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Snuffysmith
BUSH'S LINCOLN GROUP: PIG BACK AT THE TROUGH - CHRISTOPHER BRAUCHLI (COMMON DREAMS, OCTOBER 14): On September 27 the Associated Press reported that the Lincoln Group had been awarded a two-year contract. to build support around the world for the militarys goals in Iraq. The Homeland Security Department has provided $2.4 million to a consortium of major universities to develop software that would let the government monitor negative opinions of the United States or its leaders in newspapers and other publications overseas.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/1014-28.htm
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CHINA BUYS THE SOFT SELL - JOSHUA KURLANTZICK (WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 15): China has amassed impressive soft power -- now it has to prove that it's willing to use it wisely.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...1301401_pf.html
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MUCH OF IRAQ STILL IN RUIN AS U.S. BUILDERS LEAVE: LOCAL OFFICIALS WILL BE FACED WITH RUNNING PLANTS AND FINISHING JOBS LEFT BY BIG COMPANIES - CHARLES J. HANLEY, ASSOCIATED PRESS (HOUSTON CHRONICLE, OCTOBER 15)
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/world/4258694.html
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US CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ FACE PERIL, NEGLECT: DRAW FIRE OVERSEAS, LACK SUPPORT AT HOME - FARAH STOCKMAN (BOSTON GLOBE, OCTOBER 16)
http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/...neglect?mode=PF
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A PLAN FOR IRAQ - DENNIS ROSS (WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 15): No one in Iraq seems to want us there, but everyone is afraid to have us leave. In the meantime, everyone seems willing to sit back, to avoid tackling the tough problems and to let us carry the brunt of the fighting. That has to stop.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...1301419_pf.html
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BREAKING UP AIN'T HARD TO DO: JAMES BAKER PREPARES THE EXITS IN IRAQ - MICHAEL YOUNG (REASON, OCTOBER 12): In reality, the Baker-Hamilton group is less there to engineer a stable future for Iraq than to create conditions for American forces to leave the country.
http://reason.com/hod/my101206.shtml
Snuffysmith
WOULD DEFEAT IN IRAQ BE SO BAD?: AFTER VIETNAM, THE DOMINOES DID NOT FALL. WHAT THAT TELLS US ABOUT THIS WAR - LESLIE GELB (TIME, OCTOBER 15): We need him to unstrap America's still muscular diplomacy to seed the antiterrorist soil within Iraq, to structure a regional peace among states that cringe from regional war, to blunt the disasters of chaos and defeat -- and perhaps even to snatch successes beforehand.
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout...1546366,00.html
Snuffysmith
RUNNING FROM IRAQ: DON'T IMAGINE IT WILL REDUCE THE JIHADIST THREAT - REUEL MARC GERECHT (WEEKLY STANDARD, OCTOBER 23)
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Publ...12/827qrepu.asp
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A SAD LITANY OF FAILURES - MORTIMER B. ZUCKERMAN (U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, OCTOBER 15): There is a real risk that, if we leave, Iraq will disintegrate even further into all-out civil war or spark a regional war and become home to an anti-American regime that will inflame jihadists and undermine Arab moderates all over the Muslim world.
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/opinion/artic...1015/23edit.htm
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THE MORE FORCE YOU USE, THE LESS EFFECTIVE YOU ARE - MICHAEL SCHWARTZ (TOMDISPATCH, OCTOBER 15): The occupation delivered economic stagnation or degradation, a powerless government, and the promise of endless violence. Given this reality, no new military strategy -- however humane, canny, or well designed -- could reverse the occupation's terminal unpopularity. Only a U.S. departure might do that.
http://tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=130105
Snuffysmith
NUCLEAR STRIKE ON IRAN IS STILL ON THE AGENDA: WHAT WILL CONGRESS DO? - JORGE HIRSCH (ANTIWAR.COM, OCTOBER 16): Congress could block the authority of the president to order the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries by passing legislation under Article I, Sect. 8, Clause 14 of the Constitution to "make rules for the government and regulation" of the armed forces.
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=9868
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DEFIANT IRAN - CHRISTOPHER DE BELLAIGUE (NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, NOVEMBER 2): By engaging itself militarily, politically, and morally across the Middle East, George Bush's America has become vulnerable. In the face of an overstretched competitor, Iran is less likely than ever to relinquish its nuclear program unless it gets something it wants in return.
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19512
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DEADLY SILENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST - JAMES ZOGBY (TOMPAINE.COM, OCTOBER 16): We simply cannot continue to alienate ourselves from the peoples of this critically important part of the world. We simply cannot persist in operating so blindly in a region whose peoples, culture and history we do not understand.
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/10/1...middle_east.php


