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tazvil04
The Bush Adminstration's reckless forray into Iraq has resulted in international security consequences including the resurgence of Russia as a dominant force...

In 2000, when Bush entered the White House --- Russia was still really economically and politically as it joined the ranks of democracies.

However, since then --- Bush has been distracted in Iraq and lost the assertiveness necessary to reign in a new Russia which is harkening back to the Cold War of the past with not only its authoritarian ways, but also its aggressiveness in securing control of future economies of scale making energy deals with China, Iran, India and elsewhere...

In addition, Russia continues to have nukes that are loosely secured and represent an incredible threat should they fall into the hands of a terrorist ---

This is a major security threat --- and the best Bush has been able to do --- is map out a plan to secure them on a timetable that will take 10 to 15 years to complete.

Inciting a New Cold War: Hypocritical U.S. Views about Russia's Democracy (5 comments )

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/walter-c-uhl...r-_b_48375.html

READ MORE: Russia, United States, Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Cohen, Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin, Iraq, U.S. Senate, George W. Bush, Katrina vanden Heuvel
Paper to be presented at the 16th Annual Russian-American Seminar, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 15-22, 2007

Speaking to the United States Senate Appropriations subcommittee last week, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice commented upon the "difficult period" afflicting recent Russian-American relations. She asserted, "the Russians, I think, do not accept fully that our relations with countries that are their neighbors, that once were part of the Soviet Union, are quite honestly good relations between independent states and the United States.

Had she been more forthright and understanding, however, she would have acknowledged that the U.S. "does not accept fully" the pursuit of "good relations between independent states" in its back yard. It's called the Monroe Doctrine

Moreover, and worse, Ms. Rice added that the difficult period has been exacerbated by the deterioration of democracy in Russia. As she noted: "It is even more difficult when one looks at what is happening domestically in Russia where I think it's fair to say that there has been a turning back of some of the reforms that led to the decentralization of power out of the Kremlin."

Again, few commentators seemed to have noticed the rank hypocrisy underlying her criticism of Russian democracy. For, depending upon your point of view -- that is, depending upon whether you consider the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to be a more heinous crime than the Bush administration's unprovoked and, thus, illegal preventive war against Iraq -- the majority of the public in America's democracy fully supported either the worst or second-worst international crime of the twenty-first century.

Ms. Rice, in fact, knowingly lied when she told the American public on September 8, 2002, that the high strength aluminum tubes that Iraq was desperately seeking could "only" be of use in a nuclear program.

Moreover, Ms. Rice apparently fails to appreciate how poorly most Russians view the "reforms that led to the decentralization of power out of the Kremlin." As Katrina vanden Heuvel recently wrote for The Nation [May 21, 2007], Boris Yeltsin -- whom Americans credit for that decentralization -- conspired to abolish the Soviet Union, imposed a "shock therapy" on Russia that "wiped out the savings of most Russians," permitted the "loans for shares" swindle that led to the rise of Russia's oligarchs and ordered tanks to fire on the Russian Parliament in October 1993, which "led to the Russian super-presidency and obedient Parliament of today,"

As Stephen F. Cohen has observed, during all of this so-called "decentralization," Russia's "essential infrastructure -- political, economic and social -- disintegrated. Moscow's hold on its vast territories was weakened by separatism, official corruption and Mafia-like crime. The worst peacetime depression in modern history brought economic losses more than twice those suffered in World War II. GDP plummeted by nearly half and capital investment by 80 percent. Most Russians were thrown into poverty. Death rates soared and the population shrank. And in August 1998, the financial system imploded." [Stephen F. Cohen, The Nation, July 10, 2006]

Thus, Americans shouldn't be surprised to learn that many Russians have a bad taste in their mouth about the so-called democracy that flourished during the Yetsin period. In addition, they shouldn't be surprised to learn that, as Vyacheslav Nikonov recently wrote in Izvestia, "Russian citizens" by "a ratio of 29 to 1" believe "the rule of Vladimir Putin�[to be] more democratic than that of Boris Yeltsin." Finally, Americans shouldn't be too surprised to learn that many Russians also have concluded that the United States supported and extolled Russian democracy only as long as kept Russia weak.

These same Russians now view the emerging American outcry about Russia's backsliding from democracy as nothing more than the resurfacing of a Cold War mindset that many Americans in both political parties have never abandoned. And, if you read the analysis of Stephen Cohen, or Anatol Lieven, -- two of America's more astute Russia scholars -- you'll see that their suspicions have a solid foundation.

More significantly, however, the contrasting examples noted above -- of (1) an American democracy that sanctions one of the worst international crimes of the early twenty-first century and (2) a U.S.-approved "decentralizing" Russian democracy that permitted the impoverishment and death of many of its people (the so-called demos) -- raise a more serious question. What, exactly, is democracy good for?

After all, in a very persuasive new book, Democracy, the eminent scholar, Charles Tilly asserts that democracies "break their commitments differently, make war differently, respond differently to external interventions and so on." Moreover democracies rescue "ordinary people from both the tyranny and the mayhem that have prevailed in most political regimes." [p. 6] Yet, the contrasting examples noted above challenge both of Tilly's assumptions.

Professor Tilly is no "preconditionalist," which is to say that he does not believe that any given polity must meet specific conditions before it can begin to transform itself into a democracy. Thus, he would reject the following conclusions reached in 1992 by Brian Downing: "Unique characteristics such as elective representative assemblies, royal subordination to law, the independence of towns, a balance of power between kings, nobles, and clerics, peasant property rights, and decentralized military forces, "provided Europe with a predisposition toward democratic political institutions, a predisposition that can never be repeated in the modern developing world" (p.3) [See Walter C. Uhler.com]

Instead, Tilly asserts: "The fundamental processes promoting democratization in all times and places consists of increasing integration of trust networks into public politics, increasing insulation of public politics from categorical inequality, and decreasing autonomy of major power centers from public politics." [p. 23]

When he writes about the integration of trust networks, Tilly acknowledges such parochial organizations initially were formed to exclusively benefit their respective members. For example, in the United States, "fraternal orders, workers' mutual benefit societies, private militias, fire companies, and similar 19th-century organizations did serve parochial interests before they advanced democracy." [p. 86]

According to Tilly, "Three main processes integrate trust networks into public politics: dissolution of segregated trust networks, integration of previously segregated trust networks, and creation of new politically connected trust networks." [p. 96] Yet, although the integration of trust networks is a necessary condition for democracy, it is not, by itself, a sufficient condition. Democracy also requires the insulation of public politics from categorical inequality and the diminution of the autonomy of major power centers.

Tilly states the obvious, when he asserts that all regimes, democratic or otherwise, inevitably intervene in the production of inequality: (1) "by protecting the advantages of their major supporters;" (2) "by establishing their own systems of extraction and allocation of resources;" and (3) by redistributing resources among different segments of their subject populations." [p. 117]

Yet, "compared to undemocratic governments, broadly speaking, democratic governments offer protection for advantages received for larger shares of their subject populations, create systems of extraction and allocation that respond more fully to popular control, produce more collective benefits, organize broader welfare programs, and redistribute more resources in favor of vulnerable populations within their constituencies more extensively." [Ibid]

Presumably writing about recent trends within the United States, Tilly concludes: "[I]f rich states dismantle the redistributive and equalizing arrangements that have grown up within democratic capitalism and rich people disconnect their trust networks from public politics by such means as gated communities and private schooling, we should expect those measures to de-democratize their regimes." [p. 204]

Nevertheless, he adds that the absence of inequality "cannot be a necessary condition of democracy." [p. 117] "Instead, the democratic accomplishment consists in insulating public politics from whatever material inequalities exist. Democracy thrives on a lack of correspondence between the inequalities of everyday life and those of state-citizen relations." [pp. 117-18]

The third and final necessary element for democratization and democracy is the willingness and ability of the state to reduce autonomous power clusters within the polity. It's accomplished by: (1) broadening political participation, (2) equalizing access to non-state political resources and opportunities and (3) inhibiting autonomous or coercive power within and outside the state. [p. 139]

And here, surprisingly, Tilly uses President Putin as an example. "Putin's anti-democratic smashing of oligarchs to reestablish state control over energy supplies helped eliminate rival centers of coercive power within the Russian regime." [p. 139]

According to Tilly, once these three elements are in place, it still requires a strong state, led by democracy-tolerant elites, determined to ensure that "political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation." [p. 189] Democracies seldom emerge or survive in weak states. Neither do they survive when political elites withdraw their own powerful trust networks.

In his examination of democracy in Russia, Tilly credits Mikhail Gorbachev not only for glasnost and perestroika, but especially for his stated ambition to create a "profound and consistent democracy" (during his extraordinary speech to the 19th party conference in June 1988). But he also notes how declining economic performance "and widespread demands for autonomy or even independence" weakened state capacity in the Soviet Union and, thus, prevented Gorbachev from leading a smooth transition to democracy on a national scale. [pp. 133-34]

Whatever one says about Yeltsin's decidedly mixed record as a democratizer, it is difficult to deny that such efforts were being pursued during a period when the state was losing its capacity to govern. Which is to say that serious democratization became virtually impossible during the later years of his rule, especially after his faltering health "caused feverish maneuvering for influence within the presidential circle." [p. 134]

Thus, Tilly credits President Putin, not only for destroying the oligarchs, but also for restoring political power in Russia. But, he also blames Putin for strengthening the state at the expense of de-democratizing Russia. Moreover, "as of 2006, Putin's regime was not striking bargains that subjected the Russian state to public politics or facilitated popular influence over public politics." [pp. 139-40]

Why? Because, the Russian government currently exercises direct control over huge oil and gas revenues, which renders such bargaining unnecessary. Thus, Putin's regime frees itself from political accountability.

Notwithstanding Professor Tilly's superb scholarship, we still must confront evidence that undermines his interpretation. First, we have President Putin's own commitment to democracy. Second, as mentioned earlier, Russians believe that their country under Putin's rule is more democratic than it was under Yeltsin. Finally, there is still that stubborn fact of elections. As Thomas Carothers has written recently: "Weak and problematic though elections often are, they now form a crucial step in the process of attaining political legitimacy throughout most of the world." [Carothers, "How Democracies Emerge: The 'Sequencing' Fallacy," Journal of Democracy p. 21]

Finally, even if one concludes that democracy in Putin's Russia is weak and undergoing de-democratization, that trend is not irreversible. For, as even Tilly notes: "If, in the future, the Russian state again becomes subject to protected, mutually binding consultation in dialogue with a broad, relatively equal citizenry, we may look back to Putin as the autocrat who took the first undemocratic steps toward that outcome." [p. 137]

More significantly, when one asks about current trends in Russia, he should also ask: "To what effect?" After all, the United States of America boasts about its possession of the oldest and most robust of democracies. Yet, the American public permitted itself to be duped into supporting an illegal, immoral war in Iraq and then tolerated some three years of worsening destruction and, finally, civil war there, before deciding, in the mid-term Congressional elections of November 2006, to hold President Bush and his administration accountable for it. Moreover, even at this late date, the issue moving the public is less the lies and immorality attending the decision to wage war than it is the fact that most Americans now believe that the war was not worth the cost.

By this standard, the sins committed by President Putin, by "turning back of some of the reforms that led to the decentralization of power out of the Kremlin," appear very minor, indeed.

