'What Americans Stand For'
Sen. Lindsey Graham discusses why he is so opposed to President Bush's plans on military tribunals and why the United States should never sanction torture.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14890882/site/newsweek/from/ET/
Full Version: Just Military News and Commentary
Common Ground Common Sense > Issues that Affect Our Lives > U.S. Military Issues > U.S. Military Issues Archive
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/P...5&date=20060925
Iraqi soldiers hinder U.S. efforts to combat militias and tame Baghdad streets
By ANTONIO CASTANEDA
The Associated Press
BAGHDAD, Iraq — The plan was simple: Iraqi troops would block escape routes while U.S. soldiers searched for weapons house by house. But the Iraqi troops didn't show up on time.
When they finally did appear, the Iraqis ignored U.S. orders and let dozens of cars pass through checkpoints in eastern Baghdad — including an ambulance full of armed militiamen, U.S. soldiers said.
It wasn't an isolated incident, they added.
Senior U.S. commanders have hailed the performance of Iraqi troops in the crackdown on militias and insurgents in Baghdad. But some U.S. soldiers say the Iraqis serving alongside them are among the worst they've seen — seeming more loyal to militias than the government.
That raises doubts whether the Iraqis can maintain order once the security operation is over and the Americans have left. It also raises broader questions about the training, reliability and loyalty of Iraqi troops — who must be competent, U.S. officials say, before America can begin pulling out of Iraq.
Last week, for example, Sgt. 1st Class Eric Sheehan could barely contain his frustration when he discovered that barriers and concertina wire that were supposed to bolster defensive positions had been dragged away — again — under the noses of nearby Iraqi soldiers.
"[I] suggest we fire these IAs and get them out of the way," Sheehan, of Jennerstown, Pa., reported to senior officers, referring to Iraqi army troops. "There's nothing we can do," came the reply.
U.S. soldiers from the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment eventually blocked the road again while Iraqi troops watched from a distance.
Some Americans speculated the missing barriers were dragged off to strengthen militia defenses in nearby Sadr City, a sprawling Shiite neighborhood that is a stronghold of anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
"They've been doing this all week. They're working against us," said Sheehan, who resorted to waking up the senior Iraqi officer at the checkpoint to complain — futilely.
Some Americans said they had seen much better Iraqi troops in the northern cities of Mosul and Tal Afar, which have more Kurdish soldiers. They have been disappointed by the performance of units committed to the Baghdad fight.
U.S. officers believe the problem has political and sectarian roots: Many of the Iraqi soldiers here are Shiites recruited from the Baghdad area.
As the security crackdown focuses on Shiite neighborhoods, Iraqi troops come in contact with fellow Shiites from some of the 23 known militias. That puts great stress on the soldiers, who grew up in a society where respect for religion runs far deeper than for government institutions.
"From my perspective, you can't make a distinction between Iraq army Shiites and the religious militias. You have a lot of soldiers and family members swayed and persuaded by the religious leadership," said Col. Greg Watt, who advises one of two Iraqi divisions in the city.
Watt expressed confidence the Iraqi army could win in a pitched battle against militias.
"But what the Iraqi army can't do is protect soldiers when they go home, or protect their families," he added. "It's very, very difficult. That's why a solution has to be a political one and not a military one."
U.S. military leaders have repeatedly called on Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, to aggressively disband the predominantly Shiite militias, but, so far, little progress is seen on Baghdad's streets.
Other developments
• Iraq's feuding ethnic and sectarian groups agreed Sunday to consider amending the constitution and begin debating legislation to create a federated nation. Shiite, Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders agreed on a compromise that will allow parliament to take up Shiite-proposed draft legislation to permit creation of partly self-ruling regions. Sunni Arabs have fought the federalism bill, fearing it will splinter the country and deny them a share of Iraq's oil, which is found in the predominantly Kurdish north and the heavily Shiite south.
• Two U.S. Marines died in combat in restive Anbar province west of Baghdad, the U.S. military said. As of Sunday, at least 2,701 members of the U.S. military have died since the war began, according to an Associated Press count.
• At least 20 people were killed and 37 injured Sunday in violence around Iraq, including a mortar attack on the Health Ministry in Baghdad and a car bombing aimed at a police patrol in the city. Police also discovered 13 more apparent victims of sectarian death squads.
• The prime minister's office said Iraqi forces had arrested a leader and seven aides in the 1920 Revolution Brigades, also known as the al-Ashreen Brigades, a group responsible for attacks and kidnappings.
Copyright © 2006 The Seattle Times Company
Iraqi soldiers hinder U.S. efforts to combat militias and tame Baghdad streets
By ANTONIO CASTANEDA
The Associated Press
BAGHDAD, Iraq — The plan was simple: Iraqi troops would block escape routes while U.S. soldiers searched for weapons house by house. But the Iraqi troops didn't show up on time.
When they finally did appear, the Iraqis ignored U.S. orders and let dozens of cars pass through checkpoints in eastern Baghdad — including an ambulance full of armed militiamen, U.S. soldiers said.
It wasn't an isolated incident, they added.
Senior U.S. commanders have hailed the performance of Iraqi troops in the crackdown on militias and insurgents in Baghdad. But some U.S. soldiers say the Iraqis serving alongside them are among the worst they've seen — seeming more loyal to militias than the government.
That raises doubts whether the Iraqis can maintain order once the security operation is over and the Americans have left. It also raises broader questions about the training, reliability and loyalty of Iraqi troops — who must be competent, U.S. officials say, before America can begin pulling out of Iraq.
Last week, for example, Sgt. 1st Class Eric Sheehan could barely contain his frustration when he discovered that barriers and concertina wire that were supposed to bolster defensive positions had been dragged away — again — under the noses of nearby Iraqi soldiers.
"[I] suggest we fire these IAs and get them out of the way," Sheehan, of Jennerstown, Pa., reported to senior officers, referring to Iraqi army troops. "There's nothing we can do," came the reply.
U.S. soldiers from the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment eventually blocked the road again while Iraqi troops watched from a distance.
Some Americans speculated the missing barriers were dragged off to strengthen militia defenses in nearby Sadr City, a sprawling Shiite neighborhood that is a stronghold of anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
"They've been doing this all week. They're working against us," said Sheehan, who resorted to waking up the senior Iraqi officer at the checkpoint to complain — futilely.
Some Americans said they had seen much better Iraqi troops in the northern cities of Mosul and Tal Afar, which have more Kurdish soldiers. They have been disappointed by the performance of units committed to the Baghdad fight.
U.S. officers believe the problem has political and sectarian roots: Many of the Iraqi soldiers here are Shiites recruited from the Baghdad area.
As the security crackdown focuses on Shiite neighborhoods, Iraqi troops come in contact with fellow Shiites from some of the 23 known militias. That puts great stress on the soldiers, who grew up in a society where respect for religion runs far deeper than for government institutions.
"From my perspective, you can't make a distinction between Iraq army Shiites and the religious militias. You have a lot of soldiers and family members swayed and persuaded by the religious leadership," said Col. Greg Watt, who advises one of two Iraqi divisions in the city.
Watt expressed confidence the Iraqi army could win in a pitched battle against militias.
"But what the Iraqi army can't do is protect soldiers when they go home, or protect their families," he added. "It's very, very difficult. That's why a solution has to be a political one and not a military one."
U.S. military leaders have repeatedly called on Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, to aggressively disband the predominantly Shiite militias, but, so far, little progress is seen on Baghdad's streets.
Other developments
• Iraq's feuding ethnic and sectarian groups agreed Sunday to consider amending the constitution and begin debating legislation to create a federated nation. Shiite, Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders agreed on a compromise that will allow parliament to take up Shiite-proposed draft legislation to permit creation of partly self-ruling regions. Sunni Arabs have fought the federalism bill, fearing it will splinter the country and deny them a share of Iraq's oil, which is found in the predominantly Kurdish north and the heavily Shiite south.
• Two U.S. Marines died in combat in restive Anbar province west of Baghdad, the U.S. military said. As of Sunday, at least 2,701 members of the U.S. military have died since the war began, according to an Associated Press count.
• At least 20 people were killed and 37 injured Sunday in violence around Iraq, including a mortar attack on the Health Ministry in Baghdad and a car bombing aimed at a police patrol in the city. Police also discovered 13 more apparent victims of sectarian death squads.
• The prime minister's office said Iraqi forces had arrested a leader and seven aides in the 1920 Revolution Brigades, also known as the al-Ashreen Brigades, a group responsible for attacks and kidnappings.
Copyright © 2006 The Seattle Times Company
WHAT IRANIANS LEAST EXPECT: WHAT IF BUSH PUBLICLY OFFERED TO OPEN AN EMBASSY IN TEHRAN? - FAREED ZAKARIA (NEWSWEEK, OCTOBER 2): If we're going to outsmart Iranian president Ahmadinejad, we need clever, compelling arguments of our own. Instead we have tended to threaten, bully and intimidate. No wonder he's winning the public diplomacy.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14975333/site/newsweek/
US-IRAN RELATIONS: PERILS AND PROMISES - HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI (PAYVAND'S IRAN NEWS ..., SEPTEMBER 22): EU Dependency and US Public Diplomacy: The US' public relations ploy to sway public opinion toward the US position on Iran has been clearly articulated by President Bush and Secretary of State Rice.
http://www.payvand.com/news/06/sep/1254.html
IRAN WAR IN OCTOBER? EVERETT (DISAGREEMENT WITHOUT BEING DISAGREEABLE, SEPTEMBER 24): The president's UN speech may have been the start of an attempt to frame the military action as an opportunity for the Iranian people to overthrow their oppressors, but much more needs to be done if such attempts at public diplomacy are to be successful.
http://dwobd.blogspot.com/
HOW THE UN MEETING TURNED INTO A FESTIVAL OF ANTI-AMERICANISM - AND BOOSTED DUBYA'S ELECTION HOPES - DAVID USBORNE (INDEPENDENT, SEPTEMBER 23): With the help of Iran's unflinching leader, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and a few others, Mr. Chavez successfully hijacked this year's UN General Assembly and turned it into a raucous carnival of anti-Americanism. Nile Gardiner, of the Heritage Foundation, said: "This is a huge public diplomacy challenge, but also a strategic threat."
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politi...icle1705645.ece
BUSH RAGES: 'I AM NOT BEELZEBUB, LORD OF SULFUR' - MIKE WHITNEY (AL-JAZEERAH, SEPTEMBER 22): And where was Bush when Chavez delivered his broadside ....hiding behind Karen Hughes's skirts, picking out a new eye-liner for his next televised harangue against Muslims, retrieving his Yale pom-poms from the dry-cleaners?
http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20edito...e%20Whitney.htm
STUFF HAPPENS AGAIN IN BAGHDAD - FRANK RICH (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Our public diplomacy efforts in Iraq were equally tone-deaf to Iraqis and their neighbors. Karen Hughes is a presidential flack whose patronizing photo-op tour of the region last year earned mostly ridicule. Our broadcasting outreach is supervised by a longtime Karl Rove pal, Kenneth Tomlinson, who last month was found by State Department investigators to be using his office -- literally -- to run a ?horse-racing operation.?
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opini...agewanted=print
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WHAT WOULD JEFFERSON SAY ABOUT IRAQ? OPPOSED TO "WARS OF CHOICE," HE WOULD HAVE A LOT TO SAY ABOUT THE FORCEFUL IMPOSITION OF DEMOCRACY - R.K. RAMAZANI (PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, SEPTEMBER 24): If asked how best to spread democracy, Jefferson would have suggested three alternative and peaceful methods. First among these would be America's own example of liberal democratic practices. Second would be effective use of what we now call public diplomacy. Third, and most important, Jefferson would have advocated expanding American educational initiatives, such as the Fulbright exchange program.
http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/ed...al/15592459.htm
US DELEGATION TO VISIT LEBANON AND DISCUSS REBUILDING (YA LIBNAN, LEBANON, SEPTEMBER 23): The group will be led by Dina Powell, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/09/post_21.php
CONDI TALKS TOUGH ON DARFUR - (NEWS FROM AFRICA, SEPTEMBER 24): After falling to the back burners of public diplomacy, it seems that maybe Darfur in Sudan is moving up the US administration's list of concerns.
http://twoandtwomakesfive.blogs.com/two_an...from_afric.html
(scroll down link for item)
WORD FOR WORD: 'ISLAMO-FASCISM' HAD ITS MOMENT - SHERYL GAY STOLBERG (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Even Karen Hughes, the former counselor to Mr. Bush who now runs the public diplomacy arm of the State Department, pushed back from the term 'Islamo-fascist,' telling CNN's Wolf Blitzer that she typically does not 'use religious terms' for fear they will be misinterpreted around the world.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/weekinre...24stolberg.html?
ATTACKS SPARK TOUGHER GUANTANAMO JAIL - ASSOCIATED PRESS (USA TODAY SEPTEMBER 23): The military is toughening a new jailhouse for suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban militants to protect guards after a spate of attacks and evidence that detainees have organized themselves into groups to mount uprisings, officials said.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09...itmo-jail_x.htm
TORTURE CHIC: SIGN OF DECADENCE ALAN BOCK (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): The eagerness of the top two guys in the administration, plenty of others in the political classes and all too many who consider themselves thinkers or intellectuals to see torture become quasi-official policy of the United States, which used to have a reputation as the freest land on earth, verges on the sadistic and pornographic.
http://www.antiwar.com/bock/?articleid=9739
WE'VE SUNK TO BIN LADEN'S LEVEL - JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY (MIAMI HERALD, SEPTEMBER 23/COMMON DREAMS): The torture of prisoners is not only illegal under American and international law it is, put simply, immoral and unjust. It is also un-American.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0923-27.htm
A TORTURED POLICY EDITORIAL (SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, SEPTEMBER 24): The upshot is a disgraceful policy on detainees that bends American norms of justice, all wrapped in the flag-waving war on terrorism.
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?...&type=printable
POWELL BELATEDLY JOINS BID TO SAVE OUR NATION'S SOUL - LEONARD PITTS JR. (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22): Even if we had to choose between saving Americans and preserving America, it should be an easy call. Kill me before you kill my country.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
ARE WE REALLY SO FEARFUL? - ARIEL DORFMAN (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): Are we so fearful, so in love with our own security and steeped in our own pain, that we are really willing to let people be tortured in the name of America?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201303_pf.html
DOES TORTURE WORK? - EDWIDGE DANTICAT (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): We are all endorsers of torture when it is done in our name.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201304_pf.html
FIRING POTENT WORDS, FROM A TANK - ARTHUR T. HADLEY (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): 'I've seen firsthand the power of Geneva Conventions, both to compel surrenders and to broadcast, for the world, our determination to live up to our highest ideals.'
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opinion/...agewanted=print
AMERICAN STANDARD OPINION (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 24): The compromise approved last week by the GOP renegades draws the line at "redefining" the Geneva Conventions, but then leaves it to the president to "interpret" the conventions pretty much as he sees fit.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/b...inion-headlines
DO UNTO YOUR ENEMY... - PAUL RIECKHOFF (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): If America continues to erode the meaning of the Geneva Conventions, we will cede the ground upon which to prosecute dictators and warlords.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opinion/...agewanted=print
SYRIA AND THE US: FELLOW TRAVELERS AT THE CROSSROADS FOR TERRORISM - AMY GOODMAN AND DAVID GOODMAN (MOTHER JONES, SEPTEMBER 23): When President Bush made torture a centerpiece of his foreign policy, he bound himself intimately to the world's worst human rights abusers.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0923-20.htm
TORTURE IS A MORAL ISSUE RELIGIOUS LEADERS FROM CONNECTICUT, SIGNATORIES (NATION, SEPTEMBER 23): The detainee legislation seems not to be about protecting our military personnel or even US citizens; rather, it appears to be designed to protect the leaders at the top of the chain of command who have tolerated, promoted, and justified torture.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20061009/moral_compass
PARSING WORDS ABOUT TORTURE - STEVE CHAPMAN (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 25): Mr. Bush's stated policy is, "We do not torture." Anyone who really believes in the logic behind his policies ought to be asking, "Why on earth not?"
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
EXPLOITATION OF 9/11 WAS SHAMEFUL - ANDREW GREELEY (CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, SEPTEMBER 22): The administration, not able to find Osama bin Laden, now plans to drag some of his henchmen -- tortured and illegally imprisoned -- before kangaroo military courts to prove how tough on terrorists it really is before the election. Do the marketers of such propaganda have no shame at all?
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-30.htm
AMERICA'S DETAINEES FACE GRAVE INJUSTICE - JONATHAN HAFETZ (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22)
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
TORTURE EXHIBIT A - WILLIAM FISHER (TOMPAINE.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The compromise bill agreed on by the White House and the famous 'Republican rebels' -- Senators McCain, Lindsey Graham, John Warner, Susan Collins, Olympia Snowe and others -- fails to mention extraordinary rendition explicitly.
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/09/2...e_exhibit_a.php
THE ABUSE CAN CONTINUE: SENATORS WON'T AUTHORIZE TORTURE, BUT THEY WON'T PREVENT IT, EITHER ? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 22)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092101647.html
COMPROMISED EDITORS (NEW REPUBLIC, SEPTEMBER 21): The compromise proposed by GOP Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and John Warner takes the administration's proposals as a starting point and then proceeds to roll back only a few of its more odious provisions.
http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=200610...editorial100206
BUSH GETS HIS WAY - DAN FROOMKIN (WASHINGTONPOST.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): On the central issue of whether the CIA should continue using interrogation methods on suspected terrorists that many say constitute torture, the White House got its way, winning agreement from the "maverick" Republican senators who had refused to go along with an overt undoing of the Geneva Conventions.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2200703_pf.html
TURNING BACK THE CLOCK ON RAPE EDITORIAL (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): The bill on jailing, interrogating and trying terror suspects contains narrow definitions of rape and sexual assault that must be fixed before Congress can responsibly pass the legislation.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/opinion/edit...html?offset=10&
A TORTUROUS COMPROMISE EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): After delaying legal action against hundreds of detainees for almost five years, the administration should work with Congress to devise interrogation and trial rules that civilized peoples expect.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...promise?mode=PF
TWO-TIERED TORTURE STANDARDS: BY ALLOWING THE CIA LEEWAY IN INTERROGATIONS, THE SENATE GAVE UP TOO MUCH IN ITS COMPROMISE WITH BUSH ? EDITORIAL (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editor...ment-editorials
CIA VALUES SHOW IN STAND ON DETAINEES - GREG MILLER (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): On the detainee issue, the CIA is less swayed by concerns that other nations might retaliate against U.S. prisoners, and more inclined to consider any cost worth paying for the intelligence it generates.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wa...,1,770657.story
WHY RETIRED MILITARY BRASS DON'T WANT TORTURE: FIRSTHAND COMBAT EXPERIENCES COMPEL OLD GUARD TO ATTACK BUSH'S 'ALTERNATIVE INTERROGATION' - CHARLES KAISER (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
HE WROTE THE BOOK ON TORTURE [REVIEW OF WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR BY JOHN YOO] - JAMES BOVARD (AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, OCTOBER 9): John Yoo, the former Justice Department official, implies that the torture scandal may be largely a liberal media concoction. Though this book went to press in July 2006, Yoo relies on dubious data from September 2004 to exonerate the federal torturers.
http://www.amconmag.com/2006/2006_10_09/review.html
UN REPORT: TORTURE IN IRAQ 'TOTALLY OUT OF HAND': BUSH ADMINISTRATION REJECTS CLAIM THAT TORTURE MAY BE WORSE THAN UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN - TOM REGAN (CSMONITOR.COM, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0922/dailyUpdate.html
IN IRAQ, A JOURNALIST IN LIMBO - TOM CURLEY (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): Bilal Hussein, an Iraqi photographer who helped the Associated Press win a Pulitzer Prize last year, is now in his sixth month in a U.S. Army prison in Iraq. He doesn't understand why he's there, and neither do his AP colleagues.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201444_pf.html
DUE PROCESS, BULLDOZED - BOB HERBERT (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Several Iraqi journalists working for international news organizations have been held without charge by American and Iraqi forces. The absence of concrete evidence in so many of the cases is disturbing, to say the least.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opini...agewanted=print
CITY OF DEATH: THE BATTLE FOR BAGHDAD - BERNHARD ZAND (SPIEGEL INTERNATIONAL, SEPTEMBER 22): Once the most progressive city in the Arab world, Baghdad has been ravaged by war and bombings. Everyone wants out, but not everyone can afford to leave -- and car bomb explosions are a daily fact of life.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiege...,438429,00.html
WAR'S FORGOTTEN WOMEN - LIZETTE ALVAREZ (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, SEPTEMBER 24): Despite longstanding predictions that the United States would shudder when its women were killed in action, female military deaths have stirred no less -- and no more -- reaction at home than the deaths of the nearly 2,700 male dead.
http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file.../news/women.php
OUR FIVE IRAQ WARS - JAMES JAY CARAFANO (WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): What the United States needs to do is finish the job in Iraq -- and that means strengthening Iraq's security forces so they can handle the insurgency.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...23-084009-2950r
FACING FACTS ON IRAQ EDITORIAL (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): There is nothing about Iraq -- including withdrawal scenarios -- that is anything but ominous.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opinion/...agewanted=print
THE FACTS ON THE GROUND: MINI-GULAGS, HIRED GUNS, LOBBYISTS, AND A REALITY BUILT ON FEAR - TOM ENGELHARDT (TOMDISPATCH, SEPTEMBER 21): While Iraq and future Iraq policy are constantly in the news, almost all the American facts-on-the-ground in that country have come into being without consultation with the American people or, in any serious way, Congress (or testing in the courts).
http://tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=123690
BE READY FOR CIVIL WAR - DANIEL GALLINGTON (WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 15): Civil war may happen in Iraq no matter what we do or what we want -- and we had better be thinking about how it would support our longer-term policy objectives.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...24-085113-5472r
SPY AGENCIES SAY IRAQ WAR WORSENS TERROR THREAT - MARK MAZZETTI (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): The classified National Intelligence Estimate attributes a more direct role to the Iraq war in fueling radicalism than that presented either in recent White House documents or in a report released Wednesday by the House Intelligence Committee, according to several officials in Washington involved in preparing the assessment or who have read the final document.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/mi...agewanted=print
NEGROPONTE HIGHLIGHTS U.S. SUCCESSES: INTELLIGENCE VIEW THAT WAR IS INCREASING TERROR IS 'FRACTION OF JUDGMENTS,' HE SAYS - NEWS SERVICES (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 25)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092400986.html
CLOSING OF A NATION - DAVID BROOKS (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Iraq is the most xenophobic, sexist and reactionary society on earth.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opini...agewanted=print
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PLAYING SHELL GAMES ON RESPONSIBILITY WITH IRAQ - DERRICK Z. JACKSON (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): The same White House that trashed generals and bean counters for saying it would take hundreds of thousands of more troops and billions more dollars to secure Iraq is now blaming the puppet government for not securing the country.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...th_iraq?mode=PF
DIVIDING IRAQ WOULD JUST MEAN MORE THREATS: SEPARATE SUNNI, SHIITE AND KURD STATES ARE A SEDUCTIVE SOLUTION, BUT A SINGLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS IRAQ'S BEST CHANCE FOR STABILITY - W. ROBERT PEARSON (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
THE TROOPS STAY ON: PRESIDENT BUSH HELD OFF ON FORCE CUTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN THIS FALL. THERE'S GOOD REASON -- BUT IS THERE A GOOD PLAN? ? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201442_pf.html
LOSING AFGHANISTAN - JOHN KERRY (WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 25): Where allies have pledged troops and assistance in Afghanistan, they must follow through. But we must lead by example. That's how you win hearts and minds, and show the world the true face of America -- and that's how you win the war on terror. (Mr. Kerry, a senator from Massachusetts, was the 2004 Democratic nominee for president.)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1159138897...in_commentaries
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THE KEY TO AFGHANISTAN: MORE TIME - JIM HOAGLAND (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): The struggle in Afghanistan needs resources, it needs time -- and it needs never to be forgotten.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201396_pf.html
A SILENCE IN THE AFGHAN MOUNTAINS: THE CONCEALMENT OF TWO DETAINEE DEATHS PAINTS A TROUBLING PICTURE OF ABUSE BY U.S. SPECIAL FORCES UNITS DEPLOYED TO THE COUNTRY - KEVIN SACK AND CRAIG PYES (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/na...-home-headlines
BUSH'S OPTIONS ON IRAN - ROBERT KUTTNER (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): Iran is far larger and more powerful than Iraq. Far from making war inevitable, that reality limits American options.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...on_iran?mode=PF
IRANIAN RHETORIC ASIDE, IT MAY BE TIME TO TALK - ROGER COHEN (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): In the Bush-led quest to transform the Middle East, a stick has been applied in Iraq. Its corollary almost certainly has to be a carrot deployed in Iran.
http://select.nytimes.com/iht/2006/09/23/w...agewanted=print
AHMADINEJAD'S GAUNTLET: THE U.S. AND IRAN NEED EACH OTHER TOO MUCH NOT TO FIND ACCOMMODATION - DAVID IGNATIUS (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): That's the challenge: Can America and Iran find a formula that will meet each side's security interests, and thereby allow Iran to return fully to the community of nations after 27 years?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201393_pf.html
IRAN'S UNSUBTLE LEADER EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): The transparent purpose of Ahmadinejad's brief against the Security Council is to delegitimize the resolution that the council passed at the end of August calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment of uranium and comply with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial..._leader?mode=PF
WASHINGTON IS SIGNALING TEHRAN - ZE'EV SCHIFF (HAARETZ.COM, SEPTEMBER 24): Washington is saying, effectively, that it will help Iran to develop into a regional power with economic capability if Iran is willing to forgo nuclear weapons. Tehran, for its part, is hesitating.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.j...SubContrassID=0
IRAN: CALLS FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES - DAVID CULP (COMMON DREAMS, SEPTEMBER 22): When he spoke about the nuclear weapons issues, the Iranian president was offering a reasonable basis for real negotiations.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-27.htm
WAR SIGNALS? - DAVE LINDORFF (NATION, SEPTEMBER 22/COMMON DREAMS): Bush Administration and the Pentagon have issued orders for a major "strike group" of ships, including the nuclear aircraft carrier Eisenhower as well as a cruiser, destroyer, frigate, submarine escort and supply ship, to head for the Persian Gulf, just off Iran's western coast.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-28.htm
WORLD POLITICS AND SHOW BIZ: ALL THE WORLD'S A STAGE JUSTIN RAIMONDO (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The regionalization of the Iraq war, the strong possibility that the U.S., not Iran, will use nuclear weapons -- in short, a cataclysmic clash of civilizations is on the immediate horizon.
http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=9732
MORE BUSH DIPLOMACY - GORDON PRATHER (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): Bush still intends to nuke the Mullahs.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=9737
AS CRAZY AS IT SOUNDS CHARLEY REESE (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): President George Bush might be planning to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities.
http://www.antiwar.com/reese/?articleid=9736
US-IRAN SHOOTOUT IS INEVITABLE LEON HADAR (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23):
http://www.antiwar.com/hadar/?articleid=9738
THE OCTOBER SURPRISE GARY HART (HUFFINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): It should come as no surprise if the Bush Administration undertakes a preemptive war against Iran sometime before the November election.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-hart/th...se_b_30086.html
SPEAKING WITH THE ENEMY: COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CHIEF EXPLAINS WHY HIS ORGANIZATION HOSTED A DISCUSSION WITH IRAN'S PRESIDENT - RICHARD N. HAASS (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/o...1,3492119.story
THE POWER OF PUBLIC OPINION - PATRICK MCELWEE (COMMON DREAMS, SEPTEMBER 22): Despite the propaganda onslaught, 19 percent believe Iran poses no threat at all to the U.S. and an additional 55 percent of the population believe Iran can be handled diplomatically.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-34.htm
FROM THE NEW "ANTI-SEMITISM" TO NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST: HOW ISRAEL IS ENGINEERING THE "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS" - JONATHAN COOK (COUNTERPUNCH, SEPTEMBER 23/24): As ever, the main target of the new anti-Semitism campaign were audiences in the US, Israel's generous patron. There, members of the Israel lobby were turning into a chorus of doom.
http://www.counterpunch.org/cook09232006.html
DO SOMETHING - OPINION (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22): Washington should be prepared to facilitate Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' efforts to reopen a dialogue with the Israelis.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/b...inion-headlines
DELUSION IN DAMASCUS: BASHAR ASSAD BELIEVES THAT SYRIA WON THE LEBANESE WAR ?EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): The many statesmen who have tried to do business with the Syrian president in the past -- such as former secretary of state Colin L. Powell or Egypt's Hosni Mubarak -- have discovered his assurances to secure the Syrian border are not only worthless but deliberately mendacious.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2300722_pf.html
AXIS OF SKETCHY ALLIES - MAUREEN DOWD (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): The administration?s great ally in the war on terror is General Musharraf, a dictator who appears to be harboring terrorists, including the one we want most.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/23/opini...agewanted=print
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DEMOCRACY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD - LORENZO VIDINO (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): Promotion of democracy is an ambitious goal whose prospects for success are unclear. What can produce immediate gains is a head-on challenge of the enemy's ideological shortcomings.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...m_world?mode=PF
VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY - SARAH L. GILDEA / F. ANDY MESSING ( WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Our experience with democracy is relatively successful, but we must be wary of forcing our brand of freedom and democracy on others, or risk disillusionment and failure.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...24-085115-9442r
AS CHÁVEZ TALKS TOUGH, THE BUSH TEAM YAWNS EDWARD M. GOMEZ (WORLD VIEWS, SF GATE, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/det...5&entry_id=9140
CHÁVEZ'S INFERNO - ALVARO VARGAS LLOSA (WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 25): Chávez's eighth circle of hell is fraudulent anti-Americanism. Since oil makes up half the government's revenue and the U.S. is the principal destination of Venezuelan oil, he pays daily homage to U.S. capitalism.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1159141344...in_commentaries
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HURRICANE CHÁVEZ: WHAT'S WORSE FOR ENERGY SECURITY: A NATURAL DISASTER OR A PETRO-BULLY? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): To the extent that Mr. Chávez's wild talk stirs up anti-American feeling, he must be regarded as an irritant.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2300721_pf.html
DEVIL IN DISGUISE
EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 22): Chávez has been brandishing anti-Americanism ever since he became president in 1998. Chávez is criticizing the leading force behind a world economic system that has enriched his country and enhanced his power.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...isguise?mode=PF
A WHIFF OF THE DEVIL - JEFF JACOBY (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): As night descends on Venezuela, thuggish rulers everywhere are finding Chávez a kindred spirit. There was indeed an odor of sulfur at the UN last week, but it didn't come from President Bush.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...e_devil?mode=PF
TRASH TALK AT THE U.N.: CHAVEZ DELUSION - STEPHEN JOHNSON (NATIONAL REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 22): When he spoke at the U.N. General Assembly this week, President Chávez made it clear that his objective is to lead a global coalition to confront the United States.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YTY3Y...DYzYjdhNTMwYjc=
DIFFERENCES ASIDE, IT'S ALL POLITICS - MARK H. TEETER (MOSCOW TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Is somebody willing to put real, visible effort into developing avenues and areas for Russian-U.S. cooperation now, to engage and interact? Or is the best we both can hope for an uncomfortable, ill-defined stasis that benefits no discernible good cause?
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2006/09/25/009.html
WHY YOU SHOULD CARE ABOUT REINHOLD NIEBUHR: NO ONE IS ALL GOOD OR ALL EVIL - EMILY L. HAUSER (SEPTEMBER 24): President Bush has long painted the international community, and the nation's foreign policy, in stark terms. "Islamo-fascists" and, before them, the "axis of evil," described our many enemies in black and white.
Yet as Bush divides the world this way, more Americans are beginning to question his strict breakdown of good and evil.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion...perspective-hed
RENOUNCING BUSH'S FAILURES IS A START: THE PRESIDENT'S ONETIME LAPDOGS SHOULD ALSO RETHINK THE EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY THAT GOT US HERE - TODD GITLIN (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): The core of the Bush problem is an extremist worldview. Bush's aggressive go-it-alone attitude kicked in long before 9/11. "You're either with us or you're with the terrorists" was just an extension of Bush's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol (the international global warming agreement) and the International Criminal Court.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
WHY WE CAN'T WIN - JON BASIL UTLEY (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): America is incapable of organizing itself to successfully impose our will by force upon small foreign nations, much less the world.
http://www.antiwar.com/utley/?articleid=9728
A FOREIGN POLICY OF FAILURE DOUG BANDOW (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The United States today is weaker, more isolated, and more vulnerable because of the Bush administration's policies.
http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9726
THE NEW GLOBAL POPULISM - KAVEH L. AFRASIABI (ASIA TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): What sets this year's General Assembly gathering somewhat apart is the window it has opened onto a global realignment consisting of many Third World nations forming a coherent anti-US bloc.
http://atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/HI23Aa02.html
THE WAR OF THE HACKS - COLBERT I. KING (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): The terrorist ilk that attacked on Sept. 11 must be broken -- not chased, harassed or condemned from a U.N. podium, but broken. That means: Take them down here, there or anywhere they're found.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201439_pf.html
QUOTATIONS FOR THE DAY
"SHOW ME WHERE THE ROADS END, AND I WILL SHOW YOU WHERE THE TALIBAN BEGINS."
--Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan; cited in Jim Hoagland, 'The Key to Afghanistan: More Time (Washington post, September 24)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201396_pf.html
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14975333/site/newsweek/
US-IRAN RELATIONS: PERILS AND PROMISES - HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI (PAYVAND'S IRAN NEWS ..., SEPTEMBER 22): EU Dependency and US Public Diplomacy: The US' public relations ploy to sway public opinion toward the US position on Iran has been clearly articulated by President Bush and Secretary of State Rice.
http://www.payvand.com/news/06/sep/1254.html
IRAN WAR IN OCTOBER? EVERETT (DISAGREEMENT WITHOUT BEING DISAGREEABLE, SEPTEMBER 24): The president's UN speech may have been the start of an attempt to frame the military action as an opportunity for the Iranian people to overthrow their oppressors, but much more needs to be done if such attempts at public diplomacy are to be successful.
http://dwobd.blogspot.com/
HOW THE UN MEETING TURNED INTO A FESTIVAL OF ANTI-AMERICANISM - AND BOOSTED DUBYA'S ELECTION HOPES - DAVID USBORNE (INDEPENDENT, SEPTEMBER 23): With the help of Iran's unflinching leader, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and a few others, Mr. Chavez successfully hijacked this year's UN General Assembly and turned it into a raucous carnival of anti-Americanism. Nile Gardiner, of the Heritage Foundation, said: "This is a huge public diplomacy challenge, but also a strategic threat."
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politi...icle1705645.ece
BUSH RAGES: 'I AM NOT BEELZEBUB, LORD OF SULFUR' - MIKE WHITNEY (AL-JAZEERAH, SEPTEMBER 22): And where was Bush when Chavez delivered his broadside ....hiding behind Karen Hughes's skirts, picking out a new eye-liner for his next televised harangue against Muslims, retrieving his Yale pom-poms from the dry-cleaners?
http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20edito...e%20Whitney.htm
STUFF HAPPENS AGAIN IN BAGHDAD - FRANK RICH (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Our public diplomacy efforts in Iraq were equally tone-deaf to Iraqis and their neighbors. Karen Hughes is a presidential flack whose patronizing photo-op tour of the region last year earned mostly ridicule. Our broadcasting outreach is supervised by a longtime Karl Rove pal, Kenneth Tomlinson, who last month was found by State Department investigators to be using his office -- literally -- to run a ?horse-racing operation.?
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opini...agewanted=print
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WHAT WOULD JEFFERSON SAY ABOUT IRAQ? OPPOSED TO "WARS OF CHOICE," HE WOULD HAVE A LOT TO SAY ABOUT THE FORCEFUL IMPOSITION OF DEMOCRACY - R.K. RAMAZANI (PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, SEPTEMBER 24): If asked how best to spread democracy, Jefferson would have suggested three alternative and peaceful methods. First among these would be America's own example of liberal democratic practices. Second would be effective use of what we now call public diplomacy. Third, and most important, Jefferson would have advocated expanding American educational initiatives, such as the Fulbright exchange program.
http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/ed...al/15592459.htm
US DELEGATION TO VISIT LEBANON AND DISCUSS REBUILDING (YA LIBNAN, LEBANON, SEPTEMBER 23): The group will be led by Dina Powell, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/09/post_21.php
CONDI TALKS TOUGH ON DARFUR - (NEWS FROM AFRICA, SEPTEMBER 24): After falling to the back burners of public diplomacy, it seems that maybe Darfur in Sudan is moving up the US administration's list of concerns.
http://twoandtwomakesfive.blogs.com/two_an...from_afric.html
(scroll down link for item)
WORD FOR WORD: 'ISLAMO-FASCISM' HAD ITS MOMENT - SHERYL GAY STOLBERG (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Even Karen Hughes, the former counselor to Mr. Bush who now runs the public diplomacy arm of the State Department, pushed back from the term 'Islamo-fascist,' telling CNN's Wolf Blitzer that she typically does not 'use religious terms' for fear they will be misinterpreted around the world.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/weekinre...24stolberg.html?
ATTACKS SPARK TOUGHER GUANTANAMO JAIL - ASSOCIATED PRESS (USA TODAY SEPTEMBER 23): The military is toughening a new jailhouse for suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban militants to protect guards after a spate of attacks and evidence that detainees have organized themselves into groups to mount uprisings, officials said.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09...itmo-jail_x.htm
TORTURE CHIC: SIGN OF DECADENCE ALAN BOCK (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): The eagerness of the top two guys in the administration, plenty of others in the political classes and all too many who consider themselves thinkers or intellectuals to see torture become quasi-official policy of the United States, which used to have a reputation as the freest land on earth, verges on the sadistic and pornographic.
http://www.antiwar.com/bock/?articleid=9739
WE'VE SUNK TO BIN LADEN'S LEVEL - JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY (MIAMI HERALD, SEPTEMBER 23/COMMON DREAMS): The torture of prisoners is not only illegal under American and international law it is, put simply, immoral and unjust. It is also un-American.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0923-27.htm
A TORTURED POLICY EDITORIAL (SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, SEPTEMBER 24): The upshot is a disgraceful policy on detainees that bends American norms of justice, all wrapped in the flag-waving war on terrorism.
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?...&type=printable
POWELL BELATEDLY JOINS BID TO SAVE OUR NATION'S SOUL - LEONARD PITTS JR. (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22): Even if we had to choose between saving Americans and preserving America, it should be an easy call. Kill me before you kill my country.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
ARE WE REALLY SO FEARFUL? - ARIEL DORFMAN (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): Are we so fearful, so in love with our own security and steeped in our own pain, that we are really willing to let people be tortured in the name of America?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201303_pf.html
DOES TORTURE WORK? - EDWIDGE DANTICAT (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): We are all endorsers of torture when it is done in our name.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201304_pf.html
FIRING POTENT WORDS, FROM A TANK - ARTHUR T. HADLEY (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): 'I've seen firsthand the power of Geneva Conventions, both to compel surrenders and to broadcast, for the world, our determination to live up to our highest ideals.'
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opinion/...agewanted=print
AMERICAN STANDARD OPINION (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 24): The compromise approved last week by the GOP renegades draws the line at "redefining" the Geneva Conventions, but then leaves it to the president to "interpret" the conventions pretty much as he sees fit.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/b...inion-headlines
DO UNTO YOUR ENEMY... - PAUL RIECKHOFF (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): If America continues to erode the meaning of the Geneva Conventions, we will cede the ground upon which to prosecute dictators and warlords.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opinion/...agewanted=print
SYRIA AND THE US: FELLOW TRAVELERS AT THE CROSSROADS FOR TERRORISM - AMY GOODMAN AND DAVID GOODMAN (MOTHER JONES, SEPTEMBER 23): When President Bush made torture a centerpiece of his foreign policy, he bound himself intimately to the world's worst human rights abusers.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0923-20.htm
TORTURE IS A MORAL ISSUE RELIGIOUS LEADERS FROM CONNECTICUT, SIGNATORIES (NATION, SEPTEMBER 23): The detainee legislation seems not to be about protecting our military personnel or even US citizens; rather, it appears to be designed to protect the leaders at the top of the chain of command who have tolerated, promoted, and justified torture.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20061009/moral_compass
PARSING WORDS ABOUT TORTURE - STEVE CHAPMAN (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 25): Mr. Bush's stated policy is, "We do not torture." Anyone who really believes in the logic behind his policies ought to be asking, "Why on earth not?"
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
EXPLOITATION OF 9/11 WAS SHAMEFUL - ANDREW GREELEY (CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, SEPTEMBER 22): The administration, not able to find Osama bin Laden, now plans to drag some of his henchmen -- tortured and illegally imprisoned -- before kangaroo military courts to prove how tough on terrorists it really is before the election. Do the marketers of such propaganda have no shame at all?
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-30.htm
AMERICA'S DETAINEES FACE GRAVE INJUSTICE - JONATHAN HAFETZ (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22)
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
TORTURE EXHIBIT A - WILLIAM FISHER (TOMPAINE.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The compromise bill agreed on by the White House and the famous 'Republican rebels' -- Senators McCain, Lindsey Graham, John Warner, Susan Collins, Olympia Snowe and others -- fails to mention extraordinary rendition explicitly.
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/09/2...e_exhibit_a.php
THE ABUSE CAN CONTINUE: SENATORS WON'T AUTHORIZE TORTURE, BUT THEY WON'T PREVENT IT, EITHER ? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 22)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092101647.html
COMPROMISED EDITORS (NEW REPUBLIC, SEPTEMBER 21): The compromise proposed by GOP Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and John Warner takes the administration's proposals as a starting point and then proceeds to roll back only a few of its more odious provisions.
http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=200610...editorial100206
BUSH GETS HIS WAY - DAN FROOMKIN (WASHINGTONPOST.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): On the central issue of whether the CIA should continue using interrogation methods on suspected terrorists that many say constitute torture, the White House got its way, winning agreement from the "maverick" Republican senators who had refused to go along with an overt undoing of the Geneva Conventions.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2200703_pf.html
TURNING BACK THE CLOCK ON RAPE EDITORIAL (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): The bill on jailing, interrogating and trying terror suspects contains narrow definitions of rape and sexual assault that must be fixed before Congress can responsibly pass the legislation.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/opinion/edit...html?offset=10&
A TORTUROUS COMPROMISE EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): After delaying legal action against hundreds of detainees for almost five years, the administration should work with Congress to devise interrogation and trial rules that civilized peoples expect.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...promise?mode=PF
TWO-TIERED TORTURE STANDARDS: BY ALLOWING THE CIA LEEWAY IN INTERROGATIONS, THE SENATE GAVE UP TOO MUCH IN ITS COMPROMISE WITH BUSH ? EDITORIAL (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editor...ment-editorials
CIA VALUES SHOW IN STAND ON DETAINEES - GREG MILLER (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): On the detainee issue, the CIA is less swayed by concerns that other nations might retaliate against U.S. prisoners, and more inclined to consider any cost worth paying for the intelligence it generates.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wa...,1,770657.story
WHY RETIRED MILITARY BRASS DON'T WANT TORTURE: FIRSTHAND COMBAT EXPERIENCES COMPEL OLD GUARD TO ATTACK BUSH'S 'ALTERNATIVE INTERROGATION' - CHARLES KAISER (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
HE WROTE THE BOOK ON TORTURE [REVIEW OF WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR BY JOHN YOO] - JAMES BOVARD (AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, OCTOBER 9): John Yoo, the former Justice Department official, implies that the torture scandal may be largely a liberal media concoction. Though this book went to press in July 2006, Yoo relies on dubious data from September 2004 to exonerate the federal torturers.
http://www.amconmag.com/2006/2006_10_09/review.html
UN REPORT: TORTURE IN IRAQ 'TOTALLY OUT OF HAND': BUSH ADMINISTRATION REJECTS CLAIM THAT TORTURE MAY BE WORSE THAN UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN - TOM REGAN (CSMONITOR.COM, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0922/dailyUpdate.html
IN IRAQ, A JOURNALIST IN LIMBO - TOM CURLEY (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): Bilal Hussein, an Iraqi photographer who helped the Associated Press win a Pulitzer Prize last year, is now in his sixth month in a U.S. Army prison in Iraq. He doesn't understand why he's there, and neither do his AP colleagues.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201444_pf.html
DUE PROCESS, BULLDOZED - BOB HERBERT (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Several Iraqi journalists working for international news organizations have been held without charge by American and Iraqi forces. The absence of concrete evidence in so many of the cases is disturbing, to say the least.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opini...agewanted=print
CITY OF DEATH: THE BATTLE FOR BAGHDAD - BERNHARD ZAND (SPIEGEL INTERNATIONAL, SEPTEMBER 22): Once the most progressive city in the Arab world, Baghdad has been ravaged by war and bombings. Everyone wants out, but not everyone can afford to leave -- and car bomb explosions are a daily fact of life.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiege...,438429,00.html
WAR'S FORGOTTEN WOMEN - LIZETTE ALVAREZ (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, SEPTEMBER 24): Despite longstanding predictions that the United States would shudder when its women were killed in action, female military deaths have stirred no less -- and no more -- reaction at home than the deaths of the nearly 2,700 male dead.
http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file.../news/women.php
OUR FIVE IRAQ WARS - JAMES JAY CARAFANO (WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): What the United States needs to do is finish the job in Iraq -- and that means strengthening Iraq's security forces so they can handle the insurgency.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...23-084009-2950r
FACING FACTS ON IRAQ EDITORIAL (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): There is nothing about Iraq -- including withdrawal scenarios -- that is anything but ominous.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opinion/...agewanted=print
THE FACTS ON THE GROUND: MINI-GULAGS, HIRED GUNS, LOBBYISTS, AND A REALITY BUILT ON FEAR - TOM ENGELHARDT (TOMDISPATCH, SEPTEMBER 21): While Iraq and future Iraq policy are constantly in the news, almost all the American facts-on-the-ground in that country have come into being without consultation with the American people or, in any serious way, Congress (or testing in the courts).
http://tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=123690
BE READY FOR CIVIL WAR - DANIEL GALLINGTON (WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 15): Civil war may happen in Iraq no matter what we do or what we want -- and we had better be thinking about how it would support our longer-term policy objectives.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...24-085113-5472r
SPY AGENCIES SAY IRAQ WAR WORSENS TERROR THREAT - MARK MAZZETTI (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): The classified National Intelligence Estimate attributes a more direct role to the Iraq war in fueling radicalism than that presented either in recent White House documents or in a report released Wednesday by the House Intelligence Committee, according to several officials in Washington involved in preparing the assessment or who have read the final document.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/mi...agewanted=print
NEGROPONTE HIGHLIGHTS U.S. SUCCESSES: INTELLIGENCE VIEW THAT WAR IS INCREASING TERROR IS 'FRACTION OF JUDGMENTS,' HE SAYS - NEWS SERVICES (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 25)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092400986.html
CLOSING OF A NATION - DAVID BROOKS (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Iraq is the most xenophobic, sexist and reactionary society on earth.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opini...agewanted=print
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PLAYING SHELL GAMES ON RESPONSIBILITY WITH IRAQ - DERRICK Z. JACKSON (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): The same White House that trashed generals and bean counters for saying it would take hundreds of thousands of more troops and billions more dollars to secure Iraq is now blaming the puppet government for not securing the country.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...th_iraq?mode=PF
DIVIDING IRAQ WOULD JUST MEAN MORE THREATS: SEPARATE SUNNI, SHIITE AND KURD STATES ARE A SEDUCTIVE SOLUTION, BUT A SINGLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS IRAQ'S BEST CHANCE FOR STABILITY - W. ROBERT PEARSON (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
THE TROOPS STAY ON: PRESIDENT BUSH HELD OFF ON FORCE CUTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN THIS FALL. THERE'S GOOD REASON -- BUT IS THERE A GOOD PLAN? ? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201442_pf.html
LOSING AFGHANISTAN - JOHN KERRY (WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 25): Where allies have pledged troops and assistance in Afghanistan, they must follow through. But we must lead by example. That's how you win hearts and minds, and show the world the true face of America -- and that's how you win the war on terror. (Mr. Kerry, a senator from Massachusetts, was the 2004 Democratic nominee for president.)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1159138897...in_commentaries
PAID SUBSCRIPTION
THE KEY TO AFGHANISTAN: MORE TIME - JIM HOAGLAND (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): The struggle in Afghanistan needs resources, it needs time -- and it needs never to be forgotten.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201396_pf.html
A SILENCE IN THE AFGHAN MOUNTAINS: THE CONCEALMENT OF TWO DETAINEE DEATHS PAINTS A TROUBLING PICTURE OF ABUSE BY U.S. SPECIAL FORCES UNITS DEPLOYED TO THE COUNTRY - KEVIN SACK AND CRAIG PYES (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/na...-home-headlines
BUSH'S OPTIONS ON IRAN - ROBERT KUTTNER (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): Iran is far larger and more powerful than Iraq. Far from making war inevitable, that reality limits American options.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...on_iran?mode=PF
IRANIAN RHETORIC ASIDE, IT MAY BE TIME TO TALK - ROGER COHEN (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): In the Bush-led quest to transform the Middle East, a stick has been applied in Iraq. Its corollary almost certainly has to be a carrot deployed in Iran.
http://select.nytimes.com/iht/2006/09/23/w...agewanted=print
AHMADINEJAD'S GAUNTLET: THE U.S. AND IRAN NEED EACH OTHER TOO MUCH NOT TO FIND ACCOMMODATION - DAVID IGNATIUS (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): That's the challenge: Can America and Iran find a formula that will meet each side's security interests, and thereby allow Iran to return fully to the community of nations after 27 years?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201393_pf.html
IRAN'S UNSUBTLE LEADER EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): The transparent purpose of Ahmadinejad's brief against the Security Council is to delegitimize the resolution that the council passed at the end of August calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment of uranium and comply with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial..._leader?mode=PF
WASHINGTON IS SIGNALING TEHRAN - ZE'EV SCHIFF (HAARETZ.COM, SEPTEMBER 24): Washington is saying, effectively, that it will help Iran to develop into a regional power with economic capability if Iran is willing to forgo nuclear weapons. Tehran, for its part, is hesitating.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.j...SubContrassID=0
IRAN: CALLS FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES - DAVID CULP (COMMON DREAMS, SEPTEMBER 22): When he spoke about the nuclear weapons issues, the Iranian president was offering a reasonable basis for real negotiations.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-27.htm
WAR SIGNALS? - DAVE LINDORFF (NATION, SEPTEMBER 22/COMMON DREAMS): Bush Administration and the Pentagon have issued orders for a major "strike group" of ships, including the nuclear aircraft carrier Eisenhower as well as a cruiser, destroyer, frigate, submarine escort and supply ship, to head for the Persian Gulf, just off Iran's western coast.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-28.htm
WORLD POLITICS AND SHOW BIZ: ALL THE WORLD'S A STAGE JUSTIN RAIMONDO (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The regionalization of the Iraq war, the strong possibility that the U.S., not Iran, will use nuclear weapons -- in short, a cataclysmic clash of civilizations is on the immediate horizon.
http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=9732
MORE BUSH DIPLOMACY - GORDON PRATHER (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): Bush still intends to nuke the Mullahs.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=9737
AS CRAZY AS IT SOUNDS CHARLEY REESE (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): President George Bush might be planning to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities.
http://www.antiwar.com/reese/?articleid=9736
US-IRAN SHOOTOUT IS INEVITABLE LEON HADAR (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23):
http://www.antiwar.com/hadar/?articleid=9738
THE OCTOBER SURPRISE GARY HART (HUFFINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): It should come as no surprise if the Bush Administration undertakes a preemptive war against Iran sometime before the November election.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-hart/th...se_b_30086.html
SPEAKING WITH THE ENEMY: COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CHIEF EXPLAINS WHY HIS ORGANIZATION HOSTED A DISCUSSION WITH IRAN'S PRESIDENT - RICHARD N. HAASS (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/o...1,3492119.story
THE POWER OF PUBLIC OPINION - PATRICK MCELWEE (COMMON DREAMS, SEPTEMBER 22): Despite the propaganda onslaught, 19 percent believe Iran poses no threat at all to the U.S. and an additional 55 percent of the population believe Iran can be handled diplomatically.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-34.htm
FROM THE NEW "ANTI-SEMITISM" TO NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST: HOW ISRAEL IS ENGINEERING THE "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS" - JONATHAN COOK (COUNTERPUNCH, SEPTEMBER 23/24): As ever, the main target of the new anti-Semitism campaign were audiences in the US, Israel's generous patron. There, members of the Israel lobby were turning into a chorus of doom.
http://www.counterpunch.org/cook09232006.html
DO SOMETHING - OPINION (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22): Washington should be prepared to facilitate Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' efforts to reopen a dialogue with the Israelis.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/b...inion-headlines
DELUSION IN DAMASCUS: BASHAR ASSAD BELIEVES THAT SYRIA WON THE LEBANESE WAR ?EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): The many statesmen who have tried to do business with the Syrian president in the past -- such as former secretary of state Colin L. Powell or Egypt's Hosni Mubarak -- have discovered his assurances to secure the Syrian border are not only worthless but deliberately mendacious.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2300722_pf.html
AXIS OF SKETCHY ALLIES - MAUREEN DOWD (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): The administration?s great ally in the war on terror is General Musharraf, a dictator who appears to be harboring terrorists, including the one we want most.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/23/opini...agewanted=print
PAID SUBSCRIPTION
DEMOCRACY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD - LORENZO VIDINO (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): Promotion of democracy is an ambitious goal whose prospects for success are unclear. What can produce immediate gains is a head-on challenge of the enemy's ideological shortcomings.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...m_world?mode=PF
VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY - SARAH L. GILDEA / F. ANDY MESSING ( WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Our experience with democracy is relatively successful, but we must be wary of forcing our brand of freedom and democracy on others, or risk disillusionment and failure.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...24-085115-9442r
AS CHÁVEZ TALKS TOUGH, THE BUSH TEAM YAWNS EDWARD M. GOMEZ (WORLD VIEWS, SF GATE, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/det...5&entry_id=9140
CHÁVEZ'S INFERNO - ALVARO VARGAS LLOSA (WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 25): Chávez's eighth circle of hell is fraudulent anti-Americanism. Since oil makes up half the government's revenue and the U.S. is the principal destination of Venezuelan oil, he pays daily homage to U.S. capitalism.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1159141344...in_commentaries
PAID SUSBCRIPTION
HURRICANE CHÁVEZ: WHAT'S WORSE FOR ENERGY SECURITY: A NATURAL DISASTER OR A PETRO-BULLY? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): To the extent that Mr. Chávez's wild talk stirs up anti-American feeling, he must be regarded as an irritant.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2300721_pf.html
DEVIL IN DISGUISE
EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 22): Chávez has been brandishing anti-Americanism ever since he became president in 1998. Chávez is criticizing the leading force behind a world economic system that has enriched his country and enhanced his power.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...isguise?mode=PF
A WHIFF OF THE DEVIL - JEFF JACOBY (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): As night descends on Venezuela, thuggish rulers everywhere are finding Chávez a kindred spirit. There was indeed an odor of sulfur at the UN last week, but it didn't come from President Bush.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...e_devil?mode=PF
TRASH TALK AT THE U.N.: CHAVEZ DELUSION - STEPHEN JOHNSON (NATIONAL REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 22): When he spoke at the U.N. General Assembly this week, President Chávez made it clear that his objective is to lead a global coalition to confront the United States.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YTY3Y...DYzYjdhNTMwYjc=
DIFFERENCES ASIDE, IT'S ALL POLITICS - MARK H. TEETER (MOSCOW TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Is somebody willing to put real, visible effort into developing avenues and areas for Russian-U.S. cooperation now, to engage and interact? Or is the best we both can hope for an uncomfortable, ill-defined stasis that benefits no discernible good cause?
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2006/09/25/009.html
WHY YOU SHOULD CARE ABOUT REINHOLD NIEBUHR: NO ONE IS ALL GOOD OR ALL EVIL - EMILY L. HAUSER (SEPTEMBER 24): President Bush has long painted the international community, and the nation's foreign policy, in stark terms. "Islamo-fascists" and, before them, the "axis of evil," described our many enemies in black and white.
Yet as Bush divides the world this way, more Americans are beginning to question his strict breakdown of good and evil.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion...perspective-hed
RENOUNCING BUSH'S FAILURES IS A START: THE PRESIDENT'S ONETIME LAPDOGS SHOULD ALSO RETHINK THE EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY THAT GOT US HERE - TODD GITLIN (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): The core of the Bush problem is an extremist worldview. Bush's aggressive go-it-alone attitude kicked in long before 9/11. "You're either with us or you're with the terrorists" was just an extension of Bush's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol (the international global warming agreement) and the International Criminal Court.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
WHY WE CAN'T WIN - JON BASIL UTLEY (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): America is incapable of organizing itself to successfully impose our will by force upon small foreign nations, much less the world.
http://www.antiwar.com/utley/?articleid=9728
A FOREIGN POLICY OF FAILURE DOUG BANDOW (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The United States today is weaker, more isolated, and more vulnerable because of the Bush administration's policies.
http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9726
THE NEW GLOBAL POPULISM - KAVEH L. AFRASIABI (ASIA TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): What sets this year's General Assembly gathering somewhat apart is the window it has opened onto a global realignment consisting of many Third World nations forming a coherent anti-US bloc.
http://atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/HI23Aa02.html
THE WAR OF THE HACKS - COLBERT I. KING (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): The terrorist ilk that attacked on Sept. 11 must be broken -- not chased, harassed or condemned from a U.N. podium, but broken. That means: Take them down here, there or anywhere they're found.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201439_pf.html
QUOTATIONS FOR THE DAY
"SHOW ME WHERE THE ROADS END, AND I WILL SHOW YOU WHERE THE TALIBAN BEGINS."
--Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan; cited in Jim Hoagland, 'The Key to Afghanistan: More Time (Washington post, September 24)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201396_pf.html
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060925/ts_al...HE0BHNlYwN0bWE-
Iraq tours stretched for 4,000 US troops: Pentagon Mon Sep 25, 7:22 PM ET
The US Army will lengthen tours in Iraq for 4,000 soldiers to maintain the US troop level there at 145,000 until next spring, the Pentagon said.
The Defense Department will keep one unit in Iraq 46 days longer and send another unit 30 days earlier than scheduled.
"These adjustments are necessary to maintain the current force structure in Iraq into the Spring of next year," the Defense Department said in a statement.
The current troop level stands at 145,000.
Last week, General John Abizaid, head of the US Central Command, said more than 140,000 troops will likely remain in country through the spring of 2007.
"In consultation with the new Iraqi government, commanders continue to assess the situation to ensure the appropriate force levels to support the Iraqi government," the military said.
"The 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division, based in Friedberg, Germany, will have their tour of duty extended for approximately 46 days," the Pentagon said in a statement.
The unit was to return home in mid-January and will remain until late February.
That will allow another unit, the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 3rd Infantry Division 12 months to rest, re-equip, train and prepare for its next tour of duty, the Pentagon said.
Another unit, the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division, will go to Iraq 30 days earlier than planned, to head for Iraq in late October.
"There's no question but that any time there's a war, the forces of the countries involved are asked to do a great deal," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said.
"From time to time there may be units that will be asked to increase the number of days in the country from what had been anticipated," he said.
The Washington Times reported Monday that the Pentagon may look at adding more units to the rotation mix.
"It may accelerate the pace of deployments, or it may mean looking at calling up additional units," the Washington daily quoted a Pentagon official as saying.
That option may become reality in November, when the Pentagon is expected to identify units that will go to Iraq next year, the report said.
The increased demand for troops comes at a time when military analysts say it is nearly stressed to the breaking point, according to the Times.
Non-deployed combat brigades are experiencing low readiness ratings due mostly to a lack of usable weapons and equipment, the paper noted.
The wear and tear in Iraq is ruining M1A1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Humvee vehicles and other equipment at such a fast pace that the Army has neither the money nor the industrial base to replace them, according to the Times.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Questions or Comments
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Iraq tours stretched for 4,000 US troops: Pentagon Mon Sep 25, 7:22 PM ET
The US Army will lengthen tours in Iraq for 4,000 soldiers to maintain the US troop level there at 145,000 until next spring, the Pentagon said.
The Defense Department will keep one unit in Iraq 46 days longer and send another unit 30 days earlier than scheduled.
"These adjustments are necessary to maintain the current force structure in Iraq into the Spring of next year," the Defense Department said in a statement.
The current troop level stands at 145,000.
Last week, General John Abizaid, head of the US Central Command, said more than 140,000 troops will likely remain in country through the spring of 2007.
"In consultation with the new Iraqi government, commanders continue to assess the situation to ensure the appropriate force levels to support the Iraqi government," the military said.
"The 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division, based in Friedberg, Germany, will have their tour of duty extended for approximately 46 days," the Pentagon said in a statement.
The unit was to return home in mid-January and will remain until late February.
That will allow another unit, the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 3rd Infantry Division 12 months to rest, re-equip, train and prepare for its next tour of duty, the Pentagon said.