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Snuffysmith
AFGHANISTAN: ISAF WARNING OFFERS CHANCE TO BREAK DESTRUCTIVE CYCLE - BY AMIN TARZI (RFE/RL, OCTOBER 13): The commander of the NATO-led force in Afghanistan, the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), warned on October 8 that without visible improvements in the daily lives of ordinary Afghans in the next six months, up to 70 percent of Afghans could shift their allegiance to the Taliban-led insurgency.
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/...28bfd04ab9.html
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AFGHANISTAN: FIVE YEARS LATER - STEPHEN ZUNES (FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, OCTOBER 14/COMMON DREAMS): On the fifth anniversary of the launch of the U.S.-led war against Afghanistan, the Taliban is growing, much of the countryside is in the hands of warlords and opium magnates, U.S. casualties are mounting, and many, if not most, Afghans are actually worse off now than they were before the U.S. invasion.
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/1014-22.htm
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WHERE THE RHETORIC DOESN'T MATCH THE REALITY: RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN - ANNE E. BRODSKY (COUNTERPUNCH, OCTOBER 13): Afghanistan is the first and prime example of how winning the war is not the same as winning the peace.
http://www.counterpunch.org/brodsky10132006.html
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FROM SWORDS TO BOMBSHELLS - SUZANNE FIELDS (WASHINGTON TIMES, OCTOBER 16): The interpretation of the Islamist mentality as rooted in Muhammad's appeal to violence, and the Islamist determination for religious domination of the world, may not tell the whole story today, but it explains why, for millions of Muslims, the image of the warrior trumps the image of a prophet of peace -- if, indeed, there ever was one.
http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20061015-101426-7404r.htm
Snuffysmith
AN OFFER KIM CAN'T REFUSE - AARON L. FRIEDBERG (WASHINGTON POST, OCTOBER 16): It should be made clear to all, including Kim, that the objective of ratcheting up financial pressure is not to topple him but to squeeze him until he chooses to abandon his nuclear ambitions.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/conte...1500997_pf.html
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THE ARMS-CONTROL ILLUSION: A SHORT HISTORY OF NONPROLIFERATION FAILURE - (OPINION JOURNAL FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EDITORIAL PAGE, OCTOBER 14): The world will need more such cooperation and creative thinking to contain a proliferation threat that is only going to grow. But the beginning of wisdom is to realize that the threat hasn't ended merely because a rogue regime signs an arms-control treaty.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/weekend/hottopic/?id=110009090
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THE LOGIC OF PROLIFERATION: HOW BUSH'S BELLIGERENCE PROMPTED NORTH KOREA TO PURSUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS - FLOYD RUDMIN (COUNTERPUNCH, OCTOBER 14-15)
http://www.counterpunch.org/rudmin10142006.html
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THE MAKINGS OF A NUCLEAR STANDOFF - JAMES CARROLL (BOSTON GLOBE, OCTOBER 16): America is not the cause of North Korea's bomb. The tyrant Kim Jong Il is. But neither is America innocent of this terrible turn in the world's story. http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...tandoff?mode=pf
Snuffysmith
STILL 1,126 NUCLEAR TESTS BEHIND THE UNITED STATES: NORTH KOREA'S BOMB - JOHN CHUCKMAN (COUNTERPUNCH, OCTOBER 14-15): Harsh sanctions against North Korea, already advocated by the emotionally-numb Bush, are a foolish response.
http://www.counterpunch.org/chuckman10142006.html
Snuffysmith
MORE NORTH KOREAS? GET USED TO IT: BAD AS A NUCLEAR HERMIT KINGDOM IS, THE U.S. JUST CAN'T CONTROL PROLIFERATION - WILLIAM LANGEWIESCHE (LOS ANGELES TIMES, OCTOBER 16): It is important to recognize that the spread of nuclear weapons is a condition over which we do not have control and for which there is no solution.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-op-...-opinion-center
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NUCLEAR SCAPEGOATING AND NORTH KOREA - EDITORIAL (WASHINGTON TIMES, OCTOBER 16): Given the historical record, it is unseemly and dishonest for Democratic partisans like Mr. Carter and Sen. John Kerry to pretend that President Bush is the central reason for the failure to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20061015-101425-1267r.htm
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NUKE REBUKE - STEVE COLL (NEW YORKER, OCTOBER 16): On Bush's watch, atomic weapons have been revalued -- not quite to the point of legitimacy, perhaps, but certainly upward, as sources of influence, national pride, and anti-American defiance. The North Korean test matters most as a symbol of accumulating trouble.
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/talk/061023ta_talk_coll
Snuffysmith
BUSH UNLEASHES THE NUCLEAR BEAST: IF THE ADMINISTRATION WON'T ABIDE BY TIME-TESTED NUCLEAR TREATIES, WHY SHOULD ANYONE ELSE? - JOSEPH CIRINCIONE (LOS ANGELES TIMES, OCTOBER 15): Bush administration officials have proved expert at smashing the agreements their predecessors so painstakingly built, but in doing so they broke the bars that had caged the nuclear beast.
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commen...omment-opinions
Snuffysmith
THE NEW NORTH KOREA: ABSURDISTAN WITH THE BOMB -- WHAT DOES NORTH KOREA'S LEADER KIM JONG IL WANT? BY TESTING A NUCLEAR WEAPON, THE ENIGMATIC DICTATOR HAS ANGERED HIS CLOSEST ALLY CHINA AND SHIFTED THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER. BUT THE COUNTRY MAY JUST BE LASHING OUT IN PARANOIA - (SPIEGEL, OCTOBER 16)
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiege...,442823,00.html
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KRAUTHAMMER, KENNEDY & KOREA: IS COMMON SENSE STILL A VIABLE OPTION IN THE MODERN "INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY?" - ANDREW C. MCCARTHY (NATIONAL REVIEW, OCTOBER 16): It may be far more practical and beneficial to warn China to rein in North Korea than to appeal to the Chinese as if they were a dependable ally -- which, manifestly, they are not.
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NmVlO...zZkYTRhZDMzNTc=
Snuffysmith
NUCLEAR TAG TEAM: THE LONE SUPERPOWER THAT COULDN'T - DAVID E. SANGER (NEW YORK TIMES, OCTOBER 15): As America barrels toward a nuclear showdown on opposite sides of Asia, perhaps the best measure of Americas power in these matters is its need for Russia and China to cooperate.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/weekinre...agewanted=print
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WITHOUT SANCTION: HOW TO DEAL WITH A MADMAN WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON HIM - ROBERT B. REICH (AMERICAN PROSPECT, OCTOBER 13): Kim Jung Il may not be rational, but the Chinese leadership is. And they're our best hope now for a rational outcome to this mess regarding North Korea.
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?sectio...articleId=12102
Snuffysmith
THE THINK-TWICE SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA - MONITOR'S VIEW (CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, OCTOBER 16): The sanctions imposed by the Security Council, even though watered down by China and Russia, at least keep a global consensus together for a more critical goal of the United States: threatening the economies of Iran and other bomb-leaning states if they get close to going nuclear.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1016/p08s02-comv.html
Snuffysmith
UN SANCTIONS: BUSH'S ELECTION-EVE CONVERSION - GRAIG CRAWFORD (HUFFINGTON POST, OCTOBER 14): You almost have to laugh at President Bush touting United Nations sanctions against North Korea as "swift and tough," considering how he once derided similar sanctions against Iraq as ineffective (when arguing for an invasion). Now that his own team is behind a nearly identical UN move against North Korea, suddenly he is on board with this approach?
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/craig-crawfo...ec_b_31707.html
Snuffysmith
SECURITY COUNCIL IN NAME ONLY: FAILING TO STOP NORTH KOREA FROM GOING NUCLEAR MAY HAVE BEEN THE LAST STRAW FOR THE ONETIME GUARDIAN OF WORLD ORDER - NIALL FERGUSON (LOS ANGELES TIMES, OCTOBER 16)
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-...nion-columnists
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NO U.N. PANACEA - ED ROYCE (WASHINGTON TIMES, OCTOBER 15): It will be business as usual at the U.N., to North Korea's advantage.
http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/200610...02320-4782r.htm
Snuffysmith
PUTIN GETS AWAY WITH MURDER: IT'S TIME TO CONFRONT THE RUSSIAN LEADER - ANDERS ASLUND (WEEKLY STANDARD, OCTOBER 23)
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Publ...12/824dulje.asp
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VOICE OF RUSSIA ENGLISH WEB SITE IGNORES THE MURDER OF RUSSIAN JOURNALIST ANNA POLITKOVSKAYA WHILE OFFERING EXTENSIVE COVERAGE OF POLITICAL SCANDALS IN THE U.S. AND GREAT BRITAIN - TED LIPIEN (FREE MEDIA ON LINE, OCTOBER 16)
http://www.freemediaonline.org/voice_of_ru...itain221140.htm
Snuffysmith
RUSSIA'S SLOW DEATH OF FREEDOM - CATHY YOUNG (BOSTON GLOBE, OCTOBER 16): INCREASINGLY, it seems that freedom in Russia will be only a short window between communist totalitarianism and a new nationalist authoritarian state.
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial...freedom?mode=PF
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A MURDER IN MOSCOW AS THINGS ONLY GET WORSE - ERIKA NIEDOWSKI (BALTIMORE SUN, OCTOBER 15): Being brave in Russia doesn't mean what it means in other, more civilized countries, where the democratic constitution is more than a piece of paper.
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/i...ideas-headlines
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HUFFING AND PUFFING: WE CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO ACCEPT THE UNACCEPTABLE AND TOLERATE THE INTOLERABLE - WILLIAM KRISTOL (WEEKLY STANDARD, OCTOBER 23): With the exception of Bush's commendable steadfastness in Iraq -- combined, how ever, with debilitating stubbornness on troop levels and strategy -- and his support for Israel, Bush's foreign policy is now Clintonian in its combination of weakness and wishful thinking.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Publ...12/816qijhd.asp
Snuffysmith
Efforts are underway in the Washington foreign policy community to synthesize what are perceived to be the two tracks of the American tradition: realism and idealism. There are some signs that a new 'Grand Coalition' will emerge that mates liberals and conservatives in a new round of muscularity, just done with a bit more finesse. In an article from yesterday's FT, Anatol Lieven warns against these tendencies and points to an alternative.

Financial Times, Monday October 16th 2006.

America’s world role has to be realistic and moral

Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman

A particularly American way of looking at the world has failed in Iraq, alongside the strategy of the Bush administration. This is a widely shared belief in expanding American power whilst spreading “freedom”.

Because this belief is deeply rooted in US political culture, no alternative approach has yet emerged from this failure. Instead, we see intellectual and political bewilderment.

There are now worrying signs that a bipartisan consensus is arising from this confusion, based on the same assumptions and myths as before. This consensus is convincing to many Americans, but thoroughly unconvincing to other nations, and utterly out of step with reality in much of the world.

It is true that any approach to foreign policy that hopes to win support in the US must embrace elements of both realism and morality. For on the one hand, a majority of Americans have always insisted that US policy serve the interests and above all the safety of Americans, rather than exclusively pursuing its ideals. Equally, dominant strains in the US tradition have repeatedly shown a deep aversion to strategies based purely on a “classical” realism free of all moral constraints and aims.

Neo-conservatives and liberal hawks do try to balance realism and morality. They correctly perceive that the internal nature of foreign countries matters as never before to American security – because Islamist revolution and extremism flourish in failed states and collapsed societies.

They are right to argue that a classical realist approach is inadequate to tackle this problem. Their answers, however, lead in the radically contradictory directions of both hardline realism and utopian morality – or rather, pseudo-realism and pseudo-morality.

Instead of this hypocritical and unsuccessful approach we propose the philosophy of ethical realism as an intellectual and moral basis for US strategy. Ethical realism was propounded in the past by some of the great figures of the American intellectual tradition, including the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, the philosopher Hans Morgenthau and the great thinker and diplomat George Kennan.

