Snuffysmith
Sep 29 2006, 06:35 AM
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/09/28/...tion=cnn_latest Military official: Iranian millions funding insurgency
POSTED: 3:36 p.m. EDT, September 28, 2006
BAGHDAD, Iraq (CNN) -- A Shiite Muslim militia involved in the warfare between Sunni and Shiites in Iraq has received "millions of dollars" and an assortment of weaponry from Iran, a senior U.S. military official says.
The official said Iran -- which is overwhelmingly Shiite and largely Persian -- tries to spread its largess to other militants as well, but can wield only so much influence throughout Iraq -- which, while predominantly Shiite, is largely Arab.
He said Iran is not trying to fuel civil war in Iraq, but rather is trying to make sure it retains some influence with whichever group comes out on top in Iraq.
The official, who asked to remain anonymous, briefed reporters Wednesday about the conflict in Iraq. A transcript of that briefing was issued Thursday. (Watch why the U.S. strategy may fail in Iraq -- 1:45)
A good deal of the briefing involved the Mehdi Army, or Jaish al-Mahdi, the militia of the powerful Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.
The group, which has power bases in the Shiite south and in Baghdad's Sadr City, has gained in political influence in the past year, with visible presence in the Iraqi government.
Asked how much money Iran has given the Mehdi Army this year, the official said, "I don't have a good estimate, but I'll tell you, it's in the millions of dollars."
The official said that high-grade military explosives and specialized timers are among the "boutique military equipment" moving from Iran into Iraq.
Some of the equipment is of the same type that Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed Shiite militia, used against Israeli forces in Lebanon during the summer, the official said.
The origin of the weapons was easy to discern because of Iranian markings on it, he said. Because Iran maintains tight control over armaments, he said, shipment of the weapons into Iraq had to involve "elements associated with the Iranian government."
The official said Iran wants "control of surrogates" in Iraq, not an easy task because Iraqi Arab nationalist groups, not pro-Iranian groups, have more grass-roots support.
Iran has "only has a window of opportunity" before historic animosities between Arab Iraq and Persian Iran prevail, he said.
Snuffysmith
Sep 29 2006, 09:06 AM
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/29/washingt...agewanted=printSeptember 29, 2006
Book Says Bush Ignored Urgent Warning on Iraq
By DAVID E. SANGER
WASHINGTON, Sept. 28 — The White House ignored an urgent warning in September 2003 from a top Iraq adviser who said that thousands of additional American troops were desperately needed to quell the insurgency there, according to a new book by Bob Woodward, the Washington Post reporter and author. The book describes a White House riven by dysfunction and division over the war.
The warning is described in “State of Denial,” scheduled for publication on Monday by Simon & Schuster. The book says President Bush’s top advisers were often at odds among themselves, and sometimes were barely on speaking terms, but shared a tendency to dismiss as too pessimistic assessments from American commanders and others about the situation in Iraq.
As late as November 2003, Mr. Bush is quoted as saying of the situation in Iraq: “I don’t want anyone in the cabinet to say it is an insurgency. I don’t think we are there yet.”
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is described as disengaged from the nuts-and-bolts of occupying and reconstructing Iraq — a task that was initially supposed to be under the direction of the Pentagon — and so hostile toward Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, that President Bush had to tell him to return her phone calls. The American commander for the Middle East, Gen. John P. Abizaid, is reported to have told visitors to his headquarters in Qatar in the fall of 2005 that “Rumsfeld doesn’t have any credibility anymore” to make a public case for the American strategy for victory in Iraq.
The book, bought by a reporter for The New York Times at retail price in advance of its official release, is the third that Mr. Woodward has written chronicling the inner debates in the White House after the Sept. 11 attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the subsequent decision to invade Iraq. Like Mr. Woodward’s previous works, the book includes lengthy verbatim quotations from conversations and describes what senior officials are thinking at various times, without identifying the sources for the information.
Mr. Woodward writes that his book is based on “interviews with President Bush’s national security team, their deputies, and other senior and key players in the administration responsible for the military, the diplomacy, and the intelligence on Iraq.” Some of those interviewed, including Mr. Rumsfeld, are identified by name, but neither Mr. Bush nor Vice President Dick Cheney agreed to be interviewed, the book says.
Robert D. Blackwill, then the top Iraq adviser on the National Security Council, is said to have issued his warning about the need for more troops in a lengthy memorandum sent to Ms. Rice. The book says Mr. Blackwill’s memorandum concluded that more ground troops, perhaps as many as 40,000, were desperately needed.
It says that Mr. Blackwill and L. Paul Bremer III, then the top American official in Iraq, later briefed Ms. Rice and Stephen J. Hadley, her deputy, about the pressing need for more troops during a secure teleconference from Iraq. It says the White House did nothing in response.
The book describes a deep fissure between Colin L. Powell, Mr. Bush’s first secretary of state, and Mr. Rumsfeld: When Mr. Powell was eased out after the 2004 elections, he told Andrew H. Card Jr., the White House chief of staff, that “if I go, Don should go,” referring to Mr. Rumsfeld.
Mr. Card then made a concerted effort to oust Mr. Rumsfeld at the end of 2005, according to the book, but was overruled by President Bush, who feared that it would disrupt the coming Iraqi elections and operations at the Pentagon.
Vice President Cheney is described as a man so determined to find proof that his claim about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was accurate that, in the summer of 2003, his aides were calling the chief weapons inspector, David Kay, with specific satellite coordinates as the sites of possible caches. None resulted in any finds.
Two members of Mr. Bush’s inner circle, Mr. Powell and the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, are described as ambivalent about the decision to invade Iraq. When Mr. Powell assented, reluctantly, in January 2003, Mr. Bush told him in an Oval Office meeting that it was “time to put your war uniform on,” a reference to his many years in the Army.
Mr. Tenet, the man who once told Mr. Bush that it was a “slam-dunk” that weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq, apparently did not share his qualms about invading Iraq directly with Mr. Bush, according to Mr. Woodward’s account.
Mr. Woodward’s first two books about the Bush administration, “Bush at War” and “Plan of Attack,” portrayed a president firmly in command and a loyal, well-run team responding to a surprise attack and the retaliation that followed. As its title indicates, “State of Denial” follows a very different storyline, of an administration that seemed to have only a foggy notion that early military success in Iraq had given way to resentment of the occupiers.
The 537-page book describes tensions among senior officials from the very beginning of the administration. Mr. Woodward writes that in the weeks before the Sept. 11 attacks, Mr. Tenet believed that Mr. Rumsfeld was impeding the effort to develop a coherent strategy to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. Mr. Rumsfeld questioned the electronic signals from terrorism suspects that the National Security Agency had been intercepting, wondering whether they might be part of an elaborate deception plan by Al Qaeda.
On July 10, 2001, the book says, Mr. Tenet and his counterterrorism chief, J. Cofer Black, met with Ms. Rice at the White House to impress upon her the seriousness of the intelligence the agency was collecting about an impending attack. But both men came away from the meeting feeling that Ms. Rice had not taken the warnings seriously.
In the weeks before the Iraq war began, President Bush’s parents did not share his confidence that the invasion of Iraq was the right step, the book recounts. Mr. Woodward writes about a private exchange in January 2003 between Mr. Bush’s mother, Barbara Bush, the former first lady, and David L. Boren, a former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and a Bush family friend.
The book says Mrs. Bush asked Mr. Boren whether it was right to be worried about a possible invasion of Iraq, and then to have confided that the president’s father, former President George H. W. Bush, “is certainly worried and is losing sleep over it; he’s up at night worried.”
The book describes an exchange in early 2003 between Lt. Gen. Jay Garner, the retired officer Mr. Bush appointed to administer postwar Iraq, and President Bush and others in the White House situation room. It describes senior war planners as having been thoroughly uninterested in the details of the postwar mission.
After General Garner finished his PowerPoint presentation — which included his plan to use up to 300,000 troops of the Iraqi Army to help secure postwar Iraq, the book says — there were no questions from anyone in the situation room, and the president gave him a rousing sendoff.
But it was General Garner who was soon removed, in favor of Mr. Bremer, whose actions in dismantling the Iraqi army and removing Baathists from office were eventually disparaged within the government.
The book suggests that senior intelligence officials were caught off guard in the opening days of the war when Iraqi civilian fighters engaged in suicide attacks against armored American forces, the first hint of the deadly insurgent attacks to come.
In a meeting with Mr. Tenet of the Central Intelligence Agency, several Pentagon officials talked about the attacks, the book says. It says that Mr. Tenet acknowledged that he did not know what to make of them.
Mr. Rumsfeld reached into political matters at the periphery of his responsibilities, according to the book. At one point, Mr. Bush traveled to Ohio, where the Abrams battle tank was manufactured. Mr. Rumsfeld phoned Mr. Card to complain that Mr. Bush should not have made the visit because Mr. Rumsfeld thought the heavy tank was incompatible with his vision of a light and fast military of the future. Mr. Woodward wrote that Mr. Card believed that Mr. Rumsfeld was “out of control.”
The fruitless search for unconventional weapons caused tension between Vice President Cheney’s office, the C.I.A. and officials in Iraq. Mr. Woodward wrote that Mr. Kay, the chief weapons inspector in Iraq, e-mailed top C.I.A. officials directly in the summer of 2003 with his most important early findings.