Read all posts by Walter C. Uhler
tazvil04
May 14, 2007
Nostalgic for the Cold War? Good News

by Conn Hallinan
Foreign Policy in Focus
The current brouhaha over a U.S. plan to deploy anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) in Poland has nothing to do with a fear that Iran will attack Europe or the U.S. with nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). It has a great deal to do with the Bush administration's efforts to neutralize Russia's and China's nuclear deterrents and edge both countries out of Central Asia.

The plan calls for deploying 10 ABMs in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic, supposedly to interdict missiles from "rogue states" – read North Korean and Iran.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security John Rood claims "North Korea possesses an ICBM-range missile" and that it is "certainly possible" that Pyongyang could sell some to Iran. Barring that, Tehran could build its own missile capable of striking Europe and the United States.

But the North Korean Taepodong-2, which failed a recent test, is not a true ICBM – in a pinch it might reach Alaska. And Iran pledged in 2003 not to upgrade its intermediate missile, the Shahab-3.

"Since there aren't, and won't be, any ICBMs [from North Korea and Iran], then against whom, against whom, is this system directed?" First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov asked last month. "Only against us."

The chief of the Russian General Staff added, "The real goal [of the U.S. deployment] is to protect [the U.S.] from Russian and Chinese nuclear-missile potential and to create exclusive conditions for the invulnerability of the United States."

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice responded that "The idea that somehow 10 interceptors and a few radars in Eastern Europe are going to threaten the Soviet [sic] strategic return is purely ludicrous, and everybody knows it."

But once you start adding up a number of other things, it isn't just 10 missiles and a radar site. There is already a similar site in Norway, and the plan is to put similar systems in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Britain is considering deploying ABM missiles at Fylingdales, which even the U.S. admits would pose a threat to Russian missiles.

"If the [Russians] are concerned about the U.S. targeting their intercontinental ballistic missiles, I think that would be problematic from the UK because I believe we probably could catch them from a UK launch site," says U.S. Lt. Gen. Trey Obering, head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.

An editorial in the Guardiancalled the Fylingdales plan "the far side of folly."

The Russians are also suspicious that the Polish missiles are the camel's nose under the tent.

Poland has made it clear that it doesn't feel threatened by Iran. For Warsaw, this is all about its traditional enemy to the East, Russia. Besides the ABM missiles, Poland is pressing Washington for Patriot missiles and high-altitude THAAD missiles, plus it is purchasing American F-16s. In response, the Russians have moved surface-to-air missiles into Belarus.

"It would be naïve to think that Washington would limit its appetite to Poland or the Czech Republic, or to the modest potential that it is now talking about," writes Viktor Litovkin of Russia's Independent Military Review.

All these systems will be tied into ABM systems in Alaska and California, plus similar planned systems in Japan, Australia, and the Philippines (not to mention sea-borne ABM systems in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean).

Keep in mind that the Russians and the Chinese are already at loggerheads with the Bush administration over its unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Total all those things up and toss in the recent decision by the Bush administration to start designing another generation of nuclear warheads, and it is no wonder the Russians have turned cranky.

The European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have – with reservations – gone along with the plan, in part because the EU would like to squeeze Russian control over gas and oil pipelines coming out of Central Asia.

According to K.M. Bhadrakumar, the former Indian ambassador to Uzbekistan and Turkey, the United States has financed a pipeline that runs natural gas from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan through Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. The pipeline will be "a rival to Russian Gazprom's Blue Stream-2," scheduled to open in 2012.

"Moscow is well aware that Washington is the driving spirit behind the EU's energy policy toward Central Asia," Bhadrakumar writes in the Asia Times, arguing that the U.S. "calculates that Moscow will be inexorably drawn into a standoff with the EU over the latter's increasingly proactive polices in Eurasia."

While Rice may suggest that "everyone" thinks Russian paranoia is "ludicrous," in fact the EU is split over the missiles and unhappy that Washington bypassed NATO to make bilateral agreements with both countries.

Neither the right-wing Polish government nor the center-right Czech governments dare put the issue up for a referendum. Sentiment in the Czech Republic is running 60-40 against the radar, and there is strong opposition to the missiles in Poland.

The German Social Democrats (SPD), junior partners in the current coalition of Chancellor Angela Merkel, also oppose it. "We do not need new rockets in Europe," says SPD chair Kurt Beck. "The SPD doesn't want a new arms race between the U.S. and Russia on European soil. We have enough problems in the world."

French President Jacques Chirac also warned, "We should be very careful about encouraging the creation of a new dividing lines in Europe or a return to the old order."

The Russians have threatened to withdraw from the European Conventional Forces Treaty and have even hinted they might reconsider their participation in the 1987 Intermediate Ballistic Missile Treaty. Russia is also making plans to quadruple its production of new ballistic missiles and add to its nuclear submarine fleet.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute researcher Shannon Kile says the Russians view the deployment "as a violation of the original NATO enlargement agreement," where the U.S. pledged it would not permanently deploy or station "military assets on the territories of former Warsaw pact countries."

Last month, the White House urged admitting Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Ukraine to NATO.

Implicit in Rice's "ludicrous" comment is that an ABM system would be incapable of stopping a full-scale nuclear attack by a major nuclear power, and not a few critics point out that the system has a dismal track record. Kile characterized the proposed ABM as "a system that won't work to fight a threat that does not exist."

But it doesn't have to work very well. ABM systems have a dark secret: They are not supposed to stop all-out missile attacks, just mop up the few retaliatory enemy missiles that manage to survive a first strike. First strikes – called "counterpoint" attacks in bloodless vocabulary of nuclear war – are a central component in U.S. nuclear doctrine.

Last week the Democrats blocked funds for the European ABM system. Robert Wexler (D-Fla.), chair of the House subcommittee on Europe, said, "Europeans also question why – if this program is really intended to protect Europe – did the administration choose to bilaterally negotiate with Poland and the Czech Republic rather than collectively decide this issue in NATO?"

But whether the Democrats will stand up to the White House is anyone's guess.

If you are sitting in Moscow or Beijing and adding up the ABMs, the new warheads, and the growing ring of bases on your borders, you have little choice but to react. Imagine the U.S. response if the Russians and the Chinese were to deploy similar systems in Canada, Mexico, and Cuba.

A nuclear arms race, an increase of tension in Europe, and the launching of a new Cold War: that is what is at stake in the European missile crisis.

Reprinted courtesy of Foreign Policy in Focus.








Find this article at:
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hallinan.php?articleid=10961
tazvil04
This is where Rice is supposed to have some expertise -- we'll see how she is able to handle this...

I believe it is too late.

With the US embroiled in Iraq and needing support from all quarters it can ill afford to alineate a potential ally like Russi a it dearly needs to compel Iranian action --- and also assist with North Korea and other issues in the Middle East....

This puts the US in a rather weak position to be able to compel moderation on the part of Putin's autocracy...

Rice bids to defuse talk of new Cold War

David Millikin | Moscow, Russia

http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?artic...national_news/#

14 May 2007 04:48

United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice insisted there was no reason to speak of a new Cold War with Russia as she arrived in Moscow on Monday for talks aimed at halting a dramatic slide in relations.

Parallels drawn by some Russian officials with the era of the East-West Cold War were misplaced, Rice said as she prepared for meetings, including with President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday.

"I think the parallels just frankly have no basis whatsoever ... It's not an easy time for the relationship. It's not. But it's also not a time in which I think any sort of cataclysmic things are happening," Rice said.

"There are some things that are going very well, some things that are going less well ... and some things that are very problematic. But it's critically important to use this time to enhance those things that are going well and to work on those things that are not going well," she said.

Rice's visit follows a sharp downturn in relations sparked by US military activity in countries that in Soviet times were ruled, often unwillingly, from Moscow.

In particular, Moscow has sharply criticised US plans to place elements of a missile defence shield in the Czech Republic and Poland.

The United States and Poland were to begin formal talks on Monday on plans to place interceptor rockets in Poland as part of the shield, which Moscow fiercely opposes.

Rice said Washington was taking steps to involve Moscow in the plans.

She reiterated Washington's insistence that the defence system is not directed against Russia but is needed to defend against new potential threats, notably from Iran.

"We've made some very forward-leaning proposals for missile defence cooperation and I look forward to discussing those further ... This is a limited missile defence system that is aimed at emerging threats," Rice said.

"It would be, I think, irresponsible not to look to technology as a way to deal with these limited threats," she said.

Rice was to start her visit on Monday by having dinner with First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov. Ivanov, who oversees the military-industrial sector of the economy, is seen as a favourite to replace Putin after elections next March.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mikhail Kamynin said that any discussion of missile defence issues in Europe should "meet the security interests of all European states" and be discussed collectively, the Itar-Tass news agency reported.

Nikolai Bordyuzha, head of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which unites several ex-Soviet states, said Washington was trying to surround Russia and its neighbours with a "military structure" that he likened to a "loaded gun".

Also aggravating relations has been US criticism of Putin's democracy record and the Kremlin's unease with plans for Kosovo's independence.

Despite Rice's reassuring comments, Russia's Kommersant newspaper wrote on Monday that Moscow and Washington had lost all trust and now see each other as a threat.

Rice's visit "begins a new phase in ... relations. As in the days of the USSR, Washington will be guided by a doctrine of 'strategic patience'", the paper said.

The deterioration in relations has been evident since Putin made a frontal assault on US foreign policy in a speech in the German city of Munich in February.

Last month Putin said Russia was freezing compliance with a key accord on European security, the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty.

Earlier, Rice made clear that the US was wary of Putin's leadership.

"I think everybody around the world, in Europe, in the US, is very concerned about the internal course that Russia has taken," she told a Senate committee last week.

She said Putin had overseen a rollback of democratic reforms, undermining the independence of the legislature, the media and judiciary.

Rice was due to meet representatives of Russian NGOs on Tuesday. Civil society has come under pressure during Putin's rule, particularly groups receiving Western funding.

A US-backed plan currently before the United Nations to grant supervised independence to the Serbian province of Kosovo has also added to tensions.

A long-time ally of Serbia, Russia says any settlement must have the backing of both sides.

State Department officials said Rice would broach all these subjects on a trip designed to smooth relations ahead of next month's group of eight summit in Germany, when Putin will meet with President George Bush.

The so-called Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States and their respective allies began soon after the end of World War II and lasted until the Soviet collapse in 1991. -- AFP
tazvil04
Nuclear terror: How real?
By Brian Michael Jenkins
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published May 13, 2007

http://washingtontimes.com/functions/print...12-102004-1533r

Former CIA Director George Tenet writes in his new book his biggest fear is "the nuclear one." He writes that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda "desperately want" to mount a nuclear terrorist attack because "they understand that... if they manage to set off a mushroom cloud, they will make history."

The history of nuclear terrorism can be summarized: There hasn't been any -- yet. But it remains a fantasy of terrorists seeking super-destructive power, and a nightmare for everyone else, with periodic reminders some day it may come true.

Al Qaeda certainly has nuclear ambitions, but is not believed to have nuclear capabilities at this time. But the absence of nuclear terrorism has not prevented nuclear terror. Such is the power of language, that the mere placement of the words "nuclear" and "terrorism" in close proximity produces a fission of fear.

The possibility someone outside government might build a nuclear weapon was contemplated at the very beginning of the atomic age in the 1940s. Nuclear terrorism plots drove suspense novels written in the 1950s and '60s, like James Bond creator Ian Fleming's "Thunderball." Today, it is "24" character Jack Bauer who chases terrorists with nuclear bombs.

