http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/08/...itary_advisors/

Inside the Iraqi forces fiasco
The U.S. effort to train Iraqi forces -- and bring our troops home -- is mired in bureaucratic mismanagement, inept recruits and astonishing shortages of equipment.

By David J. Morris

Aug. 14, 2006 | Back in March, Marine Maj. William McCollough, the commanding officer of a small team of U.S. military advisors training an Iraqi army battalion in the volatile Anbar province, found out that his team had failed to receive a supply of 40 mm grenades. They were crucial munitions: Since the 15-man team of Marines had arrived in late January in the al-Jazirah region, an insurgent hotbed between Fallujah and Ramadi, the small compound they shared with their Iraqi counterparts had been attacked almost every night. In one of their first major engagements, the Marines simply lined up on the roof of their barracks and poured grenades into a nearby tree line until the enemy fire stopped. For an isolated advisor team living among foreign troops of questionable dependability, a supply of grenades could mean the difference in whether it could stop insurgents from overrunning the perimeter.

The missing supply of grenades was another in a string of shortfalls McCollough's team had experienced since arriving, and the major had had it. He sent a letter to the Marine high command in Iraq, stating that the Iraqi 1st Battalion they were training would have to cease operations due to the lack of logistical support. According to McCollough, a general on the receiving end of the letter "scorched some earth," and his team started to get more of what they needed.

I spent five days in July living and patrolling with this group of Marines and the Iraqis they were training. Initially, the prospect of embedding with what appeared to be a team of military baby sitters was uninspiring. But I soon realized it would provide an extraordinary look inside what strategists consider to be perhaps the last, best hope to salvage stability from the U.S. occupation of Iraq as it spirals toward full-blown civil war.

In a nationally televised speech in June 2005 at Ft. Bragg, N.C., President Bush made an announcement that has been repeated many times since: "As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." McCollough's team of advisors, known as a Military Transition Team, or MiTT, is at the center of that strategy. Comprising 10 to 15 U.S. servicemen drawn from across the armed forces, each MiTT lives with Iraqi forces for months at a time, providing them with training, oversight and operational support. More than 200 MiTTs are operating in Iraq, according to the Pentagon. The training and deployment of autonomous Iraqi forces is seen as critical to securing the country, handing it over to the fledgling Iraqi government, and bringing U.S. troops home.

But according to more than a dozen Marine and Army officers I spoke with, since its launch approximately a year ago, the MiTT program has been dogged by bureaucratic mismanagement, inadequate training, and an astonishing shortage of equipment and supplies -- the latter a predicament I witnessed firsthand with McCollough's team. Many servicemen assigned to the MiTTs are distraught by this state of affairs. One disillusioned lieutenant I spoke with said that despite his intense love of the Marine Corps, he would be leaving the service because of what he has observed during his advisory tour. A frustrated team leader told me, "Thirty years from now, when historians are trying to figure out how we lost this war, they'll look to the MiTT program."

- - - - - - - - - - - -


Across the Euphrates River from Fallujah, al-Jazirah is a lush patchwork of palm groves and grass fields, bisected by dikes and dotted by the occasional farmhouse. Thickly vegetated and shockingly green, it is marvelous guerrilla country -- much more like Vietnam in appearance than anyone wants to admit.

When McCollough and his team arrived, the area was largely in the hands of hard-core Iraqi insurgents and foreign jihadis. The main road that connected the web of villages in al-Jazirah, dubbed "Route Duster" by the Marines, was virtually undrivable due to the constant threat of ambush. Mortar and small-arms attacks on the Marines compound became so commonplace through the spring that unless it was a sustained barrage, the Marines simply noted the time and went about their business. One afternoon I watched in amazement during an intense 120 mm mortar attack as one of McCollough's lieutenants stomped out of the team's barracks in nothing but shorts and flip-flops to get a closer look at the barrage. Marching back in, he declared, "It ain't that close" and went back to tinkering with the team's laptop computer.

McCollough's team is known as MiTT 3/5, because its members hail primarily from the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment. Embedding with them meant incurring a startling degree of danger. At one point McCollough showed me a calendar he kept inside his journal, on which a circled date indicated enemy contact. Beginning in early February, almost every date was circled. During one stretch, McCollough's team had either been shot at, mortared, RPG'd or hit by a roadside bomb on 37 out of 40 days. Nearly half of his team had been wounded, one member three times.