Another unit, the 4th Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division, will go to Iraq 30 days earlier than planned, to head for Iraq in late October.
"There's no question but that any time there's a war, the forces of the countries involved are asked to do a great deal," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said.
"From time to time there may be units that will be asked to increase the number of days in the country from what had been anticipated," he said.
The Washington Times reported Monday that the Pentagon may look at adding more units to the rotation mix.
"It may accelerate the pace of deployments, or it may mean looking at calling up additional units," the Washington daily quoted a Pentagon official as saying.
That option may become reality in November, when the Pentagon is expected to identify units that will go to Iraq next year, the report said.
The increased demand for troops comes at a time when military analysts say it is nearly stressed to the breaking point, according to the Times.
Non-deployed combat brigades are experiencing low readiness ratings due mostly to a lack of usable weapons and equipment, the paper noted.
The wear and tear in Iraq is ruining M1A1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Humvee vehicles and other equipment at such a fast pace that the Army has neither the money nor the industrial base to replace them, according to the Times.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Questions or Comments
Privacy Policy -Terms of Service - Copyright/IP Policy - Ad Feedback
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-0..._x.htm?csp=N009
Families bear catastrophic war wounds
Army Spc. Ethan Biggers, 21, left, shown in this undated photo is in a coma at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington after being shot in the head by a sniper in Iraq on March 5, 2006. Twin brother, Army Spc. Matthew Biggers, is shown on the right.
By Gregg Zoroya, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — Army chaplain Kenneth Kaibel touched a cup of Communion wine to the lips of Spc. Ethan Biggers, who lay comatose at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. A drop slipped down his throat. The soldier gagged and coughed twice as his stepmother, Cheryl Biggers, cradled him ever more closely.
"That's all right," she whispered, her left hand gently supporting the base of his head. Depressions revealed where battlefield surgeons peeled back his scalp and removed large sections of skull to relieve swelling from a bullet fired by a sniper in Iraq in March.
His stepmother grasped his clenched fingers and kept her face close to his. "I want to make sure that he knows that I have him," Cheryl Biggers explained.
That was in June. Ethan Biggers, 22, was later transferred to a Department of Veterans Affairs hospital in Tampa and remains in a near-coma state.
"He can hear us. He opens his eyes. And we think he can follow our voices," says Cheryl Biggers, 51. "But he can't quite focus."
Biggers is part of a small but growing number of catastrophically wounded casualties from Iraq and Afghanistan — many of whom would never have survived this long in previous wars.
According to the Pentagon, at least 250 soldiers and Marines have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan with head wounds that left them — at least initially — comatose or unable to care for themselves.
ARMY MULLS LIVING WILLS: More returning from war with brain damage
"We all look at the amputees and say, 'God, they're really lucky,' " says Liza Biggers, 25, who left her career as a freelance artist to devote all her time to her brother.
Families' lives rearranged
Families of these wrecked young men contend not only with the shock of seeing the physical destruction to their loved ones but also with how their own lives change dramatically. Parents and siblings give up careers, forsake wages and reconstruct homes to care for wounded relatives rather than consign them to a nursing home.
"My son is in such a state," says Edgar Edmundson, 51, who left his job as a pie bakery supervisor to care full time for his son, Eric, 26, an Army sergeant. "He doesn't have control of his bladder or his bowels. He can't walk and he can't talk. ... To me, his father, the life my son knew is over."
Eric Edmundson, married and the father of a 20-month-old girl, was hurt in a roadside explosion Oct. 2 in Iraq. During surgery, his heart stopped and he suffered severe brain damage. His father, who had dreams of one day opening a gun and bait shop with his only son, now bathes and changes him daily and takes him to a rehabilitation center for physical therapy. Edgar Edmundson and his wife, Beth, who works as a state office supervisor, share a three-bedroom rental home in New Bern, N.C., with their son and his family.
"I guess you could say we don't have any disposable income," Edgar Edmundson says. "I live this every day. My son and I were very close. We had big plans."
Families say they also struggle with military and VA medical systems that were unprepared for these severely brain-damaged casualties.
They say the rehabilitation of catastrophic cases has not kept pace with the advances in battlefield medicine that kept these servicemembers alive and brought them home safely.
"They're saving their lives. But there is no system really in place to give them their life back," says Marissa Behee, whose husband, Jarod, 27, was shot in the head by a sniper in Iraq on May 25, 2005.
She says her husband showed little improvement after spending three months in the summer of 2005 in one of the VA's new polytrauma centers in Palo Alto, Calif. The centers are designed specifically to treat servicemembers suffering multiple injuries.
Help for soldiers, families
VA officials defend their programs and say they have made great strides in meeting these severe needs with their polytrauma facilities. By the end of this fiscal year, 21 new outpatient centers designed to monitor and continue treating rehab patients will be operating, officials say. They concede, however, that war has brought new challenges.
"There are some issues about family support, issues about the complexity of the medical and specialized needs that have to be addressed," says Lucille "Lu" Beck, chief consultant to the VA for rehabilitative services. "We have survivors now who come to us with medical conditions, rehab needs, multiple impairments that we've not seen before."
Behee has formed a foundation called Heroes with Head Injuries to provide other families with information on how to navigate the military medical system with a brain-damaged loved one.
In an effort to address concerns about military care, the Army's Wounded Warrior Program, which serves as an advocate for severely disabled soldiers and their families, held the first in a series of symposiums with wounded soldiers and family members. In June, the Army asked the more than 40 attendees to go through dozens of complaints and narrow them to a manageable list. Among the issues raised: problems in the process of notifying families about casualties; a shortage of trained case managers; the adequacy of rehabilitation for severely brain-damaged soldiers; confusion about the medical retirement process; and the need for more financial support for families.
"They are being pushed to the highest level," says Army Col. Mary Carstensen, director of the Wounded Warrior Program.
One recommendation from the symposium was for the military to more aggressively urge soldiers to fill out living wills containing directives about whether medical treatment should be withheld in the event of a dire brain injury.
Ethan Biggers' family is divided. His twin brother, Matt, a former soldier, believes Ethan wouldn't have wanted extraordinary steps taken to preserve his life.
Army Maj. Ronald Riechers, a neurologist who treated Ethan Biggers at Walter Reed, is grim about his future. He says Biggers could either remain in a near-coma or progress to requiring significant lifelong assistance. Perhaps he would be able to sit in a wheelchair, Riechers says.
Cheryl and Liza Biggers believe they see incremental improvement in Ethan and hold out hope. Ethan Biggers' wife, Britni, hopes her husband will someday recognize the couple's son, Eben, born June 2.
Liza Biggers works with hospital staff to stimulate responses from her brother, using Britni's Cotton Blossom body lotion, peeled oranges and Tootsie Rolls.
"I feel that we're here to get Ethan better," she says. "It's not asking too much to sacrifice a year or two of our lives to get Ethan back."
They suffered a setback July 27 when Ethan's father, Rand Biggers, died in a traffic accident. He had shepherded his son through the military's medical system. "I believe in God," he had said. "Something goodwill come out of it."
Today, the Biggers family continues its vigil at Ethan's bedside.
Cheryl Biggers says that for soldiers like her stepson, their last waking thought was of war. "I want to make sure that he knows where he is, that he's safe. We wouldn't be here with him unless it was safe, and trying to convince him to wake up," she says softly, cradling Ethan.
"Come on out and join us," she tells him. "Everybody's waiting."
Families bear catastrophic war wounds
Army Spc. Ethan Biggers, 21, left, shown in this undated photo is in a coma at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington after being shot in the head by a sniper in Iraq on March 5, 2006. Twin brother, Army Spc. Matthew Biggers, is shown on the right.
By Gregg Zoroya, USA TODAY
WASHINGTON — Army chaplain Kenneth Kaibel touched a cup of Communion wine to the lips of Spc. Ethan Biggers, who lay comatose at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. A drop slipped down his throat. The soldier gagged and coughed twice as his stepmother, Cheryl Biggers, cradled him ever more closely.
"That's all right," she whispered, her left hand gently supporting the base of his head. Depressions revealed where battlefield surgeons peeled back his scalp and removed large sections of skull to relieve swelling from a bullet fired by a sniper in Iraq in March.
His stepmother grasped his clenched fingers and kept her face close to his. "I want to make sure that he knows that I have him," Cheryl Biggers explained.
That was in June. Ethan Biggers, 22, was later transferred to a Department of Veterans Affairs hospital in Tampa and remains in a near-coma state.
"He can hear us. He opens his eyes. And we think he can follow our voices," says Cheryl Biggers, 51. "But he can't quite focus."
Biggers is part of a small but growing number of catastrophically wounded casualties from Iraq and Afghanistan — many of whom would never have survived this long in previous wars.
According to the Pentagon, at least 250 soldiers and Marines have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan with head wounds that left them — at least initially — comatose or unable to care for themselves.
ARMY MULLS LIVING WILLS: More returning from war with brain damage
"We all look at the amputees and say, 'God, they're really lucky,' " says Liza Biggers, 25, who left her career as a freelance artist to devote all her time to her brother.
Families' lives rearranged
Families of these wrecked young men contend not only with the shock of seeing the physical destruction to their loved ones but also with how their own lives change dramatically. Parents and siblings give up careers, forsake wages and reconstruct homes to care for wounded relatives rather than consign them to a nursing home.
"My son is in such a state," says Edgar Edmundson, 51, who left his job as a pie bakery supervisor to care full time for his son, Eric, 26, an Army sergeant. "He doesn't have control of his bladder or his bowels. He can't walk and he can't talk. ... To me, his father, the life my son knew is over."
Eric Edmundson, married and the father of a 20-month-old girl, was hurt in a roadside explosion Oct. 2 in Iraq. During surgery, his heart stopped and he suffered severe brain damage. His father, who had dreams of one day opening a gun and bait shop with his only son, now bathes and changes him daily and takes him to a rehabilitation center for physical therapy. Edgar Edmundson and his wife, Beth, who works as a state office supervisor, share a three-bedroom rental home in New Bern, N.C., with their son and his family.
"I guess you could say we don't have any disposable income," Edgar Edmundson says. "I live this every day. My son and I were very close. We had big plans."
Families say they also struggle with military and VA medical systems that were unprepared for these severely brain-damaged casualties.
They say the rehabilitation of catastrophic cases has not kept pace with the advances in battlefield medicine that kept these servicemembers alive and brought them home safely.
"They're saving their lives. But there is no system really in place to give them their life back," says Marissa Behee, whose husband, Jarod, 27, was shot in the head by a sniper in Iraq on May 25, 2005.
She says her husband showed little improvement after spending three months in the summer of 2005 in one of the VA's new polytrauma centers in Palo Alto, Calif. The centers are designed specifically to treat servicemembers suffering multiple injuries.
Help for soldiers, families
VA officials defend their programs and say they have made great strides in meeting these severe needs with their polytrauma facilities. By the end of this fiscal year, 21 new outpatient centers designed to monitor and continue treating rehab patients will be operating, officials say. They concede, however, that war has brought new challenges.
"There are some issues about family support, issues about the complexity of the medical and specialized needs that have to be addressed," says Lucille "Lu" Beck, chief consultant to the VA for rehabilitative services. "We have survivors now who come to us with medical conditions, rehab needs, multiple impairments that we've not seen before."
Behee has formed a foundation called Heroes with Head Injuries to provide other families with information on how to navigate the military medical system with a brain-damaged loved one.
In an effort to address concerns about military care, the Army's Wounded Warrior Program, which serves as an advocate for severely disabled soldiers and their families, held the first in a series of symposiums with wounded soldiers and family members. In June, the Army asked the more than 40 attendees to go through dozens of complaints and narrow them to a manageable list. Among the issues raised: problems in the process of notifying families about casualties; a shortage of trained case managers; the adequacy of rehabilitation for severely brain-damaged soldiers; confusion about the medical retirement process; and the need for more financial support for families.
"They are being pushed to the highest level," says Army Col. Mary Carstensen, director of the Wounded Warrior Program.
One recommendation from the symposium was for the military to more aggressively urge soldiers to fill out living wills containing directives about whether medical treatment should be withheld in the event of a dire brain injury.
Ethan Biggers' family is divided. His twin brother, Matt, a former soldier, believes Ethan wouldn't have wanted extraordinary steps taken to preserve his life.
Army Maj. Ronald Riechers, a neurologist who treated Ethan Biggers at Walter Reed, is grim about his future. He says Biggers could either remain in a near-coma or progress to requiring significant lifelong assistance. Perhaps he would be able to sit in a wheelchair, Riechers says.
Cheryl and Liza Biggers believe they see incremental improvement in Ethan and hold out hope. Ethan Biggers' wife, Britni, hopes her husband will someday recognize the couple's son, Eben, born June 2.
Liza Biggers works with hospital staff to stimulate responses from her brother, using Britni's Cotton Blossom body lotion, peeled oranges and Tootsie Rolls.
"I feel that we're here to get Ethan better," she says. "It's not asking too much to sacrifice a year or two of our lives to get Ethan back."
They suffered a setback July 27 when Ethan's father, Rand Biggers, died in a traffic accident. He had shepherded his son through the military's medical system. "I believe in God," he had said. "Something goodwill come out of it."
Today, the Biggers family continues its vigil at Ethan's bedside.
Cheryl Biggers says that for soldiers like her stepson, their last waking thought was of war. "I want to make sure that he knows where he is, that he's safe. We wouldn't be here with him unless it was safe, and trying to convince him to wake up," she says softly, cradling Ethan.
"Come on out and join us," she tells him. "Everybody's waiting."
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0925/p20s01-lire.html
Backstory: Enlisting churches to help soldiers
A military chaplain in Minnesota encourages clergy to act as counselors to National Guard troops returning from Iraq.
By Sean J. Miller | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
MINNEAPOLIS – John Morris, a military chaplain, stands at the front of a crowded conference room dressed in desert fatigues and tan combat boots, commanding his audience's attention with a tone barely above a whisper. Addressing some 30 Minnesota church leaders, Major Morris opens with a story about his time in Anbar Province, an insurgent stronghold in western Iraq.
"When the insurgents found out a new unit was there, they would walk a child in front of our convoys," he recalls. "What does a good Minnesota person do? Stop. You only do that one time, because you get ambushed and someone gets maimed or killed."
It's a chilling story, which Morris heard from numerous soldiers in combat, meant to convey the reality of war - and the kind of psychological stress soldiers go through in the field and when they come home.
Morris is on a mission. Since returning from the Middle East, the deputy state chaplain of the Minnesota Army National Guard has labored to convince members of Minnesota's religious community - many of whom oppose the war - to support the soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. More than that, he wants them to be frontline counselors and comforters.
"Sociologists or psychologists - they're great, they're helpful," Morris tells the audience. "But when I get to this issue, I have to always tell them, 'I'm sorry but there are people better qualified than you to handle this: religious leaders.' You're the healers. You bring reconciliation."
***
Morris is tall, with close-cropped brown hair and smooth features. He projects a calm, commanding presence that comes from experience hard earned. In April 2004, he was deployed with the US troops who surrounded Fallujah in response to four American contractors being killed and mutilated. While the battle for Fallujah raged, Morris circled the area in an armored Humvee offering Protestant Easter sunrise services to the support troops. The brutality of the conflict tested even his Christianity.
"That's probably the closest I've ever come to hate," says Morris."I came so close to the mentality: 'Kill them all and God is on our side.' Spiritual discipline held me back from that abyss."
Morris's spiritual discipline was still being tested two months after he returned home to Roseville, Minn. He was experiencing violent mood swings. His anger erupted at the slightest provocation, as when someone cut in front of him in a line at the airport. Morris wondered what combat soldiers must face after coming home.
"I'm a chaplain and I didn't pull a trigger and didn't take a human life, and I'm this mad," he says.
The horrors of war do shadow American soldiers. According to a 2004 study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, 17 percent of combat veterans arrive home with mental health issues, ranging from depression to posttraumatic stress disorder.
National Guard soldiers face their own peculiar problems. They experience a rapid change from military to civilian life. In less than two weeks, once their tours in Iraq or Afghanistan are up, they can go from dodging roadside bombs and insurgent ambushes, to picking up Starbucks and rushing to a business meeting. Moreover, not since World War II have so many Guard soldiers served in combat and had to reintegrate into civilian life.
The Pentagon has learned - often the hard way - that returning soldiers need long-term support with the transition. "We didn't do it for the Vietnam vets, and in a sense we're paying for that now," says David Segal, a military sociologist at the University of Maryland.
Guard soldiers are entitled to the same counseling and support services offered to members of other branches of the military. But they often live hundreds of miles from the nearest military post, which can make counseling difficult.
Minnesota's program is unusual because - in addition to offering spiritual counseling - it requires Guard soldiers to report back to their barracks 30, 60, and 90 days after they're home. This is actually in violation of Pentagon policy, which insists that Guard members are "on leave" and cannot be called back. But Morris calls this time the "golden, hour," and feels it's critical to keep members connected and supported.
"I'm proud to tell you that, in Minnesota, we are in open violation of that Department of Defense policy," he says.
In the last year, he's had two soldiers tell him that they planned to kill themselves after they reported back to their barracks. Morris says he got those soldiers counseling, which they may not have received otherwise.
Another soldier Morris helped was Sgt. Ron Huff, an 18-year veteran of the Army National Guard. Sergeant Huff recently spent a year in Iraq clearing improvised explosive devises from the highway between Tikrit and Kirkuk. In his first month home, he couldn't switch out of his Iraq driving style and was ticketed four times for speeding by the same sheriff's deputy. Later, he experienced flashbacks, turned to alcohol, and totaled his motorcycle.
In Iraq, Huff commanded 35 soldiers - who affectionately called him "Huff Daddy" - but back home he didn't know where, or how, to ask for help. That's when Morris walked into his office. As Huff recalls it, Morris made him realize that "I'm not the only one who feels crazy." Huff and Morris now work together. "He's the smart guy and I'm the common sense guy," Huff says.
***
In the year sinc Morris started his church outreach programcalled "Beyond the Yellow Ribbon," Minnesota hasn't lost a Guard to suicide. The idea is to ask churches with soldiers in their congregations to become "military friendly." Morris encourages them to take care of the service members and their families - bringing them meals, providing marital counseling, or just listening.
Pastors, he says, can publicly welcome soldiers home and acknowledge their service. They can also watch for signs of reckless behavior.
The program "is a step in the right direction," says Prof. Segal, the military sociologist. "I think it will make the transition easier."
Yet not everyone is enamored of Morris's program. Gary Kohls, a lay member of Every Church a Peace Church, a national group that encourages churches to preach pacifism, says Christians shouldn't engage in combat, even if they're soldiers. "We take the stance that [combat trauma] could be prevented totally, by refusing to engage in homicidal violence," says Dr. Kohls, the leader of a worship community in Duluth, Minn. "I'm very disappointed when churches are either silent or vocally in support of killing."
It took until late July for Minnesota's religious leaders to accept an invitation to hear Morris address the problems faced by returning Guard soldiers. When the chaplain finished his presentation and the applause died down, he made a heartfelt request. "Please, do not repeat what we did to Vietnam veterans," he said.
One pastor who listened that morning - and won't - was Don Britt. His church, the United Church of Christ, has opposed the war in Iraq. "I hate war and I hate this war in particular," says Mr. Britt. "But I have a son there."
Britt says listening to Morris will help him raise his congregation's awareness of his son, Dan, and other soldiers' experience. "Hopefully, a lot more people will make the distinction between the politicians making the decisions to send these guys to war and our soldiers," he says.
Backstory: Enlisting churches to help soldiers
A military chaplain in Minnesota encourages clergy to act as counselors to National Guard troops returning from Iraq.
By Sean J. Miller | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
MINNEAPOLIS – John Morris, a military chaplain, stands at the front of a crowded conference room dressed in desert fatigues and tan combat boots, commanding his audience's attention with a tone barely above a whisper. Addressing some 30 Minnesota church leaders, Major Morris opens with a story about his time in Anbar Province, an insurgent stronghold in western Iraq.
"When the insurgents found out a new unit was there, they would walk a child in front of our convoys," he recalls. "What does a good Minnesota person do? Stop. You only do that one time, because you get ambushed and someone gets maimed or killed."
It's a chilling story, which Morris heard from numerous soldiers in combat, meant to convey the reality of war - and the kind of psychological stress soldiers go through in the field and when they come home.
Morris is on a mission. Since returning from the Middle East, the deputy state chaplain of the Minnesota Army National Guard has labored to convince members of Minnesota's religious community - many of whom oppose the war - to support the soldiers returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. More than that, he wants them to be frontline counselors and comforters.
"Sociologists or psychologists - they're great, they're helpful," Morris tells the audience. "But when I get to this issue, I have to always tell them, 'I'm sorry but there are people better qualified than you to handle this: religious leaders.' You're the healers. You bring reconciliation."
***
Morris is tall, with close-cropped brown hair and smooth features. He projects a calm, commanding presence that comes from experience hard earned. In April 2004, he was deployed with the US troops who surrounded Fallujah in response to four American contractors being killed and mutilated. While the battle for Fallujah raged, Morris circled the area in an armored Humvee offering Protestant Easter sunrise services to the support troops. The brutality of the conflict tested even his Christianity.
"That's probably the closest I've ever come to hate," says Morris."I came so close to the mentality: 'Kill them all and God is on our side.' Spiritual discipline held me back from that abyss."
Morris's spiritual discipline was still being tested two months after he returned home to Roseville, Minn. He was experiencing violent mood swings. His anger erupted at the slightest provocation, as when someone cut in front of him in a line at the airport. Morris wondered what combat soldiers must face after coming home.
"I'm a chaplain and I didn't pull a trigger and didn't take a human life, and I'm this mad," he says.
The horrors of war do shadow American soldiers. According to a 2004 study published in the New England Journal of Medicine, 17 percent of combat veterans arrive home with mental health issues, ranging from depression to posttraumatic stress disorder.
National Guard soldiers face their own peculiar problems. They experience a rapid change from military to civilian life. In less than two weeks, once their tours in Iraq or Afghanistan are up, they can go from dodging roadside bombs and insurgent ambushes, to picking up Starbucks and rushing to a business meeting. Moreover, not since World War II have so many Guard soldiers served in combat and had to reintegrate into civilian life.
The Pentagon has learned - often the hard way - that returning soldiers need long-term support with the transition. "We didn't do it for the Vietnam vets, and in a sense we're paying for that now," says David Segal, a military sociologist at the University of Maryland.
Guard soldiers are entitled to the same counseling and support services offered to members of other branches of the military. But they often live hundreds of miles from the nearest military post, which can make counseling difficult.
Minnesota's program is unusual because - in addition to offering spiritual counseling - it requires Guard soldiers to report back to their barracks 30, 60, and 90 days after they're home. This is actually in violation of Pentagon policy, which insists that Guard members are "on leave" and cannot be called back. But Morris calls this time the "golden, hour," and feels it's critical to keep members connected and supported.
"I'm proud to tell you that, in Minnesota, we are in open violation of that Department of Defense policy," he says.
In the last year, he's had two soldiers tell him that they planned to kill themselves after they reported back to their barracks. Morris says he got those soldiers counseling, which they may not have received otherwise.
Another soldier Morris helped was Sgt. Ron Huff, an 18-year veteran of the Army National Guard. Sergeant Huff recently spent a year in Iraq clearing improvised explosive devises from the highway between Tikrit and Kirkuk. In his first month home, he couldn't switch out of his Iraq driving style and was ticketed four times for speeding by the same sheriff's deputy. Later, he experienced flashbacks, turned to alcohol, and totaled his motorcycle.
In Iraq, Huff commanded 35 soldiers - who affectionately called him "Huff Daddy" - but back home he didn't know where, or how, to ask for help. That's when Morris walked into his office. As Huff recalls it, Morris made him realize that "I'm not the only one who feels crazy." Huff and Morris now work together. "He's the smart guy and I'm the common sense guy," Huff says.
***
In the year sinc Morris started his church outreach programcalled "Beyond the Yellow Ribbon," Minnesota hasn't lost a Guard to suicide. The idea is to ask churches with soldiers in their congregations to become "military friendly." Morris encourages them to take care of the service members and their families - bringing them meals, providing marital counseling, or just listening.
Pastors, he says, can publicly welcome soldiers home and acknowledge their service. They can also watch for signs of reckless behavior.
The program "is a step in the right direction," says Prof. Segal, the military sociologist. "I think it will make the transition easier."
Yet not everyone is enamored of Morris's program. Gary Kohls, a lay member of Every Church a Peace Church, a national group that encourages churches to preach pacifism, says Christians shouldn't engage in combat, even if they're soldiers. "We take the stance that [combat trauma] could be prevented totally, by refusing to engage in homicidal violence," says Dr. Kohls, the leader of a worship community in Duluth, Minn. "I'm very disappointed when churches are either silent or vocally in support of killing."
It took until late July for Minnesota's religious leaders to accept an invitation to hear Morris address the problems faced by returning Guard soldiers. When the chaplain finished his presentation and the applause died down, he made a heartfelt request. "Please, do not repeat what we did to Vietnam veterans," he said.
One pastor who listened that morning - and won't - was Don Britt. His church, the United Church of Christ, has opposed the war in Iraq. "I hate war and I hate this war in particular," says Mr. Britt. "But I have a son there."
Britt says listening to Morris will help him raise his congregation's awareness of his son, Dan, and other soldiers' experience. "Hopefully, a lot more people will make the distinction between the politicians making the decisions to send these guys to war and our soldiers," he says.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060926/pl_af...HE0BHNlYwN0bWE-
Three Marines to face court-martial in Iraq murder probe: military Mon Sep 25, 8:45 PM ET
Three US Marines are to face court-martial for allegedly murdering an Iraqi civilian north of Baghdad earlier this year, the military said in a statement.
Corporal Marshall Magincalda, private first-class John Jodka and lance-corporal Jerry Shumate are accused of killing Hashim Ibrahim Awad on April 26 in Hamdania, the statement said.
The statement released by the Marines at their Camp Pendleton base south of Los Angeles said the three men would face court-martial at a later date.
Marines commander James Mattis had ordered the court-martial following preliminary hearings against the men. The statement said the death penalty would not be sought against any of the three Marines.
Jodka, Magincalda and Shumate are charged with murder, conspiracy and housebreaking. They also are charged with seizing and holding the victim against his will.
Jodka also faces a charge of assault, while Magincalda and Shumate also are charged with larceny.
The charges relate to the death of Awad in April. Prosecutors allege that Awad was kidnapped from his home and shot dead.
The accused Marines are alleged to have attempted to cover up the killing by planting a shovel and an AK-47 assault rifle next to the body in order to make it look as if Awad had been an insurgent planting a roadside bomb.
Neighbours and family members alleged Marines shot the 52-year-old disabled former Iraqi soldier because he had refused to act as an informer for coalition forces hunting members of the insurgency.
A relative of the dead man also claimed that an unidentified US soldier had later offered to pay the family an undisclosed sum in compensation provided they told investigators that Awad had been an insurgent.
Jodka, Magincalda and Shumate are among seven Marines and one navy corpsman charged in the killing. The remaining five suspects await preliminary hearings.
Charges of assault against a fourth Marine, lance-corporal Henry Lever, relating to a separate incident on April 10 were dismissed.
The Hamdaniya case is the first hearing relating to the conduct of Marines in Iraq to take place at Camp Pendleton, which is also expected to host hearings and trials for the deaths of 24 civilians in Haditha last November.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
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Three Marines to face court-martial in Iraq murder probe: military Mon Sep 25, 8:45 PM ET
Three US Marines are to face court-martial for allegedly murdering an Iraqi civilian north of Baghdad earlier this year, the military said in a statement.
Corporal Marshall Magincalda, private first-class John Jodka and lance-corporal Jerry Shumate are accused of killing Hashim Ibrahim Awad on April 26 in Hamdania, the statement said.
The statement released by the Marines at their Camp Pendleton base south of Los Angeles said the three men would face court-martial at a later date.
Marines commander James Mattis had ordered the court-martial following preliminary hearings against the men. The statement said the death penalty would not be sought against any of the three Marines.
Jodka, Magincalda and Shumate are charged with murder, conspiracy and housebreaking. They also are charged with seizing and holding the victim against his will.
Jodka also faces a charge of assault, while Magincalda and Shumate also are charged with larceny.
The charges relate to the death of Awad in April. Prosecutors allege that Awad was kidnapped from his home and shot dead.
The accused Marines are alleged to have attempted to cover up the killing by planting a shovel and an AK-47 assault rifle next to the body in order to make it look as if Awad had been an insurgent planting a roadside bomb.
Neighbours and family members alleged Marines shot the 52-year-old disabled former Iraqi soldier because he had refused to act as an informer for coalition forces hunting members of the insurgency.
A relative of the dead man also claimed that an unidentified US soldier had later offered to pay the family an undisclosed sum in compensation provided they told investigators that Awad had been an insurgent.
Jodka, Magincalda and Shumate are among seven Marines and one navy corpsman charged in the killing. The remaining five suspects await preliminary hearings.
Charges of assault against a fourth Marine, lance-corporal Henry Lever, relating to a separate incident on April 10 were dismissed.
The Hamdaniya case is the first hearing relating to the conduct of Marines in Iraq to take place at Camp Pendleton, which is also expected to host hearings and trials for the deaths of 24 civilians in Haditha last November.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Questions or Comments
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http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060925/ts_al...HE0BHNlYwN0bWE-
White House admits Iraq fuels extremism Mon Sep 25, 3:32 PM ET
The White House acknowledged that Iraq was among several factors that "fuel the spread of jihadism" but said that winning the war would dishearten potential terrorists.
Spokesman Tony Snow sought to challenge news reports on Sunday about the latest National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, which represents the comprehensive consensus findings of the 16 US intelligence agencies.
"It assesses that a variety of factors, in addition to Iraq, fuel the spread of jihadism, including longstanding social grievances, slowness of the pace of reform, and the use of the Internet," he told reporters.
"And it also notes that should jihadists be perceived to have failed in Iraq, fewer will be inspired to carry on the fight," the spokesman said as US President George W. Bush traveled here for a political fundraiser.
On Sunday, the New York Times quoted an official familiar with the report, entitled "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States," as saying that "the Iraq war has made the overall terrorism problem worse."
That contradicts frequent speeches by Bush ahead of November 7 legislative elections, in which the unpopular war in Iraq may cost his Republican party control of one or both houses of the US Congress.
The Washington Post said the report described the Iraq conflict as the primary recruiting vehicle for violent Islamic extremists.
While the US has seriously damaged Al-Qaeda and disrupted its ability to carry out major operations since the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, it noted, radical Islamic networks have spread and decentralized.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
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Questions or Comments
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White House admits Iraq fuels extremism Mon Sep 25, 3:32 PM ET
The White House acknowledged that Iraq was among several factors that "fuel the spread of jihadism" but said that winning the war would dishearten potential terrorists.
Spokesman Tony Snow sought to challenge news reports on Sunday about the latest National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, which represents the comprehensive consensus findings of the 16 US intelligence agencies.
"It assesses that a variety of factors, in addition to Iraq, fuel the spread of jihadism, including longstanding social grievances, slowness of the pace of reform, and the use of the Internet," he told reporters.
"And it also notes that should jihadists be perceived to have failed in Iraq, fewer will be inspired to carry on the fight," the spokesman said as US President George W. Bush traveled here for a political fundraiser.
On Sunday, the New York Times quoted an official familiar with the report, entitled "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States," as saying that "the Iraq war has made the overall terrorism problem worse."
That contradicts frequent speeches by Bush ahead of November 7 legislative elections, in which the unpopular war in Iraq may cost his Republican party control of one or both houses of the US Congress.
The Washington Post said the report described the Iraq conflict as the primary recruiting vehicle for violent Islamic extremists.
While the US has seriously damaged Al-Qaeda and disrupted its ability to carry out major operations since the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington, it noted, radical Islamic networks have spread and decentralized.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Questions or Comments
Privacy Policy -Terms of Service - Copyright/IP Policy - Ad Feedback
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/80766b90-4cbb-11db...00779e2340.html
US forces in Iraq to exceed 140,000
By Edward Luce in Washington
Published: September 25 2006 18:48 | Last updated: September 25 2006 18:48
US officials said on Monday that American troop levels in Iraq were likely to remain well above 140,000 for the next few months, although they would not confirm reports that the 3,500-strong First Armoured Division had been ordered to remain in Iraq beyond its official tour of duty.
Growing sectarian conflict between Iraqi militias in the last few months and the continuation of the mostly Sunni insurgency against US forces has complicated the Bush administration’s goal of “standing down as the Iraqis stand up”. The overall US troop presence in Iraq has risen from 127,000 in July to 142,000 this week.
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Last week John Abizaid, the US commander in the region, said that US troop deployment in Iraq was likely to remain at these levels well into 2007 in order to wrest Baghdad and other provinces from the day-to-day control of sectarian death squads and insurgent groups.
In August, General Abizaid, the most senior Arab-American in uniform who has a reputation for being a straight talker, surprised many when he told the Senate armed services committee that Iraq could be heading towards civil war. This contradicted the Bush administration’s view that the situation was gradually improving. As many as 20,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed in 2006 – although estimates vary drastically.
“The Bush administration has complicated its task in Iraq by talking up the rhetoric at home of ‘standing down as they stand up’,” said Tony Cordesmann, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “But in practice Mr Bush has responded to what the commanders are requesting on the ground, which is more troops and, to a lesser extent, more equipment.”
However, the increase in deployment comes amid growing complaints from senior generals about the overstretch of US military units, some of which have served more than one tour of duty in Iraq and also in Afghanistan, where US troop levels have also risen this year from 15,800 to 20,000 owing to the resurgence of Taliban forces.
There are also concerns about pressure to send regular military and National Guard units back to Iraq within the one-year pause that is customary. In addition, the army and National Guard have both recently relaxed recruiting standards by raising the maximum age and improving the one-off cash payment as an incentive for new recruits.
Worries about the Bush administration’s handling of the increasingly unpopular war in Iraq intensified at the weekend when the New York Times and Washington Post leaked contents of a classified US National Intelligence estimate from April that said America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 had exacerbated the threat from Islamist terrorist groups.
The report, which was submitted to Mr Bush in April, also said that the overall threat from Islamist terror groups had grown since the attacks of September 11 2001.
The disclosure comes just six weeks before critical mid-term elections, where Mr Bush’s Republicans face the threat of losing control of the House of Representatives. The opposition Democrats have fielded a number of Iraq war veterans in order to bolster their credibility as patriotic critics of the war in Iraq.
Mr Bush has ignored continuing calls by retired US generals – most recently on Monday – to sack Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defence, over his handling of the war in Iraq.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
US forces in Iraq to exceed 140,000
By Edward Luce in Washington
Published: September 25 2006 18:48 | Last updated: September 25 2006 18:48
US officials said on Monday that American troop levels in Iraq were likely to remain well above 140,000 for the next few months, although they would not confirm reports that the 3,500-strong First Armoured Division had been ordered to remain in Iraq beyond its official tour of duty.
Growing sectarian conflict between Iraqi militias in the last few months and the continuation of the mostly Sunni insurgency against US forces has complicated the Bush administration’s goal of “standing down as the Iraqis stand up”. The overall US troop presence in Iraq has risen from 127,000 in July to 142,000 this week.
ADVERTISEMENT
Last week John Abizaid, the US commander in the region, said that US troop deployment in Iraq was likely to remain at these levels well into 2007 in order to wrest Baghdad and other provinces from the day-to-day control of sectarian death squads and insurgent groups.
In August, General Abizaid, the most senior Arab-American in uniform who has a reputation for being a straight talker, surprised many when he told the Senate armed services committee that Iraq could be heading towards civil war. This contradicted the Bush administration’s view that the situation was gradually improving. As many as 20,000 Iraqi civilians have been killed in 2006 – although estimates vary drastically.
“The Bush administration has complicated its task in Iraq by talking up the rhetoric at home of ‘standing down as they stand up’,” said Tony Cordesmann, a senior analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “But in practice Mr Bush has responded to what the commanders are requesting on the ground, which is more troops and, to a lesser extent, more equipment.”
However, the increase in deployment comes amid growing complaints from senior generals about the overstretch of US military units, some of which have served more than one tour of duty in Iraq and also in Afghanistan, where US troop levels have also risen this year from 15,800 to 20,000 owing to the resurgence of Taliban forces.
There are also concerns about pressure to send regular military and National Guard units back to Iraq within the one-year pause that is customary. In addition, the army and National Guard have both recently relaxed recruiting standards by raising the maximum age and improving the one-off cash payment as an incentive for new recruits.
Worries about the Bush administration’s handling of the increasingly unpopular war in Iraq intensified at the weekend when the New York Times and Washington Post leaked contents of a classified US National Intelligence estimate from April that said America’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 had exacerbated the threat from Islamist terrorist groups.
The report, which was submitted to Mr Bush in April, also said that the overall threat from Islamist terror groups had grown since the attacks of September 11 2001.
The disclosure comes just six weeks before critical mid-term elections, where Mr Bush’s Republicans face the threat of losing control of the House of Representatives. The opposition Democrats have fielded a number of Iraq war veterans in order to bolster their credibility as patriotic critics of the war in Iraq.
Mr Bush has ignored continuing calls by retired US generals – most recently on Monday – to sack Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defence, over his handling of the war in Iraq.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092500731.html
Three Retired Officers Demand Rumsfeld's Resignation
By William Branigin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, September 25, 2006; 5:14 PM
Three retired military officers who served in Iraq called today for the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, telling a Democratic "oversight hearing" on Capitol Hill that the Pentagon chief bungled planning for the U.S. invasion, dismissed the prospect of an insurgency and sent American troops into the fray with inadequate equipment.
The testimony by the three --two retired Army major generals and a former Marine colonel -- came a day after disclosure of a classified intelligence assessment that concluded the war in Iraq has fueled recruitment of violent Islamic extremists, helping to create a new generation of potential terrorists around the world and worsening the U.S. position.
In testimony before the Democratic Policy Committee today, retired Maj. Gen. John R.S. Batiste, who commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq in 2004 and 2005 and served as a senior military assistant to former deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, charged that Rumsfeld and others in the Bush administration "did not tell the American people the truth for fear of losing support for the war in Iraq."
He told the committee, "If we had seriously laid out and considered the full range of requirements for the war in Iraq, we would likely have taken a different course of action that would have maintained a clear focus on our main effort in Afghanistan, not fueled Islamic fundamentalism across the globe, and not created more enemies than there were insurgents."
Joining his call for Rumsfeld to resign were retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, who was responsible for training Iraq's military and police in 2003 and 2004, and retired Marine Col. Thomas X. Hammes, who served in Iraq in 2004 and helped establish bases for the reconstituted Iraqi armed forces.
Rumsfeld, appearing at a news briefing with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, rejected the demands for his resignation. Asked about the Capitol Hill hearing and whether he was considering stepping down, Rumsfeld shook his head slightly and mouthed the word "no" before calling for the next question.
Democrats today sought to make the most of the National Intelligence Assessment and of the retired officers' remarks at the hearing, which Democratic leaders said they had to hold by themselves outside the regular congressional process because of the Republican leadership's persistent "neglect" of oversight.
"On the heels of the disclosure that America's intelligence community has concluded that the war in Iraq has increased the terrorist threat, today's hearing deals a fatal blow to any claim that staying the current course is an acceptable strategy for success in Iraq," said a statement issued by the office of Senate Minority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.).
Batiste charged in his testimony that Rumsfeld "is not a competent wartime leader" and surrounded himself with "compliant" subordinates.
"Secretary Rumsfeld ignored 12 years of U.S. Central Command deliberate planning and strategy, dismissed honest dissent, and browbeat subordinates to build 'his plan,' which did not address the hard work to crush the insurgency, secure a post-Saddam Iraq, build the peace and set Iraq up for self-reliance," Batiste said.
In addition, Rumsfeld "refused to acknowledge and even ignored the potential for the insurgency," the retired general said. "At one point, he threatened to fire the next person who talked about the need for a post-war plan," Batiste added.
"Secretary Rumsfeld's dismal strategic decisions resulted in the unnecessary deaths of American servicemen and women, our allies, and the good people of Iraq," Batiste said. "He was responsible for America and her allies going to war with the wrong plan and a strategy that did not address the realities of fighting an insurgency."
Eaton told the panel, "We went in with a bad plan," adding that "stay the course is not a strategy."
Hammes said removing the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein "introduced major instability not just in Iraq, but in the greater Middle East." And while the Bush administration has repeatedly said the war in Iraq is critical to U.S. security, "it has asked nothing of the majority of U.S. citizens," he said.
"While asking major sacrifices, to include the ultimate sacrifice, from those Americans who are serving in Iraq, we are not even asking our fellow citizens to pay for the war," Hammes complained. "Instead we are charging it to our children and grandchildren."
Responding to critics who have charged that the National Intelligence Assessment shows the failure of Bush's Iraq war policy, the White House today sought to put the best face on the document, which was completed in April and disclosed in the news media Sunday.
"One thing that the reports do not say is that war in Iraq has made terrorism worse," White House spokesman Tony Snow said.
The National Intelligence Assessment "is not limited to Iraq," he told a news briefing. "The false impression has been created that the NIE focuses solely on Iraq and terrorism. This NIE examines global terrorism in its totality, the morphing of al-Qaeda and its affiliates and other jihadist movements. It assesses that a variety of factors, in addition to Iraq, fuel the spread of jihadism, including longstanding social grievances, slowness of the pace of reform and the use of the Internet. And it also notes that should jihadists be perceived to have failed in Iraq, fewer will be inspired to carry on the fight."
All these points already have been stated publicly by Bush, Snow asserted.
"Obviously, we're not going to go into what the classified report does say, but what we did see in the newspapers yesterday, the substance, is precisely what the president has been saying," he told reporters.
Separately, Vice President Cheney today accused Democrats of advancing a "strategy of resignation and defeatism in the face of determined enemies."
In a speech at a Republican fundraiser in Milwaukee, Cheney indicated that he was not backing away from national security issues despite Democrats' criticism that the administration has mishandled the war in Iraq.
"As we make our case to the voters in this election season, it's vital to keep issues of national security at the top of the agenda," Cheney told Wisconsin Republicans, Reuters news agency reported. He specifically criticized Reid, the Senate Democratic leader, as well as Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.) and Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean.
Reid replied in a statement, "When the U.S. intelligence community confirmed that America is losing the war on terror because of Bush failures in Iraq, this White House lost all credibility on matters of national security. With Iraq in a civil war, Afghanistan moving backwards and our own borders unsecured, it's clear George Bush and Dick Cheney are desperate to hide their record and distort the truth."
Three Retired Officers Demand Rumsfeld's Resignation
By William Branigin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, September 25, 2006; 5:14 PM
Three retired military officers who served in Iraq called today for the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, telling a Democratic "oversight hearing" on Capitol Hill that the Pentagon chief bungled planning for the U.S. invasion, dismissed the prospect of an insurgency and sent American troops into the fray with inadequate equipment.
The testimony by the three --two retired Army major generals and a former Marine colonel -- came a day after disclosure of a classified intelligence assessment that concluded the war in Iraq has fueled recruitment of violent Islamic extremists, helping to create a new generation of potential terrorists around the world and worsening the U.S. position.
In testimony before the Democratic Policy Committee today, retired Maj. Gen. John R.S. Batiste, who commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq in 2004 and 2005 and served as a senior military assistant to former deputy defense secretary Paul Wolfowitz, charged that Rumsfeld and others in the Bush administration "did not tell the American people the truth for fear of losing support for the war in Iraq."
He told the committee, "If we had seriously laid out and considered the full range of requirements for the war in Iraq, we would likely have taken a different course of action that would have maintained a clear focus on our main effort in Afghanistan, not fueled Islamic fundamentalism across the globe, and not created more enemies than there were insurgents."
Joining his call for Rumsfeld to resign were retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, who was responsible for training Iraq's military and police in 2003 and 2004, and retired Marine Col. Thomas X. Hammes, who served in Iraq in 2004 and helped establish bases for the reconstituted Iraqi armed forces.
Rumsfeld, appearing at a news briefing with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, rejected the demands for his resignation. Asked about the Capitol Hill hearing and whether he was considering stepping down, Rumsfeld shook his head slightly and mouthed the word "no" before calling for the next question.
Democrats today sought to make the most of the National Intelligence Assessment and of the retired officers' remarks at the hearing, which Democratic leaders said they had to hold by themselves outside the regular congressional process because of the Republican leadership's persistent "neglect" of oversight.
"On the heels of the disclosure that America's intelligence community has concluded that the war in Iraq has increased the terrorist threat, today's hearing deals a fatal blow to any claim that staying the current course is an acceptable strategy for success in Iraq," said a statement issued by the office of Senate Minority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.).
Batiste charged in his testimony that Rumsfeld "is not a competent wartime leader" and surrounded himself with "compliant" subordinates.
"Secretary Rumsfeld ignored 12 years of U.S. Central Command deliberate planning and strategy, dismissed honest dissent, and browbeat subordinates to build 'his plan,' which did not address the hard work to crush the insurgency, secure a post-Saddam Iraq, build the peace and set Iraq up for self-reliance," Batiste said.
In addition, Rumsfeld "refused to acknowledge and even ignored the potential for the insurgency," the retired general said. "At one point, he threatened to fire the next person who talked about the need for a post-war plan," Batiste added.
"Secretary Rumsfeld's dismal strategic decisions resulted in the unnecessary deaths of American servicemen and women, our allies, and the good people of Iraq," Batiste said. "He was responsible for America and her allies going to war with the wrong plan and a strategy that did not address the realities of fighting an insurgency."
Eaton told the panel, "We went in with a bad plan," adding that "stay the course is not a strategy."
Hammes said removing the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein "introduced major instability not just in Iraq, but in the greater Middle East." And while the Bush administration has repeatedly said the war in Iraq is critical to U.S. security, "it has asked nothing of the majority of U.S. citizens," he said.
"While asking major sacrifices, to include the ultimate sacrifice, from those Americans who are serving in Iraq, we are not even asking our fellow citizens to pay for the war," Hammes complained. "Instead we are charging it to our children and grandchildren."
Responding to critics who have charged that the National Intelligence Assessment shows the failure of Bush's Iraq war policy, the White House today sought to put the best face on the document, which was completed in April and disclosed in the news media Sunday.
"One thing that the reports do not say is that war in Iraq has made terrorism worse," White House spokesman Tony Snow said.
The National Intelligence Assessment "is not limited to Iraq," he told a news briefing. "The false impression has been created that the NIE focuses solely on Iraq and terrorism. This NIE examines global terrorism in its totality, the morphing of al-Qaeda and its affiliates and other jihadist movements. It assesses that a variety of factors, in addition to Iraq, fuel the spread of jihadism, including longstanding social grievances, slowness of the pace of reform and the use of the Internet. And it also notes that should jihadists be perceived to have failed in Iraq, fewer will be inspired to carry on the fight."
All these points already have been stated publicly by Bush, Snow asserted.
"Obviously, we're not going to go into what the classified report does say, but what we did see in the newspapers yesterday, the substance, is precisely what the president has been saying," he told reporters.
Separately, Vice President Cheney today accused Democrats of advancing a "strategy of resignation and defeatism in the face of determined enemies."
In a speech at a Republican fundraiser in Milwaukee, Cheney indicated that he was not backing away from national security issues despite Democrats' criticism that the administration has mishandled the war in Iraq.
"As we make our case to the voters in this election season, it's vital to keep issues of national security at the top of the agenda," Cheney told Wisconsin Republicans, Reuters news agency reported. He specifically criticized Reid, the Senate Democratic leader, as well as Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.) and Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean.
Reid replied in a statement, "When the U.S. intelligence community confirmed that America is losing the war on terror because of Bush failures in Iraq, this White House lost all credibility on matters of national security. With Iraq in a civil war, Afghanistan moving backwards and our own borders unsecured, it's clear George Bush and Dick Cheney are desperate to hide their record and distort the truth."
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=2490012
Iraq war fuels Islamic radicals: retired U.S. general
Sep 25, 2006 — By Susan Cornwell
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The conduct of the Iraq war fueled Islamic fundamentalism across the globe and created more enemies for the United States, a retired U.S. Army general who served in the conflict said on Monday.
The views of retired Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste buttressed an assessment by U.S. intelligence agencies, which intelligence officials said concluded the war had inspired Islamist extremists and made the militant movement more dangerous.
The Iraq conflict, which began in March 2003, made "America arguably less safe now than it was on September 11, 2001," Batiste, who commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq in 2004-2005, told a hearing on the war called by U.S. Senate Democrats.
"If we had seriously laid out and considered the full range of requirements for the war in Iraq, we would likely have taken a different course of action that would have maintained a clear focus on our main effort in Afghanistan, not fueled Islamic fundamentalism across the globe, and not created more enemies than there were insurgents," Batiste said.
Batiste, who was among retired generals who called for the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld earlier this year, poured scorn on the war plan along with two other retired military men at the Democrat-sponsored session.
They said the Pentagon let the insurgency grow by not sending enough U.S. troops and made enemies by abusing Iraqis.
"Probably 99 percent of those people were guilty of absolutely nothing," Batiste said of thousands of Iraqis that U.S. forces held at Abu Ghraib prison. "But the way we treated them, the way we abused them, turned them against the effort in Iraq forever."
At one point, retired Marine Corps Col. Thomas X. Hammes derisively referred to the U.S. Iraq strategy as "Whack-a-mole," a fairground game where the player uses a big hammer to swat at mechanical moles as they pop up from holes.
MORE TROOPS, MORE TIME
But their proposed solution was not the U.S. troop pullout sought by some Democrats. They urged more troops and time.
Hammes said the United States needed another 10 years to succeed in Iraq, while retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton said the Army needed another 60,000 troops to finish the job. There are 142,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.
Hammes helped establish bases for Iraqi armed forces in 2004, while Eaton trained Iraqi military and police in 2003-4.
Most Democrats are pushing for a plan to start withdrawing U.S. forces, but without a deadline to finish the withdrawal.
Democrats said the hearing would be the first of several on war oversight, which they charged the majority Republicans were neglecting. Republicans denounced the exercise as partisan.
Ahead of November elections in which control of Congress is at stake, Democrats have seized upon the National Intelligence Estimate to undermine the image fostered by President George W. Bush and Republicans as the party best able to stop terrorism.
The classified intelligence document said Iraq had become the main recruiting tool for the Islamic militant movement as well as a training ground for guerrillas, according to current and former intelligence officials familiar with it.
The White House contends that the parts that have been reported are not representative of the complete document.
"This NIE examines global terrorism and its totality, the morphing of al Qaeda and its affiliates and other jihadist movements," White House spokesman Tony Snow said. "It assesses that a variety of factors, in addition to Iraq, fuels a spread of jihadism, including long-standing social grievances, slowness of the pace of reform and the use of the Internet."
"One thing that the reports do not say is that the war in Iraq has made terrorism worse," Snow added.
Sen. Pat Roberts of Kansas, Republican chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, urged the administration to declassify the document.
(Additional reporting by David Morgan and Matt Spetalnick)
Copyright 2006 Reuters News Service. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
Copyright © 2006 ABCNews Internet Ventures
Iraq war fuels Islamic radicals: retired U.S. general
Sep 25, 2006 — By Susan Cornwell
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The conduct of the Iraq war fueled Islamic fundamentalism across the globe and created more enemies for the United States, a retired U.S. Army general who served in the conflict said on Monday.
The views of retired Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste buttressed an assessment by U.S. intelligence agencies, which intelligence officials said concluded the war had inspired Islamist extremists and made the militant movement more dangerous.
The Iraq conflict, which began in March 2003, made "America arguably less safe now than it was on September 11, 2001," Batiste, who commanded the 1st Infantry Division in Iraq in 2004-2005, told a hearing on the war called by U.S. Senate Democrats.
"If we had seriously laid out and considered the full range of requirements for the war in Iraq, we would likely have taken a different course of action that would have maintained a clear focus on our main effort in Afghanistan, not fueled Islamic fundamentalism across the globe, and not created more enemies than there were insurgents," Batiste said.
Batiste, who was among retired generals who called for the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld earlier this year, poured scorn on the war plan along with two other retired military men at the Democrat-sponsored session.
They said the Pentagon let the insurgency grow by not sending enough U.S. troops and made enemies by abusing Iraqis.
"Probably 99 percent of those people were guilty of absolutely nothing," Batiste said of thousands of Iraqis that U.S. forces held at Abu Ghraib prison. "But the way we treated them, the way we abused them, turned them against the effort in Iraq forever."
At one point, retired Marine Corps Col. Thomas X. Hammes derisively referred to the U.S. Iraq strategy as "Whack-a-mole," a fairground game where the player uses a big hammer to swat at mechanical moles as they pop up from holes.
MORE TROOPS, MORE TIME
But their proposed solution was not the U.S. troop pullout sought by some Democrats. They urged more troops and time.
Hammes said the United States needed another 10 years to succeed in Iraq, while retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton said the Army needed another 60,000 troops to finish the job. There are 142,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.
Hammes helped establish bases for Iraqi armed forces in 2004, while Eaton trained Iraqi military and police in 2003-4.
Most Democrats are pushing for a plan to start withdrawing U.S. forces, but without a deadline to finish the withdrawal.
Democrats said the hearing would be the first of several on war oversight, which they charged the majority Republicans were neglecting. Republicans denounced the exercise as partisan.
Ahead of November elections in which control of Congress is at stake, Democrats have seized upon the National Intelligence Estimate to undermine the image fostered by President George W. Bush and Republicans as the party best able to stop terrorism.
The classified intelligence document said Iraq had become the main recruiting tool for the Islamic militant movement as well as a training ground for guerrillas, according to current and former intelligence officials familiar with it.
The White House contends that the parts that have been reported are not representative of the complete document.
"This NIE examines global terrorism and its totality, the morphing of al Qaeda and its affiliates and other jihadist movements," White House spokesman Tony Snow said. "It assesses that a variety of factors, in addition to Iraq, fuels a spread of jihadism, including long-standing social grievances, slowness of the pace of reform and the use of the Internet."
"One thing that the reports do not say is that the war in Iraq has made terrorism worse," Snow added.
Sen. Pat Roberts of Kansas, Republican chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, urged the administration to declassify the document.
(Additional reporting by David Morgan and Matt Spetalnick)
Copyright 2006 Reuters News Service. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
Copyright © 2006 ABCNews Internet Ventures
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2500878_pf.html
No Silent Majority for Bush
By E. J. Dionne Jr.
Tuesday, September 26, 2006; A21
What could prove to be the most important factor in the 2006 elections is overlooked because it is unseen: The Republicans cannot try to curry favor with a "silent majority" that favors the Iraq war because a majority of Americans, both vocal and quiet, have come to see the war as a mistake.
President Bush's defenders have cast opponents of the war as weak on terrorism. Yesterday, Vice President Cheney accused Democrats of "resignation and defeatism." But the charges have not taken hold, because most Americans don't agree with the premise linking the war on terror with the war in Iraq.
And blame for the failures in Iraq has fallen not on some liberal coterie supposedly holding our generals back but on the choices of civilians in a conservative administration. Those civilians, and their allies outside the administration, find themselves under increasing fire from leaders of the military and the intelligence services for bad planning, flawed analysis and unrealistic expectations.
Moreover, the tone of the opposition to this war is quite different from the tenor of some sections of the movement against the Vietnam War. Reaction to "hippie protesters," as the phrase went, allowed President Richard Nixon to pit a hardworking, patriotic "silent majority" -- it was one of the most politically potent phrases of his presidency -- against the privileged, the young and the media, whom his vice president Spiro Agnew memorably characterized as "effete snobs" and "nattering nabobs of negativism."
As the historian and Nixon biographer Stephen Ambrose noted, tiny minorities -- "they numbered less than 1 percent of the demonstrators," he wrote of a 1969 rally -- "waved Viet Cong flags . . . and even burned American flags" and served as "magnets to the television cameras." They were used to exemplify an entire movement.
By contrast, critics of the Iraq war, deeply influenced by the post-Sept. 11 climate of national solidarity, have been resolutely patriotic and pro-military. They have often chastised the administration for offering American troops too little in the way of body armor and armored vehicles, and for shortchanging veterans.
Among the most visible critics of the administration's approach have been generals, vets, parents with sons and daughters in the military, and foreign policy realists who think of themselves as moderate or even conservative opponents of what they see as the administration's radical direction.
That is why news over the weekend of a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq is especially troublesome for Republican electoral chances. By finding that the war in Iraq has encouraged global terrorism and spawned a new generation of Islamic radicals, the report by 16 government intelligence services undercuts the administration's central argument that the Iraq war has made the United States safer.
Nor is there any way to dismiss the assessment as partisan, left-wing or unpatriotic. That high-level government officials have offered their own criticisms of the war's impact makes it difficult for Republicans to force the argument into a classic "he said-she said" framework in which facts can be set aside and the claims of critics dismissed as political.
It is no wonder that the administration immediately insisted that news reports were "not representative of the complete document," in the words of a White House spokesman. The phrase was a classic instance of the non-denial denial, a defensive response from an administration that has tried, with some success, to remain on offense on the terrorism issue all month.
The conventional, and accurate, view of this fall's elections is that Iraq is a Democratic issue and the broader war on terrorism is a Republican issue. Accordingly, Democrats such as Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid were understandably eager to point to the report as a commentary on the president's "repeated missteps in Iraq and his stubborn refusal to change course," as Reid put it Sunday.
But beneath the conventional account is a more revealing truth: that over the past four years, the burden of proof on the Iraq war has been turned on its head.
During the 2002 election campaign -- before the war had actually begun -- Democratic candidates all over the country fled the Iraq debate and feared raising any questions about Bush's national security choices. In 2006 it's the administration trying to keep Iraq out of the campaign and to move the public conversation to anything else as an alternative to an accounting for its war decisions that so many middle-of-the-road Americans now regret. There is no silent majority to bail the president out.
postchat@aol.com
© 2006 The Washington Post Company
No Silent Majority for Bush
By E. J. Dionne Jr.
Tuesday, September 26, 2006; A21
What could prove to be the most important factor in the 2006 elections is overlooked because it is unseen: The Republicans cannot try to curry favor with a "silent majority" that favors the Iraq war because a majority of Americans, both vocal and quiet, have come to see the war as a mistake.
President Bush's defenders have cast opponents of the war as weak on terrorism. Yesterday, Vice President Cheney accused Democrats of "resignation and defeatism." But the charges have not taken hold, because most Americans don't agree with the premise linking the war on terror with the war in Iraq.
And blame for the failures in Iraq has fallen not on some liberal coterie supposedly holding our generals back but on the choices of civilians in a conservative administration. Those civilians, and their allies outside the administration, find themselves under increasing fire from leaders of the military and the intelligence services for bad planning, flawed analysis and unrealistic expectations.
Moreover, the tone of the opposition to this war is quite different from the tenor of some sections of the movement against the Vietnam War. Reaction to "hippie protesters," as the phrase went, allowed President Richard Nixon to pit a hardworking, patriotic "silent majority" -- it was one of the most politically potent phrases of his presidency -- against the privileged, the young and the media, whom his vice president Spiro Agnew memorably characterized as "effete snobs" and "nattering nabobs of negativism."
As the historian and Nixon biographer Stephen Ambrose noted, tiny minorities -- "they numbered less than 1 percent of the demonstrators," he wrote of a 1969 rally -- "waved Viet Cong flags . . . and even burned American flags" and served as "magnets to the television cameras." They were used to exemplify an entire movement.
By contrast, critics of the Iraq war, deeply influenced by the post-Sept. 11 climate of national solidarity, have been resolutely patriotic and pro-military. They have often chastised the administration for offering American troops too little in the way of body armor and armored vehicles, and for shortchanging veterans.
Among the most visible critics of the administration's approach have been generals, vets, parents with sons and daughters in the military, and foreign policy realists who think of themselves as moderate or even conservative opponents of what they see as the administration's radical direction.
That is why news over the weekend of a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq is especially troublesome for Republican electoral chances. By finding that the war in Iraq has encouraged global terrorism and spawned a new generation of Islamic radicals, the report by 16 government intelligence services undercuts the administration's central argument that the Iraq war has made the United States safer.
Nor is there any way to dismiss the assessment as partisan, left-wing or unpatriotic. That high-level government officials have offered their own criticisms of the war's impact makes it difficult for Republicans to force the argument into a classic "he said-she said" framework in which facts can be set aside and the claims of critics dismissed as political.
It is no wonder that the administration immediately insisted that news reports were "not representative of the complete document," in the words of a White House spokesman. The phrase was a classic instance of the non-denial denial, a defensive response from an administration that has tried, with some success, to remain on offense on the terrorism issue all month.
The conventional, and accurate, view of this fall's elections is that Iraq is a Democratic issue and the broader war on terrorism is a Republican issue. Accordingly, Democrats such as Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid were understandably eager to point to the report as a commentary on the president's "repeated missteps in Iraq and his stubborn refusal to change course," as Reid put it Sunday.
But beneath the conventional account is a more revealing truth: that over the past four years, the burden of proof on the Iraq war has been turned on its head.