These men were strong opponents of Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism, but all three became deeply disillusioned with US Cold War strategy, especially its combination of national messianism with paranoia and militarism. Niebuhr, Morgenthau and Kennan were all supporters of resisting communist aggression in Korea, but all joined in strong opposition to the Vietnam war. Their voices have been largely, and hauntingly, absent from the recent foreign policy debates.

Ethical realism points towards an international strategy based on prudence; a concentration on possible results rather than good intentions; a close study of the nature, views and interests of other states, and a willingness to accommodate them when these do not contradict America’s own truly vital interests; and a mixture of profound American patriotism with an equally profound awareness of the limits on both American power and on American goodness.

From ethical realism, we derive the concept of the Great Capitalist Peace, which echoes Kennan’s and Morgenthau’s concepts of international order and the moral purposes of diplomacy. It denotes a global order tacitly agreed to by all the major states of the world, and which guarantees their truly vital interests, including the defeat of terrorist groups.

The Great Capitalist Peace depends in part on American global power.

However, both the real limits on American power and the need to accommodate the legitimate interests and ambitions of other states mean that, in most areas, the direct use of American power needs to be deliberately restrained.

Instead, the US should whenever possible work through informal concerts linking the most important states of a region. In the Middle East, for example, the US needs to help create a regional concert of states including Iran and Syria, and to seek through this concert to contain and regulate the conflict in Iraq after the US withdraws from that country. To that end, it is also essential that the US act with determination to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In the Far East, the US should understand that China, not America, will in future be the regional “first among equals”. As long as China is prepared to act responsibly and in co-operation with other regional states like Japan, the US should explicitly recognise China’s leadership in seeking answers to the dangerous actions of the North Korean regime and other future regional challenges.

This concept is not opposed to the long-term spread of democracy. On the contrary, it is an essential precondition for true democracy in much of the world. For it would be a guarantee of international peace, order, trade, and development, without which democracy can in any case never long endure.



Anatol Lieven is a senior fellow at the New America Foundation. John Hulsman is von Oppenheim Scholar at the German Council on Foreign Relations. Their book, Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role in the World, is published by Pantheon and available on amazon.com and amazon.co.uk.
Snuffysmith
http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/10/1...orea_effect.php
The North Korea Effect
Elizabeth Spiro Clark
October 17, 2006


Elizabeth Spiro Clark is a retired Foreign Service officer who writes extensively on issues of global democratization.

Two factors have altered the politics of the Bush administration’s confrontation with Iran: the North Korean nuclear test and the deteriorating situation in Iraq.

On the surface, it seems the nuclear test should have strengthened the case for a military attack on Iran. After all, the Bush administration could argue that it might be too late to stop the North Koreans from developing the bomb but not too late to preempt Iranian nuclear development. However, at his October 11 press conference President Bush repeatedly embraced multilateral diplomacy—tough diplomacy, of course.

Bush said Americans he talked to asked him why he did not just take North Korea out militarily. He put the talk of a military option in terms of having a rhetoric that underlined the consistency in his goals. Bush seemed relieved and happy that other players, China, South Korea, Japan and Russia, were now agreeing with the U.S. on the necessity of sanctioning North Korea. On Iran, too, Bush could find himself in the embrace of the tough multilateral negotiations strategy—might it be time to coin the acronym TMNS?—and may have to, as in North Korea, further transform the military option into a symbol of consistency.

Bush also made the point last week that North Korea is not Iraq. The administration tried diplomacy in Iraq and failed, he insisted. According to the president, the administration is still trying negotiations with North Korea. Leaving aside the logical and factual gaps in that formulation, Bush has left himself an opening with his comment that North Korea and Iraq were “different cases” to change course in Iran. Bush can back off regime change as a goal in Iran to give himself “time” for negotiations, and a dodge for not preempting in Iran what the administration says is intolerable in North Korea.

Until now, the prescription for all the “axis of evil” states was the same: regime change; now, “cases are different.” The North Korea test is forcing an intellectual awakening in the White House—that going it alone has its drawbacks. This will lead to a new appreciation for nuance in administration calculations.

Ever since the Bush administration requested and got $75 million from Congress last February to aid the Iranian democratic opposition—echoing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998—the policy has been to increase pressure on Iran. A whole series of statements and actions mimicked the lead-up to the war in Iraq, most notably taking the Iranian case to the Security Council where our sanctions demands were certain to fail to get support, leaving the way open for breaking off negotiations and setting up a “coalition of the willing”—a coalition of one this time—to take military action. Even the Administration’s “compromise” to agree to join EU negotiations with Iran was classic unilateralism; the U.S. leaving conditions in place it knew would not be accepted by the Iranians or our allies, refusing to drop regime change as a goal or to discuss Iran’s security concerns. More recently, the case for a march to war with Iran has been fed by reports that the Air Force does not share the negative attitude of the other services for military action against Iran.

The second big change is in the situation in Iraq. The president repeatedly said that he would “finish the job” in Iraq, although “tactics” could change. He echoed his March 21 press conference statement that it would be up to his successor to make decisions on withdrawing from Iraq. However, when Bush spoke in March, the situation in Iraq had not deteriorated to its present point. Signposts to collapse are now everywhere. On her recent trip to Baghdad, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had to be helicoptered into the Green Zone because the road to the airport was not safe. (What war does helicoptering into—and out of—embassies recall?)

Rice moved on from Baghdad to visit Irbil in Kurdistan. Kurdistan, with the best military forces in Iraq guaranteeing its borders, is all but independent from Iraq already. Irbil is building an airport that will take the largest aircraft in the world. Is the administration signaling that the current policy of securing Baghdad may not last forever? The current negotiations between the Iraqi government and tribal chiefs in Anbar province could be read as a lead-in to claiming we are “finishing the job” there, standing up an antiterrorist government in a province that has been described as the heart of both foreign terrorist infiltration and the insurgency. These could be among the “adjustments of tactics” designed to cover up the fact that Iraq is collapsing—fast.

In his press conference, Bush made much of the “huge stakes in the Middle East;” if we don’t “win” there they will attack America “here.” That is a mantra that could be used to justify expanding military operations to Iran. Bush may even conceivably believe that America would face a serious threat that Iran would use its nuclear bombs against the U.S. if it should develop them.

Maybe, though, if Bush can be beguiled into tough multilateralism he can discover and embrace the concept of “containment.” A strategy that combines containment, deterrence and negotiated settlements is already, in fact, taking shape within the administration, according to reporting by Guy Dinmore in the October 13 Financial Times. John Hillan, assistant secretary of state for political and military affairs, is said to be pushing military assistance to the Gulf states to beef up their cooperation as a counter to a nuclear Iran. The same report quotes Cliff Kupchan of the Eurasia Group consultancy as actively looking for an alternative to the “binary choice” of living with a nuclear Iran or staging military strikes. If the realities of the U.S. constraints in Iraq and the epiphany that multilateralism may have its advantages in situations like North Korea, perhaps the Bush administration can be coaxed off the ledge with Iran.
Snuffysmith
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=1075
North Korean Lessons for Ban Ki-moon
by Patrick Seale Released: 15 Oct 2006

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By a strange twist of fate, the two Koreas -- North and South -- have suddenly grabbed the international headlines. The crisis over North Korea’s nuclear test has coincided with the appointment of South Korea’s Ban Ki-moon as the new Secretary-General of the United Nations. He will replace Kofi Annan on 1 January.

Ban Ki-moon, South Korea’s long-serving foreign minister, is known as a sound manager and patient diplomat. But if he is to succeed he will need more substantial gifts. He must grow into a statesman of independent mind and international authority. This is no easy task because the post of UN Secretary General is a curious one. It carries immense responsibilities but few powers.

Officially, the Secretary General’s duty is to alert member states to any development which, in his opinion, could endanger the maintenance of peace and international security. In practice, a great deal depends on the personality and moral force of the incumbent.

Many commentators have said that Ban Ki-moon’s immediate task is to carry forward and implement the reforms of the United Nations started by his predecessor -- to eliminate any hint of corruption or cronyism in the world body, to streamline the administration, and so forth. These are, of course, important goals.

But far more important, in my view at least, is to restore faith in the international system which has, in recent years, sustained some severe damage. Indeed the international system has rarely seemed more fragile. Instead of international order, something like international anarchy prevails. The strong do what they like with impunity, while the weak tremble, and look to their defences.