They were some of the most skilled soldiers I've seen, from my own service in the Marines to trips into Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Yet, as I would learn during this trip, optimism about the U.S. efforts to train Iraqi forces largely begins and ends with the top brass and Bush administration officials back in Washington.

By most accounts, McCollough's team is a model one. A Marine officer I spoke with in Ramadi described it as "exceptional." But that is telling in its own right: Even MiTT 3/5 is undermanned and grievously undersupplied, and it was given only skeletal preparation for its pivotal mission.

A survey of the MiTT compound revealed that much of the equipment had been acquired by scrounging or borrowing from other American units. The team's two generators -- without which the team would have no electricity, air conditioning or access to the U.S. military's tactical intranet -- were obtained by the team's logistics officer, who twisted the arm of a friend stationed at a nearby Marine supply depot.

Much of the Marines' gear was substandard. The doors of their dilapidated Humvees didn't close properly and had inch-wide gaps at the top of them -- potentially deadly in a sector rife with roadside bombs. At the beginning of my embedded tour I had noticed that all of the Marines at the public affairs office at Camp Fallujah had been outfitted with the latest fire-retardant combat uniforms -- but McCollough's Marines were all wearing less-protective cotton uniforms, despite an order from on high that all Marines in Iraq have the new ones.

In a document distributed to commanders after the MiTT program was launched, Lt. Gen. John Sattler, the head Marine general in Iraq, identified the advisor teams as "the main effort" -- an official designation that should have given them head-of-the-line privileges for supplies, ammunition, communication equipment and all the sundry items that a combat unit needs to function in the field. However, when the logistics officer assigned to MiTT 3/5 first submitted support requests, he told me, the response from Marine supply officers was, "Who are you? What unit are you with? What's a MiTT?" The disconnect between them and the larger American military apparatus drove the Marine advisors crazy -- "the main effort" was the punch line to many jokes told by McCollough's team while I was with them.

The MiTT program is strained by other fundamental issues. Historically, the mission of training indigenous troops has been handled by U.S. Army Special Forces, made up of experienced soldiers who have undergone years of specialized linguistic and culture-specific training. But with the military stretched thin by the Bush administration's far-reaching war on terror, there simply aren't enough Special Forces troops to go around, so the military has been forced to draw upon less seasoned troops from across the armed forces.

Despite an admirable track record in combating the insurgency in al-Jazirah, McCollough's team had a less-than-auspicious beginning. Formed around a few handpicked officers and sergeants, a number of the men who joined the team had been assigned against their wishes and on short notice from other noncombat units within the Marine Corps. The team's second in command came from the traffic-management office at Camp Pendleton and had never served in an infantry unit before. Only a third of the team had training in the foreign weapons the Iraqis use.

A senior enlisted Marine on the team described their mission preparation as "a joke." The entirety of it consisted of a week's lectures at Camp Taji, a forward operating base north of Baghdad. Most of the classes were hastily assembled slide presentations. One covered Iraqi radio equipment and was given by an instructor who had never seen the gear before. The sector-specific training consisted of a one-hour briefing given by an officer who had visited al-Jazirah only once.

One recent after-action report I saw, written by a MiTT team leader from elsewhere in Iraq, concluded that the Pentagon has "given lip-service to the importance of advisors but has not allocated resources (time, funding and command attention) to the training and equipping of the advisors."

In Washington, the message about the MiTT program remains upbeat. "The [Iraqi] army has been improving by leaps and bounds in the eight months we've been here," Army Col. Brian Jones, a commander in the Diyala province bordering Iran, said during a Pentagon press briefing on Aug. 4. "And truly I think we're starting to see the evolution of a professional force."

But McCollough's team expressed concern about the long-term prospects for the Iraqi forces they've been training. Soldiers continue to desert, and the battalion is never at full strength because Iraqis expect to have at least one week of leave per month in order to ensure that their families are safe and provided for.

Several of the Marines said they've seen some progress with the Iraqis. Yet, despite the Marines' continual hectoring, the Iraqis' field discipline leaves much to be desired. A gunnery sergeant told me that, with few exceptions, the Iraqis were poor shots. The Marines were happy to have at least curtailed the infamous "death blossom" -- the Iraqis' indiscriminate spraying of bullets into the air. But many moments were frustrating for Marines accustomed to working with well-disciplined troops. A prime example occurred in June: In the middle of an extended gun battle, the Marines were flabbergasted to discover some of the Iraqi soldiers relaxing and eating watermelon instead of manning their weapons.

