Is the surge working? Christopher Preble weighs in on MSNBC.

War Psychiatry and Iraq Atrocities: How Killing Becomes a Reflex

Penny Coleman, AlterNet

War on Iraq: Modern American military training methods can turn off the switch that controls a human being's inherent aversion to killing.

CIA IG REPORT ON 9/11 DECLASSIFIED BY LAW

In compliance with a requirement imposed by Congress, the Central
Intelligence Agency declassified and released the executive summary of
a CIA Inspector General report that was generally critical of CIA
performance prior to September 11, 2001.

http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/oig-911.pdf

From a secrecy policy point of view, the most interesting thing about
the disclosure is that it was the result of a congressional initiative
undertaken against the wishes of the executive branch.

"While meeting the dictates of the law," said CIA Director Mike Hayden
in an official statement, "I want to make it clear that this
declassification was neither my choice nor my preference."

http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2007/08/cia082107.html

In theory, the CIA's "choice" or "preference" should be irrelevant to
the declassification process. The President has directed categorically
that "Information shall be declassified as soon as it no longer meets
the standards for classification under this order." (Executive Order
13292, section 3.1). It is clear from the release of the Inspector
General report, which was partially redacted, that it could be
declassified. And therefore it should have been.

But the executive order is not self-enforcing and declassification does
not occur spontaneously. Without some external stimulus it may not
occur at all.

In this case, Congress provided the missing ingredient, thanks to Sen.
Ron Wyden (D-OR), who authored the amendment to the recent legislation
implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

While giving the needed push, Congress did not declassify the document
itself, which is arguably within its power, nor did it define the
precise terms of declassification, stating only that the document
should be "declassified to the maximum extent possible, consistent with
national security" -- as determined by the CIA.

By contrast, a more ambitious and unprecedented declassification action
is the congressional requirement to disclose the amount of the 2007
National Intelligence Program budget, which must be declassified and
released by October 30. No exercise of discretion is permitted.

Warfare State Is Part of Us
by Norman Solomon, TomPaine.com
The warfare state won't disappear when President Bush moves on.

The Real Iraq Progress Report
by Robert Scheer, Truthdig
Reality is obscured as Democrats are dazzled into continuing the war.

Inequality Run Amok
by Dmitri Iglitzin and Steven Hill, The Huffington Post
The nation's stark, and growing, economic inequality has become a third rail of politics.

Withdrawal Follies
by Tom Engelhardt, TomDispatch.com
Be careful: Then they favor "withdrawing" from Iraq, they may not be mean what you think.
--

Voluntary “Carbon Offsetting” As Strategy For Privatizing America’s Public Lands
by Bill Willers / August 22nd, 2007

Concern about catastrophes related to global warming has generated a scheme for “carbon offsetting” in which citizens are encouraged to compensate for personal CO2 (greenhouse gas) production by paying for equivalent reduction elsewhere, such as with wind energy or tree planting. British Petroleum, for example, advertises that by paying about $40 a year drivers can make up for their gasoline consumption by letting global warming become a problem for someone else to solve. Because this tends to neutralize any sense of individual responsibility even as it allows for ongoing high levels of fossil fuel use, critics have denounced the plan as both inadequate and subversive. (Full article …)

The Path Towards War With Iran
Ramifications of the Proposal to Add Iran's Revolutionary Guard to the List of Terrorist Organizations

by Jeremy R. Hammond / August 22nd, 2007

This month saw yet another escalation of the U.S. policy of isolating and pressuring Iran as the White House announced its intention to add Iran’s Revolutionary Guard to the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. There is something to be learned from this about the nature of U.S. foreign policy if we care to examine the implications; and the ramifications of such a decision could be quite serious and potentially deadly, so it warrants a look. (Full article …)

Financial Bankruptcy, the US Dollar, and the Real Economy
by Rodrigue Tremblay / August 22nd, 2007

The U.S. government is on a ‘burning platform’ of unsustainable policies and practices.

