Never in His Wildest Dreams
It's week two in the Scooter Libby trial. Marcy has done a great job of live-blogging todays testimony. Today was my first day at the trial. I spent most of it in the courtroom, seated behind Mrs. Libby, and some in the media room. There were a lot of veteran PlameGate reporters on hand: David Corn of the Nation, David Schuster of MSNBC, Michael Isikoff of Newsweek, Byron York of the National Review and John Dickerson of Time, to name a few. Also following the action: Kelly O'Donnell of NBC News, David Stout of the New York Times, Nina Totenberg of NPR.
Being in the courtroom has advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, you get the big picture, being able to watch the interaction between the prosecution and defense teams, Scooter Libby and his lawyers, the jury and the Judge. You also get to see what seems of interest to the jurors, what they smile and laugh at and what doesn't faze them.
On the minus side, it was stifling hot, many of us (including the Judge at one point) were using paper to fan ourselves and if you leave while court is in session, you can't get back in. Also, you are reduced to handwritten notes since no laptops are allowed in the courtroom. This is not a high-tech trial. The lawyers aren't tapping away at computers. The exhibits aren't fancy. There are a lot of assistants on both sides.
Now for the substance. Cathie Martin, Cheney's former press secretary, was the first witness of the day, where she underwent cross-examination by Libby lawyer Ted Wells. He took her through a chronological version of her testimony from last week.
If there was anything new, I didn't learn it. If he had a point, I didn't get it.
I think he was trying to show that none of the Administration's talking points involved Valerie Plame Wilson. She also said she didn't discuss Plame's CIA employment with Libby during July. Wells tried to get her to say that she didn't hear the entire phone conversation between Libby and Matthew Cooper. But, it fizzled because she insisted she was in the same room as Libby for the whole conversation, she just was talking on the phone during some of it and Libby was reading from the Administration's script the whole time.
So, according to Martin, there was nothing ad-libbed that she would have missed. I was really hoping Wells would end on a high note, leaving the jury to ponder a bone of contention that could amount to a reasonable doubt, but he ended with a housekeeping matter about document identification.
After Martin, which was dullsville, Ari Fleischer took the stand. Compared to Martin, he was a compelling witness.
He also was unshakable in his assertion that Scooter Libby told him at lunch on July 7th, the day he left for Africa, that Wilson's wife suggested him for the Africa trip and that she worked in the CIA's counterproliferation division. He said Libby told him this was "hush-hush" and on the QT.
Ari was a polished pro. Rather than directing his answers to Zeidenberg or Jeffress, he turned to the jury and spoke to them directly, gesturing with his hands. This is a trick FBI agents use. When it happens in my trials, I ask the judge to instruct the witness not to direct his answers to the jury, but to the lawyer asking the questions. Either Judge Walton would not have entertained such a motion, or Team Libby didn't think of it. After a while, it got obnoxious watching Fleischer suck up to the jury.
Jeffress was a good cross-examiner, he had his facts down and it was easier to follow where he was going than it was with Wells and Martin, but he failed to trip up Ari. The whole issue of Ari's immunity fell flat, there was no attempt to show Ari had committed a crime and Ari took full responsiblilty for having leaked to reporters, although he made a point of saying several times, he had no clue Plame's status may have been classified.
In fact, he testified, "never in my wildest dreams" did he imagine she was a covert agent in the intelligence section of the CIA.
Ari used communicator type words, to say he was "horrified" that he might have a role in exposing Plame. He explained Dan Bartlett's statement to him on Air Force One about Wilson's wife being behind the Niger mission and working for the CIA as an extemporaneous utterance by Bartlett, not particularly directed at him. Ari was more interested in the document he was reading at the time, and didn't pay much attention to Bartlett, since he had heard this before -- from Libby.
Ouch.
Jeffress was trying to show that Ari told David Gregory of NBC News and John Dickenson of Time about Plame's job and supposed role in sending Wilson to Africa -- the inference being, that maybe Russert really heard about Plame from Gregory while Dickenson may have been the person who told Matthew Cooper. But, it was a balloon that didn't take off. I expect they will return to this theory during Russert and Coopers' testimony.
At the end of the day, Cheney former counsel David Addington, now his Chief of Staff, took the stand. He was friendly, not hostile yet seemed to bury Libby. He said that between July 6 and July 14, Libby asked him if the President could order material declassified and whether there would be a paper trail if a CIA employee's spouse went on a trip. He also said that at one point in the conversation, Libby used his hands to gesture him to speak lower.