During the 2002 election campaign -- before the war had actually begun -- Democratic candidates all over the country fled the Iraq debate and feared raising any questions about Bush's national security choices. In 2006 it's the administration trying to keep Iraq out of the campaign and to move the public conversation to anything else as an alternative to an accounting for its war decisions that so many middle-of-the-road Americans now regret. There is no silent majority to bail the president out.
postchat@aol.com
© 2006 The Washington Post Company
The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth...
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092501114.html
For Democrats, Welcome Words on Rumsfeld -- if Not the War
By Dana Milbank
Tuesday, September 26, 2006; Page A02
Maj. Gen. John Batiste, the former commander of the Army's 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, had complained loudly about the handling of the Iraq war since he retired 11 months ago -- but no one invited him to present his views to Congress.
"I find that outrageous," the general said. "I have a sense for what I'm talking about."
Yesterday, Batiste got his moment -- sort of. Shunned by the Senate Armed Services Committee, Batiste and two other retired officers spoke before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, a rump group with little legislative clout but access to a proper Senate hearing room. And Batiste made up for lost time.
"Donald Rumsfeld is not a competent wartime leader," said Batiste, wearing a pinstripe suit, calling himself a "lifelong Republican" and bearing a slight resemblance to Oliver North. "He surrounds himself with like-minded and compliant subordinates who do not grasp the importance of the principles of war, the complexities of Iraq or the human dimension of warfare. . . . Bottom line: His plan allowed the insurgency to take root and metastasize to where it is today."
Further, Batiste charged, Rumsfeld "reduced force levels to unacceptable levels, micromanaged the war" and created an environment where U.S. troops "are doing unconscionable things."
"Our world is much less safe today than it was on September 11," Batiste said, echoing the administration's newly leaked intelligence estimate.
Batiste, who retired in protest rather than accept a three-star promotion, was a persuasive witness -- and Democrats were joyous. "Your statement, I believe, defines the word 'courage,' " Sen. Byron Dorgan (N.D.) gushed. Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.) pumped his fist and gave Batiste and his colleagues pats on the biceps. And Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (Nev.) proclaimed, giddily: "This hearing today could change our country."
Perhaps. But Democrats, while celebrating Batiste's criticism of the administration, exercised some selective listening at the hearing when Batiste and his colleagues offered their solution: more troops, more money and more time in Iraq.
"We must mobilize our country for a protracted challenge," Batiste warned.
"We better be planning for at least a minimum of a decade or longer," contributed retired Marine Col. Thomas Hammes.
"We are, conservatively, 60,000 soldiers short," added retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who was in charge of building the Iraqi Security Forces.
That last remark caused Schumer to shake his head, indicating he was not so sure. And, indeed, the retired officers' recommendations were off-message for the Democrats. Six of the seven Democrats at the hearing supported legislation calling for the start of a troop withdrawal from Iraq this year. One, Richard Durbin (Ill.), voted for the pullout to be mostly complete by next summer.
The officers' bipartisan scolding disappointed some of the antiwar activists in the crowd, who wore colorful shirts with messages such as "Troops Home Fast" and "Say No to War."
"Peace is the solution, not more war," one activist shouted as the session ended.
But on balance, the retired officers' strong words about the war's conduct outweighed their calls for a greater commitment to Iraq. "Secretary Rumsfeld built his team by systematically removing dissension," Batiste said. "At one point, he threatened to fire the next person who talked about the need for a postwar plan."
Rumsfeld "has tried and continues to fight this war on the cheap," Eaton added. "The Army is in terrible shape, and the Marines aren't much better."
"It is time for him to provide the nation the last in a long series of services and step down," Hammes said coolly.
Rumsfeld himself, meeting with Afghanistan's president yesterday, answered the dissidents' calls for his resignation with a two-word answer. "I'm not," he told reporters, and then he asked for a different question.
But those at the hearing practiced no such economy of words. Dorgan twice referred to William Manchester's "Glory and the Dream." Antiwar Rep. Walter Jones (N.C.), the lone Republican participant, quoted Rudyard Kipling: If any question why we died/ Tell them, because our fathers lied.
In between literary allusions, senators worked to squeeze every possible criticism out of the witnesses. When Batiste spoke about the need for strong leadership, Durbin tried to lead the witness. "What I hear you saying," Durbin said, "is we're talking about political competence, too."
"Absolutely," Batiste complied.
The questioners skillfully directed the witnesses toward past failures rather than their expansive prescriptions for the future. A notable exception was the relatively hawkish Hillary Rodham Clinton (N.Y.), who, as the last questioner, invited the officers to comment on the effect of a specific withdrawal date.
"The result will be a civil war of some magnitude that will turn into a regional mess," Batiste said without hesitation.
As he stood to leave, Batiste worried that this last point -- the need to stay in Iraq -- might be overlooked. "The hard part," he told reporters, "is moving forward."
Did he detect any enthusiasm for making a bigger effort in Iraq?
"God help us if there's not," the general said.
---------------------
I have to listen to these gentlemen, cause they earned it...
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092501114.html
For Democrats, Welcome Words on Rumsfeld -- if Not the War
By Dana Milbank
Tuesday, September 26, 2006; Page A02
Maj. Gen. John Batiste, the former commander of the Army's 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, had complained loudly about the handling of the Iraq war since he retired 11 months ago -- but no one invited him to present his views to Congress.
"I find that outrageous," the general said. "I have a sense for what I'm talking about."
Yesterday, Batiste got his moment -- sort of. Shunned by the Senate Armed Services Committee, Batiste and two other retired officers spoke before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, a rump group with little legislative clout but access to a proper Senate hearing room. And Batiste made up for lost time.
"Donald Rumsfeld is not a competent wartime leader," said Batiste, wearing a pinstripe suit, calling himself a "lifelong Republican" and bearing a slight resemblance to Oliver North. "He surrounds himself with like-minded and compliant subordinates who do not grasp the importance of the principles of war, the complexities of Iraq or the human dimension of warfare. . . . Bottom line: His plan allowed the insurgency to take root and metastasize to where it is today."
Further, Batiste charged, Rumsfeld "reduced force levels to unacceptable levels, micromanaged the war" and created an environment where U.S. troops "are doing unconscionable things."
"Our world is much less safe today than it was on September 11," Batiste said, echoing the administration's newly leaked intelligence estimate.
Batiste, who retired in protest rather than accept a three-star promotion, was a persuasive witness -- and Democrats were joyous. "Your statement, I believe, defines the word 'courage,' " Sen. Byron Dorgan (N.D.) gushed. Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.) pumped his fist and gave Batiste and his colleagues pats on the biceps. And Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (Nev.) proclaimed, giddily: "This hearing today could change our country."
Perhaps. But Democrats, while celebrating Batiste's criticism of the administration, exercised some selective listening at the hearing when Batiste and his colleagues offered their solution: more troops, more money and more time in Iraq.
"We must mobilize our country for a protracted challenge," Batiste warned.
"We better be planning for at least a minimum of a decade or longer," contributed retired Marine Col. Thomas Hammes.
"We are, conservatively, 60,000 soldiers short," added retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who was in charge of building the Iraqi Security Forces.
That last remark caused Schumer to shake his head, indicating he was not so sure. And, indeed, the retired officers' recommendations were off-message for the Democrats. Six of the seven Democrats at the hearing supported legislation calling for the start of a troop withdrawal from Iraq this year. One, Richard Durbin (Ill.), voted for the pullout to be mostly complete by next summer.
The officers' bipartisan scolding disappointed some of the antiwar activists in the crowd, who wore colorful shirts with messages such as "Troops Home Fast" and "Say No to War."
"Peace is the solution, not more war," one activist shouted as the session ended.
But on balance, the retired officers' strong words about the war's conduct outweighed their calls for a greater commitment to Iraq. "Secretary Rumsfeld built his team by systematically removing dissension," Batiste said. "At one point, he threatened to fire the next person who talked about the need for a postwar plan."
Rumsfeld "has tried and continues to fight this war on the cheap," Eaton added. "The Army is in terrible shape, and the Marines aren't much better."
"It is time for him to provide the nation the last in a long series of services and step down," Hammes said coolly.
Rumsfeld himself, meeting with Afghanistan's president yesterday, answered the dissidents' calls for his resignation with a two-word answer. "I'm not," he told reporters, and then he asked for a different question.
But those at the hearing practiced no such economy of words. Dorgan twice referred to William Manchester's "Glory and the Dream." Antiwar Rep. Walter Jones (N.C.), the lone Republican participant, quoted Rudyard Kipling: If any question why we died/ Tell them, because our fathers lied.
In between literary allusions, senators worked to squeeze every possible criticism out of the witnesses. When Batiste spoke about the need for strong leadership, Durbin tried to lead the witness. "What I hear you saying," Durbin said, "is we're talking about political competence, too."
"Absolutely," Batiste complied.
The questioners skillfully directed the witnesses toward past failures rather than their expansive prescriptions for the future. A notable exception was the relatively hawkish Hillary Rodham Clinton (N.Y.), who, as the last questioner, invited the officers to comment on the effect of a specific withdrawal date.
"The result will be a civil war of some magnitude that will turn into a regional mess," Batiste said without hesitation.
As he stood to leave, Batiste worried that this last point -- the need to stay in Iraq -- might be overlooked. "The hard part," he told reporters, "is moving forward."
Did he detect any enthusiasm for making a bigger effort in Iraq?
"God help us if there's not," the general said.
---------------------
I have to listen to these gentlemen, cause they earned it...
QUOTE(Snuffysmith @ Sep 25 2006, 09:13 AM)
WHAT IRANIANS LEAST EXPECT: WHAT IF BUSH PUBLICLY OFFERED TO OPEN AN EMBASSY IN TEHRAN? - FAREED ZAKARIA (NEWSWEEK, OCTOBER 2): If we're going to outsmart Iranian president Ahmadinejad, we need clever, compelling arguments of our own. Instead we have tended to threaten, bully and intimidate. No wonder he's winning the public diplomacy.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14975333/site/newsweek/
US-IRAN RELATIONS: PERILS AND PROMISES - HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI (PAYVAND'S IRAN NEWS ..., SEPTEMBER 22): EU Dependency and US Public Diplomacy: The US' public relations ploy to sway public opinion toward the US position on Iran has been clearly articulated by President Bush and Secretary of State Rice.
http://www.payvand.com/news/06/sep/1254.html
IRAN WAR IN OCTOBER? EVERETT (DISAGREEMENT WITHOUT BEING DISAGREEABLE, SEPTEMBER 24): The president's UN speech may have been the start of an attempt to frame the military action as an opportunity for the Iranian people to overthrow their oppressors, but much more needs to be done if such attempts at public diplomacy are to be successful.
http://dwobd.blogspot.com/
HOW THE UN MEETING TURNED INTO A FESTIVAL OF ANTI-AMERICANISM - AND BOOSTED DUBYA'S ELECTION HOPES - DAVID USBORNE (INDEPENDENT, SEPTEMBER 23): With the help of Iran's unflinching leader, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and a few others, Mr. Chavez successfully hijacked this year's UN General Assembly and turned it into a raucous carnival of anti-Americanism. Nile Gardiner, of the Heritage Foundation, said: "This is a huge public diplomacy challenge, but also a strategic threat."
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politi...icle1705645.ece
BUSH RAGES: 'I AM NOT BEELZEBUB, LORD OF SULFUR' - MIKE WHITNEY (AL-JAZEERAH, SEPTEMBER 22): And where was Bush when Chavez delivered his broadside ....hiding behind Karen Hughes's skirts, picking out a new eye-liner for his next televised harangue against Muslims, retrieving his Yale pom-poms from the dry-cleaners?
http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20edito...e%20Whitney.htm
STUFF HAPPENS AGAIN IN BAGHDAD - FRANK RICH (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Our public diplomacy efforts in Iraq were equally tone-deaf to Iraqis and their neighbors. Karen Hughes is a presidential flack whose patronizing photo-op tour of the region last year earned mostly ridicule. Our broadcasting outreach is supervised by a longtime Karl Rove pal, Kenneth Tomlinson, who last month was found by State Department investigators to be using his office -- literally -- to run a ?horse-racing operation.?
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opini...agewanted=print
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WHAT WOULD JEFFERSON SAY ABOUT IRAQ? OPPOSED TO "WARS OF CHOICE," HE WOULD HAVE A LOT TO SAY ABOUT THE FORCEFUL IMPOSITION OF DEMOCRACY - R.K. RAMAZANI (PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, SEPTEMBER 24): If asked how best to spread democracy, Jefferson would have suggested three alternative and peaceful methods. First among these would be America's own example of liberal democratic practices. Second would be effective use of what we now call public diplomacy. Third, and most important, Jefferson would have advocated expanding American educational initiatives, such as the Fulbright exchange program.
http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/ed...al/15592459.htm
US DELEGATION TO VISIT LEBANON AND DISCUSS REBUILDING (YA LIBNAN, LEBANON, SEPTEMBER 23): The group will be led by Dina Powell, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/09/post_21.php
CONDI TALKS TOUGH ON DARFUR - (NEWS FROM AFRICA, SEPTEMBER 24): After falling to the back burners of public diplomacy, it seems that maybe Darfur in Sudan is moving up the US administration's list of concerns.
http://twoandtwomakesfive.blogs.com/two_an...from_afric.html
(scroll down link for item)
WORD FOR WORD: 'ISLAMO-FASCISM' HAD ITS MOMENT - SHERYL GAY STOLBERG (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Even Karen Hughes, the former counselor to Mr. Bush who now runs the public diplomacy arm of the State Department, pushed back from the term 'Islamo-fascist,' telling CNN's Wolf Blitzer that she typically does not 'use religious terms' for fear they will be misinterpreted around the world.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/weekinre...24stolberg.html?
ATTACKS SPARK TOUGHER GUANTANAMO JAIL - ASSOCIATED PRESS (USA TODAY SEPTEMBER 23): The military is toughening a new jailhouse for suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban militants to protect guards after a spate of attacks and evidence that detainees have organized themselves into groups to mount uprisings, officials said.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09...itmo-jail_x.htm
TORTURE CHIC: SIGN OF DECADENCE ALAN BOCK (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): The eagerness of the top two guys in the administration, plenty of others in the political classes and all too many who consider themselves thinkers or intellectuals to see torture become quasi-official policy of the United States, which used to have a reputation as the freest land on earth, verges on the sadistic and pornographic.
http://www.antiwar.com/bock/?articleid=9739
WE'VE SUNK TO BIN LADEN'S LEVEL - JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY (MIAMI HERALD, SEPTEMBER 23/COMMON DREAMS): The torture of prisoners is not only illegal under American and international law it is, put simply, immoral and unjust. It is also un-American.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0923-27.htm
A TORTURED POLICY EDITORIAL (SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, SEPTEMBER 24): The upshot is a disgraceful policy on detainees that bends American norms of justice, all wrapped in the flag-waving war on terrorism.
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?...&type=printable
POWELL BELATEDLY JOINS BID TO SAVE OUR NATION'S SOUL - LEONARD PITTS JR. (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22): Even if we had to choose between saving Americans and preserving America, it should be an easy call. Kill me before you kill my country.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
ARE WE REALLY SO FEARFUL? - ARIEL DORFMAN (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): Are we so fearful, so in love with our own security and steeped in our own pain, that we are really willing to let people be tortured in the name of America?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201303_pf.html
DOES TORTURE WORK? - EDWIDGE DANTICAT (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): We are all endorsers of torture when it is done in our name.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201304_pf.html
FIRING POTENT WORDS, FROM A TANK - ARTHUR T. HADLEY (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): 'I've seen firsthand the power of Geneva Conventions, both to compel surrenders and to broadcast, for the world, our determination to live up to our highest ideals.'
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opinion/...agewanted=print
AMERICAN STANDARD OPINION (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 24): The compromise approved last week by the GOP renegades draws the line at "redefining" the Geneva Conventions, but then leaves it to the president to "interpret" the conventions pretty much as he sees fit.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/b...inion-headlines
DO UNTO YOUR ENEMY... - PAUL RIECKHOFF (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): If America continues to erode the meaning of the Geneva Conventions, we will cede the ground upon which to prosecute dictators and warlords.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opinion/...agewanted=print
SYRIA AND THE US: FELLOW TRAVELERS AT THE CROSSROADS FOR TERRORISM - AMY GOODMAN AND DAVID GOODMAN (MOTHER JONES, SEPTEMBER 23): When President Bush made torture a centerpiece of his foreign policy, he bound himself intimately to the world's worst human rights abusers.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0923-20.htm
TORTURE IS A MORAL ISSUE RELIGIOUS LEADERS FROM CONNECTICUT, SIGNATORIES (NATION, SEPTEMBER 23): The detainee legislation seems not to be about protecting our military personnel or even US citizens; rather, it appears to be designed to protect the leaders at the top of the chain of command who have tolerated, promoted, and justified torture.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20061009/moral_compass
PARSING WORDS ABOUT TORTURE - STEVE CHAPMAN (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 25): Mr. Bush's stated policy is, "We do not torture." Anyone who really believes in the logic behind his policies ought to be asking, "Why on earth not?"
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
EXPLOITATION OF 9/11 WAS SHAMEFUL - ANDREW GREELEY (CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, SEPTEMBER 22): The administration, not able to find Osama bin Laden, now plans to drag some of his henchmen -- tortured and illegally imprisoned -- before kangaroo military courts to prove how tough on terrorists it really is before the election. Do the marketers of such propaganda have no shame at all?
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-30.htm
AMERICA'S DETAINEES FACE GRAVE INJUSTICE - JONATHAN HAFETZ (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22)
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
TORTURE EXHIBIT A - WILLIAM FISHER (TOMPAINE.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The compromise bill agreed on by the White House and the famous 'Republican rebels' -- Senators McCain, Lindsey Graham, John Warner, Susan Collins, Olympia Snowe and others -- fails to mention extraordinary rendition explicitly.
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/09/2...e_exhibit_a.php
THE ABUSE CAN CONTINUE: SENATORS WON'T AUTHORIZE TORTURE, BUT THEY WON'T PREVENT IT, EITHER ? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 22)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092101647.html
COMPROMISED EDITORS (NEW REPUBLIC, SEPTEMBER 21): The compromise proposed by GOP Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and John Warner takes the administration's proposals as a starting point and then proceeds to roll back only a few of its more odious provisions.
http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=200610...editorial100206
BUSH GETS HIS WAY - DAN FROOMKIN (WASHINGTONPOST.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): On the central issue of whether the CIA should continue using interrogation methods on suspected terrorists that many say constitute torture, the White House got its way, winning agreement from the "maverick" Republican senators who had refused to go along with an overt undoing of the Geneva Conventions.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2200703_pf.html
TURNING BACK THE CLOCK ON RAPE EDITORIAL (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): The bill on jailing, interrogating and trying terror suspects contains narrow definitions of rape and sexual assault that must be fixed before Congress can responsibly pass the legislation.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/opinion/edit...html?offset=10&
A TORTUROUS COMPROMISE EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): After delaying legal action against hundreds of detainees for almost five years, the administration should work with Congress to devise interrogation and trial rules that civilized peoples expect.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...promise?mode=PF
TWO-TIERED TORTURE STANDARDS: BY ALLOWING THE CIA LEEWAY IN INTERROGATIONS, THE SENATE GAVE UP TOO MUCH IN ITS COMPROMISE WITH BUSH ? EDITORIAL (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editor...ment-editorials
CIA VALUES SHOW IN STAND ON DETAINEES - GREG MILLER (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): On the detainee issue, the CIA is less swayed by concerns that other nations might retaliate against U.S. prisoners, and more inclined to consider any cost worth paying for the intelligence it generates.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wa...,1,770657.story
WHY RETIRED MILITARY BRASS DON'T WANT TORTURE: FIRSTHAND COMBAT EXPERIENCES COMPEL OLD GUARD TO ATTACK BUSH'S 'ALTERNATIVE INTERROGATION' - CHARLES KAISER (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
HE WROTE THE BOOK ON TORTURE [REVIEW OF WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR BY JOHN YOO] - JAMES BOVARD (AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, OCTOBER 9): John Yoo, the former Justice Department official, implies that the torture scandal may be largely a liberal media concoction. Though this book went to press in July 2006, Yoo relies on dubious data from September 2004 to exonerate the federal torturers.
http://www.amconmag.com/2006/2006_10_09/review.html
UN REPORT: TORTURE IN IRAQ 'TOTALLY OUT OF HAND': BUSH ADMINISTRATION REJECTS CLAIM THAT TORTURE MAY BE WORSE THAN UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN - TOM REGAN (CSMONITOR.COM, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0922/dailyUpdate.html
IN IRAQ, A JOURNALIST IN LIMBO - TOM CURLEY (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): Bilal Hussein, an Iraqi photographer who helped the Associated Press win a Pulitzer Prize last year, is now in his sixth month in a U.S. Army prison in Iraq. He doesn't understand why he's there, and neither do his AP colleagues.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201444_pf.html
DUE PROCESS, BULLDOZED - BOB HERBERT (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Several Iraqi journalists working for international news organizations have been held without charge by American and Iraqi forces. The absence of concrete evidence in so many of the cases is disturbing, to say the least.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opini...agewanted=print
CITY OF DEATH: THE BATTLE FOR BAGHDAD - BERNHARD ZAND (SPIEGEL INTERNATIONAL, SEPTEMBER 22): Once the most progressive city in the Arab world, Baghdad has been ravaged by war and bombings. Everyone wants out, but not everyone can afford to leave -- and car bomb explosions are a daily fact of life.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiege...,438429,00.html
WAR'S FORGOTTEN WOMEN - LIZETTE ALVAREZ (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, SEPTEMBER 24): Despite longstanding predictions that the United States would shudder when its women were killed in action, female military deaths have stirred no less -- and no more -- reaction at home than the deaths of the nearly 2,700 male dead.
http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file.../news/women.php
OUR FIVE IRAQ WARS - JAMES JAY CARAFANO (WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): What the United States needs to do is finish the job in Iraq -- and that means strengthening Iraq's security forces so they can handle the insurgency.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...23-084009-2950r
FACING FACTS ON IRAQ EDITORIAL (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): There is nothing about Iraq -- including withdrawal scenarios -- that is anything but ominous.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opinion/...agewanted=print
THE FACTS ON THE GROUND: MINI-GULAGS, HIRED GUNS, LOBBYISTS, AND A REALITY BUILT ON FEAR - TOM ENGELHARDT (TOMDISPATCH, SEPTEMBER 21): While Iraq and future Iraq policy are constantly in the news, almost all the American facts-on-the-ground in that country have come into being without consultation with the American people or, in any serious way, Congress (or testing in the courts).
http://tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=123690
BE READY FOR CIVIL WAR - DANIEL GALLINGTON (WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 15): Civil war may happen in Iraq no matter what we do or what we want -- and we had better be thinking about how it would support our longer-term policy objectives.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...24-085113-5472r
SPY AGENCIES SAY IRAQ WAR WORSENS TERROR THREAT - MARK MAZZETTI (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): The classified National Intelligence Estimate attributes a more direct role to the Iraq war in fueling radicalism than that presented either in recent White House documents or in a report released Wednesday by the House Intelligence Committee, according to several officials in Washington involved in preparing the assessment or who have read the final document.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/mi...agewanted=print
NEGROPONTE HIGHLIGHTS U.S. SUCCESSES: INTELLIGENCE VIEW THAT WAR IS INCREASING TERROR IS 'FRACTION OF JUDGMENTS,' HE SAYS - NEWS SERVICES (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 25)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092400986.html
CLOSING OF A NATION - DAVID BROOKS (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Iraq is the most xenophobic, sexist and reactionary society on earth.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opini...agewanted=print
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PLAYING SHELL GAMES ON RESPONSIBILITY WITH IRAQ - DERRICK Z. JACKSON (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): The same White House that trashed generals and bean counters for saying it would take hundreds of thousands of more troops and billions more dollars to secure Iraq is now blaming the puppet government for not securing the country.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...th_iraq?mode=PF
DIVIDING IRAQ WOULD JUST MEAN MORE THREATS: SEPARATE SUNNI, SHIITE AND KURD STATES ARE A SEDUCTIVE SOLUTION, BUT A SINGLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS IRAQ'S BEST CHANCE FOR STABILITY - W. ROBERT PEARSON (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
THE TROOPS STAY ON: PRESIDENT BUSH HELD OFF ON FORCE CUTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN THIS FALL. THERE'S GOOD REASON -- BUT IS THERE A GOOD PLAN? ? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201442_pf.html
LOSING AFGHANISTAN - JOHN KERRY (WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 25): Where allies have pledged troops and assistance in Afghanistan, they must follow through. But we must lead by example. That's how you win hearts and minds, and show the world the true face of America -- and that's how you win the war on terror. (Mr. Kerry, a senator from Massachusetts, was the 2004 Democratic nominee for president.)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1159138897...in_commentaries
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THE KEY TO AFGHANISTAN: MORE TIME - JIM HOAGLAND (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): The struggle in Afghanistan needs resources, it needs time -- and it needs never to be forgotten.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201396_pf.html
A SILENCE IN THE AFGHAN MOUNTAINS: THE CONCEALMENT OF TWO DETAINEE DEATHS PAINTS A TROUBLING PICTURE OF ABUSE BY U.S. SPECIAL FORCES UNITS DEPLOYED TO THE COUNTRY - KEVIN SACK AND CRAIG PYES (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/na...-home-headlines
BUSH'S OPTIONS ON IRAN - ROBERT KUTTNER (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): Iran is far larger and more powerful than Iraq. Far from making war inevitable, that reality limits American options.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...on_iran?mode=PF
IRANIAN RHETORIC ASIDE, IT MAY BE TIME TO TALK - ROGER COHEN (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): In the Bush-led quest to transform the Middle East, a stick has been applied in Iraq. Its corollary almost certainly has to be a carrot deployed in Iran.
http://select.nytimes.com/iht/2006/09/23/w...agewanted=print
AHMADINEJAD'S GAUNTLET: THE U.S. AND IRAN NEED EACH OTHER TOO MUCH NOT TO FIND ACCOMMODATION - DAVID IGNATIUS (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): That's the challenge: Can America and Iran find a formula that will meet each side's security interests, and thereby allow Iran to return fully to the community of nations after 27 years?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201393_pf.html
IRAN'S UNSUBTLE LEADER EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): The transparent purpose of Ahmadinejad's brief against the Security Council is to delegitimize the resolution that the council passed at the end of August calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment of uranium and comply with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial..._leader?mode=PF
WASHINGTON IS SIGNALING TEHRAN - ZE'EV SCHIFF (HAARETZ.COM, SEPTEMBER 24): Washington is saying, effectively, that it will help Iran to develop into a regional power with economic capability if Iran is willing to forgo nuclear weapons. Tehran, for its part, is hesitating.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.j...SubContrassID=0
IRAN: CALLS FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES - DAVID CULP (COMMON DREAMS, SEPTEMBER 22): When he spoke about the nuclear weapons issues, the Iranian president was offering a reasonable basis for real negotiations.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-27.htm
WAR SIGNALS? - DAVE LINDORFF (NATION, SEPTEMBER 22/COMMON DREAMS): Bush Administration and the Pentagon have issued orders for a major "strike group" of ships, including the nuclear aircraft carrier Eisenhower as well as a cruiser, destroyer, frigate, submarine escort and supply ship, to head for the Persian Gulf, just off Iran's western coast.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-28.htm
WORLD POLITICS AND SHOW BIZ: ALL THE WORLD'S A STAGE JUSTIN RAIMONDO (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The regionalization of the Iraq war, the strong possibility that the U.S., not Iran, will use nuclear weapons -- in short, a cataclysmic clash of civilizations is on the immediate horizon.
http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=9732
MORE BUSH DIPLOMACY - GORDON PRATHER (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): Bush still intends to nuke the Mullahs.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=9737
AS CRAZY AS IT SOUNDS CHARLEY REESE (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): President George Bush might be planning to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities.
http://www.antiwar.com/reese/?articleid=9736
US-IRAN SHOOTOUT IS INEVITABLE LEON HADAR (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23):
http://www.antiwar.com/hadar/?articleid=9738
THE OCTOBER SURPRISE GARY HART (HUFFINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): It should come as no surprise if the Bush Administration undertakes a preemptive war against Iran sometime before the November election.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-hart/th...se_b_30086.html
SPEAKING WITH THE ENEMY: COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CHIEF EXPLAINS WHY HIS ORGANIZATION HOSTED A DISCUSSION WITH IRAN'S PRESIDENT - RICHARD N. HAASS (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/o...1,3492119.story
THE POWER OF PUBLIC OPINION - PATRICK MCELWEE (COMMON DREAMS, SEPTEMBER 22): Despite the propaganda onslaught, 19 percent believe Iran poses no threat at all to the U.S. and an additional 55 percent of the population believe Iran can be handled diplomatically.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-34.htm
FROM THE NEW "ANTI-SEMITISM" TO NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST: HOW ISRAEL IS ENGINEERING THE "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS" - JONATHAN COOK (COUNTERPUNCH, SEPTEMBER 23/24): As ever, the main target of the new anti-Semitism campaign were audiences in the US, Israel's generous patron. There, members of the Israel lobby were turning into a chorus of doom.
http://www.counterpunch.org/cook09232006.html
DO SOMETHING - OPINION (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22): Washington should be prepared to facilitate Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' efforts to reopen a dialogue with the Israelis.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/b...inion-headlines
DELUSION IN DAMASCUS: BASHAR ASSAD BELIEVES THAT SYRIA WON THE LEBANESE WAR ?EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): The many statesmen who have tried to do business with the Syrian president in the past -- such as former secretary of state Colin L. Powell or Egypt's Hosni Mubarak -- have discovered his assurances to secure the Syrian border are not only worthless but deliberately mendacious.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2300722_pf.html
AXIS OF SKETCHY ALLIES - MAUREEN DOWD (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): The administration?s great ally in the war on terror is General Musharraf, a dictator who appears to be harboring terrorists, including the one we want most.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/23/opini...agewanted=print
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DEMOCRACY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD - LORENZO VIDINO (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): Promotion of democracy is an ambitious goal whose prospects for success are unclear. What can produce immediate gains is a head-on challenge of the enemy's ideological shortcomings.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...m_world?mode=PF
VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY - SARAH L. GILDEA / F. ANDY MESSING ( WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Our experience with democracy is relatively successful, but we must be wary of forcing our brand of freedom and democracy on others, or risk disillusionment and failure.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...24-085115-9442r
AS CHÁVEZ TALKS TOUGH, THE BUSH TEAM YAWNS EDWARD M. GOMEZ (WORLD VIEWS, SF GATE, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/det...5&entry_id=9140
CHÁVEZ'S INFERNO - ALVARO VARGAS LLOSA (WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 25): Chávez's eighth circle of hell is fraudulent anti-Americanism. Since oil makes up half the government's revenue and the U.S. is the principal destination of Venezuelan oil, he pays daily homage to U.S. capitalism.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1159141344...in_commentaries
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HURRICANE CHÁVEZ: WHAT'S WORSE FOR ENERGY SECURITY: A NATURAL DISASTER OR A PETRO-BULLY? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): To the extent that Mr. Chávez's wild talk stirs up anti-American feeling, he must be regarded as an irritant.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2300721_pf.html
DEVIL IN DISGUISE
EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 22): Chávez has been brandishing anti-Americanism ever since he became president in 1998. Chávez is criticizing the leading force behind a world economic system that has enriched his country and enhanced his power.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...isguise?mode=PF
A WHIFF OF THE DEVIL - JEFF JACOBY (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): As night descends on Venezuela, thuggish rulers everywhere are finding Chávez a kindred spirit. There was indeed an odor of sulfur at the UN last week, but it didn't come from President Bush.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...e_devil?mode=PF
TRASH TALK AT THE U.N.: CHAVEZ DELUSION - STEPHEN JOHNSON (NATIONAL REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 22): When he spoke at the U.N. General Assembly this week, President Chávez made it clear that his objective is to lead a global coalition to confront the United States.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YTY3Y...DYzYjdhNTMwYjc=
DIFFERENCES ASIDE, IT'S ALL POLITICS - MARK H. TEETER (MOSCOW TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Is somebody willing to put real, visible effort into developing avenues and areas for Russian-U.S. cooperation now, to engage and interact? Or is the best we both can hope for an uncomfortable, ill-defined stasis that benefits no discernible good cause?
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2006/09/25/009.html
WHY YOU SHOULD CARE ABOUT REINHOLD NIEBUHR: NO ONE IS ALL GOOD OR ALL EVIL - EMILY L. HAUSER (SEPTEMBER 24): President Bush has long painted the international community, and the nation's foreign policy, in stark terms. "Islamo-fascists" and, before them, the "axis of evil," described our many enemies in black and white.
Yet as Bush divides the world this way, more Americans are beginning to question his strict breakdown of good and evil.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion...perspective-hed
RENOUNCING BUSH'S FAILURES IS A START: THE PRESIDENT'S ONETIME LAPDOGS SHOULD ALSO RETHINK THE EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY THAT GOT US HERE - TODD GITLIN (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): The core of the Bush problem is an extremist worldview. Bush's aggressive go-it-alone attitude kicked in long before 9/11. "You're either with us or you're with the terrorists" was just an extension of Bush's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol (the international global warming agreement) and the International Criminal Court.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
WHY WE CAN'T WIN - JON BASIL UTLEY (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): America is incapable of organizing itself to successfully impose our will by force upon small foreign nations, much less the world.
http://www.antiwar.com/utley/?articleid=9728
A FOREIGN POLICY OF FAILURE DOUG BANDOW (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The United States today is weaker, more isolated, and more vulnerable because of the Bush administration's policies.
http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9726
THE NEW GLOBAL POPULISM - KAVEH L. AFRASIABI (ASIA TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): What sets this year's General Assembly gathering somewhat apart is the window it has opened onto a global realignment consisting of many Third World nations forming a coherent anti-US bloc.
http://atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/HI23Aa02.html
THE WAR OF THE HACKS - COLBERT I. KING (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): The terrorist ilk that attacked on Sept. 11 must be broken -- not chased, harassed or condemned from a U.N. podium, but broken. That means: Take them down here, there or anywhere they're found.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201439_pf.html
QUOTATIONS FOR THE DAY
"SHOW ME WHERE THE ROADS END, AND I WILL SHOW YOU WHERE THE TALIBAN BEGINS."
--Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan; cited in Jim Hoagland, 'The Key to Afghanistan: More Time (Washington post, September 24)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201396_pf.html
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14975333/site/newsweek/
US-IRAN RELATIONS: PERILS AND PROMISES - HOOSHANG AMIRAHMADI (PAYVAND'S IRAN NEWS ..., SEPTEMBER 22): EU Dependency and US Public Diplomacy: The US' public relations ploy to sway public opinion toward the US position on Iran has been clearly articulated by President Bush and Secretary of State Rice.
http://www.payvand.com/news/06/sep/1254.html
IRAN WAR IN OCTOBER? EVERETT (DISAGREEMENT WITHOUT BEING DISAGREEABLE, SEPTEMBER 24): The president's UN speech may have been the start of an attempt to frame the military action as an opportunity for the Iranian people to overthrow their oppressors, but much more needs to be done if such attempts at public diplomacy are to be successful.
http://dwobd.blogspot.com/
HOW THE UN MEETING TURNED INTO A FESTIVAL OF ANTI-AMERICANISM - AND BOOSTED DUBYA'S ELECTION HOPES - DAVID USBORNE (INDEPENDENT, SEPTEMBER 23): With the help of Iran's unflinching leader, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and a few others, Mr. Chavez successfully hijacked this year's UN General Assembly and turned it into a raucous carnival of anti-Americanism. Nile Gardiner, of the Heritage Foundation, said: "This is a huge public diplomacy challenge, but also a strategic threat."
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politi...icle1705645.ece
BUSH RAGES: 'I AM NOT BEELZEBUB, LORD OF SULFUR' - MIKE WHITNEY (AL-JAZEERAH, SEPTEMBER 22): And where was Bush when Chavez delivered his broadside ....hiding behind Karen Hughes's skirts, picking out a new eye-liner for his next televised harangue against Muslims, retrieving his Yale pom-poms from the dry-cleaners?
http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20edito...e%20Whitney.htm
STUFF HAPPENS AGAIN IN BAGHDAD - FRANK RICH (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Our public diplomacy efforts in Iraq were equally tone-deaf to Iraqis and their neighbors. Karen Hughes is a presidential flack whose patronizing photo-op tour of the region last year earned mostly ridicule. Our broadcasting outreach is supervised by a longtime Karl Rove pal, Kenneth Tomlinson, who last month was found by State Department investigators to be using his office -- literally -- to run a ?horse-racing operation.?
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opini...agewanted=print
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WHAT WOULD JEFFERSON SAY ABOUT IRAQ? OPPOSED TO "WARS OF CHOICE," HE WOULD HAVE A LOT TO SAY ABOUT THE FORCEFUL IMPOSITION OF DEMOCRACY - R.K. RAMAZANI (PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, SEPTEMBER 24): If asked how best to spread democracy, Jefferson would have suggested three alternative and peaceful methods. First among these would be America's own example of liberal democratic practices. Second would be effective use of what we now call public diplomacy. Third, and most important, Jefferson would have advocated expanding American educational initiatives, such as the Fulbright exchange program.
http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/ed...al/15592459.htm
US DELEGATION TO VISIT LEBANON AND DISCUSS REBUILDING (YA LIBNAN, LEBANON, SEPTEMBER 23): The group will be led by Dina Powell, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/09/post_21.php
CONDI TALKS TOUGH ON DARFUR - (NEWS FROM AFRICA, SEPTEMBER 24): After falling to the back burners of public diplomacy, it seems that maybe Darfur in Sudan is moving up the US administration's list of concerns.
http://twoandtwomakesfive.blogs.com/two_an...from_afric.html
(scroll down link for item)
WORD FOR WORD: 'ISLAMO-FASCISM' HAD ITS MOMENT - SHERYL GAY STOLBERG (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Even Karen Hughes, the former counselor to Mr. Bush who now runs the public diplomacy arm of the State Department, pushed back from the term 'Islamo-fascist,' telling CNN's Wolf Blitzer that she typically does not 'use religious terms' for fear they will be misinterpreted around the world.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/weekinre...24stolberg.html?
ATTACKS SPARK TOUGHER GUANTANAMO JAIL - ASSOCIATED PRESS (USA TODAY SEPTEMBER 23): The military is toughening a new jailhouse for suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban militants to protect guards after a spate of attacks and evidence that detainees have organized themselves into groups to mount uprisings, officials said.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-09...itmo-jail_x.htm
TORTURE CHIC: SIGN OF DECADENCE ALAN BOCK (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): The eagerness of the top two guys in the administration, plenty of others in the political classes and all too many who consider themselves thinkers or intellectuals to see torture become quasi-official policy of the United States, which used to have a reputation as the freest land on earth, verges on the sadistic and pornographic.
http://www.antiwar.com/bock/?articleid=9739
WE'VE SUNK TO BIN LADEN'S LEVEL - JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY (MIAMI HERALD, SEPTEMBER 23/COMMON DREAMS): The torture of prisoners is not only illegal under American and international law it is, put simply, immoral and unjust. It is also un-American.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0923-27.htm
A TORTURED POLICY EDITORIAL (SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, SEPTEMBER 24): The upshot is a disgraceful policy on detainees that bends American norms of justice, all wrapped in the flag-waving war on terrorism.
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?...&type=printable
POWELL BELATEDLY JOINS BID TO SAVE OUR NATION'S SOUL - LEONARD PITTS JR. (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22): Even if we had to choose between saving Americans and preserving America, it should be an easy call. Kill me before you kill my country.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
ARE WE REALLY SO FEARFUL? - ARIEL DORFMAN (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): Are we so fearful, so in love with our own security and steeped in our own pain, that we are really willing to let people be tortured in the name of America?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201303_pf.html
DOES TORTURE WORK? - EDWIDGE DANTICAT (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): We are all endorsers of torture when it is done in our name.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201304_pf.html
FIRING POTENT WORDS, FROM A TANK - ARTHUR T. HADLEY (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): 'I've seen firsthand the power of Geneva Conventions, both to compel surrenders and to broadcast, for the world, our determination to live up to our highest ideals.'
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opinion/...agewanted=print
AMERICAN STANDARD OPINION (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 24): The compromise approved last week by the GOP renegades draws the line at "redefining" the Geneva Conventions, but then leaves it to the president to "interpret" the conventions pretty much as he sees fit.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/b...inion-headlines
DO UNTO YOUR ENEMY... - PAUL RIECKHOFF (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): If America continues to erode the meaning of the Geneva Conventions, we will cede the ground upon which to prosecute dictators and warlords.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opinion/...agewanted=print
SYRIA AND THE US: FELLOW TRAVELERS AT THE CROSSROADS FOR TERRORISM - AMY GOODMAN AND DAVID GOODMAN (MOTHER JONES, SEPTEMBER 23): When President Bush made torture a centerpiece of his foreign policy, he bound himself intimately to the world's worst human rights abusers.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0923-20.htm
TORTURE IS A MORAL ISSUE RELIGIOUS LEADERS FROM CONNECTICUT, SIGNATORIES (NATION, SEPTEMBER 23): The detainee legislation seems not to be about protecting our military personnel or even US citizens; rather, it appears to be designed to protect the leaders at the top of the chain of command who have tolerated, promoted, and justified torture.
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20061009/moral_compass
PARSING WORDS ABOUT TORTURE - STEVE CHAPMAN (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 25): Mr. Bush's stated policy is, "We do not torture." Anyone who really believes in the logic behind his policies ought to be asking, "Why on earth not?"
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
EXPLOITATION OF 9/11 WAS SHAMEFUL - ANDREW GREELEY (CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, SEPTEMBER 22): The administration, not able to find Osama bin Laden, now plans to drag some of his henchmen -- tortured and illegally imprisoned -- before kangaroo military courts to prove how tough on terrorists it really is before the election. Do the marketers of such propaganda have no shame at all?
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-30.htm
AMERICA'S DETAINEES FACE GRAVE INJUSTICE - JONATHAN HAFETZ (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22)
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines
TORTURE EXHIBIT A - WILLIAM FISHER (TOMPAINE.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The compromise bill agreed on by the White House and the famous 'Republican rebels' -- Senators McCain, Lindsey Graham, John Warner, Susan Collins, Olympia Snowe and others -- fails to mention extraordinary rendition explicitly.
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/09/2...e_exhibit_a.php
THE ABUSE CAN CONTINUE: SENATORS WON'T AUTHORIZE TORTURE, BUT THEY WON'T PREVENT IT, EITHER ? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 22)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092101647.html
COMPROMISED EDITORS (NEW REPUBLIC, SEPTEMBER 21): The compromise proposed by GOP Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham, and John Warner takes the administration's proposals as a starting point and then proceeds to roll back only a few of its more odious provisions.
http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=200610...editorial100206
BUSH GETS HIS WAY - DAN FROOMKIN (WASHINGTONPOST.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): On the central issue of whether the CIA should continue using interrogation methods on suspected terrorists that many say constitute torture, the White House got its way, winning agreement from the "maverick" Republican senators who had refused to go along with an overt undoing of the Geneva Conventions.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2200703_pf.html
TURNING BACK THE CLOCK ON RAPE EDITORIAL (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): The bill on jailing, interrogating and trying terror suspects contains narrow definitions of rape and sexual assault that must be fixed before Congress can responsibly pass the legislation.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/opinion/edit...html?offset=10&
A TORTUROUS COMPROMISE EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): After delaying legal action against hundreds of detainees for almost five years, the administration should work with Congress to devise interrogation and trial rules that civilized peoples expect.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...promise?mode=PF
TWO-TIERED TORTURE STANDARDS: BY ALLOWING THE CIA LEEWAY IN INTERROGATIONS, THE SENATE GAVE UP TOO MUCH IN ITS COMPROMISE WITH BUSH ? EDITORIAL (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/editor...ment-editorials
CIA VALUES SHOW IN STAND ON DETAINEES - GREG MILLER (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): On the detainee issue, the CIA is less swayed by concerns that other nations might retaliate against U.S. prisoners, and more inclined to consider any cost worth paying for the intelligence it generates.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wa...,1,770657.story
WHY RETIRED MILITARY BRASS DON'T WANT TORTURE: FIRSTHAND COMBAT EXPERIENCES COMPEL OLD GUARD TO ATTACK BUSH'S 'ALTERNATIVE INTERROGATION' - CHARLES KAISER (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
HE WROTE THE BOOK ON TORTURE [REVIEW OF WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR BY JOHN YOO] - JAMES BOVARD (AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, OCTOBER 9): John Yoo, the former Justice Department official, implies that the torture scandal may be largely a liberal media concoction. Though this book went to press in July 2006, Yoo relies on dubious data from September 2004 to exonerate the federal torturers.
http://www.amconmag.com/2006/2006_10_09/review.html
UN REPORT: TORTURE IN IRAQ 'TOTALLY OUT OF HAND': BUSH ADMINISTRATION REJECTS CLAIM THAT TORTURE MAY BE WORSE THAN UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN - TOM REGAN (CSMONITOR.COM, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0922/dailyUpdate.html
IN IRAQ, A JOURNALIST IN LIMBO - TOM CURLEY (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): Bilal Hussein, an Iraqi photographer who helped the Associated Press win a Pulitzer Prize last year, is now in his sixth month in a U.S. Army prison in Iraq. He doesn't understand why he's there, and neither do his AP colleagues.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201444_pf.html
DUE PROCESS, BULLDOZED - BOB HERBERT (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Several Iraqi journalists working for international news organizations have been held without charge by American and Iraqi forces. The absence of concrete evidence in so many of the cases is disturbing, to say the least.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/opini...agewanted=print
CITY OF DEATH: THE BATTLE FOR BAGHDAD - BERNHARD ZAND (SPIEGEL INTERNATIONAL, SEPTEMBER 22): Once the most progressive city in the Arab world, Baghdad has been ravaged by war and bombings. Everyone wants out, but not everyone can afford to leave -- and car bomb explosions are a daily fact of life.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiege...,438429,00.html
WAR'S FORGOTTEN WOMEN - LIZETTE ALVAREZ (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, SEPTEMBER 24): Despite longstanding predictions that the United States would shudder when its women were killed in action, female military deaths have stirred no less -- and no more -- reaction at home than the deaths of the nearly 2,700 male dead.
http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file.../news/women.php
OUR FIVE IRAQ WARS - JAMES JAY CARAFANO (WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): What the United States needs to do is finish the job in Iraq -- and that means strengthening Iraq's security forces so they can handle the insurgency.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...23-084009-2950r
FACING FACTS ON IRAQ EDITORIAL (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): There is nothing about Iraq -- including withdrawal scenarios -- that is anything but ominous.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opinion/...agewanted=print
THE FACTS ON THE GROUND: MINI-GULAGS, HIRED GUNS, LOBBYISTS, AND A REALITY BUILT ON FEAR - TOM ENGELHARDT (TOMDISPATCH, SEPTEMBER 21): While Iraq and future Iraq policy are constantly in the news, almost all the American facts-on-the-ground in that country have come into being without consultation with the American people or, in any serious way, Congress (or testing in the courts).
http://tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=123690
BE READY FOR CIVIL WAR - DANIEL GALLINGTON (WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 15): Civil war may happen in Iraq no matter what we do or what we want -- and we had better be thinking about how it would support our longer-term policy objectives.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...24-085113-5472r
SPY AGENCIES SAY IRAQ WAR WORSENS TERROR THREAT - MARK MAZZETTI (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): The classified National Intelligence Estimate attributes a more direct role to the Iraq war in fueling radicalism than that presented either in recent White House documents or in a report released Wednesday by the House Intelligence Committee, according to several officials in Washington involved in preparing the assessment or who have read the final document.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/mi...agewanted=print
NEGROPONTE HIGHLIGHTS U.S. SUCCESSES: INTELLIGENCE VIEW THAT WAR IS INCREASING TERROR IS 'FRACTION OF JUDGMENTS,' HE SAYS - NEWS SERVICES (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 25)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092400986.html
CLOSING OF A NATION - DAVID BROOKS (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): Iraq is the most xenophobic, sexist and reactionary society on earth.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/opini...agewanted=print
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PLAYING SHELL GAMES ON RESPONSIBILITY WITH IRAQ - DERRICK Z. JACKSON (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): The same White House that trashed generals and bean counters for saying it would take hundreds of thousands of more troops and billions more dollars to secure Iraq is now blaming the puppet government for not securing the country.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...th_iraq?mode=PF
DIVIDING IRAQ WOULD JUST MEAN MORE THREATS: SEPARATE SUNNI, SHIITE AND KURD STATES ARE A SEDUCTIVE SOLUTION, BUT A SINGLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS IRAQ'S BEST CHANCE FOR STABILITY - W. ROBERT PEARSON (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
THE TROOPS STAY ON: PRESIDENT BUSH HELD OFF ON FORCE CUTS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN THIS FALL. THERE'S GOOD REASON -- BUT IS THERE A GOOD PLAN? ? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201442_pf.html
LOSING AFGHANISTAN - JOHN KERRY (WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 25): Where allies have pledged troops and assistance in Afghanistan, they must follow through. But we must lead by example. That's how you win hearts and minds, and show the world the true face of America -- and that's how you win the war on terror. (Mr. Kerry, a senator from Massachusetts, was the 2004 Democratic nominee for president.)
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1159138897...in_commentaries
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THE KEY TO AFGHANISTAN: MORE TIME - JIM HOAGLAND (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): The struggle in Afghanistan needs resources, it needs time -- and it needs never to be forgotten.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201396_pf.html
A SILENCE IN THE AFGHAN MOUNTAINS: THE CONCEALMENT OF TWO DETAINEE DEATHS PAINTS A TROUBLING PICTURE OF ABUSE BY U.S. SPECIAL FORCES UNITS DEPLOYED TO THE COUNTRY - KEVIN SACK AND CRAIG PYES (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24)
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/na...-home-headlines
BUSH'S OPTIONS ON IRAN - ROBERT KUTTNER (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 23): Iran is far larger and more powerful than Iraq. Far from making war inevitable, that reality limits American options.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...on_iran?mode=PF
IRANIAN RHETORIC ASIDE, IT MAY BE TIME TO TALK - ROGER COHEN (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): In the Bush-led quest to transform the Middle East, a stick has been applied in Iraq. Its corollary almost certainly has to be a carrot deployed in Iran.
http://select.nytimes.com/iht/2006/09/23/w...agewanted=print
AHMADINEJAD'S GAUNTLET: THE U.S. AND IRAN NEED EACH OTHER TOO MUCH NOT TO FIND ACCOMMODATION - DAVID IGNATIUS (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): That's the challenge: Can America and Iran find a formula that will meet each side's security interests, and thereby allow Iran to return fully to the community of nations after 27 years?
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201393_pf.html
IRAN'S UNSUBTLE LEADER EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): The transparent purpose of Ahmadinejad's brief against the Security Council is to delegitimize the resolution that the council passed at the end of August calling on Iran to suspend its enrichment of uranium and comply with the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial..._leader?mode=PF
WASHINGTON IS SIGNALING TEHRAN - ZE'EV SCHIFF (HAARETZ.COM, SEPTEMBER 24): Washington is saying, effectively, that it will help Iran to develop into a regional power with economic capability if Iran is willing to forgo nuclear weapons. Tehran, for its part, is hesitating.
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.j...SubContrassID=0
IRAN: CALLS FOR DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES - DAVID CULP (COMMON DREAMS, SEPTEMBER 22): When he spoke about the nuclear weapons issues, the Iranian president was offering a reasonable basis for real negotiations.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-27.htm
WAR SIGNALS? - DAVE LINDORFF (NATION, SEPTEMBER 22/COMMON DREAMS): Bush Administration and the Pentagon have issued orders for a major "strike group" of ships, including the nuclear aircraft carrier Eisenhower as well as a cruiser, destroyer, frigate, submarine escort and supply ship, to head for the Persian Gulf, just off Iran's western coast.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-28.htm
WORLD POLITICS AND SHOW BIZ: ALL THE WORLD'S A STAGE JUSTIN RAIMONDO (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The regionalization of the Iraq war, the strong possibility that the U.S., not Iran, will use nuclear weapons -- in short, a cataclysmic clash of civilizations is on the immediate horizon.
http://www.antiwar.com/justin/?articleid=9732
MORE BUSH DIPLOMACY - GORDON PRATHER (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): Bush still intends to nuke the Mullahs.
http://www.antiwar.com/prather/?articleid=9737
AS CRAZY AS IT SOUNDS CHARLEY REESE (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23): President George Bush might be planning to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities.
http://www.antiwar.com/reese/?articleid=9736
US-IRAN SHOOTOUT IS INEVITABLE LEON HADAR (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 23):
http://www.antiwar.com/hadar/?articleid=9738
THE OCTOBER SURPRISE GARY HART (HUFFINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): It should come as no surprise if the Bush Administration undertakes a preemptive war against Iran sometime before the November election.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-hart/th...se_b_30086.html
SPEAKING WITH THE ENEMY: COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CHIEF EXPLAINS WHY HIS ORGANIZATION HOSTED A DISCUSSION WITH IRAN'S PRESIDENT - RICHARD N. HAASS (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/o...1,3492119.story
THE POWER OF PUBLIC OPINION - PATRICK MCELWEE (COMMON DREAMS, SEPTEMBER 22): Despite the propaganda onslaught, 19 percent believe Iran poses no threat at all to the U.S. and an additional 55 percent of the population believe Iran can be handled diplomatically.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0922-34.htm
FROM THE NEW "ANTI-SEMITISM" TO NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST: HOW ISRAEL IS ENGINEERING THE "CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS" - JONATHAN COOK (COUNTERPUNCH, SEPTEMBER 23/24): As ever, the main target of the new anti-Semitism campaign were audiences in the US, Israel's generous patron. There, members of the Israel lobby were turning into a chorus of doom.
http://www.counterpunch.org/cook09232006.html
DO SOMETHING - OPINION (BALTIMORE SUN, SEPTEMBER 22): Washington should be prepared to facilitate Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' efforts to reopen a dialogue with the Israelis.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/b...inion-headlines
DELUSION IN DAMASCUS: BASHAR ASSAD BELIEVES THAT SYRIA WON THE LEBANESE WAR ?EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): The many statesmen who have tried to do business with the Syrian president in the past -- such as former secretary of state Colin L. Powell or Egypt's Hosni Mubarak -- have discovered his assurances to secure the Syrian border are not only worthless but deliberately mendacious.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2300722_pf.html
AXIS OF SKETCHY ALLIES - MAUREEN DOWD (NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 24): The administration?s great ally in the war on terror is General Musharraf, a dictator who appears to be harboring terrorists, including the one we want most.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/09/23/opini...agewanted=print
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DEMOCRACY IN THE MUSLIM WORLD - LORENZO VIDINO (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): Promotion of democracy is an ambitious goal whose prospects for success are unclear. What can produce immediate gains is a head-on challenge of the enemy's ideological shortcomings.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...m_world?mode=PF
VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY - SARAH L. GILDEA / F. ANDY MESSING ( WASHINGTON TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Our experience with democracy is relatively successful, but we must be wary of forcing our brand of freedom and democracy on others, or risk disillusionment and failure.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...24-085115-9442r
AS CHÁVEZ TALKS TOUGH, THE BUSH TEAM YAWNS EDWARD M. GOMEZ (WORLD VIEWS, SF GATE, SEPTEMBER 23)
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/sfgate/det...5&entry_id=9140
CHÁVEZ'S INFERNO - ALVARO VARGAS LLOSA (WALL STREET JOURNAL, SEPTEMBER 25): Chávez's eighth circle of hell is fraudulent anti-Americanism. Since oil makes up half the government's revenue and the U.S. is the principal destination of Venezuelan oil, he pays daily homage to U.S. capitalism.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1159141344...in_commentaries
PAID SUSBCRIPTION
HURRICANE CHÁVEZ: WHAT'S WORSE FOR ENERGY SECURITY: A NATURAL DISASTER OR A PETRO-BULLY? EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 24): To the extent that Mr. Chávez's wild talk stirs up anti-American feeling, he must be regarded as an irritant.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2300721_pf.html
DEVIL IN DISGUISE
EDITORIAL (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 22): Chávez has been brandishing anti-Americanism ever since he became president in 1998. Chávez is criticizing the leading force behind a world economic system that has enriched his country and enhanced his power.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...isguise?mode=PF
A WHIFF OF THE DEVIL - JEFF JACOBY (BOSTON GLOBE, SEPTEMBER 24): As night descends on Venezuela, thuggish rulers everywhere are finding Chávez a kindred spirit. There was indeed an odor of sulfur at the UN last week, but it didn't come from President Bush.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...e_devil?mode=PF
TRASH TALK AT THE U.N.: CHAVEZ DELUSION - STEPHEN JOHNSON (NATIONAL REVIEW, SEPTEMBER 22): When he spoke at the U.N. General Assembly this week, President Chávez made it clear that his objective is to lead a global coalition to confront the United States.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YTY3Y...DYzYjdhNTMwYjc=
DIFFERENCES ASIDE, IT'S ALL POLITICS - MARK H. TEETER (MOSCOW TIMES, SEPTEMBER 25): Is somebody willing to put real, visible effort into developing avenues and areas for Russian-U.S. cooperation now, to engage and interact? Or is the best we both can hope for an uncomfortable, ill-defined stasis that benefits no discernible good cause?
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2006/09/25/009.html
WHY YOU SHOULD CARE ABOUT REINHOLD NIEBUHR: NO ONE IS ALL GOOD OR ALL EVIL - EMILY L. HAUSER (SEPTEMBER 24): President Bush has long painted the international community, and the nation's foreign policy, in stark terms. "Islamo-fascists" and, before them, the "axis of evil," described our many enemies in black and white.
Yet as Bush divides the world this way, more Americans are beginning to question his strict breakdown of good and evil.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion...perspective-hed
RENOUNCING BUSH'S FAILURES IS A START: THE PRESIDENT'S ONETIME LAPDOGS SHOULD ALSO RETHINK THE EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY THAT GOT US HERE - TODD GITLIN (LOS ANGELES TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): The core of the Bush problem is an extremist worldview. Bush's aggressive go-it-alone attitude kicked in long before 9/11. "You're either with us or you're with the terrorists" was just an extension of Bush's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol (the international global warming agreement) and the International Criminal Court.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
WHY WE CAN'T WIN - JON BASIL UTLEY (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): America is incapable of organizing itself to successfully impose our will by force upon small foreign nations, much less the world.
http://www.antiwar.com/utley/?articleid=9728
A FOREIGN POLICY OF FAILURE DOUG BANDOW (ANTIWAR.COM, SEPTEMBER 22): The United States today is weaker, more isolated, and more vulnerable because of the Bush administration's policies.
http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=9726
THE NEW GLOBAL POPULISM - KAVEH L. AFRASIABI (ASIA TIMES, SEPTEMBER 23): What sets this year's General Assembly gathering somewhat apart is the window it has opened onto a global realignment consisting of many Third World nations forming a coherent anti-US bloc.
http://atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page/HI23Aa02.html
THE WAR OF THE HACKS - COLBERT I. KING (WASHINGTON POST, SEPTEMBER 23): The terrorist ilk that attacked on Sept. 11 must be broken -- not chased, harassed or condemned from a U.N. podium, but broken. That means: Take them down here, there or anywhere they're found.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201439_pf.html
QUOTATIONS FOR THE DAY
"SHOW ME WHERE THE ROADS END, AND I WILL SHOW YOU WHERE THE TALIBAN BEGINS."
--Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan; cited in Jim Hoagland, 'The Key to Afghanistan: More Time (Washington post, September 24)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...2201396_pf.html
Looks like the MSM is going to the full court press to insure the USA is defeated in Iraq, eh?
QUOTE(Indianhead @ Sep 26 2006, 09:15 AM)
The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth...
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092501114.html
For Democrats, Welcome Words on Rumsfeld -- if Not the War
By Dana Milbank
Tuesday, September 26, 2006; Page A02
Maj. Gen. John Batiste, the former commander of the Army's 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, had complained loudly about the handling of the Iraq war since he retired 11 months ago -- but no one invited him to present his views to Congress.
"I find that outrageous," the general said. "I have a sense for what I'm talking about."
Yesterday, Batiste got his moment -- sort of. Shunned by the Senate Armed Services Committee, Batiste and two other retired officers spoke before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, a rump group with little legislative clout but access to a proper Senate hearing room. And Batiste made up for lost time.
"Donald Rumsfeld is not a competent wartime leader," said Batiste, wearing a pinstripe suit, calling himself a "lifelong Republican" and bearing a slight resemblance to Oliver North. "He surrounds himself with like-minded and compliant subordinates who do not grasp the importance of the principles of war, the complexities of Iraq or the human dimension of warfare. . . . Bottom line: His plan allowed the insurgency to take root and metastasize to where it is today."
Further, Batiste charged, Rumsfeld "reduced force levels to unacceptable levels, micromanaged the war" and created an environment where U.S. troops "are doing unconscionable things."
"Our world is much less safe today than it was on September 11," Batiste said, echoing the administration's newly leaked intelligence estimate.