– David Walker, U.S. Comptroller General (Full article …)

Credit Derivative Orgy is Behind Liquidity Crisis
by Martha Rosenberg / August 22nd, 2007

Financial Times warned against them. So did Warren Buffet, Alan Greenspan, Jim Sinclair and the chief economist at Morgan Stanley. (Full article …)

Wednesday, August 22, 2007

Jacob Hornberger’s Blog [Blog Archives]


A Sovereign and Independent U.S. Puppet
by Jacob G. Hornberger

President Bush and members of Congress have become frustrated and exasperated with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. They say he’s not meeting their deadlines. Bush even says that if Maliki doesn’t straighten up, the Iraqi people will oust him from office.

But wait a minute! I thought Iraq was now a sovereign and independent country. I thought that that was what the invasion of Iraq four years ago was all about — well, at least after those infamous and scary WMDs failed to materialize.

The fact is that Bush’s and Congress’s attitude reflects what U.S. foreign policy has long been based upon, especially in Iraq — the installation of a puppet regime that will do the bidding of U.S. officials.

In fact, the great offense committed by Saddam Hussein, the offense that cost him his job, was simply that he didn’t kneel and obey the dictates of U.S. officials, especially after U.S. officials had furnished him with those WMDs so that he could kill Iranians with them. (The reason that it was considered okay to kill Iranians was because the Iranian people had ousted their U.S.-installed puppet, the shah of Iran, without U.S. permission).

When President Bush invaded Iraq, the goal was the same as it had been throughout the period of the brutal sanctions, which year after year had contributed to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children. The goal was the ouster of Saddam and the installation of a U.S.-installed puppet, such as CIA or Pentagon favorites Iyad Alawi or Ahmad Chalabi.

Such regime change has long been a core element of U.S. foreign policy. Just ask the people of Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, Chile, Nicaragua, Grenada, Vietnam, Haiti, Afghanistan, and countless others.

What happened in Iraq, however, was something that U.S. officials never expected: The Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Sistani outsmarted and outmaneuvered President Bush by demanding nationwide elections rather than allow Bush to implement some type of electoral caucus plan that was obviously designed to get a U.S. puppet into power.

The result is something that I suspect most Americans still don’t realize, which we have long been pointing out here at FFF. President Bush’s invasion of Iraq brought into existence a radical Islamic regime that early on aligned itself with Iran. Yes, I said Iran — you know, the nation that Bush calls evil and that Bush is still threatening to invade.

For his part, Maliki hasn’t taken kindly to the subtle threats issued by President Bush and the members of Congress. Lashing out against them, he pointed out that no one has the right to impose deadlines on his elected government and that his country “can find friends elsewhere.”

Hey, you can’t really find fault with what the guy is saying, can you? After all, didn’t President Bush and the Pentagon tell the guy that Iraq was now a sovereign and independent country? And isn’t Maliki’s response exactly what President Bush would say if a foreign regime imposed deadlines on the U.S. government?

What undoubtedly set Bush off is that Maliki visited Tehran on August 8-9, after which he invited Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to visit Iraq, an invitation that has now been accepted. Oh, did I mention that Maliki just returned from visiting Syria, which Bush also says is a terrorist nation (even though the CIA uses Syria to torture suspected terrorists on its behalf).

Thus, the Iraq adventure gets crazier and crazier as each day passes. Hopefully, as the craziness continues, along with the continuous stream of dead bodies, the American people will do some deep reflecting on the moral bankruptcy of the U.S. government’s pro-empire, pro-intervention foreign policy and come to the realization that the only genuine solution is a restoration of non-interventionist, pro-republic foreign policy to our land.

Mr. Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation.

Donald Boudreaux's’s Blog [Blog Archives]


Sheldon Richman’s Blog


Jim Bovard’s Blog

VIDEO: Economic Collapse As Precursor To Open Plan For Martial Law?- by Paul Joseph Watson - 2007-08-19

North American Integration and the Militarization of the Arctic
by Michel Chossudovsky
Global Research, August 20, 2007

Email this article to a friend Print this article
The Battle for the Arctic is part of a global military agenda of conquest and territorial control. It has been described as a New Cold War between Russia and America.

Washington's objective is to secure territorial control, on behalf of the Anglo-American oil giants, over extensive Arctic oil and natural gas reserves. The Arctic region could hold up to 25% of the World's oil and gas reserves, according to some estimates. (Moscow Times, 3 August 2007). These estimates are corroborated by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): "he real possibility exists that you could have another world class petroleum province like the North Sea." (quoted by CNNMoney.com, 25 October 2006)

From Washington's perspective, the battle for the Arctic is part of broader global military agenda.

