves:

* On the 32nd day of the war, Hizbullah is still standing and fighting. That by itself is a stunning feat: a small guerilla organization, with a few thousand fighters, is standing up to one of the strongest armies in the world and has not been broken after a month of "pulverizing". Since 1948, the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan have repeatedly been beaten in wars that were much shorter.

As I have already said: if a light-weight boxer is fighting a heavy-weight champion and is still standing in the 12th round, the victory is his - whatever the count of points says.

* In the test of results - the only one that counts in war - the strategic and tactical command of Hizbullah is decidedly better than that of our own army. All along, our army's strategy has been primitive, brutal and unsophisticated.

* Clearly, Hizbullah has prepared well for this war - while the Israeli command has prepared for a quite different war.

* On the level of individual fighters, the Hizbullah are not inferior to our soldiers, neither in bravery nor in initiative.

THE MAIN guilt for the failure belongs with General Dan Halutz. I say "guilt" and not merely "responsibility", which comes with the job.

He is living proof of the fact that an inflated ego and a brutal attitude are not enough to create a competent Chief-of-Staff. The opposite may be true.

Halutz gained fame (or notoriety) when he was asked what he feels when he drops a one-ton bomb on a residential quarter and answered: "a slight bang on the wing." He added that afterwards he sleeps well at night. (In the same interview he also called me and my friends "traitors" who should be prosecuted.)

Now it is already clear - again, in the test of results - that Dan Halutz is the worst Chief-of-Staff in the annals of the Israeli army, a completely incompetent officer for his job.

Recently he has changed his blue Air-Force uniform for the green one of the land army. Too late.

Halutz started this war with the bluster of an Air-Force officer. He believed that it was possible to crush Hizbullah by aerial bombardment, supplemented by artillery shelling from land and sea. He believed that if he destroyed the towns, neighborhoods, roads and ports of Lebanon, the Lebanese people would rise and compel their government to remove Hizbullah. For a week he killed and devastated, until it became clear to everybody that this method achieves the opposite - strengthens Hizbullah, weakens its opponents within Lebanon and throughout the Arab world and destroys the world-wide sympathy Israel enjoyed at the beginning of the war.

When he reached this point, Halutz did not know what to do next. For three weeks he sent his soldiers into Lebanon on senseless and hopeless missions, gaining nothing. Even in the battles that were fought in villages right on the border, no significant victories were achieved. After the fourth week, when he was requested to submit a plan to the government, it was unbelievably primitive.

If the "enemy" had been a regular army, it would have been a bad plan. Just pushing the enemy back is hardly a strategy at all. But when the other side is a guerilla force, this is simply foolish. It may cause the death of many soldiers, for no practical result.

Now he is trying to achieve a token victory, occupying empty space as far from the border as possible, after the UN has already called for an end to the hostilities. (As in almost all previous Israeli wars, this call is being ignored, in the hope of snatching some gains at the last moment.) Behind this line, Hizbullah remains intact in their bunkers.

HOWEVER, THE Chief-of-Staff does not act in a vacuum. As Commander-in-Chief he has indeed a huge influence, but he is also merely the top of the military pyramid.

This war casts a dark shadow on the whole upper echelon of our army. I assume that there are some talented officers, but the general picture is of a senior officers corps that is mediocre or worse, grey and unoriginal. Almost all the many officers that have appeared on TV are unimpressive, uninspiring professionals, experts on covering their behinds, repeating empty clich�s like parrots.

The ex-generals, who have been crowding out everybody else in the TV and radio studios, have also mostly surprised us with their mediocrity, limited intelligence and general ignorance. One gets the impression that they have not read books on military history, and fill the void with empty phrases.

More than once it has been said in this column that an army that has been acting for many years as a colonial police force against the Palestinian population - "terrorists", women and children - and spending its time running after stone-throwing boys, cannot remain an efficient army. The test of results confirms this.

AS AFTER every failure of our military, the intelligence community is quick to cover its ass. Their chiefs declare that they knew everything, that they provided the troops with full and accurate information, that they are not to blame if the army did not act on it.

That does not sound reasonable. Judging from the reactions of the commanders in the field, they clearly were completely unaware of the defense system built by Hizbullah in South Lebanon. The complex infrastructure of hidden bunkers, stocked with modern equipment and stockpiles of food and weapons was a complete surprise for the army. It was not ready for these bunkers, including those built two or three kilometers from the border. They are reminiscent of the tunnels in Vietnam.

The intelligence community has also been corrupted by the long occupation of the Palestinian territories. They have got used to relying on the thousands of collaborators that have been recruited in the course of 39 years by torture, bribery and extortion (junkies needing drugs, someone begging to be allowed to visit his dying mother, someone desiring a chunk from the cake of corruption, etc.) Clearly, no collaborators were found among the Hizbullah, and without them intelligence is blind.

It is also clear that Intelligence, and the army in general, was not ready for the deadly efficiency of Hizbullah's anti-tank weapons. Hard to believe, but according to official figures, more than 20 tanks were hit.

The Merkava ("carriage") tank is the pride of the army. Its father, General Israel Tal, a victorious tank general, did not want only to build the world's most advanced tank, but also a tank that provided its crew with the best possible protection. Now it appears that an anti-tank weapon from the late 1980s that is available in large quantities, can disable the tank, killing or grievously wounding the soldiers inside.

THE COMMON denominator of all the failures is the disdain for Arabs, a contempt that has dire consequences. It has caused total misunderstanding, a kind of blindness of Hizbullah's motives, attitudes, standing in Lebanese society etc.

I am convinced that today's soldiers are in no way inferior to their predecessors. Their motivation is high, they have shown great bravery in the evacuation of the wounded under fire. (I very much appreciate that in particular, since my own life was saved by soldiers who risked theirs to get me out under fire when I was wounded.) But the best soldiers cannot succeed when the command is incompetent.

History teaches that defeat can be a great blessing for an army. A victorious army rests on its laurels, it has no motive for self-criticism, it degenerates, its commanders become careless and lose the next war. (see: the Six-day war leading to the Yom Kippur war). A defeated army, on the other side, knows that it must rehabilitate itself. On one condition: that it admits defeat.

After this war, the Chief-of-Staff must be dismissed and the senior officer corps overhauled. For that, a Minister of Defense is needed who is not a marionette of the Chief-of-Staff. (But that concerns the political leadership, about whose failures and sins we shall speak another time.)

We, as people of peace, have a great interest in changing the military leadership. First, because it has a huge impact on the forming of policy and, as we just saw, irresponsible commanders can easily drag the government into dangerous adventures. And second, because even after achieving peace we shall need an efficient army - at least until the wolf lies down with the lamb, as the prophet Isaiah promised. (And not in the Israeli version: "No problem. Just bring a new lamb every day.")

THE MAIN lesson of the war, beyond all military analysis, lies in the five words we inscribed on our banner from the very first day: "There is no military solution!"

Even a strong army cannot defeat a guerilla organization, because the guerilla is a political phenomenon. Perhaps the opposite is true: the stronger the army, the better equipped with advanced technology, the smaller are its chances of winning such a confrontation. Our conflict - in the North, the Center and the South - is a political conflict, and can only be resolved by political means. The army is the instrument worst suited for that.

The war has proved that Hizbullah is a strong opponent, and any political solution in the North must include it. Since Syria is its strong ally, it must also be included. The settlement must be worthwhile for them too, otherwise it will not last.

The price is the return of the Golan Heights.

What is true in the North is also true in the South. The army will not defeat the Palestinians, because such a victory is altogether impossible. For the good of the army, it must be extricated from the quagmire.

If that now enters the consciousness of the Israeli public, something good may yet have come out of this war.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...1400105_pf.html

Pace: Bigger U.S. Force May Stabilize Iraq

By ROBERT BURNS
The Associated Press
Monday, August 14, 2006; 3:54 AM



MOSUL, Iraq -- Iraq could be stabilized faster if the United States increased the size of its force, but the costs would outweigh the benefits, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said Sunday.

Gen. Peter Pace said in an interview at the conclusion of a two-day visit _ his first since surging sectarian violence triggered talk of all-out civil war _ that his meetings with U.S. commanders and their troops left him convinced that the Pentagon is correct to focus its effort mainly on training Iraqi security forces.

He said the current American force of about 133,000 troops is the right size for that training mission and for the more deadly work of containing the insurgency and helping reduce sect-on-sect killings.

"More U.S. and coalition forces could get the job done quicker, but that would mean dependency much longer for the Iraqi armed forces and the Iraqi government," he said, speaking in a recreation room for U.S. troops as a searing summer sun set on a day that took him from Baghdad to Fallujah to Mosul.

During a question-and-answer session with troops in Baghdad on Saturday, Pace said U.S. officials had hoped as recently as July that they could reduce the U.S. force by two brigades, or about 7,000 troops, this fall. But with the surge in sectarian killings, the force was instead increased by two brigades.

Pace returned to Washington early Monday.

Pace said his encounters with U.S. troops at each stop in Iraq reinforced his belief that they are proud of what they are doing and satisfied with what they have accomplished. But he also said he had detected among them "some frustration at the Iraqis for not yet grasping the opportunity that's in front of them."

He was alluding to the failure of rival Shiite and Sunni sects to reconcile their differences, stop the sectarian violence that has gripped Baghdad in recent months and establish an effective government.

The troops feel, "We're doing our part. When is the (Iraqi) governance part going to kick in? And that's a fair question."

Pace preached patience.

"It's too early to pass judgment on a brand new government," he said, referring to Prime Minister Nouri al-Malaki.

In Fallujah, once a key stronghold of the insurgency and still troubled by almost daily murders of policemen, a few Marines posed questions to Pace that suggested a creeping doubt about what their sacrifices have gained.

How much more time, one Marine asked, should the Iraqi government be given to achieve the political unity necessary to stabilize the country?

"I guess they have as long as it takes _ which is not forever," Pace replied.

Pace argued that setting a deadline for the United States to withdraw its support would risk pushing the Iraqis into political decisions that are unviable. On the other hand, he said, "You do not want to leave it open ended."

Another Marine wanted to know if U.S. troops would stay in Iraq in the event of an all-out civil war. Pace repeated what he told a Senate committee last week: a civil war is possible, but not expected. He did not say what the United States would do if it actually happened.

Another asked what the United States would do if the Iraqi government did not support extending the U.N. resolution that authorizes the presence of American and other foreign troops in Iraq. Pace said the Iraqis already have said they favor extending the U.S. mandate, which expires in December.