The invasion, occupation and destruction of Iraq by the United States and Britain, without UN authorisation, struck a great blow at the international security system from which it has not yet recovered. It is precisely because the international system has been so weakened that countries like North Korea find it necessary to acquire nuclear weapons and that Iran’s ultimate intentions concerning its nuclear activities remain shrouded in ambiguity. In view of what Iraq has suffered, it would not be in the least surprising if Iran sought to acquire an effective deterrent.

In other words, Ban Ki-moon's priorities must be to persuade a superpower like the United States and an emerging great power like China to play by the rules, and at the same time to reassure relatively small powers, that are constantly faced with abuse, sanctions and threats of "regime change," that the system can afford them some real protection.

All the countries of East Asia are now pondering the impact of North Korea’s nuclear test on their own security and on their network of friendships and alliances.

Japan, under its new hard-line prime minister, Shinzo Abe, has called for tough financial and trade sanctions against North Korea -- in effect a boycott of an already starving country. Japanese right-wing nationalists will clamour for Japan itself to acquire nuclear weapons -- as it could within weeks if it chose to do so -- but Shinzo Abe himself will probably decide to depend more than ever on the protection of America’s nuclear umbrella. One outcome, therefore, is likely to be a further tightening of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

China may indeed fear that Kim Jong-il’s nuclear test might cause Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, breaching China’s regional nuclear monopoly. But China is North Korea’s traditional ally and main economic partner. It will not want to destabilise or bring down the Pyongyang regime. Although it has expressed firm opposition to the test, it is going along with the punitive sanctions which the United States and Japan have imposed by way of the UN Security Council.

Some Chinese strategists might even believe that a North Korean nuclear arsenal could serve as a counterweight to U.S. military power in East Asia and, by dispersing U.S. forces, might facilitate China’s unification with Taiwan.

The key reaction will, of course, be that of the United States. At a press conference on 11 October, President George W Bush was asked if he was ready to live with a nuclear North Korea. "No," he replied. What does this categorical rejection mean? It is likely to mean more crippling sanctions, fiercer threats and greater isolation of Pyongyang. Bush has also repeated his refusal to engage in bilateral talks with North Korea. But, rather than surrendering, Kim Jong-il is likely to respond by expanding his nuclear arsenal.

As usual, amidst all the international cacophony, the sanest voice has been that of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter -- winner of the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize who has continued his tireless efforts to resolve conflicts around the world. No doubt he deserves a second prize.

In an article in the International Herald Tribune of 12 October, Jimmy Carter urges the United States to give North Korea a "firm and direct statement of no hostile intent" and to move "toward normal relations" if North Korea foregoes any further nuclear weapons program and remains at peace with its neighbours. He criticises the Bush administration for refusing to engage in bilateral talks and suggests sending "a trusted emissary like former Secretary of State Jim Baker" to Pyongyang.

This is how Jimmy Carter concludes his article: "What must be avoided is to leave a beleaguered nuclear nation convinced that it is permanently excluded from the international community, its existence threatened, its people suffering horrible deprivation and its hard-liners in total control of military and political policy."

Will Ban Ki-moon follow Jimmy Carter’s advice or will he serve as a mouthpiece for those in Washington who favour threats, embargoes and the use of force? That is the immediate challenge facing the new UN Secretary General.


Patrick Seale is a leading British writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.

Copyright © 2006 Patrick Seale

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Released: 15 October 2006
Word Count: 940
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October 13, 2006

Part Two: Winning the Ground War
How Hezbollah Defeated Israel
By ALASTAIR CROOKE and MARK PERRY

Israel's decision to launch a ground war to accomplish what its air force had failed to do was made hesitantly and haphazardly. While Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units had been making forays into southern Lebanon during the second week of the conflict, the Israeli military leadership remained undecided over when and where--even whether--to deploy their ground units.

In part, the army's indecisiveness over when, where and whether to deploy its major ground units was a function of the air force's claims to victory. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) kept claiming that it would succeed from the air--in just one more day, and then another. This indecision was mirrored by the Western media's uncertainty about when a ground campaign would take place--or whether in fact it had already occurred.

Senior Israeli officers continued to tell their press contacts that the timing of a ground offensive was a tightly kept secret when, in fact, they didn't know themselves. The hesitation was also the result of the experience of small IDF units that had already penetrated beyond the border. Special IDF units operating in southern Lebanon were reporting to their commanders as early as July 18 that Hezbollah units were fighting tenaciously to hold their positions on the first ridgeline overlooking Israel.

At this point, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made a political decision: he would deploy the full might of the IDF to defeat Hezbollah at the same time that his top aides signaled Israel's willingness to accept a ceasefire and the deployment of an international force. Olmert determined that Israel should not tip its hand--it would accept the deployment of a United Nations force, but only as a last resort.

First, he decided, Israel would say that it would accept a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) force. In keeping with this strategy, Israeli reserve forces were called to the front on July 21. The surprise call-up (the IDF was to defeat Hezbollah first from the air, and then--if that failed--use its regular forces, with no reserve forces to be called) made the initial deployment of the reserves hurried and uncoordinated. (It is, to repeat, likely that Israel did not believe it would have to call on its reserves during the conflict, or it would have called them much earlier.)

Moreover, the decision to call the reserves took key senior reserve officers, usually the first to be notified of a pending call-up, by surprise. The reserve call-up was handled chaotically--with the reserve "tail" of logistical support lagging some 24-48 hours behind the deployment of reserve forces.

The July 21 call-up was a clear sign to military strategists in the Pentagon that Israel's war was not going well. It also helps to explain why Israeli reserve troops arrived at the front without the necessary equipment, without a coherent battle plan, and without the munitions necessary to carry on the fight. (Throughout the conflict, Israel struggled to provide adequate support to its reserve forces: food, ammunition and even water supplies reached units a full 24-48 hours behind a unit's appearance at its assigned northern deployment zones.)

The effect of this was immediately perceived by military observers. "Israeli troops looked unprepared, sloppy and demoralized," one former senior US commander noted. "This wasn't the vaunted IDF that we saw in previous wars."

In keeping with Olmert's political ploy, the IDF's goal of the total destruction of Hezbollah was also being markedly scaled back. "There is one line between our military objectives and our political objectives," Brigadier-General Ido Nehushtan, a member of Israel's general staff, said on the day after the reserve call-up. "The goal is not necessarily to eliminate every Hezbollah rocket. What we must do is disrupt the military logic of Hezbollah. I would say that this is still not a matter of days away."

This was a decidedly strange way of presenting a military strategy--to conduct a war to "disrupt the military logic" of an enemy. Nehushtan's statement had a chilling effect on IDF ground commanders, who wondered exactly what the war's goals were. But other IDF commanders were upbeat--while the IAF had failed to stop Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israeli cities, fewer rockets were fired at Israel from July 19-21 than at any other time (a very small number on July 19, perhaps as few as 40 on July 20 and 50 on July 22).

July 22 also marks the first time that the United States responded militarily to the conflict. Late on the day of the 21st, the White House received a request from Olmert and the IDF for the provision of large amounts of precision-guided munitions--another telltale sign that the IAF had failed in its mission to degrade Hezbollah military assets significantly during the opening rounds of the war.

The request was quickly approved and the munitions were shipped to Israel beginning on the morning of July 22. Senior Pentagon officials were dismayed by the shipment, as it meant that Israel had expended most of its munitions in the war's first 10 days--an enormous targeting expenditure that suggested Israel had abandoned tactical bombing of Hezbollah assets and was poised for an onslaught on what remained of Lebanon's infrastructure, a strategy that had not worked during World War II, when the United States and Britain destroyed Germany's 66 major population centers without any discernable impact either on German morale or military capabilities.

But there was little grumbling in the Pentagon, though one former serving officer observed that the deployment of US munitions to Israel was reminiscent of a similar request made by Israel in 1973--at the height of the Yom Kippur War. "This can only mean one thing," this officer said at the time. "They're on the ropes."

In spite of its deep misgivings about the Israeli response (and the misgivings, though unreported, were deep and significant--and extended even into the upper echelons of the US Air Force), senior US military officers kept their views out of public view. And for good reason: criticism of Israel for requesting a shipment of arms during the 1973 war led to the resignation of then Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman General George Brown. Brown was enraged that US weapons and munitions were being sent to Israel at the same time that American commanders in Vietnam were protesting a lack of supplies in their war in Southeast Asia.