It is intimately related to the process of North American integration under the Security and Prosperity Partnership Agreement (SPP) and the proposed North American Union (NAU). The SPP envisages, under the auspices of a proposed "multiservice [North American] Defense Command", the militarization of a vast territory extending from the Caribbean basin to the Canadian Arctic.

It also bears a relationship to America's hegemonic objectives in different parts of the World including the Middle East. The underlying economic objective of US military operations is the conquest, privatization and appropriation of the World's reserves of fossil fuel. The Arctic is no exception. The Arctic is an integral part of the "Battle for Oil". It is one of the remaining frontiers of untapped energy reserves.

The Arctic nations (with territories North of the Arctic circle) are Russia, Canada, Denmark, the US, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland. The first three countries (Russia, Canada and Denmark) possess significant territories extending northwards of the Arctic circle. (see Map).


Copyright BBC

Directed against Russia, which is in the process of claiming part of the Arctic shelf, Washington's Arctic strategy is tied into a broader process of militarization and territorial integration.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United States has adopted a unilateral approach to Arctic development. It has refused to approve the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was ratified by both Russia and Canada. A United Nations Committee currently administers the Law of the Sea Convention.

The US transpolar territory is much smaller than that of Russia, Canada and Denmark. US territories bordering the Arctic are limited to the North Alaskan coastline, extending from the Bering straits to the Northeastern Alaskan US-Canadian border. The US has a number of US military bases and installations in Alaska. There are several human settlements on the Northern Slope ( Northern Alaska coastline bordering the Arctic Ocean), including Prudhoe Bay, Barrow and Cape Lisborne. This Northern Slope is rich in oil. It was among the first areas of development of Arctic oil. The Alaskan pipeline links Prudoe Bay on the North Slope to the port of Valdez in Prince William Sound on the Gulf of Alaska.

Russia

Russia, in contrast, has by far the largest border with the Arctic, from the Northwestern city of Murmansk on the Russian-Finnish border, extending over the entire Northern Siberian region, to the Bering Straits, which separate Alaska from the Russian Federation. Murmansk is the largest city north of the Arctic Circle, with a population of more than 400,000 inhabitants. In other words, a large part of the Russian continental shelf borders the Arctic.

Russia, going back to the Soviet era, had established scientific-military stations on the island of Northern Zemlya as well as in the Francois Joseph archipelago (Franz Josef Land), which is also under Russian jurisdiction. (See map.) Northern Zemlya was used during the Soviet era for underground nuclear testing.

Russia is now claiming sovereignty (under the International Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS) of a vast 1,191,000 sq km territory which is part of the Arctic shelf.

This territory claimed by Russia submitted to the UN Committee that administers UNCLOS is said to contain substantial hydrocarbon reserves, on the Arctic seabed:

The 1982 International Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes a 12 mile zone for territorial waters and a larger 200 mile economic zone in which a country has exclusive drilling rights for hydrocarbon and other resources.

Russia claims that the entire swath of Arctic seabed in the triangle that ends at the North Pole belongs to Russia, but the United Nations Committee that administers the Law of the Sea Convention has so far refused to recognize Russia’s claim to the entire Arctic seabed.

In order to legally claim that Russia’s economic zone in the Arctic extends far beyond the 200 mile zone, it is necessary to present viable scientific evidence showing that the Arctic Ocean’s sea shelf to the north of Russian shores is a continuation of the Siberian continental platform. In 2001, Russia submitted documents to the UN commission on the limits of the continental shelf seeking to push Russia's maritime borders beyond the 200 mile zone. It was rejected.

Now Russian scientists assert there is new evidence that Russia’s northern Arctic region is directly linked to the North Pole via an underwater shelf. Last week a group of Russian geologists returned from a six-week voyage to the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater shelf in Russia's remote eastern Arctic Ocean. They claimed the ridge was linked to Russian Federation territory, boosting Russia's claim over the oil- and gas-rich triangle.