One Marine wound up his question about the pace of U.S. troop deployments to Iraq by asking, "Is the war coming to an end?"

Pace didn't answer directly. He said Pentagon officials and military leaders are trying to keep enough troops in Iraq to achieve the mission of training Iraqi troops to take over the security mission, while avoiding having so many that it creates an Iraqi dependency.

© 2006 The Associated Press

http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...ainful_lessons/
J. CALEB DONALDSON AND MARTHA MINOW
Relearning Vietnam's painful lessons
By J. Caleb Donaldson and Martha Minow |
August 14, 2006

CURRENT EVENTS make the Vietnam era more relevant than ever. We are engaged in a war without plan or prospects for disengagement. The conflict seems part of a global danger, but we also seem interlopers -- and attractive targets -- in a civil war. Fighting among civilian populations raises the specter of atrocities, and we inevitably hear echoes of the My Lai massacre in the news of Marines killing civilians in Haditha, and the abuses of detainees in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib.

A criminal trial started last week against a CIA contractor for allegedly abusing a detainee in Afghanistan, just as the Los Angeles Times reports that declassified documents reveal more than 300 verified war crimes committed by US troops during the Vietnam War. Court martial and civilian criminal proceedings have begun against those allegedly involved in a rape and mass murder in Mahmoudiya.

Some of the incidents in Iraq eerily resemble those in Vietnam: mass rapes, the killing of civilian families, even the abuse of animals. The alleged ``bad apple" behind the March 12 Mahmoudiya rape and murder reportedly set a puppy on fire and threw it off a rooftop, and soldiers in Vietnam were seen ``senselessly stabbing a pig." Whether ``mere" crimes or those more closely related to the tactical goals of armed conflict, each set of atrocities manifestly violated the law of war.

Abuses by our soldiers expose inadequate training, supervision, and clarity from the top. In the Vietnam War, and now, we suffered from failed leadership and overtaxed and inadequately trained soldiers, though now we also have private contractors operating outside clear chains of command and legal liability.

Vague orders and uncertainty provide soldiers with an excuse for their behavior and officers a way to avoid responsibility, but that's the way the military has to work, in the jungle near An Khe or in Mosul. Orders need to allow enough flexibility for those on the ground to accomplish objectives. But flexibility should not become a black hole for responsibility when the unspeakable happens.

Soldiers in such conditions are under unyielding pressure to follow orders and conform to their group. They face ostracism, court martial, or physical danger if they threaten the cohesion of a fighting unit. They risk reprisals if they blow a whistle -- though today their digital cameras may serve as silent witnesses.

The pressures from uncertainty, fear, anxiety, and boredom are excruciating. And young people in their late teens and early 20s have few reserves to manage the tension. Extensive studies conducted by social psychologists show that people tend to obey authority even when directed to inflict harm, people tend to conform to peer pressure, and people adapt to roles and may, as a result, not recognize brutality when in the middle of committing it. The cruelty of Abu Ghraib guards chillingly resembles Philip Zimbardo's prison simulation experiments from the 1970s.

Putting aside what it would take to exit Iraq, to stop atrocities, we need to provide better training, and accountability for each soldier. Even a soldier who could rationally calculate chances of detection and punishment cannot be counted on to prevent atrocities. Of more than 300 substantiated war crimes in Vietnam, only 14 soldiers received any sentence. One man convicted of indecent acts on a 13-year-old girl served only seven months in prison. Of course, few soldiers can stop to weigh risks of punishment or see the big picture while on special operations, or on duty to get information from detainees.

The best protection against atrocities is leadership at the top, setting the highest standards, vowing not to strain but to uphold the law, and honoring legal standards in the details of each operation. The White House and secretary of defense show no leadership of this kind. Worse, they demand ever more secrecy in the name of national security. Secret prisons, secret orders, guidelines for interrogation hidden from public review diverge from our fundamental principles -- and also make more abuses entirely foreseeable. Private contractors whose numbers are unknown to the secretary of defense and Congress fall outside the lines of military authority and the reach of international law. Congress tries to forbid cruel and inhumane treatment by our troops, but the president veils his aversion to exercise his veto in a signing statement claiming his own authority to interpret the law.

National security requires special rules, but secrecy too often leaves unpunished the individuals who commit atrocities, prevents superiors from being held responsible, shields them from incentive to change their policies, and conveniently allows the citizenry to remain in the dark about the real costs of war.

As we learn anew the costs of our Vietnam tragedy, we see how secrecy and time thicken the fog of war. Potential witnesses and suspects issue contradictory statements, and grow old or die. Accountability grows more remote. Perhaps, though, for our current struggle, it is not yet too late.

J. Caleb Donaldson is a student and Martha Minow a professor at Harvard Law School. Minow is the author of ``Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence."

© Copyright 2006 Globe Newspaper Company.

http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/world/15273146.htm

Haditha probe leaves Marines wondering
ANTONIO CASTANEDA
Associated Press
HADITHA, Iraq - A young Marine wonders if his superiors will support him if he shoots at perceived threats. An officer worries that civilians look at his Marines with more suspicion. The proud colonel acknowledges that his Corps has lost stature in the public's eyes.

Allegations that Marines deliberately killed 24 civilians - including women and children - last November in this rebellious city have prompted reactions ranging from shame and anger to disbelief within the Marine Corps.

In this intensely proud service, some say they're being prematurely judged. Others grasp for plausible explanations behind the alleged slaughter.

A Pentagon official said this month that evidence collected in the Nov. 19, 2005 killings supports accusations that U.S. Marines deliberately shot the civilians, including unarmed women and children.

The commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force must eventually endorse the investigation's findings before charges are formally pressed.

Marines don't see themselves as common grunts. Most Marines join their service knowing that America heavily relies on them in ground wars. To some, they are the modern day version of Roman legionnaires, reflected in a famous saying that claims Marines "guard heaven's gates."

If the Haditha allegations are true, it would call into question what Marines consider their strengths: Discipline in the ranks and holding the high moral ground in wartime.

Marines are alleged to have covered up the Haditha killings for weeks. Moreover, the nature of the incident was not discovered internally: The investigation was launched only after Time magazine questioned U.S. commanders about the civilian deaths.

Senior Marine commanders insist the investigation will not damage the Corps irrevocably.

"We're going to come out of this just fine," said Lt. Gen. James Amos, the outgoing commander of the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force. "I don't know what the investigation is going to say. The truth will come out and the Marine Corps is going to do the right thing. The American people will know the truth."

But on the front lines of the war, grunts and field commanders say the allegations have further complicated a difficult task. About 20,000 Marines are thinly spread out over violent Anbar province, a North Carolina-size area with over a million Sunni Arabs at the forefront of the insurgency.

Cpl. Luis Perez, 22, of Lusby, Md., who is stationed in Ramadi, said the case "kind of makes you want someone higher up to be there to make sure you're completely in the right" when instinct says to fire.

Perez said insurgents in Ramadi had been increasingly firing from mosques to try to "lure us into doing something that we don't want to do."

Commanders in the field have echoed an array of challenges stemming from the Haditha case. Arab television networks have regularly covered the investigation's progress.

"The Iraqi people are going to perceive that everybody does business this way, and that's not the case," said Capt. Andrew Del Gaudio, 30, a New Yorker who leads a company of Marines in Ramadi. "We inherently have a responsibility to apply our craft with humanity ... and to apply a proportionate amount of force to a threat."

Many grunts in the field privately complain that outsiders unfamiliar with the pressures of a counterinsurgency war unfairly condemn the accused men. Some expressed anger at what they considered political attacks directed at the Marines - instead of against policy-makers in Washington.

"Institutionally, it's sad because we've been prejudged by many. Many who have qualms against the (Bush) administration use this," said Col. Juan Ayala, a 26-year veteran of the Marine Corps who now trains the Iraqi army. "You see an institution that you really love taking slaps ... but if guys are guilty of disobeying the law of armed conflict, they should face justice."

U.S. commanders were concerned enough by the investigation's initial findings to order U.S. troops in Iraq to undergo refresher training in "core values," including how to treat Iraq civilians.

"The core values training that we just completed is one of those things that I think we need to do from time to time again just to make sure we understand the complexity of the environment that we are in, and how our training fits, how our values fit into a different culture," said Maj. Gen. Richard C. Zilmer, the top Marine commander in Iraq.

Other changes have been implemented as a result of the investigation. After a Marine spokesman repeatedly defended the accused Marines - reportedly going as far as to accuse a Time magazine reporter of believing al-Qaida propaganda - official statements now undergo greater scrutiny before they are released.

Some Marines privately speculated that the troops under investigation probably unleashed their anger on civilians who likely knew who planted the bomb that killed a young lance corporal, triggering the bloodletting. In most parts of Iraq, civilians stay silent after insurgent attacks, either out of fear or sympathy for militants.

"We are not tasked with doing something simple," said Del Gaudio - just as a suicide car bomb exploded down the street from his base, shattering windows and wounding four soldiers. A few minutes later Del Gaudio continued.

"I've told my Marines since Day One: I will always stand beside any decision they make. ... Anytime they shoot someone I want them to have a clear conscience," he said. "It is too dangerous to foster that type of (second-guessing) environment. It's inherently a relationship of trust with me and my Marines. I trust that we have trained them the right way."

Since the accused battalion in Haditha was on its third tour in Iraq in three years, some have blamed repeated deployments for sparking the killings. Seven Marines and a sailor from another battalion also on its third Iraq tour are accused of unjustifiably killing a man in the western town of Hamdania. Both battalions took part in the storming of Fallujah in Nov. 2004.

But some have pointed out that the senior officer accused of overseeing the alleged killings in Haditha was only in the third month of his first tour in Iraq. Some commanders contend that multiple deployments were likely not a factor in such incidents.

"These guys enlisted after 9/11. And to a man I'd say they wanted to go to war," said Lt. Col. Patrick Looney, who commanded Marines from the 3rd Battalion, 5th Regiment charged in the Hamdania killing. "They knew they were going to war."

http://www.metimes.com/articles/normal.php...14-035136-1700r

DC's 'Open secret': Rumsfeld wants to quit Iraq
Sherwood Ross
Middle East Times
August 14, 2006

WASHINGTON, DC -- It is an "open secret" in Washington US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld "wants to extricate himself from Iraq" but President George W. Bush "remains resolute," thus the US hangs on, a US investigative reporter has written.