At one point, when Mr. Kay warned that it was possible the Iraqis might have had the capability to make such weapons but did not actually produce them, waiting instead until they were needed, the book says he was told by John McLaughlin, the C.I.A.’s deputy director: “Don’t tell anyone this. This could be upsetting. Be very careful. We can’t let this out until we’re sure.”
Mr. Cheney was involved in the details of the hunt for illicit weapons, the book says. One night, Mr. Woodward wrote, Mr. Kay was awakened at 3 a.m. by an aide who told him Mr. Cheney’s office was on the phone. It says Mr. Kay was told that Mr. Cheney wanted to make sure he had read a highly classified communications intercept picked up from Syria indicating a possible location for chemical weapons.
Mr. Woodward and a colleague, Carl Bernstein, led The Post’s reporting during Watergate, and Mr. Woodward has since written a string of best sellers about Washington. More recently, the identity of Mr. Woodward’s Watergate source known as Deep Throat was disclosed as having been W. Mark Felt, a senior F.B.I. official.
In late 2005, Mr. Woodward was subpoenaed by the special prosecutor in the C.I.A. leak case. He also apologized to The Post’s executive editor for concealing for more than two years that he had been drawn into the scandal.
Mark Mazzetti and David Johnston contributed reporting from Washington, and Julie Bosman from New York.
Snuffysmith
Sep 30 2006, 03:01 PM
http://www.counterpunch.org/whitney09302006.htmlAll the News from Iraq is Bad ... and Getting Worse
The Breaking Point
By MIKE WHITNEY
It was another bad week in Iraq. While bodies were piling up in the Baghdad morgue and the militia fighting steadily intensified, the Bush administration was hit with a rash of PR scandals that are bound to erode public support for the war. The worst of these is the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) which was leaked to the New York Times and which stated that "the American invasion and occupation of Iraq has helped spawn a new generation of Islamic radicalism and that the overall terrorist threat has grown since the 9-11 attacks."
The NIE carries great weight because it represents the unanimous judgment of all 16 of the American intelligence agencies. The document's findings cast doubt on the central tenet of the war on terror, that is, that terror originates from a radical ideology (Islamo-fascism) which fosters an irrational hatred for modernity, western-style democracy, and personal freedom. The NIE proves that the Bush-Blair theory of terror is hopelessly flawed and that violent jihad is actually fueled by occupation and injustice. Terrorism is a reaction to foreign policy. It has nothing to do with "hating our freedoms". The NIE confirms this simple truism.
The long-term effects of the report are impossible to calculate. The Bush agenda is predicated on the "Big Lie", that we are under attack and that "We must fight them there, if we don't want to fight them here."The administration has manipulated the "perception of a threat"to justify its endless "preemptive"wars, curtailed civil liberties and enhanced powers of the executive. The NIE shows that the war on terror is a sham that only generates more violent extremism.
The administration will now have to counter the report's conclusions if it wants to revive support for the war on terror and continue its ongoing consolidation of power. We should anticipate another Karl Rove public relations campaign to reengage the public and perpetuate the global onslaught.
More Dismal News
The results from a number of polls appeared in last week's news. In a University of Maryland survey the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) found that "71% of Iraqis want the US troops to leave within a year". The poll also found that nearly 4 out of 5 Iraqis believe that the US military is "provoking more conflict than it is preventing"and that "60% of Iraqis approve of attacks on US-led forces."The survey shows that popular support for the occupation has continued to dwindle while hostility towards the American presence is growing beyond all expectation.
In still another poll (Harris poll) showed that only 20% of Americans are "still confidant that US policies in Iraq will be successful". Public support for the war is plummeting despite the enthusiastic efforts of the media and the political establishment.
Ironically, a "leak"from the Pentagon revealed that the Lincoln Group (which was the focus of an earlier investigation for planting "pro-occupation"stories in Iraqi newspapers) was just awarded another $6 million contract. According to the Kansas City Star, "The Washington-based group won a two year contract to monitor a number of English and Arabic media outlets and produce public relations products such as talking points or speeches for US forces in Iraq".
The administration continues to (cynically) believe that their well-paid propagandists can prevail in the "hearts and minds"campaign by creating patriotic sound bytes and poignant anecdotes about devoted soldiers performing their duties. What's needed, however, is a dramatic change of policy. The country is increasingly disillusioned with Iraq and is looking for signs of progress or a firm date for withdrawal. Rumsfeld's scribes at the Lincoln Group will have no luck trying to rekindle the confidence they have already squandered. All of the prime indicators are now pointed in the opposite direction and a full 63% of the American people now feel that the war was a "mistake".
Perception Management in the Perennial War
In a fascinating article by Eric Boehlert, "The Press downplays Iraq during the Campaign Season. Again"the author shows how the media either "covers"or "doesn't cover"the war depending on how close we are to the elections:
"Fact: In the 10 weeks prior to Election Day in 2004, the war in Iraq was the most reported story on the weekly news programs just twice, according to the media research of Andrew Tyndall. But immediately following Bush's reelection, the war in Iraq instantly became the most covered story on the nightly news programs"for 7 weeks in a row."
Boehlert also shows how the media has steadily reduced its coverage of the war to maintain the rapidly diminishing support:
"In 2003 ABC, NBC, and CBS nightly newscasts, on average, devoted 388 minutes each month to covering IraqBy 2005, that monthly tally had decreased by more than 50%---to 166 minutes each month. Today, unless there is a dramatic late-September surge in coverage, the Big Three nightly newscasts will end up the month having devoted a total of 40 minutes to Iraq, or less than 15% of their airtime."
15% less than 2003! And, Iraq continues to be the main issue on people's minds going into the election season.
These figures tell the "hidden"story of Iraq. They expose how the mainstream media intentionally reduces its coverage to maintain support for the war. The figures fail to show, however, the omissions and diversions that the media provides on an hourly basis. The American people are prevented from seeing flag-draped coffins, disgruntled GIs, or the vast devastation caused by military occupation. Televised coverage is carefully limited to fashion a misleading narrative of sectarian warfare, which suggests that the main problem is "Iraqi killing Iraqi". The real problem is US occupation, a fact that is unavoidably evident in every survey conducted in Iraq.
When we consider relentless maneuverings of the media, it is gratifying to see that Americans are finally beginning to recognize the truth behind the imagery. Fortunately, there are limits to the effectiveness of propaganda regardless of how adroitly it is employed.
Pushed to the Brink
In other news of the week, the Congressional Research Service announced that the "total cost of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and enhanced security at military bases since September 11, 2001, could reach $549 billion this year. The White House Office of Management and Budget estimated that the war will cost $110 billion for fiscal year 2007"(McClatchy Newspapers)
More than a half trillion dollars in 3 years.
Iraq is devouring resources at an unprecedented pace and producing nothing in return. There's no more "happy talk"from officials in the Bush administration about how "Iraq will pay for itself"through oil revenues as Paul Wolfowitz foolishly stated prior to the invasion. Iraq has become a black-hole swallowing up boatloads of cash that otherwise would have been earmarked for education, health care, infrastructure and security. The war is bankrupting the nation while grooming the next generation's terrorists. This is the very definition of failure.
The Iraqi mission is not only over-budget but overextended. The cracks and fissures in the military are quickly becoming gaping holes. The Army and Marines are trying to find creative ways to put more boots on the ground, but their only option is to increase deployments to the theatre. Some of the troops are presently on their 4th tour of duty and it is likely that even more of the National Guard will be called up, leaving the country vulnerable to terrorist attack or natural disaster.
The Washington Times reports that "The increased demand for troops comes at a time when military analysts say it is stressed to the breaking point.Non-deployed combat brigades are experiencing low-readiness ratings due mostly to lack of usable weapons and equipment. The wear and tear in Iraq is ruining M1A1 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Humvees and other equipment at such a fast pace that the Army has neither the money nor the industrial base to replace them."
The military is in a shambles and headed for a calamity.
America's enemies should be thrilled that Don Rumsfeld is still overseeing all operations in Iraq. His incompetence is only matched by his astonishing inability to learn from his mistakes. It's plain that America will not prevail with Rumsfeld in command.
Overextended, over-budget and mismanaged. The war in Iraq is foundering and the war on terror has been exposed as a fraud.
How much worse can it get?
There is no good news from Iraq. It's all bad. The magnitude of America's defeat is becoming clearer and clearer with each passing day. Rumsfeld's cheery propaganda campaign has fallen on hard times and will have no effect on the wars' final outcome. The problem is the policy; it is untenable and will require a thorough overhaul.
We should expect to see dramatic changes following the elections. The Iraq Survey Group, steered by committee-chair and Bush family friend James Baker, will release their findings right after the November balloting. Judging by their guarded comments, big changes are ahead. Perhaps, the troops will move to the perimeter and let the Iraqis kill each other in a full-blown civil war.
Whatever transpires, the first phase of the Iraqi fiasco is nearly over. The Bush administration will be compelled to protect its interests while limiting the exposure of its troops. They may choose to minimize their activities to bombing raids and counter-insurgency operations, further destroying the threadbare fabric of Iraqi society.
Security is not important. Lives are not important. Only oil and the people it enriches are important.
Snuffysmith
Oct 1 2006, 11:00 PM
http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/review...und-truth_x.htm'Truth' of troops in Iraq gets past politics
Updated 9/21/2006 8:07 PM ET E-mail
Scars remain: The Ground Truth follows several military personnel, includinga Marine at a service for 31 killed near Ar Rutbah, Iraq, in 2005.
