POLAND QUESTIONING TIES TO U.S. - ZBIGNIEW JANOWSKI (BALTIMORE SUN, NOVEMBER 17): Poland may be a useful pawn for U.S. foreign policy, but with the slowly growing disenchantment over American sincerity among ordinary Poles, it may be only a matter of time before Poland joins the ranks of anti-Americans.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines

DON'T GIVE UP ON RUSSIA - JIM HOAGLAND (WASHINGTON POST, NOVEMBER 17): Bush's clearing vision of Putin's flaws and the American leader's candor with his peers are welcome developments. But they make it even more important for the United States and Russia to seize opportunities that reinforce a relationship that cannot for long be dominated by personal ties.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...1601361_pf.html

PIN AND CONSEQUENCES - EDITORIAL (NEW YORK TIMES, NOVEMBER 15): Americans have a right to know what standards their president has been applying to the treatment of prisoners. The nation's image is at stake, as well as the safety of every man and woman who is fighting Mr. Bush's so-called war on terror.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/15/opinion/...agewanted=print

WAR HAS CHANGED. THE LAWS OF WAR MUST, TOO: THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS ARE OUTDATED FOR TODAY'S WAR ON TERROR. THE US SHOULD LEAD A CALL TO MODERNIZE THEM - SCOTT HOLCOMB AND MARK RIBBING (CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, NOVEMBER 16): If America hopes to persuade other nations of the legitimacy of its counterterrorism campaigns, it must work to rebuild its moral authority by helping to create internationally accepted standards.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1116/p09s01-coop.html

ELECTION GIVES TERRORISTS CAUSE FOR CELEBRATION - CAL THOMAS (BALTIMORE SUN, NOVEMBER 15): The Islamo-fascists really do want to defeat America in Iraq and then use a failed state to replicate 9/11 (and worse) around the world. They say so, and their actions prove their intent.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/o...-oped-headlines

CTC: MILITANT IDEOLOGY ATLAS - MARC LYNCH (ABU AARDVARK, NOVEMBER 16): The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has just released a massive report entitled the Militant Ideology Atlas. The report offers a massive database of figures who play a role in the jihadist intellectual universe, summaries of a large number of important texts which circulate in that intellectual universe, and an intriguing citation analysis used to determine the influence and centrality of various figures.
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark...ilitant_id.html
REPORT AT
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas/default.asp

OUR ENEMIES' GLEE - AMIR TAHERI (NEW YORK POST, NOVEMBER 16): The mullahs and al Qaeda may soon find out that their celebration of "the end of Bush" was premature.
http://www.nypost.com/php/pfriendly/print....amir_taheri.htm

A BETTER WAY TO FIGHT TERRORISM - JOHN HAMRE (WASHINGTON POST, NOVEMBER 16): The United States will lose the global war on terrorism if we feel we must adopt tactics that undermine our civic values.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...1501336_pf.html

POURING CHARDONNAY DIPLOMACY - MAUREEN DOWD (NEW YORK TIMES, NOVEMBER 15): Voters rejected W.'s black-and-white, good-and-evil, incompetent foreign policy last week.
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/11/15/opini...agewanted=print
PAID SUBSCRIPTION

OBLIGATIONS - EDITORS (NEW REPUBLIC, NOVEMBER 17): American power may not be capable of transforming ancient cultures or deep hatreds, but that fact does not absolve us of the duty to conduct a foreign policy that takes its moral obligations seriously.
http://www.tnr.com/docprint.mhtml?i=200611...editorial112706

THE COMING US WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ - MARTIN VAN CREVELD (INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, NOVEMBER 16/COMMON DREAMS): Above all, America must take a hard look at its foreign policy. What role should the strongest power on earth play in the international arena, and just what are the limits of that role? How can U.S. power be matched with its finite economic possibilities and under what circumstances should it be used? If American power is used, what should its objectives be?
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/1116-21.htm

TOMGRAM: WILL DADDY'S BOYS EXTEND THE WAR?: NO EXIT?: WHAT IT MEANS TO "SALVAGE U.S. PRESTIGE" IN IRAQ - TOM ENGELHARDT (TOMDISPATCH, NOVEMBER 16): Now, the dreamers, the greatest gamblers in our history, are departing official Washington and the "realists" have hit the corridors of power that they always thought they owned. It wouldn't hurt if they opened their eyes.
http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=141003