But what about reality? I presented my first paper on nuclear terrorism at a conference in Los Alamos, N.M., in 1975. The title: "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" We still ask that question 32 years later.

The debate in the 1970s focused on whether terrorists could build a bomb even if they had the material. Bomb designers tended to argue the principles of nuclear weapons design were by then well known, and therefore terrorists probably would be able to fabricate a crude nuclear weapon. But bomb builders remained skeptical: Building a nuclear bomb involved more than equations on paper.

Having no expertise in design of nuclear weapons, I took a different tack, looking at terrorist motives and intentions. While nuclear terrorism seemed theoretically attractive, even those we labeled terrorists did not do everything they could have done just a few decades ago.

Technological limitations and operational difficulties aside, terrorists seemed to operate within self-imposed constraints in the 1970s. They worried that large-scale indiscriminate violence might tarnish their image, threaten the cohesion of their groups, alienate their perceived constituents, and provoke a backlash that would threaten their survival. But these constraints were not universal or immutable and changed over time.

Beginning in the 1980s, the constraints began to erode and large-scale terrorist violence increased. By the 1990s, my colleagues at the Rand Corp. were writing about the "new terrorism," referring to terrorists increasingly motivated by religious fanaticism and determined to kill in quantity and likely to seek weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to expand their capacity for mayhem.

Perceptions of the likely terrorist scenario also changed. Prompted by the prevalence of terrorist hostage-taking in the 1970s, analysts scaled up contemporary scenarios and wondered whether terrorists with nuclear weapons might some day hold cities hostage to extort political concessions. At least some terrorists apparently thought along the same lines. This later changed to fears that if terrorists acquired WMD they would attack without warning.

The fall of the Soviet Union and growing concerns about the security of its huge nuclear arsenal deepened fears of nuclear terrorism. Exploratory discussions about how the United States and the Soviet Union might generally cooperate against terrorism, which began in the 1980s, developed into concrete programs aimed at securing Russian weapons and finding employment for Russian weapons designers.

The end of the Cold War also required a thorough rethinking of American national security policy. Two threats dominated attention: escalating terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. The two were easily conflated. Analysts feared that hostile states with nuclear weapons might be tempted to arm terrorists with one. Even without state approval, rogue elements involved in these programs might, for financial gain or ideological reasons, facilitate terrorist acquisition.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks redefined plausibility. Terrorist scenarios previously considered far-fetched suddenly became operative presumptions. Facing the reality of large-scale death and destruction, could America afford to take the chance terrorists might attack again, causing even greater devastation?

The subsequent "global war on terror" (the terms "terror" and "terrorism" initially were used interchangeably) would include not only a campaign against those responsible for September 11, but also a campaign against hostile states suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons. Pre-emption became national policy. Suspicion sufficed and the U.S. invaded Iraq to destroy WMD that turned out not to exist.

There is less uncertainty about North Korea's nuclear arsenal, since the North has already tested a nuclear weapon. There is enough suspicion about Iran's nuclear intentions to fear Iran and North Korea, even if they don't launch suicidal nuclear attacks, will clandestinely provide terrorists with nuclear weapons. If dismantling these programs proves impossible, the world is confronted with the unattractive alternatives of another pre-emptive military attack or accepting the risk.

Some analysts have suggested instead that deterrence strategies, which worked during the Cold War, might be modified and applied to new nuclear weapons states -- even to terrorists themselves. But this idea tends to be rejected in official circles from fear deterrence implies acceptance of nuclear weapons and therefore undercuts current efforts aimed at their elimination.

Whether nuclear terrorism will be avoided or is only a matter of time remains in the realm of speculation. Nonetheless, it will continue to be a source of public apprehension and a factor confronting governments around the world.

Brian Michael Jenkins is a terrorism expert at the Rand Corp., a nonprofit research organization.
tazvil04
27 April 2007

U.S.-Russia Cooperation Touted for Reducing Nuclear Threat
State’s Negroponte says Russia a key ally in fight on terrorism

By Eric Green
USINFO Staff Writer

http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display....&chanlid=is


Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte (File photo © AP Images)Washington -- Russia is one of the strongest partners of the United States in countering the global terrorist threat and in restraining countries from becoming “nuclear weapons states,” says Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte.

In April 25 prepared remarks, Negroponte touted the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program as an important aspect of the U.S.-Russian relationship in securing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction in states of the former Soviet Union. Negroponte said the program also encourages “higher levels of conduct in handling these weapons” and supports U.S.-Russian cooperation “with the objective of preventing proliferation.”

Speaking at the EastWest Institute’s 2007 awards dinner in Washington, Negroponte said the threat reduction program has provided funding and expertise for former Soviet states to decommission nuclear, biological and chemical weapon stockpiles, as agreed to by the Soviet Union in disarmament treaties. He added that in recent years, the program’s mission has expanded to enhancing land and maritime border security in some former Soviet countries.

Negroponte also praised U.S.-Russian bilateral cooperation in the Six-Party Talks aimed at eliminating nuclear programs from the Korean Peninsula. (See related article.)

In addition, he commended Russia’s partnership in the successful passage of U.N. sanctions against Iran in December 2006 and March 2007. The sanctions were designed to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programs. (See related article.)

Negroponte said the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship is critical, not just for Russians and Americans, “but for the many other peoples and nations who look to us for far-sighted leadership and constructive international cooperation.”

One of the most “dynamic dimensions” in the U.S.-Russian relationship is in commercial cooperation, said Negroponte. He said that in 2006 the United States and Russia reached a bilateral agreement providing each country more access to the other's markets. (See related article.)

“This was an important step forward that will benefit us both,” said Negroponte.

He said Russia is working to fulfill all of the multilateral requirements for its membership in the World Trade Organization, which the United States views as a “positive step towards Russia’s integration into the world economy.”

The United States and Russia also work closely on a wide array of other programs, including the International Space Station, said Negroponte. This partnership paid huge dividends, he said, when the Russian Soyuz spacecraft was the only remaining means of reaching the International Space Station, allowing for the rescue of stranded American and Russian astronauts.

“So in the areas of scientific research, space exploration, commerce, countering terrorism and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the world looks to Russia and the United States for leadership,” said Negroponte.

He added that 200 years of U.S.-Russian diplomatic relations have shown the two countries are “essential partners in promoting peace and prosperity around the world. Every effort we can make to strengthen that partnership is a wise investment in our common future.”

Negroponte extended his condolences on the passing of former Russian President Boris Yeltsin. He said as Russia’s first democratically elected post-Soviet president, Yeltsin will be remembered for his “significant contribution to ending the Cold War and his efforts to expand political and economic freedom at home and abroad.”

Yeltsin also will be remembered “fondly by the American people for establishing good relations between our nations after many years of conflict,” Negroponte said.
tazvil04
Loose Nukes
Updated: January 2006

http://www.cfr.org/publication/9549/

What are “loose nukes”?
The term originally referred to poorly guarded nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union that might tempt terrorists or criminals. Today, experts use the term to refer to nuclear weapons, materials, or know-how that could fall into the wrong hands. Areas of particular concern include the black market in uranium and plutonium, as well as the temptation for poorly paid former Soviet nuclear scientists to sell their skills to the highest bidder.

In which countries are loose nukes a problem?
Mainly in Russia. Before its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had more than 27,000 nuclear weapons and enough weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to triple that number. Since, severe economic distress, rampant crime, and widespread corruption in Russia and other former Soviet countries have fed concerns in the West about loose nukes, underpaid nuclear scientists, and the smuggling of nuclear materials. Security at Russia’s nuclear storage sites remains worrisome

The former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—where the Soviets based many of their nuclear warheads—safely returned their Soviet nuclear weapons to post-communist Russia in the 1990s, but all three countries still have stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Ukraine and Kazakhstan also have nuclear power plants the byproducts of which cannot be used to make a nuclear bomb but might tempt terrorists trying to make a “dirty bomb”—a regular explosive laced with lower-grade radioactive material.

Some experts also worry about Pakistan, a relatively recent nuclear power with untested security systems, dozens of nuclear weapons, and no shortage of Islamist militants. The United States recently offered to help Pakistan improve its nuclear security measures, an offer which Pakistan has tacitly accepted since November 2001.

Have any Russian nuclear weapons gone missing?
There have been no confirmed reports of missing or stolen former-Soviet nuclear weapons, but there is ample evidence of a significant black market in nuclear materials. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported more than a hundred nuclear smuggling incidents since 1993, eighteen of which involved highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient in an atomic bomb and the most dangerous product on the nuclear black market.

Have terrorist organizations ever tried to obtain Russian nuclear weapons?
Yes. Russian authorities say that in the past three years alone they have broken up hundreds of nuclear-material smuggling deals. In October 2001, shortly after the World Trade Center attacks, a Russian nuclear official reported having foiled two separate incidents over the previous eight months in which terrorists had “staked out” a secret weapons storage site. In the 1990s, U.S. authorities discovered several al-Qaeda plots to obtain nuclear materials, and former CIA Director George Tenet told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Osama bin Laden had sought to “acquire or develop a nuclear device.”

Could terrorists steal a Russian nuclear weapon?
It’s hard to say. Russian authorities say their nuclear weapons are under “safe and reliable” protection against a wide range of terrorist attacks. But Western analysts still worry that Russian security might be lax. And other Russian nuclear materials are less well-protected, including storage sites for tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

How do governments protect their nuclear weapons?
The United States protects its nuclear weapons with barriers, guards, surveillance cameras, motion sensors, and background checks on personnel. Several other nuclear powers—though not all—take similar precautions. Russia ’s security measures are flimsier. Guards at nuclear weapons facilities have gone unpaid for months at a time, and even basic security arrangements such as fences, doors, and padlocks remain inadequate in many locations. Futhermore, while U.S. nuclear weapons are engineered with “built-in” security mechanisms, we know very little about what sort of built-in safeguards there may be on Russia’s or Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals to prevent unauthorized detonations.
tazvil04
Posted 01/09/06 12:08Print this story Failing Grades on Nuclear Safety