The result is a military posture in limbo somewhere between aggressiveness and withdrawal that could bog the US down in Iraq for years. Tragically, it opens the door to escalation of the horrific violence which in Baghdad on kills around 50 people daily and wounds many times more.

The Pentagon has largely switched from rooting out and killing insurgents, as in the first two years of the war (2003-4), to hunkering its troops down in "isolated mega-bases," said George Packer, a staff writer for The New Yorker magazine and author of The Assassins' Gate (Farrar, Straus & Giroux). This approach, known in Washington as an "exit strategy," has put the much victimized Iraqi public at increased risk.

"Commanders are under tremendous pressure to keep [military] casualties low, and combat deaths have been declining for several months, as patrols are reduced and the Americans rely more and more on air power," Packer wrote in the magazine April 10 in words that sound prescient four months later as civilian killed and wounded overflow Iraqi morgues and hospitals.

"The retreat to enduring FOBs [forward operating bases] seems like an acknowledgment that counterinsurgency is just too hard," Packer wrote. He quoted Kalev Sepp, a retired Special Forces officer, who stated, "If you really want to reduce your casualties go back to Fort Riley. It's absurd to think that you can protect the population from armed insurgents without putting your men's lives at risk."

Concentrating forces at large bases, Sepp added, "is old Army thinking - centralization of resources, of people, of control. Counterinsurgency requires decentralization."

Soldiers who rarely, if ever, leave their FOBs are derisively referred to as "fobbits," Packer said, adding he spent two days at 62-square-kilometer (24-square-mile) FOB Speicher, a few kilometers north of Tikrit, "without seeing an Iraqi." ("Fobbits" are a play on the word "Hobbits," a race in J.R.R. Tolkien's Middle-earth fantasy The Hobbit.)

Speicher is home to at least 9,000 soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division. It resembles a Midwestern city with "a bus system, a cavernous dining hall that serves four flavors of Baskin-Robbins ice cream, a couple of gyms, and several movie theaters," Packer writes.

As US troops regroup in defensive pockets, a senior Iraqi official told Packard, the insurgents are shifting their tactics from attacking US and Iraqi forces, at great risk to themselves, "toward killings of local officials and ordinary citizens, intended to undermine the public's confidence that the government can protect it." These killings "have created an atmosphere of sectarian hysteria that residents of Baghdad have never known before," Packer writes.

A State Department official told Packer, "Certain people in the Pentagon want to get out of Iraq at all costs" and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Rumsfeld have battled over how best to protect Iraq's infrastructure. Rumsfeld has rejected assigning soldiers to provide security for the small reconstruction teams US Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad wants to establish in provincial capitals. Rumsfeld prefers to use contractors.

"Insurgents have become so adept at hitting pipelines, power stations, and refineries that fuel and electricity shortages have become nationwide crises; meanwhile, some Iraqi army units and tribes that are being paid to guard these facilities are collaborating in their destruction," Packer writes.

He goes on to say an American withdrawal "would leave behind killings on a larger scale than anything yet seen," a war in which Baghdad and other mixed cities "would be divided up into barricaded sectors, and a civil war in the center of the country might spread into a regional war."

A former US administration official told Packer the Iraq war has been characterized by "an intellectual failure at the start ... an implementation failure after that ... and now there's a failure of political will." "I'm afraid we're going to cut," he added. "We're unwilling to make the sacrifice and spend the political capital."

As for the Pentagon policy of turning the fighting over to the Iraqi army, a sergeant in Baquba, northeast of Baghdad, observed, "We'll be here for 10 years in some form, but boots-on-the-ground-wise? We're really almost done." A field-grade officer in the 101st Airborne described the policy as "handing a "expletive deleted" sandwich over to someone else."

The US dilemma was summed up by Baghdad doctor who told Packer, "Not one of the Iraqis believes that you Americans should leave tomorrow," [even if they say otherwise for public consumption.] "They know that we can't have the US Army leaving the country right now, because, excuse me to say, George Bush did a mess, he must clean it."

But what if, instead, the Pentagon's "fobbits" are concentrated in the safety of their secure bases outside the big cities to lick their ice cream cones while Iraq burns?

Sherwood Ross is a US reporter who writes on military history and politics for newspapers and magazines. Contact him at sherwoodr1@yahoo.com.

http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/index.cfm/...em/itemID/12805
U.S. Cannot Stop Iraq Civil War, Say Americans
August 14, 2006
- Many adults in the United States believe their country will be unable to prevent sectarian violence in Iraq, according to a poll by Opinion Dynamics released by Fox News. 67 per cent of respondents think the U.S. will not stop the situation from becoming a civil war.

The coalition effort against Saddam Hussein’s regime was launched in March 2003. At least 2,592 American soldiers have died during the military operation, and more than 19,300 troops have been wounded in action.

In December 2005, Iraqi voters renewed their National Assembly. In May, Shiite United Iraqi Alliance member Nouri al-Maliki officially took over as prime minister.

On Aug. 7, U.S. president George W. Bush discussed the situation, saying, "No question it’s still difficult. On the other hand, the political process is part of helping to achieve our objective, which is a free country, an ally in the war on terror that can sustain itself and govern itself and defend itself." 58 per cent of respondents believe the U.S. should pull out all of its troops from Iraq before the end of 2007.

Polling Data

Do you think the United States can prevent the violence in Iraq from becoming a civil war?

Yes
18%

No
67%

Already a civil war
3%

Don’t know
12%



Thinking about the situation in Iraq, do you think the United States should...

Pull out all troops by year-end
27%

Pull out all troops gradually over the next year
31%

Pull out after Iraqi troops are capable of
taking over, even if it takes years
33%

Send more troops
4%

Don’t know
5%



Source: Opinion Dynamics / Fox News
Methodology: Telephone interviews with 900 registered American voters, conducted on Aug. 8 and Aug. 9, 2006. Margin of error is 3 per cent.

http://washtimes.com/upi/20060812-021048-7645r.htm

Analysis: U.S. Army faces FCS shambles
By Martin Sieff
UPI Senior News Analyst
Aug. 14, 2006 at 7:31AM
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's cyber-dream for the U.S. Army has become a cyber nightmare.
Rumsfeld took office determined to transform the U.S. armed forces into a high-tech, computerized, lean, mean fighting machine that would be invincible.
Instead, the U.S. Army today remains becalmed in Iraq, stuck in the middle of a low intensity guerrilla war it has been unable to tame. And that war is now morphing into a no-holds-barred civil war. Meanwhile, U.S. military preparedness, retired generals and respected military analysts warn, is now lower than it was in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War -- when Rumsfeld was U.S. defense secretary for the first time.
Rumsfeld wanted the U.S. Army to switch to a state-of-the-art, integrated computer system that could shunt intelligence into the battlefield in real time and allow senior commanders hundreds or thousands of miles away to keep a tight grip on combat operations as they were happening.
Instead, the vaunted Future Combat Systems program is now a shambles.
Unprecedented billions of dollars have been poured into FCS and it has been given top call on Army resources even while U.S. combat troops in Iraq went short of low-tech body armor and steel protection for their combat vehicles.
However, a recent Congressional Budget Office report warns that the FCS program could eat up half the force's annual procurement budget.
The CBO says that the FCS program is on track to eventually eat up between 40 and 50 percent of the Army's procurement accounts, leaving scarce dollars to buy other needed gear, CongressDaily reported Aug. 3.
"Dedicating such a large proportion of the service's procurement funding to the FCS program would leave little money for purchasing other weapons systems (such as helicopters) or needed support equipment (such as generators and ammunition)," the CBO said in the report.
The CBO also projected that the FCS price tag, which already has jumped by billions of dollars in the last few years due to a major program restructuring, could grow by another 60 percent, largely because the program entered the development stage prematurely, CongressDaily said.
"The FCS program may continue to experience cost growths at historical rates," CBO said. "If it does, the average annual funding needed for the program, CBO estimates, may climb from the $8 billion to $10 billion projected most recently by the Army to between $13 billion and $16 billion."
The CBO report is not an isolated warning. Several recent Government Accountability Office studies have also questioned the Army's ability to develop and buy FCS, a system of manned and unmanned vehicles tied together by an extensive high-tech network.
Earlier this summer, the Pentagon's own Cost Analysis Improvement Group estimated the total cost to develop, procure and operate FCS has soared from $175 billion to more than $300 billion since 2003. The Army rejected those estimates as wrong, stating that the total cost will be roughly $230 billion.
On July 21, CongressDaily reported that the FCS program's budget shortfalls could exceed $20 billion annually. Faced with one of its toughest funding challenges in years, top U.S. Army officers are reviewing several options and negotiating tactics, including the possibility of submitting a budget proposal for fiscal 2008 and beyond that exceeds the guidance issued by senior defense officials, CongressDaily said.
The Army is reluctant to cut spending on FCS, something it believes would essentially mortgage the Army's future to pay for its current needs, the newspaper said.
Communications equipment critical to the Army's high tech Future Combat System are lagging and over budget, according to the GAO.
The three systems -- the Joint Tactical Radio System, Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, and the System of Systems Common Operating Environment -- are critical to the $120 billion Future Combat System program being a viable replacement to the current generation of tanks and armored vehicles.
But if the FCS fails, the Army's entire combat strategy will be at risk. At Rumsfeld's prodding, the Army has been developing a new generation of tanks that is supposed to be faster and more maneuverable, but will have far less army than many battle tanks of the past quarter century. That idea has already been thrown into doubt by the devastating effectiveness of improvised explosive devices, or IEDs in Iraq. Over the past year-and-a-half, they have been the biggest killer of U.S. soldiers in the war there.
But if the FCS fails, the new generation tanks will be at a devastating disadvantage on conventional battlefields too. The FCS was supposed to give U.S. land combat formations an overwhelming advantage in action. However, each of the three communications systems that the FCS relies upon now has significant problems.
The Joint Tactical Radio System's first iteration is supposed to be able to transmit at least 6 miles, but has a range of only 1.8 miles. Moreover, it does not meet security requirements, CongressDaily reported last year.
The Pentagon directed the cancellation of Boeing's nearly $500 million contract to develop and build the radios in April 2005; if left unchecked the cost was expected to rise to nearly $900 million.
Second, The Warfighter Information Network-Tactical, a mobile internet and cellular communications network being developed to support a large, dispersed battlefield, was supposed to begin production in March 2006. However, according to GAO, needed technologies for that equipment to function will not be available until 2009.
Third, the System of Systems Common Operating Environment -- the operating software to integrate the Future Combat System communications network -- is also showing signs of being behind schedule, according to GAO.
Rumsfeld seems to be the only figure in the Pentagon who still remains optimistic about the FCS program's prospects. Recent experiences in Iraq have taught senior U.S. Army planners not to trust in optimism.

http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,110119,00.html

Al-Qaida Gains Strength in Iraq
Associated Press | August 16, 2006
HADITHA, Iraq - In the dusty plains of western Iraq, al-Qaida is gaining strength. Daily attacks against U.S. and Iraqi forces are on the rise and there is little sign of progress in convincing the population to support the national government.