AMERICA FACES A FUTURE OF MANAGING IMPERIAL DECLINE: BUSH'S FAILURE TO GRASP THE LIMITS OF US GLOBAL POWER HAS LED TO AN ADVENTURISM FOR WHICH HIS SUCCESSORS WILL PAY A HEAVY PRICE - MARTIN JACQUES (GUARDIAN, NOVEMBER 16/COMMON DREAMS): Just six years into the 21st century, one can say this is not shaping up to be anything like an American century. Rather, the US seems much more likely to be faced with a very different kind of future: how to manage its own imperial decline.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/1116-20.htm

MIDTERMS AND WARS - HELLE DALE (WASHINGTON TIMES, NOVEMBER 15): The concern over American withdrawal has been on the minds of foreign observers of the Bush administration's foreign policy for a while, especially its critics. After overreaching in Iraq, so their scenario goes, there would follow a precipitous American withdrawal and a period of isolationism, leaving a power vacuum globally.
http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/hdale.htm

IDEAS DO HAVE CONSEQUENCES - ALEJANDRO CHAFUEN (WASHINGTON TIMES, NOVEMBER 16): Throughout history, ideas have usually come first: political action has followed. If the United States and the West want to encourage freedom, they must support and encourage the free flow of ideas and the institutions that make it possible.
http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.p...15-093408-8325r

A 'Grand Bargain' with Iran
Gareth Porter
November 17, 2006


With the replacement of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates, a member of the Baker-Hamilton Commission who came out for diplomatic engagement with Iran in 2004, it now appears all but certain that the commission will recommend a diplomatic dialogue with both Iran and Syria as an approach to stabilizing Iraq. The question is just how far-reaching the recommendation will be. Will the commission call for negotiations with Iran in the framework of a “grand bargain” that would address the full range of issues dividing the two countries or suggest a narrow approach that tries to get Iranian cooperation on Iraq without having to make significant concessions to Iranian interests?

The grand bargain approach is unlikely to gain acceptance of the political and foreign policy elite as long as it clings to an unrealistic understanding of the power relationship between the United States and Iran. The precondition for a new diplomatic policy toward Iran and Iraq, therefore, is the acceptance of the reality that the United States does not have the power to impose a solution on Iran but must make major concessions to Iranian interests in order to achieve it own interests.

But a “grand bargain” represents the only real hope of for finding a way of curbing the sectarian violence in Iraq and avoiding a regional conflagration over the Iranian nuclear program. It has the advantage of being able to refer to an Iranian proposal to the United States in spring 2003 which laid out a very concrete framework for negotiating such a bargain.

Few political leaders are aware of the substance of the 2003 Iranian proposal, because major news media have never fully reported it. But that proposal, which is now a matter of public record, responded to U.S. interests on all four issues on which the Bush administration had made public demands on it. The proposal offered to use Iranian influence in Iraq to support “political stabilization and the establishment of democratic institutions and a non-religious government,” disavowing the aim of imposing a Shiite theocracy on Iraq. And it offers “full transparency” to provide assurances that it is not developing weapons of mass destruction.

Most important politically for the United States, however, Iranian leaders offered to stop “material support to Palestinian opposition groups…from Iranian territory” as well as “pressure on these organizations to stop violent actions against civilians within [Israel’s] borders of 1967.” And it offered to accept the Arab League “Beirut declaration”—a Saudi-sponsored initiative in March 2002 which proposed a comprehensive peace, including the establishment of normal relations, with Israel based on Israel’s withdrawal to pre-1967 war lines.

What Iran wanted in return for these concessions was an end to U.S. “hostile behavior,” including the “axis of evil” tag and its designation as a “terrorist” state, as well as end to commercial sanctions, “decisive action” against anti-Iranian MEK terrorists, especially on U.S. territory, and access to peaceful nuclear and other technologies. Finally Iran wanted recognition of its “legitimate security interest in the region”—a phrase that has been interpreted as referring to security guarantees against U.S. attack and recognition as a party to future security arrangements in the region.

These points leave many questions unanswered, particularly in regard to how the Iranians would propose to provide assurances that it is not going to obtain nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the proposal suggests a much greater willingness on Iran’s part to take its place in a stable regional order than the U.S. national security elite has believed in the past. A pragmatic search for alternatives to a failed policy would surely require a full exploration of the Iranian offer.

Up to now, however, the political consensus in Washington has firmly rejected a broad diplomatic effort that would deal with Iran’s major political-diplomatic interests and grievances as well as U.S. interests. Although Gates and former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brezinski called for “selective political engagement” with Iran in their 2004 report for the Council on Foreign Relations, for example, they explicitly ruled out a “grand bargain” as unrealistic.