By JOSHUA WILLIAMS

http://defensenews.com/story.php?F=1455934&C=commentary
Last month, many students across America received report cards assessing their performance. On Dec. 5, the president also got his. It was not refrigerator material.
The members of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission gave the U.S. government failing grades on efforts to protect America from terrorists seeking nuclear weapons and materials. Chairman Thomas Kean and Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton cited “insufficient progress” in the race against time to prevent the world’s most dangerous people from getting the world’s most dangerous weapons.
In the words of Commissioner Timothy Roemer, “If my children were to receive this report card, they would have to repeat a grade.”
We do not lack the programs needed to prevent nuclear terrorism. The problem is that the programs in place are not being implemented quickly or aggressively enough. As Kean, Hamilton and their colleagues note, “the size of the problem still dwarfs the policy response.” We are failing in three critical areas.
• Too little has been done to secure and eliminate nuclear materials in Russia and the former Soviet Union. Though progress has been made in recent months — getting U.S. officials greater access to Russian nuclear facilities and resolving a liability dispute that was blocking a program to eliminate enough plutonium for roughly 6,000 atomic bombs — we are still behind the curve.
Kean and Hamilton reported that less than half of Russia’s nuclear material has received security upgrades. This means that more than 300 tons of loose nuclear material remains unguarded in Russia and the former Soviet states. That is enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for tens of thousands of crude nuclear bombs.
In the past year, moreover, security improvements were completed more than twice as slowly as expected. Locking down nuclear material in the former Soviet Union is an essential front in the war on terror. We must progress at a faster rate.
• Some 40 states around the world possess weapon-usable nuclear material. The most vulnerable sites are research reactors fueled by HEU. Roughly 100 of these reactors contain enough HEU for a bomb.
Though the Department of Energy founded the Global Threat Reduction Initiative in May 2004 to secure these facilities, clean out the exorbitantly dangerous HEU fuel and convert the reactors to safer low-enriched uranium, current plans don’t call for the program to be completed for another decade. The 9/11 commissioners agree that this timetable is far too long.
• There is too little public discussion of this issue. In February 2004, President George W. Bush publicly identified nuclear terrorism as the gravest threat to American national security. Since then, the president has been largely silent. Addressing the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference in Washington Nov. 7, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman commented, “There can be no excuse on our part not to think of nuclear issues in terms of a very real terrorist threat.” Despite these statements, there has been no national debate about the importance of securing nuclear materials.
In a public statement Nov. 14 with the release of the commission’s third interim progress report, Chairman Kean put it succinctly: “Why isn’t the president talking about securing nuclear materials? Why isn’t the Congress focused? Why aren’t there more hearings and debate? What about the media? Why aren’t the airwaves filled with more commentary if everyone agrees this is the most serious threat?”
Kean has it right. We are currently coming up short, but we are not predestined to fail. In their progress report, the 9/11 commissioners highlight a series of steps that can be taken to significantly reduce, if not eradicate, the threat of nuclear terrorism.
The United States and Russia must strengthen and extend the agreement to secure Moscow’s loose nukes and materials. The existing agreement is set to expire in mid-2006. If it is not renewed, much of this crucial work will be suspended.
Just as importantly, the president should accelerate the timetable for securing all weapon-usable nuclear material no matter where it is in the world. He must request enough funding from Congress to get the job done. In turn, Congress should fully fund any such request. Experts at the Carnegie Endowment believe that the Global Threat Reduction Initiative could be completed by 2010 rather than 2015 with adequate personnel and resources.
Above all, the 9/11 commissioners argue, President Bush should publicly make preventing nuclear terrorism his top national security priority. The necessary programs are in place. The challenge now is one of focus and implementation. That is a challenge of leadership. The president must lend a sense of urgency to these ongoing efforts.
tazvil04
I do not think he was speaking of the US here --- I think he could have been equally speaking of terrorism on the whole...

May 13, 2007
The World
The Cure for Chilling Words Could Be a Cooler Temper
By C. J. CHIVERS
MOSCOW
NEW YORK TIMES

MUCH of Vladimir V. Putin’s second presidential term, which began in 2004, has been defined by his escalating opposition to American foreign policy and his revival of Russian influence.

With criticisms at turns withering and cogent, emotional and petulant, he has made his name in part by presenting himself as a counterweight to the United States and its policies abroad.

He has accused the United States of hypocrisy, arrogance, colonialism, military recklessness and adventurism, and of interfering with the internal affairs of other states.

So when he stood in Red Square last Wednesday, giving a Victory Day address in memory of soldiers who died defeating Nazi Germany, he sent some shivers across the West when he said this:

“The number of threats is not decreasing. They are only transforming and changing the guise. As during the Third Reich era, these new threats show the same contempt for human life and claims to world exclusiveness and diktat.”

Never before had he seemed to compare the United States to the Third Reich, even indirectly, which is what Sergei Markov, a political commentator close to the Kremlin, said he had done.

On Thursday, the foreign ministry told American diplomats that Mr. Putin did not have the United States in mind. American diplomats took that non-apology with a shrug, given the pace of Mr. Putin’s recent verbal attacks.

Lost in much of the din was a public address by a senior American diplomat on the same day.

Speaking in Berlin, Daniel Fried, the assistant secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, presented his own analysis of Russia’s strained relations with much of the West, giving full recognition to the new tensions but counseling just the opposite of hysteria.

The opposing speeches offered glimpses, through very different frames, of how the two former foes are struggling to define the terms of their new relationship.

The current problems, Mr. Fried suggested, should be viewed through the lens of history, then managed methodically, a technique that could presumably dull the emotional edge of any bluster.

“Russia and the West have dealt with one another — sometimes well, more often uneasily — since at least Peter the Great,” Mr. Fried said.

He added that what was needed was sustained engagement, mixed with firmness, to try to help influence Russia during its “unfinished transformation.”

Mr. Fried also made clear that the West need not be fully impressed by Mr. Putin’s ambitious posturing. Russia remains in many ways underdeveloped and disconnected from Western values, he said, and should still be held to account.

“We do not want a weak Russia, but a strong Russia must be strong in 21st-century, not 19th-century, terms,” he said.

“A strong center is part of this healthy mix,” he added. “But a strong center in a state of weak institutions, is not.”

Mr. Fried also called on Europe to stand against Russia’s desire to continue to have influence over countries the Soviet Union once occupied, a reminder that even as Russia complains about what it calls interference in its own domestic affairs it openly supports separatists in Georgia and Moldova, and has tried to bully Ukraine and the Baltic states.

“We should not pay a price for cooperation, nor indulge Russia when it behaves as if a residual sphere of influence over its neighbors is its due,” he said.

The next round in the ongoing struggle begins next week, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is scheduled to visit that country — in part to meet Mr. Putin and discuss the tensions between the two nations.

Ms. Rice told a Senate panel on Thursday that she was worried about Russia’s conduct both at home and abroad.

“It’s been a difficult period,” she said.

Just how difficult was clear in the amount of time Mr. Fried spent talking about it. In a speech that surveyed the world, with topics ranging from international terrorism to global warming, his call to calmly brace against Russia’s behavior took up more than a third of the time.
tazvil04
article can be found on the web at
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen


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The New American Cold War
by STEPHEN F. COHEN

[from the July 10, 2006 issue]

Contrary to established opinion, the gravest threats to America's national security are still in Russia. They derive from an unprecedented development that most US policy-makers have recklessly disregarded, as evidenced by the undeclared cold war Washington has waged, under both parties, against post-Communist Russia during the past fifteen years.

As a result of the Soviet breakup in 1991, Russia, a state bearing every nuclear and other device of mass destruction, virtually collapsed. During the 1990s its essential infrastructures--political, economic and social--disintegrated. Moscow's hold on its vast territories was weakened by separatism, official corruption and Mafia-like crime. The worst peacetime depression in modern history brought economic losses more than twice those suffered in World War II. GDP plummeted by nearly half and capital investment by 80 percent. Most Russians were thrown into poverty. Death rates soared and the population shrank. And in August 1998, the financial system imploded.

No one in authority anywhere had ever foreseen that one of the twentieth century's two superpowers would plunge, along with its arsenals of destruction, into such catastrophic circumstances. Even today, we cannot be sure what Russia's collapse might mean for the rest of the world.

Outwardly, the nation may now seem to have recovered. Its economy has grown on average by 6 to 7 percent annually since 1999, its stock-market index increased last year by 83 percent and its gold and foreign currency reserves are the world's fifth largest. Moscow is booming with new construction, frenzied consumption of Western luxury goods and fifty-six large casinos. Some of this wealth has trickled down to the provinces and middle and lower classes, whose income has been rising. But these advances, loudly touted by the Russian government and Western investment-fund promoters, are due largely to high world prices for the country's oil and gas and stand out only in comparison with the wasteland of 1998.

More fundamental realities indicate that Russia remains in an unprecedented state of peacetime demodernization and depopulation. Investment in the economy and other basic infrastructures remains barely a third of the 1990 level. Some two-thirds of Russians still live below or very near the poverty line, including 80 percent of families with two or more children, 60 percent of rural citizens and large segments of the educated and professional classes, among them teachers, doctors and military officers. The gap between the poor and the rich, Russian experts tell us, is becoming "explosive."

Most tragic and telling, the nation continues to suffer wartime death and birth rates, its population declining by 700,000 or more every year. Male life expectancy is barely 59 years and, at the other end of the life cycle, 2 to 3 million children are homeless. Old and new diseases, from tuberculosis to HIV infections, have grown into epidemics. Nationalists may exaggerate in charging that "the Motherland is dying," but even the head of Moscow's most pro-Western university warns that Russia remains in "extremely deep crisis."

The stability of the political regime atop this bleak post-Soviet landscape rests heavily, if not entirely, on the personal popularity and authority of one man, President Vladimir Putin, who admits the state "is not yet completely stable." While Putin's ratings are an extraordinary 70 to 75 percent positive, political institutions and would-be leaders below him have almost no public support.

The top business and administrative elites, having rapaciously "privatized" the Soviet state's richest assets in the 1990s, are particularly despised. Indeed, their possession of that property, because it lacks popular legitimacy, remains a time bomb embedded in the political and economic system. The huge military is equally unstable, its ranks torn by a lack of funds, abuses of authority and discontent. No wonder serious analysts worry that one or more sudden developments--a sharp fall in world oil prices, more major episodes of ethnic violence or terrorism, or Putin's disappearance--might plunge Russia into an even worse crisis. Pointing to the disorder spreading from Chechnya through the country's southern rim, for example, the eminent scholar Peter Reddaway even asks "whether Russia is stable enough to hold together."

As long as catastrophic possibilities exist in that nation, so do the unprecedented threats to US and international security. Experts differ as to which danger is the gravest--proliferation of Russia's enormous stockpile of nuclear, chemical and biological materials; ill-maintained nuclear reactors on land and on decommissioned submarines; an impaired early-warning system controlling missiles on hair-trigger alert; or the first-ever civil war in a shattered superpower, the terror-ridden Chechen conflict. But no one should doubt that together they constitute a much greater constant threat than any the United States faced during the Soviet era.

Nor is a catastrophe involving weapons of mass destruction the only danger in what remains the world's largest territorial country. Nearly a quarter of the planet's people live on Russia's borders, among them conflicting ethnic and religious groups. Any instability in Russia could easily spread to a crucial and exceedingly volatile part of the world.

There is another, perhaps more likely, possibility. Petrodollars may bring Russia long-term stability, but on the basis of growing authoritarianism and xenophobic nationalism. Those ominous factors derive primarily not from Russia's lost superpower status (or Putin's KGB background), as the US press regularly misinforms readers, but from so many lost and damaged lives at home since 1991. Often called the "Weimar scenario," this outcome probably would not be truly fascist, but it would be a Russia possessing weapons of mass destruction and large proportions of the world's oil and natural gas, even more hostile to the West than was its Soviet predecessor.

How has the US government responded to these unprecedented perils? It doesn't require a degree in international relations or media punditry to understand that the first principle of policy toward post-Communist Russia must follow the Hippocratic injunction: Do no harm! Do nothing to undermine its fragile stability, nothing to dissuade the Kremlin from giving first priority to repairing the nation's crumbling infrastructures, nothing to cause it to rely more heavily on its stockpiles of superpower weapons instead of reducing them, nothing to make Moscow uncooperative with the West in those joint pursuits. Everything else in that savaged country is of far less consequence.

Since the early 1990s Washington has simultaneously conducted, under Democrats and Republicans, two fundamentally different policies toward post-Soviet Russia--one decorative and outwardly reassuring, the other real and exceedingly reckless. The decorative policy, which has been taken at face value in the United States, at least until recently, professes to have replaced America's previous cold war intentions with a generous relationship of "strategic partnership and friendship." The public image of this approach has featured happy-talk meetings between American and Russian presidents, first "Bill and Boris" (Clinton and Yeltsin), then "George and Vladimir."

