http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...1101005_pf.html

Pentagon Weighing Report On Anbar
Violence Negated Plan to Pull Troops

By Ann Scott Tyson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, September 12, 2006; A19



The Pentagon is taking "very seriously" a classified intelligence report concluding that the U.S. military has fought to a stalemate in Iraq's western Anbar province as political conditions also worsen in the "epicenter" of the country's Sunni insurgency, a senior defense official said yesterday.

In congressional testimony on security in Iraq, Pentagon officials also said the rise of "ethno-sectarian violence" has laid the conditions for civil war, aborting plans by U.S. commanders to begin withdrawing U.S. troops. Gaps in the capabilities of Iraqi security forces leave open the prospect that U.S. forces may have to stay in the country for as many as five or more years, they said.

Calling Anbar "a very hot zone on the battlefield," Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric S. Edelman said the secret report on the volatile, strategic province was gaining high-level attention at the Pentagon.

"It is an important report. We've taken it very seriously," Edelman told a panel of the House Government Reform Committee. "This is an operational assessment by one very good intel officer," he said, adding that "a lot of us are looking at it very closely" and are seeking a further assessment on Anbar from top U.S. commanders in Iraq.

The report, first outlined publicly in The Washington Post yesterday, said a shortage of U.S. and Iraqi troops in Anbar and the collapse of local governments have left a vacuum that has been exploited by the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq. It painted a bleak picture of security prospects in Anbar, a large province bordering Syria and Jordan that includes the troubled cities of Fallujah and Ramadi.

"Anbar has been the epicenter of the insurgency," Edelman said, adding that "a purely military solution to any insurgency is not possible." He said the report was a "snapshot" that does not represent the entire country.

Edelman prompted an angry retort from Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-Ohio) by saying that it would not be "productive" to discuss the classified report on the conflict in Anbar in a public hearing.

"But wouldn't it be of interest to the parents of American soldiers who are being sent to fight, that they would know that a report existed that said that a province was beyond repair and the thing couldn't be won militarily? Wouldn't that be of interest, Mr. Edelman?" Kucinich replied. Edelman explained that he was concerned because "the enemy, you know, is clearly following the discussion."

On overall security in Iraq, lawmakers pressed Edelman and Rear Adm. William D. Sullivan, vice director for strategic plans and policy on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on why the growth of Iraq's military and police forces has not yet permitted a reduction in the number of U.S. troops, which increased to 140,000 over the summer.

Iraq expects by December to have completed the training and equipping of 325,000 security forces, including 137,000 military personnel and 188,000 police and other Ministry of Interior forces, Sullivan said. And the U.S. military has turned over 53 of its 100 bases in Iraq to the Iraqi government. But he said the emergence of sectarian violence in addition to the Sunni insurgency has led U.S. commanders to decide "that they cannot afford to draw down our own troop levels while the Iraqis are still building up theirs."

Sullivan conceded that in the longer term, because Iraq's military has been trained and outfitted primarily to fight an insurgency, rather than to defend Iraq against foreign attack, U.S. forces could be required as backup for many years.

"Am I wrong in making the assumption that we're going to have American troops there or nearby for a long time . . . in order to defend this nation?" asked Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), chairman of the Government Reform subcommittee on national security.

"It is very much a possibility," Sullivan replied. He said the intent in developing Iraq's military was to create a force "that would have a modicum of its own self-defense capability without being an army that could threaten its neighbors." Iraqi leaders are still trying to "figure out what kind of military ultimately they need," he said.

Edelman said he did not know whether U.S. troops would be withdrawn from Iraq in five or fewer years. Asked whether they would be home in 10 years, he replied: "I certainly hope so."

© 2006 The Washington Post Company

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/12/world/mi...st/12anbar.html

Grim Outlook Seen in West Iraq Without More Troops and Aid

Max Becherer/Polaris, for The New York Times
A herd of sheep was led past Iraqi soldiers in Abu Hazziem in Anbar Province in July. The Sunni-dominated province is a stronghold of insurgents.

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Published: September 12, 2006
WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 — The political and security situation in western Iraq is grim and will continue to deteriorate unless the region receives a major infusion of aid and a division is sent to reinforce the American troops operating there, according to the senior Marine intelligence officer in Iraq.