U.S. commanders acknowledge they are locked in struggle with insurgents for the allegiance of Iraq's youth.

"We're in a recruiting war with the insurgency," said Brig. Gen. Robert Neller, the deputy Marine commander in western Iraq.

U.S. commanders have said privately that a military solution to the insurgency in Anbar is impossible, and what's needed is a political deal between the Sunni Arabs and the other religious and ethnic communities.

"This country needs a political solution - not a military solution," one government worker told Marines who stopped by his home in Haditha. "Are we going to stay in this situation where you shoot them, they shoot you? We are the victims."

American attention has shifted in recent weeks to Baghdad, where violence between Sunni and Shiite extremists is on the rise. The U.S. is sending nearly 12,000 U.S. and Iraqi forces to the capita to curb the violence.

U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad has said sectarian violence in the capital is now a greater threat to Iraq's stability than the Sunni Arab insurgency, which is entrenched in western Iraq.

Nevertheless, of the 23 U.S. troops who have died this month in Iraq, 16 of them were in Anbar.

The situation in Anbar, with its heavily Sunni population, is a barometer for the entire Sunni Arab minority, which lost its favored position to the majority Shiites and the Kurds when Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed in 2003.

As long as the insurgency rages here, it is unlikely that Sunni Arab politicians in Baghdad can win over significant numbers of Sunnis to support the government of national unity, which took office May 20.

Some areas in Anbar have shown significant progress, such as the border city of Qaim, once an al-Qaida stronghold. Trouble has increased in other areas, like the rural stretch between Ramadi and Fallujah.

U.S. commanders say few insurgents have shown a willingness to meet, much less hold meaningful talks.

The top U.S. commander in Haditha went so far as to ask local leaders to spread the word that Marines wanted to know which reconstruction projects would be safe from sabotage. But insurgents never responded.

We asked "'Is there anything we can allow the community to do that won't hurt their political cause,'" Lt. Col. Norm Cooling, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, said.

U.S. troops face similar problems elsewhere in Anbar, a North Carolina-sized province that extends from the western edge of Baghdad to the borders with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

In Ramadi, the largest city and provincial capital, several prominent tribal leaders who had approached the military earlier this year were promptly slain. Commanders say several key Sunni leaders have fled to Jordan, Syria, and Egypt.

Even in calmer Fallujah, which remains under tight U.S. and Iraqi control, several prominent leaders have been killed - including the city council chief, a senior cleric, and deputy police chief. The mayor also recently fled the city.

The war has eroded the quality of life for hundreds of thousands of Sunni Arabs, many of whom have been steadily abandoning the area. In the cluster of riverside homes that make up Haditha, Haqlaniyah and Parwana, U.S. commanders estimate that about two-thirds of the population have fled their homes since the beginning of the war.

"The situation is starting to go from bad to worse, from worse to worst," said one government official in Haditha who asked that his name not be used for fear of reprisal. City council members here won't admit to being part of the government, and officials frequently resign after insurgent threats.

The majority of Iraqi soldiers are Shiite or Kurdish - while young Sunni Arabs make up most of the insurgency. The Americans would like to redress the imbalance and bring more Sunnis into the ranks.

But efforts to recruit more Anbar Sunnis into the army have faltered, either because of intimidation by insurgents or genuine support for their cause.

The death last June of al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi appears to have made little dent in support for the terror group. Most of al-Qaida's fighters are Iraqis rather than foreign fighters, U.S. officials say.

In Ramadi, for example, U.S. commanders estimate that a quarter of the fighters are al-Qaida members. In Haditha, Cooling called al-Qaida the most prominent insurgent group in "influence and resources."

Some commanders said the insurgents have grown adept at shifting away from areas targeted by U.S. troops, turning up elsewhere. For example, some Marines attributed a recent spike across the region to increased U.S. military operations in Ramadi.

"It's like pushing on a water balloon, if you will. When you apply pressure to Fallujah, they squirt elsewhere," Cooling said. "Wherever you do not apply a significant amount of pressure, that's where the enemy is going to go."

The U.S. military has pinned its hopes on the development of Iraqi forces. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers have flowed into Anbar over the past year and are expected to soon take over key terrain such as Fallujah.

But commanders say it's a struggle to keep soldiers stationed in Anbar - thousands have deserted after being given orders here or shortly after arriving.

Sound Off...What do you think? Join the discussion.

Copyright 2006 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

MULTINATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ WANTS NEW MEDIA CAMPAIGN AIMED AT IRAQIS - FAWZIA SHEIKH (ALTERNATIVE VIEWPOINTS, AUGUST 14): William Rugh, former U.S. ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and Yemen, told Inside the Army last week that the Army lacks the skills, experience and mandate to assume the State Department's responsibility of public diplomacy. http://alternativenewspoints.blogspot.com/...-wants-new.html

MEANWHILE, IN BAGHDAD ... EDITORIAL (NEW YORK TIMES, AUGUST 16): While Lebanon is now trying to pick up the pieces, Iraq is falling apart at an accelerating pace.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/16/opinion/...agewanted=print


00 DAYS 00 HOURS 00 MINUTES 00 SECONDS UNTIL THE US HAS BEEN IN IRAQ LONGER THAN IN WORLD WAR II (IRONING THE FLAG): We're counting from the day Germany declared war on the US (December 11, 1941) to VE day (May 8, 1945). This is 1244 days. The Invasion of Iraq began on March 20, 2003 at 21:34 EST when the US began their first air strike on Baghdad. On August 15, 2006 21:30 EST the United States will have been at war in Iraq longer than it was at war with Germany in World War II.
http://www.ironingtheflag.com/worldwar2.html


DEMS AND THE DARK YEARS: "ANOTHER VIETNAM" IN IRAQ? THAT DOESN'T SEEM A WINNING MESSAGE - BRENDAN MINITER (OPINION JOURNAL FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EDITORIAL PAGE, AUGUST 15): Withdrawing from Iraq now would usher in a new dark period in the U.S., one in which the nation makes clear it is unwilling to confront emerging threats.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/b...r/?id=110008796


RELEARNING VIETNAM'S PAINFUL LESSONS - J. CALEB DONALDSON AND MARTHA MINOW (BOSTON GLOBE, AUGUST 14): Some of the incidents in Iraq eerily resemble those in Vietnam: mass rapes, the killing of civilian families, even the abuse of animals. Abuses by our soldiers expose inadequate training, supervision, and clarity from the top.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...lessons?mode=PF


BUSH'S VIETNAM?: NOT YET BUT DOES BUSH REALIZE HOW CLOSE IT IS? - RICH LOWRY (NATIONAL REVIEW, AUGUST 15): For the past 30 years, left-right debate over America's wars has traveled a well-worn rut. The Left says whatever war is in question is 'another Vietnam,' while the Right denies it. After three decades of being serially wrong, in the Iraq war liberals might be making their first-ever correct diagnosis.
http://article.nationalreview.com/print/?q...GFiOTUxZjAzMTA=

ON IRAQ, THE MILITARY SHARES SOME BLAME WILLIAM M. ARKIN (WASHINGTONPOST.COM, AUGUST 10): Rumsfeld and company may have bullied and manipulated the American public into a losing strategy to fight terrorism, but the military -- particularly those at the top -- share a good part of the responsibility.
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarnin...hares_so_1.html

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20060817/pl_nm/bush_iraq_dc_4

White House sees "huge challenges" in Iraq
By Steve Holland
Thu Aug 17, 3:32 PM ET

Amid a largely bleak picture in Iraq, President Bush received an update on the security situation from top commanders on Thursday and the White House said "huge challenges" remain.

Bush held talks with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and senior advisers. Participating by video link were top generals George Casey and John Abizaid.

White House spokesman Tony Snow said he suspected there could be some discussion about U.S. troop levels in Iraq but he had no details.

"When you're getting a comprehensive review, one of the questions that's going to come up is, what do we need? The president has always said that that's the first question he asks his commanders, and I suspect that it will arise today," said White House spokesman Tony Snow.

Bush is under election-year pressure to start bringing some troops home this year, but a spasm of violence in Baghdad has forced commanders to move some American forces from other parts of Iraq into the capital.

The New York Times reported on Thursday that the number of daily strikes against American and Iraqi security forces has doubled since January.

But Bush says he will not be governed by public-opinion polls or political considerations in making decisions about Iraq, which he calls a central front in the war on terrorism.

The Times quoted an unnamed military affairs expert who briefed at the White House last month as saying senior administration officials "have acknowledged to me that they are considering alternatives other than democracy" in Iraq.

'JUST NOT TRUE'

Snow opened his daily briefing by saying, "It's just not true."

The Bush administration is insisting that Iraq is not sliding into a civil war despite weeks of sectarian violence that have killed hundreds of Iraqis.

"The administration continues, though, to take a very close and candid look at what's going on. The security situation in some places is uneven. And it's clear that there are huge challenges that await us," Snow said.

A new poll by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found Americans significantly more pessimistic about the situation in Iraq now than they were two months ago.

In June, after the killing of Iraq's al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 53 percent of Americans thought the situation was going well in Iraq, while only 41 percent believe so now after weeks of sectarian violence, the poll said.

The survey also said that 52 percent of Americans believe there should be a timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops, while 41 percent believe there should not be.

Bush's overall job approval rating was at 37 percent, which is in the danger zone for a president whose party is seeking to retain control of the U.S. Congress in the November election.

Democrats accuse Bush of staying the course with a failed policy in Iraq and say the Iraq war is draining resources from fighting the greater threat to U.S. security, al Qaeda.

"We need a new direction. We need to refocus our attention on destroying the enemy that attacked us five years ago, protecting America, and rebuilding our military," said Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid of Nevada on Wednesday.