Judith Miller testifies tomorrow. Fitz says he won't introduce Scooter's Aspen letter in his case in chief. At this point, Team Libby's defense isn't focused enough for me to predict where they will go with her. So tune in to Marcy's live-blogging and back here tomorrow night, and we'll all find out together.
[Cross posted at Huffington Post and Firedoglake.]
Update: The defense introduced a handwritten letter Libby wrote to Fleischer. You can read it here.
Others weighing in: Media Blogs, Booman Tribune, John Dickerson at Slate, Michael Iskikoff at Newsweek
Update: White Collar Crime Blog weighs in on the Jencks Act and the Libby Trial.
Full Version: Never In His Wildest Dreams
From TomPaine.com
QUOTE
Cheney To The Stand
John Prados
January 30, 2007
John Prados is a senior analyst at the National Security Archive in Washington. His current book is Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA.
Every day, more of the sordid tale of Vice President Dick Cheney’s no-holds-barred effort to get his way on the Iraq war is coming out.
Months ago, Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, blasted the Bush administration for its resort to a “cabal” led by Cheney. Now we are getting chapter and verse from the prosecution of another chief of staff, I. Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Cheney’s front man until he was indicted for obstruction of justice. Testimony at Libby’s trial in U.S. District Court shows exactly how the cabal operated, in this case attempting to smear Iraq war critic Ambassador Joseph Wilson by blowing the cover of his wife, Valerie Plame, until then an undercover officer for the CIA.
When the conspiracy to discredit Wilson began to fray, Cheney took the lead in trying to shore it up. Whatever it took, Cheney was ready to give. This is becoming crystal clear at the trial, where a parade of Bush administration and CIA officials are testifying. News stories have referred to Cheney, sometimes even attributing a leading role to him, but they hardly do justice to the record revealed by trial testimony.
The story begins with Wilson, who blew the whistle on the administration’s phony Niger uranium claim a couple of months after Bush’s invasion of Iraq. At first Wilson spoke to officials about getting the record corrected. When that didn’t work, he gave material to a columnist for a piece that appeared in The New York Times in early May. Libby assistant Eric Edelman drew attention to the column but no one in the OVP—the Office of the Vice-President—much cared because, according to the testimony of Cheney’s then-public affairs aide Cathie Martin, Times columnists write stuff like that all the time. Wilson upped the ante, giving more material to Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus for a story that paper printed on June 12, 2003. From that moment the former diplomat was never out of Cheney’s crosshairs.
Both Martin and former CIA officers show that the OVP had advance knowledge of the Pincus story and began moving to identify Wilson the day before it appeared. Libby demanded the information from CIA’s Iraq point man, Robert Grenier, and actually called him out of a meeting with agency director George Tenet to get it. His first question was whether it would be alright to put this out in public. Grenier got agency PR chief Bill Harlow on the phone, and Libby handed off his end to Martin. At that point she learned Ambassador Wilson’s identity and that Wilson’s wife worked at CIA. When Martin entered Cheney’s office to give this information to the vice-president, Libby already knew it.
In the days after this exchange the “Sixteen Words” Iraq deception in Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address became a hot issue, while Wilson’s account of his futile Niger trip stood without contradiction. On June 23, Libby began openly counterattacking, calling in Times reporter Judith Miller to complain of “highly distorted” and selective leaking from the CIA, bringing up Wilson as well. Libby also mentioned Mrs. Wilson’s CIA connection. According to Miller’s personal account of this episode in The New York Times (October 16, 2005), Libby claimed: that Cheney did not know Joe Wilson; that the vice-president had no idea what Wilson had done; and that the CIA did not report it to him. These statements correspond exactly to the talking points that the OVP developed when Wilson went public on July 6, revealed in a trial exhibit. These were emailed to White House spokesman Ari Fleischer for use in countering Wilson.
On his copy of Wilson’s July 6 New York Times op-ed, Cheney scribbled questions to raise. The most leading of these suggested that Valerie Plame had sent Wilson “on a junket.” Libby then had breakfast with Judith Miller on July 8. He treated Miller to a lengthy diatribe on Wilson, offering more information on Valerie Plame, plus details that could only have come from mining the record and pressuring the CIA for information. Libby claimed that Wilson’s reporting cable “barely made it out of the bowels of the CIA.” And, he told Miller, charges of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq contained in the still-classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) were even stronger than what appeared in the sanitized version the administration had released previously.