The assessment, prepared last month by Col. Peter Devlin at the Marine headquarters in Anbar Province, has been sent to senior military officials in Iraq and at the Pentagon.

While the American military is focused on trying to secure Baghdad and prevent the sectarian strife there from escalating into a civil war, the assessment points to the difficulties in Anbar, a vast Sunni-dominated area of western Iraq where the insurgency is particularly strong. The province includes such restive towns as Ramadi, Haditha and Hit.

Marine commanders have been mounting a campaign to secure the province in the face of a virulent insurgency. But they have had to cope with seriously short-handed Iraqi Army units and a Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad that has tended to view the area as a low priority for government spending and programs.

Elements of the assessment were reported Monday in The Washington Post. Military officials familiar with the document disclosed additional material and provided several quotations from the assessment.

One factor that has hampered the American counterinsurgency effort has been the limited number of American troops. As a general rule, a substantial number of troops are required in a counterinsurgency campaign to protect the population from attacks and intimidation by insurgent groups.

There are about 30,000 marines, soldiers, airmen and sailors in Anbar, a region that borders Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia and is roughly the size of Louisiana.

American forces can generally maneuver where they want and are fighting to regain control of Ramadi, the provincial capital, neighborhood by neighborhood. But there are areas of the province where the Americans have not established a persistent presence, the assessment says.

Without the deployment of an additional division, “there is nothing MNF-W can do to influence the motivation of the Sunni to wage an insurgency,” the report states, according to a military officer familiar with it. MNF-W stands for Multinational Force-West, the formal name of the Marine command. A division numbers about 16,000 troops. The limited number of troops, however, is just one problem in countering the insurgency there, the report says. The assessment describes Anbar as a region marked by violence and criminality. Except for a few relatively bright spots, like the towns of Falluja and Qaim, the region generally lacks functional governments and a respect for the rule of law.

Anbar does not have valuable resources like oil. Nor does its Sunni population appear to represent an important constituency for the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. Although there is economic growth in relatively secure areas, much of it can be attributed to the American-supported reconstruction effort. The level of economic activity in the province is just a fraction of what it was before 2003, the assessment says.

Feeling marginalized in the new Iraq, the Sunnis in Anbar have generally lost faith in the new Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad. The Sunnis’ “greatest fears have been realized,” the report says.

The Sunnis’ suspicion of the government makes the task of forging a political reconciliation more difficult, and has also complicated one policy option that some critics of Bush administration’s strategy have proposed as an alternative means of stabilizing Iraq: dividing the country into Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni enclaves. Such a plan would not be welcomed by Sunnis, since they would not trust the central government to share proceeds from oil sales, the assessment says.

As the situation has deteriorated, insurgent attacks have increased. The report describes Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia as an “integral part of the social fabric” of Anbar. The organization, which is predominantly made up of fighters who are native Iraqis, is flush with cash, much of it earned from black market or criminal activity.

As an intelligence assessment, the report is intended to analyze trends, not make policy recommendations. A spokesman for the Marine command declined to comment on the assessment. Many of the points in the analysis were also presented to Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, when he met with senior Marine officers at Camp Falluja in August.

Several elements of the intelligence assessment are consistent with the views of some Marine officers who were interviewed in the field in July. Discussing force levels, Lt. Col. Ronald Gridley, the executive officer with Regimental Combat Team 7, a Marine unit that is charged with securing a large swath of the province, said then that his regiment had recommended that additional troops be allocated to its section of Anbar. Even a battalion or two, he said, would help a great deal.

“What we recommend and what we get is going to be two different things,” Colonel Gridley said. “In our perfect world, we could use some more infantrymen to be able to patrol the streets and partner with the Iraqi Army.”

Since the intelligence assessment was prepared in August, however, no reinforcements have been sent. To the contrary, the strain on the American troops in Anbar has increased. An American Stryker unit, which was under the overall Marine command, has been sent from Rawa to Baghdad to help with the operation there. Also, military police who had been earmarked for training the Iraq police in Anbar have also been sent to Baghdad. The Marines have sought to make up the shortfall by using existing troops.