The latest findings are likely to prompt Russia to lodge another bid at the UN to secure its rights over the Arctic sea shelf. If no other power challenges Russia’s claim, it will likely go through unchallenged. (See Vladimir Frolov, Global Research, July 2007)

Russia is basing its claim on the grounds that this portion of the Arctic sea shelf is connected to Russia's continental shelf, through the 2000 km long underwater Lomonosov ridge. "According to Russian media, the physical connection to the Russian intercontinental shelf means that the ridge is technically a part of Russia, and therefore open to exploitation."

( http://www.oilmarketer.co.uk/2007/07/04/ru...artic-oil-grab/

The Strategic Role of Canada and Denmark's Arctic Territories

After Russia, Canada and Denmark have the largest transpolar territories.

To effectively challenge and encroach upon Russian territorial claims in the Arctic, Washington requires not only the collaboration of Canada and Denmark, but also jurisdiction over their respective Northern territories, which are considered by Washington as strategic from both a military and economic standpoint.

The US has a military presence in both Canada and Denmark (Greenland). Both countries play an important role in Washington's Arctic strategy.

Canada's territory, extends northwards to the Queen Elizabeth archipelago which includes Ellesmere Island bordering onto the Sea of Lincoln, which is part of the Arctic Ocean. Ellesmere Island is part of the Canadian territory of Nunavut.

Alert on Ellesmere Island (located at 82°28'N, 62°30'W) is considered the northernmost human settlement in the world. In practice it operates as a military intelligence station (Canadian Forces Station Alert) is under the jurisdiction of the Canadian military. CFS Alert is 840 km from the North Pole.

The militarization of the Arctic is part of the process of North American integration under the Security and Prosperity Partnership Agreement (SPP). The proposed North American Union (NAU) constitutes a means for the US to extend its sovereignty over Canada's Arctic territories.

When the creation of US Northern Command was announced in April 2002, Canada accepted the right of the US to deploy US troops on Canadian soil, extending into its Arctic territories:

"U.S. troops could be deployed to Canada and Canadian troops could cross the border into the United States if the continent was attacked by terrorists who do not respect borders, according to an agreement announced by U.S. and Canadian officials." (Edmunton Sun, 11 September 2002)

In April 2006, Canada formally ratified a renewed North American Aerospace Defense Agreement (NORAD), ("renewed NORAD"), which allows the US Navy and Coast Guard to deploy American war ships in Canadian territorial waters including its Arctic seabed territories. (For further details, see Michel Chossudovsky, Canada's Sovereignty in Jeopardy: The Militarization of North America, Global Research, August 2007)

Greenland

Greenland, which is under Danish jurisdiction, constitutes a sizeable landmass bordering the Arctic Ocean.

The Thule Air Force base in Northern Greenland is under the jurisdiction of the US Air Force 821st Air Base Group. It constitutes the US's northernmost military facility (76°32′N, 68°50′W). The military base lies approximately 1118 km north of the Arctic Circle and 1524 km south of the Terrestrial North Pole. The Thule base is 885 km east of the North Magnetic Pole.

The Thule US Air Force base also "hosts the 12th Space Warning Squadron, a Ballistic Missile Early Warning Site designed to detect and track Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) launched against North America."

The Thule base links up to NORAD and US Northern Command headquarters at the Peterson Air Force base in Colorado. The Thule base is also "host to Detachment 3 of the 22d Space Operations Squadron, which is part of the 50th Space Wing's global satellite control network."

Denmark is member of NATO, firmly allied with the US. Both Danish and Canadian territory will be used by the US to militarize the Arctic. Denmark has also been a firm supporter of the Bush administration's military agenda in the Middle East.

Canada's Arctic Military Facilities

Ottawa's July 2007 decision to establish a military facility in Resolute Bay in the Northwest Passage was not intended to reassert "Canadian sovereignty. In fact quite the opposite. It was established in consultation with Washington. A deep-water port at Nanisivik, on the northern tip of Baffin Island is also envsaged.

The US administration is firmly behind the Canadian government's decision. The latter does not "reassert Canadian sovereignty". Quite the opposite. It is a means to eventually establish US territorial control over Canada's entire Arctic region including its waterways.