A number of veteran U.S. military advisors I spoke with believe that the training under way essentially will last only as long as American officers are physically present and directly supporting the Iraqi army units.

In addition to the challenges posed by the Iraqi trainees, the Marine advisors have run into some galling problems with the U.S. military itself. In February, when the Iraqi 1st Battalion began taking casualties, the Marines took them to a U.S. medical facility at Taqqadum, a sprawling logistics base a few miles to the south -- and were initially turned away. "Iraqi soldiers aren't allowed on this base," they were told. After wrangling with the gate guards, they were eventually able to get the wounded Iraqis treatment, but it was an incident that none of the Marines forgot. The American attitude, according to McCollough, is frequently one of "Well, they're only Iraqi casualties" -- not something to get too worked up over.

There is an almost mind-boggling gap between the Marine advisors' daily reality and life on the large, relatively plush forward operating bases that support many U.S. troops in Iraq. This is a point of irritation for the Marine advisors, who refer to the other troops as "Fobbits," a derogatory term denoting those who never leave the safe environment of the large bases. At Taqqadum, American personnel dine on prime rib and enjoy Baskin-Robbins ice cream. In one of the chow halls there, I spotted a 4-foot-tall Statue of Liberty sculpted out of butter. In contrast, McCollough's men subsisted mostly on Iraqi army chow, Top Ramen noodles, Spam and junk food sent to them by family members back home. Combined with the relentless pace of operations in al-Jazirah, the poor rations resulted in major weight loss among some members of the team. One gunnery sergeant told me he'd shed almost 40 pounds over the course of the deployment.

While at Taqqadum, which increasingly resembles the "Little America" bases that became emblematic of the bloated U.S. war effort in Vietnam, I also noticed fliers for aerobics and salsa-dancing classes. There were weekly jazz concerts. When McCollough's team first arrived in Iraq, he told me, they went hunting at the Taqqadum post exchange for felt-tipped markers and protractors for their field maps. They were disgusted to discover that while there was thong underwear, hair care products and other luxury items available, they could not find some of the combat-essential items they needed.

As the U.S. military increasingly has dug in with large bases like Taqqadum, the trail of logistics and supplies supporting them has grown longer. As one particularly frustrated Army captain at Camp Ramadi put it, "We're chasing our own tail over here."

Yet, out on the bleeding edge of the war, the MiTT Marines took an unmistakable pride in their situation. They saw themselves as the magnificent bastards of the Corps, far away from the flagpole, and while they felt the burn of neglect from higher headquarters, the war seemed to retain an adventure-like feel for them. They had an unbelievable nonchalance toward danger. It seemed miraculous that none of them had been killed, which McCollough attributed in part to dumb luck.

In spite of the doubts hanging over the MiTT program, over time many of the Marines had developed a sentimental attachment to their Iraqi counterparts. And despite the Iraqis' mixed feelings about the American occupation, good will developed in the other direction as well. On my last day with McCollough's team, he told that he had recently taken the Iraqi 1st Battalion's executive officer, Lt. Col. Jafra, to the U.S. hospital at Taqqadum to have his leg looked at. Jafra, a Shiite from the Sadr City neighborhood of Baghdad, had taken some shrapnel in his ankle from an American artillery shell during the Gulf War. At one point Jafra said to McCollough, "I prefer to think that you shot me, Major McCollough, because that way, if it was a fellow soldier I respect who shot me, then there is no anger."

During my time with McCollough's team, I was heartened by the camaraderie between the Marines and the Iraqis. But that couldn't obscure the feeling that the MiTT program appears headed the way of many aspects of this war -- another casualty of poor planning, attention and execution by U.S. leaders.

MiTT members help shape Iraqi Army upstarts
Submitted by: 2nd Marine Division
Story by: Computed Name: Capt. Patrick B. Kerr

Story Identification #: 2005111745938




AR RAMADI, Iraq(Nov. 17, 2005) -- In a dusty outpost 40 km. from the Iranian border, the future of Iraq is being built from the ground up. Home to approximately 8,000 Iraqi Army (IA) soldiers and about 150 coalition trainers, the An Numaniyah training base is where many Iraqi soldiers, also known as “Jundi,” get their first taste of life in the army. Although a far cry from Parris Island, the Iraqi equivalent to boot camp offers local men the opportunity to help secure the country as it continues to bolster its ranks against the ongoing insurgency.