The current JCS chairman, Peter Pace, who remained notably silent during the Israeli-Hezbollah war, understood history, saluted, and remained silent. But the JCS and senior military commanders were not the only US officials who were worried about Israel's performance. While the new US munitions were winging their way to Israel (via Prestwick, Scotland), intelligence officials were conducting initial assessments of the war's opening days, including one noting that in spite of the sustained Israeli air offensive, Al-Manar was still broadcasting in Beirut, though the IAF had destroyed the broadcast bands of Lebanon's other major networks. (This would remain true throughout the war--Al-Manar never went off the air.) How effective could the Israeli air campaign have been if they couldn't even knock out a television station's transmissions?

The call-up of Israel's reserves was meant to buttress forces already fighting in southern Lebanon, and to add weight to the ground assault. On July 22, Hezbollah units of the Nasr Brigade fought the IDF street-to-street in Maroun al-Ras. While the IDF claimed at the end of the day that it had taken the town, it had not. The fighting had been bloody, but Hezbollah fighters had not been dislodged. Many of the Nasr Brigade's soldiers had spent countless days waiting for the Israeli assault and, because of Hezbollah's ability to intercept IDF military communications, Israeli soldiers bumped up against units that were well entrenched.

IDF detachments continually failed to flank the defenders, meeting counterpunches toward the west of the city. Special three-man hunter-killer teams from the Nasr Brigade destroyed several Israeli armored vehicles during the fight with light man-made anti-tank missiles. "We knew they were going to do this," Ilay Talmor, an exhausted Israeli second lieutenant, said at the time. "This is territory they say is theirs. We would do the same thing if someone came into our country."

While the IDF continued to insist that its incursions would be "limited in scope", despite the recall of thousands of reserve troops, IDF battalions began to form south of the border. "We are not preparing for an invasion of Lebanon," said Avi Pazner, a senior Israeli government spokesman. The IDF then called Maroun al-Ras its "first foothold" in southern Lebanon. "A combination of air force, artillery and ground-force pressure will push Hezbollah out without arriving at the point where we have to invade and occupy," Pazner said.

The difference between "pushing" out a force and invading and occupying a town was thereby set, another clear signal to US military experts that the IDF could enter a town but could not occupy it. One US officer schooled in US military history compared the IDF's foray into southern Lebanon to Robert E Lee's bloody attack on Union positions at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, during the American Civil War. "Oh I can get there, all right," Lee's lieutenant said during that war, "it's staying there that's the problem."

After-battle reports of Hezbollah commanders now confirm that IDF troops never fully secured the border area and Maroun al-Ras was never fully taken. Nor did Hezbollah ever feel the need to call up its reserves, as Israel had done. "The entire war was fought by one Hezbollah brigade of 3,000 troops, and no more," one military expert in the region said. "The Nasr Brigade fought the entire war. Hezbollah never felt the need to reinforce it."

Reports from Lebanon underscore this point. Much to their surprise, Hezbollah commanders found that Israeli troops were poorly organized and disciplined. The only Israeli unit that performed up to standards was the Golani Brigade, according to Lebanese observers. The IDF was "a motley assortment", one official with a deep knowledge of US slang reported. "But that's what happens when you have spent four decades firing rubber bullets at women and children in the West Bank and Gaza."

IDF commanders were also disturbed by the performance of their troops, noting a signal lack of discipline even among its best-trained regular soldiers. The reserves were worse, and IDF commanders hesitated to put them into battle.

On July 25, Olmert's strategy of backing down from a claimed goal to destroy Hezbollah was in full force. The Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz was the bearer of these tidings, saying that Israel's current goal was to create a "security zone" in southern Lebanon. His words were accompanied by a threat: "If there is not a multinational force that will get in to control the fences, we will continue to control with our fire towards anyone that gets close to the defined security zone, and they will know that they can be hurt."

Gone quite suddenly was a claim that Israel would destroy Hezbollah; gone too was a claim that only NATO would be acceptable as a peacekeeping unit on the border. On July 25, Israel also reported that Abu Jaafar, a commander of Hezbollah's "central sector" on the Lebanese border, was killed "in an exchange of fire" with Israeli troops near the border village of Maroun al-Ras--which had not yet been taken. The report was not true. Abu Jaafar made public comments after the end of the war.

Later on July 25, during US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit to Jerusalem, the Israeli military fought its way into Bint Jbeil, calling it "Hezbollah's terror capital". The fight for Bint Jbeil went on for nine days. But it remained in Hezbollah hands until the end of the conflict. By then, the town had been destroyed, as Hezbollah fighters were able to survive repeated air and artillery shellings, retreating into their bunkers during the worst of the air and artillery campaign, and only emerging when IDF troops in follow-on operations tried to claim the city.

The Hezbollah tactics were reminiscent of those followed by the North Vietnamese Army during the opening days of the Vietnam conflict--when NVA commanders told their troops that they needed to "ride out the bombs" and then fight the Americans in small unit actions. "You must grab them by their belt buckles," a Vietnamese commander said in describing these tactics.

On July 24, as yet another sign of its looming failure in Lebanon, Israel deployed the first of thousands of cluster munitions against what it called "Hezbollah emplacements" in southern Lebanon. Cluster munitions are an effective, if vicious, combat tool and those nations that use them, including every single member of NATO (as well as Russia and China), have consistently refused to enter an international agreement banning their use.

The most responsible nation-states that use them, however, "double fuse" their munitions to cut down on the failure rate of the "bomblets" after they have been deployed. During the administration of US president Bill Clinton, defense secretary William Cohen agreed to the double-fusing of US cluster munitions and a phase-out of the "high dud rate" munitions in the US stockpile, which was intended to cut the failure rate of these munitions from 14% (some estimates are higher) to less than 3% (though some estimates are lower).

While investigations into Israel's use of these munitions is not yet complete, it now appears that the IDF deployed single-fused munitions. Recent reports in the Israeli press indicate that artillery officers carpeted dozens of Lebanese villages with the bomblets--as close to the definition of the "indiscriminate" use of firepower as one can get.

The Israeli munitions may well have been purchased from aging US stockpiles that were not double-fused, making the United States complicit in this indiscriminate targeting. Such a conclusion seems to fit with the time-line of the resupply of munitions to Israel on July 22. The IDF may well have been able to offload these munitions and deploy them quickly enough to have created the cluster-munitions crisis in Lebanon that plagues that nation still--and that started on July 24.

On July 26, IDF officials conceded that the previous 24 hours in their fight for Bint Jbail was "the hardest day of fighting in southern Lebanon". After failing to take the town from Hezbollah in the morning, IDF commanders decided to send in their elite Golani Brigade. In two hours in the afternoon, nine Golani Brigade soldiers were killed and 22 were wounded. Late in the afternoon, the IDF deployed its elite Paratroopers Brigade to Maroun al-Ras, where fighting with elements of the Nasr Brigade was in its third day.

On July 27, in response to the failure of its units to take these cities, the Israeli government agreed to a call-up of three more reserve divisions--a full 15,000 troops. By July 28, however, it was becoming clear just how severe the failure of the IAF had been in its attempts to stop Hezbollah rocket attacks. On that day, Hezbollah deployed a new rocket, the Khaibar-1, which hit Afula.

On July 28, the severity of Israel's intelligence failures finally reached the Israeli public. On that day, Mossad officials leaked information that, by their estimate, Hezbollah had not suffered a significant degradation in its military capabilities, and that the organization might be able to carry on the conflict for several more months. The IDF disagreed, stating that Hezbollah had been severely damaged. The first cracks in the Israeli intelligence community were beginning to show.

Experts in the US were also beginning to question Israel's strategy and capability. The conservative Brookings Institution published a commentary by Philip H Gordon (who blamed Hezbollah for the crisis) advising, "The issue is not whether Hezbollah is responsible for this crisis--it is--or whether Israel has the right to defend itself--it does--but whether this particular strategy [of a sustained air campaign] will work. It will not. It will not render Hezbollah powerless, because it is simply impossible to eliminate thousands of small, mobile, hidden and easily resupplied rockets via an air campaign."

Gordan's commentary reflected the views of an increasing number of military officers, who were scrambling to dust off their own air plans in the case of a White House order targeting Iranian nuclear sites. "There is a common misperception that the [US] Air Force was thrilled by the Israeli war against Lebanon," one Middle East expert with access to senior Pentagon officials told us. "They were aghast. They well know the limits of their own power and they know how it can be abused.

