Bush Iraq policy too timid, says general

By Toby Harnden in Washington
Last Updated: 2:06am GMT 20/01/2007

A principal advocate of a "surge" in American troops in Iraq has now rejected President George W. Bush's new policy as a confused and timid plan that is "too little, too late".

"It doesn't go far enough, it isn't comprehensive enough," said General Anthony Zinni, a former commander of US forces in the Middle East. "I thought he'd come out with a much stronger, bolder programme."

The general opposed the Iraq invasion but now argues that "if we pull out now we will rue the day because this will become a much worse situation". But Mr Bush's remedy appeared to be "just doing more on security" with inadequate troops, he said.
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Gen Zinni's is one of the principal voices in a chorus of discontent among those who had called for more forces to avert defeat in Iraq. Viewed as a member of the "realist" wing of the Republican party, he has been joined by neo-conservative hawks who backed the invasion.

Frederick Kagan, an American Enterprise Institute academic whose Iraq Project Group (IPG) report provided the intellectual foundation of the surge policy, said that holding back some of the new forces in reserve, was "antithetical" to his surge plan.

"Other elements of the administration's pan are also significantly at variance with the proposal of the IPG, especially the administration's emphasis on putting Iraqis in the lead at all levels," he said.

Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA officer and member of the IPG, wrote this week that Mr Bush's plan "envisions a too-small U.S. force doing too much" and that the notion of keeping some of the surge troops in reserve was "a frightening echo of the self-defeating, undermanned optimism" of the past.

Gen Zinni, who was speaking in Washington at a gathering of The Committee for the Republic, a mainly conservative group concerned about the dangers of US imperial over-reach, said that "any general who says we have enough troops is crazy".

A Republican, he said that in 2000 was "regrettably" a member of the Veterans for Bush group. The US was no faced with no good options. "These are all iffy because of the way we've handled this and the way we've messed it up for four years."

The concept of term Global War on Terror, he said, was ludicrous. "This is Franklin Roosevelt declaring war on kamikaze attacks, Woodrow Wilson declaring war on u-boats. We declared war on a tactic."

He was starkly critical of the neo-conservatives. "We have drawn a line where everything on this side is evil and everything on this side is good. Then we have problems with the nuances. I'm wary of people that have short answers...they are our big enemies here."

The US had invaded Iraq on the basis of a false assumption that "from the fire would rise a Phoenix of democracy" and "the road to Jerusalem leads through Baghdad, when its' just the opposite". Military planning had also been flawed. "Shock and awe is now 'aw shucks'."

Political:

"How do we help the Iraqi government succeed? The government in Iraq is a fragile one, under tremendous pressure from internal and external sources. The US government is part of that pressure. Demands are made that may be beyond the ability of that government and its leaders to deliver. This is a fragmented society that has never known a true representative government, let alone democracy; the new system has been foisted upon them in a rapid-fire series of elections. The Iraqi society needs help. It is coping with monumental problems. Under the stress of near civil war, Iraqis are trying to sort out contentious constituional issues such as local versus federal authority, revenue sharing, the role of Islam in governance, and the status of militias.

This society has no history of anything other than authoritarian rule, so decision-makers get a cacophony of views from mutally distrustful elements of an unnatural state. The Iraqi government needs technocratic advice and expertise. International support in this area would be best. It should be in the form of advisory groups that can offer advice, options, recommendations, etc. for consideration on each of the plaguing issues that confron Iraq;s legislative and executive brances. Iraqis also need the help and support of mediation experts, preferably non-governmental organizations that specialize in mediation and facilitation. In the end, the sectarian factions will need to hash out their differences at a peace table. The US administration may not like the attendees, but Iraqis will need to sort it out among themselves. They can't do it without the support of neutral, trusted facilitators.

To function, all governments need bureaucratic institutions. A requirement exists to build these in Iraq. They must be reasonably effective and non-corrupt. Again, international support should be generated to help form these agencies. This is not asking for boots on the ground, but technocratic support and advice. In the end, a society struggling to cope with a hostile environment needs the viable institutions that allow it to survive and eventually propser. The best way to help Iraq succeeed is to help Iraq build institutions that give it the basis to survive and grow. These will be the political, economic, security, and social institutions necessary for stability."