By Claudia Puig, USA TODAY
The Ground Truth is a cinematic call to arms. It asks that we not only support the troops but also bear witness to their anguish, no matter what position we may have on the war in Iraq.
It is a documentary for those who proudly emblazon yellow ribbons, and for those who vehemently oppose the war. It should also be seen by those who may be uncertain what to think.
This troubling and gripping chronicle of the men and women who served in the military is profoundly moving. Through interviews with a half-dozen American soldiers who returned from fighting in Iraq scarred in myriad ways, we get a visceral sense of the heavy burden they have borne.
The film — spanning recruitment through deployment in Iraq and back to U.S. civilian life — is told from the vantage point of several strikingly articulate, candid and gravely disillusioned military personnel. Most sign up with hope and belief in the cause. Some regarded a military stint as a way of gaining career training, believing the recruiters who lured them with promises of top-notch medical and educational benefits.
Once there, some say, they were haunted by the sight of dead children. They return home alienated, guilt-ridden and depressed. Some come back missing a leg, an arm or otherwise disfigured. They contend that the government minimizes their physical and psychological pain.
While on duty, Marine Jimmy J. Massey lamented the toll of casualties — including women and children — from an attack on an Iraqi town. When his superior asks why he's so glum, he explains that being responsible for so many dead and wounded Iraqis made it a "bad day." He is sharply reprimanded by the officer, he says, with the rejoinder: "No, that's a good day."
This is undeniably one of the year's most compelling films, and also one of the saddest. Unflinching, disturbing and fascinating, The Ground Truth never weighs in on the merits of the war, nor engages in Bush-bashing. This is how these soldiers feel and there is no denying their sense of outrage.
Documentaries like this one have a valuable place in the world of film. Clearly, this is not intended to be an objective news report. Still, you wonder why there were no interviews with soldiers who felt their time in Iraq was well-spent.
It is not clear whether director Patricia Foulkrod tried to find such people and was unable to, or decided to focus solely on the war's gut-wrenching effects on the psyche.
The voices of these brave young people reverberate hauntingly. A Marine named Sean Huze is plagued by his experience in Iraq. Images of the destruction of villages and murder of innocents remain with him once he's back home with his wife. "Your purpose (in the military) is to kill, make no mistake," Huze says. "There was nothing honorable about what we did. And that broke my heart."
Snuffysmith
Oct 2 2006, 11:04 AM
The article below addresses winning hearts and minds in 4th Generation Warfare; it has some truly excellent insights that go beyond just the issue of “hearts and minds” and gives the term a new meaning and importance. The author is Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czega, founder and first director of the Schook of Adcanced Military Studies ar Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
AUSA: Army Magazine
Front and Center
08/01/2006
On Winning Hearts and Minds
By Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de Czege
For American and allied statesmen and generals, winning the complex contests of force of this century, whether they involve warring, policing or both in combination, will increasingly depend on winning the hearts and minds of two different groups of people—those at home and those among whom such contests are waged. This will be true whether the contest is with another state, as those in the recent past with Panama, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq, or with violent political movements, such as those being encountered in Afghanistan and Iraq today. Statesmen and generals cannot ignore the will of their own polities, and in modern times it has become increasingly prudent to court the people on the other side as well. Populations, friend or foe, can help or hinder. And installing a new government or supporting the counterinsurgent efforts of an ally under siege will require the patient support of the home population and the help of the governed abroad. While this is really an ageless problem, many challenges of winning hearts and minds are unique to our time. Consequently, 21st-century military doctrines must be built on a deeper understanding of how human beings think and how ideas are propagated through societies. The purpose of this article is to introduce some rigorous new ways to think about the art and science of winning hearts and minds.
We will have to reframe the way we go about doing it and will need ways to make our messages contagious to the specific people whose support we seek. We will have to identify the few key people necessary to transform the message into an epidemic mass movement, and we will need to be mindful of and shape the environment into one that will propel rather than choke off the epidemic. This suggests not 20th-century, industrial age, centralized, homogenized and mass-produced approaches, no matter how high-tech and glitzy, but localized, nuanced, decentralized, grass-roots-up and highly focused approaches that concentrate resources on a few key areas. This is what the winners in the 21st-century marketplace are doing, and this is what statesmen, generals, colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, warrant officers, sergeants, corporals and privates will have to do together in the complex contests of force we now face.
In the 20th century, the strategic aim of conquest was to replace hostile regimes with independent ones—not colonies, but responsible partners in the international system. Such wars imposed huge reconstruction costs on the victors. In the 21st century, powers have become more sensitive to these costs from the outset. They enter war with rules of engagement that try to balance military necessity and political objectives. The notion of winning the hearts and minds of the citizenry, however, is not yet central to early war planning, and seems to occur most often as an afterthought. The experience of the many complex contests of force of this century suggests giving primacy to this effort, as the logic of proper backward planning would suggest.
Successful 20th-century insurgents and counterinsurgents took into account the socio-political effects of their actions on the general populations of the country being contested, and 20th-century warfare among nation-states could succeed without undue concern for the hearts and minds of the people either at home or in the enemy country being “liberated” from tyranny. Citizens of 20th-century democracies, like the United States, Great Britain and France, might debate long over whether to go to war, but once duly constituted authorities took that step, all but a few citizens united behind the effort. Patriotic peer pressures, even in democracies at war, were so much greater then than they are today. It was considered high patriotic duty to trust the national leadership and unify to avenge the wrongs that caused the war. Few citizens had personal contacts in the enemy country. Those who did, especially if they had kin there, were suspected of divided loyalties. In the World War II United States, most ethnic Japanese spent the war in internment camps. For most citizens, the enemy was a distant, strange and dehumanized abstraction.
Once people were mobilized for war against an enemy country, there was little differentiation between the enemy regime and its citizens. In fact, citizens were considered complicit in whatever wrongs were committed. This was particularly true of the two world wars. The Geneva Conventions and the Law of Land Warfare were the only constraints on the treatment of noncombatants by the military. Some national armies were more scrupulous than others, but many millions of noncombatants were killed, injured or maimed as a normal consequence of industrial age war machines, especially in Europe and Asia. Rules of engagement for soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines were rarely stricter than these conventions required.
A phenomenon now commonplace was then only in its infancy. During the long war in Vietnam, while Americans were attempting various ways to win the support of the populations in South Vietnam and counter the will of those in the North, the Communist Vietnamese were trying to win the support of Americans at home as well as turn world opinion against the American effort.
For several significant reasons the enemy is now a far less distant, strange and dehumanized abstraction. It is more commonplace to differentiate between the enemy regime and its citizens, and the contest for hearts and minds has become a crucial, many sided and complex contest. These trends will continue. The most significant reasons for these changes came about as recently as the last decade of the 20th century. They have the potential to bring about surprising political change at pandemic speeds and proportions.
Global satellite, wireless and fiber optic cable technology expanded the scope, intensity, intrusivity and quality of global media coverage. Distant newsworthy events and problems are no longer dehumanized abstractions. Human suffering is recognizable globally for what it is. All sides have rapid access, the ability to capture the attention of billions of people and the savvy to spin their messages in their own interests.
When Cold War barriers fell, personal contacts and business with another one-third of the human race became possible. The population behind the Iron Curtain was educated, sophisticated and eager to reach across the former divide. The Internet provided a way for people of similar interests to form virtual communities regardless of geography or kinship.
The resulting global transparency and the new technical capabilities that facilitate it have intertwined people’s lives radically. This is very apparent in how people make their money, spend it and invest it for retirement, especially in the United States and the most developed democracies in Europe and Asia. (Closed tyrannies are the least affected.) In an increasing number of modernizing countries with open economies and improving governance, the economic enterprises that pay salaries and dividends sell globally, buy materials and services globally, draw investment funds globally and invest their retirement funds globally. Global supply chains mean a wider variety of products, at increasingly lower cost for equivalent quality for virtually all households.
The full political implications of all this are far from clear, but this much is discernible: communities of interest cross national boundaries much more easily and extensively today than in the 1960s when the disaffected anti-war movement in the United States communicated with the Communist Party in Vietnam. During the war between NATO countries and the Serbian Slobodan Milosevic regime over genocide in Kosovo province, many of the most educated Serbs, those of the budding middle class of entrepreneurs and technicians, were more interested in economic development and the dream of eventual political and economic integration with the regime’s enemies than in supporting their national leader. The precise destruction by NATO aircraft of property and the economic infrastructure as well as the threats to their safety caused many Serbs to rally to their natural internal enemy, the nationalist tyrant. In many instances in the future, current trends will favor the developed democracies in transnational transactions.
It will be increasingly important to identify and take into account such transnational affinities. At a minimum, one should not antagonize potential allies needlessly, and military planners have increasingly come to recognize this. Rules of engagement have become more specific and of greater strategic importance. Even when soldiers engage in warfare with other states, they may also make war against stateless allies of the enemy state while they cooperate with some social groups or communities within it, compete with some and maintain neutrality with others.
Population densities are increasing everywhere, especially in underdeveloped and failing states. Knowledge of social dynamics and the cultural mosaic will matter more. What “the people” think, the decisions they make and the actions and mass movements that flow from them will matter more. In fact, success in war will hinge on the ability to influence the decisions of various audiences to support or impede one side or the other. Similarly, success in policing operations, which I wrote about in my last article in ARMY Magazine (July), will depend greatly on influencing various groups to trust their present security and future prospects to the governments we support rather than to extended families, clans or tribes that make their separate accommodations with violent political movements or organized crime.