The Iraqi Army has deployed two divisions in the region with a combined authorized strength of some 19,000. But the Iraqi military is under strength. The two Iraqi divisions in Anbar together are some 5,000 troops short of that level, while hundreds more are absent without leave. As a result of these developments and the practice of giving monthly leaves, the day-to-day strength of the two divisions is 50 percent for one division and 35 percent for the other.

A separate report, titled “Stabilizing Iraq,” issued Monday by the Government Accountability Office, says that, although the solution to securing the country is not entirely military, there is an important relationship between security conditions and efforts to strengthen the economy.

The G.A.O. report noted that attacks against the American-led forces and Iraqi security forces reached an “all-time high during July 2006.”

“Despite coalition efforts and the efforts of the newly formed Iraqi government, insurgents continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit new fighters, supply themselves, and attack coalition and Iraqi security forces,” the G.A.O report added. “The deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of U.S. and international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/13/world/mi...13military.html

Grim Report Out of Anbar Is Disputed by General

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Published: September 13, 2006
WASHINGTON, Sept. 12 — The senior Marine commander in Iraq said Tuesday that he had sufficient forces to carry out his mission but that the mission did not include defeating the insurgency.

“For what we are trying to achieve out here I think our force levels are about right,” said Maj. Gen. Richard C. Zilmer, who defined his primary mission as training the Iraqi forces who ultimately would be responsible for security in the area.

“Now, if that mission statement changes — if there is seen a larger role for coalition forces out here to win that insurgency fight — then that is going to change the metrics of what we need out here,” General Zilmer added.

The Marine general commands a force of 30,000 troops who are charged with securing Anbar Province, a vast region in western Iraq that borders Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. He spoke to reporters in a telephone interview from his headquarters at Camp Falluja.

The Pentagon arranged the interview after articles in The Washington Post and The New York Times reported that General Zilmer’s senior intelligence officer had submitted a grim assessment about the political and security situation in Iraq.

The intelligence assessment concluded that Al Qaeda of Mesopotamia, the dominant insurgent group in the area, is an “integral part of the social fabric” in Anbar. It described the region as marked by violence and criminality. It reported that Sunnis had lost confidence in the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government.

The classified intelligence assessment, according to military officials familiar with it, also said that the region would continue to deteriorate unless there was an infusion of aid and a division was sent to reinforce General Zilmer’s command, known as MNF-W, for Multinational Force-West.

In his telephone discussion with reporters, General Zilmer declined to discuss the specifics of the report but indicated that he agreed with the intelligence assessment.

At the same time, he insisted that the United States was winning the war, while acknowledging that the effort was hampered by sectarian differences and the belief among Iraqis in Anbar that the Baghdad-based government was not meeting their needs.

“Until those things change, until those long-term effects are realized, then trying to solve the insurgency out here is going to be problematic,” he said.

General Zilmer said that sending additional American troops would help in the short run, but was not the key to “achieve long-term security and stability out here in Anbar” because that ultimately depended on the Iraqis.

The general’s comments contrasted with those of some of his subordinate officers in the field. Regimental Combat Team 7, which reports to General Zilmer, has recommended that additional forces be deployed in its sector, its officers have said.

The general’s account of his mission — training Iraqi forces — was also a narrow one.

President Bush has suggested an expansive strategy to achieve victory by using American forces to clear contested towns of insurgents, holding them with Iraqi security forces and then spending funds to rebuild the infrastructure and win the support of the Iraqi people.

A White House fact sheet issued in March described this process as the “Strategy for Victory: Clear, Hold and Build.” At the White House, Tony Snow, the president’s spokesman, asserted that Mr. Bush was prepared to send more troops to Anbar if they were requested. “He has made it absolutely clear to generals that the job is to win,” Mr. Snow said. “And the first thing you have to do is, to the best of your ability, cut through that fog of war and tell him what the situation is and what they need to get the job done.”

Mr. Snow added, however, that the intelligence assessment did not account for the accomplishments of American forces in Iraq. General Zilmer made a similar point in a statement that was released early Tuesday.

“Recent media reports fail to accurately capture the entirety and complexity of the current situation in the Al Anbar Province of Iraq,” the statement said. “The classified assessment, which has been referred to in these reports, was intended to focus on the causes of the insurgency. It was not intended to address the positive effects coalition and Iraqi forces have achieved on the security environment over the past years.”