Despite the dangerous work and the rigorous conditions involved, interest in joining the Iraqi Army has never been higher. The Senior U.S. Advisor to the training base U.S. Army Col. Mark Anderson attributes the high demand to both a desire to participate in the emerging Iraqi democracy and because it provides a promising career opportunity that might otherwise not be available to many out-of-work Iraqis. For the average Iraqi male, being able to provide for family members is a priority above all others.

The newest tenant on the base, 3rd Brigade, 7th Division, is being trained by both Iraqi instructors and a 48-member coalition detachment comprised of members of U.S. Marines and soldiers from the active, reserve and National Guard components. Designated a MiTT (Military Transition Team), its mission is to man, train, equip and deploy with Iraqi counterparts to the Western Al Anbar province in order to set conditions for the future transfer to Iraqi Army control. Like some of their fellow recruits back in the U.S., many of these Iraqis will find themselves on the front lines soon after their training is complete. The road ahead is not an easy one, but the team continues to tackle the obstacles thrown its way.

One of the biggest challenges the MiTT faces is figuring out how to bridge the cultural gap between the two forces. In the old Iraqi Army, for instance, officers and senior enlisted personnel often abused their power and distanced themselves from their subordinates. Leading by example was a foreign concept to most men in a position of authority. Thanks to the influence of Marines like MiTT Commander Col. Pete Martino, that is all about to change.

“There used to be an overemphasis on doing things the Iraqi way,” said Martino. “But the new approach holds the Iraqi’s feet to the fire.”

Another challenge is integrating Iraqis recruited from the different tribes in Iraq. Tribal rivalry is a major component in Iraqi culture and these same tensions frequently permeate the ranks of the Iraqi Army. Working through these differences is not as easy; military discipline demands that everyone get along. It takes strong leadership and the ability to articulate a common goal that is only achievable through teamwork.

The MiTT has developed a comprehensive training program that is broken down into five major components to include an officer training course, an noncommissioned officer training course, a basic and an advanced infantry course, military occupational specialty training courses and camp guard. The training now places a big emphasis on leadership and discipline, two elements that were noticeably lacking from the previous training regimen.

In a telling sign that there is a new sheriff in town, Martino relayed a story about the 3/7 Commander Col. Ishmael Shihab Mohammed. Described by MiTT members as a capable and assertive leader, Ishmael recently called two soldiers to the front of formation one day during the leadership assessment phase of training. He then pointed out that the first soldier had demonstrated superior leadership skills, a strong work ethic and would be promoted to brigade sergeant major. He made it clear that from now on, all the other soldiers would follow the newly-promoted soldier’s orders and that he was to serve as a role model for the rest of the unit.

The second soldier, on the other hand, was accused of being lazy, sneaky and a troublemaker. Ishmael said that in the old Iraqi army, he would have been shot for dereliction of duty. The punishment for his crimes this time would be far less severe, but effective nonetheless. He was ordered to remove his uniform and equipment, escorted to the base entrance and told to never come back.

“Needless to say, the unit immediately straightened up after this display,” said Martino.

With nine weeks of grueling training ahead of them, both the MiTT and the Iraqi soldiers have their work cut out for them. Building a professional and cohesive Iraqi fighting unit will take extraordinary patience and hard work on the part of the American trainers and an equal amount of determination on the part of the Iraqis. Judging by the tight ship the MiTT has helped assemble thus far, it will be more than capable of accomplishing the mission. It is now just a matter of time before the new recruits begin conducting military operations in the vast desert of western Al Anbar province in an effort to make their homeland more secure.

http://www.marines.mil/marinelink/mcn2000....21?opendocument

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»Forums Index » Military Advisor Support »General Discussion »What was successful?
Author Topic: What was successful? (6 messages, Page 1 of 1)

DanMcDade
-Col-
Posts: 15
Joined: Jun 16, 2005


Posted: Nov 1, 2005 05:03 PM Msg. 1 of 6
What would you consider to be one of the top factors that led to a successful mission?