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HoustonChronicle.com -- http://www.HoustonChronicle.com | Section: Political news

Aug. 17, 2006, 3:06PM



Troops express worries about Iraq
By PAULINE JELINEK Associated Press Writer
© 2006 The Associated Press

WASHINGTON — President Bush is not frustrated over the slow progress in Iraq, the White House insists. But a lot of other Americans are _ apparently including U.S. troops.

The Pentagon's top general says troops suggested to him during a recent trip to Iraq that they are among those who are worried.

White House spokesman Tony Snow took pains to deny a report Wednesday that Bush had privately expressed frustration with the Iraqis for not appreciating American sacrifices made there and with the Iraqi people and their leaders for not supporting the U.S. mission.

"We don't expect ... an overnight success," Snow said when asked Bush's opinion on the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Just when success might come _ and whether it is even possible _ are key questions for war-weary Americans. And the latest setbacks in Iraq come as congressional elections approach.

Troops are also disgruntled over Iraqi efforts, according to questions put to Marine Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when he visited the country over the weekend.

One asked how much more time the Iraqi government should be given to achieve the political unity needed to stabilize the country.

Another wanted to know whether U.S. forces will stay if Iraqis descend into all-out civil war.

And a third ended a question about continued U.S. troop deployments to Iraq by asking, "Is the war coming to an end?"

Pace said his talks with troops reassured him that they are proud of what they're doing and satisfied with what they've accomplished.

But he also said he detected among them "some frustration at the Iraqis for not yet grasping the opportunity that's in front of them."

Rival Shiite and Sunni sects have failed to reconcile their differences and establish an effective government capable of taking over security responsibilities for the country.

Pace said the troops feel, "`We're doing our part. When is the (Iraqi) governance part going to kick in?' And that's a fair question."

Pushing Iraqis along for three years through formation of an interim government, the writing of their constitution and election of the current government _ only to have the fighting worsen _ has grown old for many in civilian and military quarters.

Sen. Carl Levin of Michigan, top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, sounded one of his recurring themes at a recent committee hearing: Iraqi politicians must get the message that U.S. troops can't stay indefinitely, and should make political compromises to stop insurgents and avoid all-out civil war.

"There's a certain irony if military and political leaders seem to be losing patience with the Iraqis," said Charles Pena, a fellow at the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy and George Washington University's homeland security institute. "We're the ones who created this situation."

"It's perfectly logical for Americans and the president to be frustrated" by lack of political progress in Iraq, said CATO Institute's Christopher Preble. He blamed Bush's "grave error" in assuming that Iraqis would unite after Saddam Hussein's fall.

Eric Davis, a Rutgers University political science professor and former head of the university's Center for Middle Eastern Studies, said he's disturbed that the Iraq debate is "increasingly being turned into a referendum on George Bush."

Suggestions that Iraqis own some of the blame infuriate him as well.

"This whole 'blaming Iraqis' thing is a simple way of trying to weasel out ... to say, 'They're not really trying to make political change, so we should leave,'" said Davis, one of several outside experts invited to a Monday meeting of Bush's war cabinet.

Snow worked hard to knock down a New York Times report Wednesday that Bush seemed frustrated with Iraqis during Monday's meeting.

"I've spoken with the note-taker in the meeting. I was in the meeting. I've talked to others in the meeting," he told White House reporters. All attending took exception to the use of the word "frustrated" to describe the president's thinking, Snow said.

Sectarian tensions have been rising following the Feb. 22 bombing at a Shiite shrine, which triggered a wave of reprisals against Sunni mosques and clerics and sent tens of thousand of Iraqis fleeing from their homes.

U.S. generals say Iraq could slide into a full-blown civil war if the killing isn't tamped down. Though they'd hoped U.S. troop levels could be reduced this year, officials have extended some tours of duty, sending 5,000 additional Americans to Baghdad to help with security. The total there now is some 133,000.

___

On the Net:

Defense Department: http://www.defenselink.mil

White House: http://www.whitehouse.gov

HoustonChronicle.com -- http://www.HoustonChronicle.com | Section: Political news
This article is: http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/politics/4124261.html

EMBEDDED REPORTING INFLUENCES WAR COVERAGE, STUDY SHOWS (PENN STATE UNIVERSITY, AUGUST 11): A Penn State study shows that the use of embedded reporters by major newspapers did affect the number and the type of stories published, resulting in more articles about the U.S. soldiers' personal lives and fewer articles about the impact of the war on Iraqi civilians.
http://www.psu.edu/ur/2006/embedreporting.html

VIA
http://www.prwatch.org/spin


BOMBS AIMED AT G.I.'S IN IRAQ ARE INCREASING - MICHAEL R. GORDON, MARK MAZZETTI AND THOM SHANKER (NEW YORK TIMES, AUGUST 17): The number of roadside bombs planted in Iraq rose in July to the highest monthly total of the war, offering more evidence that the anti-American insurgency has continued to strengthen despite the killing of the terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/17/world/mi...agewanted=print


IN BAGHDAD, A PUSH TO ALTER PERCEPTIONS: AS U.S. TROOPS WORK TO QUELL VIOLENCE, THEY ALSO AIM TO BUILD PUBLIC'S TRUST IN IRAQI ARMY - SUDARSAN RAGHAVAN (WASHINGTON, AUGUST 18): In their struggle to quell the sectarian violence gripping the capital, thousands of U.S. troops and their Iraqi counterparts are fanning out into Baghdad's most violent neighborhoods, a mission that is part security sweep, part public relations.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...1701755_pf.html


IRAQI SPEAKER DERAILS BUSH'S DREAMS: THE SUNNY SCENARIO OF SUNNI ARAB POLITICAL INTEGRATION GETS DIMMER AS SPEAKER AL-MASHHADANI TAKES A HARD LINE AGAINST SHIITES -- AND THE U.S. - JUAN COLE (SALON, AUGUST 17)
http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2006/...dani/print.html


BUSH DISMISSES THE IDEA OF PARTITIONING IRAQ: PRESIDENT TELLS ANALYSTS DIVIDING THE COUNTRY WOULDN'T END VIOLENCE AND INDICATES NO POLICY CHANGES ARE PLANNED - PAUL RICHTER AND PETER WALLSTEN (LOS ANGELES TIMES, AUGUST 16)
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/l...1,4604973.story


WHAT ARE WE FIGHTING FOR? NOT DEMOCRACY WILLIAM ARKIN (WASHINGTONPOST.COM, AUGUST 16): The Bush administration is again shifting the justification for the United States' presence in Iraq. Now the Bush administration has adopted a new strategy: Defeating al-Qaeda in Iraq.
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarnin..._for_not_d.html

WHY VICTORY STILL PROVES ELUSIVE: WHAT WENT WRONG IN IRAQ--AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT - JOHN KEEGAN (OPINION JOURNAL FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EDITORIAL PAGE, AUGUST 16): Whether pure military skills will win the war, however, cannot be predicted.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/la/?id=110008800

Bush Must Negotiate to Make America Safer, Say Former Generals

By Aaron Glantz

Twenty-one former generals and high ranking national security officials have called on United States President George W. Bush to reverse course and embrace a new area of negotiation with Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. In a letter released Thursday, the group told reporters Bush's 'hard line' policies have undermined national security and made America less safe.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article14614.htm

http://iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/ar...ws/iraqarmy.php
Trying to build an army in a combat zone
By Michael R. Gordon The New York Times
SATURDAY, AUGUST 19, 2006
The rules posted on the wall of the U.S. Marine Corps base in Barwana concisely summed up its predicament in Iraq: Be polite, be professional, have a plan to kill everyone you meet.

Barwana was a way station for a joint Iraqi-U.S. convoy as it traveled to a stretch of hard-packed sand in the Haditha triad, one of the more challenging areas in Anbar, the most dangerous province in Iraq.

The convoy's goal was to inspect a company of Iraqi soldiers who had been involved in a U.S.-directed operation to round up insurgents. With Iraq engulfed in bloody turmoil, any prospect of establishing a modicum of order depends heavily on the new Iraqi Army and the small cadre of Americans who are training it.

The rules at Barwana hinted at one rationale. For all the U.S. military's fighting skills, the Iraqi troops are better able to differentiate among the welter of tribes, self-styled militias, religious groupings, insurgent organizations and jihadists who make up part of Iraq.

But there are other important rationales as well. With U.S. forces stretched perilously thin, fielding an Iraqi military - along with a parallel effort to build up the Iraqi police - is the closest thing the Bush administration has to an exit strategy.

According to Pentagon officials, there is to be a 10-division Iraqi force. The effort to raise and train the troops, they stated, is 85 percent complete. Statistics like these convey a sense of measurable progress in a region that otherwise appears to be a caldron of violence.

What I saw in more than three weeks in Anbar Province was not reassuring. Dogged efforts were being undercut by a dysfunctional Iraqi bureaucracy in Baghdad.

The U.S. advisers were able and extremely dedicated, and the Iraqi troops under their tutelage were making strides toward becoming an independent fighting element. But Iraq's Ministry of Defense has been slow to issue promotions for the new soldiers and to distribute proper pay.

A goodly number of the Iraqi soldiers have voted with their feet and gone absent without leave - or left to join the Iraqi police, so they could live close to home.

In the Haditha triad, Colonel Jebbar Abass, a beefy Iraqi with a drooping mustache, commanded a battalion that started out with about 700 soldiers last autumn. It had dropped to about 400 troops. Since almost one- third of his battalion is on leave at any one time, that means that Abass can field about 270 soldiers on any given day, a useful supplement to the U.S. Marine Corps forces in and around Haditha but hardly enough to enable the Americans to draw back.

Figures provided by U.S. military commanders show that the two Iraqi divisions in Anbar Province are about 5,000 short of their authorized strength, while some 660 soldiers are currently absent without leave.

The Americans have some genuine Iraqi partners in one of Iraq's most hostile regions, and U.S. commanders believe that Iraqi troop levels in Anbar have finally bottomed out and may be slowly starting to improve. But what kind of exit strategy is it when Iraqi soldiers have been leaving faster than the Americans?

The project to field a new Iraqi Army was greatly hampered by clumsy political engineering in the months following Saddam Hussein's fall. From the start, U.S. generals realized that they lacked the troop strength to seal the borders and control the country. A plan to enlist the support of anti-Saddam Iraqi troops was approved in March 2003 by President George W. Bush.