While it was never easy and Americans rarely mastered it, winning hearts and minds will be more difficult than ever in this information age. There will be no whispering to the home audience without adversaries also listening in. There is more than one people to win or keep neutral. Often there are several peoples with competing agendas, and they all are listening no matter to whom your message may be directed. The people today are much more savvy than those in 20th-century wars. Thus the message has to be far subtler, and the messenger cleverer. Crude and broad appeals are more inclined to backfire. Not only will unsubtle kinetics tend to drown out soft power maneuver and information operations, but even necessary security measures that inflict short-term pain for long-term gain may be impossible to implement (for example, British Gen. Templer’s strategic hamlet program for Chinese squatters during the Malayan emergency).
Finally, there is the problem of clutter. People the world over are becoming immune to high-tech communications and clutter at the very time we in the services are becoming more seized with the need to maximize our high-tech communications advantages and sophisticated information operations. People overwhelmed with new forms of communications tend to pay less attention to it. In a crisis, people are less likely to heed the advice of a stranger, even when that stranger speaks to them in the privacy of the home while safely surrounded by family and friends. We will need to engage people during crisis and cause them to change their behavior. That will remain a tall order.
The good news is that the science of how people think and how social groups are influenced is advancing, and two books by Malcolm Gladwell, Blink and The Tipping Point, make that science readily available to those of us whose predominantly hard science precommissioning education kept us away from such soft sciences.
In The Tipping Point, Gladwell shows us why epidemics are useful metaphors for shaping our thinking about winning hearts and minds. His ideas should affect every thinking military professional with a message to peddle (“surrender to me”) or a campaign to promote (“support a new democratically elected government”). In fact, his ideas should shape the way we all look at every military operation in the 21st century.
This notion of a tipping point seems to apply to social phenomenon particularly. Ideas pass a certain point in popularity or acceptance and then they tip.
We assume, intuitively, that neighborhoods and social problems decline in some kind of steady progression. But sometimes they may not decline steadily at all; at the tipping point, schools can lose control of their students, and family life can disintegrate all at once.
What was gradual arithmetic progress or stasis before, suddenly changes at a dramatic geometric rate. Anyone who has ever been in a combat unit that has panicked, or observed it in the enemy force, has witnessed a virtual epidemic of fear seize the previously brave. It can happen incredibly fast and unexpectedly. Historians have highlighted the dramatic collapse of France in May 1940. We have all stood by as the former Soviet Union collapsed rapidly and inexplicably. Some recently had a hand in the rapid collapse of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. Many have firsthand experience of the surprising and rapid rise of violent resistance in Iraq. What Gladwell says about tipping points should not surprise us. It is useful to know how and why they occur.
One of Gladwell’s examples is the dramatic drop in murders and other serious crimes in New York between 1992 and 1997.
In 1992, there were 2,154 murders in New York City and 626,182 serious crimes, with the weight of those falling on places like Brownsville and East New York. But then something strange happened. At some critical point, the crime rate began to turn. It tipped. Within five years, murders had dropped 64.3 percent to 770. In Brownsville and East New York, the sidewalks filled up again, the bicycles came back and old folks reappeared on the stoops.
Gladwell points out that when something like this happens, different professions will attribute the change to different causes. Each will make a diagnosis that explains the change from their particular frames of reference, but each diagnosis will reveal causes that would explain only steady arithmetic progress, not the dramatic change in evidence. In the New York example, the police, criminologists and economists all identified different long-term trends. The puzzling gap between the scale of changes and the size of the effect intrigued him. He noted, “Humans are socialized to make rough approximations between cause and effect based on the idea that what goes into any transaction or relationship or system must be directly related, in intensity and dimension, to what comes out. We tend to think in arithmetic progression analogies, not in geometric ones. That little changes can have big effects is a fairly radical idea.”
After examining many such social epidemics, Gladwell concludes that “ideas, products, messages and behaviors spread just like viruses do.” Epidemics of disease are a function of three things: the people who transmit infectious agents; the agent itself; and the environment in which the agent is operating. When this system is jolted out of equilibrium, it tips. Some change (and it may be very small) has happened in one or more of these areas.
What happened in New York is that the small number of people in the small number of situations in which the police or the new social forces had some impact started behaving very differently, and that behavior spread to other would-be criminals in similar situations. Somehow, a large number of people in New York got infected with an anticrime virus in a short time.
The Tipping Point answers two basic questions. Why is it that some ideas or behaviors or products start epidemics and others do not? And what can be done to deliberately start and control positive epidemics of our own? He begins by identifying the fundamental mechanisms at work: the contagious agent (or contagious idea) and the several little changes at the margin that unexpectedly have very big effects in a relatively short time. There is no reason for us to conclude that winning hearts and minds follows any other mechanism or process.
Gladwell argues convincingly that social movements, such as winning hearts and minds, are propagated primarily by word of mouth, and, paradoxically, that word-of-mouth epidemics are becoming more, not less, important. The flood of information coming at people overwhelms their ability to make judgments. Thus they rely more and more on very primitive social contacts, traditional forms of communications and the people in their lives whom they respect, admire and trust. Among the latter there are three kinds of people who play key and very specialized roles—Mavens, Connectors and Salesmen.
Research and experience tells us that people adopt new ideas at widely different rates. These are easily represented on a bell curve. At the near end there are a small handful of innovators or visionaries, followed by a slightly larger group of early adapting opinion leaders. Then follows the big bulge making up the early majority and the late majority. At the tail are the laggards. It is essential to understand the different motivations of each group and the fact that they do not communicate well among themselves. Visionaries want revolutionary change and are willing to take huge risks to achieve it. The early majority are pragmatists. Change must fit into the world of complex arrangements they inhabit, and they must see a pragmatic improvement. The late majority are conservative conformists. If it appears to pan out for the early majority, they do not want to be left behind. The laggards are the archconservatives. The problem is the usual chasm between the visionaries who “get it” quickly and easily with little translation, and the majority who may have trouble even making sense of the new idea, never mind finding it practical or personally advantageous. Mavens, Connectors and Salesmen together make up the bridge between visionaries and the pragmatists. The key lies in finding them and getting their help.
Some people matter more than others in the winning of hearts and minds. We are all familiar with the finding of sociologists that in most organizations, 20 percent of the people do 80 percent of the work. Studies of social epidemics indicate that most of the work is done by a tiny fraction of unusual personality types.
All people do not pass along ideas at an equal rate. Most people live and move within a small circle of fellow workers, close friends and family. Some have more contacts to share ideas. Some few are extraordinary Connectors because their worlds are large and open-ended. They occupy many different worlds and subcultures. This is something intrinsic to their personality, a combination of curiosity, self-confidence, sociability and energy. The best way to get through a door is through a social contact. Connectors network even through weak ties or acquaintances. When an idea gets the approval of these people, many get exposed to it quickly. Connectors possess raw transmission power. They are naturally and irrepressibly social. Finding them within any community should not be difficult. They may find you.
Mavens, the information brokers within their large networks, inordinately influence Connectors. If anyone knows who can be trusted to have sound judgment on any important subject, it will be the Connector. He will know that these people are not necessarily the people with the highest social standing in the community. Just because a person has a high social standing in a specific society does not mean that he or she is an opinion leader in a particular field of knowledge. Interests among people differ widely, and the propensity to be and remain informed on any subject is not evenly distributed. Mavens are people who are naturally intrigued by and naturally pursue knowledge about a particular subject.
Not only are Mavens keenly interested in new knowledge about their favored field, but they are compelled to form judgments and pass them on to all who will listen. Their motivation is purely social—an automatic and reflexive desire to be informed and helpful in sharing knowledge. What makes them important is not only what they know but how they pass it along. The message “The British are coming!” was carried by a volunteer, riding on a cold night, with no personal agenda other than concern for the liberty of his peers. Gladwell concludes that Paul Revere was probably both a Connector and a Maven. As a Connector he knew exactly whom to contact in every village and settlement along the way. As a Maven of Colonial politics, it was natural that the tip-off about the possible British operation would find its way to him, and he was compelled to tell every person he saw along the route. All he needed was confirmation by the lookout and the signal of whether by land or by sea. The result was a very large turnout indeed. For years people thought that the small turnout generated by the parallel ride of William Dawes that very same night was because he passed through Loyalist areas. Not true. He was neither a Maven nor a Connector.
Finding Mavens is more difficult, unless you set Maven traps, as savvy businesses do. The cost of finding and converting these rare people is well worth it. Such traps usually involve a special offer of information on their favorite subject.
Mavens, however, are not persuaders. For social epidemics to start, some people, including the groups identified by studies as early adopting and early majority types, have to change their minds and be persuaded to actually do something. Salesmen have the specialized skills to persuade those who are unconvinced by the messages they hear. A few persuaded Salesmen are essential to starting a hearts and minds epidemic.
Who are these Salesmen, what makes them so good and how do we recognize them? Studies show that Salesmen have a kind of natural exuberance, honestly love helping people and are particularly gifted at making rational, clearly articulated and cogent arguments. To be effective, they have to believe in what they are selling. What separates a great Salesman from an average one is the number and quality of answers to objections commonly raised, and the ability to judge what kind of responses work best with what kinds of people. But there is one more vital factor that makes great Salesmen. They can build a level of trust and rapport more quickly and credibly than others and when they sell something they like or believe in, their nonverbal cues, like smiles and nods, communicate powerfully.
