ON IRAQ, THE MILITARY SHARES SOME BLAME WILLIAM M. ARKIN (WASHINGTONPOST.COM, AUGUST 10): Rumsfeld and company may have bullied and manipulated the American public into a losing strategy to fight terrorism, but the military -- particularly those at the top -- share a good part of the responsibility.
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarnin...hares_so_1.html

http://www.counterpunch.org/downing08182006.html

Time to Call for a Rapid Withdrawal
The American Generals and Iraq
By BRIAN M. DOWNING

The Iraq war is the first in American history to steadily worsen our national security. Our generals, through action and acquiescence, despite their sworn duty to protect the nation, have played no small role in endangering America. This is all the more paradoxical and alarming because some thirty years ago they determined to go to war only if national security was at stake. The military--and perhaps only the military--can get us out of the calamity and reorganize the foundering war on terror. They must bear in mind where their duty truly lies and call for a rapid withdrawal from Iraq.

The effort to westernize Iraq and the region has failed. Insurgents and foreign fighters are as strong as ever and demonstrate a surprising ability to adapt tactically. Meanwhile, the coalition grows smaller and smaller. There is little chance that al Malaki's coalition will be able to do anything but issue proclamations from a Baghdad fortress to a heedless and increasingly violence-prone populace. Sectarian violence has become so intense in recent weeks that it is likely only a matter of time until one horrendous incident or another triggers full and open combat between sectarian forces. Reports are surfacing that Shi'as in the coalition are pressing for partitioning, which would raise still more problems for our occupation.

The news on the overall war on terror, now obscured by events in Iraq and Lebanon, is almost as grim. Our ideology-based efforts to modernize Afghanistan have led, predictably, to widespread anti-Westernism, which has brought about a strong Taliban resurgence in the South, where NATO troops are taking increasing casualties. There's little doubt that voters back in Europe will look at their losses and press to withdraw from a failing mission led by a ham-fisted and increasingly reckless ally. Elsewhere, the group we back in Somalia has been driven from the capital by an Islamist group supported by Eritrea and opposed by Ethiopia. We may have yet another war on our hands. The introduction of over a hundred thousand US troops into the Middle East has breathed new life into al Qaeda, and many countries in the region fear that skilled jihadists, fresh from Iraq, are returning home to ply their trades.

Long-standing allies have seen us as a bit haughty since World War Two, but now they see us as irresponsible, and even dangerous. Our tactless policies seem devised not to transform the Middle East into a peaceful, pro-West region, but to bring about lasting enmity between Islam and the West--a clash of civilizations by design. Russia and China, whose antagonisms reach back centuries and even thrived during decades of ideological affinity, look with concern upon the behavior of the remaining superpower and seek rapprochement with each other, including joint military measures--presumably not aimed to deter Mongolian or Tajik aggression. We may be at the outset of a diplomatic revolution in which the US is no longer trusted with leadership, indeed many heads of state pursue policies to contain the United States or, worse, keep us bogged down in the Middle East.

Our generals deserve considerable blame. They surrendered, with hardly a murmur, the principle of going to war only when America's security was at stake, which had enjoyed doctrine status under Weinberger and Powell. The former is deceased, the latter disgraced. They stood at parade rest though perhaps not at ease, as politicians who had adroitly avoided military service--while they were chasin' Charlie -­ told them that our invasion of Iraq would be welcomed and swiftly lead to the flowering of democracy throughout the region. An institution that assigns the writings of T. E. Lawrence and Vo Nguyen Giap as routinely as a seminary assigns those of Augustine and Aquinas could not produce generals or even many lieutenants credulous enough to believe these think-tank scenarios. The military's post-Vietnam writings abounded with assertions of the generals' solemn duty to oppose unwise military ventures, through resignations if need be. It became a credo in service academies and staff colleges. In 2003, our generals had neither the courage of their youths nor that of their convictions.

In Iraq, our generals put aside the lessons of counter-insurgency and rely on massive firepower, which even with precision guided munitions devastated large portions of Fallujah and Ramadi, creating ruins reminiscent of Stalingrad and Hue. They have made piles of rubble and called it victory. They have allowed politicians in Washington to delay combat operations in order to reduce casualties at election time. They round up thousands of innocent Iraqis unfortunate enough simply to be near a car-bombing, detain them for lengthy periods, and submit them to systematic humiliation and torture. The ratio of future insurgents to actual ones caught up in these sweeps is likely appallingly high. Ably displaying the mordancy war imparts, GIs call one detainment center, "Jihad University." We are more despised in Iraq today than we were three years ago, more than we ever were in Vietnam.