"It seemed to them [USAF officers] that Israel threw away the book in Lebanon. This wasn't surgical, it wasn't precise, and it certainly wasn't smart. You can't just coat a country in iron and hope to win."

The cold, harsh numbers of the war point up the fallacy of the Israeli air and ground campaign. Hezbollah had secreted upwards of 18,000 rockets in its arsenals prior to the conflict. These sites were hardened against Israeli air strikes and easily survived the air campaign. Hezbollah officials calculated that from the time of firing until the IAF was able to identify and deploy fighters to take out the mobile rockets was 90 seconds. Through years of diligent training, Hezbollah rocket teams had learned to deploy, fire and safely cover their mobile launchers in less than 60 seconds, with the result that IAF planes and helicopters (which Israel has in much fewer numbers than it boasts) could not stop Hezbollah's continued rocket fire at Israel ("Israel is about three helicopters away from a total disaster," one US military officer commented).

Hezbollah fired about 4,000 rockets at Israel (a more precise, though uncertain, figure calculates the firing of 4,180 rockets), bringing its stockpiles down to 14,000 rockets--enough to prosecute the war for at least three more months.

Moreover, and more significant, Hezbollah's fighters proved to be dedicated and disciplined. Using intelligence assets to pinpoint Israeli infantry penetrations, they proved the equal of Israel's best fighting units. In some cases, Israeli units were defeated on the field of battle, forced into sudden retreats or forced to rely on air cover to save elements from being overrun. Even toward the end of the war, on August 9, the IDF announced that 15 of its reserve soldiers were killed and 40 wounded in fighting in the villages of Marjayoun, Khiam and Kila--a stunning casualty rate for a marginal piece of real estate.

The robust Hezbollah defense was also taking its toll on Israeli armor. When Israel finally agreed to a ceasefire and began its withdrawal from the border area, it left behind upwards of 40 armored vehicles, nearly all of them destroyed by expertly deployed AT-3 "Sagger" anti-tank missiles--which is the NATO name for the Russian-made vehicle- or man-deployed, wire-guided, second-generation 9M14 Malyutka--or "Little Baby".

With a range of 3 kilometers, the Sagger proved enormously successful in taking on Israeli tanks, a fact that must have given Israeli armor commanders fits, in large part because the Sagger missile deployed by Hezbollah is an older version (developed and deployed in 1973) of a more modern version that is more easily hidden and deployed and has a larger warhead. If the IDF could not protect its armor against the 1973 "second generation" version, IDF commanders must now be wondering how it can possibly protect itself against a version that is more modern, more sophisticated, and more deadly.

Prior to the implementation of the ceasefire, the Israeli political establishment decided that it would "clear drop" Israeli paratroopers in key areas along the Litani River. The decision was apparently made to convince the international community that the rules of engagement for a UN force should extend from the Litani south. Such a claim could not be made unless Israel could credibly claim to have cleared that part of Lebanon to the Litani.

A significant number of Israeli forces were airlifted into key areas just south of the Litani to accomplish this goal. The decision might well have led to a disaster. Most of the Israeli forces airlifted to these sites were immediately surrounded by Hezbollah units and may well have been decisively mauled had a ceasefire not gone into effect. The political decision angered retired IDF officers, one of whom accused Olmert of "spinning the military"--using the military for public relations purposes.

Perhaps the most telling sign of Israel's military failure comes in counting the dead and wounded. Israel now claims that it killed about 400-500 Hezbollah fighters, while its own losses were significantly less. But a more precise accounting shows that Israeli and Hezbollah casualties were nearly even. It is impossible for Shi'ites (and Hezbollah) not to allow an honorable burial for its martyrs, so in this case it is simply a matter of counting funerals. Fewer than 180 funerals have been held for Hezbollah fighters--nearly equal to the number killed on the Israeli side. That number may be revised upward: our most recent information from Lebanon says the number of Shi'ite martyr funerals in the south can now be precisely tabulated at 184.

But by any accounting--whether in rockets, armored vehicles or numbers of dead and wounded--Hezbollah's fight against Israel must be accorded a decisive military and political victory. Even if it were otherwise (and it is clearly not), the full impact of Hezbollah's war with Israel over a period of 34 days in July and August has caused a political earthquake in the region.

Hezbollah's military defeat of Israel was decisive, but its political defeat of the United States--which unquestioningly sided with Israel during the conflict and refused to bring it to an end--was catastrophic and has had a lasting impact on US prestige in the region.

Click Here to Read Part One: Winning the Intelligence War

Next: How Hezbollah won the political war

Alastair Crooke and Mark Perry are the co-directors of Conflicts Forum, a London-based group dedicated to providing an opening to political Islam. Crooke is the former Middle East adviser to European Union High Representative Javier Solana and served as a staff member of the Mitchell Commission investigating the causes of the second intifada. Perry is a Washington, DC-based political consultant, author of six books on US history, and a former personal adviser to the late Yasser Arafat.

(Research for this article was provided by Madeleine Perry.)

This article originally appeared in Asia Times.
Snuffysmith
US Says North Korean Test Was Nuclear

In an extraordinarily brief statement, the Director of the National Intelligence Office announced that the United States has confirmed that North Korea’s large explosion last week was nuclear. How do they know and why did it take them so long to confirm?

Apparently, the North Koreans had announced the test ahead of time to the Chinese and the Russians but the first physical evidence that something had happened in North Korea was seismic signals indicating a large explosion. (Some of the seismic recording stations are operated by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Office and are designed to verify compliance with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which has not been ratified by the United States.) The seismic data indicated a fairly small test (by nuclear standards), less than a kiloton, probably only a half kiloton. Some reports cite as low as 200 tons.

When we get down to half a kiloton, 500 tons, of high explosive (specifically TNT) equivalent, then it is technically conceivable that the explosion could have actually been conventional, not nuclear. Given the North Korean penchant for bluff, could they have actually set off half a kiloton of conventional explosives? The United States is planning a conventional test, Divine Strake, that will simulate nuclear effects and it will be over 700 tons of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil explosive, equivalent to almost 600 tons of TNT. A semi-trailer truck can carry 25 tons of cargo, so the 700 tons for Devine Strake, more than enough to simulate the North Korean test, would be 35 truckloads. That is a lot of ammonium nitrate, but not the sort of activity that would necessarily jump out at intelligence analysts monitoring North Korea. Seismic signals can distinguish explosions from small earthquakes but cannot tell the difference between conventional and nuclear explosions. So North Korea could have been faking it.

This explanation seems increasingly unlikely in light of recent reports that radioactivity consistent with a nuclear weapon has been detected downwind of the North Korean test site. This could nail the test as nuclear. It is not easy to seal up a nuclear explosion and we don’t even know how hard the North Koreans tried. If they wanted to minimize radioactive venting, they would have plugged the tunnel with a backfill of soil or clay and might have included concrete barriers. These might have ruptured or leaked during the test. If this happened, then quite an array of radioactive materials might have made it out and could have been detected. In addition to leakage, there is seepage. Even with a successful immediate seal of the test, gases might seep out through porous rock or cracks in the rock. According to my geological map of North Korea, the reported test site is in granite. Granite is not permeable but gases might leak out through difficult-to-detect cracks.

After the test, air samples taken down wind could be collected, returned to a laboratory and tested for even tiny traces of radioactivity. A leak would result in many telltale radioactive particles that would even give us some information about the design of the bomb. A seep most likely would give much less information, since the sample might be largely limited to gases, like xenon-133 with a five day half life. Xenon-133 might come from a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. If that possibility could be eliminated, then a nuclear test is the most plausible remaining explanation. The DNI statement gave no details, referring simply to radioactive debris.

Anonymous sources in the government apparently have reported that the bomb was plutonium. I have no special inside information so I can only speculate, but this probably implies that there was a leak, not a seep, and we got a good radioactive sample. (Another point in the cited New York Times article, that use of plutonium indicates that the North Korean uranium enrichment program is not developed, is difficult to understand. When the United States tested a plutonium bomb in 1945, the test indicated nothing at all about the highly advanced state of its uranium enrichment program.)