When a Salesman sells, there is no ambiguity in the presentation of the message or its delivery. When two people talk, what really happens is an elaborate and precise dance. Beyond talking and listening in turn, each partner underscores words and meaning with facial expressions and hand, arm and body movements while the other responds in kind and in rhythm. These forge a bond or not. Salesmen have more mastery over this reflex than others. Research reveals that they can draw people into their own rhythms and dictate the terms of the interaction. Research also reveals that an elemental communication among humans is to naturally imitate emotions of support and caring. Emotions are shown to be contagious. Some people are better at sending emotions than others and are thus more influential than others. All such subtle nonverbal cues and communications are as important as verbal messages, sometimes more so, especially when this person is known, loved and trusted already.
Salesmen should not be difficult to recognize in any community. They are the likeable people who exude charm, enthusiasm and that recognizable something more difficult to put your finger on. They are naturally energetic positive thinkers. And, as the example of Paul Revere illustrates, sometimes one person can be more than one of these valuable types of people, but these will be very rare.
But the most important point for soldiers and marines engaged in the current deadly struggles for hearts and minds is that all contenders will vie for the allegiance of the few Connectors, Mavens and Salesmen in every rural village and urban community. The importance of knowing the people among whom these struggles are waged boils down to finding and converting these few.
To start an epidemic, Connectors, Mavens and Salesmen have to have a memorable message to pass on. As much as we would like to believe that the inherent quality of ideas makes them contagious, Gladwell’s research reveals that small and seemingly trivial things make messages stick.
Not only do epidemics tip because of the extraordinary efforts of a few select carriers, but also because something happens to transform the epidemic itself; the strains change to become more resistant to people’s immune system. An idea becomes more appealing to a target audience. Research indicates that there are specific ways of making a message memorable, such as relatively simple changes in presentation and how the information is structured. Gladwell argues that for messages to have the maximum impact on all their intended audiences, inordinate efforts will be required to ensure that busy practical people of a culture foreign to ours not only hear and remember what we are saying to them, but find it attractive enough to take certain risks to act as we desire. We cannot assume that this will be easy or self-evident, because contagiousness is often an unexpected property.
Conventional advertisers believe in speaking loudly and often enough—the rule of six hearings—to make a message memorable. They wage war on competing clutter with humor, splashy graphics and celebrity endorsements. Such methods are less effective than it is believed, and they are often impractical in a combat zone. Worse still, such tactics can also alienate or invite ridicule.
A combat zone has its special kind of clutter. Some of those who are clamoring for attention have hostile intent. This is the first hurdle to overcome before any community will even listen. More on this in the discussion of shaping the context.
To start a hearts and minds epidemic, the message must have five essential qualities. First, it must be credible. Americans, Pushtun villagers and Sadr City residents will not find the same truths equally credible. An incredible message may be true, but it will not be entertained seriously. And as much as we would like to spin a purse out of a sow’s ear, such attempts generally backfire. Therefore, second, the message has to be verifiable locally and by the intended audience. It is essential to think through how local people can verify it. Third, it must be understood in the way it was intended. Local testing for this quality is vital. Fourth, the message must apply to people personally and concretely, not abstractly. For instance, how will supporting this election process at this time affect their lives? And finally, how they can act on it in their local community must be unambiguous. Localized and clearly conveyed instructions are essential.
All this sounds like common sense, and it is, but following such rules without shortcuts is difficult and rarely done. What makes sense to one cultural community may not to another. Cross-cultural communications and communicating with several different cultural communities at once can be very tricky. It takes patience, persistence and some trial and error; however, small and seemingly trivial things make messages either contagious or counterproductive. And then there is the competitive nature of the contest when the opposition is not bound by truth in advertising rules. In fact, to win, all he has to do is cause you to fail.
Epidemics are sensitive to the conditions and circumstances of the times and places in which they occur. In fact, studies have proven that people are extremely sensitive to context. They respond to signals in their physical surroundings and take cues from their social environment.
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling are authors of the so-called broken window theory. They say that features of our environment provide a strong impetus to act a certain way. While we tend to explain behavior in terms of personal attributes, the truth is that a troubled person may be tipped toward crime by something as simple as everyday signs of disorder like trash in the streets or graffiti. These send a strong signal that says, “No one cares, and no one is in charge.”
When the crime epidemic in New York City was turned around, key city leaders believed in this theory and put it into practice. Many now believe that in addition to the other positive changes at work, the vigorous implementation of this theory, first in the subway system and then generally throughout the city, tipped the rising crime wave dramatically.
Often it is within our power to change the signals that invite crime or dysfunctional behavior in the first place. The principle is to begin somewhere and show steady, inexorable progress. In New York, officials began reclaiming the subway system one train and one line at a time. Once reclaimed and secured, these areas were not allowed to become unsecured again. Then they moved area by area to what they called quality of life and other petty street crimes. In the process of catching petty criminals, they also swept up perpetrators of more serious crimes. The New York authorities thus sent a clear and unambiguous message of unremitting progress and no prospect of retreat to potential criminals.
This principle has been put to use in Iraq and elsewhere by various commanders and in various ways, within their capacity and resources. But for such approaches to work, commanders require enough resources, strong support from above and a sustained effort over time. And they must first meet the people’s fundamental expectations of any government—it must keep them safe, secure their property and facilitate their livelihood, and not just now and then, but, to a reasonable extent, always. When people fear the consequences of acting on the message being sent, it does not matter how memorable it is, no epidemic will follow.
Small, close-knit groups have the power to magnify the epidemic potential of a message or idea. This is another example of how context affects the course of social epidemics. We are all susceptible to peer pressure and social norms. Psychologists tell us that when people are asked to consider evidence or make decisions in a group, they come to very different conclusions than when they are asked the same question by themselves. The spread of any new and contagious ideology can be accelerated with the skillful use of group power.
People with an idea to sell have long realized the value of creating a community around new converts where those new beliefs can be practiced, expressed and nurtured. This is one effective way to make a fundamental change in people’s beliefs and behavior. One successful strategy for rapidly propagating a contagious message through history has been to collect the most enthusiastic followers in a particular area into close-knit societies. In this way one super Connector/Maven/Salesman, through occasional visits, can tie many groups together, while daily group dynamics reinforce basic tenets of the movement while they are away.
The rule of 150 refers to the largest number of people who can be in a close-knit group. It is supported by a concept in cognitive psychology called channel capacity, the limited amount of space in our brain for certain kinds of important social information. Neocortex size correlates with social group size in primates. The larger the neocortex, the larger average group they live in. Brains enlarge to handle the complexities of large social groups. Not only do social beings have to know everyone in the group, but they also have to know how everyone gets along and relates to everyone else. In a group of five people that makes 10 separate relationships to understand. In groups of 20, the number of separate two-way relationships to know and remember is already 190. Even a small increase in group size creates significant additional social and intellectual burdens. Scientists believe that 150 represents the maximum number of individuals with whom humans can have a genuine social relationship. Anthropological literature confirms this number again and again. In one study, 148.4 were the number of people in the villages of 21 separate hunter and gatherer societies across several continents. The size of companies of soldiers across many nations and centuries has remained steady at no more than 150. At this size, orders can be implemented and unruly behavior controlled on the basis of personal loyalties and direct man-to-man contacts. With larger groups, this becomes impossible. Beyond this number, people become strangers to each other, and division into separate groups appear, loyalties divide, disputes erupt. Smaller groups are more close-knit and share trust.
The rule of 150 has several important implications for winning hearts and minds. Below that number, people are more easily infected by the group or community ethos. Such groups are powerful incubators for ideas because people can more easily agree and act with one voice. They can also coalesce and successfully counteract the poisonous surrounding contextual influences. Unity comes from sharing a common relationship.
Groups that adhere to the rule of 150 also have one other very powerful property called transactive memory. This is more than the sum of ideas and impressions stored in individual brains, but people in close-knit groups also store knowledge about who in the group knows what about what. People create an implicit joint memory.
Since mental energy is limited, people in such groups can concentrate on what each knows best. Truly knowing a person means knowing their skills, abilities and passions—what they like, what they do, what they want to do, what they are truly good at doing. It also means trusting someone else to know things in their specialty. This gives the Mavens in the group much more power to infect others. It’s the recreation at the organizational level of the kind of intimacy that exists in a family.
This kind of intimacy makes groups of less than 150 much more effective and incredibly efficient at adaptation and competition—entrepreneurial. Opponents in the 20th century were made up of large monolithic hierarchies. Today, there is much more likely to be many small and relatively diverse organizations loosely held together by one compelling and contagious idea. These are groups that exploit the bonds of memory and peer pressure.
As Gladwell says, “One paradox of social epidemics is that in order to create one contagious movement, you often have to create many small movements first—all headed roughly in the same direction or focused on one thing.” The important thing for soldiers and marines to bear in mind is that while this is the mechanism implacable foes and warring factions of today employ to win hearts and minds, they can employ this piece of wisdom themselves. A national hearts and minds campaign is won one clan, one village and one community of close-knit people at a time. There is no substitute for winning the confidence and trust of each of these, one by one. It has been done, but far too often once it has, we abandon the village or community altogether for another place, or the handoff to the relieving force is ineffectively done. The second try is always more difficult, by far.
