http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/20...neralship_N.htm


A failure in generalship
By Lt. Col. Paul Yingling for the Armed Forces Journal

"You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in
the least of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would become
most dangerous in case of a serious conflict." — Frederick the Great

For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat
at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of
Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese
communists. In 2007, Iraq's grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing
hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive
regional war. These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a
crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals
have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on
the application of force to achieve the aims of policy.

The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society
to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities.

Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this
responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires
the intervention of Congress.

The Responsibilities of Generalship

Armies do not fight wars; nations fight wars. War is not a military activity
conducted by soldiers, but rather a social activity that involves entire nations.

Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz noted that passion, probability
and policy each play their role in war. Any understanding of war that ignores one
of these elements is fundamentally flawed.

The passion of the people is necessary to endure the sacrifices inherent in war.
Regardless of the system of government, the people supply the blood and treasure
required to prosecute war. The statesman must stir these passions to a level
commensurate with the popular sacrifices required. When the ends of policy are
small, the statesman can prosecute a conflict without asking the public for
great sacrifice. Global conflicts such as World War II require the full mobilization
of entire societies to provide the men and materiel necessary for the successful
prosecution of war. The greatest error the statesman can make is to commit his nation
to a great conflict without mobilizing popular passions to a level commensurate
with the stakes of the conflict.

Popular passions are necessary for the successful prosecution of war, but cannot
be sufficient. To prevail, generals must provide policymakers and the public with a
correct estimation of strategic probabilities. The general is responsible
for estimating the likelihood of success in applying force to achieve the aims of
policy. The general describes both the means necessary for the successful
prosecution of war and the ways in which the nation will employ those means. If the
policymaker desires ends for which the means he provides are insufficient, the
general is responsible for advising the statesman of this incongruence. The
statesman must then scale back the ends of policy or mobilize popular passions to
provide greater means. If the general remains silent while the statesman commits
a nation to war with insufficient means, he shares culpability for the results.

However much it is influenced by passion and probability, war is ultimately an
instrument of policy and its conduct is the responsibility of policymakers. War is
a social activity undertaken on behalf of the nation; Augustine counsels us that the
only purpose of war is to achieve a better peace. The choice of making war to achieve
a better peace is inherently a value judgment in which the statesman must
decide those interests and beliefs worth killing and dying for. The military man is
no better qualified than the common citizen to make such judgments. He must
therefore confine his input to his area of expertise — the estimation of strategic
probabilities.

The correct estimation of strategic possibilities can be further subdivided
into the preparation for war and the conduct of war. Preparation for war
consists in the raising, arming, equipping and training of forces. The conduct of war
consists of both planning for the use of those forces and directing those forces in
operations. To prepare forces for war, the general must visualize the conditions of future
combat. To raise military forces properly, the general must visualize the quality and
quantity of forces needed in the next war.

To arm and equip military forces properly, the general must visualize the materiel
requirements of future engagements. To train military forces properly, the
general must visualize the human demands on future battlefields, and replicate
those conditions in peacetime exercises.

Of course, not even the most skilled general can visualize precisely how future
wars will be fought. According to British military historian and soldier Sir Michael
Howard, "In structuring and preparing an army for war, you can be clear that you
will not get it precisely right, but the important thing is not to be too far
wrong, so that you can put it right quickly."

The most tragic error a general can make is to assume without much reflection that
wars of the future will look much like wars of the past. Following World War I,
French generals committed this error, assuming that the next war would involve
static battles dominated by firepower and fixed fortifications. Throughout the
interwar years, French generals raised, equipped, armed and trained the French
military to fight the last war. In stark contrast, German generals spent the
interwar years attempting to break the stalemate created by firepower and
fortifications. They developed a new form of war — the blitzkrieg — that integrated
mobility, firepower and decentralized tactics. The German Army did not get this
new form of warfare precisely right. After the 1939 conquest of Poland, the German
Army undertook a critical self-examination of its operations. However, German
generals did not get it too far wrong either, and in less than a year had
adapted their tactics for the invasion of France.

After visualizing the conditions of future combat, the general is responsible for
explaining to civilian policymakers the demands of future combat and the risks
entailed in failing to meet those demands. Civilian policymakers have neither the
expertise nor the inclination to think deeply about strategic probabilities in
the distant future. Policymakers, especially elected representatives, face
powerful incentives to focus on near-term challenges that are of immediate concern
to the public. Generating military capability is the labor of decades. If the
general waits until the public and its elected representatives are immediately
concerned with national security threats before finding his voice, he has waited
too long. The general who speaks too loudly of preparing for war while the
nation is at peace places at risk his position and status. However, the general
who speaks too softly places at risk the security of his country.

...

There is alot more...and it's all good. This guy deserves promotion, if only for his
ability to think strategically and relate such thought to the process.

For those of us who really care about our military, read the rest at...

http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/20...neralship_N.htm

before it's gone...Peace.