CraigEverett
-SGT-
Posts: 8
Joined: Oct 19, 2005


Posted: Nov 5, 2005 04:46 PM Msg. 2 of 6
Having a good personal relationship with the host nation leaders, and gaining the personal respect and trust of their troops.

There are many factors that contribute to this; a (very) few of the related areas are: cross-cultural communication, an interest in the host nation's language that appears to be sincere (vs. knowing the language already and being aloof around the host nation troops and leaders), an engaging personality, percieved charisma in public situations, being a good gift-giver and generally thoughtful person, eliminating food aversions, modifying daily habits to meet a standard that the host nation can live with and respects, etc.

It is an important and often overlooked fact that outside of the American military system no one has to do anything you tell them to. Sure, you can try dangling something over their heads but in the end everything you get out of the host nation is, strictly speaking, a favor. Keep in mind as an advisor and/or as a training cycle instructor exactly where you stand with the real power in the host organization you are working with (this is not always the commander).

GunnyOrr
--
Posts: 18
Joined: Nov 10, 2005


Posted: Nov 11, 2005 10:20 AM Msg. 3 of 6
A strong personal and professional relationship is the only factor that I ever found to lead to success. The Iraqis will accomplish things as not to let you down, or to save face with their friends and family. If this relationship is not established, the saving face will come in a negative form such as pointing blame at others. I can't think of anything else that more closely contributed to mission success than relationships, from the Jundi level to the Battalion Commander.

JamesWilson
-Sgt-
Posts: 5
Joined: Nov 14, 2005


Posted: Nov 15, 2005 01:14 PM Msg. 4 of 6
The most successful part was the relationships established professionally and personnally made the Iraqis trust you more and more willing to work for and with you. Just little things like carrying small conversations and positive reenforcement.

brian.cillessen
--
Posts: 17
Joined: Nov 13, 2005


Posted: Nov 20, 2005 10:24 PM Msg. 5 of 6
An advisor is a tactical diplomat representing the United States and it is essential to relate to the HN soldiers professionally, personally, and culturally. Professional relationships are fostered because US Marines represent a warrior ethos that is widely known and accepted. The HN soldiers in Afghanistan were eager to meet all professional standards because they did not want to disappoint their advisors. Personal relationships and culture are not separate facets, but are important because of the cultural divides between the HN soldiers and the US Marines. The Marine advisors should always treat the soldiers with respect and dignity, even during the most challenging or trying moments; respect and dignity does not detract from firmness or discipline. Exercising patience and maintaining composure are essential. The HN soldiers may have a different work ethic and will often fall short of Marine standards. If an advisor loses his temper or composure, a bad situation will get worse. In order to breach the cultural divide, Captain XXX XXXX, an ANA advisor in 2004, expressed that he "drank thousands of gallons of tea and ate entirely too much goat" when establishing rapport with the Afghan soldiers. He continually checked the soldiers and watched out for their welfare. He further stated, "There were many times when I would be checking the lines and the soldiers would want to sit and have tea. Even if I didn’t understand a word they were speaking, I always obliged." Operationally, these interpersonal skills translated to the civilian population as well. The Marine Advisor continually supports the ANA Commander on most missions and often finds himself in the middle of Shura (informal)? or Jirga (formal)?? meetings with village elders or local government officials. The mutual support of the advisor and his ANA counter-part will provide confidence for the local population and added to the legitimacy of the HN military.

It was amazing how Marines could live and interact with the ANA soldiers and forego some of the amenities to avoid seperating themselves from their counterparts. This was vital to the CO-VANS in Vietnam too.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Brian G Cillessen
Edited by brian.cillessen on Nov 20, 2005 at 10:27 PM

RonaldMclaughlin
-Maj-
Posts: 4
Joined: Jun 16, 2005


Posted: Yesterday @ 11:48 AM Msg. 6 of 6
I took it as a success when I came to realize that we were creating an Iraqi unit and not a Marine unit. You are not trying to create someone to the standards of the Marines, but instead someone who is better than the AIF.





Time: Mon August 14, 2006 11:28 AM CFBB v1.3.0 47 ms.
© AderSoftware 2002-2004
https://www.mccll.usmc.mil/cfbb/index.cfm?p...opic&topicID=79

Methinks SSGT Noonanda had some positive things to say 'bout his experiences too. Maybe he'll duck back in here and give us more first hand reports, eh?