We still have much to learn about the successful application of military forces in the 21st century. We need to reframe the way we think about the world and the problems to which statesmen and generals will apply military forces.
First, these problems will primarily be social ones. The ways we have simplified and bounded problems in the past will not be practical. And as in all military operations since Urgent Fury in Grenada, with the one possible exception of Operations Desert Shield and Storm, winning hearts and minds in support of the strategic aim will be the essential core around which operations should be planned and executed, rather than an afterthought, as even recently. The corollary to this is: all elements of national and coalition power, not only the military, should be leveraged in support.
Second, recognizing the difficulty of winning hearts and minds, there are new questions we should ask before statesmen make decisions to act. New kinds of foreknowledge become salient.
Third, centralized and homogenized hearts and minds campaigns and approaches aimed at the population in general simply miss the target. Focused, nuanced and decentralized approaches that concentrate resources on a few key areas to do a lot with a little should replace broad brush, homogenized and centralized efforts that now do a little with a lot. But the prize is great for those who grasp these fundamental ideas because people can radically transform their behavior or beliefs in the face of the right kind of impetus.
Fourth, I have given far too little space in this article to the other side of the coin in the many sided and complex contest for hearts and minds—maintaining support of the people at home. Gladwell’s ideas serve as a useful guide for those crucial efforts as well. Nothing is as popular as success, and early success followed by steady competent progress is of course the simple and timeless formula that satisfied the democratic citizens of ancient Athens as well as those of any other free society. Such societies should be even more hesitant to launch operations on their own initiative without the essential knowledge of the challenges ahead and the means to see them through. When Athens did so during the Peloponnesian War, the mistake was fatal.
The final point is this: the science of the military art and science refers to far more than how to get accurate and lethal steel on target and how to achieve a sudden, devastating positional advantage. It includes a wide array of soft social sciences equally pertinent to getting the mission accomplished. These will require greater attention in the future without compromising standards of knowledge in the other fields.
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BRIG. GEN. HUBA WASS DE CZEGE, USA Ret., a consultant for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command advanced warfighting experiments, was one of the principal developers of the Army’s AirLand Battle concept and the founder and first director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
202 797-5271 in DC
301 840-8992 in MD
winslowwheeler@comcast.net
Snuffysmith
Oct 3 2006, 08:17 AM
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=17696Republicans’ October Surprise: Keep harmful surprises under lock and key
It’s just starting to dawn on both Pentagon and White House that you cannot run an empire without an imperial army; and the military cannot even keep up with the insurgencies in two nations, Afghanistan and Iraq, with a combined population of 50 million, says Ben Tanosborn.
You can let your guard down for now, Ahmadinejad! Fear not, foreign and domestic enemies of the Empire! Bush’s White House has declared a moratorium on any new belligerence for the first half of the fall… and until after mid-term elections [November 7] you won’t hear an administration mouse squeak anywhere – other than the tireless Energizer pounding, tattooing in our minds, the message that national security can only be provided the elephantine way.
Everything the government does will stay classified, and our master control will only operate selected channels with censured pictures and no sound. And it will be allowed to remain that way as the US media continues to be its true self: docile and respectful, subservient and dumb. Until Election Day, silence will reign.
Bombing of Iran can wait another day, and Syria needn’t be accused of looking cross-eyed at Israel. The best way to assure a next Republican Congress is for the Bushies to keep a low hawkish profile until the vote has been tallied… their way.
As for Woodward’s book, any fire during the first week or two of guest appearances in the media will be quickly extinguished, and the controversy will die of natural death; after all, this questionable investigative reporter has been living for three decades off the Watergate fat. Didn’t he recently write two books where he gave Bush undeserved praise? Why should his compilation of rumors now lead us the other way? The nation has already been thoroughly brainwashed into extreme fear.
No, Woodward’s book will not serve as the Democrats’ own October Surprise. And the folks at the White House cannot ridiculously engage in saber rattling with any more nations that may represent evil to this messianic madman that occupies it. It’s just starting to dawn on both Pentagon and White House that you cannot run an empire without an imperial army; and the military cannot even keep up with the insurgencies in two nations, Afghanistan and Iraq, with a combined population of 50 million. For Bush to extend the crusade to 70 million Iranians would be sheer madness… and most people in his cabal may not be overly bright, but neither are they insane.
As for the military, the GOP-led Pentagon needs to keep things low key and cool. All those “investigations” involving crimes committed by the troops need to remain just that: investigations, purported crimes yet to be resolved. Haditha and the rest… hush! This is not the time to reach decisions and charge soldiers. Nor is this the time to tell the American public that recruitment for the military is not going well, and that now 1 in 7 enlistees joins the military thanks to a “moral waiver,” where the ratio was 1 in 9 before. Let’s face it; we are still a long ways from the “no questions asked” banner at the recruiting stations of the French Foreign Legion. [One prays it’ll never get to the point where gang-training becomes a positive trait for the recruitment of marines.]
And while they hush-hush the military dirty linen, it’s important that the wholesale deception extends to the economy as well. It’s critical for the GOP to maintain alive the myth of the “good economy” and keep the truth under wraps a little longer. For the “housing balloon” (misnamed a bubble) has began to deflate, and it will take a few months before the disappearing middle class comes to the realization that they are not so well-off; having lived during the past few years not on the fruits of their own labor but on the future sweat of their kids and grandkids. A bubble bursts all at once, but the “economy balloon” deflates slowly before recession, or worse, is finally reached.
As for the deteriorating state of “gainful employment”… sh! The GOP faithful, including its Wall Street frontline, must silence any rumors that America is becoming a minimum wage nation, and that in this “great” economy only 20 percent of the jobs (yes… one in five!) are adequately compensated to give a person a sense of worth, or the ability to maintain a household. Mum! This is a taboo topic, a growing economy where much of the workforce has been experiencing economic degeneration for over a generation… and wealth has been channeled to the reservoir of a chosen few and their enablers.
From now until November 7, the watchword for the GOP – its October Surprise – is to keep out any harmful surprises. The reality continues to be that a solid majority of American males still prefer a “regular Joe” they can watch a football game and have a beer with… and that’s Bush. And as far as American moms, they just want cheap gas for their SUVs; and gas prices have recently come down some… never mind how much they had gone up. So for the GOP, its best bet, its October Surprise, is hush! Make sure the political base gets to vote, while trying to keep others from the ballot box.
And, if this October Surprise of silence fails for the GOP… there is always a go-to last resort, a technological godfather of sorts, the Diebold machines (or Devil machines) where instead of a paper trail, there is a trail of sulfur… and rotten eggs. Not just in Ohio, but other states.
GOP’s October Surprise: to silence any possible military, political or economic surprises for the next five weeks. The rest [to keep ownership of Congress] is a Karl Rove cinch.
© 2006 Ben Tanosborn
Snuffysmith
Oct 4 2006, 10:48 PM
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/05/washingt...059&partner=AOLMilitary Hones a New Strategy on Insurgency
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Published: October 5, 2006
WASHINGTON, Oct. 4 — The United States Army and Marines are finishing work on a new counterinsurgency doctrine that draws on the hard-learned lessons from Iraq and makes the welfare and protection of civilians a bedrock element of military strategy.
The doctrine warns against some of the practices used early in the war, when the military operated without an effective counterinsurgency playbook. It cautions against overly aggressive raids and mistreatment of detainees. Instead it emphasizes the importance of safeguarding civilians and restoring essential services, and the rapid development of local security forces.
The current military leadership in Iraq has already embraced many of the ideas in the doctrine. But some military experts question whether the Army and the Marines have sufficient troops to carry out the doctrine effectively while also preparing for other threats.
The subtleties of the battle were highlighted Wednesday when the Iraqi Interior Ministry suspended a police brigade on suspicion that some members had been involved in death squads. The move was the most serious step Iraqi officials had taken to tackle the festering problem of militias operating within ministry forces. [Page A19.]
The new doctrine is part of a broader effort to change the culture of a military that has long promoted the virtues of using firepower and battlefield maneuvers in swift, decisive operations against a conventional enemy.
“The Army will use this manual to change its entire culture as it transitions to irregular warfare,” said Jack Keane, a retired four-star general who served in 2003 as the acting chief of staff of the Army. “But the Army does not have nearly enough resources, particularly in terms of people, to meet its global responsibilities while making such a significant commitment to irregular warfare.”
The doctrine is outlined in a new field manual on counterinsurgency that is to be published next month. But recent drafts of the unclassified documents have been made available to The New York Times, and military officials said that the major elements of final version would not change.
The spirit of the document is captured in nine paradoxes that reflect the nimbleness required to win the support of the people and isolate insurgents from their potential base of support — a task so complex that military officers refer to it as the graduate level of war.
Instead of massing firepower to destroy Republican Guard troops and other enemy forces, as was required in the opening weeks of the invasion of Iraq, the draft manual emphasizes the importance of minimizing civilian casualties. “The more force used, the less effective it is,” it notes.
Stressing the need to build up local institutions and encourage economic development, the manual cautions against putting too much weight on purely military solutions. “Tactical success guarantees nothing,” it says.
Noting the need to interact with the people to gather intelligence and understand the civilians’ needs, the doctrine cautions against hunkering down at large bases. “The more you protect your force, the less secure you are,” it asserts.
