I don't know either. But, if Israel was in favor of us invading Iraq they kept a low profile. If they weren't they did the same it seems. Whichever way it was they would have been blamed for supporting a dictator if they opposed the invasion, and being in cahoots with Bush if they supported it.

Israel’s Terrorism
by Gabriel Ash
www.dissidentvoice.org
July 18, 2006

The Middle East is boiling over yet again. Israel is resorting to the one strategy it has perfected since the day it was created, murdering civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure.

The Israeli defense doctrine, old as Israel itself, considers bombing of civilian targets a means for pressuring “militants” and uncooperative governments. So Israel bombs bridges and villages in South Lebanon, power plants in Gaza, orchards, fields, schools, hospitals, residential neighborhoods, beach barbecue parties, etc. Everything is a legitimate target. Israeli ministers announce publicly that their chief strategy is to cause civilian suffering. Every day sees its Guernica, and the U.N., which proudly displays a reproduction of the painting, is mum in the face of a hundred Guernicas. 

To be clear, Israel’s actions fit the very definition of terrorism. Doubly so now, since the bombing campaign is a response to attacks on Israeli soldiers, not civilians. The ever more morally bankrupt “international community” sees nothing, hears nothing, and says nothing. Don’t take my word for it. An aide of the Israeli PM said recently: “We are acting there [in Gaza] in an unprecedented manner; we’re firing hundreds of artillery shells, attacking from the air, sea and land and the world remains silent.”

Having been so encouraged by the world’s indifference to the bombing of Gaza, Israel is giving Lebanon the same murderous treatment. Putin and Chirac have managed to assemble some moderate testiness. The rest of the world called for “restraint.” When the mission statement is to exact revenge and kill civilians, what’s restraint?

According to the EU, Hamas has to renounce violence to become a “responsible government.” And Hizbullah has to release the captured soldiers. The Israeli government, on the other hand, although responsible for an unending campaign of terrorism, need not renounce violence, nor release any of its political prisoners. The brotherhood of money and white skin is proving again to be thicker than blood.

Hizbullah’s intervention proved again it is the only power that wouldn’t stay silent in the face of Israeli barbarism. Since Israel recognizes neither international laws nor international borders, there was nothing morally wrong in Hizbullah’s fighters crossing the border into Israel to raid a military patrol. Israel should not enjoy the defense of principles it doesn’t respect. With its latest raid, Hizbullah consolidated its position as the leading popular voice in the Middle East, displaying tactical brilliance, solidarity, and a refusal to be bribed or cowered that is putting the rest of the world -- the Arab puppet governments as well as Europe’s hypocrites -- to shame. To boot, Hizbullah is also putting to shame other Muslim radicals, most notably the Iraqi thugs and Al-Qaeda, both by successfully raiding legitimate military targets and by feeding a broad popular consensus that cuts across the Sunni-Shia divide.

However, courage and legitimacy aside, it is anybody’s guess whether the leadership of Hizbullah foresaw that Israel would go postal and open a full-blown air war against Lebanon, shooting civilians in cars like ducks. If they did not, they were certainly shortsighted, and if they did, they were reckless.

Nevertheless, it is far from clear who wins when the dust settles. While guaranteed to suffer severe damage, Hizbullah still has the odds on its side. When Israel invaded Lebanon for the umpteenth time, government officials announced that Israel’s goal was nothing less than the disarming of Hizbullah and the setting of “new rules of the game.” That pronouncement sounds awfully reminiscent of Sharon’s stated goal for invading Lebanon in 1982, to create “a new order in Lebanon.” What are the chances that Olmert will have better success than Sharon? Slim. Hizbullah will nor disarm willfully. Who will disarm it? There are three candidates, and none of them looks too promising.

Israel: Israel can re-occupy Lebanon. That would certainly be a setback to Hizbullah, which would lose men, installations, and freedom of operation. But can Israel destroy Hizbullah? Note that Israel is unable to destroy Hamas, a much weaker organization, on a much smaller territory. No matter how much violence it used, Israel couldn’t prevent Hamas from launching rockets and gaining popularity. Will Israel be more successful in Lebanon?