Batiste, who retired in protest rather than accept a three-star promotion, was a persuasive witness -- and Democrats were joyous. "Your statement, I believe, defines the word 'courage,' " Sen. Byron Dorgan (N.D.) gushed. Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.) pumped his fist and gave Batiste and his colleagues pats on the biceps. And Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (Nev.) proclaimed, giddily: "This hearing today could change our country."
Perhaps. But Democrats, while celebrating Batiste's criticism of the administration, exercised some selective listening at the hearing when Batiste and his colleagues offered their solution: more troops, more money and more time in Iraq.
"We must mobilize our country for a protracted challenge," Batiste warned.
"We better be planning for at least a minimum of a decade or longer," contributed retired Marine Col. Thomas Hammes.
"We are, conservatively, 60,000 soldiers short," added retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who was in charge of building the Iraqi Security Forces.
That last remark caused Schumer to shake his head, indicating he was not so sure. And, indeed, the retired officers' recommendations were off-message for the Democrats. Six of the seven Democrats at the hearing supported legislation calling for the start of a troop withdrawal from Iraq this year. One, Richard Durbin (Ill.), voted for the pullout to be mostly complete by next summer.
The officers' bipartisan scolding disappointed some of the antiwar activists in the crowd, who wore colorful shirts with messages such as "Troops Home Fast" and "Say No to War."
"Peace is the solution, not more war," one activist shouted as the session ended.
But on balance, the retired officers' strong words about the war's conduct outweighed their calls for a greater commitment to Iraq. "Secretary Rumsfeld built his team by systematically removing dissension," Batiste said. "At one point, he threatened to fire the next person who talked about the need for a postwar plan."
Rumsfeld "has tried and continues to fight this war on the cheap," Eaton added. "The Army is in terrible shape, and the Marines aren't much better."
"It is time for him to provide the nation the last in a long series of services and step down," Hammes said coolly.
Rumsfeld himself, meeting with Afghanistan's president yesterday, answered the dissidents' calls for his resignation with a two-word answer. "I'm not," he told reporters, and then he asked for a different question.
But those at the hearing practiced no such economy of words. Dorgan twice referred to William Manchester's "Glory and the Dream." Antiwar Rep. Walter Jones (N.C.), the lone Republican participant, quoted Rudyard Kipling: If any question why we died/ Tell them, because our fathers lied.
In between literary allusions, senators worked to squeeze every possible criticism out of the witnesses. When Batiste spoke about the need for strong leadership, Durbin tried to lead the witness. "What I hear you saying," Durbin said, "is we're talking about political competence, too."
"Absolutely," Batiste complied.
The questioners skillfully directed the witnesses toward past failures rather than their expansive prescriptions for the future. A notable exception was the relatively hawkish Hillary Rodham Clinton (N.Y.), who, as the last questioner, invited the officers to comment on the effect of a specific withdrawal date.
"The result will be a civil war of some magnitude that will turn into a regional mess," Batiste said without hesitation.
As he stood to leave, Batiste worried that this last point -- the need to stay in Iraq -- might be overlooked. "The hard part," he told reporters, "is moving forward."
Did he detect any enthusiasm for making a bigger effort in Iraq?
"God help us if there's not," the general said.
---------------------
I have to listen to these gentlemen, cause they earned it...
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...6092501114.html
For Democrats, Welcome Words on Rumsfeld -- if Not the War
By Dana Milbank
Tuesday, September 26, 2006; Page A02
Maj. Gen. John Batiste, the former commander of the Army's 1st Infantry Division in Iraq, had complained loudly about the handling of the Iraq war since he retired 11 months ago -- but no one invited him to present his views to Congress.
"I find that outrageous," the general said. "I have a sense for what I'm talking about."
Yesterday, Batiste got his moment -- sort of. Shunned by the Senate Armed Services Committee, Batiste and two other retired officers spoke before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, a rump group with little legislative clout but access to a proper Senate hearing room. And Batiste made up for lost time.
"Donald Rumsfeld is not a competent wartime leader," said Batiste, wearing a pinstripe suit, calling himself a "lifelong Republican" and bearing a slight resemblance to Oliver North. "He surrounds himself with like-minded and compliant subordinates who do not grasp the importance of the principles of war, the complexities of Iraq or the human dimension of warfare. . . . Bottom line: His plan allowed the insurgency to take root and metastasize to where it is today."
Further, Batiste charged, Rumsfeld "reduced force levels to unacceptable levels, micromanaged the war" and created an environment where U.S. troops "are doing unconscionable things."
"Our world is much less safe today than it was on September 11," Batiste said, echoing the administration's newly leaked intelligence estimate.
Batiste, who retired in protest rather than accept a three-star promotion, was a persuasive witness -- and Democrats were joyous. "Your statement, I believe, defines the word 'courage,' " Sen. Byron Dorgan (N.D.) gushed. Sen. Charles Schumer (N.Y.) pumped his fist and gave Batiste and his colleagues pats on the biceps. And Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (Nev.) proclaimed, giddily: "This hearing today could change our country."
Perhaps. But Democrats, while celebrating Batiste's criticism of the administration, exercised some selective listening at the hearing when Batiste and his colleagues offered their solution: more troops, more money and more time in Iraq.
"We must mobilize our country for a protracted challenge," Batiste warned.
"We better be planning for at least a minimum of a decade or longer," contributed retired Marine Col. Thomas Hammes.
"We are, conservatively, 60,000 soldiers short," added retired Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, who was in charge of building the Iraqi Security Forces.
That last remark caused Schumer to shake his head, indicating he was not so sure. And, indeed, the retired officers' recommendations were off-message for the Democrats. Six of the seven Democrats at the hearing supported legislation calling for the start of a troop withdrawal from Iraq this year. One, Richard Durbin (Ill.), voted for the pullout to be mostly complete by next summer.
The officers' bipartisan scolding disappointed some of the antiwar activists in the crowd, who wore colorful shirts with messages such as "Troops Home Fast" and "Say No to War."
"Peace is the solution, not more war," one activist shouted as the session ended.
But on balance, the retired officers' strong words about the war's conduct outweighed their calls for a greater commitment to Iraq. "Secretary Rumsfeld built his team by systematically removing dissension," Batiste said. "At one point, he threatened to fire the next person who talked about the need for a postwar plan."
Rumsfeld "has tried and continues to fight this war on the cheap," Eaton added. "The Army is in terrible shape, and the Marines aren't much better."
"It is time for him to provide the nation the last in a long series of services and step down," Hammes said coolly.
Rumsfeld himself, meeting with Afghanistan's president yesterday, answered the dissidents' calls for his resignation with a two-word answer. "I'm not," he told reporters, and then he asked for a different question.
But those at the hearing practiced no such economy of words. Dorgan twice referred to William Manchester's "Glory and the Dream." Antiwar Rep. Walter Jones (N.C.), the lone Republican participant, quoted Rudyard Kipling: If any question why we died/ Tell them, because our fathers lied.
In between literary allusions, senators worked to squeeze every possible criticism out of the witnesses. When Batiste spoke about the need for strong leadership, Durbin tried to lead the witness. "What I hear you saying," Durbin said, "is we're talking about political competence, too."
"Absolutely," Batiste complied.
The questioners skillfully directed the witnesses toward past failures rather than their expansive prescriptions for the future. A notable exception was the relatively hawkish Hillary Rodham Clinton (N.Y.), who, as the last questioner, invited the officers to comment on the effect of a specific withdrawal date.
"The result will be a civil war of some magnitude that will turn into a regional mess," Batiste said without hesitation.
As he stood to leave, Batiste worried that this last point -- the need to stay in Iraq -- might be overlooked. "The hard part," he told reporters, "is moving forward."
Did he detect any enthusiasm for making a bigger effort in Iraq?
"God help us if there's not," the general said.
---------------------
I have to listen to these gentlemen, cause they earned it...
QUOTE
The view of the soldier, no matter how experienced in military affairs he may be, is still restricted to the conduct of operations and military strategy. Civilian control of the military means at a minimum that it is the role of the statesman to take the broader view, deciding when political considerations take precedence over even the most pressing military matters. The soldier is a fighter and an adviser, not a policymaker.
Mackubin Thomas Owens is an associate dean of academics and a professor of national-security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.
Mackubin Thomas Owens is an associate dean of academics and a professor of national-security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.
I wonder how well it would a gone over if five or six retired Generals had openly questioned FDR's decision on Lend/Lease, or stationing the Marines in Iceland, or fortifying Wake and Midway Island, or moving the Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor, or putting the war in Europe first, or invading North Africa before Europe, or a multitude of other decisions made by a war president? How about Truman's decision to end the war with Japan by using the atomic bomb?
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,114882,00.html
Congress to Debate Terrorism Techniques
Associated Press | September 26, 2006
WASHINGTON - One prominent feature is missing in debate over President Bush's deal with Senate leaders on the treatment of alleged terrorists in custody: an open and explicit accounting of interrogation techniques that may be used.
The deal, which the House and Senate are expected to vote on before Congress adjourns this week, prohibits consequences more than actions, and leaves much open to interpretation. For example, interrogators would not only be barred from causing captives "prolonged" mental suffering, as they are now, but would be prevented from inflicting "serious and nontransitory" mental harm, whether the technique is prolonged or not.
Exactly what techniques may and may not be used under such strictures is unclear even to those who negotiated the agreement. It gives Bush leeway to interpret the language and to produce regulations that senators say they can challenge if the steps go too far. But it's unlikely Bush will lay out techniques in enough detail for everyone to be sure what's allowed and what's beyond the pale.
Measures used against detainees in secret CIA prisons have not been fully discussed in an open forum for fear of hampering interrogators or helping terrorists train people to deal with such steps. But a partial picture has emerged in public reports and conversations with intelligence officials who have discussed interrogation on condition they not be identified.
Among the tens of thousands of people held by U.S. authorities during the war on terrorism, 96 are thought to have been in secret CIA custody.
A look at what's known about some of the more radical techniques and their possible fate under the agreement:
-Sleep deprivation and disorientation:
These tactics are thought to have been used in extraordinary circumstances. Specific methods may involve using loud noise, such as clattering machinery or blasting music, to keep captives awake; interrogating them day and night or moving them from place to place to disorient them.
"People who have gone through this describe this as one of the worst things that a human being can experience because sleep is such a fundamental need," said Tom Malinowski, Washington advocacy director for Human Rights Watch. He was speaking generally about the technique, not with specific knowledge about how U.S. interrogators might have applied it.
-Temperature extremes:
Exposing prisoners to uncomfortable cold or heat for long periods.
-Stress positions:
Prolonged, forced standing is also believed to have been used in some cases. Captives might be threatened with beatings if they sit, or shackled in a way to prevent sitting. Various other forms of discomfort have been allowed.
-Simulated drowning:
Meant to induce panic, the technique is commonly known as waterboarding because it may involve a prisoner being tied to a board, head slanted down, a wet towel placed on his face and water applied to the towel. As many as four prisoners are believed to have been subjected to this.
"It's a technique that we need to let the world know we are no longer engaging in," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., one of those who negotiated the deal.
Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona, another broker of the agreement, said the deal "could mean" the prohibition of extreme sleep deprivation, hypothermia, waterboarding and other steps that amount to torture or come close to it. Yet he acknowledged he has not been privy to everything that has been done with captives and that the agreement's practical effects remain to be seen.
McCain, who was beaten as a Vietnam prisoner of war, said some forms of induced stress are an important and valid tool for interrogators.
The most extreme steps have been clearly prohibited all along, including closed-hand punching, electric shock, terrorizing suspects with dogs, disfigurement and sexual abuse, although some were used in criminal fashion at Abu Ghraib, the U.S. military-run prison in Iraq. Openhanded slapping has not been similarly banned.
An updated U.S. Army manual released this month, which applies to all the armed services but not the CIA, explicitly bans withholding food and water, performing mock executions, using electric shock, burning and causing other pain and waterboarding, among other techniques.
The deal between the administration and the Senate is packed with imprecise adjectives.
It would make it a crime to inflict extreme physical pain, burns or physical disfigurement of a serious nature, or impairment of the function of organs or of mental faculty. Mental
Congress to Debate Terrorism Techniques
Associated Press | September 26, 2006
WASHINGTON - One prominent feature is missing in debate over President Bush's deal with Senate leaders on the treatment of alleged terrorists in custody: an open and explicit accounting of interrogation techniques that may be used.
The deal, which the House and Senate are expected to vote on before Congress adjourns this week, prohibits consequences more than actions, and leaves much open to interpretation. For example, interrogators would not only be barred from causing captives "prolonged" mental suffering, as they are now, but would be prevented from inflicting "serious and nontransitory" mental harm, whether the technique is prolonged or not.
Exactly what techniques may and may not be used under such strictures is unclear even to those who negotiated the agreement. It gives Bush leeway to interpret the language and to produce regulations that senators say they can challenge if the steps go too far. But it's unlikely Bush will lay out techniques in enough detail for everyone to be sure what's allowed and what's beyond the pale.
Measures used against detainees in secret CIA prisons have not been fully discussed in an open forum for fear of hampering interrogators or helping terrorists train people to deal with such steps. But a partial picture has emerged in public reports and conversations with intelligence officials who have discussed interrogation on condition they not be identified.
Among the tens of thousands of people held by U.S. authorities during the war on terrorism, 96 are thought to have been in secret CIA custody.
A look at what's known about some of the more radical techniques and their possible fate under the agreement:
-Sleep deprivation and disorientation:
These tactics are thought to have been used in extraordinary circumstances. Specific methods may involve using loud noise, such as clattering machinery or blasting music, to keep captives awake; interrogating them day and night or moving them from place to place to disorient them.
"People who have gone through this describe this as one of the worst things that a human being can experience because sleep is such a fundamental need," said Tom Malinowski, Washington advocacy director for Human Rights Watch. He was speaking generally about the technique, not with specific knowledge about how U.S. interrogators might have applied it.
-Temperature extremes:
Exposing prisoners to uncomfortable cold or heat for long periods.
-Stress positions:
Prolonged, forced standing is also believed to have been used in some cases. Captives might be threatened with beatings if they sit, or shackled in a way to prevent sitting. Various other forms of discomfort have been allowed.
-Simulated drowning:
Meant to induce panic, the technique is commonly known as waterboarding because it may involve a prisoner being tied to a board, head slanted down, a wet towel placed on his face and water applied to the towel. As many as four prisoners are believed to have been subjected to this.
"It's a technique that we need to let the world know we are no longer engaging in," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., one of those who negotiated the deal.
Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona, another broker of the agreement, said the deal "could mean" the prohibition of extreme sleep deprivation, hypothermia, waterboarding and other steps that amount to torture or come close to it. Yet he acknowledged he has not been privy to everything that has been done with captives and that the agreement's practical effects remain to be seen.
McCain, who was beaten as a Vietnam prisoner of war, said some forms of induced stress are an important and valid tool for interrogators.
The most extreme steps have been clearly prohibited all along, including closed-hand punching, electric shock, terrorizing suspects with dogs, disfigurement and sexual abuse, although some were used in criminal fashion at Abu Ghraib, the U.S. military-run prison in Iraq. Openhanded slapping has not been similarly banned.
An updated U.S. Army manual released this month, which applies to all the armed services but not the CIA, explicitly bans withholding food and water, performing mock executions, using electric shock, burning and causing other pain and waterboarding, among other techniques.
The deal between the administration and the Senate is packed with imprecise adjectives.
It would make it a crime to inflict extreme physical pain, burns or physical disfigurement of a serious nature, or impairment of the function of organs or of mental faculty. Mental
http://www.netscape.com/viewstory/2006/09/...1%2F&frame=true
How Bush Wrecked the Army
Another general revolts.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Monday, Sept. 25, 2006, at 5:51 PM ET
The generals' revolt has spread inside the Pentagon, and the point of the spear is one of Donald Rumsfeld's most favored officers, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff.
This new phase of rebellion isn't aimed at the war in Iraq directly, as was the protest by six retired generals that made headlines last spring. But in some ways, it's more potent, and not just because Schoomaker is very much on active duty. His challenge is dramatic because he's questioning one of the war's consequences—its threat to the Army's ability to keep functioning.
The trumpet sounded last month, when Schoomaker refused to give Rumsfeld a detailed Army budget proposal for fiscal year 2008. The Air Force and Navy met the Aug. 15 deadline for submitting their program requests. But Schoomaker—in an unprecedented move—said he preferred not to.
Rumsfeld had limited the Army's budget for 2008 to $114 billion. Schoomaker told him that the sum wasn't enough to maintain the Army's present commitments. Simply to repair the tanks, radios, and other equipment damaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, he would need at least another $17 billion. If he didn't get it, he said, there was no point drawing up a budget at all.
Today's Los Angeles Times reported on Schoomaker's revolt, but there have been stirrings of a ruffle since the summer. On Aug. 23, at a speech before the National Press Club, Schoomaker publicly threw down the gauntlet: "There is no sense in us submitting a budget that we cannot execute … a broken budget."
A month earlier, Government Executive reported that Schoomaker had told a group of congressional staffers about grave backlogs at the Army's repair depots. Nearly 1,500 Humvees, M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, and other vehicles were awaiting repair at the Red River Army Depot in Texas. The same was true of 500 M1 tanks at the Anniston depot in Alabama. None of the Army's five largest depots was operating at more than 50 percent capacity—all because of a shortage of money.
It's not just the repair depots that are overworked. Friday's New York Times reported that the Army is so bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan that just two or three active-duty combat brigades—7,000 to 10,000 soldiers—are fully ready to deal with a crisis that might erupt elsewhere in the world.
And among the units cycling in and out of Iraq, troubles are brewing. The 3rd Infantry Division, which so quickly roared up the desert to Baghdad at the outset of this war, is scheduled to head back to Iraq soon for its third tour of duty. Yet, according to a story in today's New York Times, two of the division's four brigades aren't ready to go. They have none of their armored vehicles and only half of their troops.
Units throughout the Army are so strained, generals say, that they're going to have to rely even more on the National Guard and Reserves, which are wildly overwhelmed themselves.
Meanwhile, to meet enlistment targets, the Army has raised the maximum age of recruits to 41, lowered their required aptitude scores, and—in another recent gulp—relaxed moral and disciplinary standards. The Army has always waived these standards to let in a small number of applicants. But since the Iraq war, this number has risen substantially. In 2001, just 10.07 percent of Army recruits were given moral waivers—i.e., were allowed into the Army, even though they had committed misdemeanors or had once-prohibited problems with drugs and alcohol, records of serious misconduct, or disqualifying medical conditions. By 2004, this number had risen to 11.98 percent. But in 2005, it soared to 15.02 percent. And as of April 2006, according to a fact sheet obtained from an Army officer, the number has leapt to 15.49 percent.
This is one reason so many Army officers, active and retired, have been so skeptical of the war all along—not so much because they oppose the war itself (though some do), but because they feared it would wreck the Army.
The Army's crisis threatens the entire structure of defense spending. Since the late 1960s, the Army, Air Force, and Navy (of which the Marines are a part) have abided by an informal agreement that gives each of them a roughly equal share of the total military budget. No service has ever wavered from its share by more than a percentage point. In this way, the chiefs have avoided the interservice rivalries that tore the military establishments apart throughout the 1940s and '50s—and let civilian secretaries of defense, especially Robert McNamara, step in and take control in the early '60s, reshaping their missions and slashing their weapons programs.
The Army is clearly in need of a higher share of the budget now. It is the service that's dominating the fighting, losing most of its troops, and getting most of its equipment chewed up in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Schoomaker gets his demand, the Army would get a significantly higher share—and the Pentagon wars would start in again.
There are ways to treat the Army's ailments without opening the purse strings. For instance, Schoomaker could cancel or postpone the Army's Future Combat Systems, a $200 billion confabulation that may be way overdesigned for any realistic scenario of future combat. But the FCS is the Army's only big-ticket weapon system, and the procurement commanders wouldn't surrender it unless the Air Force and Navy chiefs junked their big fighter planes and submarines, which isn't about to happen, either.
Early on in his regime, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld might have had the clout to force such a bargain, but no longer. He has already abdicated his authority, allowing Schoomaker to appeal directly for more money to the White House's Office of Management and Budget. (According to Army Times, this is another unprecedented move: No service secretary has ever dealt directly with the OMB—all such appeals are supposed to be made through the secretary of defense.)
This bureaucratic turbulence only reflects a broader dilemma that higher political authorities will soon have to address, whether they'd like to or not. Schoomaker's central complaint is that he doesn't have the money to maintain the Army's global missions. The president and the Congress can pony up the money (a lot more money) or scale back the missions. To do otherwise—to stay the course with inadequate resources—is to invite defeats and disasters.
How Bush Wrecked the Army
Another general revolts.
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Monday, Sept. 25, 2006, at 5:51 PM ET
The generals' revolt has spread inside the Pentagon, and the point of the spear is one of Donald Rumsfeld's most favored officers, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army chief of staff.
This new phase of rebellion isn't aimed at the war in Iraq directly, as was the protest by six retired generals that made headlines last spring. But in some ways, it's more potent, and not just because Schoomaker is very much on active duty. His challenge is dramatic because he's questioning one of the war's consequences—its threat to the Army's ability to keep functioning.
The trumpet sounded last month, when Schoomaker refused to give Rumsfeld a detailed Army budget proposal for fiscal year 2008. The Air Force and Navy met the Aug. 15 deadline for submitting their program requests. But Schoomaker—in an unprecedented move—said he preferred not to.
Rumsfeld had limited the Army's budget for 2008 to $114 billion. Schoomaker told him that the sum wasn't enough to maintain the Army's present commitments. Simply to repair the tanks, radios, and other equipment damaged in Afghanistan and Iraq, he would need at least another $17 billion. If he didn't get it, he said, there was no point drawing up a budget at all.
Today's Los Angeles Times reported on Schoomaker's revolt, but there have been stirrings of a ruffle since the summer. On Aug. 23, at a speech before the National Press Club, Schoomaker publicly threw down the gauntlet: "There is no sense in us submitting a budget that we cannot execute … a broken budget."
A month earlier, Government Executive reported that Schoomaker had told a group of congressional staffers about grave backlogs at the Army's repair depots. Nearly 1,500 Humvees, M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, and other vehicles were awaiting repair at the Red River Army Depot in Texas. The same was true of 500 M1 tanks at the Anniston depot in Alabama. None of the Army's five largest depots was operating at more than 50 percent capacity—all because of a shortage of money.
It's not just the repair depots that are overworked. Friday's New York Times reported that the Army is so bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan that just two or three active-duty combat brigades—7,000 to 10,000 soldiers—are fully ready to deal with a crisis that might erupt elsewhere in the world.
And among the units cycling in and out of Iraq, troubles are brewing. The 3rd Infantry Division, which so quickly roared up the desert to Baghdad at the outset of this war, is scheduled to head back to Iraq soon for its third tour of duty. Yet, according to a story in today's New York Times, two of the division's four brigades aren't ready to go. They have none of their armored vehicles and only half of their troops.
Units throughout the Army are so strained, generals say, that they're going to have to rely even more on the National Guard and Reserves, which are wildly overwhelmed themselves.
Meanwhile, to meet enlistment targets, the Army has raised the maximum age of recruits to 41, lowered their required aptitude scores, and—in another recent gulp—relaxed moral and disciplinary standards. The Army has always waived these standards to let in a small number of applicants. But since the Iraq war, this number has risen substantially. In 2001, just 10.07 percent of Army recruits were given moral waivers—i.e., were allowed into the Army, even though they had committed misdemeanors or had once-prohibited problems with drugs and alcohol, records of serious misconduct, or disqualifying medical conditions. By 2004, this number had risen to 11.98 percent. But in 2005, it soared to 15.02 percent. And as of April 2006, according to a fact sheet obtained from an Army officer, the number has leapt to 15.49 percent.
This is one reason so many Army officers, active and retired, have been so skeptical of the war all along—not so much because they oppose the war itself (though some do), but because they feared it would wreck the Army.
The Army's crisis threatens the entire structure of defense spending. Since the late 1960s, the Army, Air Force, and Navy (of which the Marines are a part) have abided by an informal agreement that gives each of them a roughly equal share of the total military budget. No service has ever wavered from its share by more than a percentage point. In this way, the chiefs have avoided the interservice rivalries that tore the military establishments apart throughout the 1940s and '50s—and let civilian secretaries of defense, especially Robert McNamara, step in and take control in the early '60s, reshaping their missions and slashing their weapons programs.
The Army is clearly in need of a higher share of the budget now. It is the service that's dominating the fighting, losing most of its troops, and getting most of its equipment chewed up in Iraq and Afghanistan. If Schoomaker gets his demand, the Army would get a significantly higher share—and the Pentagon wars would start in again.
There are ways to treat the Army's ailments without opening the purse strings. For instance, Schoomaker could cancel or postpone the Army's Future Combat Systems, a $200 billion confabulation that may be way overdesigned for any realistic scenario of future combat. But the FCS is the Army's only big-ticket weapon system, and the procurement commanders wouldn't surrender it unless the Air Force and Navy chiefs junked their big fighter planes and submarines, which isn't about to happen, either.
Early on in his regime, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld might have had the clout to force such a bargain, but no longer. He has already abdicated his authority, allowing Schoomaker to appeal directly for more money to the White House's Office of Management and Budget. (According to Army Times, this is another unprecedented move: No service secretary has ever dealt directly with the OMB—all such appeals are supposed to be made through the secretary of defense.)
This bureaucratic turbulence only reflects a broader dilemma that higher political authorities will soon have to address, whether they'd like to or not. Schoomaker's central complaint is that he doesn't have the money to maintain the Army's global missions. The president and the Congress can pony up the money (a lot more money) or scale back the missions. To do otherwise—to stay the course with inadequate resources—is to invite defeats and disasters.
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,114879,00.html
Marines to Face Courts-Martial
Associated Press | September 26, 2006
SAN DIEGO - Three Marines from Camp Pendleton will face courts-martial on murder and kidnapping charges in the death of an Iraqi man in the town of Hamdania, the Marine Corps said Monday.
Gen. James Mattis, the commanding general in the case, said he would not seek the death penalty.
The three were among seven Marines and one Navy corpsman charged with kidnapping and murdering 52-year-old Hashim Ibrahim Awad last April. The other five face preliminary hearings in coming weeks.
Pfc. John J. Jodka, 20, Cpl. Marshall L. Magincalda, 23, and Lance Cpl. Jerry E. Shumate, 21, will also face charges including conspiracy, housebreaking and wrongfully seizing and holding a victim against his will. No dates were set for the courts-martial.
The Marines Corps dropped some charges against the three, including an assault charge against Magincalda and Shumate. Jodka had charges of making a false official statement, larceny and wrongfully endeavoring to impede an investigation dropped.
Joseph Casas, an attorney for Jodka, said he was pleased.
"(Jodka) is looking forward to getting a fair court martial and moving this forward as expeditiously as possible," Casas said. "Every day he sits in there in limbo is a day behind bars that he doesn't spend with his family."
Attorneys for Magincalda and Shumate did not immediately return phone messages seeking comment.
According to prosecutors, the Marines and sailor kidnapped Awad on April 26, bound his feet, dragged him from his home and shot him to death in a roadside hole.
Jodka is accused of firing on Awad. Magincalda is suspected of binding Awad's feet and kidnapping him. Shumate is suspected of firing his M-16 at Awad, then lying to investigators about what had happened.
Court documents do not spell out a possible motive, but say the group went looking for a known terrorist. When they couldn't find one, the documents say, they entered Awad's home and took him against his will.
Marine spokesman Maj. Jeff Nyhart said the courts-martial of the three men would not influence whether the other five troops are ordered to stand trial.
"Each case is separate and based on its own merits," Nyhart said.
Since the start of the Iraq war in 2003, at least 14 members of the U.S. military have been convicted in connection with the deaths of Iraqis. Two received sentences of up to life in prison, while most others were given little or no jail time.
Sound Off...What do you think? Join the discussion.
Copyright 2006 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
Marines to Face Courts-Martial
Associated Press | September 26, 2006
SAN DIEGO - Three Marines from Camp Pendleton will face courts-martial on murder and kidnapping charges in the death of an Iraqi man in the town of Hamdania, the Marine Corps said Monday.
Gen. James Mattis, the commanding general in the case, said he would not seek the death penalty.
The three were among seven Marines and one Navy corpsman charged with kidnapping and murdering 52-year-old Hashim Ibrahim Awad last April. The other five face preliminary hearings in coming weeks.
Pfc. John J. Jodka, 20, Cpl. Marshall L. Magincalda, 23, and Lance Cpl. Jerry E. Shumate, 21, will also face charges including conspiracy, housebreaking and wrongfully seizing and holding a victim against his will. No dates were set for the courts-martial.
The Marines Corps dropped some charges against the three, including an assault charge against Magincalda and Shumate. Jodka had charges of making a false official statement, larceny and wrongfully endeavoring to impede an investigation dropped.
Joseph Casas, an attorney for Jodka, said he was pleased.
"(Jodka) is looking forward to getting a fair court martial and moving this forward as expeditiously as possible," Casas said. "Every day he sits in there in limbo is a day behind bars that he doesn't spend with his family."
Attorneys for Magincalda and Shumate did not immediately return phone messages seeking comment.
According to prosecutors, the Marines and sailor kidnapped Awad on April 26, bound his feet, dragged him from his home and shot him to death in a roadside hole.
Jodka is accused of firing on Awad. Magincalda is suspected of binding Awad's feet and kidnapping him. Shumate is suspected of firing his M-16 at Awad, then lying to investigators about what had happened.
Court documents do not spell out a possible motive, but say the group went looking for a known terrorist. When they couldn't find one, the documents say, they entered Awad's home and took him against his will.
Marine spokesman Maj. Jeff Nyhart said the courts-martial of the three men would not influence whether the other five troops are ordered to stand trial.
"Each case is separate and based on its own merits," Nyhart said.
Since the start of the Iraq war in 2003, at least 14 members of the U.S. military have been convicted in connection with the deaths of Iraqis. Two received sentences of up to life in prison, while most others were given little or no jail time.
Sound Off...What do you think? Join the discussion.
Copyright 2006 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,114880,00.html
Eighteen Killed in Afghan Bombing
Associated Press | September 26, 2006
LASHKAR GAH, Afghanistan - A suicide bomber struck outside the compound of a southern Afghan provincial governor on Tuesday, killing 18 people, including several Muslim pilgrims seeking paperwork to travel to Mecca, officials said.
The attacker was stopped by Afghan soldiers at the compound's security gate, where he detonated his explosive vest, said Ghulam Muhiddin, spokesman for the Helmand provincial governor.
The bomber had been walking toward a vehicle of the private military contractors who provide security for the governor, said Squadron Leader Jason Chalk, a NATO spokesman.
Nine Afghan soldiers and nine civilians were killed, said Rahmatullah Mohammdi, director of the hospital in Lashkar Gah. Seventeen people were wounded, he said.
The governor, Mohammed Daoud Safi, was inside the compound and was not injured in the attack.
Among the civilians waiting outside the compound were Afghan pilgrims seeking permission to travel to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, Muhiddin said. The main mosque in Lashkar Gah sits across from the compound.
Tuesday's suicide attack was the deadliest in Afghanistan since Aug. 28, when 21 civilians were killed in Lashkar Gah by a bomber targeting an ex-police chief.
Meanwhile, a bomb attack Tuesday against a NATO patrol south of the Afghan capital killed an Italian soldier and a child, officials said.
A remote-control bomb planted under a bridge detonated when a three-vehicle military convoy passed by, said Ali Shah Paktiawal, Kabul police criminal director.
Chief Corp. Maj. Giorgio Langella was killed in the blast, and five Italian soldiers were wounded, the Italian Defense Ministry said in Rome.
A child riding in a car behind the NATO convoy was killed, NATO said. Four other civilians in the car were wounded.
Two people were detained for questioning in the blast, which went off about five miles south of Kabul, police said.
The bloodied body of the slain soldier, with his bulletproof vest still on, lay on the ground alongside his weapon shortly after the blast, according to an Associated Press reporter at the scene.
Six Italian troops carried the victim's body to a military helicopter that landed near the blast site. Other helicopters hovered overhead as police and Italian troops cordoned off the area.
Italy has some 1,600 troops in the 20,000-strong NATO-led force in Afghanistan.
An Italian soldier died and two were injured on Sept. 20 when their armored vehicle overturned on a steep incline near Kabul. Four Italian soldiers were wounded Sept. 8 by a roadside bomb in the western Farah province.
Taliban-linked militants have stepped up their attacks across Afghanistan the last several months, though attacks in Kabul are still much rarer than in the country's south.
Attacks in the capital are mostly aimed at foreign military troops. On Sept. 8, a suicide car bomber rammed into a U.S. Humvee, killing 16 people, including two U.S. Soldiers. The attack was Kabul's deadliest since the 2001 toppling of the Taliban.
Copyright 2006 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
Eighteen Killed in Afghan Bombing
Associated Press | September 26, 2006
LASHKAR GAH, Afghanistan - A suicide bomber struck outside the compound of a southern Afghan provincial governor on Tuesday, killing 18 people, including several Muslim pilgrims seeking paperwork to travel to Mecca, officials said.
The attacker was stopped by Afghan soldiers at the compound's security gate, where he detonated his explosive vest, said Ghulam Muhiddin, spokesman for the Helmand provincial governor.
The bomber had been walking toward a vehicle of the private military contractors who provide security for the governor, said Squadron Leader Jason Chalk, a NATO spokesman.
Nine Afghan soldiers and nine civilians were killed, said Rahmatullah Mohammdi, director of the hospital in Lashkar Gah. Seventeen people were wounded, he said.
The governor, Mohammed Daoud Safi, was inside the compound and was not injured in the attack.
Among the civilians waiting outside the compound were Afghan pilgrims seeking permission to travel to Mecca in Saudi Arabia, Muhiddin said. The main mosque in Lashkar Gah sits across from the compound.
Tuesday's suicide attack was the deadliest in Afghanistan since Aug. 28, when 21 civilians were killed in Lashkar Gah by a bomber targeting an ex-police chief.
Meanwhile, a bomb attack Tuesday against a NATO patrol south of the Afghan capital killed an Italian soldier and a child, officials said.
A remote-control bomb planted under a bridge detonated when a three-vehicle military convoy passed by, said Ali Shah Paktiawal, Kabul police criminal director.
Chief Corp. Maj. Giorgio Langella was killed in the blast, and five Italian soldiers were wounded, the Italian Defense Ministry said in Rome.
A child riding in a car behind the NATO convoy was killed, NATO said. Four other civilians in the car were wounded.
Two people were detained for questioning in the blast, which went off about five miles south of Kabul, police said.
The bloodied body of the slain soldier, with his bulletproof vest still on, lay on the ground alongside his weapon shortly after the blast, according to an Associated Press reporter at the scene.
Six Italian troops carried the victim's body to a military helicopter that landed near the blast site. Other helicopters hovered overhead as police and Italian troops cordoned off the area.
Italy has some 1,600 troops in the 20,000-strong NATO-led force in Afghanistan.
An Italian soldier died and two were injured on Sept. 20 when their armored vehicle overturned on a steep incline near Kabul. Four Italian soldiers were wounded Sept. 8 by a roadside bomb in the western Farah province.
Taliban-linked militants have stepped up their attacks across Afghanistan the last several months, though attacks in Kabul are still much rarer than in the country's south.
Attacks in the capital are mostly aimed at foreign military troops. On Sept. 8, a suicide car bomber rammed into a U.S. Humvee, killing 16 people, including two U.S. Soldiers. The attack was Kabul's deadliest since the 2001 toppling of the Taliban.
Copyright 2006 Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.
http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,114817,00.html
DoD Announces Tour Extension of Army Unit, Early Deployment of Another
Military.com | Sgt. Sara Wood | September 25, 2006
Washington D.C. - One Army unit will be extended in Iraq and another will be deployed earlier than previously scheduled, DoD officials announced today.
The 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division, based in Friedberg, Germany, will have its tour of duty extended for about 46 days, DoD officials said. The unit was scheduled to redeploy in mid-January 2007 and will now begin that redeployment in late February. Also, the 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, will deploy 30 days earlier then originally scheduled, beginning their deployment in late October.
These adjustments are being made to maintain the force structure of 15 combat brigades in Iraq, which combatant commanders in Iraq have determined is needed at this time and probably at least until next spring, Bryan Whitman, a DoD spokesman, said.
“What these decisions reflect is the flexibility that the United States military has to adjust to a changing environment and a changing situation,” Whitman said. “It reflects … a continuing commitment on the part of the international community as well as the United States to see that this mission is successful and to make sure that the necessary resources are available so that the mission will be successful.”
The extended tour of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, will allow the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, based in Fort Stewart, Ga., to complete its one year “dwell time” -- time in the U.S. -- before deploying again in January 2007, Whitman said. Dwell time is important because it gives the unit time to refit, retrain, rest and get ready for another deployment, he said.
The Army has made every effort to notify the family members of the soldiers affected by these decisions in advance, Whitman said. He stressed that the Army is committed to taking care of soldiers’ families and ensuring they fully understand why the decision was made, particularly the families of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division.
“This is a unit that has been performing magnificently in Iraq, and their services are going to be needed for a while longer, and we know that that comes at a tremendous sacrifice not only for them, but also for their families that are expecting them home in Germany,” he said.
U.S. force levels in Iraq continue to be based on conditions on the ground and are made in consultation with the Iraqi government, Whitman said. He noted that Iraqi security forces continue to make progress, and force rotations can be changed based on further changes in the security situation.
“Each and every week, the Iraqi security forces are increasing in numbers as well as increasing in their capabilities,” he said. “Over time, they are becoming more and more responsible for Iraq, and that will eventually lead to not needing as many U.S. military forces in the country.”
Copyright 2006 Military.com. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.
DoD Announces Tour Extension of Army Unit, Early Deployment of Another
Military.com | Sgt. Sara Wood | September 25, 2006
Washington D.C. - One Army unit will be extended in Iraq and another will be deployed earlier than previously scheduled, DoD officials announced today.
The 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division, based in Friedberg, Germany, will have its tour of duty extended for about 46 days, DoD officials said. The unit was scheduled to redeploy in mid-January 2007 and will now begin that redeployment in late February. Also, the 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, will deploy 30 days earlier then originally scheduled, beginning their deployment in late October.
These adjustments are being made to maintain the force structure of 15 combat brigades in Iraq, which combatant commanders in Iraq have determined is needed at this time and probably at least until next spring, Bryan Whitman, a DoD spokesman, said.
“What these decisions reflect is the flexibility that the United States military has to adjust to a changing environment and a changing situation,” Whitman said. “It reflects … a continuing commitment on the part of the international community as well as the United States to see that this mission is successful and to make sure that the necessary resources are available so that the mission will be successful.”
The extended tour of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, will allow the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, based in Fort Stewart, Ga., to complete its one year “dwell time” -- time in the U.S. -- before deploying again in January 2007, Whitman said. Dwell time is important because it gives the unit time to refit, retrain, rest and get ready for another deployment, he said.
The Army has made every effort to notify the family members of the soldiers affected by these decisions in advance, Whitman said. He stressed that the Army is committed to taking care of soldiers’ families and ensuring they fully understand why the decision was made, particularly the families of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division.
“This is a unit that has been performing magnificently in Iraq, and their services are going to be needed for a while longer, and we know that that comes at a tremendous sacrifice not only for them, but also for their families that are expecting them home in Germany,” he said.
U.S. force levels in Iraq continue to be based on conditions on the ground and are made in consultation with the Iraqi government, Whitman said. He noted that Iraqi security forces continue to make progress, and force rotations can be changed based on further changes in the security situation.
“Each and every week, the Iraqi security forces are increasing in numbers as well as increasing in their capabilities,” he said. “Over time, they are becoming more and more responsible for Iraq, and that will eventually lead to not needing as many U.S. military forces in the country.”
Copyright 2006 Military.com. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.
http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,114814,00.html
Disabled Americans Prepare Airmen for Battlefield
Air Force Print News | Ssgt. C. Todd Lopez | September 25, 2006
Washington D.C. - In several factories around the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States, Americans who are blind or severely disabled are now assembling the uniforms Airmen will soon wear while fighting the war on terrorism.
Under federal law, when purchasing certain items, the Department of Defense and other government agencies must first place orders from nonprofit manufacturers that employ Americans who are blind or have other severe disabilities.
In 1938, Congress passed the Wagner-O'Day Act. The law required government agencies to give consideration to nonprofit manufacturers that employed Americans who are blind. In 1971, the act was amended to give consideration to Americans with other severe disabilities. Today, the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act, called JWOD by those involved with federal procurement, helps ensure meaningful employment for thousands of Americans who are blind or otherwise severely disabled, said Leon Wilson Jr., executive director of the JWOD Committee.
"The intent of the act is to use the purchasing power of the government to facilitate jobs for people who are blind and severely disabled," Mr. Wilson said. "The government's continued support of the JWOD Act is critical to the effort of addressing this nation's 70 percent unemployment rate for people with significant disabilities."
As a result of the JWOD Act, over 45,000 blind and severely disabled Americans find employment each year with over 600 JWOD nonprofit organizations, Mr. Wilson said.
Not every item the Air Force or other services needs is made by people who are blind or severely disabled. But the JWOD Committee, by law, has created and continues to update a procurement list of nearly 10,000 items that can be furnished to the government.
The JWOD procurement list serves as a starting point for federal procurement officials. If a needed item appears on the list, procurement officials work with the JWOD Committee to find a nonprofit agency -- one that employs Americans who are blind or severely disabled -- that is capable of filling the need.
"Once a full or partial product or service requirement is on the list, the nonprofit agency designated by the committee becomes a government source of supply, until the item is removed from the list, or the item or service can no longer meet government requirements or be provided in a timely manner," Mr. Wilson said.
To be eligible to provide goods or services to the federal government under the JWOD Act, an agency must, among other things, employ individuals who are either blind or severely handicapped for not less than 75 percent of the man-hours of direct labor required for the production or provision of the commodities or services.
Because the government is required to use JWOD sources for items on the procurement list, the government can field items faster than it could if it had to competitively source the items, said Diana Stewart, a spokeswoman with the Defense Supply Center in Philadelphia.
"Working with JWOD allowed us to quickly place on contract ABUs, while the competitive solicitation goes through the formal process of advertisement to all potential sources," Ms. Stewart said. "Essentially, it gets production started sooner than that which could be obtained on a competitive solicitation, thereby allowing us to begin accumulating inventory to support introduction of the new uniform."
Because the JWOD program does not have the full requirement on its procurement list, not all ABUs will be made by Americans who are blind or severely disabled. Right now, for instance, the Defense Logistics Agency has a competitive bid out to for-profit manufacturers to build additional uniforms.
"Production by commercial sources will follow and will supplement the JWOD production of the ABU, providing sufficient inventory to roll out the new uniform to larger portions of the Air Force," Ms. Stewart said.
Still, the first 100,000 ABUs will be built by Americans who are blind. And likely, based on the quality shown by JWOD-recommended nonprofit contractors in the past, people who are blind or severely disabled will continue to build a percentage of the ABUs, Ms. Stewart said.
"The JWOD firms are held to the same standards as commercial sources and must comply with the same quality and delivery requirements, as well as requirements for use of domestic components and manufacturing," she said. "And there are many, many cases where JWOD sources have exceeded quality and delivery expectations."
The Air Force isn't the first service to have uniforms or other products built by the JWOD Program. In fact, the Department of Defense purchases thousands of products from JWOD sources, to include uniform items, trash bags, office supplies, flashlights, batteries, medical supplies, janitorial supplies, mattresses, and rifle range targets.
The Air Force expects the first delivery of the ABU to begin in fiscal 2007. Those first uniforms will be given to deploying Airmen.
Copyright 2006 Air Force Print News. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.
Disabled Americans Prepare Airmen for Battlefield
Air Force Print News | Ssgt. C. Todd Lopez | September 25, 2006
Washington D.C. - In several factories around the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States, Americans who are blind or severely disabled are now assembling the uniforms Airmen will soon wear while fighting the war on terrorism.
Under federal law, when purchasing certain items, the Department of Defense and other government agencies must first place orders from nonprofit manufacturers that employ Americans who are blind or have other severe disabilities.
In 1938, Congress passed the Wagner-O'Day Act. The law required government agencies to give consideration to nonprofit manufacturers that employed Americans who are blind. In 1971, the act was amended to give consideration to Americans with other severe disabilities. Today, the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act, called JWOD by those involved with federal procurement, helps ensure meaningful employment for thousands of Americans who are blind or otherwise severely disabled, said Leon Wilson Jr., executive director of the JWOD Committee.
"The intent of the act is to use the purchasing power of the government to facilitate jobs for people who are blind and severely disabled," Mr. Wilson said. "The government's continued support of the JWOD Act is critical to the effort of addressing this nation's 70 percent unemployment rate for people with significant disabilities."
As a result of the JWOD Act, over 45,000 blind and severely disabled Americans find employment each year with over 600 JWOD nonprofit organizations, Mr. Wilson said.
Not every item the Air Force or other services needs is made by people who are blind or severely disabled. But the JWOD Committee, by law, has created and continues to update a procurement list of nearly 10,000 items that can be furnished to the government.
The JWOD procurement list serves as a starting point for federal procurement officials. If a needed item appears on the list, procurement officials work with the JWOD Committee to find a nonprofit agency -- one that employs Americans who are blind or severely disabled -- that is capable of filling the need.
"Once a full or partial product or service requirement is on the list, the nonprofit agency designated by the committee becomes a government source of supply, until the item is removed from the list, or the item or service can no longer meet government requirements or be provided in a timely manner," Mr. Wilson said.
To be eligible to provide goods or services to the federal government under the JWOD Act, an agency must, among other things, employ individuals who are either blind or severely handicapped for not less than 75 percent of the man-hours of direct labor required for the production or provision of the commodities or services.
Because the government is required to use JWOD sources for items on the procurement list, the government can field items faster than it could if it had to competitively source the items, said Diana Stewart, a spokeswoman with the Defense Supply Center in Philadelphia.
"Working with JWOD allowed us to quickly place on contract ABUs, while the competitive solicitation goes through the formal process of advertisement to all potential sources," Ms. Stewart said. "Essentially, it gets production started sooner than that which could be obtained on a competitive solicitation, thereby allowing us to begin accumulating inventory to support introduction of the new uniform."
Because the JWOD program does not have the full requirement on its procurement list, not all ABUs will be made by Americans who are blind or severely disabled. Right now, for instance, the Defense Logistics Agency has a competitive bid out to for-profit manufacturers to build additional uniforms.
"Production by commercial sources will follow and will supplement the JWOD production of the ABU, providing sufficient inventory to roll out the new uniform to larger portions of the Air Force," Ms. Stewart said.
Still, the first 100,000 ABUs will be built by Americans who are blind. And likely, based on the quality shown by JWOD-recommended nonprofit contractors in the past, people who are blind or severely disabled will continue to build a percentage of the ABUs, Ms. Stewart said.
"The JWOD firms are held to the same standards as commercial sources and must comply with the same quality and delivery requirements, as well as requirements for use of domestic components and manufacturing," she said. "And there are many, many cases where JWOD sources have exceeded quality and delivery expectations."
The Air Force isn't the first service to have uniforms or other products built by the JWOD Program. In fact, the Department of Defense purchases thousands of products from JWOD sources, to include uniform items, trash bags, office supplies, flashlights, batteries, medical supplies, janitorial supplies, mattresses, and rifle range targets.
The Air Force expects the first delivery of the ABU to begin in fiscal 2007. Those first uniforms will be given to deploying Airmen.
Copyright 2006 Air Force Print News. All opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of Military.com.
http://www.military.com/opinion/0,15202,114900,00.html
Clinton's Rich Soak the Americans
Frank Gaffney | September 26, 2006
For millions of Americans, the spectacle of buffoonery and bombast served up last week in New York by the UN General Assembly -- in particular, the appearances there of despots like Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad -- raised anew questions about the legitimacy and utility of the United Nations. Incredibly, despite this performance and the UN's rampant corruption, scandals and virulent hostility towards the Free World, the organization has taken a major step towards becoming a supranational government, unaccountable to and ever more routinely at odds with the United States.
The occasion was the seemingly innocuous launching on September 19th of a new International Drug Purchasing Facility, dubbed UNITAID, to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. UNITAID will, for the first time, rely for its institutional funding on what the UN euphemistically calls an "innovative financing mechanism." Another word for it is "globotaxes" -- levies imposed on international transactions, in this case airline tickets.
As Secretary General Kofi Annan noted on the occasion of UNITAID's launching, the French, Chilean, Norwegian, Brazilian and British governments have been responsible for this initiative. He also credited them with "advancing similar innovative financing mechanisms" that "can help us reach the Millennium Development Goals" for reducing poverty, disease and other blights on humanity.
That is UN-speak for a commitment developed nations like the United States undertook in 2002 to commit 0.7% of their gross domestic product to Official Development Assistance (ODA, also known as foreign aid). The Bush Administration claims to have a different interpretation of this commitment. But UN types like Jeffrey Sachs, Annan's point man on the Millenium Development Goals, assert that -- since the United States only gives 0.15 percent of GDP in official (as opposed to private) foreign aid -- this country "owes" some $845 billion between now and 2015 in ODA.
Since there is no likelihood any Congress, whether controlled by Republicans or Democrats, will approve that kind of money for foreign aid, the alternative idea of generating such funds instead through new, international taxes has gained traction. That is, in part, due to the vested interest former President Bill Clinton has in such an idea.
As Kofi Annan noted in his September 19th statement welcoming UNITAID: "I am pleased that...the Clinton Foundation will be actively involved" in this initiative. In fact, under the leadership of Hillary Clinton's controversial former health care guru, Ira Magaziner, the Clinton Foundation will be responsible for negotiating bulk purchases of drugs for UNITAID. Magaziner enthused about the power of such a private sector-UN partnership last week, "Through this initiative we'll have a sustainable way to assure a supply of drugs and tests for the long term."
What is particularly worrying is that UNITAID's seemingly unobjectionable disease-relief program will simply be the first of many purposes to which the UN hopes to apply globotaxes. For example, UN types have already begun discussing levies on energy purchases, carbon emissions, international corporate activity and currency transactions. The last of these alone is estimated to be capable of generating a mind-boggling $13 trillion per year!
The purposes towards which such funds might be applied include development assistance, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping operations, raising and maintaining a UN army and underwriting for the international institutions that will be charged with administering these funds. Some advocates even explicitly propose international taxes as a means of redistributing wealth from the developed to the developing world.
The cause of promoting "innovative financing mechanisms" on U.S. taxpayers has become a focus of, among others, the Clinton Global Initiative. This is the former president's vehicle for promoting international good works with respect to climate change, poverty alleviation and mitigating religious and ethnic conflict, along with global health.
Under the rubric of public-spiritedness, Mr. Clinton has enlisted the help of a number of major corporations, Democratic party operatives and policy wonks and public figures, including First Lady Laura Bush. Of particular concern, however, are the political implications of the immense amount of money and personal prestige being put in the service of the UN/Clinton agenda by such philanthropists as Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, George Soros, Ted Turner and Richard Branson.
With the resources and influence of such deep-pocketed friends, it seems likely that the traditional mantra of Democratic class warfare -- "soak the rich" -- will be turned on its head. All other things being equal, the precedent created by an international airline levy-funded UNITAID for fighting disease will likely result in a determined campaign aimed at imposing a variety of globotaxes whereby Bill Clinton's rich friends will help soak the American taxpayer.
A United Nations that becomes, thanks to globotaxes, increasingly independent of its member states' contributions is a UN that will become even more unaccountable, non-transparent and, in all likelihood, even more corrupt and virulently anti-American. Such an organization will inevitably also seek to sap this country's sovereignty as it strives to build a supranational government attuned to the sentiments of its so-called "non-aligned" majority that is increasingly brazen in its hostility towards the United States .
Legislation sponsored by Senators Jim Inhofe and Ben Nelson and Representatives Roy Blunt and Ron Paul is pending in Congress that would block UN taxation of Americans without representation. Our forefathers fought a revolution to prevent just such an infringement on our sovereignty and rights. We must resist the present danger no less vociferously.
Clinton's Rich Soak the Americans
Frank Gaffney | September 26, 2006
For millions of Americans, the spectacle of buffoonery and bombast served up last week in New York by the UN General Assembly -- in particular, the appearances there of despots like Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad -- raised anew questions about the legitimacy and utility of the United Nations. Incredibly, despite this performance and the UN's rampant corruption, scandals and virulent hostility towards the Free World, the organization has taken a major step towards becoming a supranational government, unaccountable to and ever more routinely at odds with the United States.
The occasion was the seemingly innocuous launching on September 19th of a new International Drug Purchasing Facility, dubbed UNITAID, to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. UNITAID will, for the first time, rely for its institutional funding on what the UN euphemistically calls an "innovative financing mechanism." Another word for it is "globotaxes" -- levies imposed on international transactions, in this case airline tickets.
As Secretary General Kofi Annan noted on the occasion of UNITAID's launching, the French, Chilean, Norwegian, Brazilian and British governments have been responsible for this initiative. He also credited them with "advancing similar innovative financing mechanisms" that "can help us reach the Millennium Development Goals" for reducing poverty, disease and other blights on humanity.
That is UN-speak for a commitment developed nations like the United States undertook in 2002 to commit 0.7% of their gross domestic product to Official Development Assistance (ODA, also known as foreign aid). The Bush Administration claims to have a different interpretation of this commitment. But UN types like Jeffrey Sachs, Annan's point man on the Millenium Development Goals, assert that -- since the United States only gives 0.15 percent of GDP in official (as opposed to private) foreign aid -- this country "owes" some $845 billion between now and 2015 in ODA.
Since there is no likelihood any Congress, whether controlled by Republicans or Democrats, will approve that kind of money for foreign aid, the alternative idea of generating such funds instead through new, international taxes has gained traction. That is, in part, due to the vested interest former President Bill Clinton has in such an idea.
As Kofi Annan noted in his September 19th statement welcoming UNITAID: "I am pleased that...the Clinton Foundation will be actively involved" in this initiative. In fact, under the leadership of Hillary Clinton's controversial former health care guru, Ira Magaziner, the Clinton Foundation will be responsible for negotiating bulk purchases of drugs for UNITAID. Magaziner enthused about the power of such a private sector-UN partnership last week, "Through this initiative we'll have a sustainable way to assure a supply of drugs and tests for the long term."
What is particularly worrying is that UNITAID's seemingly unobjectionable disease-relief program will simply be the first of many purposes to which the UN hopes to apply globotaxes. For example, UN types have already begun discussing levies on energy purchases, carbon emissions, international corporate activity and currency transactions. The last of these alone is estimated to be capable of generating a mind-boggling $13 trillion per year!
The purposes towards which such funds might be applied include development assistance, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping operations, raising and maintaining a UN army and underwriting for the international institutions that will be charged with administering these funds. Some advocates even explicitly propose international taxes as a means of redistributing wealth from the developed to the developing world.
The cause of promoting "innovative financing mechanisms" on U.S. taxpayers has become a focus of, among others, the Clinton Global Initiative. This is the former president's vehicle for promoting international good works with respect to climate change, poverty alleviation and mitigating religious and ethnic conflict, along with global health.
Under the rubric of public-spiritedness, Mr. Clinton has enlisted the help of a number of major corporations, Democratic party operatives and policy wonks and public figures, including First Lady Laura Bush. Of particular concern, however, are the political implications of the immense amount of money and personal prestige being put in the service of the UN/Clinton agenda by such philanthropists as Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, George Soros, Ted Turner and Richard Branson.
With the resources and influence of such deep-pocketed friends, it seems likely that the traditional mantra of Democratic class warfare -- "soak the rich" -- will be turned on its head. All other things being equal, the precedent created by an international airline levy-funded UNITAID for fighting disease will likely result in a determined campaign aimed at imposing a variety of globotaxes whereby Bill Clinton's rich friends will help soak the American taxpayer.
A United Nations that becomes, thanks to globotaxes, increasingly independent of its member states' contributions is a UN that will become even more unaccountable, non-transparent and, in all likelihood, even more corrupt and virulently anti-American. Such an organization will inevitably also seek to sap this country's sovereignty as it strives to build a supranational government attuned to the sentiments of its so-called "non-aligned" majority that is increasingly brazen in its hostility towards the United States .
Legislation sponsored by Senators Jim Inhofe and Ben Nelson and Representatives Roy Blunt and Ron Paul is pending in Congress that would block UN taxation of Americans without representation. Our forefathers fought a revolution to prevent just such an infringement on our sovereignty and rights. We must resist the present danger no less vociferously.
September 26, 2006
The Lt. Watada Case: a Day of Reckoning for US Courts
Judicial Complicity in US War Crimes
By PAUL ROCKWELL
For Vietnam War veterans, the pending court-martial of Lt. Ehren Watada is déjà vu "all over again." Watada may be the first commissioned officer to refuse deployment to Iraq, but he is hardly the first American soldier to face trumped-up charges for denouncing U.S. aggression abroad.
It has been over 40 years since Army Pfc. James Johnson, Pvt. David Samas, and Pvt. Dennis Mora, plus dozens of other war-resisters, were court-martialed for challenging the gross illegalities of U.S. devastation in Vietnam. Few Americans remember the dark days of wartime jurisprudence, when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear a single challenge to the Vietnam War, and when judges deliberately and consistently ignored international law.
It is in the context of judicial abdication during the Vietnam War that the full implications of the Watada trial can be understood. Until the rulings of the '60s are overturned, there will be no justice for Lt. Watada, or for his comrades engulfed in atrocity-producing situations in Iraq.
In the mid-'60s and early '70s, American soldiers were sent to jail for refusing to commit war crimes. Dr. Howard Levy, a Green Beret dermatologist, spent two years in prison for refusing to violate his Hippocratic Oath when the Green Berets used medicine as a political tactic in Vietnam.
Vietnam Rulings Nullify The Law
In 1965 David Henry Mitchell II was convicted of willful failure to report for induction into the U.S. armed forces. In his appeal, Mitchell challenged the legality of Lyndon Johnson's war. He raised basic constitutional issues: the absence of a formal declaration of war from Congress, broken treaties, and a pattern of war crimes on the battlefield. No soldier, Mitchell argued, should ever be forced to participate in criminal policies.
Chief Judge William H. Timbers simply refused to hear the evidence. With a wave of the hand, he ruled summarily that Mitchell's claims "are wholly without merit. ...The President, as Commander-in-Chief, has always exercised the power to begin hostilities." When Mitchell's attorneys argued that, under Nuremberg, soldiers have a duty to disassociate themselves from war crimes of their government, the judge freaked out. It is, he said, "a sickening spectacle [for] a 22-year-old citizen...to assert such tommyrot." The judge argued that treaties and Geneva Conventions are "utterly irrelevant as a defense on the charge of willful refusal to report for induction." The message was clear, and a precedent was set: Even if a war is manifestly illegal, soldiers are still expected to participate. United States v. Mitchell was the first in a series of infamous cases through which American judges placed Presidential war beyond the arm of the law.
In 1966, Army Private Robert Luftig, claiming that it is unconstitutional to force Americans to participate in undeclared war, tried to block orders to ship him to the battlefield. He sued Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
In a facile ruling, Federal Judge Alexander Holtzoff invoked the "political question." In jurisprudence "the political question doctrine" is a way by which pro-war judges foreclose any substantive discussion of the legalities of a war. The war, Holtzoff stated, "is obviously a political question that is outside the judicial function." With "no discussion or citation to authority," the Federal Appeals Court concurred.
By 1966, the anti-war movement in the military was gaining momentum. More and more soldiers demanded the protection of the Constitution and international laws. Large rallies were held in defense of soldiers who stood up to the deceitful practices of Johnson and Robert McNamara.
The case of the Fort Hood Three became the most celebrated trial of the period. James Johnson, David Samas, and Dennis Mora -- members of the 2nd Armored division at Fort Hood -- refused orders to go to Vietnam. They never really got a chance to defend themselves in court. Federal District Judge Edward Curran refused to hear evidence of war crimes. He threw the case out. He, too, called the war a political issue beyond judicial cognizance. His ruling reeked of arrogance. He wrote:
"The suit is in reality a suit against the United States, and the United States has not consented to be sued. In addition, it is not the function of the judiciary to entertain such litigation which challenges the validity, the wisdom or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces abroad. The issue presented involves a challenge to the conduct of not only diplomatic, but foreign affairs, over which the President is exclusively responsible."
Curran's authoritarian message was unmistakable. War dissolves the separation of powers. American soldiers can expect no protection from treaties, ratified by the Senate, or from the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Obey orders, shut up, or go to jail.
Like Curran's decision, almost all Vietnam War rulings were based on the "political question doctrine," for which there is no textual foundation in the Constitution. The "political question" is a judge-invented dogma that makes the applicability of law dependent on the political discretion of the executive branch. In a war context, the "political question" becomes a stop-thought, a bar to any evidence that is vital to the defense of a soldier who refuses to commit war crimes.
Taken together, the Vietnam War rulings contradict the landmark precedent Marbury v. Madison. In 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall captured the essence of judicial abdication: "It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect. ...To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?...It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."
As Peter Irons noted in War Powers: How The Imperial Presidency Hijacked The Constitution (one of many illuminating books from The American Empire Project series of books published by Metropolitan Books), "Several of the Vietnam War cases resulted in significant judicial rulings that, for all practical purposes, read the declaration-of-war clause out of the Constitution."
