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Cold War strategy won't work today
Abdul Aziz Said is professor and director of the Center for Global Peace at American University in Washington

Jim Zanotti is a research associate at the Center for Global Peace

The violence that engulfed Lebanon, Israel and Gaza this summer featured the convergence of many of the Mideast problems that have perplexed U.S. policy experts: Shia and Sunni rivalry intermingled with strategic coordination, Iran's assertive bid to frustrate Western efforts at global leadership, the rising anxiety of authoritarian Arab regimes in dealing with restive populations, and the ongoing Israel/Palestine conflict.

Now facing an exponentially more difficult situation, U.S. experts are energetically seeking a grand strategy for solving all the problems in the Middle East. Many Americans point to the late, distinguished U.S. diplomat George Kennan as proof that a grand strategy can work. After all, Kennan conceptualized our Cold War containment policy, which many regard as the primary factor in our defeat of world communism.

Kennan, however, lamented the overly broad implementation of his original idea (in places such as Vietnam). His conclusions, though they contemplated a "duel of infinite duration," had been based on his up-close observations of the Soviet leadership and people in Moscow at a fixed point in time. He later realized the danger that the policy, decoupled from the analysis that initially justified it, would become an abstract end in itself - impervious to modification or refinement in the face of changing conditions domestically and abroad.

Without noting Kennan's own cautionary lessons about his theory, or even the fact that some of our Cold War successes (such as Reagan's "conversion through confrontation" diplomacy) occurred when we departed from the theory, many Americans use containment as a model for advocating abstract principles as panaceas for the Middle East, minimizing the importance of case-by-case analysis. Some, for example, champion the spread of democracy. Others refuse to deal with sponsors of terror or with human-rights abusers. Still others deify classical realpolitik calculations. This foreign-policy tendency of ours is so pronounced that some are now recommending that containment be resurrected for Iran. Advocates of this position want to check the mullahs' regional ambitions without either talking to them or unduly provoking them - despite vast, fundamental differences between Moscow in 1946 and present-day Tehran.

We need to realize that although the ideas behind our general principles often have merit, the human element is the only common thread running through the problems in today's Middle East. Our task is to understand and work with the people of the region, not to solve their problems for them through the detached application of universal formulas. It requires a rethinking of our traditionally abstract approach, so that we can engage adversaries directly and honestly in diplomatic and cultural exchanges.

With Iran, if we open a discussion on the broad range of issues that separate us, we do not commit ourselves to a softening on any of them. Perhaps, though, abandonment of the mutual blame game will create bargaining room. Steps taken to placate Tehran's fears of U.S. encirclement may not lead Iran to disavow either nuclear weapons or support for Shia militants in Iraq and Lebanon. Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the internal pressure that could be brought to bear on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the mullahs by the Iranian people - the most pro-American populace in the Muslim Middle East - if they believe the United States is really trying to defuse tensions.

In a similar vein, the fear of a civil war among Palestinians may provide a window of opportunity for us (working with Israel, Arab states, and the international community) to demonstrate that genuine possibilities exist for a resumption of the peace process. Such overtures, if made in the right manner, could trigger a wave of popular opinion among Palestinians that convinces Hamas its political survival requires moderation of its positions and tactics.

One aspect of Kennan's example we should emulate is to make sure our experts have the proximity to important actors and events in Tehran and Damascus that he had in Moscow. Just as critical is finding U.S. leaders who use experts' real-time analysis to transform emerging challenges into opportunities. We must patiently and discreetly prioritize those opportunities ripe for action, vigilantly seizing upon chances with our allies and our adversaries to build a more peaceful and prosperous future.


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Contact the writers at jz3970a@american.edu.

Jim Zanotti
(J.D., Harvard)
M.A. Candidate, International Peace & Conflict Resolution
American University - School of International Service
Washington, DC
202.380.7091
jimzanotti@gmail.com