The military generally turned its back on counterinsurgency operations after the Vietnam War. The Army concentrated on defending Europe against a Soviet attack. The Marines were focused on expeditionary operations in the third world.
“Basically, after Vietnam, the general attitude of the American military was that we don’t want to fight that kind of war again,” said Conrad C. Crane, the director of the military history institute at the Army War College, a retired Army lieutenant colonel and one of the principal drafters of the new doctrine. “The Army’s idea was to fight the big war against the Russians and ignore these other things.”
A common assumption was that if the military trained for major combat operations, it would be able to easily handle less violent operations like peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. But that assumption proved to be wrong in Iraq; in effect, the military without an up-to-date doctrine. Different units improvised different approaches. The failure by civilian policy makers to prepare for the reconstruction of Iraq compounded the problem.
The limited number of forces was also a constraint. To mass enough troops to storm Falluja, an insurgent stronghold, in 2004, American commanders drew troops from Haditha, another town in western Iraq. Insurgents took advantage of the Americans’ limited numbers to attack the police there. Iraqi policemen were executed, dealing a severe setback to efforts to build a local force.
Frank G. Hoffman, a retired Marine infantry officer who works as a research fellow at an agency at the Marine base at Quantico, Va., said that in 2005, the Marines sometimes lacked sufficient forces to safeguard civilians. As a result, while these forces were often effective “in neutralizing an identifiable foe, they could not stay and work with the population the way the classical counterinsurgency would suggest.”
The effort to develop the new program began a year ago under Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, former commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the current chief of the First Marine Expeditionary Force. Colonel Crane, Lt. Col. John A. Nagl and Col. Douglas King of the Marines were among the major drafters.
Academics and experts from private groups were asked for input. A draft was completed in June and was circulated for comment. Almost 800 responses were received, but military officials said they would not alter the substance of the new doctrine.
“We are codifying the best practices of previous counterinsurgency campaigns and the lessons we have learned from Iraq and Afghanistan to help our forces succeed in the current fight and prepare for the future,” Colonel Nagl said.
In drafting the doctrine, the military drew upon some of the classic texts on counterinsurgency by the likes of T. E. Lawrence of Arabia, and David Galula, whose ideas were partly informed by his experience in Algeria.
Colonel Crane said that many of the ideas adopted for the manual had been percolating throughout the military. “In many ways, this is a bottom-up change, “ he said. “The young soldiers who had been through Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Iraq and Afghanistan, understood why we need to do this.”
As the manual is being drafted, the military has also revised the curriculum at its war colleges and training ranges to emphasize counterinsurgency. At the National Training Center in California, the old tank-on-tank war games against a Soviet-style enemy have been supplanted by combat rehearsals in which troops on their way to Iraq and Afghanistan engage in mock operations with role players who simulate insurgents, militias and civilians.
Dennis Tighe, a training program manager for the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, said the rehearsals were vital for preparing troops for their new counterinsurgency mission. But the Army is stretched so thin and so many units are focused on rehearsing for Iraq and Afghanistan at the training center that concerns have grown that the Army may be raising a new group of young officers with little experience in high-intensity warfare against heavily equipped armies like North Korea.
“That is one of the things folks are a little concerned about,” Mr. Tighe said.
While the counterinsurgency doctrine attempts to look beyond Iraq, it cites as a positive example the experience in 2005 of the Army’s Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which worked with Iraqi security forces to clear Tal Afar of insurgents, to hold the town with Iraqi and American troops, then to encourage reconstruction there, an approach known as “clear, hold, build.”
One military officer who served in Iraq said American units there generally carried out the tenets of the emerging doctrine when they had sufficient forces. But protecting civilians is a troop-intensive task. He noted that there were areas in which there were not enough American and Iraqi troops to protect Iraqis adequately against intimidation, a central element of the counterinsurgency strategy.
“The units that have sufficient forces are applying the doctrine with good effect,” said the officer, who is not authorized to speak on military policy. “Those units without sufficient forces can only conduct raids to disrupt the enemy while protecting themselves. They can’t do enough to protect the population effectively and partner with Iraqi forces.”
Snuffysmith
Oct 4 2006, 10:52 PM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...0401707_pf.html'Just a Comma' Becomes Part of Iraq Debate
Opponents See Bush's Words on War as Insensitive or as Code for Religious Right
By Peter Baker
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, October 5, 2006; A19
SCOTTSDALE, Ariz., Oct. 4 -- When the president speaks, every word can be subject to scrutiny. Even the punctuation marks.
As he heads out on the campaign trail, haunted by an unpopular war, President Bush has begun reassuring audiences that this traumatic period in Iraq will be seen as "just a comma" in the history books. By that, aides say, he means to reinforce his message of resolve in the long struggle for Iraqi democracy.
But opponents of the war have seized on the formulation, seeing it as evidence that Bush is indifferent to suffering. To them, it sounds as if the president is dismissing more than 2,700 U.S. troop deaths as "just a comma." And a lively Internet debate has broken out about the origins of the phrase, with some speculating that Bush means it as a coded message to religious supporters, evoking the aphorism "Never put a period where God has put a comma."
Presidential utterances have long drawn enormous notice. But instant transcripts and the Internet have focused an even more powerful microscope on the nation's leader. The approaching midterm elections have intensified the already close scrutiny of the president's words as he sharpens his rhetoric.
As Bush wound up a three-day campaign swing out west on Wednesday, for example, he attacked Democrats for voting last week against legislation authorizing warrantless telephone and e-mail surveillance.
"One hundred and seventy-seven of the opposition party said, 'You know, we don't think we ought to be listening to the conversations of terrorists,' " Bush said at a fundraiser for Rep. Rick Renzi (R-Ariz.) before heading to Colorado for gubernatorial candidate Bob Beauprez.
Asked about the president's statement, White House aides could not name any Democrat who has said that the government should not listen in on terrorists. Democrats who voted against the legislation had complained that it would hand too much power to the president and had said that they wanted more checks in the bill to protect civil liberties.
Sen. Russell Feingold (D-Wis.) called Bush's comment outrageous: "Every member of Congress, from both parties, supports listening in on terrorist communications, but the president still hasn't explained why we have to break the law to do it. It is time for the president to stop exploiting the terrorist threat to justify his power grab."
White House spokeswoman Dana Perino defended Bush's remark as a reasonable extrapolation of the Democratic position. "Of course, they aren't silly enough to say they don't want to listen in on terrorists, but actions speak louder than words, and people should know what the Democrats' voting record is," she said.
The comma remark, though, offers an especially intriguing case study in how a few words can trigger many interpretations. Bush used it in an interview with CNN's Wolf Blitzer aired on Sept. 24 in talking about Iraq. He noted the bloodshed shown on television but hailed the resiliency of the Iraqi people and cited the election last December in which 12 million came to the polls despite the violence.
"Admittedly, it seems like a decade ago," Bush went on. "I like to tell people when the final history is written on Iraq, it will look like just a comma because there is -- my point is, there's a strong will for democracy." The president used a similar line at a campaign event last week in Alabama and again on Tuesday in Stockton, Calif.
Critics of Bush began e-mailing and blogging about the remark within minutes of the CNN interview. The Carpetbagger Report blog called it stunning "even by Bush's already-low standards" and added: "Everything we're seeing is 'just a comma.' I'm sure that will bring comfort to the families of those who have sacrificed so much for Bush's mistakes."
Then Ian Welsh, on his Agonist blog, postulated a theory about the hidden meaning of the comment, citing the "never put a period" saying and calling it a "dog whistle" comment that only some would understand: "He is constantly littering his speeches with code words and phrases meant for the religious right. Other people don't hear them, but they do, and most of the time it allows Bush both to say what those who aren't evangelical or born again want to hear, while still reassuring the religious right [what it] wants to hear."
But it turns out that the phrase "never put a period" originated not with a Christian conservative figure or biblical passage but with Gracie Allen, the comedienne wife of George Burns. And the phrase is a favorite not of the religious right but of the religious left. The United Church of Christ, which is devoted to fighting for what it calls social justice and opposes the war, adopted the phrase in January 2002.
"I needed something short and succinct," said Ron Buford, the marketing director who came up with it. "When I saw the Gracie Allen quote, I was up all night thinking about it -- God is still speaking, there's more for us to know."
When he heard about Bush's comment, Buford was stunned. "It's ironic that, as savvy as they are about using these quotes to strengthen their base, that he would use a quote that we've been using lately," Buford said.
Aides said it is ridiculous to believe Bush is sending subliminal messages. "People have too much time on their hands," said Bush counselor Dan Bartlett. "I can assure you, you don't need a secret decoder ring to decipher what he's saying."
All Bush means, he said, is the struggle to build Iraqi democracy will take years. "He's making a historical analysis -- that these brief periods seem long and protracted now, but when you look back at them in history, they won't seem that way. He's definitely not discounting the loss of life or the sacrifice people are making."
© 2006 The Washington Post Company
Snuffysmith
Oct 4 2006, 11:02 PM
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...0300398_pf.htmlAttacks in Baghdad Kill 13 U.S. Soldiers in 3 Days
Officials Cite Troops' Increased Exposure in Capital
By Amit R. Paley
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, October 5, 2006; A01
BAGHDAD, Oct. 4 -- Thirteen U.S. soldiers have been killed in Baghdad since Monday, the American military reported, registering the highest three-day death toll for U.S. forces in the capital since the start of the war.