That summer day was critical to this entire enterprise. OVP counsel David Addington, by his own testimony, advised Libby that the president can use his constitutional powers as commander in chief (that again) to declassify even if statutes exist that govern this very action. Libby then closeted himself with Mr. Cheney and deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley and decided to declassify portions of the NIE, which brings us to Libby Trial Exhibit no. 523, a fresh set of talking points dictated by Cheney himself during a break between Capitol Hill events on July 8. The talking points included reference to the NIE. Note that the president was out of the country, on a trip to Africa—this act was unilateral by Cheney. The CIA was not informed of the NIE declassification for nine days. Cheney told Libby to call reporters, effectively taking his own press aide out of the loop.
Meanwhile Hadley assistant Robert Joseph also claimed, again deceptively, that CIA had accepted the phony charge for the Bush speech. Security adviser Condi Rice promptly went over the cliff, telling reporters the language had only been in the Bush speech because of the CIA. Again it was Cheney, Libby and Hadley who worked into the night to concoct George Tenet's statement in which the CIA took the blame for the deceptive “sixteen words.” Cheney then dictated more talking points to guide Fleischer in his interactions with the press. He also gave Libby, instead of his press aides, the action with reporters and planned the press conference where White House communications director Dan Bartlett would release the NIE and attempt to explain the phony charges in the State of the Union address, previewing the show for conservative columnists at a luncheon at his own official residence. George Bush, stuck in darkest Africa by Condi Rice’s gaffes, went along meekly.
There can be no question that Cheney was the puppeteer in this entire production. This is not the same role as previous vice presidents, even activist ones like Al Gore or Walter Mondale—indeed Mondale said recently that had he taken such liberties, President Jimmy Carter would have made him resign. At a minimum it is clear Cheney believes he can substitute his judgment for the president’s. Cheney not only reinforces Bush’s worst traits, he sandbags the president into even more extreme positions. Where this will lead when it comes to Iran or North Korea should send shudders up the spine.
Cheney has gone out of his way to make sure no one got to the bottom of this affair. Sen. John D. Rockefeller, D-W. Va., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, related new key details of this in an interview with McClatchy newspapers last week. During the previous Congress, the committee attempted to conduct a “Phase II” investigation of how the Iraq intelligence was manipulated to bring on the war, but was stymied at every turn by obstacles thrown up by the Republican majority, led by then-chairman Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kan. Rockefeller told reporters that Cheney’s interference with committee business “was just constant” and that it was “not hearsay” that Cheney had induced Roberts to drag out the inquiry.
Cheney himself continues to push the line that “obviously” only flawed intelligence was at issue on Iraq, and as he told Newsweek last week , “we should not let the fact of past problems in that area lead us to ignore the threat we face today.” Cheney is himself to testify at the Libby trial. It is a good bet that he hopes questioning will stay away from these areas.
John Prados
January 30, 2007
John Prados is a senior analyst at the National Security Archive in Washington. His current book is Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA.
Every day, more of the sordid tale of Vice President Dick Cheney’s no-holds-barred effort to get his way on the Iraq war is coming out.
Months ago, Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell, blasted the Bush administration for its resort to a “cabal” led by Cheney. Now we are getting chapter and verse from the prosecution of another chief of staff, I. Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby, Cheney’s front man until he was indicted for obstruction of justice. Testimony at Libby’s trial in U.S. District Court shows exactly how the cabal operated, in this case attempting to smear Iraq war critic Ambassador Joseph Wilson by blowing the cover of his wife, Valerie Plame, until then an undercover officer for the CIA.
When the conspiracy to discredit Wilson began to fray, Cheney took the lead in trying to shore it up. Whatever it took, Cheney was ready to give. This is becoming crystal clear at the trial, where a parade of Bush administration and CIA officials are testifying. News stories have referred to Cheney, sometimes even attributing a leading role to him, but they hardly do justice to the record revealed by trial testimony.
The story begins with Wilson, who blew the whistle on the administration’s phony Niger uranium claim a couple of months after Bush’s invasion of Iraq. At first Wilson spoke to officials about getting the record corrected. When that didn’t work, he gave material to a columnist for a piece that appeared in The New York Times in early May. Libby assistant Eric Edelman drew attention to the column but no one in the OVP—the Office of the Vice-President—much cared because, according to the testimony of Cheney’s then-public affairs aide Cathie Martin, Times columnists write stuff like that all the time. Wilson upped the ante, giving more material to Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus for a story that paper printed on June 12, 2003. From that moment the former diplomat was never out of Cheney’s crosshairs.