The “International Community”: One could see France and the U.S. occupying Lebanon, probably under the guise of some invitation from the Christian minority, or a call for U.N. “peacekeeping” a la Haiti. Assuming Western powers are stupid (or cornered) enough to take the bait, can they achieve in Lebanon what Israel, with a lot more commitment, couldn’t? A Western occupation of Lebanon is likely to turn the whole Middle East into one long crusaders vs. Muslims crescent. Does the West have the stomach for that? Does it have a reasonable chance of winning?

The “Cedar Revolution”: The most promising alternative, for the West, is to empower some local stooges that would rule the new Lebanon colony for Western and Israeli interests. That is the West’s favorite strategy, currently tried in many places around the globe. But Shiites are a poor, radical, bitter and armed majority in Lebanon. It would take more than a few Starbucks customers to subdue them. The anti-Hizbullah coalition is small and weak. Its unity is doubtful and its willingness to fight far from evident. Hizbullah, on the other hand, will have not only well-disciplined cadres and massive popular support, but also the support of Syria and Iran.

Israel could seek to cause as much damage as possible to Hizbullah’s infrastructure with aerial assaults, then call it victory. But the blow to Hizbullah would not be enough to put an end to its operations, probably leaving Olmert in the unpleasant position of having to declare impotence. Hence the scenario of a full-blown war is extremely plausible. Such a war will eventually involve an Israeli invasion seeking to severely weakens Hizbullah, followed by an international peacekeeping force that replaces Israel and nurtures a government of Lebanese collaborators. In the rosiest scenario that government eventually gains the ability to repress the majority of the Lebanese population with only Western financial support. At that point the “peacekeepers” withdraw and Lebanon joins the dubious fraternity of Egypt and Jordan, safe Western puppet regimes.

A not-so-slight complication of this classic colonial scenario is the fact that Hizbullah is not an isolated resistance movement; rather it enjoys the international support of Iran and Syria, as well as strong ties with the Iraqi Shia militias, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, in the context of a growing resource conflict between the superpowers, Iran could eventually receive covert support from Russia and/or China, in ways reminiscent of the support the Afghani Mujahaddin (and Bin Laden) received from the U.S. Thus, a successful repression of Hizbullah is likely to require at some point dealing a severe blow to Syria and Iran, and such a blow could require a proxy war between the U.S., Russia and China.

To put it differently, the Israel-Hizbullah war can remain contained, or it can end in a decisive manner. But it cannot both remain contained and end in a decisive manner.

(In light of this, one must read skeptically Western editorials calling on Israel to exercise caution, avoid overreaching and limit itself to targeting Hizbullah only are a miserable attempt to defend Israel while keeping up the pretense of opposing the targeting of civilians. The fact is the “collateral damage” is not a result of Israel’s failure to “minimize the damage to civilian bystanders.” Since Israel can only achieve its aims by widening the scope of the war and forcing other parties to get involved, “damage to civilians” is not a by-product but the core of Israel’s strategy of escalation. The longer other parties fail to get involved, the more civilians will die. The New York Times is right that such indiscriminate murder strengthens Hamas and Hizbullah, but the problem is not one that Israel can rectify by changing its tactics. The problem is Israel itself and its true goals.)

The long war scenario, which is the only scenario that has a slightest chance of achieving Israel’s goal of disarming Hizbullah, is similar to what the U.S. strategy in Iraq, where success is getting ever more elusive. It is also similar to the original Sharon plan for Lebanon in 1982, which failed. Why would this scenario be more successful in today’s Lebanon? Odds are that it won’t. But there are good reasons to believe that it will be tried. Three reasons, to be precise:

First, the post-colonial Western imagination is limited. This scenario is the well-understood way of dealing with subject populations in troubled corners of the world. It worked many times in the past, and even if its effectiveness is on a downward curve, there isn’t any alternative short of giving up power and compromising.

Second, even if final success is elusive, war buys time, for Israel as well as for the U.S., for the politicians as well as for the interests they represents. For the latter, losing in a decade is still better than compromising today. Raymond Aaron called politics “the art of making things last.” That holds true even when what is being made to last is misery.