The real US policy has been very different--a relentless, winner-take-all exploitation of Russia's post-1991 weakness. Accompanied by broken American promises, condescending lectures and demands for unilateral concessions, it has been even more aggressive and uncompromising than was Washington's approach to Soviet Communist Russia. Consider its defining elements as they have unfolded--with fulsome support in both American political parties, influential newspapers and policy think tanks--since the early 1990s:

§ A growing military encirclement of Russia, on and near its borders, by US and NATO bases, which are already ensconced or being planned in at least half the fourteen other former Soviet republics, from the Baltics and Ukraine to Georgia, Azerbaijan and the new states of Central Asia. The result is a US-built reverse iron curtain and the remilitarization of American-Russian relations.

§ A tacit (and closely related) US denial that Russia has any legitimate national interests outside its own territory, even in ethnically akin or contiguous former republics such as Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia. How else to explain, to take a bellwether example, the thinking of Richard Holbrooke, Democratic would-be Secretary of State? While roundly condemning the Kremlin for promoting a pro-Moscow government in neighboring Ukraine, where Russia has centuries of shared linguistic, marital, religious, economic and security ties, Holbrooke declares that far-away Slav nation part of "our core zone of security."

§ Even more, a presumption that Russia does not have full sovereignty within its own borders, as expressed by constant US interventions in Moscow's internal affairs since 1992. They have included an on-site crusade by swarms of American "advisers," particularly during the 1990s, to direct Russia's "transition" from Communism; endless missionary sermons from afar, often couched in threats, on how that nation should and should not organize its political and economic systems; and active support for Russian anti-Kremlin groups, some associated with hated Yeltsin-era oligarchs.

That interventionary impulse has now grown even into suggestions that Putin be overthrown by the kind of US-backed "color revolutions" carried out since 2003 in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, and attempted this year in Belarus. Thus, while mainstream editorial pages increasingly call the Russian president "thug," "fascist" and "Saddam Hussein," one of the Carnegie Endowment's several Washington crusaders assures us of "Putin's weakness" and vulnerability to "regime change." (Do proponents of "democratic regime change" in Russia care that it might mean destabilizing a nuclear state?)

§ Underpinning these components of the real US policy are familiar cold war double standards condemning Moscow for doing what Washington does--such as seeking allies and military bases in former Soviet republics, using its assets (oil and gas in Russia's case) as aid to friendly governments and regulating foreign money in its political life.

More broadly, when NATO expands to Russia's front and back doorsteps, gobbling up former Soviet-bloc members and republics, it is "fighting terrorism" and "protecting new states"; when Moscow protests, it is engaging in "cold war thinking." When Washington meddles in the politics of Georgia and Ukraine, it is "promoting democracy"; when the Kremlin does so, it is "neoimperialism." And not to forget the historical background: When in the 1990s the US-supported Yeltsin overthrew Russia's elected Parliament and Constitutional Court by force, gave its national wealth and television networks to Kremlin insiders, imposed a constitution without real constraints on executive power and rigged elections, it was "democratic reform"; when Putin continues that process, it is "authoritarianism."

§ Finally, the United States is attempting, by exploiting Russia's weakness, to acquire the nuclear superiority it could not achieve during the Soviet era. That is the essential meaning of two major steps taken by the Bush Administration in 2002, both against Moscow's strong wishes. One was the Administration's unilateral withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, freeing it to try to create a system capable of destroying incoming missiles and thereby the capacity to launch a nuclear first strike without fear of retaliation. The other was pressuring the Kremlin to sign an ultimately empty nuclear weapons reduction agreement requiring no actual destruction of weapons and indeed allowing development of new ones; providing for no verification; and permitting unilateral withdrawal before the specified reductions are required.

The extraordinarily anti-Russian nature of these policies casts serious doubt on two American official and media axioms: that the recent "chill" in US-Russian relations has been caused by Putin's behavior at home and abroad, and that the cold war ended fifteen years ago. The first axiom is false, the second only half true: The cold war ended in Moscow, but not in Washington, as is clear from a brief look back.

The last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, came to power in 1985 with heretical "New Thinking" that proposed not merely to ease but to actually abolish the decades-long cold war. His proposals triggered a fateful struggle in Washington (and Moscow) between policy-makers who wanted to seize the historic opportunity and those who did not. President Ronald Reagan decided to meet Gorbachev at least part of the way, as did his successor, the first President George Bush. As a result, in December 1989, at a historic summit meeting at Malta, Gorbachev and Bush declared the cold war over. (That extraordinary agreement evidently has been forgotten; thus we have the New York Times recently asserting that the US-Russian relationship today "is far better than it was 15 years ago.")

Declarations alone, however, could not terminate decades of warfare attitudes. Even when Bush was agreeing to end the cold war in 1989-91, many of his top advisers, like many members of the US political elite and media, strongly resisted. (I witnessed that rift on the eve of Malta, when I was asked to debate the issue in front of Bush and his divided foreign policy team.) Proof came with the Soviet breakup in December 1991: US officials and the media immediately presented the purported "end of the cold war" not as a mutual Soviet-American decision, which it certainly was, but as a great American victory and Russian defeat.

That (now standard) triumphalist narrative is the primary reason the cold war was quickly revived--not in Moscow a decade later by Putin but in Washington in the early 1990s, when the Clinton Administration made two epically unwise decisions. One was to treat post-Communist Russia as a defeated nation that was expected to replicate America's domestic practices and bow to its foreign policies. It required, behind the facade of the Clinton-Yeltsin "partnership and friendship" (as Clinton's top "Russia hand," Strobe Talbott, later confirmed), telling Yeltsin "here's some more shit for your face" and Moscow's "submissiveness." From that triumphalism grew the still-ongoing interventions in Moscow's internal affairs and the abiding notion that Russia has no autonomous rights at home or abroad.

Clinton's other unwise decision was to break the Bush Administration's promise to Soviet Russia in 1990-91 not to expand NATO "one inch to the east" and instead begin its expansion to Russia's borders. From that profound act of bad faith, followed by others, came the dangerously provocative military encirclement of Russia and growing Russian suspicions of US intentions. Thus, while American journalists and even scholars insist that "the cold war has indeed vanished" and that concerns about a new one are "silly," Russians across the political spectrum now believe that in Washington "the cold war did not end" and, still more, that "the US is imposing a new cold war on Russia."

That ominous view is being greatly exacerbated by Washington's ever-growing "anti-Russian fatwa," as a former Reagan appointee terms it. This year it includes a torrent of official and media statements denouncing Russia's domestic and foreign policies, vowing to bring more of its neighbors into NATO and urging Bush to boycott the G-8 summit to be chaired by Putin in St. Petersburg in July; a call by would-be Republican presidential nominee Senator John McCain for "very harsh" measures against Moscow; Congress's pointed refusal to repeal a Soviet-era restriction on trade with Russia; the Pentagon's revival of old rumors that Russian intelligence gave Saddam Hussein information endangering US troops; and comments by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, echoing the regime-changers, urging Russians, "if necessary, to change their government."

For its part, the White House deleted from its 2006 National Security Strategy the long-professed US-Russian partnership, backtracked on agreements to help Moscow join the World Trade Organization and adopted sanctions against Belarus, the Slav former republic most culturally akin to Russia and with whom the Kremlin is negotiating a new union state. Most significant, in May it dispatched Vice President Cheney to an anti-Russian conference in former Soviet Lithuania, now a NATO member, to denounce the Kremlin and make clear it is not "a strategic partner and a trusted friend," thereby ending fifteen years of official pretense.

More astonishing is a Council on Foreign Relations "task force report" on Russia, co-chaired by Democratic presidential aspirant John Edwards, issued in March. The "nonpartisan" council's reputed moderation and balance are nowhere in evidence. An unrelenting exercise in double standards, the report blames all the "disappointments" in US-Russian relations solely on "Russia's wrong direction" under Putin--from meddling in the former Soviet republics and backing Iran to conflicts over NATO, energy politics and the "rollback of Russian democracy."

Strongly implying that Bush has been too soft on Putin, the council report flatly rejects partnership with Moscow as "not a realistic prospect." It calls instead for "selective cooperation" and "selective opposition," depending on which suits US interests, and, in effect, Soviet-era containment. Urging more Western intervention in Moscow's political affairs, the report even reserves for Washington the right to reject Russia's future elections and leaders as "illegitimate." An article in the council's influential journal Foreign Affairs menacingly adds that the United States is quickly "attaining nuclear primacy" and the ability "to destroy the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a first strike."

Every consequence of this bipartisan American cold war against post-Communist Russia has exacerbated the dangers inherent in the Soviet breakup mentioned above. The crusade to transform Russia during the 1990s, with its disastrous "shock therapy" economic measures and resulting antidemocratic acts, further destabilized the country, fostering an oligarchical system that plundered the state's wealth, deprived essential infrastructures of investment, impoverished the people and nurtured dangerous corruption. In the process, it discredited Western-style reform, generated mass anti-Americanism where there had been almost none--only 5 percent of Russians surveyed in May thought the United States was a "friend"--and eviscerated the once-influential pro-American faction in Kremlin and electoral politics.

Military encirclement, the Bush Administration's striving for nuclear supremacy and today's renewed US intrusions into Russian politics are having even worse consequences. They have provoked the Kremlin into undertaking its own conventional and nuclear buildup, relying more rather than less on compromised mechanisms of control and maintenance, while continuing to invest miserly sums in the country's decaying economic base and human resources. The same American policies have also caused Moscow to cooperate less rather than more in existing US-funded programs to reduce the multiple risks represented by Russia's materials of mass destruction and to prevent accidental nuclear war. More generally, they have inspired a new Kremlin ideology of "emphasizing our sovereignty" that is increasingly nationalistic, intolerant of foreign-funded NGOs as "fifth columns" and reliant on anti-Western views of the "patriotic" Russian intelligentsia and the Orthodox Church.

Moscow's responses abroad have also been the opposite of what Washington policy-makers should want. Interpreting US-backed "color revolutions" as a quest for military outposts on Russia's borders, the Kremlin now opposes pro-democracy movements in former Soviet republics more than ever, while supporting the most authoritarian regimes in the region, from Belarus to Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Moscow is forming a political, economic and military "strategic partnership" with China, lending support to Iran and other anti-American governments in the Middle East and already putting surface-to-air missiles back in Belarus, in effect Russia's western border with NATO.

If American policy and Russia's predictable countermeasures continue to develop into a full-scale cold war, several new factors could make it even more dangerous than was its predecessor. Above all, the growing presence of Western bases and US-backed governments in the former Soviet republics has moved the "front lines" of the conflict, in the alarmed words of a Moscow newspaper, from Germany to Russia's "near abroad." As a "hostile ring tightens around the Motherland," in the view of former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, many different Russians see a mortal threat. Putin's chief political deputy, Vladislav Surkov, for example, sees the "enemy...at the gates," and the novelist and Soviet-era dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn sees the "complete encirclement of Russia and then the loss of its sovereignty." The risks of direct military conflict could therefore be greater than ever. Protesting overflights by NATO aircraft, a Russian general has already warned, "If they violate our borders, they should be shot down."

Worsening the geopolitical factor are radically different American and Russian self-perceptions. By the mid-1960s the US-Soviet cold war relationship had acquired a significant degree of stability because the two superpowers, perceiving a stalemate, began to settle for political and military "parity." Today, however, the United States, the self-proclaimed "only superpower," has a far more expansive view of its international entitlements and possibilities. Moscow, on the other hand, feels weaker and more vulnerable than it did before 1991. And in that asymmetry lies the potential for a less predictable cold war relationship between the two still fully armed nuclear states.