Under the renegotiated North American Aerospace Defense Agreement (NORAD), the US military has access to Canada's domestic territorial waters including Canada's sea shelf with the Arctic, which coincidentally also provides Washington under the guise of "North American sovereignty" with a justification to challenge Russia in the Arctic.





Global Research Articles by Michel Chossudovsky

US Military Calls for Missile Defense as a Tool for Global Deterrence
Newswire Services
August 20, 2007

Riki Ellison, President of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, MDAA, http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/, attended the Space and Missile Defense Conference this week held in Huntsville, Alabama. The conference was hosted by Lieutenant General Kevin T. Campbell, Commander, United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC). Ellison's report on the significant meetings and speeches reflect the latest thinking on missile defense by our nation's warfighters. His comments follow:

"In Huntsville Alabama this week, celebrating the 50th anniversary of the space and missile defense for our country, the 10th Annual Space and Missile Defense Conference took place. The conference brought together those responsible for developing, deploying and using our nation's missile defense systems. Generals in attendance included General Kevin P. Chilton, Commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC); Lieutenant-General C. Robert "Bob" Kehler, acting Commander, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM); and Leiutenant-General William G. Webster, Deputy Commander, United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). All attendees presented their positions and thoughts on the current and future state of missile defense."

"I observed that from the collective Generals' viewpoints presented, our National Security and that of our Allies is dependent on Global Deterrence with Allied participation aimed at threatening nation and non-nation states. Global deterrence, according to Lt. Gen. Kehler, is applying and deploying tools that encourage restraint, deny benefits and impose costs to those nations and non-nation states that threaten the United States and its allies. An integrated missile defense to include cruise missile defense made up of seamless layered missile defense systems in each and every Command Region around the world is a valuable tool for global deterrence." Adding missile defense to our nation's strategic offense enhances greatly our deterrent force and allows many more options than those of eras long ago which depended on Mutual Assured Destruction where the only defense, deterrent and option was a nuclear strike.

"The commanders recognized the value of our current and future evolving missile defense systems especially in their sensor capabilities. For having exact information or 'situational awareness' on your opponents in all mediums -- land, sea, air and space -- allows for strategic opportunity to deter and to dissuade. Assuring space, the most critical medium of communication and awareness, allows sharing of critical information to inform so that better decisions are made. In this manner assuring space is a critical strategic objective of which all are in agreement."

"Amongst the military presenters were two of MDAA's Board of Advisors; Ambassador Robert Joseph and retired Lieutenant-General Ron Kadish. Ambassador Joseph spoke on the current threats as he stated 'that there is no greater threat to the United States then Iran's race to Nuclear Weapons as they are more complex, more dangerous, more regional and more global than any other nation." Ambassador Joseph further remarked that it is in the United States self interest to defend against Iran which includes the deployment of the European Missile Defense Site in Poland and the Czech Republic. Fellow MDAA advisor Ron Kadish's presentation was on missile defense testing and the absolute necessity of having testing as he outlined four fundamental points:

-- Testing schedules cannot be scheduled to a political schedule or that

of outside pressure.

-- Testing is expensive; the alternative to not testing is much worse and

has consequences.

-- Testing cannot be too threat specific, design a system to defend

against all threats.

-- Testing is about predictability and confidence, the more we test the

more confidence we have.

Ellison ended his observations of the conference by concluding "The exchange of ideas, visions and determination of developing and deploying missile defense amongst those that were in attendance in Huntsville helps our nation become safer."

http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/...articleID=35493

Fortress Technologies to Secure National Guard Deployable Communications Solution Company Enables Secure Voice, Video and Data Transmissions During Emergency Response Operations By: Marketwire . Aug. 22, 2007 12:30 PM

CNNMoney.com
Mortgage meltdown: Here come the judgments
Tuesday August 21, 6:11 am ET
By Les Christie, CNNMoney.com staff writer

Earlier this year, a Wisconsin couple won a judgment against Chevy Chase Bank that said the bank deceived them over the terms of their mortgage.

The judge ordered Chevy Chase to rescind the loan and certified the lawsuit as class-action, which could potentially release thousands of other borrowers who felt misled.

According to their attorney, Bryan and Susan Andrews believed they were getting a loan with a fixed 1.95 percent annual interest rate for the first five years. What they got was an option adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM); the 1.95 percent rate only applied for the first month and rose every month afterwards.