The main source of resistance to a grand bargain is the illusion that the United States can still rely on coercion—through sanctions and the threat of force—to get Iran to give up the nuclear option. The Bush administration is not alone in being guided by that illusion. It was also the fundamental premise of the 2004 Gates-Brzezinski report, which observed that the United States could engage Iran more successfully than it had in the previous 25 years because “the U.S. military intervention along Iran’s flanks in both Afghanistan and Iraq has changed the geopolitical landscape in the region.”

It is also argued that Iran is now so overconfident, because of the U.S. debacle in Iraq, it is no longer afraid of U.S. attack and therefore has no motivation to reach a broad compromise with the United States. But that objection assumes that the only Iranian reason for offering concessions to the United States is fear of attack. In fact, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei opposed negotiations with the United States in the 1990s because he felt that Iran was too weak to defend its interests adequately in such negotiations.

Since 2003, the dramatic political changes in the region, including the coming to power of friendly Shiite regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the growing strength of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Hamas regime in Palestine have convinced Tehran that this is a good time to bargain with the United States. Khamenei’s top foreign affairs adviser, Ali Akbar Velatyati, told a seminar last May, “Now we have the power to haggle, why do we not haggle?”

Iran’s leadership is motivated to “haggle” with the United States not primarily because it is afraid of the United States, but because it needs the United States help to fulfill two ambitions: to be integrated fully into the global economic system, and to take it place as a legitimate regional power in the Middle East. That gives the United States strong bargaining leverage with Iran, but it is not the power to compel Iran to do something that it believes is not in its interests.

Now that much of the braggadocio has been drained out of the Bush administration, one might expect the national security elite to become much more interested in traditional diplomatic bargaining with Iran. But most of that elite remain profoundly uncomfortable, with the idea of real bargaining with Tehran, in which legitimate Iranian political-security interests would have to be recognized. The relationship these former officials and pundits prefer is one in which the United States and its allies tell Iran what is demanded of it, and what positive and negative inducements can be expected, depending on its behavior.

Kenneth Pollack advocated that approach as an alternative to a grand bargain with Iran in an article in Foreign Affairs last year. That same “carrots and sticks” approach is now being pushed by the National Review, with emphasis on the need for tough economic sanctions. The specialists on the use of power have been operating for years on the basis of the assumption that American dominance confers the ability to coerce smaller states, and they are loathe to give it up.

We can expect a combination of right-wing hawks and centrist national security specialists to put up a strong fight in the coming weeks against the option of a grand bargain and in favor an approach that does not require real diplomatic concessions to Iran. The belief that the United States should be able to prevail in a confrontation with a third-rate power like Iran still runs deep in Washington.

But the recent American experience with Iran in the past few years has repeatedly contradicted that belief. What it shows is that when U.S. demands involve interests that Iran regards as vital, threats and intimidation are counterproductive. The bloody debacle in Iraq only makes the absence of U.S. ability to coerce more obvious. Until that fundamental lesson is absorbed by the national security elite, the United States will continue to be struggling with its demons rather than extricating itself from the Middle East.

http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/11/1...n_with_iran.php

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http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wo...2&track=tottext

THE CONFLICT IN IRAQ: SOME OPTIONS; KISSINGER'S VIEW
U.S. has many options in Iraq, none easy
Shift power to a 'strongman'? Ask Iran for help? Choices reflect varying degrees of gloom.
By Paul Richter
Times Staff Writer

November 19, 2006

WASHINGTON — The debate over U.S. options in Iraq has intensified since the midterm election, but as officials await the recommendations of a high-profile study group, few good policy choices have emerged and the outlook on the war has grown increasingly pessimistic.

A change of course could become a turning point for the U.S. mission, and the six most-discussed options reflect varying degrees of gloom. The Bush administration advocates a relatively optimistic plan, calling for small-scale adjustments to the U.S. approach, or temporary troop increases, in hopes of stabilizing the country and giving its frail government a chance to take hold.

But pessimists contend that the United States must develop an end point for its mission. They say U.S. and Iraqi leaders need to consider dividing the country, shifting more of the burden of stewardship to its neighbors, or even replacing its Western-style government with a "strongman."

President Bush continues to publicly rule out some choices, such as troop withdrawals or initiating talks with countries such as Syria.

But behind the scenes, his top civilian and military officials are furiously rethinking all the options — including some that already have been tried and rejected.

But all concede, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said last week, that "there is no magic bullet."

The options

Stay the course, with tactical adjustments

Advocates: President Bush, top U.S. military leaders.