Not all rulings, to be sure, relied on the "political question doctrine." Pro-war judges were very shrewd, and some played word games. To get around the declaration-of-war requirement in the Constitution, District Judge George Templar called the Vietnam War a "limited action," and suddenly the war-power clause became irrelevant. Three million Vietnamese, thousands of Cambodians, and 55,000 American troops died in Templar's "limited action."
At the end of 1966 and the beginning of 1967, David Harris, (who eventually published Our War, in 1996) attended a trial of a draft- and war-resister in a federal courtroom in San Jose. In his own defense, the resister called an army sergeant as a witness, a sergeant who spent time in the "bush" torturing prisoners for military intelligence. The judge did not want the jury to hear the testimony. In a separate hearing to determine admissibility of evidence, the sergeant answered a number of questions.
Had the sergeant seen prisoners tortured? Yes. Did Americans observe and participate? Yes. Was the sergeant under orders to carry out the abuse? Yes. Orders, he said, were given by word and gesture. The sergeant then described torture in detail. It included the use of an Army field phone with a hand-cranked electric generator. First, he would disconnect the phone. Then he would run wires straight from the two poles of the generator to the prisoner's testicles. He'd crank the handle, and when the juice hit him, the prisoner usually screamed and flopped around like a fish. A man in the sergeant's unit would say, "Dial him up," and the prisoner would "ring."
And what was the final result of all the testimony? The judge ruled that the sergeant's testimony was irrelevant and barred it from the court. The judge did not dispute the facts. He simply prevented the defense from using them in court.
Far from smothering the GI peace movement in its infancy, courts-martial of refuseniks enraged many American troops. The "Zieg Heil" judges, as they were known among soldiers, spawned more resistance within the military. What began as individual acts of conscience merged into a relentless, uncontrollable movement that eventually helped to force the U.S. government to halt its war.
Denied due process in the courts, American youth in battle saw no alternative (it was a matter of life and death) but to rebel. Troops began to take collective direct-action for themselves. Black soldiers from Fort Hood refused "riot" duty in Chicago during the 1968 Democratic Convention. Rebellions erupted at Fort Dix. Coffee houses sprung up at major bases. GIs created a raunchy, humorous, and defiant underground press. And because of the default of American courts, international war crime tribunals, like the Bertrand Russell Tribunal, became front-page news in Europe.
Costs Of Judicial Abdication
While the tragic events of the Vietnam period are matters of public record, the role of the judiciary in crimes against peace is rarely acknowledged.
It is often said that "In war the laws are silent." It is not true. Laws are codified, and there are always courageous individuals to vindicate them. It's not the law that is silent; it's the cowardly judges who refuse to enforce the law, who paralyze the quest for justice.
The cost of judicial abdication in the Vietnam War years, when American judges averted their eyes from the emerging holocaust of Indochina, is incalculable. Without judicial immunity, many of the horrendous deeds of the Johnson-Nixon years might never have occurred.
There were more than 12 opportunities for American judges to confront the constitutional issues evoked by Presidential war. When Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who publicly acknowledged the illegality of U.S. invasions in Indochina, offered to hear a war-challenge appeal, his colleagues on the Court overruled him.
With judicial assurance of complete impunity, beginning on December 18, 1972, Nixon dropped forty-thousand tons of explosives -- in three thousand sorties -- on a sixty-mile-long population corridor from Hanoi to Haiphong Harbor. The New York Times called Operation Linebacker II "stone-age barbarism." The Washington Post called it "savage and senseless." Nixon's Watergate break-in was a mere peccadillo compared to the judge-sanctioned air raids in Asia.
The wanton destruction of cities and towns, the use of Agent Orange to destroy nature and crops, systematic torture and rendition, assassination programs -- the bloody tragic course of the entire war depended on the winks and nods of judges who betrayed our troops. American judges played golf at country clubs on weekends while American soldiers of conscience, who tried to uphold the Constitution, languished in prison. And throughout the decade of lawlessness, not a single civilian leader, not one commander or high-level officer was ever convicted for commission of war crimes.
For soldiers in the 1960s, upholding the rule of law was more dangerous than breaking it. It was a sad, sad time for American jurisprudence.
History Vindicates Our Soldiers Of Conscience
History has long since vindicated the soldiers who spoke out against the war that destroyed their lives -- soldiers who tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to uphold the Constitution and international law; soldiers who warned their beloved nation, long before the My Lai massacres, of America's impending descent into barbarism. How many Vietnamese lives could have been saved, how many American soldiers might be home today with their grandchildren, had American judges, as well as presiding military commanders, confronted the legal monstrosities of the war against Vietnam?
Judicial Complicity Continues
Nor has judicial complicity in crimes against peace abated since the Vietnam War. In February 2003, Military Families Speak Out; Representative John Conyers; and members of Congress; along with active-duty reservists, filed suit to challenge the imminent invasion of Iraq. In Doe v. Bush, attorney John Bonifaz argued that the president is not a king, he "does not have the power to wage war against another country absent a declaration of war from Congress."
The judge was not moved. After all it was this same infamous Judge -- Joseph L. Tauro -- who had sanctioned Nixon's war crimes in Cambodia forty years earlier. Tauro again called this new invasion a "political question" and dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the appellate judge found a new way to finesse the legal issues concerning Iraq. He argued that, since the invasion was not actually in progress, the "case is not ripe." Six days after he threw out the challenge, the terror over Baghdad began.
Because of judicial abdication in time of war, American soldiers are damned if they do and damned if they don't. If they challenge the legality of a pending war, their case is "premature." If they wait for an invasion to become a fait accompli, when chaos is loosed on hapless populations, it is too late. The political question doctrine still hangs like the sword of Damocles over American soldiers of conscience. Camilo Mejia spent nine months in jail, Kevin Benderman over 15 months in prison, for becoming conscientious objectors to the carnage of another occupation.
How many more American soldiers, how many Iraqi civilians who never threatened the sovereignty of the U.S., must die before American judges fulfill their obligation to uphold and enforce the rule of law? How long will it be before the infamous Vietnam War rulings are reversed, before the blood-drenched "political question doctrine" is buried for good?
These are the underlying issues for the pending court-martial of Lt. Ehren Watada, a trial that could become a reckoning for the American judicial system.
The future of Lt. Watada is now in the hands of Lieutenant General James Dubik, Commanding General at Fort Lewis, Washington. He has yet to set a date for the court-martial. Will he drop the charges against Watada, as letter-writers urge? Or will he, like his timid predecessors, repeat the follies of the past?
There is no man or woman in uniform who speaks with greater passion, force and clarity than Lt. Watada:
QUOTE
"It is my conclusion as an officer of the armed forces that the war in Iraq is not only morally wrong, but a horrible breach of American law."
http://www.counterpunch.org/rockwell09262006.html
The Lt. Watada Case: a Day of Reckoning for US Courts
Judicial Complicity in US War Crimes
By PAUL ROCKWELL
For Vietnam War veterans, the pending court-martial of Lt. Ehren Watada is déjà vu "all over again." Watada may be the first commissioned officer to refuse deployment to Iraq, but he is hardly the first American soldier to face trumped-up charges for denouncing U.S. aggression abroad.
It has been over 40 years since Army Pfc. James Johnson, Pvt. David Samas, and Pvt. Dennis Mora, plus dozens of other war-resisters, were court-martialed for challenging the gross illegalities of U.S. devastation in Vietnam. Few Americans remember the dark days of wartime jurisprudence, when the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear a single challenge to the Vietnam War, and when judges deliberately and consistently ignored international law.
It is in the context of judicial abdication during the Vietnam War that the full implications of the Watada trial can be understood. Until the rulings of the '60s are overturned, there will be no justice for Lt. Watada, or for his comrades engulfed in atrocity-producing situations in Iraq.
In the mid-'60s and early '70s, American soldiers were sent to jail for refusing to commit war crimes. Dr. Howard Levy, a Green Beret dermatologist, spent two years in prison for refusing to violate his Hippocratic Oath when the Green Berets used medicine as a political tactic in Vietnam.
Vietnam Rulings Nullify The Law
In 1965 David Henry Mitchell II was convicted of willful failure to report for induction into the U.S. armed forces. In his appeal, Mitchell challenged the legality of Lyndon Johnson's war. He raised basic constitutional issues: the absence of a formal declaration of war from Congress, broken treaties, and a pattern of war crimes on the battlefield. No soldier, Mitchell argued, should ever be forced to participate in criminal policies.
Chief Judge William H. Timbers simply refused to hear the evidence. With a wave of the hand, he ruled summarily that Mitchell's claims "are wholly without merit. ...The President, as Commander-in-Chief, has always exercised the power to begin hostilities." When Mitchell's attorneys argued that, under Nuremberg, soldiers have a duty to disassociate themselves from war crimes of their government, the judge freaked out. It is, he said, "a sickening spectacle [for] a 22-year-old citizen...to assert such tommyrot." The judge argued that treaties and Geneva Conventions are "utterly irrelevant as a defense on the charge of willful refusal to report for induction." The message was clear, and a precedent was set: Even if a war is manifestly illegal, soldiers are still expected to participate. United States v. Mitchell was the first in a series of infamous cases through which American judges placed Presidential war beyond the arm of the law.
In 1966, Army Private Robert Luftig, claiming that it is unconstitutional to force Americans to participate in undeclared war, tried to block orders to ship him to the battlefield. He sued Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
In a facile ruling, Federal Judge Alexander Holtzoff invoked the "political question." In jurisprudence "the political question doctrine" is a way by which pro-war judges foreclose any substantive discussion of the legalities of a war. The war, Holtzoff stated, "is obviously a political question that is outside the judicial function." With "no discussion or citation to authority," the Federal Appeals Court concurred.
By 1966, the anti-war movement in the military was gaining momentum. More and more soldiers demanded the protection of the Constitution and international laws. Large rallies were held in defense of soldiers who stood up to the deceitful practices of Johnson and Robert McNamara.
The case of the Fort Hood Three became the most celebrated trial of the period. James Johnson, David Samas, and Dennis Mora -- members of the 2nd Armored division at Fort Hood -- refused orders to go to Vietnam. They never really got a chance to defend themselves in court. Federal District Judge Edward Curran refused to hear evidence of war crimes. He threw the case out. He, too, called the war a political issue beyond judicial cognizance. His ruling reeked of arrogance. He wrote:
"The suit is in reality a suit against the United States, and the United States has not consented to be sued. In addition, it is not the function of the judiciary to entertain such litigation which challenges the validity, the wisdom or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces abroad. The issue presented involves a challenge to the conduct of not only diplomatic, but foreign affairs, over which the President is exclusively responsible."
Curran's authoritarian message was unmistakable. War dissolves the separation of powers. American soldiers can expect no protection from treaties, ratified by the Senate, or from the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Obey orders, shut up, or go to jail.
Like Curran's decision, almost all Vietnam War rulings were based on the "political question doctrine," for which there is no textual foundation in the Constitution. The "political question" is a judge-invented dogma that makes the applicability of law dependent on the political discretion of the executive branch. In a war context, the "political question" becomes a stop-thought, a bar to any evidence that is vital to the defense of a soldier who refuses to commit war crimes.
Taken together, the Vietnam War rulings contradict the landmark precedent Marbury v. Madison. In 1803, Chief Justice John Marshall captured the essence of judicial abdication: "It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect. ...To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?...It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."
As Peter Irons noted in War Powers: How The Imperial Presidency Hijacked The Constitution (one of many illuminating books from The American Empire Project series of books published by Metropolitan Books), "Several of the Vietnam War cases resulted in significant judicial rulings that, for all practical purposes, read the declaration-of-war clause out of the Constitution."
Not all rulings, to be sure, relied on the "political question doctrine." Pro-war judges were very shrewd, and some played word games. To get around the declaration-of-war requirement in the Constitution, District Judge George Templar called the Vietnam War a "limited action," and suddenly the war-power clause became irrelevant. Three million Vietnamese, thousands of Cambodians, and 55,000 American troops died in Templar's "limited action."
At the end of 1966 and the beginning of 1967, David Harris, (who eventually published Our War, in 1996) attended a trial of a draft- and war-resister in a federal courtroom in San Jose. In his own defense, the resister called an army sergeant as a witness, a sergeant who spent time in the "bush" torturing prisoners for military intelligence. The judge did not want the jury to hear the testimony. In a separate hearing to determine admissibility of evidence, the sergeant answered a number of questions.
Had the sergeant seen prisoners tortured? Yes. Did Americans observe and participate? Yes. Was the sergeant under orders to carry out the abuse? Yes. Orders, he said, were given by word and gesture. The sergeant then described torture in detail. It included the use of an Army field phone with a hand-cranked electric generator. First, he would disconnect the phone. Then he would run wires straight from the two poles of the generator to the prisoner's testicles. He'd crank the handle, and when the juice hit him, the prisoner usually screamed and flopped around like a fish. A man in the sergeant's unit would say, "Dial him up," and the prisoner would "ring."
And what was the final result of all the testimony? The judge ruled that the sergeant's testimony was irrelevant and barred it from the court. The judge did not dispute the facts. He simply prevented the defense from using them in court.
Far from smothering the GI peace movement in its infancy, courts-martial of refuseniks enraged many American troops. The "Zieg Heil" judges, as they were known among soldiers, spawned more resistance within the military. What began as individual acts of conscience merged into a relentless, uncontrollable movement that eventually helped to force the U.S. government to halt its war.
Denied due process in the courts, American youth in battle saw no alternative (it was a matter of life and death) but to rebel. Troops began to take collective direct-action for themselves. Black soldiers from Fort Hood refused "riot" duty in Chicago during the 1968 Democratic Convention. Rebellions erupted at Fort Dix. Coffee houses sprung up at major bases. GIs created a raunchy, humorous, and defiant underground press. And because of the default of American courts, international war crime tribunals, like the Bertrand Russell Tribunal, became front-page news in Europe.
Costs Of Judicial Abdication
While the tragic events of the Vietnam period are matters of public record, the role of the judiciary in crimes against peace is rarely acknowledged.
It is often said that "In war the laws are silent." It is not true. Laws are codified, and there are always courageous individuals to vindicate them. It's not the law that is silent; it's the cowardly judges who refuse to enforce the law, who paralyze the quest for justice.
The cost of judicial abdication in the Vietnam War years, when American judges averted their eyes from the emerging holocaust of Indochina, is incalculable. Without judicial immunity, many of the horrendous deeds of the Johnson-Nixon years might never have occurred.
There were more than 12 opportunities for American judges to confront the constitutional issues evoked by Presidential war. When Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, who publicly acknowledged the illegality of U.S. invasions in Indochina, offered to hear a war-challenge appeal, his colleagues on the Court overruled him.
With judicial assurance of complete impunity, beginning on December 18, 1972, Nixon dropped forty-thousand tons of explosives -- in three thousand sorties -- on a sixty-mile-long population corridor from Hanoi to Haiphong Harbor. The New York Times called Operation Linebacker II "stone-age barbarism." The Washington Post called it "savage and senseless." Nixon's Watergate break-in was a mere peccadillo compared to the judge-sanctioned air raids in Asia.
The wanton destruction of cities and towns, the use of Agent Orange to destroy nature and crops, systematic torture and rendition, assassination programs -- the bloody tragic course of the entire war depended on the winks and nods of judges who betrayed our troops. American judges played golf at country clubs on weekends while American soldiers of conscience, who tried to uphold the Constitution, languished in prison. And throughout the decade of lawlessness, not a single civilian leader, not one commander or high-level officer was ever convicted for commission of war crimes.
For soldiers in the 1960s, upholding the rule of law was more dangerous than breaking it. It was a sad, sad time for American jurisprudence.
History Vindicates Our Soldiers Of Conscience
History has long since vindicated the soldiers who spoke out against the war that destroyed their lives -- soldiers who tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to uphold the Constitution and international law; soldiers who warned their beloved nation, long before the My Lai massacres, of America's impending descent into barbarism. How many Vietnamese lives could have been saved, how many American soldiers might be home today with their grandchildren, had American judges, as well as presiding military commanders, confronted the legal monstrosities of the war against Vietnam?
Judicial Complicity Continues
Nor has judicial complicity in crimes against peace abated since the Vietnam War. In February 2003, Military Families Speak Out; Representative John Conyers; and members of Congress; along with active-duty reservists, filed suit to challenge the imminent invasion of Iraq. In Doe v. Bush, attorney John Bonifaz argued that the president is not a king, he "does not have the power to wage war against another country absent a declaration of war from Congress."
The judge was not moved. After all it was this same infamous Judge -- Joseph L. Tauro -- who had sanctioned Nixon's war crimes in Cambodia forty years earlier. Tauro again called this new invasion a "political question" and dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the appellate judge found a new way to finesse the legal issues concerning Iraq. He argued that, since the invasion was not actually in progress, the "case is not ripe." Six days after he threw out the challenge, the terror over Baghdad began.
Because of judicial abdication in time of war, American soldiers are damned if they do and damned if they don't. If they challenge the legality of a pending war, their case is "premature." If they wait for an invasion to become a fait accompli, when chaos is loosed on hapless populations, it is too late. The political question doctrine still hangs like the sword of Damocles over American soldiers of conscience. Camilo Mejia spent nine months in jail, Kevin Benderman over 15 months in prison, for becoming conscientious objectors to the carnage of another occupation.
How many more American soldiers, how many Iraqi civilians who never threatened the sovereignty of the U.S., must die before American judges fulfill their obligation to uphold and enforce the rule of law? How long will it be before the infamous Vietnam War rulings are reversed, before the blood-drenched "political question doctrine" is buried for good?
These are the underlying issues for the pending court-martial of Lt. Ehren Watada, a trial that could become a reckoning for the American judicial system.
The future of Lt. Watada is now in the hands of Lieutenant General James Dubik, Commanding General at Fort Lewis, Washington. He has yet to set a date for the court-martial. Will he drop the charges against Watada, as letter-writers urge? Or will he, like his timid predecessors, repeat the follies of the past?
There is no man or woman in uniform who speaks with greater passion, force and clarity than Lt. Watada:
QUOTE
"It is my conclusion as an officer of the armed forces that the war in Iraq is not only morally wrong, but a horrible breach of American law."
http://www.counterpunch.org/rockwell09262006.html
http://www.tcf.org/publications/internatio...r_diplomacy.pdf
The End of the Summer of Diplomacy
Assessing Military Options on Iran
Sam Gardiner, Col. USAF (Ret.)
The End of the Summer of Diplomacy
Assessing Military Options on Iran
Sam Gardiner, Col. USAF (Ret.)
http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassi...y_Judgments.pdf
Declassified Key Judgements of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" dated April 2006
Declassified Key Judgements of the National Intelligence Estimate "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" dated April 2006
Sobering Conclusions On Why Jihad Has Spread
By Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus
In announcing yesterday that he would release the key judgments of a controversial National Intelligence Estimate, President Bush said he agreed with the document's conclusion "that because of our successes against the leadership of al-Qaeda, the enemy is becoming more diffuse and independent."
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
By Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus
In announcing yesterday that he would release the key judgments of a controversial National Intelligence Estimate, President Bush said he agreed with the document's conclusion "that because of our successes against the leadership of al-Qaeda, the enemy is becoming more diffuse and independent."
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
http://www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20edito...s%20Fallows.htm
Blind Into Baghdad: The inside story of a historic failure
By James Fallows
Feb 28, 2006
The U.S. occupation of Iraq is a debacle not because the government did no planning but because a vast amount of expert planning was willfully ignored by the people in charge.
The Atlantic.com, January/February 2004
On a Friday afternoon last November, I met Douglas Feith in his office at the Pentagon to discuss what has happened in Iraq. Feith's title is undersecretary of defense for policy, which places him, along with several other undersecretaries, just below Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in the Pentagon's hierarchy. Informally he is seen in Washington as "Wolfowitz's Wolfowitz"—that is, as a deputy who has a wide range of responsibilities but is clearly identified with one particular policy. That policy is bringing regime change to Iraq—a goal that both Wolfowitz and Feith strongly advocated through the 1990s. To opponents of the war in Iraq, Feith is one of several shadowy, Rasputinlike figures who are shaping U.S. policy. He is seen much the way enemies of the Clinton Administration saw Hillary Clinton. Others associated with the Bush Administration who are seen this way include the consultant Richard Perle; Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the chief of staff for Vice President Dick Cheney; and the Vice President himself. What these officials have in common is their presumably great private influence and—even in the case of the Vice President—their limited public visibility and accountability.
In person Douglas Feith is nothing like Rasputin. Between a Reagan-era stint in the Pentagon and his current job he was a Washington lawyer for fifteen years, and he answered my questions with a lawyer's affability in the face of presumed disagreement. I could be biased in Feith's favor, because he was the most senior Administration official who granted my request for an interview about postwar Iraq. Like Donald Rumsfeld, Feith acts and sounds younger than many others of his age (fifty). But distinctly unlike Rumsfeld at a press conference, Feith in this interview did not seem at all arrogant or testy. His replies were relatively candid and unforced, in contrast to the angry or relentlessly on-message responses that have become standard from senior Administration officials. He acknowledged what was "becoming the conventional wisdom" about the Administration's failure to plan adequately for events after the fall of Baghdad, and then explained—with animation, dramatic pauses, and gestures—why he thought it was wrong.
Feith offered a number of specific illustrations of what he considered underappreciated successes. Some were familiar —the oil wells weren't on fire, Iraqis didn't starve or flee—but others were less so. For instance, he described the Administration's careful effort to replace old Iraqi dinars, which carried Saddam Hussein's image ("It's interesting how important that is, and it ties into the whole issue of whether people think that Saddam might be coming back"), with a new form of currency, without causing a run on the currency.
But mainly he challenged the premise of most critics: that the Administration could have done a better job of preparing for the consequences of victory. When I asked what had gone better than expected, and what had gone worse, he said, "We don't exactly deal in 'expectations.' Expectations are too close to 'predictions.' We're not comfortable with predictions. It is one of the big strategic premises of the work that we do."
The limits of future knowledge, Feith said, were of special importance to Rumsfeld, "who is death to predictions." "His big strategic theme is uncertainty," Feith said. "The need to deal strategically with uncertainty. The inability to predict the future. The limits on our knowledge and the limits on our intelligence."
In practice, Feith said, this meant being ready for whatever proved to be the situation in postwar Iraq. "You will not find a single piece of paper ... If anybody ever went through all of our records—and someday some people will, presumably—nobody will find a single piece of paper that says, 'Mr. Secretary or Mr. President, let us tell you what postwar Iraq is going to look like, and here is what we need plans for.' If you tried that, you would get thrown out of Rumsfeld's office so fast—if you ever went in there and said, 'Let me tell you what something's going to look like in the future,' you wouldn't get to your next sentence!"
"This is an important point," he said, "because of this issue of What did we believe? ... The common line is, nobody planned for security because Ahmed Chalabi told us that everything was going to be swell." Chalabi, the exiled leader of the Iraqi National Congress, has often been blamed for making rosy predictions about the ease of governing postwar Iraq. "So we predicted that everything was going to be swell, and we didn't plan for things not being swell." Here Feith paused for a few seconds, raised his hands with both palms up, and put on a "Can you believe it?" expression. "I mean—one would really have to be a simpleton. And whatever people think of me, how can anybody think that Don Rumsfeld is that dumb? He's so evidently not that dumb, that how can people write things like that?" He sounded amazed rather than angry.
No one contends that Donald Rumsfeld, or Paul Wolfowitz, or Douglas Feith, or the Administration as a whole is dumb. The wisdom of their preparations for the aftermath of military victory in Iraq is the question. Feith's argument was a less defensive-sounding version of the Administration's general response to criticisms of its postwar policy: Life is uncertain, especially when the lid comes off a long-tyrannized society. American planners did about as well as anyone could in preparing for the unforeseeable. Anyone who says otherwise is indulging in lazy, unfair second-guessing. "The notion that there was a memo that was once written, that if we had only listened to that memo, all would be well in Iraq, is so preposterous," Feith told me.
The notion of a single memo's changing history is indeed farfetched. The idea that a substantial body of knowledge could have improved postwar prospects is not. The Administration could not have known everything about what it would find in Iraq. But it could have—and should have—done far more than it did.
Almost everything, good and bad, that has happened in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was the subject of extensive pre-war discussion and analysis. This is particularly true of what have proved to be the harshest realities for the United States since the fall of Baghdad: that occupying the country is much more difficult than conquering it; that a breakdown in public order can jeopardize every other goal; that the ambition of patiently nurturing a new democracy is at odds with the desire to turn control over to the Iraqis quickly and get U.S. troops out; that the Sunni center of the country is the main security problem; that with each passing day Americans risk being seen less as liberators and more as occupiers, and targets.
All this, and much more, was laid out in detail and in writing long before the U.S. government made the final decision to attack. Even now the collective efforts at planning by the CIA, the State Department, the Army and the Marine Corps, the United States Agency for International Development, and a wide variety of other groups inside and outside the government are underappreciated by the public. The one pre-war effort that has received substantial recent attention, the State Department's Future of Iraq project, produced thousands of pages of findings, barely one paragraph of which has until now been quoted in the press. The Administration will be admired in retrospect for how much knowledge it created about the challenge it was taking on. U.S. government predictions about postwar Iraq's problems have proved as accurate as the assessments of pre-war Iraq's strategic threat have proved flawed.
But the Administration will be condemned for what it did with what was known. The problems the United States has encountered are precisely the ones its own expert agencies warned against. Exactly what went wrong with the occupation will be studied for years—or should be. The missteps of the first half year in Iraq are as significant as other classic and carefully examined failures in foreign policy, including John Kennedy's handling of the Bay of Pigs invasion, in 1961, and Lyndon Johnson's decision to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam, in 1965. The United States withstood those previous failures, and it will withstand this one. Having taken over Iraq and captured Saddam Hussein, it has no moral or practical choice other than to see out the occupation and to help rebuild and democratize the country. But its missteps have come at a heavy cost. And the ongoing financial, diplomatic, and human cost of the Iraq occupation is the more grievous in light of advance warnings the government had.
Before September 11, 2001: The Early Days
Concern about Saddam Hussein pre-dated the 9/11 attacks and even the inauguration of George W. Bush. In 1998 Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, which declared that "it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power." During the 2000 presidential campaign Al Gore promised to support groups working to unseat Saddam Hussein. In the week before Bush took office, Nicholas Lemann reported in The New Yorker that "the idea of overthrowing Saddam is not an idle fantasy—or, if it is, it's one that has lately occupied the minds of many American officials, including people close to George W. Bush." But the intellectual case for regime change, argued during the Clinton years by some Democrats and notably by Paul Wolfowitz, then the dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, shifted clearly toward operational planning after the destruction of the World Trade Center.
For much of the public this case for war against Iraq rested on an assumed connection (though this was never demonstrated, and was officially disavowed by the President) between Saddam Hussein's regime and the terrorist hijackers. Within the government the case was equally compelling but different. September 11 had shown that the United States was newly vulnerable; to protect itself it had to fight terrorists at their source; and because Saddam Hussein's regime was the leading potential source of future "state-sponsored" terrorism, it had become an active threat, whether or not it played any role in 9/11. The very next day, September 12, 2001, James Woolsey, who had been Clinton's first CIA director, told me that no matter who proved to be responsible for this attack, the solution had to include removing Saddam Hussein, because he was so likely to be involved next time. A military planner inside the Pentagon later told me that on September 13 his group was asked to draw up scenarios for an assault on Iraq, not just Afghanistan.
Soon after becoming the Army Chief of Staff, in 1999, General Eric Shinseki had begun ordering war-game exercises to judge strategies and manpower needs for possible combat in Iraq. This was not because he assumed a war was imminent. He thought that the greater Caspian Sea region, including Iraq, would present a uniquely difficult challenge for U.S. troops, because of its geography and political tensions. After 9/11, Army war games involving Iraq began in earnest.
In his first State of the Union address, on January 29, 2002, President Bush said that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were an "axis of evil" that threatened world peace. "By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States."
By the time of this speech efforts were afoot not simply to remove Saddam Hussein but also to imagine what Iraq would be like when he was gone. In late October of 2001, while the U.S. military was conducting its rout of the Taliban from Afghanistan, the State Department had quietly begun its planning for the aftermath of a "transition" in Iraq. At about the time of the "axis of evil" speech, working groups within the department were putting together a list of postwar jobs and topics to be considered, and possible groups of experts to work on them.
One Year Before the War: The "Future of Iraq"
Thus was born the Future of Iraq project, whose existence is by now well known, but whose findings and potential impact have rarely been reported and examined. The State Department first publicly mentioned the project in March of 2002, when it quietly announced the lineup of the working groups. At the time, media attention was overwhelmingly directed toward Afghanistan, where Operation Anaconda, the half-successful effort to kill or capture al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, was under way.
For several months before announcing the project the State Department had been attempting to coordinate the efforts of the many fractious Iraqi exile organizations. The Future of Iraq project held the potential for harnessing, and perhaps even harmonizing, the expertise available from the exile groups.
It was also in keeping with a surprisingly well established U.S. government tradition of preparing for postwar duties before there was a clear idea of when fighting would begin, let alone when it would end. Before the United States entered World War II, teams at the Army War College were studying what went right and wrong when American doughboys occupied Germany after World War I. Within months of the attack on Pearl Harbor a School of Military Government had been created, at the University of Virginia, to plan for the occupation of both Germany and Japan. In 1995, while U.S. negotiators, led by Richard Holbrooke, were still working at the Dayton peace talks to end the war in the Balkans, World Bank representatives were on hand to arrange loans for the new regimes.
Contemplating postwar plans posed a problem for those who, like many in the State Department, were skeptical of the need for war. Were they making a war more likely if they prepared for its aftermath? Thomas Warrick, the State Department official who directed the Future of Iraq project, was considered to be in the antiwar camp. But according to associates, he explained the importance of preparing for war by saying, "I'm nervous that they're actually going to do it—and the day after they'll turn to us and ask, 'Now what?'" So he pushed ahead with the project, setting up numerous conferences and drafting sessions that would bring together teams of exiles—among them Kanan Makiya, the author of the influential anti-Saddam book Republic of Fear, first published in 1989. A small number of "international advisers," mainly from the United States, were also assigned to the teams. Eventually there would be seventeen working groups, designed systematically to cover what would be needed to rebuild the political and economic infrastructure of the country. "Democratic Principles and Procedures" was the name of one of the groups, which was assigned to suggest the legal framework for a new government; Makiya would write much of its report. The "Transitional Justice" group was supposed to work on reparations, amnesty, and de-Baathification laws. Groups studying economic matters included "Public Finance," "Oil and Energy," and "Water, Agriculture and Environment."
In May of 2002 Congress authorized $5 million to fund the project's studies. In the flurry of news from Afghanistan the project went unnoticed in the press until June, when the State Department announced that the first meetings would take place in July. "The role of the U.S. government and State Department is to see what the Iraqis and Iraqi-Americans want," Warrick said at a conference on June 1, 2002. "The impetus for change comes from [Iraqis], not us. This is the job of Iraqis inside and outside."
That same day President Bush delivered a graduation speech at West Point, giving a first look at the doctrine of pre-emptive war. He told the cadets, to cheers, "Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives." Later in the summer the doctrine was elaborated in a new National Security Strategy, which explained that since "rogue states" could not be contained or deterred, they needed to be destroyed before they could attack.
Whenever National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was interviewed that summer, she talked mainly about the thinking behind the new policy. When Vice President Dick Cheney was interviewed, he talked mainly about Saddam Hussein's defiance of international law. But when Secretary of State Colin Powell was interviewed, he constantly stressed the value of an international approach to the problem and the need to give UN arms inspectors adequate time to do their job.
War with Iraq was not inevitable at this point, but it seemed more and more likely. Daily conversation in Washington, which usually reverts to "So, who do you think will be the next President?," switched instead to "So, when do you think we're going to war?"
It was in these circumstances that the Future of Iraq project's working groups deliberated. Most of the meetings were in Washington. Some were in London, and one session, in early September, took place in Surrey, where representatives of a dozen mutually suspicious exile groups discussed prospects for democratic coexistence when Saddam Hussein was gone. (Along with Chalabi's INC the meeting included several rival Kurdish groups, Assyrian and Turkomen organizations, the Iraqi Constitutional Monarchy Movement, and others.)
The project did not overcome all the tensions among its members, and the results of its deliberations were uneven. Three of its intended working groups never actually met—including, ominously, "Preserving Iraq's Cultural Heritage." The "Education" group finally produced a report only six pages long, in contrast to many hundreds of pages from most others. Some recommendations were quirky or reflected the tastes of the individual participants who drafted them. A report titled "Free Media" proposed that all Iraqi journalists be taken out of the country for a month-long re-education process: "Those who 'get it' go back as reporters; others would be retired or reassigned." A group that was considering ways of informing Iraq about the realities of democracy mentioned Baywatch and Leave It to Beaver as information sources that had given Iraqis an imprecise understanding of American society. It recommended that a new film, Colonial America: Life in a Theocracy, be shot, noting, "The Puritan experiments provide amazing parallels with current Moslem fundamentalism. The ultimate failures of these US experiments can also be vividly illustrated—witch trials, intolerance, etc."
But whatever may have been unrealistic or factional about these efforts, even more of what the project created was impressive. The final report consisted of thirteen volumes of recommendations on specific topics, plus a one-volume summary and overview. These I have read—and I read them several months into the occupation, when it was unfairly easy to judge how well the forecast was standing up. (Several hundred of the 2,500 pages were in Arabic, which sped up the reading process.) The report was labeled "For Official Use Only"—an administrative term that implies confidentiality but has no legal significance. The State Department held the report closely until, last fall, it agreed to congressional requests to turn over the findings.
Most of the project's judgments look good in retrospect—and virtually all reveal a touching earnestness about working out the details of reconstructing a society. For instance, one of the thickest volumes considered the corruption endemic in Iraqi life and laid out strategies for coping with it. (These included a new "Iraqi Government Code of Ethics," which began, "Honesty, integrity, and fairness are the fundamental values for the people of Iraq.") The overview volume, which appears to have been composed as a series of PowerPoint charts, said that the United States was undertaking this effort because, among other things, "detailed public planning" conveys U.S. government "seriousness" and the message that the U.S. government "wants to learn from past regime change experiences."
For their part, the Iraqi participants emphasized several points that ran through all the working groups' reports. A recurring theme was the urgency of restoring electricity and water supplies as soon as possible after regime change. The first item in the list of recommendations from the "Water, Agriculture and Environment" group read, "Fundamental importance of clean water supplies for Iraqis immediately after transition. Key to coalition/community relations." One of the groups making economic recommendations wrote, "Stressed importance of getting electrical grid up and running immediately—key to water systems, jobs. Could go a long way to determining Iraqis' attitudes toward Coalition forces."
A second theme was the need to plan carefully for the handling and demobilization of Iraq's very sizable military. On the one hand, a functioning army would be necessary for public order and, once coalition forces withdrew, for the country's defense. ("Our vision of the future is to build a democratic civil society. In order to make this vision a reality, we need to have an army that can work alongside this new society.") On the other hand, a large number of Saddam's henchmen would have to be removed. The trick would be to get rid of the leaders without needlessly alienating the ordinary troops—or leaving them without income. One group wrote, "All combatants who are included in the demobilization process must be assured by their leaders and the new government of their legal rights and that new prospects for work and education will be provided by the new system." Toward this end it laid out a series of steps the occupation authorities should take in the "disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration" process. Another group, in a paper on democratic principles, warned, "The decommissioning of hundreds of thousands of trained military personnel that [a rapid purge] implies could create social problems."
Next the working groups emphasized how disorderly Iraq would be soon after liberation, and how difficult it would be to get the country on the path to democracy—though that was where it had to go. "The removal of Saddam's regime will provide a power vacuum and create popular anxieties about the viability of all Iraqi institutions," a paper on rebuilding civil society said. "The traumatic and disruptive events attendant to the regime change will affect all Iraqis, both Saddam's conspirators and the general populace." Another report warned more explicitly that "the period immediately after regime change might offer these criminals the opportunity to engage in acts of killing, plunder and looting." In the short term the occupying forces would have to prevent disorder. In the long term, according to a report written by Kanan Makiya, they would need to recognize that "the extent of the Iraqi totalitarian state, its absolute power and control exercised from Baghdad, not to mention the terror used to enforce compliance, cannot be overestimated in their impact on the Iraqi psyche and the attendant feeling of fear, weakness, and shame." Makiya continued, "These conditions and circumstances do not provide a strong foundation on which to build new institutions and a modern nation state."
Each of the preceding themes would seem to imply a long, difficult U.S. commitment in Iraq. America should view its involvement in Iraq, the summary report said, not as it had Afghanistan, which was left to stew in lightly supervised warlordism, but as it had Germany and Japan, which were rebuilt over many years. But nearly every working group stressed one other point: the military occupation itself had to be brief. "Note: Military government idea did not go down well," one chart in the summary volume said. The "Oil and Energy" group presented a "key concept": "Iraqis do not work for American contractors; Americans are seen assisting Iraqis."
Americans are often irritated by the illogic of "resentful dependence" by weaker states. South Koreans, for example, complain bitterly about U.S. soldiers in their country but would complain all the more bitterly if the soldiers were removed. The authors of the Future of Iraq report could by those standards also be accused of illogical thinking, in wanting U.S. support but not wanting U.S. control. Moreover, many of the project's members had a bias that prefigured an important source of postwar tension: they were exiles who considered themselves the likeliest beneficiaries if the United States transferred power to Iraqis quickly—even though, precisely because of their exile, they had no obvious base of support within Iraq.
To skip ahead in the story: As chaos increased in Baghdad last summer, the chief U.S. administrator, L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer, wrestled constantly with a variant of this exile paradox. The Iraqi Governing Council, whose twenty-five members were chosen by Americans, was supposed to do only the preparatory work for an elected Iraqi government. But the greater the pressure on Bremer for "Iraqification," the more tempted he was to give in to the council's demand that he simply put it in charge without waiting for an election. More than a year earlier, long before combat began, the explicit recommendations and implicit lessons of the Future of Iraq project had given the U.S. government a very good idea of what political conflicts it could expect in Iraq.
Ten Months Before the War: War Games and Warnings
As combat slowed in Afghanistan and the teams of the Future of Iraq project continued their deliberations, the U.S. government put itself on a wartime footing. In late May the CIA had begun what would become a long series of war-game exercises, to think through the best- and worst-case scenarios after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. According to a person familiar with the process, one recurring theme in the exercises was the risk of civil disorder after the fall of Baghdad. The exercises explored how to find and secure the weapons of mass destruction that were then assumed to be in and around Baghdad, and indicated that the hardest task would be finding and protecting scientists who knew about the weapons before they could be killed by the regime as it was going down.
The CIA also considered whether a new Iraqi government could be put together through a process like the Bonn conference, which was then being used to devise a post-Taliban regime for Afghanistan. At the Bonn conference representatives of rival political and ethic groups agreed on the terms that established Hamid Karzai as the new Afghan President. The CIA believed that rivalries in Iraq were so deep, and the political culture so shallow, that a similarly quick transfer of sovereignty would only invite chaos.
Representatives from the Defense Department were among those who participated in the first of these CIA war-game sessions. When their Pentagon superiors at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) found out about this, in early summer, the representatives were reprimanded and told not to participate further. "OSD" is Washington shorthand, used frequently in discussions about the origins of Iraq war plans, and it usually refers to strong guidance from Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, and one of Feith's deputies, William Luti. Their displeasure over the CIA exercise was an early illustration of a view that became stronger throughout 2002: that postwar planning was an impediment to war.
Because detailed thought about the postwar situation meant facing costs and potential problems, and thus weakened the case for launching a "war of choice" (the Washington term for a war not waged in immediate self-defense), it could be seen as an "antiwar" undertaking. The knowledge that U.S. soldiers would still be in Germany and Japan sixty-plus years after Pearl Harbor would obviously not have changed the decision to enter World War II, and in theory the Bush Administration could have presented the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in a similar way: as a job that had to be done, even though it might saddle Americans with costs and a military presence for decades to come. Everyone can think of moments when Bush or Rumsfeld has reminded the nation that this would be a long-term challenge. But during the months when the Administration was making its case for the war—successfully to Congress, less so to the United Nations—it acted as if the long run should be thought about only later on.
On July 31, 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee invited a panel of experts to discuss the case for war against Iraq. On August 1 it heard from other experts about the likely "day after" consequences of military victory. Senator Joseph Biden, a Democrat from Delaware, was then the chairman of the committee. That first day Biden said that the threat of WMD might force him to vote in favor of the war (as he ultimately did). But he worried that if the United States invaded without full allied support, "we may very well radicalize the rest of the world, we may pick up a bill that's $70 billion, $80 billion, we may have to have extensive commitment of U.S. forces for an extended period of time in Iraq."
Phebe Marr, an Iraq scholar retired from the National Defense University, told the committee that the United States "should assume that it cannot get the results it wants on the cheap" from regime change. "It must be prepared to put some troops on the ground, advisers to help create new institutions, and above all, time and effort in the future to see the project through to a satisfactory end. If the United States is not willing to do so, it had best rethink the project." Rend Rahim Francke, an Iraqi exile serving on the Future of Iraq project (and now the ambassador from Iraq to the United States), said that "the system of public security will break down, because there will be no functioning police force, no civil service, and no justice system" on the first day after the fighting. "There will be a vacuum of political authority and administrative authority," she said. "The infrastructure of vital sectors will have to be restored. An adequate police force must be trained and equipped as quickly as possible. And the economy will have to be jump-started from not only stagnation but devastation." Other witnesses discussed the need to commit U.S. troops for many years—but to begin turning constitutional authority over to the Iraqis within six months. The upshot of the hearings was an emphasis on the short-term importance of security, the medium-term challenge of maintaining control while transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis, and the long-term reality of commitments and costs. All the experts agreed that what came after the fall of Baghdad would be harder for the United States than what came before.
Six Months Before the War: Getting Serious
One week before Labor Day, while President Bush was at his ranch in Texas, Vice President Cheney gave a speech at a Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Nashville. "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction [and that he will use them] against our friends, against our allies, and against us," Cheney said. Time was running out, he concluded, for America to remove this threat. A few days later CNN quoted a source "intimately familiar with [Colin] Powell's thinking" as saying that Powell was still insistent on the need for allied support and would oppose any war in which the United States would "go it alone ... as if it doesn't give a damn" about other nations' views. Just after Labor Day, Powell apparently won a battle inside the Administration and persuaded Bush to take the U.S. case to the United Nations. On September 12 Bush addressed the UN General Assembly and urged it to insist on Iraqi compliance with its previous resolutions concerning disarmament.
Before the war the Administration exercised remarkable "message discipline" about financial projections. When asked how much the war might cost, officials said that so many things were uncertain, starting with whether there would even be a war, that there was no responsible way to make an estimate. In part this reflected Rumsfeld's emphasis on the unknowability of the future. It was also politically essential, in delaying the time when the Administration had to argue that regime change in Iraq was worth a specific number of billions of dollars.
In September, Lawrence Lindsay, then the chief White House economic adviser, broke discipline. He was asked by The Wall Street Journal how much a war and its aftermath might cost. He replied that it might end up at one to two percent of the gross domestic product, which would mean $100 billion to $200 billion. Lindsay added that he thought the cost of not going to war could conceivably be greater—but that didn't placate his critics within the Administration. The Administration was further annoyed by a report a few days later from Democrats on the House Budget Committee, which estimated the cost of the war at $48 billion to $93 billion. Lindsay was widely criticized in "background" comments from Administration officials, and by the end of the year he had been forced to resign. His comment "made it clear Larry just didn't get it," an unnamed Administration official told The Washington Post when Lindsay left. Lindsay's example could hardly have encouraged others in the Administration to be forthcoming with financial projections. Indeed, no one who remained in the Administration offered a plausible cost estimate until months after the war began.
In September the United States Agency for International Development began to think in earnest about its postwar responsibilities in Iraq. It was the natural contact for nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, from the United States and other countries that were concerned with relief efforts in Iraq.
USAID's administrator, Andrew Natsios, came to the assignment with a complex set of experiences and instincts. He started his career, in the 1970s, as a Republican state legislator in Massachusetts, and before the Bush Administration he had been the administrator of the state's "Big Dig," the largest public-works effort ever in the country. Before the Big Dig, Natsios spent five years as an executive at a major humanitarian NGO called World Vision. He also served in the Persian Gulf during the 1991 Gulf War, as an Army Reserve officer. By background he was the Administration official best prepared to anticipate the combination of wartime and postwar obligations in Iraq.
At any given moment USAID is drawing up contingency plans for countries that might soon need help. "I actually have a list, which I will not show you," Natsios told me in the fall, "of countries where there may not be American troops soon, but they could fall apart—and if they do, what we could do for them." By mid-September of 2002, six months before the official beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Natsios had additional teams working on plans for Iraq. Representatives of about a dozen relief organizations and NGOs were gathering each week at USAID headquarters for routine coordination meetings. Iraq occupied more and more of their time through 2002. On October 10, one day before Congress voted to authorize the war, the meetings were recast as the Iraq Working Group.
Five Months Before the War: Occupiers or Liberators?
The weekly meetings at USAID quickly settled into a pattern. The representatives of the NGOs would say, "We've dealt with situations like this before, and we know what to expect." The U.S. government representatives would either say nothing or else reply, No, this time it will be different.
The NGOs had experience dealing with a reality that has not fully sunk in for most of the American public. In the nearly three decades since U.S. troops left Vietnam, the American military has fought only two wars as most people understand the term: the two against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. But through the past thirty years U.S. troops have almost continuously been involved in combat somewhere. Because those engagements—in Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—have no obvious connection with one another, politicians and the public usually discuss them as stand-alone cases. Each one seems an aberration from the "real" wars the military is set up to fight.
To the NGO world, these and other modern wars (like the ones in Africa) are not the exception but the new norm: brutal localized encounters that destroy the existing political order and create a need for long-term international supervision and support. Within the U.S. military almost no one welcomes this reality, but many recognize that peacekeeping, policing, and, yes, nation-building are now the expected military tasks. The military has gotten used to working alongside the NGOs—and the NGOs were ready with a checklist of things to worry about once the regime had fallen.
An even larger question about historical precedent began to surface. When Administration officials talked about models for what would happen in Iraq, they almost always referred to the lasting success in Japan and Germany—or else to countries of the former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. (A civilian adviser who went to Baghdad early in the occupation recalls looking at his fellow passengers on the military transport plane. The ones who weren't asleep or flipping through magazines were reading books about Japan or Germany, not about the Arab world. "That was not a good sign," he told me.) If one thought of Iraq as Poland, or as the former East Germany, or as the former Czechoslovakia, or as almost any part of the onetime Soviet empire in Eastern Europe other than Romania, one would naturally conclude that regime change in itself would set the country well along the path toward recovery. These countries were fine once their repressive leaders were removed; so might Iraq well be. And if the former Yugoslavia indicated darker possibilities, that could be explained as yet another failure of Clinton-era foreign policy.
Many NGO representatives assumed that postwar recovery would not be so automatic, and that they should begin working on preparations before the combat began. "At the beginning our main message was the need for access," I was told by Sandra Mitchell, the vice-president of the International Rescue Committee, who attended the USAID meetings. Because of U.S. sanctions against Iraq, it was illegal for American humanitarian organizations to operate there. (Journalists were about the only category of Americans who would not get in trouble with their own government by traveling to and spending money in Iraq.) "Our initial messages were like those in any potential crisis situation," Mitchell said, "but the reason we were so insistent in this case was the precarious situation that already existed in Iraq. The internal infrastructure was shot, and you couldn't easily swing in resources from neighboring countries, like in the Balkans." The NGOs therefore asked, as a first step, for a presidential directive exempting them from the sanctions. They were told to expect an answer to this request by December. That deadline passed with no ruling. By early last year the NGOs felt that it was too dangerous to go to Iraq, and the Administration feared that if they went they might be used as hostages. No directive was ever issued.
Through the fall and winter of 2002 the International Rescue Committee, Refugees International, InterAction, and other groups that met with USAID kept warning about one likely postwar problem that, as it turned out, Iraq avoided—a mass flow of refugees—and another that was exactly as bad as everyone warned: the lawlessness and looting of the "day after" in Baghdad. The Bush Administration would later point to the absence of refugees as a sign of the occupation's underreported success. This achievement was, indeed, due in part to a success: the speed and precision of the military campaign itself. But the absence of refugees was also a sign of a profound failure: the mistaken estimates of Iraq's WMD threat. All pre-war scenarios involving huge movements of refugees began with the assumption that Saddam Hussein would use chemical or biological weapons against U.S. troops or his own Kurdish or Shiite populations—and that either the fact or the fear of such assaults would force terrified Iraqis to evacuate.
The power vacuum that led to looting was disastrous. "The looting was not a surprise," Sandra Mitchell told me. "It should not have come as a surprise. Anyone who has witnessed the fall of a regime while another force is coming in on a temporary basis knows that looting is standard procedure. In Iraq there were very strong signals that this could be the period of greatest concern for humanitarian response." One lesson of postwar reconstruction through the 1990s was that even a short period of disorder could have long-lasting effects.
The meetings at USAID gave the veterans of international relief operations a way to register their concerns. The problem was that they heard so little back. "The people in front of us were very well-meaning," says Joel Charny, who represented Refugees International at the meetings. "And in fairness, they were on such a short leash. But the dialogue was one-way. We would tell them stuff, and they would nod and say, Everything's under control. To me it was like the old four-corners offense in basketball. They were there to just dribble out the clock but be able to say they'd consulted with us."
And again the question arose of whether what lay ahead in Iraq would be similar to the other "small wars" of the previous decade-plus or something new. If it was similar, the NGOs had their checklists ready. These included, significantly, the obligations placed on any "occupying power" by the Fourth Geneva Convention, which was signed in 1949 and is mainly a commonsense list of duties—from protecting hospitals to minimizing postwar reprisals—that a victorious army must carry out. "But we were corrected when we raised this point," Sandra Mitchell says. "The American troops would be 'liberators' rather than 'occupiers,' so the obligations did not apply. Our point was not to pass judgment on the military action but to describe the responsibilities."
In the same mid-October week that the Senate approved the war resolution, a team from the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College, in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, began a postwar-planning exercise. Even more explicitly than the NGOs, the Army team insisted that America's military past, reaching back to its conquest of the Philippines, in 1898, would be a useful guide to its future duties in Iraq. As a rule, professional soldiers spend more time thinking and talking about history than other people do; past battles are the only real evidence about doctrine and equipment. The institute—in essence, the War College's think tank—was charged with reviewing recent occupations to help the Army "best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq," as the institute's director later said in a foreword to the team's report. "As the possibility of war with Iraq looms on the horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the challenges of occupying the country."
The study's principal authors were Conrad Crane, who graduated from West Point in the early 1970s and taught there as a history professor through the 1990s, and Andrew Terrill, an Army Reserve officer and a strategic-studies professor. With a team of other researchers, which included representatives from the Army and the joint staff as well as other government agencies and think tanks, they began high-speed work on a set of detailed recommendations about postwar priorities. The Army War College report was also connected to a pre-war struggle with yet another profound postwar consequence: the fight within the Pentagon, between the civilian leadership in OSD and the generals running the Army, over the size and composition of the force that would conquer Iraq.
Four Months Before the War: The Battle in the Pentagon
On November 5, 2002, the Republicans regained control of the Senate and increased their majority in the House in national midterm elections. On November 8 the UN Security Council voted 15-0 in favor of Resolution 1441, threatening Iraq with "serious consequences" if it could not prove that it had abandoned its weapons programs.
Just before 9/11 Donald Rumsfeld had been thought of as standing on a banana peel. The newspapers were full of leaked anonymous complaints from military officials who thought that his efforts to streamline and "transform" the Pentagon were unrealistic and damaging. But with his dramatic metamorphosis from embattled Secretary of Defense to triumphant Secretary of War, Rumsfeld's reputation outside the Administration and his influence within it rose. He was operating from a position of great power when, in November, he decided to "cut the TPFDD."
"Tipfid" is how people in the military pronounce the acronym for "time-phased force and deployment data," but what it really means to the armed forces, in particular the Army, is a way of doing business that is methodical, careful, and sure. The TPFDD for Iraq was an unbelievably complex master plan governing which forces would go where, when, and with what equipment, on which planes or ships, so that everything would be coordinated and ready at the time of attack. One reason it took the military six months to get set for each of its wars against Iraq, a comparatively pitiful foe, was the thoroughness of TPFDD planning. To its supporters, this approach is old-school in the best sense: if you fight, you really fight. To its detractors, this approach is simply old—ponderous, inefficient, and, although they don't dare call it cowardly, risk-averse at the least.
A streamlined approach had proved successful in Afghanistan, at least for a while, as a relatively small U.S. force left much of the ground fighting to the Northern Alliance. In the longer run the American strategy created complications for Afghanistan, because the victorious Northern Alliance leaders were newly legitimized as warlords. Donald Rumsfeld was one member of the Administration who seemed still to share the pre-9/11 suspicion about the risks of nation-building, and so didn't much care about the postwar consequences of a relatively small invasion force. (His deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, was more open to the challenge of rebuilding Iraq, but he would never undercut or disobey Rumsfeld.) In November, Rumsfeld began working through the TPFDD, with the goal of paring the force planned for Iraq to its leanest, lightest acceptable level.
The war games run by the Army and the Pentagon's joint staff had led to very high projected troop levels. The Army's recommendation was for an invasion force 400,000 strong, made up of as many Americans as necessary and as many allied troops as possible. "All the numbers we were coming up with were quite large," Thomas White, a retired general (and former Enron executive) who was the Secretary of the Army during the war, told me recently. But Rumsfeld's idea of the right force size was more like 75,000. The Army and the military's joint leadership moderated their requests in putting together the TPFDD, but Rumsfeld began challenging the force numbers in detail. When combat began, slightly more than 200,000 U.S. soldiers were massed around Iraq.
"In what I came to think of as Secretary Rumsfeld's style," an Army official who was involved in the process told me recently, "he didn't directly say no but asked a lot of hard questions about the plan and sent us away without approval. He would ask questions that delayed the activation of units, because he didn't think the planned flow was right. Our people came back with the understanding that their numbers were far too big and they should be thinking more along the lines of Afghanistan"—that is, plan for a light, mobile attack featuring Special Forces soldiers. Another participant described Rumsfeld as looking line by line at the deployments proposed in the TPFDD and saying, "Can't we do this with one company?" or "Shouldn't we get rid of this unit?" Making detailed, last-minute adjustments to the TPFDD was, in the Army's view, like pulling cogs at random out of a machine. According to an observer, "The generals would say, Sir, these changes will ripple back to every railhead and every company."
The longer-term problem involved what would happen after Baghdad fell, as it inevitably would. This was distinctly an Army rather than a general military concern. "Where's the Air Force now?" an Army officer asked rhetorically last fall. "They're back on their bases—and they're better off, since they don't need to patrol the 'no-fly' zones [in northern and southern Iraq, which U.S. warplanes had patrolled since the end of the Gulf War]. The Navy's gone, and most of the Marines have been pulled back. It's the Army holding the sack of "expletive deleted"." A related concern involved what a long-term commitment to Iraq would do to the Army's "ops tempo," or pace of operations—especially if Reserve and National Guard members, who had no expectations of long-term foreign service when they signed up, were posted in Iraq for months or even years.
The military's fundamental argument for building up what Rumsfeld considered a wastefully large force is that it would be even more useful after Baghdad fell than during actual combat. The first few days or weeks after the fighting, in this view, were crucial in setting long-term expectations. Civilians would see that they could expect a rapid return to order, and would behave accordingly—or they would see the opposite. This was the "shock and awe" that really mattered, in the Army's view: the ability to make clear who was in charge. "Insights from successful occupations suggest that it is best to go in real heavy and then draw down fast," Conrad Crane, of the Army War College, told me. That is, a larger force would be necessary during and immediately after the war, but might mean a much smaller occupation presence six months later.
"We're in Baghdad, the regime is toppled—what's next?" Thomas White told me, recounting discussions before the war. One of the strongest advocates of a larger force was General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff. White said, "Guys like Shinseki, who had been in Bosnia [where he supervised the NATO force], been in Kosovo, started running the numbers and said, 'Let's assume the world is linear.' For five million Bosnians we had two hundred thousand people to watch over them. Now we have twenty-five million Iraqis to worry about, spread out over a state the size of California. How many people is this going to take?" The heart of the Army's argument was that with too few soldiers, the United States would win the war only to be trapped in an untenable position during the occupation.
A note of personal rancor complicated these discussions, as it did many disagreements over postwar plans. In our interview Douglas Feith played this down—maintaining that press reports had exaggerated the degree of quarreling and division inside the Administration. These reports, he said, mainly reflected the experience of lower-level officials, who were embroiled in one specific policy area and "might find themselves pretty much always at odds with their counterparts from another agency." Higher up, where one might be "fighting with someone on one issue but allied with them on something else," relations were more collegial. Perhaps so. But there was no concealing the hostility within the Pentagon between most uniformed leaders, especially in the Army, and the civilians in OSD.
Donald Rumsfeld viewed Shinseki as a symbol of uncooperative, old-style thinking, and had in the past gone out of his way to humiliate him. In the spring of 2002, fourteen months before the scheduled end of Shinseki's term, Rumsfeld announced who his successor would be; such an announcement, which converts the incumbent into a lame duck, usually comes at the last minute. The action was one of several calculated insults.
From OSD's point of view, Shinseki and many of his colleagues were dragging their feet. From the Army's point of view, OSD was being reckless about the way it was committing troops and high-handed in disregarding the military's professional advice. One man who was then working in the Pentagon told me of walking down a hallway a few months before the war and seeing Army General John Abizaid standing outside a door. Abizaid, who after the war succeeded Tommy Franks as commander of the Central Command, or CENTCOM, was then the director of the Joint Staff—the highest uniformed position in the Pentagon apart from the Joint Chiefs. A planning meeting for Iraq operations was under way. OSD officials told him he could not take part.
The military-civilian difference finally turned on the question of which would be harder: winning the war or maintaining the peace. According to Thomas White and several others, OSD acted as if the war itself would pose the real challenge. As White put it, "The planning assumptions were that the people would realize they were liberated, they would be happy that we were there, so it would take a much smaller force to secure the peace than it did to win the war. The resistance would principally be the remnants of the Baath Party, but they would go away fairly rapidly. And, critically, if we didn't damage the infrastructure in our military operation, as we didn't, the restart of the country could be done fairly rapidly." The first assumption was clearly expressed by Cheney three days before the war began, in an exchange with Tim Russert on Meet the Press: RUSSERT: If your analysis is not correct, and we're not treated as liberators but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with significant American casualties?
CHENEY: Well, I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators ... The read we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but what they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that. Through the 1990s Marine General Anthony Zinni, who preceded Tommy Franks as CENTCOM commander, had done war-gaming for a possible invasion of Iraq. His exercises involved a much larger U.S. force than the one that actually attacked last year. "They were very proud that they didn't have the kind of numbers my plan had called for," Zinni told me, referring to Rumsfeld and Cheney. "The reason we had those two extra divisions was the security situation. Revenge killings, crime, chaos—this was all foreseeable."
Thomas White agrees. Because of reasoning like Cheney's, "we went in with the minimum force to accomplish the military objectives, which was a straightforward task, never really in question," he told me. "And then we immediately found ourselves shorthanded in the aftermath. We sat there and watched people dismantle and run off with the country, basically."
Three Months Before the War
In the beginning of December, Iraq submitted its 12,000-page declaration to the UN Security Council contending that it had no remaining WMD stores. Near the end of December, President Bush authorized the dispatch of more than 200,000 U.S. soldiers to the Persian Gulf.
There had still been few or no estimates of the war's cost from the Administration—only contentions that projections like Lawrence Lindsay's were too high. When pressed on this point, Administration officials repeatedly said that with so many uncertainties, they could not possibly estimate the cost. But early in December, just before Lindsay was forced out, The New York Review of Books published an article by William Nordhaus titled "Iraq: The Economic Consequences of War," which included carefully considered estimates. Nordhaus, an economist at Yale, had served on Jimmy Carter's Council of Economic Advisers; the article was excerpted from a much longer economic paper he had prepared. His range of estimates was enormous, depending on how long the war lasted and what its impact on the world economy proved to be. Nordhaus calculated that over the course of a decade the direct and indirect costs of the war to the United States could be as low as $121 billion or as high as $1.6 trillion. This was a more thoroughgoing approach than the congressional budget committees had taken, but it was similar in its overall outlook. Nordhaus told me recently that he thinks he should have increased all his estimates to account for the "opportunity costs" of stationing soldiers in Iraq—that is, if they are assigned to Iraq, they're not available for deployment somewhere else.
On the last day of December, Mitch Daniels, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, told The New York Times that the war might cost $50 billion to $60 billion. He had to backtrack immediately, his spokesman stressing that "it is impossible to know what any military campaign would ultimately cost." The spokesman explained Daniels's mistake by saying, "The only cost estimate we know of in this arena is the Persian Gulf War, and that was a sixty-billion-dollar event." Daniels would leave the Administration, of his own volition, five months later.