"The second month, the interest rate was about 5 percent," said their attorney Kevin Demet. "After a year it was about 7 percent and now it's in the 8s."

The bank said it clearly spelled out the loan terms, but the judge found that Chevy Chase violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), which mandates that mortgage documents must be clear and understandable. Chevy Chase is appealing the judgment, and did not respond for comment for this article.

The Andrews' victory is just an early skirmish in what could be a prolonged battle between borrowers and lenders in the mortgage meltdown mess.

"It's a three-part business cycle now," said Don Lampe, a partner with the law firm Womble Carlyle, whose specialty is mortgage matters. "Boom, bust and recrimination. We're moving into the recrimination phase."

"Most claims will be against mortgage brokers for putting them into loans where they shouldn't have been," said Dan Mulligan, a California-based real estate attorney.

One reason that borrowers often did not understand the terms of their mortgages according to Jo Carillo, a property law professor with the University of California, Hastings College of Law, was the novelty of many of these loans.

"Many originators had no experience explaining them," she said. "It appears to be hard to explain the true costs."

According to Carillo, some bad advice from mortgage originators may have been made in good faith. Caught up in red-hot housing markets, overly exuberant brokers and loan officers told clients not to worry about concerns like their ARMs resetting; they could always refinance and, anyway, interest rates were bound to fall.

Even savvy borrowers, said Lampe, "assumed that rising prices would enable them to refinance."

With credit much tighter today, the refinance option is off the table for many. And, as prices have fallen in many places, it's more difficult to sell a home for the amount owed.

"They can't refinance it, they can't sell it, and they can't afford it," said Paul Hancock, a Florida attorney specializing in mortgage brokering and real estate law.

Aside from bad advice, out-and-out lying also seems to have added to the mess. Borrowers often exaggerated income in order to qualify for larger loans. According to Michael Seng, a professor with the John Marshall School of Law Fair Housing Legal Support Center, mortgage brokers were behind much of this.

"We're running into stated-income loans where brokers got borrowers to sign blank forms that the brokers filled in; they often did not accurately reflect the borrowers' incomes," he said.

Richard Hagar, a veteran real estate appraiser and expert witness, also blames appraisers. According to him, many of them puffed up home values to make deals work. "We saw some really Mickey-Mouse things," he said, "A $200,000 house would come in at $300,000. When appraisers puff up values, they can be sued; I heartily recommend it."

Class action suits are often the only way for borrowers to gain a remedy, according to Seng. "If [individuals] can't make the mortgage payment, they can't pay a lawyer."

But a ruling earlier this year by an appeals court in Boston casts doubt on whether class-action suits will be allowed in mortgage rescission cases, whose remedy is that borrowers turn back their mortgages and get back their fees and expenses. They then have to find a new loan.

The court ruled that rescission didn't apply in class-actions because it is a strictly personal matter. Furthermore, Congress limited TILA violation judgments to a maximum of $500,000, a mere fraction of the kinds of sums a class action suit would generate.

How the cases will play out is in doubt but there's one thing for sure: There'll be a lot of work for attorneys over the next few months.

In the land of the Bushes, things are so bad, they can’t even successfully launch a trial balloon.

The long anticipated Petraeus report was supposed to provide Congress and the public the definitive assessment of the Iraq war. For months, the president has been dropping Petraeus’s name as if to say, “be patient, whatever your views, and Petraeus will make it all better.”

Just wait for Petraeus, Bush pleaded and an increasingly dubious Congress and public had no choice but to wait for the general’s mid September return from Iraq and his presumably no holds barred report on where we are and where we should go.

But then, a few weeks ago, we learned it wouldn’t exactly be a Petraeus report. Call it the Petraeus-Crocker Report instead because we would also be the grateful recipients of Ambassador Ryan Crocker’s wisdom and he, after all, would be in a better position to assess the political scene than the general so busy with military matters.

That little alteration didn’t cause alarm so the administration figured it could do a bit more fudging. It wouldn’t exactly be a Petraeus-Crocker report either, said the administration but the pair would be contributing to an administration report. And, by the way, they wouldn’t be testifying in public, the secretaries of state and defense would do that as they are better equipped to interpret the thoughts of the general and the ambassador.