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http://www.archipelago.org/vol10-12/freespeech.htm

A Statement in Support of Open and Free Discussion about U.S. and Israeli Foreign Policy and Against Suppression of Speech
Professor Tony Judt of New York University is an historian of the modern age with an entirely merited international reputation. His recent book on the past fifty years in Europe, Post War, was recognized upon its publication as a modern classic. Professor Judt is also a severe critic of the policies of the State of Israel, especially of the ethnic nationalism which defines much of its culture and politics. He has engendered the special hostility of some of Israel’s organized supporters in the United States. He has expressed views, however, voiced in Israel itself not only by writers and scholars but also by experienced political figures, and by retired senior officers and intelligence officials. He has also asked whether the present U.S. alliance with Israel, which he thinks gives a free hand to the Israelis and takes very little account of the legitimate claims of the Palestinians, is in the long-term interest of our nation. There, too, he is not alone: many Americans with experience and knowledge of the Mideast, including many distinguished public officials, have raised the identical question.

These are, clearly, not matters of concern only to the American Jewish community. Yet some groups within it claim the right to set the agenda for the entire nation’s discussion of the problem. They insist, further, that they have the right either to certify or to declare illegitimate each and every participant in the debate. The American universities have been placed on permanent trial by these groups: no conference, guest speaker or teacher escapes their scrutiny. Indeed, students (in a practice reminiscent of the most sordid aspects of the McCarthy years) have been enlisted to act as informers on their teachers. Institutions deemed to be insufficiently supportive of Israel have been subjected to pressure by state legislatures or private donors. The ombudsmen and ombudswomen at our major newspapers report that they spend much of their energy and time dealing with the incessant demands of Israel’s supporters, who often act not as individual readers but in an entirely organized manner. Finally, the U.S. Congress is under surveillance far more intense than the usual sort of lobbying—and government officials deemed insufficiently pliable are given to understand that their careers are at risk. When did we last hear from candidates for public office who did not profess fervent attachment to the state of Israel?

These activities require a good deal of coordination and a large amount of funding. The organizations involved, when seeking donations, are hardly modest about their capacities to influence national debate. Yet when two distinguished academics, Professors Mearsheimer and Walt, suggested that there was an Israel lobby with a pervasive role in our entire foreign and military policy, they were promptly accused of promoting absurd and hateful views of a “Jewish conspiracy.” One has only to turn to the home pages of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, or the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations to see that there is indeed no covert conspiracy. Rather, there is a very well organized and continuous campaign on behalf of Israel, openly coordinated with the work of the Israel embassy and with the government in Jerusalem. Those who question its projects are, if not Jewish, in considerable danger of being publicly declared “anti-Semitic.” If Jewish, they incur the charge of “self-hatred.” These groups insist that they accept, even welcome, “legitimate” criticism of Israel. They reserve for themselves the right to declare what criticism, indeed what turns of phrase, are “legitimate.” We recall the frenzy when Howard Dean, as Presidential candidate, called for more “even handedness” in U.S. policy in the Mideast.

Against this background, a group of younger citizens of New York recently invited Professor Judt to open a discussion on the Israel lobby. The group usually meets at the Polish Consulate in New York. Dr. Abraham Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League took exception to the invitation and induced the Polish Consulate to deny its premises to the group. We consider this to have been an act of political vigilantism, and entirely incompatible with the culture of a democracy. Dr. Foxman has compounded the offense by defaming Professors Mearsheimer and Walt after learning that the publishers Farrar Straus & Giroux had invited them to write a book on their views of the Israel lobby and U.S. policy. He compared these scholars to the racist demagogue, David Duke.

Dr. Foxman has comported himself as an adversary of our traditions. His behavior is all the more regrettable, since the ultimate security of the American Jewish community depends upon the maintenance of our traditions of openness and pluralism. The leaders of that varied community would do well to reflect upon the damage caused by allowing Dr. Foxman and those who act like him to attack with unreason and distortion. By invoking anti-Semitism and the Holocaust at every opportunity, they are in fact trivializing the real dangers of anti-Semitism and profaning the memory of the victims of that catastrophe.

We express our solidarity with Professor Judt and Professors Mearsheimer and Walt. We consider that this nation’s public sphere will be strengthened by a full discussion of both the American alliance with Israel and Israel’s policies. In a historical moment when the “War On Terror” serves as an excuse for an American version of authoritarianism, we invite our fellow citizens to renew their own attachment to the Constitutional traditions of American freedom of speech and thought.

(signed)

Norman Birnbaum, University Professor Emeritus, Georgetown University Law Center

Chas W. Freeman, Jr., Ambassador, U.S.F.S. Ret.

Dr. Anatol Lieven, Senior research fellow, New America Foundation, Washington D.C.

Katherine McNamara, Editor and Publisher, Archipelago.org

Abbott Gleason, Keeney Professor of History Emeritus, Brown University

Ambassador Carleton S. Coon, Jr. (ret.)

Samuel M. Hoskinson, Former Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council; former senior staff member, N.S.C.

Graham E. Fuller, former Vice-Chair of the National Intelligence Council, C.I.A.

Naoko Shibusawa, Assistant Professor of History, Brown University

Cynthia Franklin, Deptment of English, University of Hawai'i

Joan W. Scott, Harold F. Linder Professor, School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

Louise McReynolds, Professor of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

William H. Hudnut III, Sr. Fellow, the Urban Land Institute, Washington, D.C.

Samuel H. Wyman, Washington, D. C.

Wendy Brown, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

Ronald Grigor Suny, Charles Tilly Collegiate Professor of Social and Political History, The University of Michigan

Sheila Suess Kennedy, School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis

Steven Beller, Washington, D. C.

Wm. E. Odom, Lieutenant General, USA (retired)

John Womack, Jr., Professor of History, Harvard University

Joshua Cohen, Professor of Political Science, Philosophy, and Law, Stanford University; Co-editor, Boston Review

Judith Butler, University of California, Berkeley

Richard E. Rubenstein, Professor of Conflict Resolution and Public Affairs, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University

The Hon. Terrell E. Arnold, Minister Counselor for Foreign Affairs (ret.)

Gareth Porter, independent historian and news analyst for Inter Press Service

Gordon Fellman, Professor of Sociology and Chair, Peace, Conflict, and Coexistence Studies, Brandeis University

The Hon. William Harrop, Ambassador to Israel (Ret.); former Inspector General, U.S. Department of State

Immanuel Wallerstein, Yale University

Geoff Eley, Karl Pohrt Distinguished University Professor of Contemporary History, Chair, Department of German, Dutch, and Scandinavian Studies, University of Michigan

Marion Berghahn, DPhil, PhD, Publisher, Oxford and New York

Thomas J. Biersteker, Henry R. Luce Professor, Brown University

Richard Levins, Harvard School of Pubic Health, Boston

Stanley N. Katz, Lecturer with the rank of Professor, Director, Center for Arts and Cultural Policy Studies, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

Dr. Eleanor Abdella Doumato, Visiting Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University,

Charles Ingrao, Professor of History, Purdue University

Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., Stillé Professor of History Emeritus, Yale University

Diane Singerman, Department of Government, School of Public Affairs, American University

Mary Ann Tetreault, Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas

Stephen O'Shea, author of Sea of Faith: Islam and Christianity in the Medieval Mediterranean World

Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Ph.D., International Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), School of International Service (SIS), American University

Barbara Aswad, Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, Wayne State University

Cindy Cooke, Scottsdale, Ariz.

Ellen Fleischmann, Associate Protessor, Department of History, University of Dayton

John L. Esposito, Georgetown University

Matthew Abraham, DePaul University, Chicago, Ill.

Kenneth Mostern, Ph.D.

Paul M. Lubeck, Professor of Sociology, University of California, Santa Cruz

Keya Ganguly, Associate Professor, Cultural Studies & Comparative Literature, University of Minnesota

Lisa Pollard, Associate Professor of History, University of North Carolina, Wilmington

Thomas A. Brady, Peder Sather Professor of History, University of California, Berkeley

L. Ling-chi Wang, Asian American Studies, University of California, Berkeley

Randi Deguilhem, Historian, Professor, CNRS, France

Martin Jay, History Department, University of California, Berkeley

Paul Freedman, Department of History, Yale University

Dr. Neve Gordon, Department of Politics and Government, Ben-Gurion University

Laurie King-Irani, Ph.D., Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Anthropology, The Catholic University of America

Dr. Elaine C. Hagopian, Prof. Emerita of Sociology, Simmons College, Boston

Charles E. Butterworth, Department of Government & Politics, University of Maryland

Lila Abu-Lughod, Professor, Columbia University

John Borneman, Professor of Anthropology, Princeton University

Andrew N. Rubin, Director, Lannan Symposium, Ass‘t Professor of English, Georgetown University

Renate Bridenthal, Professor Emerita of History, Brooklyn College, CUNY

Ilene P. Cohen, Princeton, N. J.