In the immediate run-up to the war the Administration still insisted that the costs were unforeseeable. "Fundamentally, we have no idea what is needed unless and until we get there on the ground," Paul Wolfowitz told the House Budget Committee on February 27, with combat less than three weeks away. "This delicate moment—when we are assembling a coalition, when we are mobilizing people inside Iraq and throughout the region to help us in the event of war, and when we are still trying, through the United Nations and by other means, to achieve a peaceful solution without war—is not a good time to publish highly suspect numerical estimates and have them drive our declaratory policy."
Wolfowitz's stonewalling that day was in keeping with the policy of all senior Administration officials. Until many months after combat had begun, they refused to hazard even the vaguest approximation of what financial costs it might involve. Shinseki, so often at odds with OSD, contemplated taking a different course. He was scheduled to testify, with Thomas White, before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 19, which turned out to be the first day of actual combat. In a routine prep session before the hearing he asked his assistants what he should say about how much the operations in Iraq were going to cost. "Well, it's impossible to predict," a briefer began, reminding him of the official line.
Shinseki cut him off. "We don't know everything," he said, and then he went through a list of the many things the military already did know. "We know how many troops are there now, and the projected numbers. We know how much it costs to feed them every day. We know how much it cost to send the force there. We know what we have spent already to prepare the force and how much it would cost to bring them back. We have estimates of how much fuel and ammunition we would use per day of operations." In short, anyone who actually wanted to make an estimate had plenty of information on hand.
At this point Jerry Sinn, a three-star general in charge of the Army's budget, said that in fact he had worked up some numbers—and he named a figure, for the Army's likely costs, in the tens of billions of dollars. But when Senator Byron Dorgan, of North Dakota, asked Shinseki at hearings on March 19 how much the war just beginning would cost, Shinseki was loyally vague ("Any potential discussion about what an operation in Iraq or any follow-on probably is undefined at this point").
When Administration officials stopped being vague, they started being unrealistic. On March 27, eight days into combat, members of the House Appropriations Committee asked Paul Wolfowitz for a figure. He told them that whatever it was, Iraq's oil supplies would keep it low. "There's a lot of money to pay for this," he said. "It doesn't have to be U.S. taxpayer money. We are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon." On April 23 Andrew Natsios, of USAID, told an incredulous Ted Koppel, on Nightline, that the total cost to America of reconstructing Iraq would be $1.7 billion. Koppel shot back, "I mean, when you talk about one-point-seven, you're not
Blind Into Baghdad: The inside story of a historic failure
By James Fallows
Feb 28, 2006
The U.S. occupation of Iraq is a debacle not because the government did no planning but because a vast amount of expert planning was willfully ignored by the people in charge.
The Atlantic.com, January/February 2004
On a Friday afternoon last November, I met Douglas Feith in his office at the Pentagon to discuss what has happened in Iraq. Feith's title is undersecretary of defense for policy, which places him, along with several other undersecretaries, just below Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in the Pentagon's hierarchy. Informally he is seen in Washington as "Wolfowitz's Wolfowitz"—that is, as a deputy who has a wide range of responsibilities but is clearly identified with one particular policy. That policy is bringing regime change to Iraq—a goal that both Wolfowitz and Feith strongly advocated through the 1990s. To opponents of the war in Iraq, Feith is one of several shadowy, Rasputinlike figures who are shaping U.S. policy. He is seen much the way enemies of the Clinton Administration saw Hillary Clinton. Others associated with the Bush Administration who are seen this way include the consultant Richard Perle; Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the chief of staff for Vice President Dick Cheney; and the Vice President himself. What these officials have in common is their presumably great private influence and—even in the case of the Vice President—their limited public visibility and accountability.
In person Douglas Feith is nothing like Rasputin. Between a Reagan-era stint in the Pentagon and his current job he was a Washington lawyer for fifteen years, and he answered my questions with a lawyer's affability in the face of presumed disagreement. I could be biased in Feith's favor, because he was the most senior Administration official who granted my request for an interview about postwar Iraq. Like Donald Rumsfeld, Feith acts and sounds younger than many others of his age (fifty). But distinctly unlike Rumsfeld at a press conference, Feith in this interview did not seem at all arrogant or testy. His replies were relatively candid and unforced, in contrast to the angry or relentlessly on-message responses that have become standard from senior Administration officials. He acknowledged what was "becoming the conventional wisdom" about the Administration's failure to plan adequately for events after the fall of Baghdad, and then explained—with animation, dramatic pauses, and gestures—why he thought it was wrong.
Feith offered a number of specific illustrations of what he considered underappreciated successes. Some were familiar —the oil wells weren't on fire, Iraqis didn't starve or flee—but others were less so. For instance, he described the Administration's careful effort to replace old Iraqi dinars, which carried Saddam Hussein's image ("It's interesting how important that is, and it ties into the whole issue of whether people think that Saddam might be coming back"), with a new form of currency, without causing a run on the currency.
But mainly he challenged the premise of most critics: that the Administration could have done a better job of preparing for the consequences of victory. When I asked what had gone better than expected, and what had gone worse, he said, "We don't exactly deal in 'expectations.' Expectations are too close to 'predictions.' We're not comfortable with predictions. It is one of the big strategic premises of the work that we do."
The limits of future knowledge, Feith said, were of special importance to Rumsfeld, "who is death to predictions." "His big strategic theme is uncertainty," Feith said. "The need to deal strategically with uncertainty. The inability to predict the future. The limits on our knowledge and the limits on our intelligence."
In practice, Feith said, this meant being ready for whatever proved to be the situation in postwar Iraq. "You will not find a single piece of paper ... If anybody ever went through all of our records—and someday some people will, presumably—nobody will find a single piece of paper that says, 'Mr. Secretary or Mr. President, let us tell you what postwar Iraq is going to look like, and here is what we need plans for.' If you tried that, you would get thrown out of Rumsfeld's office so fast—if you ever went in there and said, 'Let me tell you what something's going to look like in the future,' you wouldn't get to your next sentence!"
"This is an important point," he said, "because of this issue of What did we believe? ... The common line is, nobody planned for security because Ahmed Chalabi told us that everything was going to be swell." Chalabi, the exiled leader of the Iraqi National Congress, has often been blamed for making rosy predictions about the ease of governing postwar Iraq. "So we predicted that everything was going to be swell, and we didn't plan for things not being swell." Here Feith paused for a few seconds, raised his hands with both palms up, and put on a "Can you believe it?" expression. "I mean—one would really have to be a simpleton. And whatever people think of me, how can anybody think that Don Rumsfeld is that dumb? He's so evidently not that dumb, that how can people write things like that?" He sounded amazed rather than angry.
No one contends that Donald Rumsfeld, or Paul Wolfowitz, or Douglas Feith, or the Administration as a whole is dumb. The wisdom of their preparations for the aftermath of military victory in Iraq is the question. Feith's argument was a less defensive-sounding version of the Administration's general response to criticisms of its postwar policy: Life is uncertain, especially when the lid comes off a long-tyrannized society. American planners did about as well as anyone could in preparing for the unforeseeable. Anyone who says otherwise is indulging in lazy, unfair second-guessing. "The notion that there was a memo that was once written, that if we had only listened to that memo, all would be well in Iraq, is so preposterous," Feith told me.
The notion of a single memo's changing history is indeed farfetched. The idea that a substantial body of knowledge could have improved postwar prospects is not. The Administration could not have known everything about what it would find in Iraq. But it could have—and should have—done far more than it did.
Almost everything, good and bad, that has happened in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was the subject of extensive pre-war discussion and analysis. This is particularly true of what have proved to be the harshest realities for the United States since the fall of Baghdad: that occupying the country is much more difficult than conquering it; that a breakdown in public order can jeopardize every other goal; that the ambition of patiently nurturing a new democracy is at odds with the desire to turn control over to the Iraqis quickly and get U.S. troops out; that the Sunni center of the country is the main security problem; that with each passing day Americans risk being seen less as liberators and more as occupiers, and targets.
All this, and much more, was laid out in detail and in writing long before the U.S. government made the final decision to attack. Even now the collective efforts at planning by the CIA, the State Department, the Army and the Marine Corps, the United States Agency for International Development, and a wide variety of other groups inside and outside the government are underappreciated by the public. The one pre-war effort that has received substantial recent attention, the State Department's Future of Iraq project, produced thousands of pages of findings, barely one paragraph of which has until now been quoted in the press. The Administration will be admired in retrospect for how much knowledge it created about the challenge it was taking on. U.S. government predictions about postwar Iraq's problems have proved as accurate as the assessments of pre-war Iraq's strategic threat have proved flawed.
But the Administration will be condemned for what it did with what was known. The problems the United States has encountered are precisely the ones its own expert agencies warned against. Exactly what went wrong with the occupation will be studied for years—or should be. The missteps of the first half year in Iraq are as significant as other classic and carefully examined failures in foreign policy, including John Kennedy's handling of the Bay of Pigs invasion, in 1961, and Lyndon Johnson's decision to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam, in 1965. The United States withstood those previous failures, and it will withstand this one. Having taken over Iraq and captured Saddam Hussein, it has no moral or practical choice other than to see out the occupation and to help rebuild and democratize the country. But its missteps have come at a heavy cost. And the ongoing financial, diplomatic, and human cost of the Iraq occupation is the more grievous in light of advance warnings the government had.
Before September 11, 2001: The Early Days
Concern about Saddam Hussein pre-dated the 9/11 attacks and even the inauguration of George W. Bush. In 1998 Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act, which declared that "it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power." During the 2000 presidential campaign Al Gore promised to support groups working to unseat Saddam Hussein. In the week before Bush took office, Nicholas Lemann reported in The New Yorker that "the idea of overthrowing Saddam is not an idle fantasy—or, if it is, it's one that has lately occupied the minds of many American officials, including people close to George W. Bush." But the intellectual case for regime change, argued during the Clinton years by some Democrats and notably by Paul Wolfowitz, then the dean of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, shifted clearly toward operational planning after the destruction of the World Trade Center.
For much of the public this case for war against Iraq rested on an assumed connection (though this was never demonstrated, and was officially disavowed by the President) between Saddam Hussein's regime and the terrorist hijackers. Within the government the case was equally compelling but different. September 11 had shown that the United States was newly vulnerable; to protect itself it had to fight terrorists at their source; and because Saddam Hussein's regime was the leading potential source of future "state-sponsored" terrorism, it had become an active threat, whether or not it played any role in 9/11. The very next day, September 12, 2001, James Woolsey, who had been Clinton's first CIA director, told me that no matter who proved to be responsible for this attack, the solution had to include removing Saddam Hussein, because he was so likely to be involved next time. A military planner inside the Pentagon later told me that on September 13 his group was asked to draw up scenarios for an assault on Iraq, not just Afghanistan.
Soon after becoming the Army Chief of Staff, in 1999, General Eric Shinseki had begun ordering war-game exercises to judge strategies and manpower needs for possible combat in Iraq. This was not because he assumed a war was imminent. He thought that the greater Caspian Sea region, including Iraq, would present a uniquely difficult challenge for U.S. troops, because of its geography and political tensions. After 9/11, Army war games involving Iraq began in earnest.
In his first State of the Union address, on January 29, 2002, President Bush said that Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were an "axis of evil" that threatened world peace. "By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States."
By the time of this speech efforts were afoot not simply to remove Saddam Hussein but also to imagine what Iraq would be like when he was gone. In late October of 2001, while the U.S. military was conducting its rout of the Taliban from Afghanistan, the State Department had quietly begun its planning for the aftermath of a "transition" in Iraq. At about the time of the "axis of evil" speech, working groups within the department were putting together a list of postwar jobs and topics to be considered, and possible groups of experts to work on them.
One Year Before the War: The "Future of Iraq"
Thus was born the Future of Iraq project, whose existence is by now well known, but whose findings and potential impact have rarely been reported and examined. The State Department first publicly mentioned the project in March of 2002, when it quietly announced the lineup of the working groups. At the time, media attention was overwhelmingly directed toward Afghanistan, where Operation Anaconda, the half-successful effort to kill or capture al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, was under way.
For several months before announcing the project the State Department had been attempting to coordinate the efforts of the many fractious Iraqi exile organizations. The Future of Iraq project held the potential for harnessing, and perhaps even harmonizing, the expertise available from the exile groups.
It was also in keeping with a surprisingly well established U.S. government tradition of preparing for postwar duties before there was a clear idea of when fighting would begin, let alone when it would end. Before the United States entered World War II, teams at the Army War College were studying what went right and wrong when American doughboys occupied Germany after World War I. Within months of the attack on Pearl Harbor a School of Military Government had been created, at the University of Virginia, to plan for the occupation of both Germany and Japan. In 1995, while U.S. negotiators, led by Richard Holbrooke, were still working at the Dayton peace talks to end the war in the Balkans, World Bank representatives were on hand to arrange loans for the new regimes.
Contemplating postwar plans posed a problem for those who, like many in the State Department, were skeptical of the need for war. Were they making a war more likely if they prepared for its aftermath? Thomas Warrick, the State Department official who directed the Future of Iraq project, was considered to be in the antiwar camp. But according to associates, he explained the importance of preparing for war by saying, "I'm nervous that they're actually going to do it—and the day after they'll turn to us and ask, 'Now what?'" So he pushed ahead with the project, setting up numerous conferences and drafting sessions that would bring together teams of exiles—among them Kanan Makiya, the author of the influential anti-Saddam book Republic of Fear, first published in 1989. A small number of "international advisers," mainly from the United States, were also assigned to the teams. Eventually there would be seventeen working groups, designed systematically to cover what would be needed to rebuild the political and economic infrastructure of the country. "Democratic Principles and Procedures" was the name of one of the groups, which was assigned to suggest the legal framework for a new government; Makiya would write much of its report. The "Transitional Justice" group was supposed to work on reparations, amnesty, and de-Baathification laws. Groups studying economic matters included "Public Finance," "Oil and Energy," and "Water, Agriculture and Environment."
In May of 2002 Congress authorized $5 million to fund the project's studies. In the flurry of news from Afghanistan the project went unnoticed in the press until June, when the State Department announced that the first meetings would take place in July. "The role of the U.S. government and State Department is to see what the Iraqis and Iraqi-Americans want," Warrick said at a conference on June 1, 2002. "The impetus for change comes from [Iraqis], not us. This is the job of Iraqis inside and outside."
That same day President Bush delivered a graduation speech at West Point, giving a first look at the doctrine of pre-emptive war. He told the cadets, to cheers, "Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives." Later in the summer the doctrine was elaborated in a new National Security Strategy, which explained that since "rogue states" could not be contained or deterred, they needed to be destroyed before they could attack.
Whenever National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was interviewed that summer, she talked mainly about the thinking behind the new policy. When Vice President Dick Cheney was interviewed, he talked mainly about Saddam Hussein's defiance of international law. But when Secretary of State Colin Powell was interviewed, he constantly stressed the value of an international approach to the problem and the need to give UN arms inspectors adequate time to do their job.
War with Iraq was not inevitable at this point, but it seemed more and more likely. Daily conversation in Washington, which usually reverts to "So, who do you think will be the next President?," switched instead to "So, when do you think we're going to war?"
It was in these circumstances that the Future of Iraq project's working groups deliberated. Most of the meetings were in Washington. Some were in London, and one session, in early September, took place in Surrey, where representatives of a dozen mutually suspicious exile groups discussed prospects for democratic coexistence when Saddam Hussein was gone. (Along with Chalabi's INC the meeting included several rival Kurdish groups, Assyrian and Turkomen organizations, the Iraqi Constitutional Monarchy Movement, and others.)
The project did not overcome all the tensions among its members, and the results of its deliberations were uneven. Three of its intended working groups never actually met—including, ominously, "Preserving Iraq's Cultural Heritage." The "Education" group finally produced a report only six pages long, in contrast to many hundreds of pages from most others. Some recommendations were quirky or reflected the tastes of the individual participants who drafted them. A report titled "Free Media" proposed that all Iraqi journalists be taken out of the country for a month-long re-education process: "Those who 'get it' go back as reporters; others would be retired or reassigned." A group that was considering ways of informing Iraq about the realities of democracy mentioned Baywatch and Leave It to Beaver as information sources that had given Iraqis an imprecise understanding of American society. It recommended that a new film, Colonial America: Life in a Theocracy, be shot, noting, "The Puritan experiments provide amazing parallels with current Moslem fundamentalism. The ultimate failures of these US experiments can also be vividly illustrated—witch trials, intolerance, etc."
But whatever may have been unrealistic or factional about these efforts, even more of what the project created was impressive. The final report consisted of thirteen volumes of recommendations on specific topics, plus a one-volume summary and overview. These I have read—and I read them several months into the occupation, when it was unfairly easy to judge how well the forecast was standing up. (Several hundred of the 2,500 pages were in Arabic, which sped up the reading process.) The report was labeled "For Official Use Only"—an administrative term that implies confidentiality but has no legal significance. The State Department held the report closely until, last fall, it agreed to congressional requests to turn over the findings.
Most of the project's judgments look good in retrospect—and virtually all reveal a touching earnestness about working out the details of reconstructing a society. For instance, one of the thickest volumes considered the corruption endemic in Iraqi life and laid out strategies for coping with it. (These included a new "Iraqi Government Code of Ethics," which began, "Honesty, integrity, and fairness are the fundamental values for the people of Iraq.") The overview volume, which appears to have been composed as a series of PowerPoint charts, said that the United States was undertaking this effort because, among other things, "detailed public planning" conveys U.S. government "seriousness" and the message that the U.S. government "wants to learn from past regime change experiences."
For their part, the Iraqi participants emphasized several points that ran through all the working groups' reports. A recurring theme was the urgency of restoring electricity and water supplies as soon as possible after regime change. The first item in the list of recommendations from the "Water, Agriculture and Environment" group read, "Fundamental importance of clean water supplies for Iraqis immediately after transition. Key to coalition/community relations." One of the groups making economic recommendations wrote, "Stressed importance of getting electrical grid up and running immediately—key to water systems, jobs. Could go a long way to determining Iraqis' attitudes toward Coalition forces."
A second theme was the need to plan carefully for the handling and demobilization of Iraq's very sizable military. On the one hand, a functioning army would be necessary for public order and, once coalition forces withdrew, for the country's defense. ("Our vision of the future is to build a democratic civil society. In order to make this vision a reality, we need to have an army that can work alongside this new society.") On the other hand, a large number of Saddam's henchmen would have to be removed. The trick would be to get rid of the leaders without needlessly alienating the ordinary troops—or leaving them without income. One group wrote, "All combatants who are included in the demobilization process must be assured by their leaders and the new government of their legal rights and that new prospects for work and education will be provided by the new system." Toward this end it laid out a series of steps the occupation authorities should take in the "disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration" process. Another group, in a paper on democratic principles, warned, "The decommissioning of hundreds of thousands of trained military personnel that [a rapid purge] implies could create social problems."
Next the working groups emphasized how disorderly Iraq would be soon after liberation, and how difficult it would be to get the country on the path to democracy—though that was where it had to go. "The removal of Saddam's regime will provide a power vacuum and create popular anxieties about the viability of all Iraqi institutions," a paper on rebuilding civil society said. "The traumatic and disruptive events attendant to the regime change will affect all Iraqis, both Saddam's conspirators and the general populace." Another report warned more explicitly that "the period immediately after regime change might offer these criminals the opportunity to engage in acts of killing, plunder and looting." In the short term the occupying forces would have to prevent disorder. In the long term, according to a report written by Kanan Makiya, they would need to recognize that "the extent of the Iraqi totalitarian state, its absolute power and control exercised from Baghdad, not to mention the terror used to enforce compliance, cannot be overestimated in their impact on the Iraqi psyche and the attendant feeling of fear, weakness, and shame." Makiya continued, "These conditions and circumstances do not provide a strong foundation on which to build new institutions and a modern nation state."
Each of the preceding themes would seem to imply a long, difficult U.S. commitment in Iraq. America should view its involvement in Iraq, the summary report said, not as it had Afghanistan, which was left to stew in lightly supervised warlordism, but as it had Germany and Japan, which were rebuilt over many years. But nearly every working group stressed one other point: the military occupation itself had to be brief. "Note: Military government idea did not go down well," one chart in the summary volume said. The "Oil and Energy" group presented a "key concept": "Iraqis do not work for American contractors; Americans are seen assisting Iraqis."
Americans are often irritated by the illogic of "resentful dependence" by weaker states. South Koreans, for example, complain bitterly about U.S. soldiers in their country but would complain all the more bitterly if the soldiers were removed. The authors of the Future of Iraq report could by those standards also be accused of illogical thinking, in wanting U.S. support but not wanting U.S. control. Moreover, many of the project's members had a bias that prefigured an important source of postwar tension: they were exiles who considered themselves the likeliest beneficiaries if the United States transferred power to Iraqis quickly—even though, precisely because of their exile, they had no obvious base of support within Iraq.
To skip ahead in the story: As chaos increased in Baghdad last summer, the chief U.S. administrator, L. Paul "Jerry" Bremer, wrestled constantly with a variant of this exile paradox. The Iraqi Governing Council, whose twenty-five members were chosen by Americans, was supposed to do only the preparatory work for an elected Iraqi government. But the greater the pressure on Bremer for "Iraqification," the more tempted he was to give in to the council's demand that he simply put it in charge without waiting for an election. More than a year earlier, long before combat began, the explicit recommendations and implicit lessons of the Future of Iraq project had given the U.S. government a very good idea of what political conflicts it could expect in Iraq.
Ten Months Before the War: War Games and Warnings
As combat slowed in Afghanistan and the teams of the Future of Iraq project continued their deliberations, the U.S. government put itself on a wartime footing. In late May the CIA had begun what would become a long series of war-game exercises, to think through the best- and worst-case scenarios after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. According to a person familiar with the process, one recurring theme in the exercises was the risk of civil disorder after the fall of Baghdad. The exercises explored how to find and secure the weapons of mass destruction that were then assumed to be in and around Baghdad, and indicated that the hardest task would be finding and protecting scientists who knew about the weapons before they could be killed by the regime as it was going down.
The CIA also considered whether a new Iraqi government could be put together through a process like the Bonn conference, which was then being used to devise a post-Taliban regime for Afghanistan. At the Bonn conference representatives of rival political and ethic groups agreed on the terms that established Hamid Karzai as the new Afghan President. The CIA believed that rivalries in Iraq were so deep, and the political culture so shallow, that a similarly quick transfer of sovereignty would only invite chaos.
Representatives from the Defense Department were among those who participated in the first of these CIA war-game sessions. When their Pentagon superiors at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) found out about this, in early summer, the representatives were reprimanded and told not to participate further. "OSD" is Washington shorthand, used frequently in discussions about the origins of Iraq war plans, and it usually refers to strong guidance from Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, and one of Feith's deputies, William Luti. Their displeasure over the CIA exercise was an early illustration of a view that became stronger throughout 2002: that postwar planning was an impediment to war.
Because detailed thought about the postwar situation meant facing costs and potential problems, and thus weakened the case for launching a "war of choice" (the Washington term for a war not waged in immediate self-defense), it could be seen as an "antiwar" undertaking. The knowledge that U.S. soldiers would still be in Germany and Japan sixty-plus years after Pearl Harbor would obviously not have changed the decision to enter World War II, and in theory the Bush Administration could have presented the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in a similar way: as a job that had to be done, even though it might saddle Americans with costs and a military presence for decades to come. Everyone can think of moments when Bush or Rumsfeld has reminded the nation that this would be a long-term challenge. But during the months when the Administration was making its case for the war—successfully to Congress, less so to the United Nations—it acted as if the long run should be thought about only later on.
On July 31, 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee invited a panel of experts to discuss the case for war against Iraq. On August 1 it heard from other experts about the likely "day after" consequences of military victory. Senator Joseph Biden, a Democrat from Delaware, was then the chairman of the committee. That first day Biden said that the threat of WMD might force him to vote in favor of the war (as he ultimately did). But he worried that if the United States invaded without full allied support, "we may very well radicalize the rest of the world, we may pick up a bill that's $70 billion, $80 billion, we may have to have extensive commitment of U.S. forces for an extended period of time in Iraq."
Phebe Marr, an Iraq scholar retired from the National Defense University, told the committee that the United States "should assume that it cannot get the results it wants on the cheap" from regime change. "It must be prepared to put some troops on the ground, advisers to help create new institutions, and above all, time and effort in the future to see the project through to a satisfactory end. If the United States is not willing to do so, it had best rethink the project." Rend Rahim Francke, an Iraqi exile serving on the Future of Iraq project (and now the ambassador from Iraq to the United States), said that "the system of public security will break down, because there will be no functioning police force, no civil service, and no justice system" on the first day after the fighting. "There will be a vacuum of political authority and administrative authority," she said. "The infrastructure of vital sectors will have to be restored. An adequate police force must be trained and equipped as quickly as possible. And the economy will have to be jump-started from not only stagnation but devastation." Other witnesses discussed the need to commit U.S. troops for many years—but to begin turning constitutional authority over to the Iraqis within six months. The upshot of the hearings was an emphasis on the short-term importance of security, the medium-term challenge of maintaining control while transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis, and the long-term reality of commitments and costs. All the experts agreed that what came after the fall of Baghdad would be harder for the United States than what came before.
Six Months Before the War: Getting Serious
One week before Labor Day, while President Bush was at his ranch in Texas, Vice President Cheney gave a speech at a Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Nashville. "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction [and that he will use them] against our friends, against our allies, and against us," Cheney said. Time was running out, he concluded, for America to remove this threat. A few days later CNN quoted a source "intimately familiar with [Colin] Powell's thinking" as saying that Powell was still insistent on the need for allied support and would oppose any war in which the United States would "go it alone ... as if it doesn't give a damn" about other nations' views. Just after Labor Day, Powell apparently won a battle inside the Administration and persuaded Bush to take the U.S. case to the United Nations. On September 12 Bush addressed the UN General Assembly and urged it to insist on Iraqi compliance with its previous resolutions concerning disarmament.
Before the war the Administration exercised remarkable "message discipline" about financial projections. When asked how much the war might cost, officials said that so many things were uncertain, starting with whether there would even be a war, that there was no responsible way to make an estimate. In part this reflected Rumsfeld's emphasis on the unknowability of the future. It was also politically essential, in delaying the time when the Administration had to argue that regime change in Iraq was worth a specific number of billions of dollars.
In September, Lawrence Lindsay, then the chief White House economic adviser, broke discipline. He was asked by The Wall Street Journal how much a war and its aftermath might cost. He replied that it might end up at one to two percent of the gross domestic product, which would mean $100 billion to $200 billion. Lindsay added that he thought the cost of not going to war could conceivably be greater—but that didn't placate his critics within the Administration. The Administration was further annoyed by a report a few days later from Democrats on the House Budget Committee, which estimated the cost of the war at $48 billion to $93 billion. Lindsay was widely criticized in "background" comments from Administration officials, and by the end of the year he had been forced to resign. His comment "made it clear Larry just didn't get it," an unnamed Administration official told The Washington Post when Lindsay left. Lindsay's example could hardly have encouraged others in the Administration to be forthcoming with financial projections. Indeed, no one who remained in the Administration offered a plausible cost estimate until months after the war began.
In September the United States Agency for International Development began to think in earnest about its postwar responsibilities in Iraq. It was the natural contact for nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, from the United States and other countries that were concerned with relief efforts in Iraq.
USAID's administrator, Andrew Natsios, came to the assignment with a complex set of experiences and instincts. He started his career, in the 1970s, as a Republican state legislator in Massachusetts, and before the Bush Administration he had been the administrator of the state's "Big Dig," the largest public-works effort ever in the country. Before the Big Dig, Natsios spent five years as an executive at a major humanitarian NGO called World Vision. He also served in the Persian Gulf during the 1991 Gulf War, as an Army Reserve officer. By background he was the Administration official best prepared to anticipate the combination of wartime and postwar obligations in Iraq.
At any given moment USAID is drawing up contingency plans for countries that might soon need help. "I actually have a list, which I will not show you," Natsios told me in the fall, "of countries where there may not be American troops soon, but they could fall apart—and if they do, what we could do for them." By mid-September of 2002, six months before the official beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Natsios had additional teams working on plans for Iraq. Representatives of about a dozen relief organizations and NGOs were gathering each week at USAID headquarters for routine coordination meetings. Iraq occupied more and more of their time through 2002. On October 10, one day before Congress voted to authorize the war, the meetings were recast as the Iraq Working Group.
Five Months Before the War: Occupiers or Liberators?
The weekly meetings at USAID quickly settled into a pattern. The representatives of the NGOs would say, "We've dealt with situations like this before, and we know what to expect." The U.S. government representatives would either say nothing or else reply, No, this time it will be different.
The NGOs had experience dealing with a reality that has not fully sunk in for most of the American public. In the nearly three decades since U.S. troops left Vietnam, the American military has fought only two wars as most people understand the term: the two against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. But through the past thirty years U.S. troops have almost continuously been involved in combat somewhere. Because those engagements—in Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and elsewhere—have no obvious connection with one another, politicians and the public usually discuss them as stand-alone cases. Each one seems an aberration from the "real" wars the military is set up to fight.
To the NGO world, these and other modern wars (like the ones in Africa) are not the exception but the new norm: brutal localized encounters that destroy the existing political order and create a need for long-term international supervision and support. Within the U.S. military almost no one welcomes this reality, but many recognize that peacekeeping, policing, and, yes, nation-building are now the expected military tasks. The military has gotten used to working alongside the NGOs—and the NGOs were ready with a checklist of things to worry about once the regime had fallen.
An even larger question about historical precedent began to surface. When Administration officials talked about models for what would happen in Iraq, they almost always referred to the lasting success in Japan and Germany—or else to countries of the former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. (A civilian adviser who went to Baghdad early in the occupation recalls looking at his fellow passengers on the military transport plane. The ones who weren't asleep or flipping through magazines were reading books about Japan or Germany, not about the Arab world. "That was not a good sign," he told me.) If one thought of Iraq as Poland, or as the former East Germany, or as the former Czechoslovakia, or as almost any part of the onetime Soviet empire in Eastern Europe other than Romania, one would naturally conclude that regime change in itself would set the country well along the path toward recovery. These countries were fine once their repressive leaders were removed; so might Iraq well be. And if the former Yugoslavia indicated darker possibilities, that could be explained as yet another failure of Clinton-era foreign policy.
Many NGO representatives assumed that postwar recovery would not be so automatic, and that they should begin working on preparations before the combat began. "At the beginning our main message was the need for access," I was told by Sandra Mitchell, the vice-president of the International Rescue Committee, who attended the USAID meetings. Because of U.S. sanctions against Iraq, it was illegal for American humanitarian organizations to operate there. (Journalists were about the only category of Americans who would not get in trouble with their own government by traveling to and spending money in Iraq.) "Our initial messages were like those in any potential crisis situation," Mitchell said, "but the reason we were so insistent in this case was the precarious situation that already existed in Iraq. The internal infrastructure was shot, and you couldn't easily swing in resources from neighboring countries, like in the Balkans." The NGOs therefore asked, as a first step, for a presidential directive exempting them from the sanctions. They were told to expect an answer to this request by December. That deadline passed with no ruling. By early last year the NGOs felt that it was too dangerous to go to Iraq, and the Administration feared that if they went they might be used as hostages. No directive was ever issued.
Through the fall and winter of 2002 the International Rescue Committee, Refugees International, InterAction, and other groups that met with USAID kept warning about one likely postwar problem that, as it turned out, Iraq avoided—a mass flow of refugees—and another that was exactly as bad as everyone warned: the lawlessness and looting of the "day after" in Baghdad. The Bush Administration would later point to the absence of refugees as a sign of the occupation's underreported success. This achievement was, indeed, due in part to a success: the speed and precision of the military campaign itself. But the absence of refugees was also a sign of a profound failure: the mistaken estimates of Iraq's WMD threat. All pre-war scenarios involving huge movements of refugees began with the assumption that Saddam Hussein would use chemical or biological weapons against U.S. troops or his own Kurdish or Shiite populations—and that either the fact or the fear of such assaults would force terrified Iraqis to evacuate.
The power vacuum that led to looting was disastrous. "The looting was not a surprise," Sandra Mitchell told me. "It should not have come as a surprise. Anyone who has witnessed the fall of a regime while another force is coming in on a temporary basis knows that looting is standard procedure. In Iraq there were very strong signals that this could be the period of greatest concern for humanitarian response." One lesson of postwar reconstruction through the 1990s was that even a short period of disorder could have long-lasting effects.
The meetings at USAID gave the veterans of international relief operations a way to register their concerns. The problem was that they heard so little back. "The people in front of us were very well-meaning," says Joel Charny, who represented Refugees International at the meetings. "And in fairness, they were on such a short leash. But the dialogue was one-way. We would tell them stuff, and they would nod and say, Everything's under control. To me it was like the old four-corners offense in basketball. They were there to just dribble out the clock but be able to say they'd consulted with us."
And again the question arose of whether what lay ahead in Iraq would be similar to the other "small wars" of the previous decade-plus or something new. If it was similar, the NGOs had their checklists ready. These included, significantly, the obligations placed on any "occupying power" by the Fourth Geneva Convention, which was signed in 1949 and is mainly a commonsense list of duties—from protecting hospitals to minimizing postwar reprisals—that a victorious army must carry out. "But we were corrected when we raised this point," Sandra Mitchell says. "The American troops would be 'liberators' rather than 'occupiers,' so the obligations did not apply. Our point was not to pass judgment on the military action but to describe the responsibilities."
In the same mid-October week that the Senate approved the war resolution, a team from the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College, in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, began a postwar-planning exercise. Even more explicitly than the NGOs, the Army team insisted that America's military past, reaching back to its conquest of the Philippines, in 1898, would be a useful guide to its future duties in Iraq. As a rule, professional soldiers spend more time thinking and talking about history than other people do; past battles are the only real evidence about doctrine and equipment. The institute—in essence, the War College's think tank—was charged with reviewing recent occupations to help the Army "best address the requirements that will necessarily follow operational victory in a war with Iraq," as the institute's director later said in a foreword to the team's report. "As the possibility of war with Iraq looms on the horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the challenges of occupying the country."
The study's principal authors were Conrad Crane, who graduated from West Point in the early 1970s and taught there as a history professor through the 1990s, and Andrew Terrill, an Army Reserve officer and a strategic-studies professor. With a team of other researchers, which included representatives from the Army and the joint staff as well as other government agencies and think tanks, they began high-speed work on a set of detailed recommendations about postwar priorities. The Army War College report was also connected to a pre-war struggle with yet another profound postwar consequence: the fight within the Pentagon, between the civilian leadership in OSD and the generals running the Army, over the size and composition of the force that would conquer Iraq.
Four Months Before the War: The Battle in the Pentagon
On November 5, 2002, the Republicans regained control of the Senate and increased their majority in the House in national midterm elections. On November 8 the UN Security Council voted 15-0 in favor of Resolution 1441, threatening Iraq with "serious consequences" if it could not prove that it had abandoned its weapons programs.
Just before 9/11 Donald Rumsfeld had been thought of as standing on a banana peel. The newspapers were full of leaked anonymous complaints from military officials who thought that his efforts to streamline and "transform" the Pentagon were unrealistic and damaging. But with his dramatic metamorphosis from embattled Secretary of Defense to triumphant Secretary of War, Rumsfeld's reputation outside the Administration and his influence within it rose. He was operating from a position of great power when, in November, he decided to "cut the TPFDD."
"Tipfid" is how people in the military pronounce the acronym for "time-phased force and deployment data," but what it really means to the armed forces, in particular the Army, is a way of doing business that is methodical, careful, and sure. The TPFDD for Iraq was an unbelievably complex master plan governing which forces would go where, when, and with what equipment, on which planes or ships, so that everything would be coordinated and ready at the time of attack. One reason it took the military six months to get set for each of its wars against Iraq, a comparatively pitiful foe, was the thoroughness of TPFDD planning. To its supporters, this approach is old-school in the best sense: if you fight, you really fight. To its detractors, this approach is simply old—ponderous, inefficient, and, although they don't dare call it cowardly, risk-averse at the least.
A streamlined approach had proved successful in Afghanistan, at least for a while, as a relatively small U.S. force left much of the ground fighting to the Northern Alliance. In the longer run the American strategy created complications for Afghanistan, because the victorious Northern Alliance leaders were newly legitimized as warlords. Donald Rumsfeld was one member of the Administration who seemed still to share the pre-9/11 suspicion about the risks of nation-building, and so didn't much care about the postwar consequences of a relatively small invasion force. (His deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, was more open to the challenge of rebuilding Iraq, but he would never undercut or disobey Rumsfeld.) In November, Rumsfeld began working through the TPFDD, with the goal of paring the force planned for Iraq to its leanest, lightest acceptable level.
The war games run by the Army and the Pentagon's joint staff had led to very high projected troop levels. The Army's recommendation was for an invasion force 400,000 strong, made up of as many Americans as necessary and as many allied troops as possible. "All the numbers we were coming up with were quite large," Thomas White, a retired general (and former Enron executive) who was the Secretary of the Army during the war, told me recently. But Rumsfeld's idea of the right force size was more like 75,000. The Army and the military's joint leadership moderated their requests in putting together the TPFDD, but Rumsfeld began challenging the force numbers in detail. When combat began, slightly more than 200,000 U.S. soldiers were massed around Iraq.
"In what I came to think of as Secretary Rumsfeld's style," an Army official who was involved in the process told me recently, "he didn't directly say no but asked a lot of hard questions about the plan and sent us away without approval. He would ask questions that delayed the activation of units, because he didn't think the planned flow was right. Our people came back with the understanding that their numbers were far too big and they should be thinking more along the lines of Afghanistan"—that is, plan for a light, mobile attack featuring Special Forces soldiers. Another participant described Rumsfeld as looking line by line at the deployments proposed in the TPFDD and saying, "Can't we do this with one company?" or "Shouldn't we get rid of this unit?" Making detailed, last-minute adjustments to the TPFDD was, in the Army's view, like pulling cogs at random out of a machine. According to an observer, "The generals would say, Sir, these changes will ripple back to every railhead and every company."
The longer-term problem involved what would happen after Baghdad fell, as it inevitably would. This was distinctly an Army rather than a general military concern. "Where's the Air Force now?" an Army officer asked rhetorically last fall. "They're back on their bases—and they're better off, since they don't need to patrol the 'no-fly' zones [in northern and southern Iraq, which U.S. warplanes had patrolled since the end of the Gulf War]. The Navy's gone, and most of the Marines have been pulled back. It's the Army holding the sack of "expletive deleted"." A related concern involved what a long-term commitment to Iraq would do to the Army's "ops tempo," or pace of operations—especially if Reserve and National Guard members, who had no expectations of long-term foreign service when they signed up, were posted in Iraq for months or even years.
The military's fundamental argument for building up what Rumsfeld considered a wastefully large force is that it would be even more useful after Baghdad fell than during actual combat. The first few days or weeks after the fighting, in this view, were crucial in setting long-term expectations. Civilians would see that they could expect a rapid return to order, and would behave accordingly—or they would see the opposite. This was the "shock and awe" that really mattered, in the Army's view: the ability to make clear who was in charge. "Insights from successful occupations suggest that it is best to go in real heavy and then draw down fast," Conrad Crane, of the Army War College, told me. That is, a larger force would be necessary during and immediately after the war, but might mean a much smaller occupation presence six months later.
"We're in Baghdad, the regime is toppled—what's next?" Thomas White told me, recounting discussions before the war. One of the strongest advocates of a larger force was General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff. White said, "Guys like Shinseki, who had been in Bosnia [where he supervised the NATO force], been in Kosovo, started running the numbers and said, 'Let's assume the world is linear.' For five million Bosnians we had two hundred thousand people to watch over them. Now we have twenty-five million Iraqis to worry about, spread out over a state the size of California. How many people is this going to take?" The heart of the Army's argument was that with too few soldiers, the United States would win the war only to be trapped in an untenable position during the occupation.
A note of personal rancor complicated these discussions, as it did many disagreements over postwar plans. In our interview Douglas Feith played this down—maintaining that press reports had exaggerated the degree of quarreling and division inside the Administration. These reports, he said, mainly reflected the experience of lower-level officials, who were embroiled in one specific policy area and "might find themselves pretty much always at odds with their counterparts from another agency." Higher up, where one might be "fighting with someone on one issue but allied with them on something else," relations were more collegial. Perhaps so. But there was no concealing the hostility within the Pentagon between most uniformed leaders, especially in the Army, and the civilians in OSD.
Donald Rumsfeld viewed Shinseki as a symbol of uncooperative, old-style thinking, and had in the past gone out of his way to humiliate him. In the spring of 2002, fourteen months before the scheduled end of Shinseki's term, Rumsfeld announced who his successor would be; such an announcement, which converts the incumbent into a lame duck, usually comes at the last minute. The action was one of several calculated insults.
From OSD's point of view, Shinseki and many of his colleagues were dragging their feet. From the Army's point of view, OSD was being reckless about the way it was committing troops and high-handed in disregarding the military's professional advice. One man who was then working in the Pentagon told me of walking down a hallway a few months before the war and seeing Army General John Abizaid standing outside a door. Abizaid, who after the war succeeded Tommy Franks as commander of the Central Command, or CENTCOM, was then the director of the Joint Staff—the highest uniformed position in the Pentagon apart from the Joint Chiefs. A planning meeting for Iraq operations was under way. OSD officials told him he could not take part.
The military-civilian difference finally turned on the question of which would be harder: winning the war or maintaining the peace. According to Thomas White and several others, OSD acted as if the war itself would pose the real challenge. As White put it, "The planning assumptions were that the people would realize they were liberated, they would be happy that we were there, so it would take a much smaller force to secure the peace than it did to win the war. The resistance would principally be the remnants of the Baath Party, but they would go away fairly rapidly. And, critically, if we didn't damage the infrastructure in our military operation, as we didn't, the restart of the country could be done fairly rapidly." The first assumption was clearly expressed by Cheney three days before the war began, in an exchange with Tim Russert on Meet the Press: RUSSERT: If your analysis is not correct, and we're not treated as liberators but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with significant American casualties?
CHENEY: Well, I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators ... The read we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but what they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that. Through the 1990s Marine General Anthony Zinni, who preceded Tommy Franks as CENTCOM commander, had done war-gaming for a possible invasion of Iraq. His exercises involved a much larger U.S. force than the one that actually attacked last year. "They were very proud that they didn't have the kind of numbers my plan had called for," Zinni told me, referring to Rumsfeld and Cheney. "The reason we had those two extra divisions was the security situation. Revenge killings, crime, chaos—this was all foreseeable."
Thomas White agrees. Because of reasoning like Cheney's, "we went in with the minimum force to accomplish the military objectives, which was a straightforward task, never really in question," he told me. "And then we immediately found ourselves shorthanded in the aftermath. We sat there and watched people dismantle and run off with the country, basically."
Three Months Before the War
In the beginning of December, Iraq submitted its 12,000-page declaration to the UN Security Council contending that it had no remaining WMD stores. Near the end of December, President Bush authorized the dispatch of more than 200,000 U.S. soldiers to the Persian Gulf.
There had still been few or no estimates of the war's cost from the Administration—only contentions that projections like Lawrence Lindsay's were too high. When pressed on this point, Administration officials repeatedly said that with so many uncertainties, they could not possibly estimate the cost. But early in December, just before Lindsay was forced out, The New York Review of Books published an article by William Nordhaus titled "Iraq: The Economic Consequences of War," which included carefully considered estimates. Nordhaus, an economist at Yale, had served on Jimmy Carter's Council of Economic Advisers; the article was excerpted from a much longer economic paper he had prepared. His range of estimates was enormous, depending on how long the war lasted and what its impact on the world economy proved to be. Nordhaus calculated that over the course of a decade the direct and indirect costs of the war to the United States could be as low as $121 billion or as high as $1.6 trillion. This was a more thoroughgoing approach than the congressional budget committees had taken, but it was similar in its overall outlook. Nordhaus told me recently that he thinks he should have increased all his estimates to account for the "opportunity costs" of stationing soldiers in Iraq—that is, if they are assigned to Iraq, they're not available for deployment somewhere else.
On the last day of December, Mitch Daniels, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, told The New York Times that the war might cost $50 billion to $60 billion. He had to backtrack immediately, his spokesman stressing that "it is impossible to know what any military campaign would ultimately cost." The spokesman explained Daniels's mistake by saying, "The only cost estimate we know of in this arena is the Persian Gulf War, and that was a sixty-billion-dollar event." Daniels would leave the Administration, of his own volition, five months later.
In the immediate run-up to the war the Administration still insisted that the costs were unforeseeable. "Fundamentally, we have no idea what is needed unless and until we get there on the ground," Paul Wolfowitz told the House Budget Committee on February 27, with combat less than three weeks away. "This delicate moment—when we are assembling a coalition, when we are mobilizing people inside Iraq and throughout the region to help us in the event of war, and when we are still trying, through the United Nations and by other means, to achieve a peaceful solution without war—is not a good time to publish highly suspect numerical estimates and have them drive our declaratory policy."
Wolfowitz's stonewalling that day was in keeping with the policy of all senior Administration officials. Until many months after combat had begun, they refused to hazard even the vaguest approximation of what financial costs it might involve. Shinseki, so often at odds with OSD, contemplated taking a different course. He was scheduled to testify, with Thomas White, before the Senate Appropriations Committee on March 19, which turned out to be the first day of actual combat. In a routine prep session before the hearing he asked his assistants what he should say about how much the operations in Iraq were going to cost. "Well, it's impossible to predict," a briefer began, reminding him of the official line.
Shinseki cut him off. "We don't know everything," he said, and then he went through a list of the many things the military already did know. "We know how many troops are there now, and the projected numbers. We know how much it costs to feed them every day. We know how much it cost to send the force there. We know what we have spent already to prepare the force and how much it would cost to bring them back. We have estimates of how much fuel and ammunition we would use per day of operations." In short, anyone who actually wanted to make an estimate had plenty of information on hand.
At this point Jerry Sinn, a three-star general in charge of the Army's budget, said that in fact he had worked up some numbers—and he named a figure, for the Army's likely costs, in the tens of billions of dollars. But when Senator Byron Dorgan, of North Dakota, asked Shinseki at hearings on March 19 how much the war just beginning would cost, Shinseki was loyally vague ("Any potential discussion about what an operation in Iraq or any follow-on probably is undefined at this point").
When Administration officials stopped being vague, they started being unrealistic. On March 27, eight days into combat, members of the House Appropriations Committee asked Paul Wolfowitz for a figure. He told them that whatever it was, Iraq's oil supplies would keep it low. "There's a lot of money to pay for this," he said. "It doesn't have to be U.S. taxpayer money. We are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon." On April 23 Andrew Natsios, of USAID, told an incredulous Ted Koppel, on Nightline, that the total cost to America of reconstructing Iraq would be $1.7 billion. Koppel shot back, "I mean, when you talk about one-point-seven, you're not
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/092606C.shtml
Commas for Profit
By Cindy Sheehan
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Tuesday 26 September 2006
Our "compassionate conservative" misleader was on CNN with Wolf Blitzer and he had the following to say about the heartache and pain that he has caused the world since his illegal and immoral occupation of Iraq began.
BLITZER: Let's move on and talk a little bit about Iraq. Because this is a huge, huge issue, as you know, for the American public: a lot of concern that perhaps they are on the verge of a civil war - if not already a civil war. We see these horrible bodies showing up, tortured, mutilation. The Shia and the Sunni, the Iranians apparently having a negative role. Of course, al Qaeda in Iraq is still operating.
BUSH: Yes, you see - you see it on TV, and that's the power of an enemy that is willing to kill innocent people. But there's also an unbelievable will and resiliency by the Iraqi people. Admittedly, it seems like a decade ago. I like to tell people when the final history is written on Iraq, it will look like just a comma because there is - my point is, there's a strong will for democracy.
That is 125 commas.
With 2701 of our children killed and over 20,000 injured, I would have to type 182 lines filled with commas. Then if we take in to account the low figure of 100,000 innocent Iraqis killed, I would need pages of commas.
Martin Luther King Jr. said: "Nothing is more dangerous than sincere ignorance and conscientious stupidity." I believe that anyone who still supports George and his war of terror on the world has to be going out of his way to ignore the facts, or is profiting some way from this occupation: politically or financially.
I want George and the conscientiously stupid people who avoid evidence like the plague to know that my son was not a comma. Casey was not a cardboard figure, or the one dimensional figure of his widely printed boot camp picture when his cheeks were still chubby from good and plentiful food.
Casey was three dimensional and had hopes and dreams. He wanted to finish college and teach elementary school. He wanted to marry and have babies. I wanted him to marry and have babies. I wanted to hold his children and spoil them and love them like a grandmother should.
Casey loved his brother Andy and his sisters Carly and Janey. He loved our dogs Buster and Chewy and our cats Emily and Molly. Casey watched professional "wrestling" on TV and called it: "male soap operas." He collected toys, and we have many boxes of unopened action figures and other collectibles in a storage now.
Casey breathed air, drank water, ate food and everything else that all other human beings do. Above all, he loved God and wanted to serve God his entire life as a Permanent Deacon in the Catholic Church. He also bled and died like a human when he was shot in the back of the head.
Conservatively, the "commas" that the Bush Regime has killed by their lies would fill many pages, but in reality, the once-breathing human beings are filling thousands upon thousands of graves and lying under tons of rubble.
I am sorry that the leader of our once great nation is so callous toward the people whose lives he has destroyed. Whether one agrees with President Chavez of Venezuela or not, it is inherently evident in our country and the world that we should agree with him when he says democracy is not imposed by "bombs and Marines." Democracy rises from the people. Great Britain did not go to war with our forebears to impose democracy, but to stop it.
Killing innocent people, torturing, draining our treasury, stealing elections, spying on American citizens without due process, leaving the people of the Gulf States hanging on their roofs for their dear lives, etc., do not bestow democracy, and the people harmed should not be reduced to punctuation marks.
My son and the others will not go down in history as "commas" but as more victims of the war machine and I hope as the last victims of wars for profit. How can George keep a straight face when he talks about the enemy being willing to "kill innocent people?" When has BushCo every shied away from murdering innocents?
George Bush* will be an asterisk in history.
*Impeached, removed from office, imprisoned for crimes against humanity.
The sooner the better.
Commas for Profit
By Cindy Sheehan
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Tuesday 26 September 2006
Our "compassionate conservative" misleader was on CNN with Wolf Blitzer and he had the following to say about the heartache and pain that he has caused the world since his illegal and immoral occupation of Iraq began.
BLITZER: Let's move on and talk a little bit about Iraq. Because this is a huge, huge issue, as you know, for the American public: a lot of concern that perhaps they are on the verge of a civil war - if not already a civil war. We see these horrible bodies showing up, tortured, mutilation. The Shia and the Sunni, the Iranians apparently having a negative role. Of course, al Qaeda in Iraq is still operating.
BUSH: Yes, you see - you see it on TV, and that's the power of an enemy that is willing to kill innocent people. But there's also an unbelievable will and resiliency by the Iraqi people. Admittedly, it seems like a decade ago. I like to tell people when the final history is written on Iraq, it will look like just a comma because there is - my point is, there's a strong will for democracy.
That is 125 commas.
With 2701 of our children killed and over 20,000 injured, I would have to type 182 lines filled with commas. Then if we take in to account the low figure of 100,000 innocent Iraqis killed, I would need pages of commas.
Martin Luther King Jr. said: "Nothing is more dangerous than sincere ignorance and conscientious stupidity." I believe that anyone who still supports George and his war of terror on the world has to be going out of his way to ignore the facts, or is profiting some way from this occupation: politically or financially.
I want George and the conscientiously stupid people who avoid evidence like the plague to know that my son was not a comma. Casey was not a cardboard figure, or the one dimensional figure of his widely printed boot camp picture when his cheeks were still chubby from good and plentiful food.
Casey was three dimensional and had hopes and dreams. He wanted to finish college and teach elementary school. He wanted to marry and have babies. I wanted him to marry and have babies. I wanted to hold his children and spoil them and love them like a grandmother should.
Casey loved his brother Andy and his sisters Carly and Janey. He loved our dogs Buster and Chewy and our cats Emily and Molly. Casey watched professional "wrestling" on TV and called it: "male soap operas." He collected toys, and we have many boxes of unopened action figures and other collectibles in a storage now.
Casey breathed air, drank water, ate food and everything else that all other human beings do. Above all, he loved God and wanted to serve God his entire life as a Permanent Deacon in the Catholic Church. He also bled and died like a human when he was shot in the back of the head.
Conservatively, the "commas" that the Bush Regime has killed by their lies would fill many pages, but in reality, the once-breathing human beings are filling thousands upon thousands of graves and lying under tons of rubble.
I am sorry that the leader of our once great nation is so callous toward the people whose lives he has destroyed. Whether one agrees with President Chavez of Venezuela or not, it is inherently evident in our country and the world that we should agree with him when he says democracy is not imposed by "bombs and Marines." Democracy rises from the people. Great Britain did not go to war with our forebears to impose democracy, but to stop it.
Killing innocent people, torturing, draining our treasury, stealing elections, spying on American citizens without due process, leaving the people of the Gulf States hanging on their roofs for their dear lives, etc., do not bestow democracy, and the people harmed should not be reduced to punctuation marks.
My son and the others will not go down in history as "commas" but as more victims of the war machine and I hope as the last victims of wars for profit. How can George keep a straight face when he talks about the enemy being willing to "kill innocent people?" When has BushCo every shied away from murdering innocents?
George Bush* will be an asterisk in history.
*Impeached, removed from office, imprisoned for crimes against humanity.
The sooner the better.
SECRECY NEWS
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2006, Issue No. 103
September 27, 2006
Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
Support Secrecy News:
http://www.fas.org/static/contrib_sec.jsp
** PRESIDENT BUSH SPEAKS OUT ON OPENNESS, CLASSIFICATION
** SELECTED CRS REPORTS
PRESIDENT BUSH SPEAKS OUT ON OPENNESS, CLASSIFICATION
"We believe that the more we inform our American citizens, the better
our government will be," President Bush said Tuesday.
The remark could be considered conventional wisdom. Yet it is
unexpected from this President since by most objective measures --
such as the record number of classification decisions, skyrocketing
expenditures on classification-related activities, and growing
security controls on unclassified documents -- public access to
government information has been markedly curtailed under the Bush
Administration.
Nevertheless, the President reiterated, "We believe that the more
transparency there is in the system, the better the system functions
on behalf of the American people."
It follows that the less transparent aspects of government, such as
the national security decision making process, function less well,
which is manifestly true.
The President spoke at a signing ceremony for the Federal Funding
Accountability and Transparency Act, which will establish a
searchable online database of federal grants and contracts.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/09/wh092606.html
A White House fact sheet presented an argument that the new law "Is
Part Of President Bush's Ongoing Commitment To Improve Transparency,
Accountability, And Management Across The Federal Government."
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/09/wh092606-fs.html
At another event on Tuesday, the President appeared to express doubt
that the national security classification system was working
properly.
Referring to press reports in the New York Times and elsewhere about
a classified National Intelligence Estimate on trends in terrorism,
portions of which were declassified Tuesday, President Bush
complained that "Somebody has taken it upon themselves to leak
classified information for political purposes."
In Washington, he said, "there's no such thing as classification
anymore, hardly."
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/09/wh092606.html
In reality, of course, classification has expanded in size and scope
to unprecedented levels in the Bush Administration.
So the President might have been making a deep point that the
efficacy of classification declines when its use increases sharply,
along the lines of Justice Potter Stewart's familiar dictum that
"when everything is classified, then nothing is classified." Or
maybe he just misspoke.
SELECTED CRS REPORTS
Some noteworthy new reports from the Congressional Research Service
that have not been made readily available to the public include the
following.
"Interrogation of Detainees: Overview of the McCain Amendment,"
updated September 25, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33655.pdf
"The War Crimes Act: Current Issues," September 25, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33662.pdf
"U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court," updated
August 29, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31495.pdf
"Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness," updated August 25, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32521.pdf
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email: saftergood@fas.org
voice: (202) 454-4691
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2006, Issue No. 103
September 27, 2006
Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
Support Secrecy News:
http://www.fas.org/static/contrib_sec.jsp
** PRESIDENT BUSH SPEAKS OUT ON OPENNESS, CLASSIFICATION
** SELECTED CRS REPORTS
PRESIDENT BUSH SPEAKS OUT ON OPENNESS, CLASSIFICATION
"We believe that the more we inform our American citizens, the better
our government will be," President Bush said Tuesday.
The remark could be considered conventional wisdom. Yet it is
unexpected from this President since by most objective measures --
such as the record number of classification decisions, skyrocketing
expenditures on classification-related activities, and growing
security controls on unclassified documents -- public access to
government information has been markedly curtailed under the Bush
Administration.
Nevertheless, the President reiterated, "We believe that the more
transparency there is in the system, the better the system functions
on behalf of the American people."
It follows that the less transparent aspects of government, such as
the national security decision making process, function less well,
which is manifestly true.
The President spoke at a signing ceremony for the Federal Funding
Accountability and Transparency Act, which will establish a
searchable online database of federal grants and contracts.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/09/wh092606.html
A White House fact sheet presented an argument that the new law "Is
Part Of President Bush's Ongoing Commitment To Improve Transparency,
Accountability, And Management Across The Federal Government."
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/09/wh092606-fs.html
At another event on Tuesday, the President appeared to express doubt
that the national security classification system was working
properly.
Referring to press reports in the New York Times and elsewhere about
a classified National Intelligence Estimate on trends in terrorism,
portions of which were declassified Tuesday, President Bush
complained that "Somebody has taken it upon themselves to leak
classified information for political purposes."
In Washington, he said, "there's no such thing as classification
anymore, hardly."
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/09/wh092606.html
In reality, of course, classification has expanded in size and scope
to unprecedented levels in the Bush Administration.
So the President might have been making a deep point that the
efficacy of classification declines when its use increases sharply,
along the lines of Justice Potter Stewart's familiar dictum that
"when everything is classified, then nothing is classified." Or
maybe he just misspoke.
SELECTED CRS REPORTS
Some noteworthy new reports from the Congressional Research Service
that have not been made readily available to the public include the
following.
"Interrogation of Detainees: Overview of the McCain Amendment,"
updated September 25, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33655.pdf
"The War Crimes Act: Current Issues," September 25, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33662.pdf
"U.S. Policy Regarding the International Criminal Court," updated
August 29, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31495.pdf
"Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness," updated August 25, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32521.pdf
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email: saftergood@fas.org
voice: (202) 454-4691
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/...articleID=11698
Military draft needed for war with Iran and Syria?
Steve Hammons
July 20, 2006
Will the U.S. soon need to activate Selective Service System plans for a military draft if open hostilities break out with Iran and Syria?
There are signs that for many possible reasons, there are people and groups in Washington and elsewhere who desire a wider war – war between the U.S. and Iran and Syria – World War III.
If they have their way, the necessity for a military draft would become a real possibility.
As has been widely reported, the U.S. Army, the Army Reserve and the National Guard have been stretched thin by the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
Over 2,600 of these men and women have been killed. Thousands more have been wounded so severely they are unable to return to duty. U.S. Marines have also been killed and severely injured.
Accounts of re-enlistment statistics seem to be mixed. Many troops are re-enlisting. At the same time, some experienced officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted troops are reportedly choosing to leave the Army, Army Reserve and National Guard.
Reports have also surfaced about Army troops and Marines experiencing significant post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological and emotional difficulties being sent back to Iraq for repeated tours of combat duty.
Although the Army recently met its periodic recruiting target, there is no question that many young men and women do not wish to join the Army at this time.
Part of the reason may be because of controversies about the reasons for the Iraq invasion and occupation, as well as the manner in which the occupation has been carried out and mistrust of some in Washington.
BROKEN U.S. ARMY AN OPPORTUNITY
Many current and former senior military officers have pointed out that the Army, both active duty and reserve components, as well as the National Guard are at risk of being “broken.”
As with many other aspects of recent developments such as the “intelligence failures” prior to the 9/11 attacks, the apparent tactical errors leading to the escape of Osama bin Laden from Tora Bora, the seemingly gross miscalculations during the occupation of Iraq, and other situations, some senior officers naturally view the “breaking” of the Army as another in an apparent long line of “mistakes.”
But, as with these other circumstances, one man’s mistake is another’s discreet plan. After all, what if the 9/11 attacks were not just an intelligence failure but part of a covert plan for a “New Pearl Harbor” that actually provided many benefits, in the eyes of some?
What if the turmoil in Iraq provides a perfect opportunity to justify U.S. forces remaining there for years, decades? After all, a fairly strong case has been made that the invasion of Iraq was linked to acquiring oil supplies, providing a base of operations for further military actions in the region and other reasons not openly stated.
What if the breaking of the Army, Army Reserve and National Guard in Iraq, and war with Iran and Syria provides the perfect opportunity to convince the public and Congress that the military draft is needed?
The breaking of the Army in Iraq and the vast increase in troops from a military draft also provide rich business opportunities for the makers of military equipment, supplies and services. Private defense contractors are finding the extended Iraq War operations very profitable. Imagine the profits from war with Iran and Syria and an expanded U.S. Army from a draft.