Third, in international politics it is often true that “it's not the destination that counts, it’s the journey.” For many Israeli and American interests, war has value, in some cases hard cash value, regardless of final outcome.

One aspect of the intrinsic value of war is that both the leaders and the public in Israel truly believe that all Arabs will surrender if enough force is applied. It never worked. But that racism is too deep to be inconvenienced by facts. The second Lebanon war won’t be the first war fought for the sake of maintaining illusions.

Israeli PM Olmert and DM Peretz are both lacking in the most important social capital in Israel, military rank. They therefore need to prove -- to the public was well as to themselves -- that their manhood is the longest in the Middle East; (in Israel this is called “deterrence.”) Within the Macho culture Israeli leaders have cultivated for decades, justice and compromise are for sissies. Real men murder civilians. The government has therefore little choice but to escalate the military conflict or risk losing its political credibility.

The Israeli Military, which pushed for the recent escalation in both Gaza and Lebanon, taking advantage of the weakness of the political echelon, itches for war. At stake is repairing the psychological damage than “asymmetric warfare” inflicts on the Israeli military (Ilan Pappe, “What Does Israel Want”) But beyond psychology, there are also crucial economic interests. Israel was in the middle of a debate over military expenditures, which the latest budget would cut significantly. The new war will certainly serve as the needed excuse for canceling or otherwise evading the cuts.

Beyond the tangible budget numbers, there is the central position of the army, and the economic interests behind it, within Israeli economy and politics. The stalemate in Gaza and the Hamas’s electoral victory are revealing the hollow core of Israel’s military dominance, Israel’s inability to reduce Palestinians to a hopeless and obedient subject population. Escalation masks this fatal weakness because Israel is undoubtedly the more powerful party. As long as fighting goes on, Israel has the upper hand, its army looks powerful, and above all, useful. The moment the fighting ends, the limits of military power reassert themselves. Continuing military escalation therefore protects the military establishment and Israel’s war economy from internal challenges.

Finally, Israel has no hope of a decisive outcome without the U.S. fully backing it against Iran. And while there are many sane voices calling for the U.S. to dissociate itself from Israel and seek a diplomatic compromise with Iran, there are also powerful U.S. interests itching for a global war. The neo-conservative argument is that a global war is necessary for the maintenance of U.S. dominance, not only in the face of rising local challenges such as Iran, but also to curb the rise of China as a global force. (as an aside, I tend to agree that war is necessary to U.S. global dominance. I doubt however that it is also sufficient.) And behind the neo-cons’ arguments loom the interests of the U.S. military-industrial-complex. Incidentally, the U.S. economy seems to be moving towards a potentially dangerous recession. While this is still early, there should be no doubt that as the U.S. economy deteriorates, the economic appeal of military conflict will increase.

Given his low poll numbers and public dissatisfaction with Iraq, Bush is probably unable to initiate a war against Iran. The generals are opposed and the GOP is likely to be hammered in the mid-term elections. But if the war is initiated by Israel and the U.S. is perceived to be “dragged” into it unwillingly, Bush and the GOP would benefit again from the popular glow of patriotism that war baths leaders in; Especially given that Democrats will not criticize a war fought “to protect Israel,” whose crony capitalists, like Haim Saban, pay for their election campaigns. An Israeli escalation in Lebanon can therefore serve as the necessary trigger for a global conflict that U.S. neo-cons desire.

A larger war will thus serve the short-term interests of the leadership in both Israel and the U.S. It may delay their inevitable decline, but chances are it won’t restore their power. Both have reached the double climax of military power and loathsomeness, a point at which they can win any war, but can impose no peace. Since the Islamist leaders of Hamas and Hizbullah tend to take the long view of history, whereas the leaders of the U.S. and Israel are driven mostly by concern for the near future of corporate balance sheets, an escalating conflict might just give both sides the kind of victory they most crave.