The administration's current approach is to continue efforts to suppress violence while pressuring the Iraqi government to reach political agreements, control the militias and strengthen security forces.

In the latest tactical shift, military leaders are planning to sharply increase the number of U.S. advisors working with Iraqi security forces. They hope American forces can be drawn down as Iraqi units take control of all regions of the country, which they say can happen within 18 months.

Pros: The approach could limit violence to give Iraqi leaders a chance to reach a power-sharing deal that offers one of the best long-term hopes for peace. It also could strengthen the Iraqi army, one of the country's less-sectarian institutions. American military leaders hope that the shift to an advisory role would allow them to eventually cut the force in Iraq to a level they could sustain and Americans might tolerate — perhaps 50,000 to 70,000 troops. There now are 144,000 U.S. troops in Iraq.

Cons: The current strategy has produced poor results. The government of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki is further from a power-sharing deal today than when it took office in May. The Shiite-led government has less control of Shiite militias, and has often been unable to field promised Iraqi units. The U.S. military has already fallen behind schedule in its effort to shift to an advisory role, in part because of the inability of Iraqi forces to take on combat roles. It is unclear that shifting to advisors — a strategy that failed to bring victory in the Vietnam War — will work. And Iraqis want a change. Mahmoud Othman, a moderate Kurdish legislator, says staying the course is the worst option, because it would mean "what you are seeing every day — all these people killed, bloodied and kidnapped."

Temporary increase in U.S. troop level

Advocates: Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.); retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni; some neoconservatives.

The Pentagon could temporarily boost the current troop level by substantial numbers — in the tens of thousands — to try to suppress violence in key areas, such as Baghdad and Sunni-dominated Al Anbar province.

Pros: Supporters contend that U.S. forces have been spread too thinly to suppress violence, and that a larger force, by establishing order, could open the way to reconstruction, economic improvement and a power-sharing deal. The idea of a temporary spike in U.S. forces, to give the current strategy one last try, was well received by the Iraq Study Group, the congressionally chartered panel, in the early stages of its deliberations.

Cons: It would further strain the U.S. military, yet could prove insufficient to provide security in much of the country. The top U.S. military commander in the Mideast, Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, said last week that the Pentagon could provide 20,000 additional troops, but only temporarily, by extending deployments and other steps. And he said that this would reduce pressure on the Iraqis to take charge of their own security. In addition, critics say, it could harm the Pentagon's ability to handle other emergencies, decrease reenlistment rates and deepen American public discontent over the war. The government of Iraq and its people are cool to the idea of more troops. The foreign forces "are what incite the problems," said Ali Adib, a lawmaker with Maliki's Islamic Dawa Party.

Gradual withdrawal

Advocates: Many Democratic leaders.

An immediate withdrawal is not on the table. The Bush administration could begin a gradual drawdown of troops over several years, possibly coupled with a redeployment that would move U.S. forces into a support position. Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), incoming chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, says the administration should begin a drawdown in four to six months. He argues that U.S. forces should shift to more limited missions, such as training Iraqi forces and fighting foreign insurgents. Iraqis say they want a withdrawal over several years, but each major group wants a pullout structured to protect its interests.

Pros: By notifying Iraqis that a withdrawal will begin soon, the United States may be able to pressure the government to assume responsibility for security. It also could provide an incentive for the rival factions to finally reach a political deal, advocates say. They argue that there is little downside to a pullback, because U.S. troops as currently deployed have been ineffective. "The fragmentation is going on regardless of our presence there," said Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.). Proponents say the U.S. forces still would be able to go after terrorists in the country.

Cons: Violence could intensify as U.S. forces pull back, jeopardizing the government, tempting the governments of neighboring countries to intervene to help the faction they support and emboldening foreign insurgents. The threat of an American pullback wouldn't produce Iraqi action, critics argue, because the Maliki government is too weak and divided. It could be taken as a signal of impending U.S. departure, and cause factions to deepen the civil war. American disengagement would mark a setback to U.S. prestige and influence in the region, critics say, and would alarm regional allies while strengthening Islamic militants and U.S. rivals such as Iran.

Partition or decentralization

Advocates: Some Kurds and former U.S. diplomat Peter Galbraith favor partition; Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) favors decentralization.

This option has a variety of applications: Iraq could be formally divided into Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni states, or the three regions could be given wide autonomy around a weak central government that would retain some responsibilities for foreign policy, defense and trade. The Iraqi Constitution provides the foundation for greater regional autonomy.