SELLING THE DRAFT
As with the Iraq War, dire circumstances would need to be present for the American people and Congress to stand for the re-activation of the military draft. Something like 9/11, like another severe terrorist attack, like war with Iran and Syria, like World War III.
After all, for Americans who believe in limited government that minimally interferes with citizens’ lives and liberty, the military draft is somewhat of a concern. It is a form of involuntary servitude.
The government comes to older teenagers and citizens in their early 20s, tells them and their parents that the government is taking them for a few years, and, by the way, they might end up dead or with horrible physical and/or psychological injuries.
Some have pointed out various positive aspects of a military draft versus an all-volunteer military. And some of these arguments seem valid. The draft would expose a wider range of young citizens to the military and this could have several kinds of benefits.
Military service can include many positive experiences: Fellowship, honor, respect, courage, new skills, teamwork, duty to country, learning about people from other backgrounds, sacrifice and many other very valuable aspects of military service are important. Many veterans can attest to this.
However, there is a dark side to military life. The killing and destroying. It can bring out the worst in people. It can be dehumanizing. It can lead to blind obedience to authority and the abuse of authority by those in power. It can be destructive in many ways.
And, sometimes it seems like those in Washington and the people and groups who have so enthusiastically pushed the Iraq War, and now expanded war, did not learn the former – only the latter.
Military draft needed for war with Iran and Syria?
Steve Hammons
July 20, 2006
Will the U.S. soon need to activate Selective Service System plans for a military draft if open hostilities break out with Iran and Syria?
There are signs that for many possible reasons, there are people and groups in Washington and elsewhere who desire a wider war – war between the U.S. and Iran and Syria – World War III.
If they have their way, the necessity for a military draft would become a real possibility.
As has been widely reported, the U.S. Army, the Army Reserve and the National Guard have been stretched thin by the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
Over 2,600 of these men and women have been killed. Thousands more have been wounded so severely they are unable to return to duty. U.S. Marines have also been killed and severely injured.
Accounts of re-enlistment statistics seem to be mixed. Many troops are re-enlisting. At the same time, some experienced officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and enlisted troops are reportedly choosing to leave the Army, Army Reserve and National Guard.
Reports have also surfaced about Army troops and Marines experiencing significant post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological and emotional difficulties being sent back to Iraq for repeated tours of combat duty.
Although the Army recently met its periodic recruiting target, there is no question that many young men and women do not wish to join the Army at this time.
Part of the reason may be because of controversies about the reasons for the Iraq invasion and occupation, as well as the manner in which the occupation has been carried out and mistrust of some in Washington.
BROKEN U.S. ARMY AN OPPORTUNITY
Many current and former senior military officers have pointed out that the Army, both active duty and reserve components, as well as the National Guard are at risk of being “broken.”
As with many other aspects of recent developments such as the “intelligence failures” prior to the 9/11 attacks, the apparent tactical errors leading to the escape of Osama bin Laden from Tora Bora, the seemingly gross miscalculations during the occupation of Iraq, and other situations, some senior officers naturally view the “breaking” of the Army as another in an apparent long line of “mistakes.”
But, as with these other circumstances, one man’s mistake is another’s discreet plan. After all, what if the 9/11 attacks were not just an intelligence failure but part of a covert plan for a “New Pearl Harbor” that actually provided many benefits, in the eyes of some?
What if the turmoil in Iraq provides a perfect opportunity to justify U.S. forces remaining there for years, decades? After all, a fairly strong case has been made that the invasion of Iraq was linked to acquiring oil supplies, providing a base of operations for further military actions in the region and other reasons not openly stated.
What if the breaking of the Army, Army Reserve and National Guard in Iraq, and war with Iran and Syria provides the perfect opportunity to convince the public and Congress that the military draft is needed?
The breaking of the Army in Iraq and the vast increase in troops from a military draft also provide rich business opportunities for the makers of military equipment, supplies and services. Private defense contractors are finding the extended Iraq War operations very profitable. Imagine the profits from war with Iran and Syria and an expanded U.S. Army from a draft.
SELLING THE DRAFT
As with the Iraq War, dire circumstances would need to be present for the American people and Congress to stand for the re-activation of the military draft. Something like 9/11, like another severe terrorist attack, like war with Iran and Syria, like World War III.
After all, for Americans who believe in limited government that minimally interferes with citizens’ lives and liberty, the military draft is somewhat of a concern. It is a form of involuntary servitude.
The government comes to older teenagers and citizens in their early 20s, tells them and their parents that the government is taking them for a few years, and, by the way, they might end up dead or with horrible physical and/or psychological injuries.
Some have pointed out various positive aspects of a military draft versus an all-volunteer military. And some of these arguments seem valid. The draft would expose a wider range of young citizens to the military and this could have several kinds of benefits.
Military service can include many positive experiences: Fellowship, honor, respect, courage, new skills, teamwork, duty to country, learning about people from other backgrounds, sacrifice and many other very valuable aspects of military service are important. Many veterans can attest to this.
However, there is a dark side to military life. The killing and destroying. It can bring out the worst in people. It can be dehumanizing. It can lead to blind obedience to authority and the abuse of authority by those in power. It can be destructive in many ways.
And, sometimes it seems like those in Washington and the people and groups who have so enthusiastically pushed the Iraq War, and now expanded war, did not learn the former – only the latter.
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Fight in Afghanistan 'toughest since Vietnam'
September 27, 2006 - 7:41PM
Australian commandoes battled hundreds of Taliban fighters and the nation's helicopters braved enemy fire to evacuate wounded coalition soldiers in the toughest fighting experienced by Australian troops since Vietnam.
The brave action of Australian troops during a 10-day action involving 500 coalition forces in a small Afghanistan valley was revealed by defence commanders for the first time today.
The offensive was launched by Australian helicopters which landed coalition forces directly on a compound in a bid to capture an enemy commander - resulting in a ferocious battle with hundreds of Taliban.
At one crucial point in the fighting, Australian helicopters braved a torrent of enemy fire to evacuate the wounded soldiers of other coalition partners.
Australian commandoes on the ground then joined the fighting with the 500-strong coalition force, fighting pitched battles with the enemy where they were forced to surround their vehicles which were being peppered by enemy fire.
Astonishingly, no Australians were killed.
Major General Mike Hindmarsh, the head of the Australian Defence Force Special Operations Command, has revealed details of the battle for the first time.
"Apart from a number of concussions from exploding RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) rounds and minor shrapnel injuries, there were no casualties," he said.
"The vehicles on the other hand were peppered with bullet and fragmentation holes."
The 200-member Australian special force task group - comprising members of the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) and Commando battalion - deployed to Afghanistan in August last year and is now on the way home.
General Hindmarsh today briefed reporters on task group activities - although he stressed much would have to remain secret because of the possibility Australian special forces might have to return.
He said the task group, based at Tarin Kowt in Oruzgan province in south-central Afghanistan, faced danger wherever they went and rarely a day went by where there was not some sort of contact with the enemy.
And he revealed that two SASR soldiers would be awarded the Medal for Gallantry for their role in an earlier battle in which their patrol fought off hundreds of enemy.
General Hindmarsh said Oruzgan was a sanctuary for adherents of Afghanistan's former Taliban regime and it was not surprising they reacted extremely aggressively to Australian troops in their backyard.
"It was akin to poking an ant bed with a stick."
General Hindmarsh said the enemy comprised a hard core of Taliban leadership and their supporters, local militants and criminal groups engaged in Afghanistan's prolific drug industry - so intertwined as to be virtually indistinguishable.
The recent operation in which the Australian task group fought aimed to clear the Chora Valley, 15km north of Tarin Kowt, of enemy forces and resulted in 10 days of fierce fighting.
It all started with an operation to capture an enemy commander at a compound in the Chora Valley.
General Hindmarsh said Australian CH-47 Chinook helicopters landed forces of a coalition partner directly onto the compound.
"Having managed to successfully conduct the search and clearance of the compound, the assault force then began receiving enemy fire from all directions, took casualties and they were under threat of being overwhelmed," he said.
"The commandoes located nearby in vehicles as the quick reaction force responded and fought their way to a blocking position to support the extraction of the support force, providing a corridor for them to exfiltrate safely through to the helicopter landing zone.
"When the assault force, by now carrying a number of dead and wounded finally reached the landing zone, Australian CH-47s landed in a maelstrom of enemy fire, picked them up and departed, leaving the commandoes to fight their way out on the ground.
"Very quickly they were engulfed in a series of ferocious running battles through a swarm of ACM (anti-coalition militia) who threatened to overwhelm them. At one stage they had to circle their vehicles and resist fierce close quarter attacks from all direction for up to an hour."
Defence head Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston said the brave deeds of the soldiers and their operations could be told now that the task group had left Afghanistan.
"I also have a great deal of empathy for the soldiers themselves who have been though an experience which in terms of prolonged battlefield stress and combat intensity, is unlike any encountered since Vietnam in the 1970s," he said.
"Their story is an inspirational tale of courage, resilience and exceptional skill involving a determined and dangerous adversary in an environment that is both harsh and unforgiving."
AAP
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright © 2006. The Sydney Morning Herald.
Fight in Afghanistan 'toughest since Vietnam'
September 27, 2006 - 7:41PM
Australian commandoes battled hundreds of Taliban fighters and the nation's helicopters braved enemy fire to evacuate wounded coalition soldiers in the toughest fighting experienced by Australian troops since Vietnam.
The brave action of Australian troops during a 10-day action involving 500 coalition forces in a small Afghanistan valley was revealed by defence commanders for the first time today.
The offensive was launched by Australian helicopters which landed coalition forces directly on a compound in a bid to capture an enemy commander - resulting in a ferocious battle with hundreds of Taliban.
At one crucial point in the fighting, Australian helicopters braved a torrent of enemy fire to evacuate the wounded soldiers of other coalition partners.
Australian commandoes on the ground then joined the fighting with the 500-strong coalition force, fighting pitched battles with the enemy where they were forced to surround their vehicles which were being peppered by enemy fire.
Astonishingly, no Australians were killed.
Major General Mike Hindmarsh, the head of the Australian Defence Force Special Operations Command, has revealed details of the battle for the first time.
"Apart from a number of concussions from exploding RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) rounds and minor shrapnel injuries, there were no casualties," he said.
"The vehicles on the other hand were peppered with bullet and fragmentation holes."
The 200-member Australian special force task group - comprising members of the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) and Commando battalion - deployed to Afghanistan in August last year and is now on the way home.
General Hindmarsh today briefed reporters on task group activities - although he stressed much would have to remain secret because of the possibility Australian special forces might have to return.
He said the task group, based at Tarin Kowt in Oruzgan province in south-central Afghanistan, faced danger wherever they went and rarely a day went by where there was not some sort of contact with the enemy.
And he revealed that two SASR soldiers would be awarded the Medal for Gallantry for their role in an earlier battle in which their patrol fought off hundreds of enemy.
General Hindmarsh said Oruzgan was a sanctuary for adherents of Afghanistan's former Taliban regime and it was not surprising they reacted extremely aggressively to Australian troops in their backyard.
"It was akin to poking an ant bed with a stick."
General Hindmarsh said the enemy comprised a hard core of Taliban leadership and their supporters, local militants and criminal groups engaged in Afghanistan's prolific drug industry - so intertwined as to be virtually indistinguishable.
The recent operation in which the Australian task group fought aimed to clear the Chora Valley, 15km north of Tarin Kowt, of enemy forces and resulted in 10 days of fierce fighting.
It all started with an operation to capture an enemy commander at a compound in the Chora Valley.
General Hindmarsh said Australian CH-47 Chinook helicopters landed forces of a coalition partner directly onto the compound.
"Having managed to successfully conduct the search and clearance of the compound, the assault force then began receiving enemy fire from all directions, took casualties and they were under threat of being overwhelmed," he said.
"The commandoes located nearby in vehicles as the quick reaction force responded and fought their way to a blocking position to support the extraction of the support force, providing a corridor for them to exfiltrate safely through to the helicopter landing zone.
"When the assault force, by now carrying a number of dead and wounded finally reached the landing zone, Australian CH-47s landed in a maelstrom of enemy fire, picked them up and departed, leaving the commandoes to fight their way out on the ground.
"Very quickly they were engulfed in a series of ferocious running battles through a swarm of ACM (anti-coalition militia) who threatened to overwhelm them. At one stage they had to circle their vehicles and resist fierce close quarter attacks from all direction for up to an hour."
Defence head Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston said the brave deeds of the soldiers and their operations could be told now that the task group had left Afghanistan.
"I also have a great deal of empathy for the soldiers themselves who have been though an experience which in terms of prolonged battlefield stress and combat intensity, is unlike any encountered since Vietnam in the 1970s," he said.
"Their story is an inspirational tale of courage, resilience and exceptional skill involving a determined and dangerous adversary in an environment that is both harsh and unforgiving."
AAP
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright © 2006. The Sydney Morning Herald.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20060927/pl_af...HE0BHNlYwN0bWE-
Wed Sep 27, 10:14 AM ET
US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said he was confident European and other countries would fill gaps in the requirements of the NATO-led force in Afghanistan.
Speaking at the end of a meeting of southeastern European defence ministers here, Rumsfeld said success in Afghanistan was "important to Europe, it's important to Asia, it's important to the 25-27 million people of that country".
"I have every confidence that NATO is fully committed in Afghanistan and that the requirements that the military commanders on the ground deem as appropriate and necessary will in fact be filled by the NATO nations and assisted by the European nations and other countries," he said on Wednesday.
Rumsfeld is headed next to Slovenia where NATO defence ministers are meeting to discuss, among other issues, the troop and equipment needs for the 20,000 strong NATO-led force in Afghanistan.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is on a twin-track mission to spread the influence of President Hamid Karzai's weak central government by providing security and fostering reconstruction.
At the end of July, the alliance embarked on a potentially perilous phase of this most ambitious of operations when it took command of international forces in the Taliban militia's southern heartland.
But the Taliban, ousted by the US-led military coalition in late 2001 for harbouring Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, has shown surprising resistance, backed by allies among drug runners and fighters loyal to local warlords.
More than 100 foreign soldiers have been killed in hostile action in Afghanistan this year, about half of them US troops, and few countries have offered reinforcements for operations in the south.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
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Wed Sep 27, 10:14 AM ET
US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said he was confident European and other countries would fill gaps in the requirements of the NATO-led force in Afghanistan.
Speaking at the end of a meeting of southeastern European defence ministers here, Rumsfeld said success in Afghanistan was "important to Europe, it's important to Asia, it's important to the 25-27 million people of that country".
"I have every confidence that NATO is fully committed in Afghanistan and that the requirements that the military commanders on the ground deem as appropriate and necessary will in fact be filled by the NATO nations and assisted by the European nations and other countries," he said on Wednesday.
Rumsfeld is headed next to Slovenia where NATO defence ministers are meeting to discuss, among other issues, the troop and equipment needs for the 20,000 strong NATO-led force in Afghanistan.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is on a twin-track mission to spread the influence of President Hamid Karzai's weak central government by providing security and fostering reconstruction.
At the end of July, the alliance embarked on a potentially perilous phase of this most ambitious of operations when it took command of international forces in the Taliban militia's southern heartland.
But the Taliban, ousted by the US-led military coalition in late 2001 for harbouring Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, has shown surprising resistance, backed by allies among drug runners and fighters loyal to local warlords.
More than 100 foreign soldiers have been killed in hostile action in Afghanistan this year, about half of them US troops, and few countries have offered reinforcements for operations in the south.
Copyright © 2006 Agence France Presse. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AFP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of Agence France Presse.
Copyright © 2006 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Questions or Comments
Privacy Policy -Terms of Service - Copyright/IP Policy - Ad Feedback
http://www.counterpunch.org/spinney09272006.html
Skullduggery in the Pentagon's Budget
Rumsfeld's AutoCarterization
By FRANKLIN C. SPINNEY
A recent report in "Aviation Week" (Sept 25, 2006) leads by saying,
"The U.S. Air Force is planning to reduce funding for pilot training and construction around the globe, although Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley says he hopes to keep procurement and research accounts intact as the Pentagon builds its Fiscal 2008 budget".
This is one of the recent spate of reports documenting shortfalls in the Department of Defense's $500+ billion budget. Predictably, the courtiers of Versailles on the Potomac are preparing for the silly season as they form their battle lines with Congress.
Assuming the Aviation Week report is correct (as it usually is on matters relating to future cash flows to the defense industry), Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley is either stupid or incredibly ignorant ... or, more likely, supremely cynical, because he is making exactly the same dysfunctional decision his predecessors made in the early to mid 1970s, which inevitably created the readiness horrors of the "hollow military" that hosed President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s.
Back to the Future.
The milcrats in the Pentagon are busily preparing to Carterize Bush and Rumsfeld by blaming them for the Pentagon's budgetary mess (partly justified of course). At the same time, Moseley's priorities show how they are moving resolutely to insure the current budget crunch worsens over time. This will set the stage for a crisis, the resolution of which, will require an increase in future budgets. In the simplest terms, they will do this by robbing the readiness accounts to protect the high cost cold-war turkeys in the modernization pipeline. The fact that the Pentagon's accounting system can not pass the simple annual audits required by law (Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 as amended) will make it easier to hide the details of the flim flam operation.
What is truly amazing is that this kind of budgetary skullduggery is happening once again:
(1) after so much documentation describing its disastrous effects to the soldiers and to the American taxpayer ... and
(2) that it is happening when much higher budgets funding are paying for much smaller military forces.
One thing is certain, however, Moseley's gambit illustrates the post-cold-war staying power of the Military--Industrial--Congressional Complex (MICC) in the hall of mirrors that is Versailles on the Potomac.
Carterization of an incumbent Administration is a recurring theme in the political-economy of Versailles. One could argue that Kennedy pioneered it when he accused Eisenhower underfunding defense and thereby permitting the emergence the (phoney) missile gap as well as the evisceration of our conventional forces. But the post-Vietnam era to the present is by far the easiest to document.
Many readers will recall the political furor over the emergence of the "hollow military" in the late 1970s. At that time I had just taken a job in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where my boss, Thomas Christie, hired me to figure out the underlying causes of the readiness problems that were creating a budgetary crisis in the Pentagon. With the help of others, including two especially talented patriots, Frank McDonald (of my office) and Charlie Murphy (who worked on Capital Hill for Congressman Jack Edwards R-Ala) we worked on this problem for three years and determined the fundamental cause of the problem was the self inflicted wound of robbing the readiness accounts to "modernize" with ever more expensive and complex weapons. This decision making bias toward overly complex, often unworkable technology resulted in a phenomenon that I called the "rising costs of low readiness." These costs included:
(1) constantly shrinking inventories of weapons and combat units over the long term, despite policies which said we were trying to increase force size,
(2) aging inventories of increasingly complex and unreliable weapons despite budget priorities that emphasized modernization, and
(3) continuing pressures to reduce readiness accounts (training and purchases of spare parts and ammunition, etc), despite policies that said readiness was our top priority, in order to free up money to pay for the higher cost weapons that were creating the first two problems.
As we learned later, all this was lubricated by a corrupt accounting/information system that made understanding the pattern of decision making almost impossible. The self-inflicted nature of the causes and evolution of these decision making pathologies were first described in my report Defense Facts of Life, a secret report written in the late 1970s, which was declassified by the Pentagon and released to the public in 1980 after Senator Sam Nunn, the former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, made an issue of it at Casper Weinberger's confirmation hearing to be Ronald Reagan's Secretary of Defense. It was eventually published together with its follow-on report, The Plans Reality Mismatch, by Westview Press in 1986. Both reports were subjects of many congressional hearings. The Pentagon never rebutted either report in a formal written rebuttal.
Milcrats in today's Pentagon, like General Moseley, can not claim ignorance because, as junior officers they did not have access to this information. The Pentagon's leadership was warned repeatedly over the next two decades about the problem of uncontrolled cost growth creating a programmatic meltdown: Now the chickens are coming home to roost again. What we are seeing today is the rising cost of low readiness writ large, even worse than I predicted repeatedly in a host of reports and op-eds throughout the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the Defense Budget Time Bomb and my last testimony to Congress in 2002. Most of these writings are still readily available to anyone who wants to read to them at the Defense and the National Interest website. Finally, these decison-making pathologies were widely covered by the press over the years, including being the subject of a Time cover story (Mar 7, 1983) and an hour long special edition of Bill Moyers Now (August 2003, which won an Emmy for being the best news magazine TV show in 2003).
Some apologists for the collective behavior of Versailles on the Potomac might be tempted to argue that the current meltdown of the Pentagon's budget is the inevitable consequence of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This would be tantamount to calling the President a liar. Mr. Bush has been paying for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with supplemental budget appropriations (money added to the core Pentagon budget each year). He has said repeatedly that he will give the military whatever it needs to accomplish its mission. Therefore, milcrats like Moseley in the Pentagon can not say now that these wars are the primary cause of the current budget crunch, unless they are willing to say they went along with a Bush strategy to deliberately underfund the supplemental budgets paying for the war. This is especially true in the case of the Air Force, which always goes to war in relative comfort when compared to the Army and Marines.
Moreover, when considering the nature of the current meltdown, one must also remember the scale of the Pentagon's operations is tiny when compared to earlier wars, like Vietnam or Korea. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, taken together, are very small operations in terms of numbers troops and equipment deployed and activity tempos. A comparison with Vietnam is very telling: if one removes the effects of inflation, the current Defense budget level exceeds that of Vietnam at its peak in 1969, when we had 550,000 troops deployed in the combat theater. And remember, the United States was also engaged in a Cold War, which included preparations for a major conventional war against the Warsaw Pact in Western Europe, as well as all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Those preparations required about a million additional troops forward deployed in West Europe and non-Vietnam East Asia, several million in the states to provide the supporting training and rotation base, and tens of thousands of nuclear warheads in a high-cost hair-trigger alert status, and a very large navy to combat the Soviet Navy while protecting our long sea-based lines of communication. Nothing today compares with that effort. Today, the US is spending more money on defense, yet milcrats like Moseley tell us they must rob the readiness accounts of a much smaller force in time of war to preserve a high-cost modernization program which is a legacy of the last war. Moreover, these decisions to rob the readiness accounts are occurring at a time when some soldiers and Marines are on their third or fourth tours in Iraq/Afghanistan (which was almost unheard of in Vietnam) and the Pentagon is mobilizing reserves, extending combat rotations, and issuing stop loss orders to prevent soldiers from punching out of the not-so-all-volunteer military.
Nor can Mr. Rumsfeld claim to be surprised by the current budget meltdown. He is ... or should be ... the best prepared SecDef in history to deal with the Pentagon's shenanigans. This is, after all, the second time he held the job. Moreover, he was present at the creation of the original "hollow military," so to speak. The Nixon and Ford Administrations, of which he was a member, made most of the programmatic decisions that planted the seed money for the R&D and procurement programs that led to the inevitable emergence of the cost growth which caused the military to rob the readiness accounts to fund the modernization budgets in the mid to late 1970s. In DoD parlance, Rumsfeld et al presided over a deliberate "front loading" and "political engineering" of the future budgets which created the meltdown Jimmy Carter inherited. (see <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/def_power_games_98.htm>Defense Power Games for an explanation of how front loading and political engineering work to paralyze the decision making process, using a case study of the Reagan spend up). In short, the "hollow military" of the late 1970s was the result of self-inflicted wounds made earlier when Rummy was in power. Then, Ronald Reagon and the Republican right wingers used the "hollow military" (with help of politically motivated leakers from the Pentagon) to Carterize Carter in 1980 and set the stage for another round of the Defense Power Games, albeit at even higher budgets.
Still think it is old news? Why don't we fast forward to George the First in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
When the end of the Cold War forced George the First to reduce the projections of future defense budgets, the Pentagon responded by front loading and politically engineering a new generation of high cost cold-war inspired programs (e.g., the F-22, the F-18E/F, a new missile destroyer, a new attack submarine, etc.) into the current budget while reducing it (via force and readiness reductions). Bill Clinton happily continued and accelerated this process under the guidance of his democratic secretaries of defense, Les Aspin and William Perry. And in so doing, George the First and Bill Clinton let the Pentagon create a future budgetary crisis ( the creation of these problems is described in my 1997 report on What Went Wrong With the Quadrennial Defense Review). Naturally,the problems they created leaked to the press during the build up to the 2000 election. This set up Gore -- who, it must be said, was a most willing victim -- for a Carterization by George the Second. What makes this operation particularly interesting is that Rumsfeld was again present at the creation, as part of the team that Carterized Gore.
So, one thing should now be clear: Rummy ought to know about Carterizing his opponents. But once again we see is the familiar spate of leaks about budget shortfalls and and smell the stench of a looming crisis. But this time it is occurring on Rummy's watch. In other words, it is beginning to look like Rummy has Carterized both himself as well as his boss, the hapless George the Second. This is something new and old at the same time. One this is clear, however, the Pentagon needs a new term of art to explain what is happening. I submit that "Autocarterization" fits the ticket as a prescription for this new variant of the old inwardly focused process which creates the crises to fuel the political lust for ever increasing defense budgets.
Now some of Alex Cockburn's critics will think that Autocarterization is a conspiracy being run by Rumsfeld, an evil genius, but these readers might want to consider the fact that the man is simply an incompetent tool of the Military--Industrial--Congressional Complex or MICC. His "Autocarterization" may simply be reflection of his own arrogance and ignorance catching up with him at last. What we are seeing is not really a new phenomenon -- it is the conditioned behavior of a living social system that has evolved methods of survival by a process of trial and error over time. In any case, the Pentagon's milcrats, like General Moseley, are primed to to take advantage of it automatically. With the cooperation of triangulating democratic apparachiks, who will throw money at the Pentagon to prove they are not do not "weak" on defense, the courtiers of Versailles will duck the blame again for their self inflicted wounds as they ratchet up the power games to set the stage for yet another round of increases in the volume of the dollar flow out the defense money spigot. Of course their front loading and political engineering operations will make future problems worse; of course the soldiers at the pointy end of the spear and taxpayer will get hosed again, but one must remember that these games serve a larger purpose, for they are necessary insure the survival and growth of the Military--Industrial--Congressional Complex over the long term. Or as one officer once told me: "Welcome to the Pentagon's Gelateria, where we never run out of self-licking ice cream cones."
The seamlessness of this well-structured way of life is not only a good for the courtiers in Versailles on the Potomac, the contractors, the supporting cast of thinktank "intellectuals," and an enervated mainstream media which recycles old news as new news, its orderliness will keep Alex Cockburn's anti-conspiracy crusade in business for years.
Franklin C. Spinney is a former Pentagon analyst and whistleblower. His writing on defense issues can be found on the invaluable Defense in the National Interest website.
Skullduggery in the Pentagon's Budget
Rumsfeld's AutoCarterization
By FRANKLIN C. SPINNEY
A recent report in "Aviation Week" (Sept 25, 2006) leads by saying,
"The U.S. Air Force is planning to reduce funding for pilot training and construction around the globe, although Chief of Staff Gen. T. Michael Moseley says he hopes to keep procurement and research accounts intact as the Pentagon builds its Fiscal 2008 budget".
This is one of the recent spate of reports documenting shortfalls in the Department of Defense's $500+ billion budget. Predictably, the courtiers of Versailles on the Potomac are preparing for the silly season as they form their battle lines with Congress.
Assuming the Aviation Week report is correct (as it usually is on matters relating to future cash flows to the defense industry), Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Moseley is either stupid or incredibly ignorant ... or, more likely, supremely cynical, because he is making exactly the same dysfunctional decision his predecessors made in the early to mid 1970s, which inevitably created the readiness horrors of the "hollow military" that hosed President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s.
Back to the Future.
The milcrats in the Pentagon are busily preparing to Carterize Bush and Rumsfeld by blaming them for the Pentagon's budgetary mess (partly justified of course). At the same time, Moseley's priorities show how they are moving resolutely to insure the current budget crunch worsens over time. This will set the stage for a crisis, the resolution of which, will require an increase in future budgets. In the simplest terms, they will do this by robbing the readiness accounts to protect the high cost cold-war turkeys in the modernization pipeline. The fact that the Pentagon's accounting system can not pass the simple annual audits required by law (Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 as amended) will make it easier to hide the details of the flim flam operation.
What is truly amazing is that this kind of budgetary skullduggery is happening once again:
(1) after so much documentation describing its disastrous effects to the soldiers and to the American taxpayer ... and
(2) that it is happening when much higher budgets funding are paying for much smaller military forces.
One thing is certain, however, Moseley's gambit illustrates the post-cold-war staying power of the Military--Industrial--Congressional Complex (MICC) in the hall of mirrors that is Versailles on the Potomac.
Carterization of an incumbent Administration is a recurring theme in the political-economy of Versailles. One could argue that Kennedy pioneered it when he accused Eisenhower underfunding defense and thereby permitting the emergence the (phoney) missile gap as well as the evisceration of our conventional forces. But the post-Vietnam era to the present is by far the easiest to document.
Many readers will recall the political furor over the emergence of the "hollow military" in the late 1970s. At that time I had just taken a job in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where my boss, Thomas Christie, hired me to figure out the underlying causes of the readiness problems that were creating a budgetary crisis in the Pentagon. With the help of others, including two especially talented patriots, Frank McDonald (of my office) and Charlie Murphy (who worked on Capital Hill for Congressman Jack Edwards R-Ala) we worked on this problem for three years and determined the fundamental cause of the problem was the self inflicted wound of robbing the readiness accounts to "modernize" with ever more expensive and complex weapons. This decision making bias toward overly complex, often unworkable technology resulted in a phenomenon that I called the "rising costs of low readiness." These costs included:
(1) constantly shrinking inventories of weapons and combat units over the long term, despite policies which said we were trying to increase force size,
(2) aging inventories of increasingly complex and unreliable weapons despite budget priorities that emphasized modernization, and
(3) continuing pressures to reduce readiness accounts (training and purchases of spare parts and ammunition, etc), despite policies that said readiness was our top priority, in order to free up money to pay for the higher cost weapons that were creating the first two problems.
As we learned later, all this was lubricated by a corrupt accounting/information system that made understanding the pattern of decision making almost impossible. The self-inflicted nature of the causes and evolution of these decision making pathologies were first described in my report Defense Facts of Life, a secret report written in the late 1970s, which was declassified by the Pentagon and released to the public in 1980 after Senator Sam Nunn, the former Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, made an issue of it at Casper Weinberger's confirmation hearing to be Ronald Reagan's Secretary of Defense. It was eventually published together with its follow-on report, The Plans Reality Mismatch, by Westview Press in 1986. Both reports were subjects of many congressional hearings. The Pentagon never rebutted either report in a formal written rebuttal.
Milcrats in today's Pentagon, like General Moseley, can not claim ignorance because, as junior officers they did not have access to this information. The Pentagon's leadership was warned repeatedly over the next two decades about the problem of uncontrolled cost growth creating a programmatic meltdown: Now the chickens are coming home to roost again. What we are seeing today is the rising cost of low readiness writ large, even worse than I predicted repeatedly in a host of reports and op-eds throughout the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the Defense Budget Time Bomb and my last testimony to Congress in 2002. Most of these writings are still readily available to anyone who wants to read to them at the Defense and the National Interest website. Finally, these decison-making pathologies were widely covered by the press over the years, including being the subject of a Time cover story (Mar 7, 1983) and an hour long special edition of Bill Moyers Now (August 2003, which won an Emmy for being the best news magazine TV show in 2003).
Some apologists for the collective behavior of Versailles on the Potomac might be tempted to argue that the current meltdown of the Pentagon's budget is the inevitable consequence of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This would be tantamount to calling the President a liar. Mr. Bush has been paying for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with supplemental budget appropriations (money added to the core Pentagon budget each year). He has said repeatedly that he will give the military whatever it needs to accomplish its mission. Therefore, milcrats like Moseley in the Pentagon can not say now that these wars are the primary cause of the current budget crunch, unless they are willing to say they went along with a Bush strategy to deliberately underfund the supplemental budgets paying for the war. This is especially true in the case of the Air Force, which always goes to war in relative comfort when compared to the Army and Marines.
Moreover, when considering the nature of the current meltdown, one must also remember the scale of the Pentagon's operations is tiny when compared to earlier wars, like Vietnam or Korea. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, taken together, are very small operations in terms of numbers troops and equipment deployed and activity tempos. A comparison with Vietnam is very telling: if one removes the effects of inflation, the current Defense budget level exceeds that of Vietnam at its peak in 1969, when we had 550,000 troops deployed in the combat theater. And remember, the United States was also engaged in a Cold War, which included preparations for a major conventional war against the Warsaw Pact in Western Europe, as well as all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Those preparations required about a million additional troops forward deployed in West Europe and non-Vietnam East Asia, several million in the states to provide the supporting training and rotation base, and tens of thousands of nuclear warheads in a high-cost hair-trigger alert status, and a very large navy to combat the Soviet Navy while protecting our long sea-based lines of communication. Nothing today compares with that effort. Today, the US is spending more money on defense, yet milcrats like Moseley tell us they must rob the readiness accounts of a much smaller force in time of war to preserve a high-cost modernization program which is a legacy of the last war. Moreover, these decisions to rob the readiness accounts are occurring at a time when some soldiers and Marines are on their third or fourth tours in Iraq/Afghanistan (which was almost unheard of in Vietnam) and the Pentagon is mobilizing reserves, extending combat rotations, and issuing stop loss orders to prevent soldiers from punching out of the not-so-all-volunteer military.
Nor can Mr. Rumsfeld claim to be surprised by the current budget meltdown. He is ... or should be ... the best prepared SecDef in history to deal with the Pentagon's shenanigans. This is, after all, the second time he held the job. Moreover, he was present at the creation of the original "hollow military," so to speak. The Nixon and Ford Administrations, of which he was a member, made most of the programmatic decisions that planted the seed money for the R&D and procurement programs that led to the inevitable emergence of the cost growth which caused the military to rob the readiness accounts to fund the modernization budgets in the mid to late 1970s. In DoD parlance, Rumsfeld et al presided over a deliberate "front loading" and "political engineering" of the future budgets which created the meltdown Jimmy Carter inherited. (see <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/def_power_games_98.htm>Defense Power Games for an explanation of how front loading and political engineering work to paralyze the decision making process, using a case study of the Reagan spend up). In short, the "hollow military" of the late 1970s was the result of self-inflicted wounds made earlier when Rummy was in power. Then, Ronald Reagon and the Republican right wingers used the "hollow military" (with help of politically motivated leakers from the Pentagon) to Carterize Carter in 1980 and set the stage for another round of the Defense Power Games, albeit at even higher budgets.
Still think it is old news? Why don't we fast forward to George the First in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
When the end of the Cold War forced George the First to reduce the projections of future defense budgets, the Pentagon responded by front loading and politically engineering a new generation of high cost cold-war inspired programs (e.g., the F-22, the F-18E/F, a new missile destroyer, a new attack submarine, etc.) into the current budget while reducing it (via force and readiness reductions). Bill Clinton happily continued and accelerated this process under the guidance of his democratic secretaries of defense, Les Aspin and William Perry. And in so doing, George the First and Bill Clinton let the Pentagon create a future budgetary crisis ( the creation of these problems is described in my 1997 report on What Went Wrong With the Quadrennial Defense Review). Naturally,the problems they created leaked to the press during the build up to the 2000 election. This set up Gore -- who, it must be said, was a most willing victim -- for a Carterization by George the Second. What makes this operation particularly interesting is that Rumsfeld was again present at the creation, as part of the team that Carterized Gore.
So, one thing should now be clear: Rummy ought to know about Carterizing his opponents. But once again we see is the familiar spate of leaks about budget shortfalls and and smell the stench of a looming crisis. But this time it is occurring on Rummy's watch. In other words, it is beginning to look like Rummy has Carterized both himself as well as his boss, the hapless George the Second. This is something new and old at the same time. One this is clear, however, the Pentagon needs a new term of art to explain what is happening. I submit that "Autocarterization" fits the ticket as a prescription for this new variant of the old inwardly focused process which creates the crises to fuel the political lust for ever increasing defense budgets.
Now some of Alex Cockburn's critics will think that Autocarterization is a conspiracy being run by Rumsfeld, an evil genius, but these readers might want to consider the fact that the man is simply an incompetent tool of the Military--Industrial--Congressional Complex or MICC. His "Autocarterization" may simply be reflection of his own arrogance and ignorance catching up with him at last. What we are seeing is not really a new phenomenon -- it is the conditioned behavior of a living social system that has evolved methods of survival by a process of trial and error over time. In any case, the Pentagon's milcrats, like General Moseley, are primed to to take advantage of it automatically. With the cooperation of triangulating democratic apparachiks, who will throw money at the Pentagon to prove they are not do not "weak" on defense, the courtiers of Versailles will duck the blame again for their self inflicted wounds as they ratchet up the power games to set the stage for yet another round of increases in the volume of the dollar flow out the defense money spigot. Of course their front loading and political engineering operations will make future problems worse; of course the soldiers at the pointy end of the spear and taxpayer will get hosed again, but one must remember that these games serve a larger purpose, for they are necessary insure the survival and growth of the Military--Industrial--Congressional Complex over the long term. Or as one officer once told me: "Welcome to the Pentagon's Gelateria, where we never run out of self-licking ice cream cones."
The seamlessness of this well-structured way of life is not only a good for the courtiers in Versailles on the Potomac, the contractors, the supporting cast of thinktank "intellectuals," and an enervated mainstream media which recycles old news as new news, its orderliness will keep Alex Cockburn's anti-conspiracy crusade in business for years.
Franklin C. Spinney is a former Pentagon analyst and whistleblower. His writing on defense issues can be found on the invaluable Defense in the National Interest website.
Andrew Bacevich : Chickens are home to roost in Iraq:
The Bush administration is running out of troops, money and ideas
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article15134.htm
The Bush administration is running out of troops, money and ideas
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article15134.htm
http://www.commondreams.org/news2006/0926-13.htm
SEPTEMBER 26, 2006
3:04 PM
CONTACT: Friends Committee on National Legislation
202-547-6000
Congress Bans Funding for Permanent U.S. Military Bases in Iraq
WASHINGTON - September 26 - The U.S. Congress this week finalized legislation that bars funding to construct permanent military bases in Iraq, and states definitively that it is the policy of the United States government not to exercise control over Iraq’s petroleum resources.
“The perception that the U.S. military plans to stay in Iraq indefinitely has fueled the insurgency and undermined the stability of the Iraqi government,” said Ruth Flower, legislative director for the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL). “This legislation is an important first step in changing the failed U.S. policy in Iraq.”
The 63-year-old Quaker lobby, FCNL, has been working with members of Congress on this policy since January 2005. Reps. Barbara Lee (CA) and Tom Allen (ME) advanced stand-alone bills to bar permanent bases in 2005, and in 2006 the House and the Senate approved similar amendments banning permanent bases as part of an emergency supplemental spending bill and then as part of the military authorization legislation. In both cases, the administration persuaded leaders in the House and Senate to strip out the “no permanent bases” language during conference committee negotiations.
But when similar language was attached to the FY07 military appropriations bill (H.R. 5631) by Rep. John Murtha (PA) in the House and Sen. Joe Biden (DE) in the Senate, negotiators from the House and Senate held firm. The final conference report on the military appropriations bill released September 25 prohibits the Pentagon from spending money to establish military installations or bases in Iraq. The House and Senate are expected to vote on the final version of this legislation later this week.
While we at FCNL believe this declaration of policy is an important step toward changing U.S. policy in Iraq, we are concerned that the military appropriations bill also includes an additional $70 billion in funding for the failed wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
“The U.S. government’s own National Intelligence Estimate confirms what we have been hearing from people in Iraq for more than a year – that the U.S. presence in Iraq has fueled the development of a new generation of violent radical groups and has made the overall problem of terrorism worse,” said Flower. War is not the answer.
SEPTEMBER 26, 2006
3:04 PM
CONTACT: Friends Committee on National Legislation
202-547-6000
Congress Bans Funding for Permanent U.S. Military Bases in Iraq
WASHINGTON - September 26 - The U.S. Congress this week finalized legislation that bars funding to construct permanent military bases in Iraq, and states definitively that it is the policy of the United States government not to exercise control over Iraq’s petroleum resources.
“The perception that the U.S. military plans to stay in Iraq indefinitely has fueled the insurgency and undermined the stability of the Iraqi government,” said Ruth Flower, legislative director for the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL). “This legislation is an important first step in changing the failed U.S. policy in Iraq.”
The 63-year-old Quaker lobby, FCNL, has been working with members of Congress on this policy since January 2005. Reps. Barbara Lee (CA) and Tom Allen (ME) advanced stand-alone bills to bar permanent bases in 2005, and in 2006 the House and the Senate approved similar amendments banning permanent bases as part of an emergency supplemental spending bill and then as part of the military authorization legislation. In both cases, the administration persuaded leaders in the House and Senate to strip out the “no permanent bases” language during conference committee negotiations.
But when similar language was attached to the FY07 military appropriations bill (H.R. 5631) by Rep. John Murtha (PA) in the House and Sen. Joe Biden (DE) in the Senate, negotiators from the House and Senate held firm. The final conference report on the military appropriations bill released September 25 prohibits the Pentagon from spending money to establish military installations or bases in Iraq. The House and Senate are expected to vote on the final version of this legislation later this week.
While we at FCNL believe this declaration of policy is an important step toward changing U.S. policy in Iraq, we are concerned that the military appropriations bill also includes an additional $70 billion in funding for the failed wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
“The U.S. government’s own National Intelligence Estimate confirms what we have been hearing from people in Iraq for more than a year – that the U.S. presence in Iraq has fueled the development of a new generation of violent radical groups and has made the overall problem of terrorism worse,” said Flower. War is not the answer.
Heralded Iraq Police Academy a 'Disaster'
By Amit R. Paley
BAGHDAD, Sept. 27 -- A $75 million project to build the largest police academy in Iraq has been so grossly mismanaged that the campus now poses health risks to recruits and might need to be partially demolished, U.S. investigators have found.
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
By Amit R. Paley
BAGHDAD, Sept. 27 -- A $75 million project to build the largest police academy in Iraq has been so grossly mismanaged that the campus now poses health risks to recruits and might need to be partially demolished, U.S. investigators have found.
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
American Commanders Question Political Will Of Iraqi Prime Minister
By Sudarsan Raghavan
BAGHDAD, Sept. 27 -- Senior U.S. military commanders are questioning whether Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has the political will to weed out official corruption and tackle the brutal militias that are threatening to plunge Iraq into civil war.
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
By Sudarsan Raghavan
BAGHDAD, Sept. 27 -- Senior U.S. military commanders are questioning whether Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has the political will to weed out official corruption and tackle the brutal militias that are threatening to plunge Iraq into civil war.
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
U.S. to Gauge Iraqi Support for Operations
By Walter Pincus
As violence continues in Iraq, the military is looking for ways to achieve stability through opinion polls and public relations.
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
By Walter Pincus
As violence continues in Iraq, the military is looking for ways to achieve stability through opinion polls and public relations.
To view the entire article, go to http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...er=emailarticle
http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=9762
September 28, 2006
Poll Shows Iraqis Weary of Violence, US Presence
by Jim Lobe
Iraqis – especially the majority Shi'ites – are increasingly angry and frustrated about their situation and impatient for U.S. troops to leave, but most do not believe their country will fall apart, according to a major new poll [.pdf] released here Wednesday by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA).
Seventy-one percent of the 1,150 randomly selected respondents interviewed for the survey in early September said they wanted all U.S. and coalition forces to leave Iraq within the next year, with more than half of them calling for the withdrawal to be completed within six months.
Moreover, nearly four in five respondents said they believed that the U.S. military in Iraq is "provoking more conflict than it is preventing," while nearly 61 percent said they approved of attacks on U.S.-led forces, an increase of 14 percent compared to the last PIPA survey of Iraqi public opinion eight months ago.
Among the three main communal groups – Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds – the biggest jump in negative opinion toward U.S. forces came from the Shi'ites, who comprise roughly 60 percent of the Iraq's population.
Nearly two of every three Shi'ites said they approved of attacks on U.S.-led forces, compared to 41 percent last January, just after a coalition of Shi'ite parties swept to victory in parliamentary elections. At that time, only 22 percent of Shia respondents favored a U.S. withdrawal within six months. The percentage has now risen to 36 percent, according to the PIPA poll.
The new survey, which to some extent mirrors the reported findings of a State Department-commissioned poll leaked to the Washington Post Wednesday, comes amid intensifying debate between most Democrats who favor setting a timeline for withdrawing forces and President George W. Bush and Republican loyalists who say that such a strategy would invite disaster.
That debate has been fueled in recent days by the disclosure of a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) – the consensus position of Washington's 16 national intelligence agencies. Among other conclusions, it found that the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq have become a "cause celebre" for jihadists worldwide and fueled the growth and spread of terrorism and Islamic radicalism.
The administration, which was forced to declassify parts of the NIE under pressure from Democrats Tuesday, has also acknowledged that another NIE on Iraq – a draft version of which was described as "grim" by one source – is under preparation.
But the White House said it is not scheduled for completion until January, a timetable that has provoked protests from Democrats who believe that its conclusions are almost certain to stoke public anger here with the Iraq war and, if released before the elections, help them win control of at least one house of Congress.
The State Department poll, which was conducted from late June to early July, reportedly found that majorities of respondents in all regions of Iraq, except Kurdistan, said that the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces would "make them feel safer and decrease violence" and that nearly two out of three respondents favored an immediate departure.
The 71 percent majority who told PIPA they want a withdrawal within one year underlined a "growing sense of urgency" on the part of Iraqis, according to PIPA director Steven Kull, who noted that last January, 70 percent of respondents said they favored withdrawal within two years.
The only group that shows less eagerness for the military to leave are Sunnis, who comprise about 20 percent of the total population and have been most resistant to the U.S. occupation and unhappy with the Shia-dominated government. The percentage of Sunnis who favor withdrawal within six months has dropped from 83 percent to 57 percent, although nine in 10 Sunnis still say they want U.S. troops out within a year.
Four out of five Iraqis – including 96 percent of Sunnis and 87 percent of Shi'ites – say that the U.S. is having a negative influence on the situation in Iraq, according to the poll, which found that Kurds still believe Washington's influence is positive by a 48-34 percent margin.
If, as most Democrats have urged, the U.S. made a commitment to withdraw from Iraq according to a specific timeline, 53 percent of respondents said they believed that would strengthen the Iraqi government, as opposed to only 23 percent who said they though it have the opposite effect.
"Basically, because U.S. forces are there, the Iraqi government doesn't really have the legitimacy it might have," suggested Kull, who noted growing confidence, particularly on the part of Shi'ites, that Iraqi security forces will have become strong enough within the next six months to handle security challenges on their own.
Growing impatience with the U.S. military presence was also reflected in the strong approval among both Sunnis and Shi'ites for attacks on U.S.-led forces, which Kull called "the most disturbing finding" of the new survey.
If, however, the U.S. made a commitment to withdraw its troops according to a timetable, support for attacks would diminish, the poll found. Nearly half of Sunnis and Shi'ites who said they support attacks said they would feel less supportive if such a commitment were made.
A major problem, however, is nearly four in five Iraqis believe that Washington won't withdraw its troops because it plans to have permanent military bases in Iraq. The same percentage also believes that even if the Iraqi government demanded that U.S. forces withdraw, Washington would not comply.
(Coincidentally and largely at the initiative of Democratic lawmakers, Congress is expected to approve a ban this week on the expenditure of any money appropriated for next year's defense budget for the purpose of building permanent bases in Iraq.)
Kull suggested that Iraqi skepticism about U.S. intentions may be behind the overwhelming approval among both Sunnis and Shi'ites for attacks on U.S. forces.
The poll uncovered no evidence, he said, for an ideological or related motive. Indeed, the survey found that views of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were remarkably negative. While nearly 100 percent of Shi'ite and Kurdish respondents expressed unfavorable views of both, three out of four Sunnis agreed with them.
Nonetheless, disillusionment and anger with the situation in Iraq has clearly grown, according to the survey. Fifty-two percent of all respondents now believe that the country is going in the "wrong direction" – up from 35 percent as recently as last June.
Among Shi'ites, a majority of 59 percent still believe it is going in the "right direction," but that is down from 84 percent in January. While the decline in optimism among Kurds has not been quite as sharp, Sunnis remain as deeply pessimistic as in January when 93 percent said the country was headed in the "wrong direction."
"The trend is a very poor one," said Kenneth Pollack, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. "There is no question that Iraqis are ever more frustrated and angry with the United States."
(Inter Press Service)
September 28, 2006
Poll Shows Iraqis Weary of Violence, US Presence
by Jim Lobe
Iraqis – especially the majority Shi'ites – are increasingly angry and frustrated about their situation and impatient for U.S. troops to leave, but most do not believe their country will fall apart, according to a major new poll [.pdf] released here Wednesday by the University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA).
Seventy-one percent of the 1,150 randomly selected respondents interviewed for the survey in early September said they wanted all U.S. and coalition forces to leave Iraq within the next year, with more than half of them calling for the withdrawal to be completed within six months.
Moreover, nearly four in five respondents said they believed that the U.S. military in Iraq is "provoking more conflict than it is preventing," while nearly 61 percent said they approved of attacks on U.S.-led forces, an increase of 14 percent compared to the last PIPA survey of Iraqi public opinion eight months ago.
Among the three main communal groups – Shia, Sunnis, and Kurds – the biggest jump in negative opinion toward U.S. forces came from the Shi'ites, who comprise roughly 60 percent of the Iraq's population.
Nearly two of every three Shi'ites said they approved of attacks on U.S.-led forces, compared to 41 percent last January, just after a coalition of Shi'ite parties swept to victory in parliamentary elections. At that time, only 22 percent of Shia respondents favored a U.S. withdrawal within six months. The percentage has now risen to 36 percent, according to the PIPA poll.
The new survey, which to some extent mirrors the reported findings of a State Department-commissioned poll leaked to the Washington Post Wednesday, comes amid intensifying debate between most Democrats who favor setting a timeline for withdrawing forces and President George W. Bush and Republican loyalists who say that such a strategy would invite disaster.
That debate has been fueled in recent days by the disclosure of a classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) – the consensus position of Washington's 16 national intelligence agencies. Among other conclusions, it found that the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq have become a "cause celebre" for jihadists worldwide and fueled the growth and spread of terrorism and Islamic radicalism.
The administration, which was forced to declassify parts of the NIE under pressure from Democrats Tuesday, has also acknowledged that another NIE on Iraq – a draft version of which was described as "grim" by one source – is under preparation.
But the White House said it is not scheduled for completion until January, a timetable that has provoked protests from Democrats who believe that its conclusions are almost certain to stoke public anger here with the Iraq war and, if released before the elections, help them win control of at least one house of Congress.
The State Department poll, which was conducted from late June to early July, reportedly found that majorities of respondents in all regions of Iraq, except Kurdistan, said that the withdrawal of U.S.-led forces would "make them feel safer and decrease violence" and that nearly two out of three respondents favored an immediate departure.
The 71 percent majority who told PIPA they want a withdrawal within one year underlined a "growing sense of urgency" on the part of Iraqis, according to PIPA director Steven Kull, who noted that last January, 70 percent of respondents said they favored withdrawal within two years.
The only group that shows less eagerness for the military to leave are Sunnis, who comprise about 20 percent of the total population and have been most resistant to the U.S. occupation and unhappy with the Shia-dominated government. The percentage of Sunnis who favor withdrawal within six months has dropped from 83 percent to 57 percent, although nine in 10 Sunnis still say they want U.S. troops out within a year.
Four out of five Iraqis – including 96 percent of Sunnis and 87 percent of Shi'ites – say that the U.S. is having a negative influence on the situation in Iraq, according to the poll, which found that Kurds still believe Washington's influence is positive by a 48-34 percent margin.
If, as most Democrats have urged, the U.S. made a commitment to withdraw from Iraq according to a specific timeline, 53 percent of respondents said they believed that would strengthen the Iraqi government, as opposed to only 23 percent who said they though it have the opposite effect.
"Basically, because U.S. forces are there, the Iraqi government doesn't really have the legitimacy it might have," suggested Kull, who noted growing confidence, particularly on the part of Shi'ites, that Iraqi security forces will have become strong enough within the next six months to handle security challenges on their own.
Growing impatience with the U.S. military presence was also reflected in the strong approval among both Sunnis and Shi'ites for attacks on U.S.-led forces, which Kull called "the most disturbing finding" of the new survey.
If, however, the U.S. made a commitment to withdraw its troops according to a timetable, support for attacks would diminish, the poll found. Nearly half of Sunnis and Shi'ites who said they support attacks said they would feel less supportive if such a commitment were made.
A major problem, however, is nearly four in five Iraqis believe that Washington won't withdraw its troops because it plans to have permanent military bases in Iraq. The same percentage also believes that even if the Iraqi government demanded that U.S. forces withdraw, Washington would not comply.
(Coincidentally and largely at the initiative of Democratic lawmakers, Congress is expected to approve a ban this week on the expenditure of any money appropriated for next year's defense budget for the purpose of building permanent bases in Iraq.)
Kull suggested that Iraqi skepticism about U.S. intentions may be behind the overwhelming approval among both Sunnis and Shi'ites for attacks on U.S. forces.
The poll uncovered no evidence, he said, for an ideological or related motive. Indeed, the survey found that views of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were remarkably negative. While nearly 100 percent of Shi'ite and Kurdish respondents expressed unfavorable views of both, three out of four Sunnis agreed with them.
Nonetheless, disillusionment and anger with the situation in Iraq has clearly grown, according to the survey. Fifty-two percent of all respondents now believe that the country is going in the "wrong direction" – up from 35 percent as recently as last June.
Among Shi'ites, a majority of 59 percent still believe it is going in the "right direction," but that is down from 84 percent in January. While the decline in optimism among Kurds has not been quite as sharp, Sunnis remain as deeply pessimistic as in January when 93 percent said the country was headed in the "wrong direction."
"The trend is a very poor one," said Kenneth Pollack, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. "There is no question that Iraqis are ever more frustrated and angry with the United States."
(Inter Press Service)
http://www.antiwar.com/glantz/?articleid=9760
September 28, 2006
In Iraq, Strife Follows US Military Wherever It Goes
by Aaron Glantz
With Salam Talib
Few in Iraq have experienced sectarian violence more than residents of Samarra, an ancient, mid-sized city on the Tigris River northwest of Baghdad. For centuries, the areas Sunni majority had lived at peace with its Shi'ite minority – but in February, someone blew up a major Shi'ite shrine in the city, sparking sectarian killing across the country that continues to this day.
Now, Samarra is being hit with a second round of violence – two tribes, both of them Sunni, are battling each other over who will control an important area just west of city.
"It started when a car bomb went off in one the al-Bubaz family's homes," explains Sheik Ahmed Yahir al-Samarrai. "They accused the al-Bubadri tribe of doing it. Then people started killing each other."
Observers say the trouble actually started before that – when the al-Bubaz tribe began to cooperate with the U.S. military a year ago. After the head of the tribe was killed, tribal leaders started to fight the movement of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and began taking money to guard a power plant.
"The Americans asked the al-Bubaz family to cooperate with them by providing security," says lawyer Nezar al-Samarrai. "The other tribes felt offended with the fact that this tribe was cooperating with the Americans."
Like many Iraqis, Nezar al-Samarrai believes the U.S. military upset tribal relations on purpose to make the situation unstable.
"They can stay in the city as long as there's instability here, and they want to stay here forever," he says.
According to the United States' Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity has paid tens of millions of dollars to tribes to protect the country's electric grid.
The GAO's Joseph Christof tells me while he hasn't heard of tribal warfare in Samarra, he has heard about a host of other problems. He summarizes the findings of a report released in April this year:
"The Iraqi Ministry of Electricity was providing the subcontracts with the tribes to protect the transmission lines and oftentimes they wouldn't necessarily protect the transmission lines. They would allow insurgents or other groups to come in and destroy the transmission lines, and they would in turn try to enact fees or tariffs to the reconstruction lines that they were supposed to be protecting."
Meanwhile, the body count continued to rise in Iraq. In Baquba, northeast of the capital, a U.S. raid and air strike killed eight people, including seven members of one family, Wednesday. Inside Baghdad itself, a car bomb exploded near a busy market in the mostly Shi'ite district of Bayaa, killing five people and wounding eight others. Gunmen in Baghdad also shot and killed the sister of a Shi'ite member of parliament. In Kirkuk in northern Iraq, at least 10 people were wounded when a car bomb exploded near the headquarters of the Turkmen Front Party.
For Sheik Ahmed Yahir al-Samarrai, three years of U.S. occupation have left him and his neighbors feeling trapped in their homes.
"There's nothing good in this country," he says. "Every day is worse than the day before. The only place that I can go to is the area around my house. I can only shop in my own area. The killings are based on the address of your identification card and your name."
September 28, 2006
In Iraq, Strife Follows US Military Wherever It Goes
by Aaron Glantz
With Salam Talib
Few in Iraq have experienced sectarian violence more than residents of Samarra, an ancient, mid-sized city on the Tigris River northwest of Baghdad. For centuries, the areas Sunni majority had lived at peace with its Shi'ite minority – but in February, someone blew up a major Shi'ite shrine in the city, sparking sectarian killing across the country that continues to this day.
Now, Samarra is being hit with a second round of violence – two tribes, both of them Sunni, are battling each other over who will control an important area just west of city.
"It started when a car bomb went off in one the al-Bubaz family's homes," explains Sheik Ahmed Yahir al-Samarrai. "They accused the al-Bubadri tribe of doing it. Then people started killing each other."
Observers say the trouble actually started before that – when the al-Bubaz tribe began to cooperate with the U.S. military a year ago. After the head of the tribe was killed, tribal leaders started to fight the movement of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and began taking money to guard a power plant.
"The Americans asked the al-Bubaz family to cooperate with them by providing security," says lawyer Nezar al-Samarrai. "The other tribes felt offended with the fact that this tribe was cooperating with the Americans."
Like many Iraqis, Nezar al-Samarrai believes the U.S. military upset tribal relations on purpose to make the situation unstable.
"They can stay in the city as long as there's instability here, and they want to stay here forever," he says.
According to the United States' Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity has paid tens of millions of dollars to tribes to protect the country's electric grid.
The GAO's Joseph Christof tells me while he hasn't heard of tribal warfare in Samarra, he has heard about a host of other problems. He summarizes the findings of a report released in April this year:
"The Iraqi Ministry of Electricity was providing the subcontracts with the tribes to protect the transmission lines and oftentimes they wouldn't necessarily protect the transmission lines. They would allow insurgents or other groups to come in and destroy the transmission lines, and they would in turn try to enact fees or tariffs to the reconstruction lines that they were supposed to be protecting."
Meanwhile, the body count continued to rise in Iraq. In Baquba, northeast of the capital, a U.S. raid and air strike killed eight people, including seven members of one family, Wednesday. Inside Baghdad itself, a car bomb exploded near a busy market in the mostly Shi'ite district of Bayaa, killing five people and wounding eight others. Gunmen in Baghdad also shot and killed the sister of a Shi'ite member of parliament. In Kirkuk in northern Iraq, at least 10 people were wounded when a car bomb exploded near the headquarters of the Turkmen Front Party.
For Sheik Ahmed Yahir al-Samarrai, three years of U.S. occupation have left him and his neighbors feeling trapped in their homes.
"There's nothing good in this country," he says. "Every day is worse than the day before. The only place that I can go to is the area around my house. I can only shop in my own area. The killings are based on the address of your identification card and your name."
http://www.thestate.com/mld/mercurynews/ne...aq/15623156.htm
U.S. general warns that Iraq is close to dissolving into civil war
By Nancy A. Youssef
McClatchy Newspapers
BAGHDAD, Iraq - A top-ranked U.S. military officer in Iraq said Wednesday that the United States thought that the government of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki was running out of time to prevent Iraq from dissolving into outright civil war.
"We have to fix this militia issue. We can't have armed militias competing with Iraq's security forces. But I have to trust the prime minister to decide when it is that we do that," said Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the second-highest-ranking American military official in Baghdad.
Chiarelli's comments to a gathering of reporters were a part of a growing chorus of concerns from U.S. political and military leaders about the Iraqi government's ability and willingness to tackle corruption and militia-run death squads. They suggest that top American leaders are growing frustrated with the pace of reforms and may even be starting to argue for eventual U.S. withdrawal.
Throughout the month, senior military officials - almost always speaking anonymously because of the sensitivity of the subject - have expressed frustration with the government, saying corruption and rogue militias backed by rebel Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada al Sadr are rampant. They've complained of ministers using their offices to fill the coffers of their political parties and of government workers using their jobs to attack rival sects. They said the Iraqi government turned a blind eye, embracing a sectarian winner-take-all approach to governance.
American and some Iraqi leaders quietly complain that Maliki isn't willing to make difficult decisions because he's politically beholden to the followers of Sadr, who backed his premiership. He often has blocked U.S. military officials from entering Shiite militia areas such as the Baghdad slum of Sadr City to make arrests.
"There's a political piece to this to see if they deal with these guys," a senior military official said earlier this month, speaking on condition of anonymity. "There is corruption and problems in some of these ministries, but it's got to be dealt with and it ought to be dealt with by the prime minister and the folks that are inside this government. I think the time is short for them to deal with that over time, because this can't go on like that."
Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, a top American military spokesman, said Wednesday that murders and executions were now the top reasons for civilian deaths in Baghdad. He said it was widely believed that Shiite militias and Sunni Muslim insurgency groups were doing the killing.
"When we say murders and executions, we're assuming murders and executions are in fact sectarian violence that is occurring within the city," Caldwell said.
In a WorldPublicOpinion.org poll conducted Sept. 1-4 by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, 77 percent of Iraqi respondents, including 100 percent of Sunnis polled, said they'd prefer a strong government that would get rid of militias.
The minority Sunnis, whom U.S. officials want to remain in the political process, threatened last week to leave the government if Maliki doesn't address the problem of the militias.
Hassan Sineid, a Shiite assemblyman and fellow member of Maliki's Dawa Party, said security forces had performed badly, and he called for the defense and interior ministers to resign. He said the prime minister soon would present a resolution before parliament calling for the disbanding of militias.
Recently, Maliki publicly denounced an attack in Sadr City that killed 34 people last week. It was one of the few occasions he's condemned violence in Iraq at a time when an average of 100 people are killed in the country each day.
American officials continue to support Maliki because he's the country's elected leader.
In other developments, the U.S. military said eight people, including four women, were killed early Wednesday in a raid in Baqouba that targeted a terrorist with ties to the group al Qaida in Iraq. Three other people, including two whom the military said were tied to terrorist activity, were wounded.
During the raid, gunfire came from the building that soldiers were targeting and from throughout the neighborhood. The military called in an air attack.
Weapons and a global positioning system were found in the targeted building. American military spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Johnson said the deaths of the women came after those in the building were warned repeatedly to stop firing.
McClatchy special correspondent Zaineb Obeid and Mark Brunswick of the Minneapolis Star Tribune contributed to this report from Baghdad.
U.S. general warns that Iraq is close to dissolving into civil war
By Nancy A. Youssef
McClatchy Newspapers
BAGHDAD, Iraq - A top-ranked U.S. military officer in Iraq said Wednesday that the United States thought that the government of Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki was running out of time to prevent Iraq from dissolving into outright civil war.
"We have to fix this militia issue. We can't have armed militias competing with Iraq's security forces. But I have to trust the prime minister to decide when it is that we do that," said Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the second-highest-ranking American military official in Baghdad.
Chiarelli's comments to a gathering of reporters were a part of a growing chorus of concerns from U.S. political and military leaders about the Iraqi government's ability and willingness to tackle corruption and militia-run death squads. They suggest that top American leaders are growing frustrated with the pace of reforms and may even be starting to argue for eventual U.S. withdrawal.
Throughout the month, senior military officials - almost always speaking anonymously because of the sensitivity of the subject - have expressed frustration with the government, saying corruption and rogue militias backed by rebel Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada al Sadr are rampant. They've complained of ministers using their offices to fill the coffers of their political parties and of government workers using their jobs to attack rival sects. They said the Iraqi government turned a blind eye, embracing a sectarian winner-take-all approach to governance.
American and some Iraqi leaders quietly complain that Maliki isn't willing to make difficult decisions because he's politically beholden to the followers of Sadr, who backed his premiership. He often has blocked U.S. military officials from entering Shiite militia areas such as the Baghdad slum of Sadr City to make arrests.
"There's a political piece to this to see if they deal with these guys," a senior military official said earlier this month, speaking on condition of anonymity. "There is corruption and problems in some of these ministries, but it's got to be dealt with and it ought to be dealt with by the prime minister and the folks that are inside this government. I think the time is short for them to deal with that over time, because this can't go on like that."
Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, a top American military spokesman, said Wednesday that murders and executions were now the top reasons for civilian deaths in Baghdad. He said it was widely believed that Shiite militias and Sunni Muslim insurgency groups were doing the killing.
"When we say murders and executions, we're assuming murders and executions are in fact sectarian violence that is occurring within the city," Caldwell said.
In a WorldPublicOpinion.org poll conducted Sept. 1-4 by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland, 77 percent of Iraqi respondents, including 100 percent of Sunnis polled, said they'd prefer a strong government that would get rid of militias.
The minority Sunnis, whom U.S. officials want to remain in the political process, threatened last week to leave the government if Maliki doesn't address the problem of the militias.
Hassan Sineid, a Shiite assemblyman and fellow member of Maliki's Dawa Party, said security forces had performed badly, and he called for the defense and interior ministers to resign. He said the prime minister soon would present a resolution before parliament calling for the disbanding of militias.
Recently, Maliki publicly denounced an attack in Sadr City that killed 34 people last week. It was one of the few occasions he's condemned violence in Iraq at a time when an average of 100 people are killed in the country each day.
American officials continue to support Maliki because he's the country's elected leader.
In other developments, the U.S. military said eight people, including four women, were killed early Wednesday in a raid in Baqouba that targeted a terrorist with ties to the group al Qaida in Iraq. Three other people, including two whom the military said were tied to terrorist activity, were wounded.
During the raid, gunfire came from the building that soldiers were targeting and from throughout the neighborhood. The military called in an air attack.
Weapons and a global positioning system were found in the targeted building. American military spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Johnson said the deaths of the women came after those in the building were warned repeatedly to stop firing.
McClatchy special correspondent Zaineb Obeid and Mark Brunswick of the Minneapolis Star Tribune contributed to this report from Baghdad.
Murtha, Democrats Say US Should Leave Iraq By '08...
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2006/09/27/m...s-_n_30383.html
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2006/09/27/m...s-_n_30383.html
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=1056
What Can America Do About Iraq?
by Patrick Seale Released: 28 Sep 2006
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. President George W. Bush is approaching a critical turning point in his controversial political career. On November 7, a little more than a month from now, mid-term congressional elections will either enhance or severely limit his powers. The outcome of these elections is, therefore, of great importance, not just for the United States, but for much of the world.
If the Democrats win control of the Senate or the House of Representatives -- or possibly both, as they fervently hope -- Bush could be reduced to being a ‘lame duck’ president for the rest of his term, his policies challenged and even overturned. If, on the other hand, the Republicans retain a majority in both chambers, Bush will feel vindicated in pursuing his "global war on terror," and in particular his war in Iraq.
The war is the issue on which Bush is most vulnerable. The American public is tired of it. The Democrats, who smell blood, are making it the focal point of their election campaign.
In fighting off their attacks, Bush’s argument is that the Iraq war must be won, whatever the cost, to make America safe from terrorism. "Some people say 'Get out, leave, before the job is done.' I believe they are absolutely wrong," he declared at the White House this week. Standing at his side was the Afghan President Hamid Karzai, an ally in the GWOT and himself in deep trouble in his own country.
Almost at the same moment, the same view was being forcefully expressed by Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush’s faithful British ally. Speaking at the Labour party conference in Manchester -- delivering in effect his farewell speech as party leader -- Blair declared: "If we retreat now [from Iraq], we will not be safer. It would be a craven act of surrender that would put our future security in the deepest peril."
Are Bush and Blair right, or are they totally wrong? This is the great debate now raging on both sides of the Atlantic. Has the Iraq war made America and Britain safer or, on the contrary, has it exposed them to terrorist attack as never before?
To Bush’s discomfort, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate -- leaked to the American press this week and now largely declassified -- has concluded that the war in Iraq has made the overall terrorism worse. Far from being in retreat, Islamic radicalism has spread across the globe.
Entitled Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States, the NIE represents the consensus view of America’s 16 intelligence agencies. It is not a report Bush can easily dismiss. Needless to say, the Democrats are making hay with it.
So, is the war on Islamic radicalism a necessary and legitimate defensive war waged by the West against a fanatical and ruthless enemy -- as Bush and Blair claim -- or is it a gigantic strategic mistake which creates more terrorists than it eliminates? Is it a wise policy or is it based on an ideological and political muddle?
If Bush and Blair are right, then the West must, of course, defend itself and make the appropriate sacrifices. But if they are wrong, if the United States and Britain are in fact less safe today than before, then what is the war for? Should it not be ended as soon as possible?
It needs to be recalled that the war in Iraq, launched in 2003, was very largely the invention of Washington’s pro-Israeli neo-cons, and especially of a group of men who had secured positions of great influence in the Pentagon, the National Security Council and Vice-President Dick Cheney’s office.
A leading neo-con, Paul Wolfowitz -- then deputy Defence Secretary, now president of the World Bank -- is widely seen as the principal architect of the Iraq war. Within 24 hours of Al-Qaida’s terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Wolfowitz was urging the United States to attack Iraq, rather than Afghanistan where Osama Bin Laden had taken refuge. Wolfowitz and his neo-con friends had, in fact, been pressing for an attack on Iraq for much of the previous decade. They seized the opportunity presented by 9/11 to push America into war.
Their main motive appears to have been to enhance Israel’s strategic environment. Smashing Iraq and its army would, they believed, remove any threat to Israel from the east. It would be a defeat for the forces of Arab nationalism, Islamic extremism and Palestinian militancy.
They preached that American and Israeli interests were identical, and that a global campaign against what is now fashionably called "Islamo-fascism" would benefit them both.
More ambitiously, they saw the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as the first move in a programme to reform and remodel the whole Middle East to make it pro-American and pro-Israeli.
In formulating and implementing these policies, Israel’s friends and supporters -- whether inside the Bush administration, in the Jewish lobby or in the many right-wing Washington think-tanks -- demonstrated their unparalleled influence in shaping America’s Middle East policy.
Theirs, however, was a geopolitical fantasy which has now turned sour. Instead of being a shining model for the region, Iraq has turned into a deadly quagmire, swallowing up American lives and billions upon billions of American tax-payers’ dollars -- over $400 billion at the last count with the cost increasing at the rate of $9 billion a month. There is no end in sight to the catastrophe.
Iraq is in ghastly turmoil. It is struggling in the murderous grip of a sectarian civil war. The month of Ramadan is bound to bring its own sickening crop of atrocities. Nearly 7,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in July and August alone, over 5,000 of them in Baghdad. The morgues are full. Savagely mutilated corpses are thrown into the street every day. Some 200,000 people have fled their homes. A recent United Nations report says that torture is now worse than under Saddam Hussein.
Far from making Israel more secure, Iraq’s destruction has played into the hands of Iran -- a more formidable adversary of Israel than Iraq ever was -- and has empowered Iran’s allies, such as Hizbullah. Israel’s war against Hizbullah in Lebanon has contributed to the wall of hate by which Israel is surrounded, while America’s authority and prestige in the Arab and Muslim world have sunk to an all-time low.
What then is to be done about Iraq? American opinion is deeply divided. The neo-cons are pressing for more U.S. troops to be sent -- over and above the 140,000 already there, which American commanders say will be needed well into next year.
On the other hand, Bush’s own church has called for the withdrawal of American troops. Speaking this week at a protest rally in front of the White House, Bishop Morrison of the United Methodist Church declared: "Our demand as a movement is to end the war now!"
Three recently-retired American generals have called for the resignation of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, whom they describe as arrogant and incompetent. A Marine colonel, Thomas Hammes, has said that America would need ten years to win the war.
Influential voices like that of George Soros, the billionaire financier and philanthropist, has sharply criticised the whole notion of a "global war on terror." Among other mistakes, it lumps together fundamentally different political movements such as Hamas, Hizbullah, Al-Qaida, the Sunni insurrection and the Shiite militias in Iraq. Each one, he argues, needs to be understood and treated separately.
Another gloomy report on the Iraq war was published in mid-September by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, an arm of Congress responsible for auditing, investigating and evaluating government policies.
It concludes that the insurgents are recruiting new fighters; that Iraq’s American-trained army, divided on sectarian and party lines, is not up to the job; that essential services have not been restored; that Iraq’s national identity has weakened; and that "the worsening security situation has made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals."
When will George W. Bush, stubborn and misguided as ever, understand that it is time to change course and get out?
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.
Copyright © 2006 Patrick Seale
---------------
Released: 28 September 2006
Word Count: 1,331
----------------
Rights & Permissions Contact: Agence Global, rights@agenceglobal.com 1.336.686.9002, or 1.212.731.0757
What Can America Do About Iraq?
by Patrick Seale Released: 28 Sep 2006
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. President George W. Bush is approaching a critical turning point in his controversial political career. On November 7, a little more than a month from now, mid-term congressional elections will either enhance or severely limit his powers. The outcome of these elections is, therefore, of great importance, not just for the United States, but for much of the world.
If the Democrats win control of the Senate or the House of Representatives -- or possibly both, as they fervently hope -- Bush could be reduced to being a ‘lame duck’ president for the rest of his term, his policies challenged and even overturned. If, on the other hand, the Republicans retain a majority in both chambers, Bush will feel vindicated in pursuing his "global war on terror," and in particular his war in Iraq.
The war is the issue on which Bush is most vulnerable. The American public is tired of it. The Democrats, who smell blood, are making it the focal point of their election campaign.
In fighting off their attacks, Bush’s argument is that the Iraq war must be won, whatever the cost, to make America safe from terrorism. "Some people say 'Get out, leave, before the job is done.' I believe they are absolutely wrong," he declared at the White House this week. Standing at his side was the Afghan President Hamid Karzai, an ally in the GWOT and himself in deep trouble in his own country.
Almost at the same moment, the same view was being forcefully expressed by Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush’s faithful British ally. Speaking at the Labour party conference in Manchester -- delivering in effect his farewell speech as party leader -- Blair declared: "If we retreat now [from Iraq], we will not be safer. It would be a craven act of surrender that would put our future security in the deepest peril."
Are Bush and Blair right, or are they totally wrong? This is the great debate now raging on both sides of the Atlantic. Has the Iraq war made America and Britain safer or, on the contrary, has it exposed them to terrorist attack as never before?
To Bush’s discomfort, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate -- leaked to the American press this week and now largely declassified -- has concluded that the war in Iraq has made the overall terrorism worse. Far from being in retreat, Islamic radicalism has spread across the globe.
Entitled Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States, the NIE represents the consensus view of America’s 16 intelligence agencies. It is not a report Bush can easily dismiss. Needless to say, the Democrats are making hay with it.
So, is the war on Islamic radicalism a necessary and legitimate defensive war waged by the West against a fanatical and ruthless enemy -- as Bush and Blair claim -- or is it a gigantic strategic mistake which creates more terrorists than it eliminates? Is it a wise policy or is it based on an ideological and political muddle?
If Bush and Blair are right, then the West must, of course, defend itself and make the appropriate sacrifices. But if they are wrong, if the United States and Britain are in fact less safe today than before, then what is the war for? Should it not be ended as soon as possible?
It needs to be recalled that the war in Iraq, launched in 2003, was very largely the invention of Washington’s pro-Israeli neo-cons, and especially of a group of men who had secured positions of great influence in the Pentagon, the National Security Council and Vice-President Dick Cheney’s office.
A leading neo-con, Paul Wolfowitz -- then deputy Defence Secretary, now president of the World Bank -- is widely seen as the principal architect of the Iraq war. Within 24 hours of Al-Qaida’s terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Wolfowitz was urging the United States to attack Iraq, rather than Afghanistan where Osama Bin Laden had taken refuge. Wolfowitz and his neo-con friends had, in fact, been pressing for an attack on Iraq for much of the previous decade. They seized the opportunity presented by 9/11 to push America into war.
Their main motive appears to have been to enhance Israel’s strategic environment. Smashing Iraq and its army would, they believed, remove any threat to Israel from the east. It would be a defeat for the forces of Arab nationalism, Islamic extremism and Palestinian militancy.
They preached that American and Israeli interests were identical, and that a global campaign against what is now fashionably called "Islamo-fascism" would benefit them both.
More ambitiously, they saw the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as the first move in a programme to reform and remodel the whole Middle East to make it pro-American and pro-Israeli.
In formulating and implementing these policies, Israel’s friends and supporters -- whether inside the Bush administration, in the Jewish lobby or in the many right-wing Washington think-tanks -- demonstrated their unparalleled influence in shaping America’s Middle East policy.
Theirs, however, was a geopolitical fantasy which has now turned sour. Instead of being a shining model for the region, Iraq has turned into a deadly quagmire, swallowing up American lives and billions upon billions of American tax-payers’ dollars -- over $400 billion at the last count with the cost increasing at the rate of $9 billion a month. There is no end in sight to the catastrophe.
Iraq is in ghastly turmoil. It is struggling in the murderous grip of a sectarian civil war. The month of Ramadan is bound to bring its own sickening crop of atrocities. Nearly 7,000 Iraqi civilians were killed in July and August alone, over 5,000 of them in Baghdad. The morgues are full. Savagely mutilated corpses are thrown into the street every day. Some 200,000 people have fled their homes. A recent United Nations report says that torture is now worse than under Saddam Hussein.
Far from making Israel more secure, Iraq’s destruction has played into the hands of Iran -- a more formidable adversary of Israel than Iraq ever was -- and has empowered Iran’s allies, such as Hizbullah. Israel’s war against Hizbullah in Lebanon has contributed to the wall of hate by which Israel is surrounded, while America’s authority and prestige in the Arab and Muslim world have sunk to an all-time low.
What then is to be done about Iraq? American opinion is deeply divided. The neo-cons are pressing for more U.S. troops to be sent -- over and above the 140,000 already there, which American commanders say will be needed well into next year.
On the other hand, Bush’s own church has called for the withdrawal of American troops. Speaking this week at a protest rally in front of the White House, Bishop Morrison of the United Methodist Church declared: "Our demand as a movement is to end the war now!"
Three recently-retired American generals have called for the resignation of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, whom they describe as arrogant and incompetent. A Marine colonel, Thomas Hammes, has said that America would need ten years to win the war.
Influential voices like that of George Soros, the billionaire financier and philanthropist, has sharply criticised the whole notion of a "global war on terror." Among other mistakes, it lumps together fundamentally different political movements such as Hamas, Hizbullah, Al-Qaida, the Sunni insurrection and the Shiite militias in Iraq. Each one, he argues, needs to be understood and treated separately.
Another gloomy report on the Iraq war was published in mid-September by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, an arm of Congress responsible for auditing, investigating and evaluating government policies.
It concludes that the insurgents are recruiting new fighters; that Iraq’s American-trained army, divided on sectarian and party lines, is not up to the job; that essential services have not been restored; that Iraq’s national identity has weakened; and that "the worsening security situation has made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals."
When will George W. Bush, stubborn and misguided as ever, understand that it is time to change course and get out?
Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.
Copyright © 2006 Patrick Seale
---------------
Released: 28 September 2006
Word Count: 1,331
----------------
Rights & Permissions Contact: Agence Global, rights@agenceglobal.com 1.336.686.9002, or 1.212.731.0757
http://www.counterpunch.org/jacobs09282006.html
One Policy, Two Parties
The Generals, the Democrats and Iraq
By RON JACOBS
Recently on CNN, Michael Ware reported from Iraq that US commanders have been privately telling him that they need "at least three times as many troops as they currently have there now, be that Iraqi and American or, even better, just three times as many as American troops." Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, three retired generals told a Democratic Policy Committee that the military itself needs more members. Indeed, General Eaton was quoted in Army Times as saying in a prepared statement that "The war on terror demands we mobilize the country and significantly increase the size of our ground forces."
Of course, the general didn't say how he expected the army to do that, although he mentioned that he thought at least 60, 000 troops would be needed, at least for a start. If I were one of those in the US who are looking to the Democrats to get them out of the bloody mess created since 2001, I would be pretty nervous that these men (and not policy makers opposed to the war) are speaking to the Democrats' policy committee.
History tells us that generals that want to expand the military are not interested in ending any war. Does the name William Westmoreland mean anything to these folks? It was his philosophy that the war in Vietnam could be won if there were just enough troops there. He thought this when there were 50,000. he thought it when there were 200,000. He even thought it when there were 500,000. And he was wrong.
The generals and the politicians that support them operate from a fundamentally incorrect premise. They do not think that their mission is itself impossible and wrong, only that Washington doesn't have enough men on the ground. Although it is remotely possible that a force twice the size of the original invasion force might have achieved the US goal of an Iraq completely controlled by Washington in 2003, the events on the ground since then render any assessment that still believes such a goal to be possible foolish and wrong.
The nationalist resistance and the jihadist opposition combined with the opposition to the occupation by many Shia groups means one thing for certain--Washington will never control Iraq like it wants to. Any government that it supports will never enjoy enough support among the Iraqis to survive its armed and unarmed resistance. The generals and politicians who still believe such a goal is possible are lying. They may not know it, being so assured of US dominance and the rightness of forcing Washington's version of freedom on the world's peoples, but their suggestions that more troops should be sent and more lives wasted is tantamount to negligent homicide.
Unfortunately, that fact probably doesn't matter. If the GOP stays in power in Congress, George Bush will continue to get whatever he wants to fight his wars. If the Democrats take control, He will still get most of what he wants, since those legislators that do oppose the war on some level are not only small in number, their voice is extremely weak. This is in no small part due to the fragmented nature of what all polls tell us is an antiwar majority. Ever since the larger of the two national antiwar organizations-UFPJ-publicly declared its refusal to work with the other national organization ANSWER, those of us opposed to the war are still searching for a national protest we can go to. It's not my intention here to get into the nature of the squabble between the leadership of the two organizations, but suffice it to say it has a lot to do with the Democratic Party's desire to manipulate the masses away from the streets and into the polling booth, as if our choice is between one or the other. Actually, voting is going to make the least amount of difference in stopping this war. Or the war in Afghanistan.
Which brings me to the recent pronouncements by NATO generals in that country. Apparently, they want more troops there, too. Why? Because they operate on the same assumptions as the generals speaking to Iraq do. That the war they are fighting can be won. Without commenting on the nature of the resistance leadership, it should be clear to any clearheaded individual who is paying attention that the essential similarity between the Iraqi and Afghani resistance is their desire to get the occupiers out of their country. Given this, it doesn't really matter how many troops the occupiers have in country, they will never win. That is, unless they kill everyone that opposes them.
It's not that they're not trying, if you believe the body counts coming out of both countries. Add to the tens of thousands already dead a family of eight killed September 27, 2006 in a raid by US troops that locals termed a "terrorist massacre." By the way, the terrorists they were refering to was the US Army.
Going back to General Westmoreland and Vietnam, let me ask one question. Who won that one, even though Washington did its best to kill everyone that opposed them?
A couple more questions while we're at it? Did the Democrats get us out of that one? Or did they go along with every request for troops and money until the protests in the streets and the military made it difficult to conduct the war and even (at times) govern the country?
Ron Jacobs is author of The Way the Wind Blew: a history of the Weather Underground, which is just republished by Verso. Jacobs' essay on Big Bill Broonzy is featured in CounterPunch's new collection on music, art and sex, Serpents in the Garden. He can be reached at: rjacobs3625@charter.net
One Policy, Two Parties
The Generals, the Democrats and Iraq
By RON JACOBS
Recently on CNN, Michael Ware reported from Iraq that US commanders have been privately telling him that they need "at least three times as many troops as they currently have there now, be that Iraqi and American or, even better, just three times as many as American troops." Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, three retired generals told a Democratic Policy Committee that the military itself needs more members. Indeed, General Eaton was quoted in Army Times as saying in a prepared statement that "The war on terror demands we mobilize the country and significantly increase the size of our ground forces."
Of course, the general didn't say how he expected the army to do that, although he mentioned that he thought at least 60, 000 troops would be needed, at least for a start. If I were one of those in the US who are looking to the Democrats to get them out of the bloody mess created since 2001, I would be pretty nervous that these men (and not policy makers opposed to the war) are speaking to the Democrats' policy committee.
History tells us that generals that want to expand the military are not interested in ending any war. Does the name William Westmoreland mean anything to these folks? It was his philosophy that the war in Vietnam could be won if there were just enough troops there. He thought this when there were 50,000. he thought it when there were 200,000. He even thought it when there were 500,000. And he was wrong.
The generals and the politicians that support them operate from a fundamentally incorrect premise. They do not think that their mission is itself impossible and wrong, only that Washington doesn't have enough men on the ground. Although it is remotely possible that a force twice the size of the original invasion force might have achieved the US goal of an Iraq completely controlled by Washington in 2003, the events on the ground since then render any assessment that still believes such a goal to be possible foolish and wrong.
The nationalist resistance and the jihadist opposition combined with the opposition to the occupation by many Shia groups means one thing for certain--Washington will never control Iraq like it wants to. Any government that it supports will never enjoy enough support among the Iraqis to survive its armed and unarmed resistance. The generals and politicians who still believe such a goal is possible are lying. They may not know it, being so assured of US dominance and the rightness of forcing Washington's version of freedom on the world's peoples, but their suggestions that more troops should be sent and more lives wasted is tantamount to negligent homicide.
Unfortunately, that fact probably doesn't matter. If the GOP stays in power in Congress, George Bush will continue to get whatever he wants to fight his wars. If the Democrats take control, He will still get most of what he wants, since those legislators that do oppose the war on some level are not only small in number, their voice is extremely weak. This is in no small part due to the fragmented nature of what all polls tell us is an antiwar majority. Ever since the larger of the two national antiwar organizations-UFPJ-publicly declared its refusal to work with the other national organization ANSWER, those of us opposed to the war are still searching for a national protest we can go to. It's not my intention here to get into the nature of the squabble between the leadership of the two organizations, but suffice it to say it has a lot to do with the Democratic Party's desire to manipulate the masses away from the streets and into the polling booth, as if our choice is between one or the other. Actually, voting is going to make the least amount of difference in stopping this war. Or the war in Afghanistan.
Which brings me to the recent pronouncements by NATO generals in that country. Apparently, they want more troops there, too. Why? Because they operate on the same assumptions as the generals speaking to Iraq do. That the war they are fighting can be won. Without commenting on the nature of the resistance leadership, it should be clear to any clearheaded individual who is paying attention that the essential similarity between the Iraqi and Afghani resistance is their desire to get the occupiers out of their country. Given this, it doesn't really matter how many troops the occupiers have in country, they will never win. That is, unless they kill everyone that opposes them.
It's not that they're not trying, if you believe the body counts coming out of both countries. Add to the tens of thousands already dead a family of eight killed September 27, 2006 in a raid by US troops that locals termed a "terrorist massacre." By the way, the terrorists they were refering to was the US Army.
Going back to General Westmoreland and Vietnam, let me ask one question. Who won that one, even though Washington did its best to kill everyone that opposed them?
A couple more questions while we're at it? Did the Democrats get us out of that one? Or did they go along with every request for troops and money until the protests in the streets and the military made it difficult to conduct the war and even (at times) govern the country?
Ron Jacobs is author of The Way the Wind Blew: a history of the Weather Underground, which is just republished by Verso. Jacobs' essay on Big Bill Broonzy is featured in CounterPunch's new collection on music, art and sex, Serpents in the Garden. He can be reached at: rjacobs3625@charter.net
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/09/2...cost_of_war.php
The Opportunity Cost Of War
Dr. Anita Dancs
September 28, 2006
Anita Dancs is the research director of the National Priorities Project.
Every dollar spent on the Iraq War is a dollar we cannot spend on addressing other priorities, whether abroad or at home. Economists call this an ‘opportunity cost.’ Congress has so far spent nearly $320 billion on the war. But all of these dollars are dollars that could have been directed toward meeting other needs and investing in our future.
In fact, that amount of money could have provided health care coverage for all uninsured children for as long as the Iraq War has lasted; provided four-year scholarships (tuition and fees) to a public university for all of this year’s graduating seniors; built half a million affordable housing units; fully-funded the amount the Coast Guard estimated is needed for port security; tripled the energy conservation budget in the U.S. Department of Energy; and still enough would be left over to reduce this year’s budget deficit by one-third.
After three and a half years of the Iraq War, much has happened in the U.S. that speaks to our elected officials’ priorities. During the same period of time, the number and percentage of people without health insurance—private, government or otherwise—has risen. Many more are under-insured and have large out-of-pocket costs for health care. A recent study found that half of all bankruptcies filed were at least in part due to unaffordable health care bills.
The poverty rate continues to hover around 12 percent, more than a third of which are children. The median household income and median family income have declined and stagnated. The jobs that have been gained since the last recession are primarily low wage. Meanwhile, income inequality has grown. The share of income going to the “bottom” four-fifths of all families has declined, while the wealthiest one-fifth of families’ share has increased.
Yet, since the Iraq War began, no event speaks more about the divestment in our infrastructure and in our families than Hurricane Katrina. The hurricane exposed the poverty that exists in this nation of wealth. But the hurricane also exposed what happens when we neglect our infrastructure.
Representatives from Louisiana had consistently requested that the Southeast Louisiana Flood Control Project be fully funded. The budget had been continually cut since 2002. In response to another request presented to the administration the year before the hurricane, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget responded in a memo that the president’s priorities included war and pro-growth economic policies. By default, the money was not available for fully funding flood control.
The request was for only $60 million. We all know now what penny-pinching on flood control and levee construction has wrought. The Congress is well aware of the more than $100 billion appropriated in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. While hurricanes cannot be prevented, one must wonder as to whether we could have at least mitigated the damage, cost, and loss of life.
But the Iraq War impacted Hurricane Katrina in another way. At the time, around 30 percent of Army troops in Iraq were National Guard troops, who would normally play a large role in response and recovery in the event of a natural disaster. Under the current model of the Guard, units only have 65-74 percent of the troops and equipment needed to conduct assigned wartime missions. As units have been deployed to Iraq, equipment and personnel has been removed from non-deployed units to those deploying. When returning home, National Guard units have been ordered by the Army to leave behind their equipment.
Thus the non-deployed National Guard troops are increasingly unprepared (in terms of troops and equipment) to support emergency efforts here in the U.S. By the time of the hurricanes, 64,000 pieces of equipment were left in Iraq by Army National Guard Units and non-deployed troops were estimated to only have 34 percent of their essential equipment. Louisiana and Mississippi had 8,200 troops and two brigades worth of equipment deployed to Iraq. Even after the Louisiana brigade returned home, it still lacked 350 pieces of essential equipment required for hurricane response.
While hurricanes cannot be prevented, scientists do, however, show the link between climate change and more severe weather. Recently, the media reported on another scientific study linking warming ocean water and the strength of hurricanes. Nevertheless, our government’s attention has been so focused on war that it has ignored the environment. While the U.S. could show global leadership and work to shape a better future through policy and budgeting, we instead witness the exact opposite. Energy policies focus on more drilling for fossil fuel, while the Environmental Protection Agency’s budget and many environmental programs are each year put on the chopping block.
The taxpayer costs of the Iraq War will be much higher than the $320 billion that Congress has thus far allocated. Each year we continue to prosecute the Iraq War, we will spend another $75 billion - $100 billion. At the time of writing, Congress is on its way to allocating another $50 billion for the first half of fiscal year 2007. But the war is essentially deficit-financed. We add more and more money onto our national debt as if it will be easier for our children to pay it back. The interest payments over the years could amount to another $100 billion or more. Veterans’ health care, consistently under-funded over the years, will also need additional funding. The health care and disability payments for soldiers wounded in the war could amount to another $100 billion. And these are only budgetary costs, not the full range of economic costs, which could exceed $1 trillion.
In the run up to the Iraq War, the American public was not made aware of the enormous cost of military operations and the possibility of a protracted involvement. In fact, the White House claimed that the war would amount to $50 billion. When its economic adviser, Lawrence Lindsey, claimed it would be between $100 billion - $200 billion, he was fired. Even after the Iraq War began, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Iraq War would cost between $85 billion - $200 billion through fiscal year 2013.
Overly optimistic scenarios of the Iraq War continue to be propounded, leading the public to draw the wrong conclusions: that war can be an inexpensive cakewalk. Yet, three and a half years later, the American public is increasingly recognizing that the costs have been too high and the benefits are altogether unclear. The public is ready to hear the truth and debate the options, if only more elected officials would show leadership in this area.
The Opportunity Cost Of War
Dr. Anita Dancs
September 28, 2006
Anita Dancs is the research director of the National Priorities Project.
Every dollar spent on the Iraq War is a dollar we cannot spend on addressing other priorities, whether abroad or at home. Economists call this an ‘opportunity cost.’ Congress has so far spent nearly $320 billion on the war. But all of these dollars are dollars that could have been directed toward meeting other needs and investing in our future.
In fact, that amount of money could have provided health care coverage for all uninsured children for as long as the Iraq War has lasted; provided four-year scholarships (tuition and fees) to a public university for all of this year’s graduating seniors; built half a million affordable housing units; fully-funded the amount the Coast Guard estimated is needed for port security; tripled the energy conservation budget in the U.S. Department of Energy; and still enough would be left over to reduce this year’s budget deficit by one-third.
After three and a half years of the Iraq War, much has happened in the U.S. that speaks to our elected officials’ priorities. During the same period of time, the number and percentage of people without health insurance—private, government or otherwise—has risen. Many more are under-insured and have large out-of-pocket costs for health care. A recent study found that half of all bankruptcies filed were at least in part due to unaffordable health care bills.
The poverty rate continues to hover around 12 percent, more than a third of which are children. The median household income and median family income have declined and stagnated. The jobs that have been gained since the last recession are primarily low wage. Meanwhile, income inequality has grown. The share of income going to the “bottom” four-fifths of all families has declined, while the wealthiest one-fifth of families’ share has increased.
Yet, since the Iraq War began, no event speaks more about the divestment in our infrastructure and in our families than Hurricane Katrina. The hurricane exposed the poverty that exists in this nation of wealth. But the hurricane also exposed what happens when we neglect our infrastructure.
Representatives from Louisiana had consistently requested that the Southeast Louisiana Flood Control Project be fully funded. The budget had been continually cut since 2002. In response to another request presented to the administration the year before the hurricane, the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget responded in a memo that the president’s priorities included war and pro-growth economic policies. By default, the money was not available for fully funding flood control.
The request was for only $60 million. We all know now what penny-pinching on flood control and levee construction has wrought. The Congress is well aware of the more than $100 billion appropriated in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. While hurricanes cannot be prevented, one must wonder as to whether we could have at least mitigated the damage, cost, and loss of life.
But the Iraq War impacted Hurricane Katrina in another way. At the time, around 30 percent of Army troops in Iraq were National Guard troops, who would normally play a large role in response and recovery in the event of a natural disaster. Under the current model of the Guard, units only have 65-74 percent of the troops and equipment needed to conduct assigned wartime missions. As units have been deployed to Iraq, equipment and personnel has been removed from non-deployed units to those deploying. When returning home, National Guard units have been ordered by the Army to leave behind their equipment.
Thus the non-deployed National Guard troops are increasingly unprepared (in terms of troops and equipment) to support emergency efforts here in the U.S. By the time of the hurricanes, 64,000 pieces of equipment were left in Iraq by Army National Guard Units and non-deployed troops were estimated to only have 34 percent of their essential equipment. Louisiana and Mississippi had 8,200 troops and two brigades worth of equipment deployed to Iraq. Even after the Louisiana brigade returned home, it still lacked 350 pieces of essential equipment required for hurricane response.
While hurricanes cannot be prevented, scientists do, however, show the link between climate change and more severe weather. Recently, the media reported on another scientific study linking warming ocean water and the strength of hurricanes. Nevertheless, our government’s attention has been so focused on war that it has ignored the environment. While the U.S. could show global leadership and work to shape a better future through policy and budgeting, we instead witness the exact opposite. Energy policies focus on more drilling for fossil fuel, while the Environmental Protection Agency’s budget and many environmental programs are each year put on the chopping block.
The taxpayer costs of the Iraq War will be much higher than the $320 billion that Congress has thus far allocated. Each year we continue to prosecute the Iraq War, we will spend another $75 billion - $100 billion. At the time of writing, Congress is on its way to allocating another $50 billion for the first half of fiscal year 2007. But the war is essentially deficit-financed. We add more and more money onto our national debt as if it will be easier for our children to pay it back. The interest payments over the years could amount to another $100 billion or more. Veterans’ health care, consistently under-funded over the years, will also need additional funding. The health care and disability payments for soldiers wounded in the war could amount to another $100 billion. And these are only budgetary costs, not the full range of economic costs, which could exceed $1 trillion.
In the run up to the Iraq War, the American public was not made aware of the enormous cost of military operations and the possibility of a protracted involvement. In fact, the White House claimed that the war would amount to $50 billion. When its economic adviser, Lawrence Lindsey, claimed it would be between $100 billion - $200 billion, he was fired. Even after the Iraq War began, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Iraq War would cost between $85 billion - $200 billion through fiscal year 2013.
Overly optimistic scenarios of the Iraq War continue to be propounded, leading the public to draw the wrong conclusions: that war can be an inexpensive cakewalk. Yet, three and a half years later, the American public is increasingly recognizing that the costs have been too high and the benefits are altogether unclear. The public is ready to hear the truth and debate the options, if only more elected officials would show leadership in this area.
SECRECY NEWS
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2006, Issue No. 104
September 28, 2006
Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
Support Secrecy News:
http://www.fas.org/static/contrib_sec.jsp
** BUSH USES SIGNING STATEMENTS TO LEVERAGE POWER FROM CONGRESS
** CONGRESS POISED TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE EXECUTIVE
** PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION (CRS)
BUSH USES SIGNING STATEMENTS TO LEVERAGE POWER FROM CONGRESS, CRS SAYS
The Bush Administration's use of Presidential signing statements to
assert objections to enacted legislation reflects an attempt to expand
and consolidate Presidential authority at the expense of Congress,
according to a new analysis from the Congressional Research Service.
"It seems evident that the Bush signing statements are an integral part
of the Administration's efforts to further its broad view of
presidential prerogatives and to assert functional and determinative
control over all elements of the executive decisionmaking process," the
CRS study said.
"It appears that recent administrations, as made apparent by the
voluminous challenges lodged by President George W. Bush, have employed
these instruments in an attempt to leverage power and control away from
Congress by establishing these broad assertions of authority as a
constitutional norm."
Signing statements have been issued by Presidents for over a century and
are not inherently problematic. To the contrary, they may be beneficial
to the extent that they alert Congress and the public to Presidential
actions and intentions.
Yet the Bush Administration has been issuing signing statements with
growing frequency, as reported earlier this year by Charlie Savage of
the Boston Globe, and in a way that involves a "qualitative difference"
from their use in the past, according to the CRS.
The Bush signing statements appear to be part of a larger campaign to
seize increased Presidential authority, the CRS said.
"The broad and persistent nature of the claims of executive authority
forwarded by President Bush appear designed to inure [i.e., to accustom]
Congress, as well as others, to the belief that the President in fact
possesses expansive and exclusive powers upon which the other branches
may not intrude," the CRS report stated.
It follows that "the appropriate focus of congressional concern should
center not on the issuance of signing statements themselves, but on the
broad assertions of presidential authority forwarded by Presidents and
the substantive actions taken to establish that authority."
The CRS study, written by T.J. Halstead, provides abundant information
on the history of presidential signing statements, describes their
limited impact on the judicial process, critiques a recent American
Bar Association report on the subject, and more.
Like other CRS products, this study has not been made directly available
to the public by CRS. A copy was obtained by Secrecy News.
See "Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional
Implications," September 22, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf
CONGRESS POISED TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE EXECUTIVE
Instead of defending Congressional prerogatives, Congress appears eager
to transfer new, unchecked authority to the President in the name of
combating terrorism.
A bill on military commissions for trial of enemy detainees that was
approved in the House this week would permanently alter the complexion
of the U.S. government by authorizing abuse of prisoners, curtailing
prisoner access to the judicial system, and other previously unthinkable
steps.
For critical perspectives on the military commissions bill, see "The
Blind Leading the Willing" by Dahlia Lithwick, Slate, September 27:
http://www.slate.com/id/2150495/
and "Rushing Off a Cliff," New York Times (editorial)(free reg. req'd),
September 28:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/28/opinion/28thu1.html
The September 27 House debate, leading to approval of the bill, is here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/h092706.html
The September 27 Senate floor debate on the bill is here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/s092706.html
Meanwhile, House Democrats said that pending legislation on domestic
intelligence surveillance would dismantle existing checks and balance
and traduce the Constitution.
H.R. 5825, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, "is a
dangerously broad bill that would turn FISA [the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, which regulates domestic intelligence surveillance] on
its head by making warrantless surveillance the rule rather than the
exception," the House Democrats said.
"[Its] vague definitions and broad loopholes allow the Executive Branch
to conduct electronic surveillance of telephone calls and e-mail in the
United States without court orders and without meaningful oversight."
Their views, detailed in a dissent to a new report of the House
Intelligence Committee, were rejected along party lines by the
Republican majority.
See "Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act," House Report 109-680,
part 1, September 25:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/h...09-680-pt1.html
PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION
Classification is the predominant means of protecting national security
information. But even when information is unclassified, there are a
number of statutes that can be used to restrict its public availability
on security-related grounds.
Such statutory controls on unclassified security-related information are
usefully cataloged in a new report from the Congressional Research
Service.
See "Protection of Security-Related Information," September 27, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL33670.pdf
For no extra charge, here are a couple of other recent CRS reports
obtained by Secrecy News.
"U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By-Side Comparison of Current
Legislation," September 5, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33561.pdf
"The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues,"
updated August 14, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22266.pdf
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email: saftergood@fas.org
voice: (202) 454-4691
from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy
Volume 2006, Issue No. 104
September 28, 2006
Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/
Support Secrecy News:
http://www.fas.org/static/contrib_sec.jsp
** BUSH USES SIGNING STATEMENTS TO LEVERAGE POWER FROM CONGRESS
** CONGRESS POISED TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE EXECUTIVE
** PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION (CRS)
BUSH USES SIGNING STATEMENTS TO LEVERAGE POWER FROM CONGRESS, CRS SAYS
The Bush Administration's use of Presidential signing statements to
assert objections to enacted legislation reflects an attempt to expand
and consolidate Presidential authority at the expense of Congress,
according to a new analysis from the Congressional Research Service.
"It seems evident that the Bush signing statements are an integral part
of the Administration's efforts to further its broad view of
presidential prerogatives and to assert functional and determinative
control over all elements of the executive decisionmaking process," the
CRS study said.
"It appears that recent administrations, as made apparent by the
voluminous challenges lodged by President George W. Bush, have employed
these instruments in an attempt to leverage power and control away from
Congress by establishing these broad assertions of authority as a
constitutional norm."
Signing statements have been issued by Presidents for over a century and
are not inherently problematic. To the contrary, they may be beneficial
to the extent that they alert Congress and the public to Presidential
actions and intentions.
Yet the Bush Administration has been issuing signing statements with
growing frequency, as reported earlier this year by Charlie Savage of
the Boston Globe, and in a way that involves a "qualitative difference"
from their use in the past, according to the CRS.
The Bush signing statements appear to be part of a larger campaign to
seize increased Presidential authority, the CRS said.
"The broad and persistent nature of the claims of executive authority
forwarded by President Bush appear designed to inure [i.e., to accustom]
Congress, as well as others, to the belief that the President in fact
possesses expansive and exclusive powers upon which the other branches
may not intrude," the CRS report stated.
It follows that "the appropriate focus of congressional concern should
center not on the issuance of signing statements themselves, but on the
broad assertions of presidential authority forwarded by Presidents and
the substantive actions taken to establish that authority."
The CRS study, written by T.J. Halstead, provides abundant information
on the history of presidential signing statements, describes their
limited impact on the judicial process, critiques a recent American
Bar Association report on the subject, and more.
Like other CRS products, this study has not been made directly available
to the public by CRS. A copy was obtained by Secrecy News.
See "Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional
Implications," September 22, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf
CONGRESS POISED TO TRANSFER POWER TO THE EXECUTIVE
Instead of defending Congressional prerogatives, Congress appears eager
to transfer new, unchecked authority to the President in the name of
combating terrorism.
A bill on military commissions for trial of enemy detainees that was
approved in the House this week would permanently alter the complexion
of the U.S. government by authorizing abuse of prisoners, curtailing
prisoner access to the judicial system, and other previously unthinkable
steps.
For critical perspectives on the military commissions bill, see "The
Blind Leading the Willing" by Dahlia Lithwick, Slate, September 27:
http://www.slate.com/id/2150495/
and "Rushing Off a Cliff," New York Times (editorial)(free reg. req'd),
September 28:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/28/opinion/28thu1.html
The September 27 House debate, leading to approval of the bill, is here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/h092706.html
The September 27 Senate floor debate on the bill is here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_cr/s092706.html
Meanwhile, House Democrats said that pending legislation on domestic
intelligence surveillance would dismantle existing checks and balance
and traduce the Constitution.
H.R. 5825, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, "is a
dangerously broad bill that would turn FISA [the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, which regulates domestic intelligence surveillance] on
its head by making warrantless surveillance the rule rather than the
exception," the House Democrats said.
"[Its] vague definitions and broad loopholes allow the Executive Branch
to conduct electronic surveillance of telephone calls and e-mail in the
United States without court orders and without meaningful oversight."
Their views, detailed in a dissent to a new report of the House
Intelligence Committee, were rejected along party lines by the
Republican majority.
See "Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act," House Report 109-680,
part 1, September 25:
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_rpt/h...09-680-pt1.html
PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY-RELATED INFORMATION
Classification is the predominant means of protecting national security
information. But even when information is unclassified, there are a
number of statutes that can be used to restrict its public availability
on security-related grounds.
Such statutory controls on unclassified security-related information are
usefully cataloged in a new report from the Congressional Research
Service.
See "Protection of Security-Related Information," September 27, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL33670.pdf
For no extra charge, here are a couple of other recent CRS reports
obtained by Secrecy News.
"U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: A Side-By-Side Comparison of Current
Legislation," September 5, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33561.pdf
"The Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues,"
updated August 14, 2006:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22266.pdf
Steven Aftergood
Project on Government Secrecy
Federation of American Scientists
web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html
email: saftergood@fas.org
voice: (202) 454-4691
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/092806B.shtml
Bush Appointees Browbeat Senior Military Officers on Geneva Conventions
By Ann Wright
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Thursday 28 September 2006
As a retired US Army Reserve colonel, I am aghast at the blatant browbeating by civilian political appointees of the Bush administration of another generation of senior US military officers. In late 2002 and 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began the browbeating. He forced US Central Command commander General Tommy Franks into accepting a war plan for Iraq that Franks knew had too few military personnel for the job ahead - the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
After he retired, Franks said he was worn down by Rumsfeld's never-ending complaints about too many military troops in the general's operations plan. Franks eventually decided to invade and occupy with the minimal forces that Rumsfeld demanded. We know the result: not enough troops to protect the civilian population or the civilian infrastructure (water, sewage, electrical plants); not enough troops to prevent looting; not enough troops to seal the borders from those coming in from other countries; not enough troops to fulfill the responsibilities of an occupying force as required by international law; not enough troops to protect the troops.
Now, William Haynes, the chief civilian lawyer of the Department of Defense, one of the administration's architects of torture and nominated to a life-long judgeship on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, has browbeaten the four military services' senior military lawyers, the Judge Advocate Generals (all two star officers), into signing a "do not object" letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The letter says that the senior military lawyers do not object to two key provisions of the Bush bill that would reinterpret US obligations under the Geneva Conventions and also would protect US intelligence agents from war crimes prosecutions. Previously the military lawyers had publicly questioned, in Congressional hearings in both the Senate and House, the reinterpreting of the Geneva Conventions. The "do not object" letter was written when, after hours of browbeating by William Haynes, the two star officers refused to sign a "letter of endorsement" of the Bush plan, but instead signed the lesser of the two options, the "do not object" statement.
According to the Washington Post (September 15, 2006), the Air Force's top lawyer, Major General Charles J. Dunlap, said that he was not forced to sign the "do not object" letter, but still had reservations about the administration's proposal, just not in the areas discussed in the letter. But, late on September 15, the Army's Judge Advocate General, Major General Scott Black, sent another letter to Senator McCain reinforcing the earlier stand of the lawyers, stating "further redefinition" of the Geneva Conventions "is unnecessary and could be seen as a weakening of our treaty obligations, rather than a reinforcement of the standards of treatment." The senior lawyers have made a noble and professional end-run around the browbeating!
Remarkably, at long last, Bush family friend, former secretary of state, and 35-year military veteran Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, finally broke his silence and acknowledged a bit of conscience regarding the effects of Bush administration's policies that he was a part of. In a letter to McCain, he said that reinterpreting the Geneva Conventions would encourage other countries to "doubt the moral basis of our fight against terrorism." No doubt Powell's goose is cooked with the Bush family.
The Bush administration's browbeating of senior military officers is over two key provisions of the bill concerning rules governing military commissions that will put terrorism suspects on trial.
In defining US obligations under the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Bush's proposal is that only detainee treatment that "shocks the conscience" should be barred (and would allow degrading acts that do not shock the conscience of someone chosen by the Bush administration).
The Senate Armed Services Committee bill is silent on what constitutes compliance with Common Article 3 and thereby would force CIA officers to treat detainees humanely and to avoid degrading acts, under common understandings of international law. (CIA officers involved in the Bush administration's secret prisons program have consulted lawyers after being warned that they could face prosecution for illegally detaining and interrogating terrorism suspects, and new CIA recruits are advised to take out private liability insurance against the risk of lawsuits as CIA officers will have to pay for their own defense, according to the Washington Times (September 10, 2006).
The second key provision of the bill is on access to classified information during military commission trials of terrorism suspects. The Bush administration advocates classified information could be withheld from a defendant if a military judge approves the withholding and if the judge determines that the withholding of classified information would not obstruct a fair trial.
The Senate Armed Services Committee bill would give defendant declassified information or substitute summaries when possible. A military judge can dismiss charges if the government objects to a judge's order that sensitive information be provided to a defendant.
The Bush administration's violation of international law has severely damaged the reputation of the United States in the international community and has put our military personnel at risk throughout the world.
The browbeating for political ends of our senior military lawyers by the administration is degrading to our professional, volunteer military and calls into question, again, the actions of the civilian leadership of this nation. The administration policy approved by Donald Rumsfeld and William Haynes condoning torture, and now the silencing of professional views of proposed policies concerning the rules for military commissions trying terrorism suspects, undermine the "good order and discipline" of the military and are dangerous for our country.
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Ann Wright, retired from the US Army Reserves as a colonel after 29 years (13 on active duty and 16 in the Reserves). She also was a US diplomat for 16 years, serving in Nicaragua, Grenada, Somalia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Sierra Leone, Micronesia and Mongolia. She was on the first team to reopen the US Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan in December, 2001. She resigned from the US government in March, 2003, in opposition to the war on Iraq.
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Bush Appointees Browbeat Senior Military Officers on Geneva Conventions
By Ann Wright
t r u t h o u t | Perspective
Thursday 28 September 2006
As a retired US Army Reserve colonel, I am aghast at the blatant browbeating by civilian political appointees of the Bush administration of another generation of senior US military officers. In late 2002 and 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld began the browbeating. He forced US Central Command commander General Tommy Franks into accepting a war plan for Iraq that Franks knew had too few military personnel for the job ahead - the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
After he retired, Franks said he was worn down by Rumsfeld's never-ending complaints about too many military troops in the general's operations plan. Franks eventually decided to invade and occupy with the minimal forces that Rumsfeld demanded. We know the result: not enough troops to protect the civilian population or the civilian infrastructure (water, sewage, electrical plants); not enough troops to prevent looting; not enough troops to seal the borders from those coming in from other countries; not enough troops to fulfill the responsibilities of an occupying force as required by international law; not enough troops to protect the troops.
Now, William Haynes, the chief civilian lawyer of the Department of Defense, one of the administration's architects of torture and nominated to a life-long judgeship on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, has browbeaten the four military services' senior military lawyers, the Judge Advocate Generals (all two star officers), into signing a "do not object" letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee. The letter says that the senior military lawyers do not object to two key provisions of the Bush bill that would reinterpret US obligations under the Geneva Conventions and also would protect US intelligence agents from war crimes prosecutions. Previously the military lawyers had publicly questioned, in Congressional hearings in both the Senate and House, the reinterpreting of the Geneva Conventions. The "do not object" letter was written when, after hours of browbeating by William Haynes, the two star officers refused to sign a "letter of endorsement" of the Bush plan, but instead signed the lesser of the two options, the "do not object" statement.
According to the Washington Post (September 15, 2006), the Air Force's top lawyer, Major General Charles J. Dunlap, said that he was not forced to sign the "do not object" letter, but still had reservations about the administration's proposal, just not in the areas discussed in the letter. But, late on September 15, the Army's Judge Advocate General, Major General Scott Black, sent another letter to Senator McCain reinforcing the earlier stand of the lawyers, stating "further redefinition" of the Geneva Conventions "is unnecessary and could be seen as a weakening of our treaty obligations, rather than a reinforcement of the standards of treatment." The senior lawyers have made a noble and professional end-run around the browbeating!
Remarkably, at long last, Bush family friend, former secretary of state, and 35-year military veteran Colin Powell, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, finally broke his silence and acknowledged a bit of conscience regarding the effects of Bush administration's policies that he was a part of. In a letter to McCain, he said that reinterpreting the Geneva Conventions would encourage other countries to "doubt the moral basis of our fight against terrorism." No doubt Powell's goose is cooked with the Bush family.
The Bush administration's browbeating of senior military officers is over two key provisions of the bill concerning rules governing military commissions that will put terrorism suspects on trial.
In defining US obligations under the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, Bush's proposal is that only detainee treatment that "shocks the conscience" should be barred (and would allow degrading acts that do not shock the conscience of someone chosen by the Bush administration).
The Senate Armed Services Committee bill is silent on what constitutes compliance with Common Article 3 and thereby would force CIA officers to treat detainees humanely and to avoid degrading acts, under common understandings of international law. (CIA officers involved in the Bush administration's secret prisons program have consulted lawyers after being warned that they could face prosecution for illegally detaining and interrogating terrorism suspects, and new CIA recruits are advised to take out private liability insurance against the risk of lawsuits as CIA officers will have to pay for their own defense, according to the Washington Times (September 10, 2006).
The second key provision of the bill is on access to classified information during military commission trials of terrorism suspects. The Bush administration advocates classified information could be withheld from a defendant if a military judge approves the withholding and if the judge determines that the withholding of classified information would not obstruct a fair trial.
The Senate Armed Services Committee bill would give defendant declassified information or substitute summaries when possible. A military judge can dismiss charges if the government objects to a judge's order that sensitive information be provided to a defendant.
The Bush administration's violation of international law has severely damaged the reputation of the United States in the international community and has put our military personnel at risk throughout the world.
The browbeating for political ends of our senior military lawyers by the administration is degrading to our professional, volunteer military and calls into question, again, the actions of the civilian leadership of this nation. The administration policy approved by Donald Rumsfeld and William Haynes condoning torture, and now the silencing of professional views of proposed policies concerning the rules for military commissions trying terrorism suspects, undermine the "good order and discipline" of the military and are dangerous for our country.
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Ann Wright, retired from the US Army Reserves as a colonel after 29 years (13 on active duty and 16 in the Reserves). She also was a US diplomat for 16 years, serving in Nicaragua, Grenada, Somalia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Sierra Leone, Micronesia and Mongolia. She was on the first team to reopen the US Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan in December, 2001. She resigned from the US government in March, 2003, in opposition to the war on Iraq.
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A suicide car bomb exploded near a Canadian military convoy in southern Afghanistan yesterday while officials reported they had killed 14 Taliban rebels elsewhere.
http://tinyurl.com/oywwm
U.S. chopper killed Afghans during 'confused' battle involving Canadians:
An American attack helicopter killed four Afghan National Police officers and a teenage boy in a botched battle involving Canadian troops last spring, say newly released documents.
http://tinyurl.com/mo7m4
NATO agrees early takeover of all Afghan peacekeeping:
NATO nations agreed on Thursday to assume command of peacekeeping across all of insurgency-hit Afghanistan in the next few weeks, a NATO spokesman said
http://tinyurl.com/nrn8u
The Taliban have `time on their side,' senior officer says:
`The enemy is becoming more tenacious'
http://tinyurl.com/kk88n
Stephen Lendman : Afghanistan: The Other Lost War :
The US Plan to Pacify Afghanistan and Control It As A Neocolonial State
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article15146.htm
http://tinyurl.com/oywwm
U.S. chopper killed Afghans during 'confused' battle involving Canadians:
An American attack helicopter killed four Afghan National Police officers and a teenage boy in a botched battle involving Canadian troops last spring, say newly released documents.
http://tinyurl.com/mo7m4
NATO agrees early takeover of all Afghan peacekeeping:
NATO nations agreed on Thursday to assume command of peacekeeping across all of insurgency-hit Afghanistan in the next few weeks, a NATO spokesman said
http://tinyurl.com/nrn8u
The Taliban have `time on their side,' senior officer says:
`The enemy is becoming more tenacious'
http://tinyurl.com/kk88n
Stephen Lendman : Afghanistan: The Other Lost War :
The US Plan to Pacify Afghanistan and Control It As A Neocolonial State
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article15146.htm
NATO Expands Role in Afghanistan
Associated Press | September 28, 2006
PORTOROZ, Slovenia - NATO decided Thursday to take control of military operations across all of Afghanistan - a move that U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld hailed as a "bold step forward" for the alliance.
Under the new arrangements, as many as 12,000 additional American troops will be put under foreign battlefield command, a number that U.S. officials said could be the most since World War II.
The move is expected to take place in the next few weeks, NATO spokesman James Appathurai said.
The largest number of U.S. troops ever put under the control of foreign battlefield commanders was about 300,000 during WWI, said military officials traveling with Rumsfeld to the NATO meeting.
It was not clear how many troops were under foreign command during WWII. A U.S. officer is in charge of the overall NATO force - Gen. James L. Jones, but Thursday's emerging agreement would put the U.S. troops under foreign commanders on the battlefield.
The ministers also agreed to provide substantial amounts of military equipment for the Afghan army.
"There were in rough numbers thousands of weapons offered up, and I believe probably millions of rounds of ammunition," Rumsfeld told reporters.
NATO-led troops took command of the southern portion of Afghanistan just two months ago and have been struggling to stem the escalating violence there. This plan would extend their control to the eastern section - which U.S. troops now command.
The NATO take-over of the eastern section had been expected later this fall, and it would switch at least 10,000 American troops from U.S. command to NATO control - specifically British Lt. Gen. David Richards. Currently about 2,000 U.S. troops are serving under NATO commanders in other portions of Afghanistan.
In opening remarks, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer had signaled that commitments for troops and equipment for Afghanistan would be a key goal of the meeting.
According to a senior U.S. official, Afghanistan had compiled a list of needed equipment, from helicopters and vehicles to armor and guns, and officials will set up a program to coordinate the donations. This information was passed on to the 26 NATO defense ministers gathered here.
NATO countries recently have been slow to meet needs for more coalition forces for the alliance in Afghanistan, where violence has surged. Jones, who also heads the U.S. European Command, asked other nations this month for about 2,500 troops and other equipment, and said last week that some had come through.
Currently there are about 20,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan and an additional 21,000 from the United States.
Under the expected equipment deal, allies will be able to coordinate and donate supplies to the Afghan National Army. The official could not estimate how much equipment was included on Afghanistan's wish list.
Associated Press | September 28, 2006
PORTOROZ, Slovenia - NATO decided Thursday to take control of military operations across all of Afghanistan - a move that U.S. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld hailed as a "bold step forward" for the alliance.
Under the new arrangements, as many as 12,000 additional American troops will be put under foreign battlefield command, a number that U.S. officials said could be the most since World War II.
The move is expected to take place in the next few weeks, NATO spokesman James Appathurai said.
The largest number of U.S. troops ever put under the control of foreign battlefield commanders was about 300,000 during WWI, said military officials traveling with Rumsfeld to the NATO meeting.
It was not clear how many troops were under foreign command during WWII. A U.S. officer is in charge of the overall NATO force - Gen. James L. Jones, but Thursday's emerging agreement would put the U.S. troops under foreign commanders on the battlefield.
The ministers also agreed to provide substantial amounts of military equipment for the Afghan army.
"There were in rough numbers thousands of weapons offered up, and I believe probably millions of rounds of ammunition," Rumsfeld told reporters.
NATO-led troops took command of the southern portion of Afghanistan just two months ago and have been struggling to stem the escalating violence there. This plan would extend their control to the eastern section - which U.S. troops now command.
The NATO take-over of the eastern section had been expected later this fall, and it would switch at least 10,000 American troops from U.S. command to NATO control - specifically British Lt. Gen. David Richards. Currently about 2,000 U.S. troops are serving under NATO commanders in other portions of Afghanistan.
In opening remarks, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer had signaled that commitments for troops and equipment for Afghanistan would be a key goal of the meeting.
According to a senior U.S. official, Afghanistan had compiled a list of needed equipment, from helicopters and vehicles to armor and guns, and officials will set up a program to coordinate the donations. This information was passed on to the 26 NATO defense ministers gathered here.
NATO countries recently have been slow to meet needs for more coalition forces for the alliance in Afghanistan, where violence has surged. Jones, who also heads the U.S. European Command, asked other nations this month for about 2,500 troops and other equipment, and said last week that some had come through.
Currently there are about 20,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan and an additional 21,000 from the United States.
Under the expected equipment deal, allies will be able to coordinate and donate supplies to the Afghan National Army. The official could not estimate how much equipment was included on Afghanistan's wish list.
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