It is time our generals speak out. Our politicians, with rare and estimable exceptions, spout only insipid dialog from page-worn scripts. Most of the public, urged on by media gunsels, simply cheers or hisses from their seats, unable to feel personally involved in events and unable to comprehend the unfolding tragedy--obvious though it is to those who studied and participated in past ones. Having played a leading and unappealing role in the unfolding tragedy, our generals can offer hope for a bold reappraisal and a painful recommendation.

Unfortunately, there are too many junior and field-grade officers who entered the service in the years of the great contest with the Evil Empire, men and women filled with national pride approaching militarism and a can-do spirit well into naiveté. They lack the historical judgment and sense of limits that a previous war impressed, at considerable cost, onto the minds of men now honored by three or four stars on their epaulets. There are more than a few who look back on past decades of civil-military harmony and wonder if their partner has failing senses or is now enamored by another and no longer faithful to America. Heretofore, a general or two have spoken out, but only in timid words questioning postwar planning, criticizing civilian meddling, and lamenting insufficient troops.

Their demurrals are true, but irrelevant and pusillanimous. It is difficult to believe such men earned Combat Infantryman Badges. The war was a mistake from the moment we crossed the Iraqi frontier three and a half years ago, from its inception, from the moment the administration advanced the preposterous notion that an American invasion of an Arab country would result in anything but a vicious guerrilla war.

It is time for our senior officers, active and retired, men who understand war and cannot be daunted by the "cut and run" gimmick, to make it clear to the public and the politicians, perhaps through a joint statement, that the war in Iraq is lost, that we are squandering young lives, and that we must withdraw in short order. Having done this, they can help devise a thoughtful strategy to combat al Qaeda, a strategy based on military realities and regional knowledge, not on ethereal ideology or the schemes of think tanks.

Our generals owe this measure of patriotic dissent--the term is not simply a leftist catch phrase--to America's military institutions, which are badly overcommitted and rapidly losing public trust. They owe it to the nation and Constitution they swore to defend, which supersedes subservience or acquiescence to any administration, let alone one as unschooled in world politics and military matters as the present one. Most of all, they owe it to the young men and women whose lives they swore some thirty years ago never again to waste in an unwinnable war. Failing that, they might have the decency to return their Combat Infantryman Badges.

Brian M. Downing is a veteran of the Vietnam War and author of several works of political and military history, including The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached at: brianmdowning@gmail.com

© Brian M. Downing

WHY VICTORY STILL PROVES ELUSIVE: WHAT WENT WRONG IN IRAQ--AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT - JOHN KEEGAN (OPINION JOURNAL FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EDITORIAL PAGE, AUGUST 16): Whether pure military skills will win the war, however, cannot be predicted.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/la/?id=110008800

http://www.denverpost.com/portlet/article/...article=4198724

The story behind America's "Fiasco"

By Tom Walker
Denver Post Staff Writer
DenverPost.com

There was never any doubt that the American military, by far the strongest in the world, would make short work of Iraqi defenses once the early "shock and awe" airstrikes were over and the boots on the ground were headed inexorably for Baghdad in March 2003.

But what about after that? What would Iraq look like after Saddam Hussein was deposed and America was strapped with occupying a country with a devastated infrastructure sorely lacking in most of the rudiments of life, like electricity, clean water and working sewer systems?

Well, the jury is in for the most part, according to Thomas E. Ricks in his blistering new book, "Fiasco." Infrastructure is still a major concern, a nascent government is struggling at getting its act together, and U.S. and coalition forces are faced with a strong and apparently well-trained, well-funded insurgency that shows no signs of letting up.

Every day there are new incidents of roadside bombs killing soldiers, or suicide bombers blowing up markets, or internecine conflict among warring Sunnis and Shiites. The two most dreaded words in Iraq right now are "civil war," and some are saying that it is inevitable, while others say it's already started. In short, Iraq is in chaos.

But, according to Ricks, senior Pentagon correspondent for The Wash-

ington Post and two-time Pulitzer Prize-winner, it didn't have to be that way. Ricks takes a lot of people to the proverbial woodshed: the Pentagon civilian leadership, the State Department and the White House, along with our top military leaders.

Much of the blame, Ricks says, was in the early planning stages when the civilian leadership was hellbent on going to war and would suffer no amount of disuasion. There were those who said that an insurgency would develop and that you would need many more troops to combat it. The leadership would not listen. The implication is that you couldn't cut the hubris with a knife.

Strategic misstep

All of the planning leading up to the war was on taking Baghdad militarily, with no grand strategy for what would come next. "It is difficult to overstate what a key misstep this lack of strategic direction was," Ricks writes, "probably the single most significant miscalculation of the entire effort. In its absence, the U.S. military would fight hard and well but blindly, and the noble sacrifices of soldiers would be undercut by the lack of thoughtful leadership at the top that soberly assessed the realities of the situation and constructed a response."