There is also a new psychological factor. Because the unfolding cold war is undeclared, it is already laden with feelings of betrayal and mistrust on both sides. Having welcomed Putin as Yeltsin's chosen successor and offered him its conception of "partnership and friendship," Washington now feels deceived by Putin's policies. According to two characteristic commentaries in the Washington Post, Bush had a "well-intentioned Russian policy," but "a Russian autocrat...betrayed the American's faith." Putin's Kremlin, however, has been reacting largely to a decade of broken US promises and Yeltsin's boozy compliance. Thus Putin's declaration four years ago, paraphrased on Russian radio: "The era of Russian geopolitical concessions [is] coming to an end." (Looking back, he remarked bitterly that Russia has been "constantly deceived.")

Still worse, the emerging cold war lacks the substantive negotiations and cooperation, known as détente, that constrained the previous one. Behind the lingering facade, a well-informed Russian tells us, "dialogue is almost nonexistent." It is especially true in regard to nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration's abandonment of the ABM treaty and real reductions, its decision to build an antimissile shield, and talk of pre-emptive war and nuclear strikes have all but abolished long-established US-Soviet agreements that have kept the nuclear peace for nearly fifty years. Indeed, according to a report, Bush's National Security Council is contemptuous of arms control as "baggage from the cold war." In short, as dangers posed by nuclear weapons have grown and a new arms race unfolds, efforts to curtail or even discuss them have ended.

Finally, anti-cold war forces that once played an important role in the United States no longer exist. Cold war lobbies, old and new ones, therefore operate virtually unopposed, some of them funded by anti-Kremlin Russian oligarchs in exile. At high political levels, the new American cold war has been, and remains, fully bipartisan, from Clinton to Bush, Madeleine Albright to Rice, Edwards to McCain. At lower levels, once robust pro-détente public groups, particularly anti-arms-race movements, have been largely demobilized by official, media and academic myths that "the cold war is over" and we have been "liberated" from nuclear and other dangers in Russia.

Also absent (or silent) are the kinds of American scholars who protested cold war excesses in the past. Meanwhile, a legion of new intellectual cold warriors has emerged, particularly in Washington, media favorites whose crusading anti-Putin zeal goes largely unchallenged. (Typically, one inveterate missionary constantly charges Moscow with "not delivering" on US interests, while another now calls for a surreal crusade, "backed by international donors," to correct young Russians' thinking about Stalin.) There are a few notable exceptions--also bipartisan, from former Reaganites to Nation contributors--but "anathematizing Russia," as Gorbachev recently put it, is so consensual that even an outspoken critic of US policy inexplicably ends an article, "Of course, Russia has been largely to blame."

Making these political factors worse has been the "pluralist" US mainstream media. In the past, opinion page editors and television producers regularly solicited voices to challenge cold war zealots, but today such dissenters, and thus the vigorous public debate of the past, are almost entirely missing. Instead, influential editorial pages are dominated by resurgent cold war orthodoxies, led by the Post, whose incessant demonization of Putin's "autocracy" and "crude neoimperialism" reads like a bygone Pravda on the Potomac. On the conservative New York Sun's front page, US-Russian relations today are presented as "a duel to the death--perhaps literally."

The Kremlin's strong preference "not to return to the cold war era," as Putin stated May 13 in response to Cheney's inflammatory charges, has been mainly responsible for preventing such fantasies from becoming reality. "Someone is still fighting the cold war," a British academic recently wrote, "but it isn't Russia." A fateful struggle over this issue, however, is now under way in Moscow, with the "pro-Western" Putin resisting demands for a "more hard line" course and, closely related, favoring larger FDR-style investments in the people (and the country's stability). Unless US policy, which is abetting the hard-liners in that struggle, changes fundamentally, the symbiotic axis between American and Russian cold warriors that drove the last conflict will re-emerge. If so, the Kremlin, whether under Putin or a successor, will fight the new one--with all the unprecedented dangers that would entail.

Given different principles and determined leadership, it is still not too late for a new US policy toward post-Soviet Russia. Its components would include full cooperation in securing Moscow's materials of mass destruction; radically reducing nuclear weapons on both sides while banning the development of new ones and taking all warheads off hair-trigger alert; dissuading other states from acquiring those weapons; countering terrorist activities and drug-trafficking near Russia; and augmenting energy supplies to the West.

None of those programs are possible without abandoning the warped priorities and fallacies that have shaped US policy since 1991. National security requires identifying and pursuing essential priorities, but US policy-makers have done neither consistently. The only truly vital American interest in Russia today is preventing its stockpiles of mass destruction from endangering the world, whether through Russia's destabilization or hostility to the West.

All of the dangerous fallacies underlying US policy are expressions of unbridled triumphalism. The decision to treat post-Soviet Russia as a vanquished nation, analogous to postwar Germany and Japan (but without the funding), squandered a historic opportunity for a real partnership and established the bipartisan premise that Moscow's "direction" at home and abroad should be determined by the United States. Applied to a country with Russia's size and long history as a world power, and that had not been militarily defeated, the premise was inherently self-defeating and certain to provoke a resentful backlash.

That folly produced two others. One was the assumption that the United States had the right, wisdom and power to remake post-Communist Russia into a political and economic replica of America. A conceit as vast as its ignorance of Russia's historical traditions and contemporary realities, it led to the counterproductive crusade of the 1990s, which continues in various ways today. The other was the presumption that Russia should be America's junior partner in foreign policy with no interests except those of the United States. By disregarding Russia's history, different geopolitical realities and vital interests, this presumption has also been senseless.

As a Eurasian state with 20-25 million Muslim citizens of its own and with Iran one of its few neighbors not being recruited by NATO, for example, Russia can ill afford to be drawn into Washington's expanding conflict with the Islamic world, whether in Iran or Iraq. Similarly, by demanding that Moscow vacate its traditional political and military positions in former Soviet republics so the United States and NATO can occupy them--and even subsidize Ukraine's defection with cheap gas--Washington is saying that Russia not only has no Monroe Doctrine-like rights in its own neighborhood but no legitimate security rights at all. Not surprisingly, such flagrant double standards have convinced the Kremlin that Washington has become more belligerent since Yeltsin's departure simply "because Russian policy has become more pro-Russian."

Nor was American triumphalism a fleeting reaction to 1991. A decade later, the tragedy of September 11 gave Washington a second chance for a real partnership with Russia. At a meeting on June 16, 2001, President Bush sensed in Putin's "soul" a partner for America. And so it seemed after September 11, when Putin's Kremlin did more than any NATO government to assist the US war effort in Afghanistan, giving it valuable intelligence, a Moscow-trained Afghan combat force and easy access to crucial air bases in former Soviet Central Asia.

The Kremlin understandably believed that in return Washington would give it an equitable relationship. Instead, it got US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, Washington's claim to permanent bases in Central Asia (as well as Georgia) and independent access to Caspian oil and gas, a second round of NATO expansion taking in several former Soviet republics and bloc members, and a still-growing indictment of its domestic and foreign conduct. Astonishingly, not even September 11 was enough to end Washington's winner-take-all principles.

Why have Democratic and Republican administrations believed they could act in such relentlessly anti-Russian ways without endangering US national security? The answer is another fallacy--the belief that Russia, diminished and weakened by its loss of the Soviet Union, had no choice but to bend to America's will. Even apart from the continued presence of Soviet-era weapons in Russia, it was a grave misconception. Because of its extraordinary material and human attributes, Russia, as its intellectuals say, has always been "destined to be a great power." This was still true after 1991.

Even before world energy prices refilled its coffers, the Kremlin had ready alternatives to the humiliating role scripted by Washington. Above all, Russia could forge strategic alliances with eager anti-US and non-NATO governments in the East and elsewhere, becoming an arsenal of conventional weapons and nuclear knowledge for states from China and India to Iran and Venezuela. Moscow has already begun that turning away from the West, and it could move much further in that direction.

Still more, even today's diminished Russia can fight, perhaps win, a cold war on its new front lines across the vast former Soviet territories. It has the advantages of geographic proximity, essential markets, energy pipelines and corporate ownership, along with kinship and language and common experiences. They give Moscow an array of soft and hard power to use, if it chooses, against neighboring governments considering a new patron in faraway Washington.

Economically, the Kremlin could cripple nearly destitute Georgia and Moldova by banning their products and otherwise unemployed migrant workers from Russia and by charging Georgia and Ukraine full "free-market" prices for essential energy. Politically, Moscow could truncate tiny Georgia and Moldova, and big Ukraine, by welcoming their large, pro-Russian territories into the Russian Federation or supporting their demands for independent statehood (as the West has been doing for Kosovo and Montenegro in Serbia). Militarily, Moscow could take further steps toward turning the Shanghai Cooperation Organization--now composed of Russia, China and four Central Asian states, with Iran and India possible members--into an anti-NATO defensive alliance, an "OPEC with nuclear weapons," a Western analyst warned.

That is not all. In the US-Russian struggle in Central Asia over Caspian oil and gas, Washington, as even the triumphalist Thomas Friedman admits, "is at a severe disadvantage." The United States has already lost its military base in Uzbekistan and may soon lose the only remaining one in the region, in Kyrgyzstan; the new pipeline it backed to bypass Russia runs through Georgia, whose stability depends considerably on Moscow; Washington's new friend in oil-rich Azerbaijan is an anachronistic dynastic ruler; and Kazakhstan, whose enormous energy reserves make it a particular US target, has its own large Russian population and is moving back toward Moscow.

Nor is the Kremlin powerless in direct dealings with the West. It can mount more than enough warheads to defeat any missile shield and illusion of "nuclear primacy." It can shut US businesses out of multibillion-dollar deals in Russia and, as it recently reminded the European Union, which gets 25 percent of its gas from Russia, "redirect supplies" to hungry markets in the East. And Moscow could deploy its resources, connections and UN Security Council veto against US interests involving, for instance, nuclear proliferation, Iran, Afghanistan and possibly even Iraq.

Contrary to exaggerated US accusations, the Kremlin has not yet resorted to such retaliatory measures in any significant way. But unless Washington stops abasing and encroaching on Russia, there is no "sovereign" reason why it should not do so. Certainly, nothing Moscow has gotten from Washington since 1992, a Western security specialist emphasizes, "compensates for the geopolitical harm the United States is doing to Russia."

American crusaders insist it is worth the risk in order to democratize Russia and other former Soviet republics. In reality, their campaigns since 1992 have only discredited that cause in Russia. Praising the despised Yeltsin and endorsing other unpopular figures as Russia's "democrats," while denouncing the popular Putin, has associated democracy with the social pain, chaos and humiliation of the 1990s. Ostracizing Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko while embracing tyrants in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan has related it to the thirst for oil. Linking "democratic revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia to NATO membership has equated them with US expansionism. Focusing on the victimization of billionaire Mikhail Khodorkhovsky and not on Russian poverty or ongoing mass protests against social injustices has suggested democracy is only for oligarchs. And by insisting on their indispensable role, US crusaders have all but said (wrongly) that Russians are incapable of democracy or resisting abuses of power on their own.