Both Martin and former CIA officers show that the OVP had advance knowledge of the Pincus story and began moving to identify Wilson the day before it appeared. Libby demanded the information from CIA’s Iraq point man, Robert Grenier, and actually called him out of a meeting with agency director George Tenet to get it. His first question was whether it would be alright to put this out in public. Grenier got agency PR chief Bill Harlow on the phone, and Libby handed off his end to Martin. At that point she learned Ambassador Wilson’s identity and that Wilson’s wife worked at CIA. When Martin entered Cheney’s office to give this information to the vice-president, Libby already knew it.
In the days after this exchange the “Sixteen Words” Iraq deception in Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address became a hot issue, while Wilson’s account of his futile Niger trip stood without contradiction. On June 23, Libby began openly counterattacking, calling in Times reporter Judith Miller to complain of “highly distorted” and selective leaking from the CIA, bringing up Wilson as well. Libby also mentioned Mrs. Wilson’s CIA connection. According to Miller’s personal account of this episode in The New York Times (October 16, 2005), Libby claimed: that Cheney did not know Joe Wilson; that the vice-president had no idea what Wilson had done; and that the CIA did not report it to him. These statements correspond exactly to the talking points that the OVP developed when Wilson went public on July 6, revealed in a trial exhibit. These were emailed to White House spokesman Ari Fleischer for use in countering Wilson.
On his copy of Wilson’s July 6 New York Times op-ed, Cheney scribbled questions to raise. The most leading of these suggested that Valerie Plame had sent Wilson “on a junket.” Libby then had breakfast with Judith Miller on July 8. He treated Miller to a lengthy diatribe on Wilson, offering more information on Valerie Plame, plus details that could only have come from mining the record and pressuring the CIA for information. Libby claimed that Wilson’s reporting cable “barely made it out of the bowels of the CIA.” And, he told Miller, charges of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq contained in the still-classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) were even stronger than what appeared in the sanitized version the administration had released previously.
That summer day was critical to this entire enterprise. OVP counsel David Addington, by his own testimony, advised Libby that the president can use his constitutional powers as commander in chief (that again) to declassify even if statutes exist that govern this very action. Libby then closeted himself with Mr. Cheney and deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley and decided to declassify portions of the NIE, which brings us to Libby Trial Exhibit no. 523, a fresh set of talking points dictated by Cheney himself during a break between Capitol Hill events on July 8. The talking points included reference to the NIE. Note that the president was out of the country, on a trip to Africa—this act was unilateral by Cheney. The CIA was not informed of the NIE declassification for nine days. Cheney told Libby to call reporters, effectively taking his own press aide out of the loop.
Meanwhile Hadley assistant Robert Joseph also claimed, again deceptively, that CIA had accepted the phony charge for the Bush speech. Security adviser Condi Rice promptly went over the cliff, telling reporters the language had only been in the Bush speech because of the CIA. Again it was Cheney, Libby and Hadley who worked into the night to concoct George Tenet's statement in which the CIA took the blame for the deceptive “sixteen words.” Cheney then dictated more talking points to guide Fleischer in his interactions with the press. He also gave Libby, instead of his press aides, the action with reporters and planned the press conference where White House communications director Dan Bartlett would release the NIE and attempt to explain the phony charges in the State of the Union address, previewing the show for conservative columnists at a luncheon at his own official residence. George Bush, stuck in darkest Africa by Condi Rice’s gaffes, went along meekly.
There can be no question that Cheney was the puppeteer in this entire production. This is not the same role as previous vice presidents, even activist ones like Al Gore or Walter Mondale—indeed Mondale said recently that had he taken such liberties, President Jimmy Carter would have made him resign. At a minimum it is clear Cheney believes he can substitute his judgment for the president’s. Cheney not only reinforces Bush’s worst traits, he sandbags the president into even more extreme positions. Where this will lead when it comes to Iran or North Korea should send shudders up the spine.
Cheney has gone out of his way to make sure no one got to the bottom of this affair. Sen. John D. Rockefeller, D-W. Va., chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, related new key details of this in an interview with McClatchy newspapers last week. During the previous Congress, the committee attempted to conduct a “Phase II” investigation of how the Iraq intelligence was manipulated to bring on the war, but was stymied at every turn by obstacles thrown up by the Republican majority, led by then-chairman Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kan. Rockefeller told reporters that Cheney’s interference with committee business “was just constant” and that it was “not hearsay” that Cheney had induced Roberts to drag out the inquiry.
Cheney himself continues to push the line that “obviously” only flawed intelligence was at issue on Iraq, and as he told Newsweek last week , “we should not let the fact of past problems in that area lead us to ignore the threat we face today.” Cheney is himself to testify at the Libby trial. It is a good bet that he hopes questioning will stay away from these areas.
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