One wished that saner voices prevailed; the slide towards war can be stopped by determined international pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire. That would save many lives, but it will also be a blow to Israeli and U.S. dominance. Therefore, unfortunately, help is definitely not on its way. The people of Lebanon are now being taught a lesson many of them had wanted to forget, that their only defense against their psychopathic southern neighbor is bigger and badder weapons. Rest assured that the lesson will be learned, and that bigger and badder weapons will be used, perhaps against Israel, perhaps half a globe away. Nothing breeds murderers better than silence in the face of murder. Israel’s unquenchable bloodlust was forged in the furnaces of the holocaust and galvanized by the silence of the world. Bin Laden said he was inspired to blow the Twin Towers by the sight of Beirut burning in 1982, “and the whole world saw and heard but it didn't respond.” Who knows whom and to what the latest mayhem will inspire. There is no real justice in this ever-unfolding sickness, but for those who are content with the poetic kind of justice, there is a plenty.

*  *  *  *

Perhaps a liberal rephrasing of Robert Frost can sum up the stakes:

Some say world domination ends in fire, Some say in ice. From knowing Olmert’s and Bush’s desire, I hold with those who favor fire. But if our leaders go for ice, I think they are enough despised, so that for their destruction ice, is also great, and would suffice.

Gabriel Ash is an activist and writer who writes because the pen is sometimes mightier than the sword and sometimes not. He welcomes comments at: g.a.evildoer@gmail.com.

I think Hezbollah started this thing not because Iran or Syria told them to do it but because Hezb knew that Israel would hit back hard. Such tactics would provide TV images that would shame Israel in the eyes of the world. At the same time, the pluck of Hezb standing up to the world's 2nd most powerful military force makes Iran and Syria look good, meaning more support will come Hezb's way.

I think Hezbollah started this thing not because Iran or Syria told them to do it but because Hezb knew that Israel would hit back hard. Such tactics would provide TV images that would shame Israel in the eyes of the world. At the same time, the pluck of Hezb standing up to the world's 2nd most powerful military force makes Iran and Syria look good, meaning more support will come Hezb's way.

Interesting theory, jeffmo.

There are so many imponderables at the moment that it's a " take your pick " situation. I'm sure you know that the one thing that's really bothering me is the awful damage being done to Lebanon. Somehow, Hezbullah's actions are making Lebanon pay heavily.

In a discussion I had this morning with what I call a headline reader, I was asked " What does Bush have to do with all of this?

My answer was " Everything "

If we had been fortunate to have had a statesman as president 5 or 6 years ago instead of a political puppet, we might have a peaceful MidEast now instead of millions and millions of Arabs hating our guts.

But undoubtedly that was part of the plan.

A.B.

NEEDED: AMERICAN DIPLOMACY.
Help Wanted
by John B. Judis
Only at TNR Online
Post date: 07.19.06

In their communiqué on Sunday, the G-8 nations warned that Hamas and Hezbollah threatened to "plunge the Middle East into chaos and provoke a wider conflict," and they also cautioned Israel "to exercise utmost restraint" in retaliating against attacks. The United States was a signatory to, rather than a subject of, the document; but when the final account of this crisis is written--perhaps years from now--the Bush administration is sure to figure as a factor. That's because over the last few decades most, if not all, Arab-Israeli crises have occurred when the United States has been either unable or unwilling to play an aggressive role as a mediator; and most have only abated after the United States has finally thrown itself into the middle of them. This latest conflict, which has engulfed Gaza and Lebanon and could spread eastward, may not prove to be an exception to this rule.

One could go back as far as 1948, but let's start with 1967. In May of that year, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered U.N. peacekeeping troops out of the Sinai and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Nasser, who, as Michael Oren shows in Six Days of War, was well past his prime, was by no means determined to go to war. He half expected that the United Nations or the United States would arrange a diplomatic settlement that would make him look good without costing him troops. The Israelis looked to the United States to prevent war, but Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, preoccupied with the Vietnam War, reneged on a promise to organize a "Red Sea Regatta" to break the blockade. Johnson initially warned the Israelis not to launch a preemptive strike, but then equivocated.