The result is dark Russian suspicions of American intentions ignored by US policy-makers and media alike. They include the belief that Washington's real purpose is to take control of the country's energy resources and nuclear weapons and use encircling NATO satellite states to "de-sovereignize" Russia, turning it into a "vassal of the West." More generally, US policy has fostered the belief that the American cold war was never really aimed at Soviet Communism but always at Russia, a suspicion given credence by Post and Times columnists who characterize Russia even after Communism as an inherently "autocratic state" with "brutish instincts."

To overcome those towering obstacles to a new relationship, Washington has to abandon the triumphalist conceits primarily responsible for the revived cold war and its growing dangers. It means respecting Russia's sovereign right to determine its course at home (including disposal of its energy resources). As the record plainly shows, interfering in Moscow's internal affairs, whether on-site or from afar, only harms the chances for political liberties and economic prosperity that still exist in that tormented nation.

It also means acknowledging Russia's legitimate security interests, especially in its own "near abroad." In particular, the planned third expansion of NATO, intended to include Ukraine, must not take place. Extending NATO to Russia's doorsteps has already brought relations near the breaking point (without actually benefiting any nation's security); absorbing Ukraine, which Moscow regards as essential to its Slavic identity and its military defense, may be the point of no return, as even pro-US Russians anxiously warn. Nor would it be democratic, since nearly two-thirds of Ukrainians are opposed. The explosive possibilities were adumbrated in late May and early June when local citizens in ethnic Russian Crimea blockaded a port and roads where a US naval ship and contingent of Marines suddenly appeared, provoking resolutions declaring the region "anti-NATO territory" and threats of "a new Vietnam."

Time for a new US policy is running out, but there is no hint of one in official or unofficial circles. Denouncing the Kremlin in May, Cheney spoke "like a triumphant cold warrior," a Times correspondent reported. A top State Department official has already announced the "next great mission" in and around Russia. In the same unreconstructed spirit, Rice has demanded Russians "recognize that we have legitimate interests...in their neighborhood," without a word about Moscow's interests; and a former Clinton official has held the Kremlin "accountable for the ominous security threats...developing between NATO's eastern border and Russia." Meanwhile, the Bush Administration is playing Russian roulette with Moscow's control of its nuclear weapons. Its missile shield project having already provoked a destabilizing Russian buildup, the Administration now proposes to further confuse Moscow's early-warning system, risking an accidental launch, by putting conventional warheads on long-range missiles for the first time.

In a democracy we might expect alternative policy proposals from would-be leaders. But there are none in either party, only demands for a more anti-Russian course, or silence. We should not be surprised. Acquiescence in Bush's monstrous war in Iraq has amply demonstrated the political elite's limited capacity for introspection, independent thought and civic courage. (It prefers to falsely blame the American people, as the managing editor of Foreign Affairs recently did, for craving "ideological red meat.") It may also be intimidated by another revived cold war practice--personal defamation. The Post and The New Yorker have already labeled critics of their Russia policy "Putin apologists" and charged them with "appeasement" and "again taking the Russian side of the Cold War."

The vision and courage of heresy will therefore be needed to escape today's new cold war orthodoxies and dangers, but it is hard to imagine a US politician answering the call. There is, however, a not-too-distant precedent. Twenty years ago, when the world faced exceedingly grave cold war perils, Gorbachev unexpectedly emerged from the orthodox and repressive Soviet political class to offer a heretical way out. Is there an American leader today ready to retrieve that missed opportunity?
tazvil04
The issue is not as some have suggested the fact that the US too is still aggressive at getting info on the Russians -- the issue is why after all these years is Russia heightening its spy efforts which are detectable by the US --- after all ---

The answer is that Russia feels bolder with the Bush Administration in power --- and with the US bogged down in Iraq -- further supporting my suggestion that Bush has made us more vulnerable with the Iraqi daliance and strengthened Russia...

May 20, 2007

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/worl...icle1813562.ece

Putin spy war on the WestMark Franchetti, Moscow, and Sarah Baxter, Washington
IT IS time to send for George Smiley. Russia’s covert foreign intelligence operations against America have reached cold war levels under President Vladimir Putin, according to Washington officials.

White House intelligence advisers believe no other country is as aggressive as Russia in trying to obtain US secrets, with the possible exception of China.

In particular the SVR, as the former KGB’s foreign intelligence arm is now known, is using a network of undercover agents in America to gather classified information about sensitive technologies, including military projects under development and high-tech research.

Yuri Shvets, a former KGB agent, said: “In the days of the Soviet Union, the number of spies was limited because they had to be based at the foreign ministry, the trade mission or the news agencies like Tass. Right now, virtually every successful private company in Russia is being used as a cover for Russian intelligence operations.”

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Intelligence experts believe that since Putin became president in 2000, the Russians have rebuilt a network of agents in the United States that had been depleted during the country’s transition from communism.

Putin served 16 years in the KGB, including a spell in foreign intelligence in East Germany. He became head of the FSB, the domestic security service. According to Shvets, the FSB has been operating widely in America because of its favoured status with Putin. Agents, some acting under diplomatic cover, are said to be trying to recruit specialists in American facilities with access to sensitive information.

A rare insight into the SVR’s methods was gained six months ago when the authorities in Canada deported a Russian man who had been masquerading as a Canadian citizen.

The alleged SVR agent had been living under a false identity as Paul William Hampel and was detained carrying a fake birth certificate, £3,000 in five currencies and several encrypted pre-paid mobile phone cards.

He claimed to be a lifeguard and travel consultant but counter-intelligence officers believe he based himself in Montreal because the city is the centre of the Canadian aerospace industry. Carrying a Canadian passport, he would have been able to travel freely to the United States.

In another incident last year, the Americans arrested Ariel Weinmann, a former US navy submariner, on charges of spying for the Russians. Weinmann was accused of making electronic copies of classified information which he sought to pass on to his handlers. He was sentenced to 12 years in jail.

John Pike, a military and security analyst who runs GlobalSecurity.org, said a surge in recruitment of US intelligence operatives since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had presented great opportunities for the Russians to penetrate the CIA and other agencies. Shvets believes Russian agents are also entering America legally as immigrants, a rarity in the strictly controlled Soviet era.

The increase in Russian intelligence activity abroad is in step with Moscow’s more aggressive stance since Putin came to power and turned the country’s lagging economy around on the back of record high oil prices.

Putin’s abrasive style has frustrated Washington. Relations between Russia and the United States are worse than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Comparisons with the tension of the cold war years have become commonplace.

“President Putin thinks the United States has been weakened by Iraq,” said Richard Holbrooke, a former US ambassador to the United Nations. “He thinks he has been strengthened by recent events and high-priced oil and he is trying to put Russia back on the international map.”

Estonia, the Baltic state, appeared last week to have become the target of a cyber attack after a row with Moscow over its decision to relocate a Soviet-era military monument. The Estonians claim professional hackers from Russia targeted the internet sites of ministries, parliament, banks, the media and large companies, causing their systems to crash.

The attack followed Russian calls to impose sanctions on Estonia, cuts in Moscow’s oil and gas deliveries and a campaign of intimidation by a Kremlin-backed youth group against the Estonian ambassador. Nato has sent a cyber-crime expert to help the Estonians, fearing that it could be next.

These concerns were raised last week at a European summit attended by Putin and Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, at Samara in southern Russia. Merkel traded barbs with Putin over Russia’s human rights record and complained that critics of the Kremlin, including Garry Kasparov, the former chess champion, were prevented from attending a protest march.

Moscow and Brussels are due to start talks on an agreement to cover trade, energy and foreign policy but Poland has been blocking the negotiations as a result of a Russian ban on its meat exports. The Kremlin’s relations with Lithuania are also tense following Moscow’s decision to cut oil supplies to the Baltic state.

In February Putin accused America of imposing its will on the rest of the world. He said that Washington’s plans to install 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic — part of an anti-missile shield bitterly opposed by the Russians — “could provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era”.
tazvil04
Playing Russian Roulette

By Anne Applebaum
Wednesday, April 9, 2003; Page A21

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...0-2003Apr8.html

A few days before the United States invaded Iraq, two retired Russian generals received medals from Saddam Hussein's defense minister. Both men had worked, in the past, at the highest levels of the Soviet military establishment. Both were involved in the 1991 coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev and the 1993 revolt against Boris Yeltsin. One of them, Igor Maltsev, was a specialist in air defense. The other, Vladislav Achalov, was a specialist in the use of special forces. When asked by a Russian reporter what he had been doing in Baghdad -- photographs of the ceremony appeared on a Russian Web site -- Achalov refused to say. Instead, he replied cryptically that "if they're awarding you a decoration, it must be for something."

And what was that something? According to the most straightforward account, they were helping to plan the defense of Iraq. According to the conspiratorial version, their appearance in Baghdad signifies the revival of the ancient rivalry between the KGB, Putin's old stomping ground, and the GRU, Russian military intelligence. Never mind: What matters is that the incident fits a pattern. For the past year, rumors of Russian military sales to the Iraqis have swirled around Washington. More recently, the Pentagon has confirmed them, angrily accusing Russian companies of supplying the Iraqis with everything from night-vision goggles to missiles to jamming devices. An apparent American attack on a convoy of Russian diplomats looks, according to the Moscow media, like an act of revenge. Condi Rice flew to Moscow on Monday to make up -- but on Tuesday, the Russians invited the French president, Jacques Chirac, and the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, to St. Petersburg for a meeting of the axis of obstruction.

We have, in other words, moved into a new phase of an old cycle. Since that moment in the summer of 2001 when George W. Bush looked into the eyes of Vladimir Putin and got a "sense of his soul," the Russian-American relationship has already come full circle. Once, we all loved Gorbachev. Then, after his troops fired on Lithuanian protesters, we all hated Gorbachev. Later, we all loved Yeltsin. Then, when he unleashed a tidal wave of economic corruption, we all hated Yeltsin. I had thought, after the manic-depressive Yeltsin years, that the American hate-love-hate relationship with Russian leaders would end, but I was wrong: President Bush fell in love with President Putin and is now falling out of love with him with stunning predictability.

It would be funny, in fact, if it weren't so serious. American leaders in general, and this administration in particular, talk a great deal about "American values," yet they persist in believing that it is possible to develop deep, meaningful, strategic partnerships with countries that do not share them. Russia does, it is true, share some of our interests. Putin took a bold and unexpected decision after Sept. 11, 2001, to ally himself with the United States in the war on terrorism. He does seem genuinely interested in injecting more entrepreneurial capitalism into Russia's oligarchic economy. But he still rules over a country whose rogue retired generals sell military advice to Saddam Hussein, whose scientists sell nuclear technology to Iran, and whose army is running one of the world's dirtiest wars in Chechnya. He hasn't shown much interest in free media or open debate, either. Both are slowly vanishing as a result.

None of which is to say that we shouldn't cooperate with Russia, or that we shouldn't talk and trade and even fight al Qaeda with Russia. But (although bombing their diplomats would seem a touch extreme) it is to say that we need to maintain some distance from Russia. Just a few months ago, there was talk, around Washington, of replacing our traditional European NATO alliances with a new, Eurasian, anti-terrorist alliance featuring Turkey, Russia and India. Then Turkey dropped out of the war with Iraq, India turned skeptical and Russia -- or some Russians, at least -- appear to have actually backed the other side.

Although it is unfashionable to say so at the moment, our relationships with Russia and Turkey are clearly not going to replace our relationships with Europe anytime soon. The web of relationships America maintains with Britain -- and ultimately even with Germany and France -- is far more complex, and runs far deeper into our societies, than does Bush's personal relationship with Putin. At the end of the day, Washington has more in common with London, Paris, Rome and Warsaw than it does with Moscow, and sooner or later that commonality will always be reflected in foreign policy.