Iraqi army continues success
By Story by Sgt. Dennis Gravelle, 138th MPAD
Aug 7, 2006, 05:28




Blackanthem Military News, TAL AFAR, Iraq – Iraqi Army Soldiers from the 3rd IA Division continued their successes in western Ninevah during Operation Sand Storm II.

The IA conducted raids and cordon-and-searches in western Ninevah and conducted validation operations in preparation for taking the lead in counter-insurgency operations.

In Tal Afar, 2nd Brigade, 3rd IA Div., uncovered a cache during searches of the city. The cache consisted of one rocket-propelled grenade launcher, seven rocket-propelled grenades, one 60mm mortar tube, two 60mm mortar base plates, one 60mm mortar bipod, four 60mm mortars, two grenades, four AK-47 magazines, three AK-47’s, and one partially constructed improvised explosive device.

In the village of Gaulat, 3rd Bde., 3rd IA Div., located Jihad propaganda consisting of cassette discs, books, and training manuals. They also found medical supplies, two ounces of cocaine and detained two people for further questioning.

Iraqi media network was on hand during searches documenting the successes of the IA and the support they were given by the people of Tal Afar.

While conducting their operations the IA treated the Iraqi citizens carefully and humanely. All aspects of the operation showed that the 3rd IA Div. is well on its way to being able to conduct independent operations
http://www.blackanthem.com/News/printer200608_150.shtml

Iraqi Forces Capture Terrorist in Baghdad Operation
By Multinational Corps – Iraq Public Affairs Office
Aug 15, 2006, 05:19




BAGHDAD, Iraq – Iraqi forces conducted an early-morning operation on August 14 in west Baghdad, capturing one of their primary targets and detaining one other individual.

Iraqi Security Forces, supported by Coalition advisors, conducted the intelligence-focused, precision raid at a two-story residence in the Mansour district, capturing their primary target without incident. This individual is believed to be responsible for the shooting death of one U.S. soldier and one interpreter in January.

No Iraqi forces, coalition forces or civilians were injured during this operation.

http://www.blackanthem.com/News/printer200608_256.shtml

CFC-A contributes $67,000 to new fire station for Mazar-e-Sharif airport
By Army 1st Sgt. David G. Fraembs, 345th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment
Aug 15, 2006, 05:00





MAZAR-E-SHARIF, Afghanistan – (Left to right) Razmohamid Alami, deputy minister of transportation, Marine Maj. Norma Salas, team chief for the Ministry of Transportation, and the police chief of Mazar-E-Sherif cut the ribbon to officially open the new fire station Aug. 10. (Photo courtesy of Maj. Norma Salas)
Blackanthem Military News, MAZAR-E-SHARIF, Afghanistan – Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan contributed $67,000 to the construction of a fire station at the Mazar-e Sharif airport, putting the airport on track to become certified as a regional airport.

“The people of Afghanistan thank the U.S. and international community for their support of our rebuilding efforts,” said Razmohamid Alami , Afghanistan ’s deputy minister of transportation, during the station’s opening ceremony here Aug. 10.

This station is the first of several projects designed to transform the airport into a regional airport certified by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The international community has pledged more than $80 million for transportation projects in Balkh Province .

Improving the transportation system in Afghanistan is one of the main priorities of the Ministry of Transportation, and improving the air transportation system is one of Alami’s priorities, he said.

Alami, who has spent 38 years involved with civil aviation, understands the importance of air transportation for Afghanistan .

“We want to use the blueprint of Mazar-e-Sharif to build regional airports in Herat , Kandahar , Kunduz and Zabul,” he said. “This will provide the regional infrastructure to support international air travel to, from and within Afghanistan .”

One of the benefits of the future air transportation system will help provide more travel opportunities for Afghans during their annual journey to Mecca , known as the Hajj. This journey is one of the five pillars of the Islamic faith and holds deep spiritual meaning to Muslims. With a regional airport system, more Afghans will be able to participate.

MND-B Soldiers strive to keep terrorists out of neighborhood in southern Baghdad
By Spc. Jason Dangel, 4th BCT PAO, 4th Inf. Div.
Aug 15, 2006, 05:34





BAGHDAD – Sgt. Peter Schmitt, team leader, Company B, 704th Support Battalion, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, pulls security as his Soldiers emplace road barriers in the Doura neighborhood in southern Baghdad Friday. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. Jason Dangel, 4th BCT PAO, 4th Inf. Div.)
Blackanthem Military News,BAGHDAD, Iraq - Scores of Iraqi citizens watched as Multi-National Division – Baghdad Soldiers and local Iraqi contractors unloaded dozens of concrete barriers around their homes in an attempt to keep terrorists out of the Doura neighborhood in southern Baghdad Friday.