That was too much. Congessional leaders of both parties reminded the administration legislation passed by Congress last May and signed by the president requires Petraeus’s presence and the trial balloon emitted one last hiss and went kerplunk.

As House Democratic Caucus Chairman Rahm Emanuel noted, the public is long past the time when it was willing to listen to the people who told us “the mission was accomplished and the insurgency was in its last throes.”


Posted by Dick Ahles at 2:09 PM | Permalink

Judge: Bush Administration Broke the Law, Must Issue Global Warming Report ASAP!
Liliana Segura: This is the first court order specifically rebuking the Bush administration for suppressing climate change science.

Law of the Sea on the Movehttp://www.thewashingtonnote.com/

Law of the Sea on the Move It hasn't been announced publicly yet, but look for the first Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Law of the Sea convention to take place on Sept. 27. Government witnesses will come then.

A second hearing will include two panels, the first featuring some expert supporters and selected opponents, followed by a second featuring industry representatives.

It seems at this point that the treaty's most vocal opponents are content to huff and puff but do very little. The strategy appears to be to use the Law of the Sea to raise as much money as possible, throw up a token opposition, and put the money away for a rainy day.

These funds could be used to fight comprehensive immigration reform or in a tilting-at-windmills battle against the Security and Prosperity Partnership with Mexico and Canada.

In either case, opponents simply want the Law of the Sea to go away. When it finally comes to a vote, it will be very clear that the vast majority of senators and their constituents want the U.S. to participate in fair and effective multilateral institutions.

-- Scott Paul

Joe Biden Blasts Bush Vision of Iraq; Nir Rosen Says "Iraq Does Not Exist Anymore"

Even President Bush is likening Iraq to images of Vietnam -- but in an opposite way from the Iraq War's critics.

Bush has suggested at the National Convention for the Veterans of Foreign Wars that withdrawal from Iraq would lead to the same kind of upheaval in the Middle East as occurred in Southeast Asia after U.S. withdrawal from Saigon.

Senator Joe Biden responds to the President thus:

President Bush continues to cling to a fundamentally flawed premise -- that Iraqis will rally behind a strong central government. That will not happen. There's no trust within the Iraqi government; no trust of the government by the Iraqi people; no capacity of that government to deliver security or services; and no prospect that it will build that trust or capacity any time soon.

Unless Iraq moves towards a federal system that gives the warring factions breathing room, we will end up trading a dictator for chaos that will set back our national security interests for a generation.

President Bush today attempted to draw an analogy to Vietnam, but in fact it's the President's policies that are pushing us toward another Saigon moment -- with helicopters fleeing the roof of our embassy -- which he says he wants to avoid.

The President also continues to play the American people for fools -- conflating the terrorists of 9/11 with Al Qaeda in Iraq today. Al Qaeda in Iraq didn't exist before we invaded -- it is a Bush fulfilling prophecy.

Separately, my New America Foundation/American Strategy Program colleague Nir Rosen has been all over the news and blogosphere today with his comments on Amy Goodman's Democracy Now in which Rosen suggests there is no more Iraq:

AMY GOODMAN: What do you think of Senator Levin calling for the Maliki and the whole government to disband? NIR ROSEN: Well, it's stupid for several reasons.

First of all, the Iraqi government doesn't matter. It has no power. And it doesn't matter who you put in there. He's not going to have any power. Baghdad doesn't really matter, except for Baghdad. Baghdad used to be the most important city in Iraq, and whoever controlled Baghdad controlled Iraq.

These days, you have a collection of city states: Mosul, Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyah. Each one is virtually independent, and they have their own warlords and their own militias. And what happens in Baghdad makes no difference. So that's the first point.

Second of all, who can he put in instead? What does he think he's going to put in? Allawi or some secular candidate? There was a democratic election, and the majority of Iraqis selected the sectarian Shiite group Dawa, Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution, the Sadr Movement. These are movements that are popular among the majority of Shias, who are the majority of Iraq.

So it doesn't matter who you put in there. And people in the Green Zone have never had any power. Americans, whether in the government or journalists, have been focused on the Green Zone from the beginning of the war, and it's never really mattered. It's been who has power on the street, the various different militias, depending on where you are -- Sunni, Shia, tribal, religious, criminal. So it just reflects the same misunderstanding of Iraqi politics.