I hope it won't be that way forever. I hope the changes in Russia continue to pull the Russians closer to the West and continue to open up Russian society, for the sake of the Russians more than anything else. But we aren't there yet, and until we are it's better not to drop allies who share our values and swear eternal friendship with Russian leaders who don't, and won't, really see the world the way we do.
tazvil04
THere is no doubt Putin is in a much stronger position domestically and internationally --- since Bush entered the White House.

This is principally because of Bush foreign policy foul ups with North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq - and our ties to the Chinese economy...

Putin is asserting himself more and there is little we can do to counter it if we want Putin's support in the UN...

Meanwhile -- Putin is openly dealing with our enemies like Iran...

May 11, 2007
Get Out of Europe; Avoid a New Cold War

http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=10950

Doug Bandow
The year 1989 showcased one of history's great moments of human liberation. The Soviet Union loosed its grip on its European satellites. Communist dominoes toppled. The Berlin Wall fell.

So ended some of the most odious regimes in human history. A variety of barbarous, collectivist regimes were swept away, and with surprisingly little violence. Hundreds of millions of people were freed.

Americans and Western Europeans also benefited from the end of the Cold War. The threats, however unlikely, of a cataclysmic nuclear exchange or a Red Army sweep across the European continent, disappeared. It was a moment to be celebrated, even cherished. But it had dramatic implications for the continent's security architecture.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization had existed for three decades, dedicated, in the words of the alliance’s first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, to keeping the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out. Despite some disquiet about German reunification after communism's collapse, Germany had ceased to threaten Europe's peace years before. The revival of Prussian militarism is about as likely as the reincarnation of Napoleonic aggression.

With the collapse of communism, military force was no longer needed to keep the Russians out. The Warsaw Pact dissolved, its members shifting westward to NATO. The Soviet Union collapsed, with a third of its population fleeing the Russian imperial embrace. The Red Army declined, becoming a pale imitation of the behemoth which defeated Nazi Germany.

As a result, there was no reason to keep America in Europe. That continent's prosperous and populous states faced no threat of outside aggression and are able to meet any remaining security needs. The only enemy they found in the last two decades was Serbia, a pitiful replacement for the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the European Union, not NATO, has proved to be the best means of spurring continental integration.

All this was in America's interest. But it was not in the interest of NATO apparatchiks.

Whereas alliances once were a means to an end – in this case, to neutralize Germany while protecting Western Europe from Soviet aggression – they now became the end. Desperate policymakers, committed to retaining NATO without a Warsaw Pact, began proposing new tasks for the Western alliance, such as fighting the illicit drug trade, promoting environmental protection, and encouraging student exchanges. In the same spirit I suggested turning tanks into bookmobiles and sending them rolling across Europe.

NATO soon turned to "out-of-area" operations, such as in the Balkans. Yet the conflicts spawned by Yugoslavia's dissolution were of only marginal security interest to Europe and of none to America. Washington's attack on Serbia grew out of a foreign policy which Michael Mandelbaum of Johns Hopkins University famously likened to social work. So long as no American interest was at stake, the Clinton administration wanted to get involved. In doing so, it relieved pressure on Europe to take responsibility for its own security.

Nevertheless, many Europeans were embarrassed by their dependence on America. During the Kosovo war analysts estimated that Europe had but 10 to 15 percent of America's combat capability. The continent's large conscript militaries had limited combat value and were particularly ill-suited for more sophisticated, high-tech operations expected to dominate future conflicts.

Thus, over the last decade Europeans have talked about taking on a greater international role. The European Union established an "European Security and Defense Policy" and hired Javier Solana, formally known as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. But European governments prefer to spout abstract rhetoric than to spend real resources.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, last year the combined defense expenditures of Europe's 24 members ran about $212 billion; the U.S. spent two and a half times as much. Yet the Europeans had a collective GDP of $14.2 trillion, about a trillion dollars more than America's economic output; their aggregate population was 535 million, almost 80 percent more than that of the U.S.

But the Europeans really can't be blamed for free-riding on America. European voters understandably prefer more munificent welfare programs to more armored divisions.

After all, they have little reason to fear Moscow. Russia's GDP last year was $1.67 trillion, less than one-eighth that of NATO's European NATO members. Russia's population was 142.1 million, little more than one-fourth that of the European states. Moscow's armed forces ran about one million, while the Europeans had 2.2 million men and women under arms. And while Europe faces its own birth dearth, Russia's population is imploding, dropping about 700,000 annually. Nile Gardiner of the Heritage Foundation reports that by mid-century Russia could have fewer than 100 million people.

Europeans see no other threats worth defending against. The continent's greatest security problem undoubtedly is terrorism, but it is aggravated rather than ameliorated by "out of area" military activities in the Middle East.

Thus, it is time for the U.S. to go home. Peace and stability in Europe are obviously of more interest to Europe than to America. Yet Europeans see no need for expansive and expensive modern military forces. Without a hegemonic, anti-American power threatening the continent, Washington also has no cause to worry, let alone to keep some 100,000 troops on the continent.

Bringing these forces home would not end military cooperation where Washington's and Europe's interests coincided. But today NATO delivers little of value to the U.S. The Europeans did not hesitate to disagree with America on side issues even during the Cold War, when they rebuffed Washington by supporting the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and building a natural gas pipeline to the Soviet Union. More recent disagreements over U.S. policies towards terrorism and Iraq have been equally sharp. In the future the Europeans are ever less likely to allow themselves to be treated like "America's vassal states," as former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski put it.

Today the Europeans are helpful in Afghanistan, though the value of their aid – currently about 20,000 soldiers – is limited by small national deployments, home opposition, and varying rules of engagement. But the most valuable European support has come outside of NATO. The United Kingdom has provided serious manpower and firepower in Iraq, a conflict in which NATO could not act because of internal opposition. Moreover, if the U.S. stopped wasting bountiful resources on Europe, it would be better able to handle contingencies elsewhere in the world.

Even after disengaging, Washington should maintain friendly relations with Europe – which will pose no difficulty, given the extensive historical, cultural, commercial, and political ties across the Atlantic. The U.S. should replace permanent bases with agreements for base access; joint operations, intelligence sharing, and regular consultation should continue. But Europe's defense should be left to Europe.

The importance of doing so has become more evident with tensions between Estonia and Russia rising to a fever pitch. As critics of NATO expansion pointed out, bringing the former Soviet satellites into NATO did nothing for allied security: if the U.S. and its traditional NATO partners could live with Estonia as part of the Soviet Union, they certainly could live with an independent Estonia living in Russia's at times dark shadow. The latter might not be a good thing, but then, neither had been the USSR's forcible incorporation of the Baltic states decades before. The question for NATO is what interests warrant going to war, and guaranteeing Estonia's independence was never one of them.

Russia's relations with newly independent Estonia and Lithuania, in particular, were never going to be easy (there were fewer disputes with Latvia). Moscow's brutal reign left little love for things Russian, yet many ethnic Russians remained after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In Estonia 28 percent of the population is Russian; by and large, Russian "immigrants" during the Soviet era were not granted citizenship, and two-thirds remain largely disenfranchised, denied full employment and voting rights. Moreover, Russian politicians have found Estonia a good cause for periodically flaunting their nationalist credentials. In fact, many analysts long expected some sort of bilateral explosion focused on the second class treatment of the ethnic Russian minorities.

That isn't the current issue between Russia and Estonia, at least directly. Rather, it is the decision of the Estonian government to remove a bronze statue of a soldier symbolizing the Soviet "liberation" of Estonia from the Nazis.

While the resistance of average Soviet citizens to the Nazi invasion was truly heroic, many subject peoples, from the Baltic states to Ukraine, originally viewed the German invaders as liberators. After Stalin's repression, terror, purges, impoverishment, and mass starvation, who could blame them? The Estonians had particular cause for complaint – the Red Army moved in uninvited in June 1940, after which hundreds of thousands of Estonian citizens disappeared into the Gulag, similar numbers of Russians were imported as replacements, and Moscow waged a systematic campaign to eliminate every last vestige of Estonian culture, language, and life.

Hitler's preference for racial subjugation and extermination eventually caused even his erstwhile allies to fight to expel his forces, but they did not welcome the Soviets back. Indeed, sporadic armed resistance to renewed Soviet rule persisted for years, especially in Ukraine. Thus, the Soviet-imposed statue in the central square of Tallinn, Estonia's capital, was aptly seen by Estonians more as a symbol of tyranny than of liberation. The only surprise is that the Estonians waited 16 years after the USSR's breakup to relocate the monument (along with the bodies of 13 Soviet soldiers) to a military cemetery on the city outskirts.

But ethnic Russians, who make up about half of Tallinn's population, protested violently, leading to mass arrests and the death of one Russian citizen. The Russian government vehemently objected; thugs surrounded Estonia's embassy in Moscow and threatened Estonian diplomats; Russian firms suspended contracts with Estonian enterprises; and the Russian government launched cyber-attacks on Estonian government websites and interrupted coal, gasoline, and fuel oil supplies to Estonia. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov complained that the Estonian action was an attempt "to rewrite history" and "to make a mockery of history," which "cannot fail to anger us."

Boris Gryzlov, chairman of Russia's lower house, the Duma, called the action "wild vandalism" and said the Estonians were "actually justifying Nazism." Other Russian officials denounced Estonia for being "pro-fascist" and engaging in "discrimination" and "repression" of ethnic Russians.

Estonia's membership in the EU immediately involved the Europeans in the dispute. Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet contended that "The European Union is under attack, because Russia is attacking Estonia." In response, the EU has threatened to block Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization.

In the case of a military assault, however, the Europeans would undoubtedly turn to the U.S. Despite all the fury – so far lots of smoke but not much fire – the U.S. could remain cheerfully aloof if Estonia was not a NATO member. But, unfortunately, the alliance entangles America.

So the U.S., alone and through NATO, has explicitly backed Estonia. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves to express his support. The alliance indicated that it was "deeply concerned by threats" from Russia and indicated that "these actions are unacceptable and must be stopped immediately." Moscow must "cease those unacceptable actions." The bilateral tensions "must be resolved diplomatically."

The Bush administration has invited Ilves to the U.S. as a sign of support. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice denounced the "unacceptable pressures on a sovereign country" and phoned Ilves to voice Washington's backing. State Department deputy spokesman Tom Casey indicated that "We are concerned" by Russia's actions.

Seeking to uphold diplomatic norms in this way usually would be unexceptional, but the Estonians likely expect more than just rhetoric. Journalist Leon Hadar reports on an Estonian diplomat who declared at a Washington conference held before the crisis: "Estonia, as a close U.S. ally, has committed its military forces to fight on the side of the Americans in Iraq," adding that: "We rushed to lend you a hand when you needed it, and we expect you to come to our help when we face a similar threat." This is an amazing bit of effrontery – Estonia intervened with all of 35 soldiers – but through NATO Washington has committed to go to war against Russia to defend Estonia (as the other Baltic states, Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania).

Given the alliance ties, Russia has broadened its complaint to America and the Europeans. For instance, Lavrov charged that "certain organizations such as NATO and the EU connive with these attempts" to rewrite history, which he saw as "an element and an instrument of the foreign policy of certain countries." Alexei Borodavkin,