The latest losses -- four soldiers who were killed at 9 a.m. Wednesday by small-arms fire -- are part of a recent spike in violent attacks against U.S. forces that have claimed the lives of at least 24 soldiers and Marines in Iraq since Saturday, the military said.
The number of planted bombs is "at an all-time high," said Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell, a military spokesman, defying American efforts to stanch the vicious sectarian bloodshed in Baghdad that threatens to plunge the country into civil war.
"This has been a hard week for U.S. forces," Caldwell said. "Unfortunately, as expected, attacks have steadily increased in Baghdad during these past weeks." Independent databases showed the three-day toll for American troops to be the highest in Baghdad so far.
U.S. military officials said the surge in violence could be partly attributed to the increased exposure of American forces as they patrol the dangerous streets of Baghdad to try to quell reprisal killings between Shiites and Sunnis. The number of troops in the capital has been doubled since June to support the Iraqi government's new security plan, said Lt. Col. Barry Johnson, another military spokesman.
"When you go into bad neighborhoods, you'll have more attacks," said Lt. Col. James A. Gavrilis, a Special Forces officer and expert on the Iraqi insurgency. "If we have more people in one area, there will be an opportunity." He said enemy fighters "are reacting to an opportunity to attack."
Ali al-Dabbagh, a spokesman for the Iraqi government, said another likely cause for the spike in American troop deaths was a recent call by the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Hamza al-Muhajer, encouraging Iraqis to "eliminate the infidels and the apostates" during the current holy month of Ramadan.
Seventy-four soldiers and Marines were killed in Iraq in September, representing the highest monthly toll since April, when 76 died, according to the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count.
Army Maj. Gen. James D. Thurman, commander of the Multinational Division Baghdad, said two weeks ago that attacks against U.S.-led coalition forces in Baghdad had reached an average of 42 a day -- with about six causing casualties or equipment damage -- up from 36 or 38 attacks.
"Why are we seeing an increase in attacks?" he said. "Well, we have twice as many forces operating throughout the city now. We're challenging the anti-Iraqi forces where they live and operate."
The disclosure of heavy American losses came on another day of horrific violence for Iraqis, with at least 59 people killed in separate incidents across the country, Iraqi police said. The single deadliest attack took place at 11 a.m. in Ramadi, a Sunni insurgent stronghold in western Iraq, when a suicide bomber blew up his car at an Iraqi army base, killing at least 19 people and wounding 10, according to a police official.
Caldwell also announced yesterday that an entire Iraqi police brigade -- comprising an estimated 800 to 1,200 officers -- had been pulled out of service and placed under investigation for alleged complicity with death squads. On Sunday, gunmen burst into a food factory in Amil, a Baghdad neighborhood under the brigade's control, and kidnapped 26 workers.
"There is clear evidence that there was some complicity in allowing death squad elements to move freely when, in fact, they were supposed to have been impeding their movement," Caldwell said. "The government of Iraq had lost trust and confidence in the 8th Brigade, 2nd National Police Division's ability to serve the public due to their poor performance and alleged criminal wrongdoings."
The move appeared to represent a new effort by Iraqi officials to root out corruption in the Iraqi security forces, which are widely believed to be infiltrated by militias and death squads that do more to exacerbate sectarian tensions than protect citizens. Caldwell said the brigade will undergo "anti-militia, anti-sectarian violence and national unity training."
The brigade's commander might be charged with a crime, and the head of the unit's second regiment has already been arrested, said Brig. Abdul Kareem Khalaf, an Interior Ministry spokesman. "They are both under investigation to know how all this happened without the security forces interfering to stop it," he said.
Also on Wednesday, a top aide to Moqtada al-Sadr said the anti-American cleric has specific information that U.S.-led coalition forces plan to launch a major attack on Sadr City, a Shiite slum in Baghdad filled with his followers.
"They want to turn it into mass graves similar to the previous ones conducted by the former regime," said the aide, Sahib al-Amery. "The occupation forces want to start a sectarian crisis on the pretext that there are Shiite militias."
The United States and Sadr have clashed frequently since the 2003 invasion, and some military officials have been calling for more aggressive moves against the Sadr-controlled Mahdi Army, which is considered to be a militia by nearly everyone in Iraq. On Wednesday, though, Amery disputed that characterization.
"The Mahdi Army is a doctrinal and ideological army, not a militia," he said. "It has no camps or headquarters, and its weapons are self-owned by its members. We in the Shiite areas, we have no terrorist groups or organizations. These are found in the Sunni areas only."
Staff writer Ann Scott Tyson and staff researcher Robert E. Thomason in Washington and special correspondents Saad al-Izzi in Baghdad and Saad Sarhan in Najaf contributed to this report.
© 2006 The Washington Post Company
Snuffysmith
Oct 4 2006, 11:07 PM
http://www.antiwar.com/glantz/?articleid=9796October 5, 2006
More Dissension in the Ranks
by Aaron Glantz
A U.S. soldier who went AWOL – away without leave – over his opposition to the war in Iraq was incarcerated at the U.S. military's Mannheim prison in Germany Tuesday, pending an appeal in Washington this November.
Augustin Aguayo's imprisonment comes less than a week after he turned himself in at Fort Irwin in California's Mojave Desert. Aguayo, 34, had been in hiding since early September.
He first applied for discharge as a conscientious objector in February 2004, about a year after his Army service commenced and as he was beginning his first deployment in Iraq. His application was denied by the Pentagon in 2005, and he appealed that decision to federal courts in Washington, which have jurisdiction over cases brought by U.S. military personnel stationed overseas.
"They said they might allow him to call me [from Germany], and if he does that would be great, but I don't see that happening," his wife, Helga Aguayo, told IPS. "I was told at Fort Irwin that he would call, and I was told that I would be able to call him, but none of that happened. I would assume they're going to try to isolate him as much as possible."
Aguayo was stationed in Germany when he escaped through a window in base housing and fled rather than face a second tour in Iraq. He maintains military commanders told him they would send him to Iraq in handcuffs, if necessary.
"Going to Kuwait or Iraq can't be ruled out yet. It doesn't seem like it will happen, but it could still. No one has given me a definite 'no' that it won't," Helga Aguayo said. "So I still have some fear in my heart that that might happen."
U.S. military records show that between 8,000 and 10,000 soldiers are currently unaccounted for. It is not known how many are AWOL for political reasons.
Hundreds of antiwar soldiers are believed to be AWOL in Canada, however. A few have publicly petitioned for asylum, and on Tuesday the first U.S. soldier who escaped to Canada turned himself in at Fort Knox.
Specialist Darrell Anderson, who won a Purple Heart for taking shrapnel to protect the rest of his unit from a roadside bomb, said he deserted the Army last year because he could no longer fight in what he believes is an illegal war.
"I feel that by resisting I made up for the things I did in Iraq," Anderson said during a press briefing shortly before turning himself in. "I feel I made up for the sins I committed in this war."
In April 2004, Anderson says, he was ordered to open fire on a car full of innocent civilians. The car had sped through a U.S. military checkpoint, and his commander said it was Army procedure to fire on any vehicle that ran through a traffic stop. Anderson refused the order.
"Events like that just kept occurring, until one day I saw a couple of my fellow soldiers get hit," he told Pacifica's Democracy Now! program, "and I pulled my trigger while pointing it at an innocent child. But my weapon was on safe, and then I realized what I was doing, and I just realized that no matter how good you believe you are, when you're there, that you're eventually – you know, the evil in this is going to take over, and you're going to kill people."
Anderson returned from Iraq emotionally damaged, with a severe case of post-traumatic stress disorder. When his unit arrived home, he ran away to Canada rather than return to Iraq. He stayed there until this weekend, when his mother Anita Dennis picked him up in Toronto and drove him back to Kentucky. She said it was a difficult drive.
"In Iraq, he rode around in Humvees and tanks having people take shots at him all day long," she told IPS. "So he doesn't do well in vehicles, and he definitely doesn't sleep in them. Soldiers can't go to sleep when they're out patrolling the city looking for land mines and IEDs [improvised explosive devices]."
Anita Dennis told IPS she agrees with her son that the Iraq war is morally wrong.
"I believe everything my son told me," she said. "Darrell said the people he fought were killing American soldiers because they don't know who we are. All they know is that we're going through their cities with tanks. Our soldiers are imprisoning them. When we take people off to Abu Ghraib, we don't tell their families. Darrell said they took boys and fathers off, and the wives and sisters never knew what happened for weeks at a time. We'd be outraged if that happened in the U.S."
Because he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, Darrell Anderson received a different treatment from Augustin Aguayo when he turned himself in. Under an agreement reached with Anderson's attorneys, authorities will not court-martial the Army specialist but will instead give him treatment for his trauma and allow him to live with his family in Kentucky.
Helga Aguayo, meantime, is trying to raise enough money to fly to Germany to testify at her husband's trial. While she works, she and their twin 10-year-old daughters are living with her parents in Los Angeles.
"We're not a rich family," she said. "All our relatives are hardworking. There's a defense fund and also a fund to help my family with expenses, and I'm hoping that I can travel to see my husband and testify. I've been told that's crucial."
"You know this guy is standing up for conscience," she added. "If his family doesn't stand there and back him, that is a huge blow to his whole defense."
(Inter Press Service)