Israel won the Six Day War, but the conflict with the Arab states, and particularly Egypt, continued unabated. In 1971, however, the new Egyptian President Anwar Sadat initiated a series of peace proposals very similar to what the Israelis and Egyptians would agree on at Camp David seven years later. In a gesture aimed at gaining American support, Sadat also threw out Egypt's Soviet advisors. The Israelis balked at Sadat's proposals, but they might have eventually come around if the United States had pushed harder. The Nixon administration, like the Johnson administration, was focused elsewhere. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was preoccupied with the Vietnam War. He had consigned the Arab-Israeli conflict to Secretary of State William Rogers, who, along with Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco, tried to marshal administration support for the Egyptian plan but, encountering resistance, gave up. And so did Sadat and the Egyptians, who along with the Syrians went to war in 1973 and came close to defeating Israel. Finally, after that war, Kissinger began his furious round of shuttle diplomacy, which helped lay the basis for Jimmy Carter's success in pushing the Camp David agreement.

Camp David ended hostilities between Israel and Egypt, but not between Israel and the Palestinians and Syrians. Soon after Reagan took office, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and his Defense Minister Ariel Sharon hatched a plan to end Palestinian attacks from Lebanon by driving the PLO out of Beirut and installing a pro-Israel Christian government. Reagan's Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, has insisted that he tried to dissuade Sharon from invading, but Israeli and American writers have concluded that Haig gave Sharon at least an amber light to invade. Like the Six Day War, Israel's invasion of Lebanon solved one problem but created many new ones, including a new anti-Israeli Shia opposition, led by a group called Hezbollah. It would have been to America's and Israel's benefit if Haig and Reagan had acted more forthrightly, but Reagan was preoccupied with winning his domestic program and Haig with Central America.

Of course, there were many other factors that contributed to these crises, but what remains striking is that they occurred at a time when American foreign-policy makers were either looking elsewhere or were divided about what to do. Equally striking is that the greatest progress in Arab-Israeli relations occurred during the Carter and Clinton administrations when American policy-makers were most clearly concentrating on the conflict.

When George W. Bush assumed the presidency in January 2001, he withdrew from the ongoing negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians that had begun at Camp David and continued at Taba. These might have broken down anyway--the second intifada had started--but Bush's alternative of letting matters take their own course only made things worse. Bush waited until April 2002 to declare the mounting violence between Israelis and Palestinians unacceptable, but even then he proved incapable of bringing the two sides together to halt it. By that point, Bush had his own preoccupation: the coming invasion of Iraq.

Pressured by British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Bush eventually agreed to a "road map" for peace, but his principal means of seeking peace in the region were based on a neoconservative fantasy about the road to Jerusalem passing through Baghdad (which presumed the success of the American invasion and occupation of Iraq) and on the assumption that Palestinian elections would result in a moderate alternative to the late Yasir Arafat. When these strategies failed, the administration pulled back its diplomatic effort. Its response to Hamas's election has been confused and divided, and helped set the stage for the present crisis. As it began, the United States was nowhere to be found. On July 5, Yossi Beilin wrote in Haaretz:


One of the most striking phenomena of recent weeks, given the stepped-up launching of Qassam rockets on Sderot, the painful incident at Kerem Shalom, and the abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit, is the absence of the American factor. ... [I]n terms of direct influence on the ground, there has been absolute American silence.

What to expect next? One can hope that the Bush administration, like the Nixon administration, will learn from its failures and devote itself to easing, if not resolving, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Unfortunately, Bush's public and private (but overheard) statements at the G-8 summit were not promising.

John B. Judis is a senior editor at The New Republic and a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

I believe that Israel is the world's fifth most powerful military force.  I read that today or yesterday.  Not sure who the top four are except for the U.S.

I think Hezbollah started this thing not because Iran or Syria told them to do it but because Hezb knew that Israel would hit back hard. Such tactics would provide TV images that would shame Israel in the eyes of the world. At the same time, the pluck of Hezb standing up to the world's 2nd most powerful military force makes Iran and Syria look good, meaning more support will come Hezb's way.