The emplacement of barriers is the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division's newest approach to keeping the residents of Al-Doura safe and the terrorists out; the work is being done by local Iraqi contractors.

All vehicles leaving or entering the neighborhood are stopped at designated checkpoints manned by Iraqi police looking for known terrorists, bomb-making materials and illegal weapons.

The new security method was implemented as part of Operation Together Forward, the ongoing security plan to curb terrorism and sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital.

"We are in a conjoined effort with the Iraqi Security Forces to block off certain roads in Doura to better establish security of the neighborhood and give the citizens there a sense of security in their government's effort to build this country," said Master Sgt. Ronald Loebel, brigade engineer noncommissioned officer-in-charge, 4th BCT, 4th Inf. Div.

The neighborhood has become increasingly violent since U.S. forces liberated Iraq in 2003, where roadside bombs, murders and terrorist attacks on Iraqi civilians happen daily, explained Loebel. The new project, with the increased presence of ISF in the area, will help mitigate violence in Al-Doura, he said.

"On average we were finding about 25 improvised-explosive devices a week in and around Doura before we started this operation," explained Loebel, a native of Killeen, Texas. "So far this week, there has only been four IEDs in the area. We have been very successful up to this point."

Murders, car bombs and sectarian violence have also decreased exponentially due to the increased security operations as ISF and Coalition Forces continue to root out the perpetrators responsible for violence in the region, he said.

The neighborhood is not being sealed off as a result of attacks on Coalition Forces but because it is being used by terrorists to incite sectarian tension between Sunni and Shiite Muslims living in Al-Doura, said 1st Lt. Casey Newell, platoon leader, Co. B, 704th Spt. Bn., of Salem, Ill.

The 4th BCT, 4th Inf. Div. and its ISF counterparts are attempting to halt attacks directed mainly at Iraqi civilians living in the area, he said.

"We want these people to feel safe by employing a means of control of who goes in and out of Doura. We want to catch the terrorists before they can hurt the citizens," he said.

Working through the night in the cover of darkness, Newell and his platoon are responsible for escorting transportation elements from Company A, 704th Spt. Bn., and Iraqi contractors from a local construction company, as they collectively work together to emplace barriers around the Doura community.

The nightly missions have not come easily for the members of the platoon, who up to this point have been constantly targeted by small-arms fire as their convoys roll into the neighborhood, said Sgt. Peter Schmitt, gun truck team leader, Co. B, 704th Spt. Bn.

Citizens still object to the roadblocks despite the added security the new barriers will provide.

Saad Qadr, a local shop owner, insisted that the barriers will cause problems for the people traveling around the neighborhood but agrees that it will offer additional security for the citizens.

The Doura barrier project is one of many operations taking place as part of Operation Together Forward.

Since Aug. 7, Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, attached to the 4th BCT, 4th Inf. Div. and working with Iraqi National Police, have cleared illegal weapons and munitions from approximately 3,100 homes and 5,300 huts, shacks and various other structures in Doura.

At the same time, Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 14th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, attached to Multi-National Division – Baghdad, have begun operations in the southern portion of the neighborhood known as Abu T'schir, an area suspected to be the home of terrorists and death squads.

To date, more than 250 homes have been cleared in Abu T'schir as Soldiers and Iraqi National Police continue to work to rid the area of violence.

http://www.blackanthem.com/News/printer200608_260.shtml

United States Helping Rebuild Iraq Despite Terrorists' Efforts
U.S. general provides progress update on restoring key Iraqi infrastructure



By David McKeeby
Washington File Staff Writer





A newly constructed school in Dohuk, Iraq, will serve approximately 840 students and 36 teachers. The project was funded by the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund and built by a local Iraqi construction company. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)

A newly constructed school in Dohuk, Iraq, will serve approximately 840 students and 36 teachers. (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)Washington – Coalition forces are working closely with Iraqi authorities to rebuild the country’s schools, energy infrastructure and water and sanitation systems.