But the Iraqi Army vanished when faced with the rapid U.S. push to Baghdad, and the Bush administration had to make a decision. Senior U.S. military commanders wanted to stick with the basic plan and recall Iraqi troops to duty. Lieutenant General David McKiernan, the top U.S. general in Iraq at the time, began to work toward this end with the CIA station chief in Baghdad by meeting with current and former Iraqi generals.

Those efforts were stopped, however, when Paul Bremer, the senior civilian official in Iraq, issued a decree abolishing the Iraqi Army, a move that was essentially an extension of the Bush administration's de-Baathification campaign.

Bremer gave his order after consulting with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, but neither Condoleezza Rice, then Bush's national security adviser, nor Colin Powell, then the secretary of state, was informed in advance.

Once the Iraqi military had been abolished, a methodical effort to rebuild the armed forces from the ground up was begun. Three Iraqi divisions were to be trained and equipped over two years, an extraordinarily slow pace for a country that was in chaos.

Meanwhile, the security situation only got worse. Most of the Iraqi officers I talked with in Iraq thought Bremer's decision to disband the military was a mystifying blunder. After the strength of the insurgency became apparent to Washington, the effort to rebuild the Iraqi Army and the police was pursued with a new urgency. The training effort that was once something of an afterthought is now the Bush administration's final card, embodied in the Multinational Security Transition Command, led by Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey.

I stopped at Camp Falluja to see Colonel Tom Greenwood, who had been a military aide on the staff of the National Security Council leading up to the war, and then commander of a Marine Expeditionary Unit in Baghdad. Now he was finishing a six-month tour as the senior marine responsible for training the Iraqi Army and police forces in Anbar.

Greenwood explained that the pay issues in Haditha were quite common. In the Anbar region, about 550 Iraqi soldiers received no pay for June, while 2,200 more were receiving less pay than they were entitled to by rank.

Logistics was another of Greenwood's worries. U.S. commanders in Baghdad had pushed the Iraqis to take over responsibility for their own logistics, but that led to cases in which Iraqi soldiers had received spoiled meat and rotten vegetables.

Each month, Iraqi soldiers are granted about a week's leave to deliver their pay to their families, who may live hundreds of kilometers away, a custom that reflects the lack of an effective banking system in Iraq. With all the dangers, hardships and problems, the soldiers do not always come back.

Factoring in the generous leaves, the 1st Iraqi Division, which has the responsibility for parts of Falluja and is deployed near Habbaniya, is at about 50 percent strength.

When I raised some of these issues in a telephone interview with Dempsey, who oversees the training effort for all of Iraq, he insisted that the problems had to be put in perspective. The two divisions in Anbar, he said, were deployed in one of the harshest regions and were in the worst shape.

Most Iraqi divisions, he said, had 85 percent to 90 percent of the troops they were authorized. When leaves were taken into account, that meant they were at 65 percent to 70 percent strength.

The pay problems at Iraq's Ministry of Defense, he said, were being addressed. They reflected the lack of an automated system but also stemmed from the need to guard against corruption and ensure that Iraqi units in the field did not obtain more pay than they were entitled to by putting phantom soldiers on the rolls.

The Iraqi government, he said, was eager to enlist recruits and would now allow a soldier to sign up for a two-year tour in which at least one year was spent in his home province.

As for logistics, Dempsey said, it is important that the Iraqis demonstrate that they are in control of their own military by assuming responsibility for sustaining and paying their own soldiers, though measures to ease the strain, like allowing commanders to buy some provisions locally, are under consideration.

The day after I visited Greenwood, I went to a dilapidated soap factory in Falluja where a U.S. military advisory team was working with an Iraqi battalion.

U.S. commanders consider Falluja a success story. After the U.S. Marine Corps cleared the city in a violent battle in 2004, seven checkpoints were established to control access, making Falluja Iraq's largest gated community.

For all that, militants have managed to slip back in. The night I arrived, a roadside bomb killed one Iraqi soldier and wounded another during a shift change at an observation post.

The military advisory team at the soap factory was commanded by Major David Richardson. He volunteered for his assignment in Iraq and was advising the battalion headed by Colonel Abdul Majid, a 41-year-old officer who fought in the Iran-Iraq war, participated in the invasion of Kuwait during Saddam's era, looks older than his years and presides over the battalion with an air of complete authority.

By reputation, Majid is a decisive and experienced officer, which is all to the good, as his forces are approaching a critical phase. The Iraqi Army is to assume responsibility for securing Falluja this autumn, though a U.S. Marine Corps unit will be poised to rush in if there is major trouble.

"I think they will take it over, struggle with it a bit and then grow into it," Richardson said. "That is the best- case scenario. The worst-case scenario is they take it over, heavy, heavy violence breaks out and essentially the people don't have any confidence in the army. I don't see that happening because there are some pretty strong battalion commanders, Majid being one of them."

One of Majid's bravest performances may have come that day at the soap factory, when three high officials arrived for a visit: Iraq's new defense minister, Abdul Qadr Muhammad Jassim; its new interior minister, Jawad Kadem al- Bolani; and General George Casey Jr., the senior U.S. commander.

Pointing to the list of 70 casualties his battalion suffered in an earlier fight for Ramadi, the Iraqi colonel recounted the familiar litany of problems: the failure to pay soldiers according to their new ranks, the difficulty in getting the Ministry of Defense to approve promotions, the higher pay provided to the local police - and in this case the failure to provide any salaries at all to 34 recruits who graduated from boot camp in April. Because of combat losses and a dearth of recruits, the battalion had fewer than half the 759 troops it was authorized.

The Iraqi defense minister said he was only then learning of such problems and promised to take corrective action. Later, I asked Majid if he thought anything would come of his appeal.

"Sure, he is going to work on it, but he won't get results soon," he said. "It is going to take a while."

Michael R. Gordon is chief military correspondent for The New York Times. This article was adapted from The New York Times Magazine.


Copyright © 2006 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HH19Ak01.html
'Misunderestimating' Bush's Iraq
By Sami Moubayed

DAMASCUS - This summer former US ambassador Peter Galbraith released a groundbreaking book called The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End. One of the most interesting facts presented by Galbraith was that two months before the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, President George W Bush was unaware that there were two branches of Islam (Sunni and Shi'ite). Bush once also famously said, "They are misunderestimating me."

Now, with the war in Lebanon having overshadowed events in Iraq, perhaps it is the US that is "misunderestimating" the situation there, where July was the bloodiest month in terms of deaths since the invasion of March 2003.

Iraq and its people have probably been the greatest losers in the Israeli war with Hezbollah. For a month, the world's attention was completely fixated on Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah. The rising sectarian violence in Iraq, until a ceasefire came into effect in Lebanon this Monday, was ignored.

Before the Lebanon war started, it seemed that Iraq was already on the verge of civil war, due to the brutality of death squads and the visible helplessness of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.

A month later, Iraq is at civil war. Just look at the figures. In July, the number of Iraqis killed in sectarian violence - and what else can one call it? - was a staggering 3,438 - two times the number of Lebanese civilians killed during the 30 days of daily air raids by Israel, and more than 100 deaths a day.

This is a 9% increase over the death toll for June. And this is not Iraqis being killed by Americans. It is Iraqis killing one another. Last month, an average of 110 Iraqis were dying per day in Iraq. Despite all the denials both of US officials and of members of the Maliki cabinet, this is war, and it is a war that was started by the Bush administration.

These numbers mean many things. First, it is clear evidence that the Baghdad Security Plan of the Iraqi prime minister (started on June 14) has completely failed. It was a plan much trumpeted by Bush and Maliki because it called for the creation of more Iraq-run checkpoints to search for arms, explosives and gunmen.

Second, the staggering Iraqi death toll means that the Sunni insurgency has not been broken - or even weakened - by the death of its leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

And third, the transfer of full responsibility for security to the Iraqi government seems as far away as it has ever been since the invasion of 2003.

The Americans have already started "Operation Together Forward" to reclaim parts of the Iraqi capital from warring militias. Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, has called for the creation of "people's committees" to provide local security. In effect, he is saying that the Shi'ites should protect Shi'ite districts, the Sunnis should protect their own neighborhoods, and mixed areas should be patrolled by joint Sunni-Shi'ite militias.

He has every reason to lose faith in both Iraqi security and the US military. A glimpse at some events over the past few days provides tragic confirmation of the widespread chaos across the country and the war that has engulfed it.

On Wednesday, a car bomb went off in Baghdad, killing 10 people and injuring more than 40. Earlier in the day, clashes had erupted in the towns of Basra and Mosul. In Basra, armed groups engaged in combat with police and the British army after they attacked the office of the governor and the city council. In Mosul, rebels were killed by Iraqi police.

On Tuesday, violence erupted in Karbala between the Iraqi army and supporters of radical cleric Mahmud al-Hasani, leading to the death of 12 Iraqis. The attack was blamed on the "nationalist attitude" of Hasani, an ally of rebel cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who is vehemently opposed to the US presence in Iraq. After storming Hasani's office, police arrested 250 of his supporters.

That same day, a suicide bomber killed nine people in Mosul outside the offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, which is headed by President Jalal Talabani. Five members of the paramilitary peshmerga were killed and 36 people were wounded.

Earlier this month, Iraq police clashed with members of the Mehdi Army led by Muqtada. Maliki, who is trying to build bridges between warring factions, denied the attack, but it was confirmed by the Ministry of Defense, making the prime minister look silly.

It also enraged Muqtada and probably explains why so much violence took place in the following week, all believed to be Muqtada's doing. The clash, which took place in Sadr City, lasted for two hours and resulted in the death of two Iraqis and the wounding of 18. A second clash took place when officials stormed the Ministry of Health and arrested seven of Minister Ali al-Shamri's bodyguards. The health minister is a Sadrist.

For two years now the Americans have been denying that Iraq is on the verge of civil war. Last week, however, two US generals spoke to Congress about the situation in Iraq. And they spoke about civil war.

General John Abizaid, the top US commander in the Middle East, said, "I believe that the sectarian violence is probably as bad as I have seen it, in Baghdad in particular, and that if not stopped it is possible that Iraq could move toward civil war."

General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Congress, "We do have the possibility of that devolving into civil war." Both acknowledged that one year ago, they did not expect things to turn so violent in Iraq.

Also last week, after the briefing of the two generals, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was asked whether the US would maintain its troops in Iraq if civil war broke out. He declined to answer, saying he didn't want to give the impression that he, too, was implying that a civil war was on the horizon. But he added that the question must be handled by the Iraqis themselves.