For those who would advocate a split

"For those who would advocate a split state - who would cave in to the ethnic, tribal, and religious differences that pull at the cohesion of this artificially created state - it is important to remember what the United States stands for. It is the beacon for those who want to live in a world that doesn't divide itself along such lines. As much as Americans believe representative government is a right of all men and women, so are the cherished freedoms that unite Americans above its social differences.

Besides, a partitioned Sunni, Shiite, and Kurd set of states simply will not work. A sunni state would be landlocked and sorely lacking in natural resources to sustain itself; the Shiites would populate a sort of rump state in the south and encourage Shia populations in other states in the Gul to separate; and the Kurds would also be landlocked, with Turkey looking over their shoulders, listening for them to utter any word of independence, at which time Ankara would react. Separating these three does not make sense and will exacerbate tensions to a point that could easily be destabilizing to the entire region. It will also send the wrong signal to others in the world who believe that tribal, ethnic, or religious identities should be the only basis for establishing states."

"What we have seen to date is confusion

"What we have seen to date is confusion, incompetence, and contradiction. We cannot at this point resort to cosmetic, scattershop proposals that have nothing behind them to try to correct the course. We have a last chance to correct things. The American people do not want to see failure. And they will nto continue to support something that can't clearly show progress and demonstrate success."

"this requires planning, organization, clear direction, and true competence in the ranks."

The Realities


"The first reality we should acknowledge is that there is no brilliant short term strategic option or stroke of genius awaiting to be unveiled. We have missed too many opportunities, and have created too much irreparable damage via the mistakes that were made, for that to be possible We are now faced with a complex set of problems that will take time, commitment, resources, skill, and some luck to work through.

The second reality is that we cannot simply pull out, as much as we may want to. The consequences of a destabilized and chaotic Iraq, sitting in the center of a critical region of the world, could have catastrophic implications.

The third reality is that there is no short term solution. It will take years to stabilize Iraq. How many? I believe at least five to seven, which doesn't mean it has to be five to seven years of living with the current situation. It means we could see a steadily improving and stabilizing Iraq over time.

The fourth reality is that the problem cannot be solved by simply addressing the security issues. Viable institutions must be built in addition to the military and police. Security is clearly a priority, and nothing else can take hold if the security environment is not reasonably stable. But security alone is not the answer.



Biggest mistake in Iraq: The rush to hold an election before the very institutions needed to govern were set up and in place.

"Can the administration get

"Can the administration get international and regional support to help in stabilizing Iraq? US officials are now running around the world trying to solicit support to help America out of the mess that's been made in Iraq. This will be a tough sell, since the United States rejected the UN process at the outset and bruised many allies with arrogant rhetoric and lack of consultation. One would suspect that the administration will now hear certain conditions laid down in exchange for their help. In the region, international actors will want a broader strategy that includes a region-wide security arrangement to replace the now shattered one. They will want re-engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and more direct diplomacy to help bring into the fold outliers such as Syria and Iran. They will want the United States to work with them to improve relationships and images on each side.

International involvement beyond the region will be dependent on some of the same conditions, but will also involve political and economic access and a voice that had been previously denied. Although boots on the ground may be a bridge too far for newly acquired allies at this point, burden sharing, political support and involvement, security training, and economic development support, among other things, can be secured."

"As much as we claim to understand

"As much as we claim to understand that this is a struggle for hearts and minds, the US Administration has failed to win that battle. The Iraqi people have not bought into the concept of a unified Iraq as the best outcome for them - an Iraq worth fighting for. They have retreated behind their sectarian identities. The bad guys have created the necessary fear, apathy, or support for them to survive in the midst of the people. If the people saw them as the obstacles to a more secure better life, they could not exist.

The people need to be engaged, and they must have a voice.. . The people cannot be uninvolved bystanders."

"We are not wanting for ideas on how to

"We are not wanting for ideas on how to stabilize Iraq. It will do us no good, however, just to produce a menu of ideas with no cohesive and comprehenisve means to implement them. This requires planning, organization, clear direction, and true competence in the ranks. That is the principal message conveyed here."