Pros: The country already is moving toward such a separation, and division could reduce violence, as it did in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

Cons: About 40% of the population still lives in mixed areas, such as Baghdad, and deciding which territory goes to which group could intensify violence and force the displacement of thousands of people. A formal division would face strong opposition from neighboring states, another reason the White House calls the idea of partition a "nonstarter." The Bush administration is more ready to accept a shift toward greater regional autonomy under a central government. But even the idea of autonomous "super-regions" faces strong resistance from many Sunni and Shiite Iraqis, who fear they would get less than they deserve.

Enlist neighbors

Advocates: Former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, co-chairman of the Iraq Study Group; Defense Secretary- designate Robert M. Gates; British Prime Minister Tony Blair; various U.S. lawmakers and foreign policy experts.

The Bush administration could launch a new diplomatic initiative, or a regional conference, to enlist the help of neighboring states. A particular goal would be to win support from Iran and Syria, with which the administration has had limited contacts. Although administration hawks oppose engagement with Iran and Syria, David Satterfield, Rice's Iraq coordinator, said last week that the administration was prepared "in principle" to hold talks with Iran about Iraq.

Pros: Iran has enormous influence over Shiite southern Iraq, and Syria over the Sunni regions and foreign insurgents. No neighbors stand to win if civil war engulfs Iraq, so they have reason to help out. Even partial cooperation could be an important step forward.

Cons: Iran and Syria probably wouldn't want to help the U.S., whose mission in Iraq has limited the energy it can put into its feuds with them. Administration officials say they have already approached the two countries on some issues, and have come away with little to show for it. The countries also could ask a high price for cooperation: Tehran could demand that the United States reduce the pressure on its nuclear program; Syria might want permission to retake a more active role in Lebanon. "If you bring them in as a major stakeholder, you're in a position of weakness," said Michael J. Williams of the Royal United Services Institute in London. And many Iraqis are skeptical of this idea, fearing it would invite meddling by the neighbors they dislike. Salim Abdullah Jabouri, a Sunni lawmaker, said the option would mean giving "wide authority to Iran or Syria to interfere in Iraq."

A 'strongman'

Advocates: Some Iraqis, some neighboring governments.

Facing the continuing failure of the elected government, many Iraqis are showing more interest in turning to a more traditional Middle Eastern arrangement: an authoritarian leader. Some Iraqis say this could come through an agreement of the members of Iraq's National Security Council, which includes representatives of all the major groups. Others say the United States could just give the Shiite majority greater leeway — as it has been demanding — to impose order.

Although the Bush administration is talking more about the need for stability and less about Iraqi democracy, it is unlikely to ever publicly endorse a shift to a nondemocratic form of government. But it could be forced to decide how hard it wants to resist if the Iraqis begin moving in this direction.

Pros: A less democratic government might be preferable to catastrophe, Iraqis say. Tawfik Zeki, a Shiite water tanker driver, said that "the only language we Iraqis understand is the language of power and an iron fist." The idea is gaining currency among some intellectuals, such as University of Baghdad political science professor Nabil Salim. "It is very difficult to talk about democracy while people are starving, they have no work, they have no security," he said.

Cons: Iraq could jettison its elected government for an authoritarian one and still not have peace. There is no obvious leader who could command widespread support, and power in Iraq is so atomized that the country could get a strongman without a sufficient army. For the Bush administration, the ascent of an authoritarian government would be a difficult blow. It would strip away another of its justifications for the 2003 invasion and would be a further setback for its campaign to bring democracy to the Middle East.


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paul.richter@latimes.com

Times staff writers Julian E. Barnes in Washington, Kim Murphy in London and Alexandra Zavis, Raheem Salman and Said Rifai in Baghdad, and special correspondents in Kirkuk and Najaf contributed to this report.

LEAVING IRAQ? NOT SO FAST: EARLY SIGNS INDICATE THAT DEMOCRATS WILL BE VERY CAUTIOUS ABOUT REDEPLOYMENT, AND THEY WANT TO MAKE SURE W. TAKES THE BLAME - MARK BENJAMIN (SALON, NOVEMBER 21): By keeping their position on what to do in Iraq both aggressive-sounding but ambiguous, Democrats hope to maintain the political momentum they generated during the elections without much risk of making the wrong policy choice.
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/11/...iraq/print.html

The belief that the strong bully can coerce compliance from the weak
doesn't stand up to terroristic tactics. We should have learned that by now...
from the school yard to international relations. Look arround you at the human
relationships you observe...isn't the worst aspects of those relationships kept
going by the use of one or more participants using coercive methods (negative
reinforcement) to get compliance?