Currently, there are 133,000 US troops in Iraq, and this war has cost billions of dollars and 2,500 American lives. The fate of these troops, if civil war were indeed to be acknowledged by everybody, is still uncertain.

Bush has already said he does not expect US troops to leave Iraq during his presidency, which ends in January 2009. On the civil-war theme, a story leaked in Newsweek, quoting "a senior Bush aide", said the White House was seriously studying what it would do in Iraq if it were to accept that civil war had broken out.

This was also confirmed in a cable sent from William Patey, the outgoing British ambassador to Iraq, to Prime Minister Tony Blair. It sounded as pessimistic as the words of Generals Abizaid and Pace. He said, "The prospect for a low-intensity civil war and a de facto division of Iraq is probably more likely at this stage than a successful and substantial transition to a stable democracy." He added: "Even the lowered expectation of President Bush for Iraq - a government that can sustain itself, defend itself, and govern itself and is an ally in the war on terror - must remain in doubt."

Amid all these problems, there is the danger of the "Hezbollah model" being adopted in Iraq. Muqtada, who has been a nightmare for the Americans since they invaded, has all the credentials to create such an organization in Iraq, modeling himself after Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

Muqtada is young. He is well connected in the religious establishment, he hails from a prominent Shi'ite family and he has a large following among Iraqis. Like Nasrallah, he is opposed to both the US and Israel. Like Nasrallah, he is an Arab nationalist at heart who does not want to see Iraq divided. The only difference is that Muqtada wants to establish a theocracy in Iraq.

He lacks Nasrallah's charisma, however, and the flow of money and arms from Iran. If he pulls the right strings, though, and makes wise alliances, he could receive strong support from the mullahs of Tehran - something that the Americans wish to avoid at any cost.

If it happens, and Muqtada decides to end all restraint, he could immediately bring down the Maliki cabinet. Or he could withdraw his ministers from the government and replace them with non-entities, and transform the cabinet into a political dwarf unable to make any real decisions. In this event, what would govern the state of affairs under Muqtada would be the power of the sword on the Iraqi street.

One of the things cemented in the minds of the Americans after the war in Lebanon - because of the stunning strength of Hezbollah - is that they do not want an Iraqi Hezbollah. Muqtada already has ministers in the Maliki cabinet and deputies in parliament. He has strong veto power by virtue of his constituency and popularity among Shi'ites.

The Americans want to control his rapidly rising popularity. They see the bitter reality that now they have to deal with Lebanon's Hezbollah. They truly wish that it was not there, but have not been able to defeat it or destroy it, neither with United Nations resolutions, nor through domestic Lebanese dialogue, nor through the military might of the Israeli army.

And with Iraq in such civil strife, it could in all likelihood become a battleground for the entire Persian and Arab neighborhood. The Saudis would support the Sunnis. Iran - and Lebanon's Hezbollah - would support the Shi'ites.

The United States would be trapped in the middle. It would be unable to side with any one party against the other. Supporting the Sunnis would mean supporting former Ba'athists. Supporting the Shi'ites would mean allying with Iran. And the Kurds, with whom the US gets on, are not very strong anyway and do not represent large numbers in Iraq.

The United States stands in a helpless situation. If only Bush had had a better idea of Sunnis and Shi'ites before he invaded.

Sami Moubayed is a Syrian political analyst.

(Copyright 2006 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing .)

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/world/mi...ref=todayspaper

Marines May Have Excised Evidence on 24 Iraqi Deaths

By DAVID S. CLOUD
Published: August 18, 2006
WASHINGTON, Aug. 17 — A high-level military investigation into the killings of 24 Iraqis in Haditha last November has uncovered instances in which American marines involved in the episode appear to have destroyed or withheld evidence, according to two Defense Department officials briefed on the case.

Returning Home
The investigation found that an official company logbook of the unit involved had been tampered with and that an incriminating video taken by an aerial drone the day of the killings was not given to investigators until Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, the second-ranking commander in Iraq, intervened, the officials said.

Those findings, contained in a long report that was completed last month but not made public, go beyond what has been previously reported about the case. It has been known that marines who carried out the killings made misleading statements to investigators and that senior officers were criticized for not being more aggressive in investigating the case, in which most or all of the Iraqis who were killed were civilians. But this is the first time details about possible concealment or destruction of evidence have been disclosed.

The report’s findings have been sent to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, which is investigating members of the unit involved in the killings, as well as higher-ranking officers in the Second Marine Division. No charges have been brought yet.

The report, based on an investigation by Maj. Gen. Eldon A. Bargewell of the Army, does not directly accuse marines of attempting a cover-up, but it does describe several suspicious incidents, according to the Defense Department officials.

It says that the logbook, which was meant to be a daily record of major incidents the marines’ company encountered, had all the pages missing for Nov. 19, the day of the killings, and that those portions had not been found, the officials said.

No conclusions are drawn about who may have tampered with the log. But the report says that Staff Sgt. Frank D. Wuterich, the leader of the squad involved in the killings, was on duty at the unit’s operations center, where the logbook was kept, shortly after the killings occurred, the officials said.

Neal A. Puckett, a lawyer for Sergeant Wuterich, was unavailable to comment.

Investigators were also initially told by Marine officers that videotape taken by the drone was not available, one of the officials said. The officials added that the marines produced the tape only after General Bargewell had completed his inquiry and they had been asked again to produce it by General Chiarelli.

The report has been closely held within the Defense Department, and the officials who agreed to discuss it did so because they said they thought it should receive wider public attention. They agreed to speak only if their names were not published because they had not been authorized by superiors to discuss its contents.

The deaths occurred outside the town of Haditha after a three-vehicle convoy of marines was hit by a roadside bomb, killing a lance corporal. The squad then began going through houses nearby, killing Iraqis found inside in what defense lawyers have said was a justifiable use of lethal force by marines who believed they were under concerted attack by insurgents.

The Marine Corps issued a press release the next day saying that 15 of the civilian deaths had been caused by the bomb explosion. But several officers in the unit have said they knew even then that marines had killed all 24 of the dead Iraqis, 9 of whom were suspected insurgents.

Since then, the idea that any of the victims were insurgents has been challenged, both by Iraqi survivors and by some American military officials familiar with the case, noting that the victims included 10 women and children and an elderly man in a wheelchair. They have said that evidence suggests that the marines overreacted after the death of their fellow marine and shot the civilians in cold blood.

Marines have told investigators that at least one Iraqi who was shot was brandishing an AK-47 assault rifle. But no records were found that such a weapon was recovered at the scene and turned in to the unit’s headquarters, as regulations require, the officials said.

Lt. Col. Sean Gibson, a Marine Corps spokesman, said: “The Marine Corps is committed to a full and thorough investigation of the events that occurred at Haditha on Nov. 19, and the actions that followed that may have contributed to any improper reporting. If allegations of wrongdoing are substantiated, the Marine Corps will pursue appropriate legal and administrative actions.”

The decision about whether to take disciplinary action will be made by Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, the commander of Marine Corps units in the Middle East, based on his review of both the Bargewell report and the results of the criminal investigation still under way.

Returning Home In addition to faulting officers in the Second Marine Division for not aggressively investigating the Haditha killings, the Bargewell report said the commanders had created a climate that minimized the importance of Iraqi lives, particularly in Haditha, where insurgent attacks were rampant, the officials said.

“In their eyes, they didn’t believe anyone was innocent,” said one of the officials, describing the attitude of the marines in the unit toward Iraqis. “Either you were an active participant, or you were complicit.”

Two days after the Haditha killings, Maj. Gen. Richard A. Huck, then the division commander, asked his staff for a briefing on what had happened, the officials said. General Huck later told investigators that he had ordered the briefing because he was concerned about the reports of civilian casualties, one of the officials said.

But the briefing provided to General Huck contained no mention of the civilian casualties, the investigators learned. Instead, according to one of the officials, it dealt almost entirely with the roadside bomb attack and other insurgent attacks on marines in Haditha throughout the day.

General Huck and other officers from the Second Marine Division have been ordered not to talk about the case, and a telephone call to the unit was referred to Colonel Gibson, the Marine spokesman. But some senior officers have previously defended their response to the killings, saying there was no reason to doubt the account provided by enlisted marines at the time, contending that civilian killings were an unfortunate but accidental byproduct of their pursuit of insurgents.

The involved marines’ battalion commander, Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani, and their company commander, Capt. Lucas McConnell, told investigators that they had not reviewed the scene within the houses after the killings, despite the high number of civilian casualties, one of the officials said. Colonel Chessani was relieved of his command in April; Marine officials would not say whether the Haditha case was involved in the decision but said there were several reasons.

The video taken by the overhead drone was very limited, according to one of the officials. The aircraft was not flying over the site until after the bomb attack, so it only captured the aftermath. Even so, the video appears to contradict statements by marines about what occurred, the officials said.

In particular, it has raised doubts about a claim by enlisted marines that five Iraqis were shot as they were running away after the roadside bombing.

The officials said the video showed the bodies of the five Iraqis on the ground close to the car that they had been riding in, the officials said. In one case, the video appears to show one body stacked on top of another, which the officials said was inconsistent with the account that the men had been shot while fleeing.

Premier Calls Iraqi Forces Ready to Extend Control

By Amit R. Paley

BAGHDAD, Aug. 17 -- Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said Thursday that Iraqi forces were prepared to take over security in most provinces if the U.S. military withdraws, as at least 23 Iraqis and an American soldier were killed in violence across the country.

To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle

Fewer Vietnam Vets Are Found to Have Stress Disorder

By Rick Weiss

A painstaking reanalysis of data collected in the 1980s from Vietnam War veterans confirms that post-traumatic stress disorder is a real and common psychiatric consequence of war, but it comes to the controversial conclusion that significantly fewer veterans were affected than experts have thought.

To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle

http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,...1228779,00.html

Putting the Iraq War on Trial
An Army officer who refused duty in Iraq goes to court with a novel arbument that he had a duty to disobey because the war is illegal

Eli Sanders/Seattle
Time Magazine

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/health/p...HfU15Ey9b6SyNAw

Review of Landmark Study Finds Fewer Vietnam Veterans With Post-Traumatic Stress

By BENEDICT CAREY
Published: August 18, 2006
Far fewer Vietnam veterans suffered from post-traumatic stress as a result of their wartime service than previously thought, researchers are reporting today, in a finding that could have lasting consequences for the understanding of combat stress, as well as for the estimates of the mental health fallout from the Iraq war.