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060913/ap_on_...anbar&printer=1

Zilmer: U.S. 'stifling' Iraq insurgency By ROBERT BURNS, AP Military Writer
Tue Sep 12, 9:06 PM ET



A senior American commander in Iraq said Tuesday that U.S.-led military operations are "stifling" the insurgency in western Anbar province but are not strong enough to defeat it.

Marine Maj. Gen. Richard C. Zilmer told reporters in a telephone interview from his headquarters in Fallujah that he has enough U.S. troops — about 30,000 — to accomplish what he called his main mission: training Iraqi security forces.

"For what we are trying to achieve out here I think our force levels are about right," he said. Even so, he said the training of Iraqi soldiers and police had not progressed as quickly as once expected.

"Now, if that mission statement changes — if there is seen a larger role for coalition forces out here to win that insurgency fight — then that is going to change the metrics of what we need out here," he added.

Zilmer, who has commanded U.S. forces in western Iraq since February, said increasing the number of U.S. troops there would help in the short term, "but at the end of the day I don't think it's going to be the significant change that is necessary to achieve long-term security and stability out here in Anbar."

What is needed, he said, is progress on the economic and political fronts that will undercut support for the insurgency.

The situation in Anbar, with its heavily Sunni population, is a barometer for the entire Sunni Arab minority, which lost its favored position to the majority Shiites and the Kurds when Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed in 2003.

As long as the insurgency rages, it is unlikely that Sunni Arab politicians in Baghdad can win over significant numbers of Sunnis to support the government of national unity, which took office May 20.

Some areas in Anbar have shown significant progress, such as the border city of Qaim, once an al-Qaida stronghold. Trouble has increased in other areas, like the rural stretch between Ramadi and Fallujah. Insurgent killings of Iraqi police in Fallujah have become commonplace, according to officials there.

Zilmer dismissed a reporter's suggestion that the war in Anbar — a province the size of North Carolina that stretches west from Baghdad to the borders of Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia — has been lost.

"I think we are winning this war," he said.

In the long run, the war will not be won on the battlefield, Zilmer said. The outcome will be determined by the Iraqis' ability to compromise on their political goals, accommodate their sectarian differences and demonstrate to ordinary people that a democratic central government can serve their needs.

"Until those things change, until those long-term effects are realized, then trying to solve the insurgency out here is going to be problematic," he said.

White House press secretary Tony Snow said President Bush would be talking to Gen. George Casey, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, later this week.

"If the president gets a recommendation from the combatant commanders to send more troops to al-Anbar province, they will get them," Snow said.

As of Monday there were 147,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, the highest number since December 2005. Most of the recent increase was for Baghdad, where U.S. and Iraqi forces are trying to avert a civil war.

Pentagon officials hastily arranged the interview with Zilmer in response to a series of news reports about a classified report by the chief of intelligence for the Marines in western Anbar province, Col. Pete Devlin. Zilmer said he agreed with the assessment by Devlin, who works for Zilmer, and he did not dispute news reports that characterized it as depicting Anbar as locked in a military stalemate with inadequate political progress.

The classified report was first reported by the Washington Post.

The New York Times reported Tuesday that the Devlin report concluded that Anbar's political and security situation will continue to deteriorate unless it gets a major infusion of aid and substantially more U.S. troops.

Zilmer would not discuss specifics of the Devlin report, but said he did not want more U.S. troops as long as his mission did not include defeating the insurgency.

The Devlin assessment was made in mid-August.

Before the telephone interview, Zilmer issued a written and a video statement.

"Recent media reports fail to accurately capture the entirety and complexity of the current situation," Zilmer said in his written statement.

He added that the assessment "which has been referred to in these reports, was intended to focus on the causes of the insurgency. It was not intended to address the positive effects Coalition and Iraqi forces have achieved on the security environment over the past years."

Zilmer acknowledged, however, that "there is an active insurgency in Anbar. The enemy we face has no concern for the welfare of the Iraqi people, nor any peaceful vision for their future. We believe the Iraqi people want something more and are willing to fight and die for it."



Copyright © 2006 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. The information contained in the AP News report may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without the prior written authority of The Associated Press.


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