It's unreal how "supportive" our government is of Israel's excessive force.  Maybe it's because we admire that sort of behavior.

When attacked I do and so do you. I've seen you attack with force here.

You have to put this in context with Israel's incursion into Gaza.  Either Hezbollah started to take pressure off their friends in Hamas, or Israel started because this was a chance to kill two birds with one stone.

I woule shed no tears if Israel rid the world of the virus that is Hamas and Hezzbollah.

They hide behind innocent civillians. They are the murderers. They know full well what Israel's response will be. They use Palestinian and Lebanese civillians as pawns in a game.

This is what sickens me about people who are ignorant of the politics of terrorism. They do not understand or refuse to underastand that Hamas and Hezzbollah.... USE HUMANS AS PAWNS IN A GAME OF POWER!

Just like the terrorists who behead people in Iraq...who are for the most part FOREIGNERS!

It is a game of power grabbing.

I would shed no tears either. But I don't beleive they can be defeated militarily.  They feed on human misery like roaches feed on crumbs. If you spray the roaches but leave the crumbs, you just get more roaches.

I understand but I disagree. The PLO was chased out of every state they infested for decades. Terrorism will not cease with the end of either group, but without a military response they just get bigger.

How much larger have they gotten and what number of weapons has Hezzbollah acquired since it was left alone to grow unhindered by military action?

I get your point. But this is not the PLO.  This is a dangerous ideology that transcends borders.  There is a reason that Lebanon breeds terrorists and Denmark doesn't.

We'll just have to disagree and see what happens.  One way or another, I hope we are not still arguing about this in our old age. That would be really sad.

The Bushies are right about one thing. Democracy is lacking in the Arab and mideast cultures. Denmark was not a very nice country centuries ago. But even not too long ago didn't tthey have colonies?

Wealth and trade changes people.

To quote Golda Mier "There will be peace in the middle east between Palestinians and Jews when Palestinian mothers love their children more than they hate the Jews." There might never be peace in the middle east in our life times as Arab clan society still exists. the Irag/Iran war was ugly in the extreme.

Denmark had colonies?  I think you are confusing it with Holland.

There are 1 million Arabs living peacefully in Israel proper.  They only difference between them and other Arabs is what side of the border they were on in 1949.  There is always hope.

There is nothing anyone here can do. Israel is defending herself against terrorist attacks and the US government is in no position to stop them. They will stop when Hezzbollah is crippled.

We invaded Afghanistan for very similar reasons.

That's true. Israel doesn't care what the American public thinks. Neither does BushCo.  The best thing we can do is figure out how to stabilize Iraq, if we even can.  If BushCo would even listen to anybody on that issue.  If he would even read a newspaper or watch TV.  Or sober up.

Denmark had colonies?  I think you are confusing it with Holland.

It's unreal how "supportive" our government is of Israel's excessive force.  Maybe it's because we admire that sort of behavior.

I'd admire anyone killing hezbollah

Actually at one time Denmark ruled most of Scandanavia, and had Norway in particular for quite a long time.  I believe that the Danes founded Iceland, and they control Greenland now.  Over a thousand years ago there was even a time when the King of Denmark was also the King of England.

Why would Israel care what anyone else thinks when it comes to survival?

But they do care what we think, because we are very important to their survival. I am sure they could find a way of surviving without us, but they would be in a more desperate situation and that would be worse than what we have now wouldn't it?

If anyone thinks Israel deopesn't have plans/fall back plan  on how to survive without US aid they don't know diddly squat about Israel.

What if they kill many others besides and thus engender sympathy for Hezbollah and similar groups, and also thereby convince more people to join and support such groups, and who then go on to, well, kill a lot more people?

If they support hezbollah they are hezbollah.

I think a good solution would be for hezbollah to expedite their journey to paradise by slitting each other's throats.  You will not get sympathy from me for hezbollah or hezbollah symphasizers being killed.

If they support hezbollah they are hezbollah.

I think a good solution would be for hezbollah to expedite their journey to paradise by slitting each other's throats.  You will not get sympathy from me for hezbollah or hezbollah symphasizers being killed.