The report, published in the journal Science and viewed by experts as authoritative, found that 18.7 percent of Vietnam veterans developed a diagnosable stress disorder that could be linked to a war event at some point in their lives, well under the previous benchmark number of 30.9 percent. And while the earlier analysis found that for 15.2 percent of the veterans the symptoms continued to be disabling at the time they were examined, the new study put that figure at 9.1 percent.

The findings come at a time of simmering debate over the emotional effects of service in Iraq which, with its lack of a conventional front echoes the Vietnam experience more than it does other wars. Politicians have clashed over the Department of Veterans Affairs’ budget, including its $3 billion annual bill for mental health, in part because of a suspicion that the estimated rates of post-traumatic stress, based on Vietnam veterans, were too high. Last year, the department commissioned a review of combat stress disability claims for evidence of exaggeration.

The debate has angered some trauma researchers, and infuriated veterans’ groups who say that as it is, mental health services too often fall short.

“I’d like to think that this study would help settle the debate, and that both sides would see that this was good science,” said the report’s lead author, Dr. Bruce Dohrenwend, a psychiatric researcher at Columbia University and the New York State Psychiatric Institute.

“It’s true we found a significant reduction in the lifetime prevalence of these disorders,” Dr. Dohrenwend said, “but on the other hand we also found that more than 9 percent had current pathology, which is a substantial number of people,” or about a quarter-million of the Americans deployed in Vietnam.

Richard McNally, a psychologist at Harvard who is skeptical of the earlier estimate, agreed, saying that the new study confirmed his and others’ suspicions. “It knocks the 30 percent number out of the box,” Dr. McNally said.

But, he added, the findings “should not be used as a justification for short-changing services that are needed to help veterans” of Iraq or Vietnam.

Bobby Muller, president of Vietnam Veterans for America in Washington, who was paralyzed from the chest down after taking a bullet in Vietnam, said that focusing only on the reduced numbers in the new study threatened to undermine financing for veterans’ services and appreciation for the seriousness of combat-related disorders.

“The fact is,” Mr. Muller said, “that veterans suffering mental health problems have been under assault, the diagnosis has been continuously attacked in terms of its legitimacy, funding has not been ramped up to handle these problems for vets returning from Iraq, and now people will see this study and say, ‘Oh look, the problem is not as bad as we thought it was.’ ” He added, “This is absolutely the last thing we need.”

A spokeswoman for the Veterans Affairs department said it had no comment on the study or on whether it would have any affect on mental health benefits for veterans. The department would need time to evaluate the findings, the spokeswoman said.

The new report is an analysis of a landmark 1988 study in which researchers tracked down 1,200 Vietnam veterans around the country and interviewed them, some in-depth, carefully checking for symptoms of psychological distress, like nightmares, flashbacks and hair-trigger irritability. The researchers in that study concluded that 15.2 percent of the veterans qualified for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress, and about twice that number, 30.9 percent, did so at some point in their lives, sometimes years after the war.

But military historians soon began to question the numbers. The 30 percent estimate seemed high, they argued, given that 15 percent of Americans deployed to Vietnam served in combat roles.

Later studies raised questions about whether some veterans were suffering traumatic reactions to war-related events, or to other, unrelated factors.

The new analysis took these concerns into account, and corrected for them. The researchers pored over data from the original 1988 study, and checked it against extensive military records and records of exposure to combat. They found that many servicemen in noncombat roles were exposed to considerable horrors, from shelling and ambushes to caring for the wounded, and that very few exaggerated their experiences.

But a number of veterans whose difficulties were diagnosed as post-traumatic disorder developed it before serving in the war. Others developed symptoms that could not be linked to any specific traumatic event — a crucial element in the diagnosis. And there were some veterans who exhibited symptoms, like nightmares, that were not severe enough to be disabling.

Correcting for these cases lowered the number of veterans who at some point in their lives suffered from the disorder to fewer than one in five and the number who currently suffered from post-traumatic stress to about one in 10. The more exposure troops had had to combat, the higher their risk of the disorder, the study found.

Dr. Matthew J. Friedman, executive director of the National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder for the Department of Veterans Affairs, said the new study should establish beyond question that post-traumatic stress disorder is both a common and legitimate diagnosis in returning soldiers. “We can quibble about the numbers,” he said, “but the point is that it’s a lot of people,” and the potential demand on services is substantial. Some veterans who were told of the findings yesterday said they doubted that the methodology used in the study took into account the experience of many former soldiers. The analysis defined combat exposure by objective measures that may have missed the harrowing experiences people had while serving and the private, subjective feelings of helplessness that followed.The most important figure in the study, most agreed, was the rate of chronic mental suffering. ”War is not healthy for children, and what this shows is how unhealthy it is, and who has to pay for the lifelong consequences of that,” said Michael Gaffney, a lawyer in Washington who served in an artillery unit in Vietnam in 1968 and 1969. “And the meat grinder is still operating, in Iraq.”

http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060818/pl_af...ha_060818155927

Probe suggests marines omitted files on Haditha killings: report Fri Aug 18, 11:59
US marines implicated in the November 2005 killings of Iraqi civilians in Haditha may reportedly have destroyed or hidden evidence, according to Defense Department officials.

A US military probe into the killings found that one of the unit's logbooks had been tampered with and a video taken on the day of the killings was not handed over to investigators until the number-two commander in Iraq, General Peter Chiarelli, intervened, the New York Times said.

The details were noted in a report completed last month -- based on an investigation by Army General Eldon Bargewell -- but were not made public.

The report did not accuse the marines of intentionally hiding facts in the case, but it did make note of several suspicious incidents, the Defense Department officials told the Times.

The soldiers are accused of killing at least 24 civilians on November 19 during an operation in Haditha, some 260 kilometers (160 miles) west of Baghdad, after one of their colleagues was killed in an attack.

According to the Pentagon officials, the logbook -- which details the major incidents affecting the unit -- was missing pages pertaining to November 19.

A criminal investigation was opened in March after Time magazine reported that witnesses and local officials said marines deliberately killed unarmed men, women and children after a fellow marine was killed in a roadside explosion.




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A Tortured Past

Documents show troops who reported abuse in Vietnam were
discredited even as the military was finding evidence of worse. By
Deborah Nelson and Nick Turse.
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http://rawstory.com/showarticle.php?src=ht...FD8JJOD480.html

Troops Long Out-Of-Uniform Sent to Iraq

By REBECCA SANTANA

(AP) U.S. army soldier Sgt. Jason Mulligan, 28, of Ridgefield, Conn. cleans his weapon after coming back...

CAMP ANACONDA, Iraq (AP) - Spc. Chris Carlson had been out of the U.S. Army for two years and was working at Costco in California when he received notice that he was being called back into service.

The 24-year-old is one of thousands of soldiers and Marines who have been deployed to Iraq under a policy that allows military leaders to recall troops who have left the service but still have time left on their contract.

"I thought it was crazy," said Carlson, who has found himself protecting convoys on Iraq's dangerous roads as part of a New Jersey National Guard unit. "Never in a million years did I think they would call me back."

Although troops are allowed to leave active duty after a few years of service, they generally still have time left on their contract with the military that is known as "inactive ready reserve" status, or IRR. During that time, they have to let their service know their current address, but they don't train, draw a paycheck or associate in any other way with the military.


(AP) U.S. army soldier Sgt. Jason Mulligan, 28, of Ridgefield, Conn. cleans his weapon after coming back...
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But with active duty units already completing multiple tours in Iraq, the Pentagon has employed the rarely used tactic of calling people back from IRR status, a policy sometimes referred to as a "backdoor draft."

According to the U.S. Army Reserve, approximately 14,000 soldiers on IRR status have been called to active duty since March 2003 and about 7,300 have been deployed to Iraq. The Marine Corps has mobilized 4,717 Marines who were classified as inactive ready reserve since Sept. 11, and 1,094 have been deployed to Iraq, according to the Marine Forces Reserve.

The 1st Squadron of the 167th Cavalry RSTA, which is based in Lincoln, Neb. and oversees the New Jersey guard unit here in Iraq, has about 40 IRR soldiers within its ranks of roughly 1,000 soldiers, and officers in the squadron say the troops have merged into the unit without any problems.

Jason Mulligan, 28, of Ridgefield, Conn., left the army back in 2002 after two years in the infantry. He was working as a painting contractor while studying wildlife conservation when he received his letter last fall alerting him that he'd been mobilized.

The letter was followed up by another warning to Mulligan that if he didn't comply, the government would prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.


(AP) U.S. army Spc. Anthony Breaux, 24, from La Place, La. jokes with other members of the N.J. National...
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"My family and my fiancee were telling me 'Don't' report. Don't show up,' said Mulligan, who also serves with a New Jersey National Guard unit as a gunner on a Humvee helping patrol the territory around Camp Anaconda, a base about 50 miles north of Baghdad. "And I thought, 'Well I got that nasty letter saying they were going to put me in jail if I don't show up.'"

Anthony Breaux, 24, from La Place, La., said he had a feeling that eventually he would be recalled to service after hearing of so many other soldiers who were pulled from IRR status. Breaux, who left active duty in September 2002, said he knew it was part of the bargain when he joined the army.

"Well, I signed up. I signed the papers. So you know what? I got to do what I got to do," Breaux said, before getting ready for a reconnaissance patrol around Camp Anaconda.

Loren Thompson, a defense analyst with the Arlington, Va.-based Lexington Institute, said part of the reason that the military has called up so many people who were on reserve status is that certain skill sets such as military police or civil affairs were concentrated in the reserves after the Cold War ended.

But he said the sheer numbers of IRR soldiers being mobilized also are a sign that the military doesn't have enough people to fight this war, now in its fourth year.

"It seems clear in retrospect that the active-duty force wasn't big enough to sustain a 'long war' against global terrorism, and also lacked the proper mix of skills to wage that war with maximum effectiveness," Thompson said.

That thought is echoed by many of the IRR soldiers. Mulligan said the military's reliance on IRR soldiers shows how "desperate" the services are for troops.

"Maybe it says something for maybe the way the military is treating the people that are over here, because they're just not wanting to stay on," said Mulligan.

Some of the IRR soldiers, such as Carlson, still will have time on their military contracts when they return from this deployment, meaning they could possibly be called back another time. But others will end their IRR status around the same time their deployment in Iraq ends next spring or will have so little time left that they would not be deployed again.

Spc. Mark Wiles, 27, of Phoenix, said his 6 1/2 years of active duty and the time he'll have