Ricks says that Army Gen. Tommy Franks was responsible for devising the plan but that "ultimately, the fault lies with (Defense Secretary Donald) Rumsfeld."

L. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the highest ranking civilian in Iraq, made some decisions that Ricks says probably sealed the deal for the insurgency.

First, he removed senior Baathists from their positions and banned them from future employment in the public sector. But, Ricks notes, these were the people who knew the ins and outs of the country's infrastructure and that knowledge was invaluable.

Second, Bremer disbanded the Iraqi army and the national police force. Here was a ready labor force of 300,000 to 400,000 people who simply went on the unemployment roles. "Abruptly terminating the livelihoods of these men created a vast pool of humiliated, antagonized and politicized men," many of whom were armed, Ricks quotes Faleh Jabar, an expert on the Baathist Party.

Finally, Bremer alienated the Iraqi middle-class by moving the country toward a free-market economy and shutting down state-run industries.

And, the occupation in the summer of 2003 came to a standstill while the country dissolved into chaos. Administration officials weren't finding what they expected after the fighting stopped. There were no weapons of mass destruction; instead they were finding violent and widespread resistance to their presence. The Iraqi people didn't welcome Americans with open arms.

Still, Ricks says, Rumsfeld could have made a difference. "Instead, Rumsfeld's self-confident stubbornness made him a big part of the problem. The defense secretary's vulnerability wasn't that he made errors, it was that he seemed unable to recognize them and make adjustments."

But Rumsfeld is not the only administration member catching heat from Ricks. He also points the finger at President Bush, along with Vice President Dick Chaney, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and more for relying on faulty intelligence and for unaltering rosy scenarios for how the war in Iraq was going to turn out.

And the military leaders don't fare any better, mostly because even though they knew, or at least sensed, that things could turn out badly, they failed to argue their case with enough fervor. Also, once the die was cast, many of them seemed unable to adjust to a changing political and military scene.

Stuck in the Green Zone

As the summer of 2003 progressed, things became worse for Bremer's CPA, Ricks says. There was a high turnover among the staff, mostly young Republicans, and there was still no strategy. The Green Zone, the protected area in central Baghdad where the civilian headquarters was located, was so isolated that people rarely got out into the countryside to see the result of their nation- building. As Ricks quotes one State Department official: "You had this odd situation where the journalists knew more about the situation than the briefers did, because the journalists moved around and the briefers didn't get out of the Green Zone much."

No one, it seems, had much good to say about the CPA under Bremer. "Underneath the poor image," writes Ricks, "was a poor reality. The CPA was ineptly organized and frequently incompetent."

One of the major arguing points between a largely acquiescent military and its civilian leadership was the number of troops that might be needed in occupying Iraq. Rumsfeld and others at the Department of Defense were determined to keep the numbers down while some in the military argued for more.

It was one of the reasons, Ricks contends, for the scandal that rocked the military to its core and is blamed for setting back efforts to win over the Iraqis - the Abu Ghraib abuse of prisoners incident.

"All of the Army's problems in Iraq in 2003 - poor planning, clumsy leadership, strategic confusion, counterproductive tactics, undermanning, being overly reactive - came together in the treatment of prisoners, a wide-ranging scandal that eventually was summarized in the phrase 'Abu

Ghraib,' after the big prison west of Baghdad where many prisoners would end up, and where some were tortured," Ricks says.

Ricks takes the administration to task, much as other books have done, notably "Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq," by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, for going to war based on faulty information and questionable purposes.

As he puts it, "The Bush administration offered three basic rationales for the U.S. intervention in Iraq: the threat it believed was posed by Saddam's WMD; the supposed nexus it saw between Saddam Hussein's government and transnational terrorism; and the need to liberate an oppressed people. In the spring of 2004, the first two arguments were undercut by official findings by the same government that had invaded Iraq, and the third was tarred by the revelation of the Abu Ghraib scandal."

Glimmer of hope

Ricks isn't wholly pessimistic, and holds out hope, scant as it is. "While there is a small chance that the Bush administration's inflexible optimism will be rewarded," he writes, "that the political process will undercut the insurgency, and that democracy will take hold in Iraq, there is a far greater chance of other, more troublesome outcomes."

One of those "troublesome outcomes" would be if Iraq should become a terrorist haven. If that happens, the thinking is the U.S. would have to go right back in and start all over.

"Fiasco" isn't a political or ideological tome. There are relatively few anonymous sources, particularly when you consider the subjects and personalities involved, and Ricks had access to tens of thousands of pages of official documents and conducted interviews with more than 100 senior military officers.

You should read this one; it's important.

Books editor Tom Walker can be reached at 303-820-1624 or twalker@denverpost.com.


Fiasco

The American Military Adventure in Iraq
By Thomas E. Ricks