Before Saddam Hussein came to power in Iraq, the nation “was the second-most prosperous country in this region. But during his tyrannical regime, the nation fell to one of the poorest in the region,” said U.S. Army Major General William McCoy at a July 10 press briefing in Baghdad, Iraq.

McCoy, commander the Gulf Regional Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which has played a major role in efforts led by the U.S. State Department to revitalize Iraq, attributed the sharp decline in living standards to the lack of attention given to proper maintenance and operations standards for Iraq’s key facilities.

The extent of this neglect and its effect on the Iraqi people was not appreciated fully by the international community until the dictator was ousted. The World Bank estimated in 2002 that reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure would cost approximately $60 billion, but McCoy said the a more accurate long-term estimate – following 30 years of minimal upgrades and deterioration -- is closer to between $80 billion and $100 billion.

Increasingly, he said, the world is recognizing “what a devastating effect Saddam Hussein had on the lives of the people here.”

To date, the United States has provided more than $21 billion toward Iraq’s reconstruction, said McCoy. More than 2,700 projects already have been completed and an additional 3,400 are under way.

The key to success is sustained investment to repair Iraq’s long-neglected infrastructure, McCoy said. The U.S. military is working ever more closely at national and local levels “to ensure that the people of Iraq have what they need,” he added.

RECONSTRUCTION SUCCESS STORIES

“Everything imaginable has been undertaken in every sector,” said McCoy, including the construction of new power plants and transmission systems, water treatment and sewage systems, schools, police and fire stations and medical clinics.

Specifically, McCoy reported that coalition forces have:

• Completed refurbishment of many of the 3,000 schools across the country slated for repair by the United States;

• Installed the Advanced First Responder Network, a high-tech data and voice communications system linking police, fire and emergency services across 14 provinces;


Residents of Airport Village and media members observe the village's new water tower. (U.S. Army)• Initiated a series of major capital projects to build new water purification and distribution systems, including a plant scheduled to open in Erbil in August that will provide drinking water for 300,000 area residents; and

• Worked with the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity to complete 150 separate projects to improve consumer power deliveries.

REVITALIZING IRAQ’S ENERGY SECTOR

Equally important to Iraq’s future, the Army Corps of Engineers has helped upgrade oil production and transportation networks to facilitate long-term economic prosperity for the new Iraq, McCoy said

As a result of a $1.7 billion U.S. investment, Iraq now is producing 2.5 million barrels of oil per day and is on track to increase production to 3 million barrels per day by the end of the year, he reported. In addition, the Corps is helping the Iraqis rehabilitate 20 neglected gas oil separation plants, which will be able to capture an additional 3,000 tons per day of natural gas that currently is being lost in the production process.

In addition, the United States recently completed a two-year project to build a new underground pipeline for Iraq’s North Oil Company. The pipeline runs beneath the Tigris River and allows oil to flow north for easy export from Kirkuk, Iraq, or southward for refining.

McCoy said that the country’s three successful elections send a message that “Iraq is moving towards its own form of democracy and self-reliance.” With security improving as the government’s institutions mature, he said “The facilities that we are building with the Iraqis today are but the beginning of the great future this country has.”

REPORT REITERATES NEED FOR SUSTAINED INVESTMENT

In a July 6 report to Congress, the State Department said refurbishing long-neglected systems and building new ones will provide the new government a firm base for future economic growth.

The report states that 2,000 megawatts of electricity now are flowing through Iraq’s electrical grid, 3.7 million Iraqis now enjoy better access to clean water and 5.1 million Iraqis have access to upgraded sewer systems. The report also states that all large-scale infrastructure projects are scheduled for completion by the end of 2006.

“It has cost the United States billions [of dollars], and it will cost Iraq tens of billions before it is over. But it is yielding tangible results every day, and every day, as projects are completed, the lives of individual Iraqis are slowly improving,” McCoy said.

A transcript of McCoy’s briefing is available on the Multi-National Force – Iraq Web site.

The full text of the State Department’s report to Congress is available on the department’s Web site.

For more information, see Iraq Update.


(The Washington File is a product of the Bureau of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display....beekcm0.3198053

I seldom read these topics anymore. The result is so predictable if one bothers to read the initial post and the ensuing threads.

Looks like we can bring everybody back soon eh?

That is if you choose to believe the selected oppposing threads to the original post.

Maybe that will be the check on which is true.


lenal