John Alden Williams, Wm. R. Kenan Professor of the Humanities (Emeritus), The College of William and Mary

Racheli Gai, Women in Black, Tucson, Ariz.

Prof. Rachel Giora, Tel Aviv

Akram Khater, Director of Middle East Studies Program, Associate Professor of History, North Carolina State University, Raleigh

Tom Mertes, Administrator, Center for Social Theory and Comparative History, UCLA

Ellen Schrecker, Professor of History, Yeshiva University

Sam Kharouf

John L. Hammond, Hunter Cllege and Graduate Center, CUNY

Frank Snowden, Professor of History, Yale University

Rabbi Lynn Gottlieb, Rabbi Emeritus, Nahalat Shalom

Philip Farah, Economist, Washington Interfaith Alliance for Middle East Peace

Edmund Burke, III, Dept. of History, University of California, Santa Cruz

Judith E. Tucker, Professor of History, Georgetown University; Editor, International Journal of Middle East Studies

Erika Anne Kreider, Tucson, Ariz.

Mouna Schaheen, Middle East Justice Now, Tucson, Ariz.

Ted Warmbrand, Tucson, Ariz.

Rev. Susan P. Wilder, Springfield, Va.

Marvin E. Gettleman, Professor emeritus, Brooklyn Polytechnic University

John O. Voll, Georgetown University

Deborah Agre, Berkeley, Ca.

Yektan Turkyilmaz, Ph.D Cadidate, Department of Cultural Anthropology, Duke University

Professor Louis J. Cantori, University of Maryland, Baltimore County

Prof. Judith Norman, Trinity University

Dr. Elise G. Young, History Department, Westfield State College

Jerri Bird, Partners for Peace

James K. Galbraith, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin

Sandi E. Cooper, Professor of History, College of Staten Island and The Graduate Center, City University of New York

Lawrence Davidson, Professor of History, West Chester University, Pennsylvania

Kay Halpern, Jewish member, Washington Interfaith Alliance for Middle East Peace

Natalie Zemon Davis, Professor of History Emerita, Princeton University

Ramsay MacMullen, Dunham Professor of History (emeritus), Yale University

Ilham Makdisi, Assist prof, History, Northeastern University, Boston

Henry Munson, Professor of Anthropology, University of Maine, Orono

Ahmad Dallal, Georgetown University

Cheryl A. Rubenberg

John Rodenbeck, Professor Emeritus, The American University in Cairo

Calvin MacKerron, Berlin, Germany

Yusra Tekbali, student, University of Arizona

Alan Richards, University of California, Santa Cruz

Dorothy Naor PhD, Herzliah, Israel

Mary Christina Wilson, Professor, Dept. of History, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Paul Wapner, Associate Professor, School of International Service, American University

David R. Applebaum, Professor of History, Rowan University

Rabab Abdulhadi, Ph.D., Director, Center for Arab American Studies, Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan-Dearborn

Nancy Gallagher, Chair, Middle East Studies Program andCo-Director, Center for Middle East Studies, Professor of History, University of California, Santa Barbara

Beshara Doumani, Department of History, University of California, Berkeley

Jessica Weinberg, Tucson, Ariz.

Dr. Thomas M. Ricks, Havertown, Pa.

Michael Marcus, Dept. of Mathematics, City College, New York

Paul Montagna, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Brooklyn College & CUNY Graduate Center

Nikki Keddie, Prof. Emerita of History, UCLA

Alan Dawley, Professor of History, The College of New Jersey

Roane Carey, Senior Editor, The Nation

Van Gosse, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Franklin and Marshall College

Jeffrey Blankfort, Former Editor, Middle East Labor Bulletin

Professor Dina Al-Kassim, University of California at Irvine

Betts Putnam-Hidalgo, Women in Black, Tucson, Az.

John J. Fitzgerald, Co-Author: The Vietnam War: A History in Documents; Department Chair (Retired); Longmeadow High School. Mass.

Sara Roy, Cambridge, Mass.

Daniel Boyarin, Taubman Professor of Talmudic Culture, University of California, Berkeley

Dennis Deslippe, Associate Professor. American Studies/WGS, Franklin & Marshall College

Shelley Wanger, Senior Editor, Pantheon and Knopf

Carolyn Eisenberg, Professor of History, Hofstra University

Wael Salameh, M.D.

Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Professor of History, University of California, Berkeley

Nadia Hijab, author

Stuart Porter, Editor, Directors Guild of Canada,Toronto, Canada

Thomas Saleh

Dr Karma Nabulsi, Fellow in Politics St Edmund Hall, Oxford University

Prof. Donald Sassoon, Dept of History, Queen Mary, University of London

Khalid Cherkaoui Semmouni, President, Moroccan Center for Human Rights, Rabat, Morocco

Ivo Banac, Dept. of History, Yale

Barbara Rosenbaum, Co-Editor, Patterns of Prejudice, London

Dr Mark Levene, Reader, Parkes Centre for Jewish/non-Jewish Relations,University of Southampton, U.K.

Eric Zolov, Associate Professor, Department of History, Franklin and Marshall College; Associate Editor, The Americas, a Quarterly Review of inter-American Cultural History

Susan Laxton, New York City

Catherine Snow, Henry Lee Shattuck Professor, Harvard Graduate School of Education

J.B. Neilands, Prof. Emeritus, Biochemistry, University of California, Berkeley

Margaret Power, Associate Professor, Department of Humanities, Illinois Institute of Technology; Co-Chair, Historians Against War

Rutie Adler, Coordinator Hebrew Language Program, Near Eastern Studies Department, University of California, Berkeley

Bruce Western, Professor of Sociology, Princeton University

Alex Grab, Dept. of History, University of Maine, Orono

Dr. Anis B. Salib, Retired Professor

Dr. Hatem Bazian, Near Eastern and Ethnic Studies, University of California, Berkeley

Irwin Wall

Judy Wall

Marcus Raskin, Staff, National Security Council (John F. Kennedy)

Beatrice S. Bartlett, Professor Emeritus, Department of History, Yale University

Bella Freud

Andrew Winnick, Professor of Economics, California State University, Los Angeles

Dr. Hatem Bazian, Near Eastern and Ethnic Studies, University of California, Berkeley

(The signers are serving and retired scholars and academics, policy analysts, diplomats, in the military, writers, editors, publishers, clergy, medical people, and others, including private citizens. Affiliations are for purposes of identification.)



letters@archipelago.org
Snuffysmith
RUNNING FROM IRAQ: DON'T IMAGINE IT WILL REDUCE THE JIHADIST THREAT - REUEL MARC GERECHT (AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, OCTOBER 17): Yet should we back down from advocating equality between men and women in Islamic countries because such advocacy makes some Muslims more inclined to convert civilian jetliners into fuel bombs? Was Madeleine Albright wrong to talk about such things incessantly? How about Karen Hughes today?
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all.../pub_detail.asp
Snuffysmith
THE TRUTH AND MYTH OF US STANDING ABROAD - WELSHMAN (EPLURIBUS MEDIA, OCTOBER 17): Resentment and suspicion permeates every aspect of the response to initiatives that the United States takes in foreign relations. It is for this reason that Karen Hughes was tasked in 2005 by President Bush to lead efforts to change this situation.
http://scoop.epluribusmedia.org/story/2006/10/17/55929/169
Snuffysmith
OPERATION COMEBACK - JOSHUA MURAVCHIK (FOREIGN POLICY, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2006): To stay relevant, neocons must admit mistakes, embrace public diplomacy, and start making the case for bombing Iran (text from Google entry).
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.p...p?story_id=3602
PAID SUBSCRIPTION
Snuffysmith
THE WEST MUST LEARN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS OF WAR - DANIEL PIPES (NEW YORK SUN, OCTOBER 17)
http://www.nysun.com/pf.php?id=41715
SEE ALSO
http://www.strumpette.com/archives/207-Los...h-Based-PR.html
Snuffysmith
THE HAMAS NETWORK: THE CASE FOR BOYCOTTING TERRORIST MEDIA - MARK DUBOWITZ AND JONATHAN SNOW (OPINION JOURNAL FROM THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EDITORIAL PAGE, OCTOBER 18): The U.S. government should designate Hamas's Al Aqsa TV as a terrorist organization.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110009110
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