The government doesn't do anything, doesn't provide any services, whether security, electricity, health or otherwise. Various militias control various ministries, and they use it as their fiefdoms. Ministries attack other ministries.

The implications of what Biden and Rosen are saying is that it appears impossible to reassemble Iraq under a single strong government, or even a strongman of the likes of Hussein. Biden's plan may be the last chance for a semi-workable model of government, but if that is not achieved, then Iraq may melt into warring, unstable fiefdoms under warlords that will assign their loyalties to Iran, Saudi Arabia, or some Talibanized network of affiliated semi-states.

Bleak, but we've known that.

-- Steve Clemons

John Bolton Peddles New Wars More than Democracy

John Bolton talks a lot about democracy but seems more about igniting wars -- particularly with North Korea, Iran, Cuba and/or China.

Bolton was in Taiwan recently speaking on American foreign policy and his experiences in the Bush administration as part of a set of pre-release publicity tours for his forthcoming book, Surrender is not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad. The picture above was taken by a friend in Taiwan at the headquarters of the Taiwan Democracy Foundation which no doubt made Bolton's journey to Taipei well, can we say, "quite worthwhile."

In a meeting with Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, Bolton reportedly stated that he "did not think one democracy should tell another democracy not to act like a democracy." Bolton was referring to American informal instructions to Taiwan that any state declarations of independence from China, as opposed to autonomy, would trigger a redefinition of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan.

One of the few good things that the Bush administration did do was to draw clear lines -- very clear lines -- for what the United States could accept regarding its own defense and security exposure to Taiwan's incremental independence efforts. Ambassadorial equivalent and China expert American Institute in Taiwan Director Douglas Paal actually did a brilliant job as the Bush administration's envoy in making sure that both Taiwanese and Chinese authorities got a reality test on the limits of American patience when it came to their sabre-rattling and dangerous rhetoric.

It's a shame that the other part of the world that has tried repeatedly to blur its boundaries and aggressively expand what it could do during the Bush administration, Israel, did not have a Doug Paal in place to communicate emphatically the limits of American strategic support. Instead we have had Elliot Abrams who has been doing what John Bolton now is -- egging on serious, potential military conflicts that America is poorly positioned to support.

Those in Washington who want to further explore John Bolton's devotion to democracy and/or war can do so at the "Margaret Thatcher Freedom Lecture" at the Heritage Foundation on September 6th at 11 a.m.

Maybe someone can ask him if he happens to be Secretary of State someday (and it could happen), would he tolerate someone on staff like him who was so clearly insubordinate of Colin Powell and Richard Armitage -- and who engaged in diplomatic brinksmanship with states like North Korea, Cuba, Iran, and China at times directly antithetical to what the Bush administration was trying to achieve. Would he keep the renedgage staffer on? or fire him?

-- Steve Clemons

Which Shakespeare Characters Do Bush and Cheney Most Resemble?
(Doesn't Cheney just seem so. . .Richard the Third?)

I just came by this interesting interview with former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director and evolving neoconservative thinker Ken Adelman.

I think Adelman has shown a great deal of honesty about both the failure of a movement he belongs to and the human failings of those trying to implement neoconservative methodologies in the national security sphere. Adelman has been extremely close, on a personal level, with Cheney and Rumsfeld -- and this has not prevented him from lodging serious, full gun critiques at them and their miserable management of the war.

I last saw Adelman at a UN Foundation party with former President Bill Clinton, Senator Hillary Clinton, former Senator and UN Foundation President Tim Wirth, Ted Turner, and many other establishment liberals in honor of Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Muhammad Yunus -- and Adelman was blunt with me in how angry he was at the Bush administration's performance in the war and expressed believable regret for having been part of the sound machine that clamored for the Iraq invasion.

To remind folks, Ken Adelman wrote the now infamous February 2002 Washington Post article, "Cake Walk in Iraq". I know now that he wishes he had not, but the article is a useful reminder when reading similar kinds of articles by the likes of Michael Ledeen and Norman Podhoretz calling for America to initiate an attack against Iran.

This interview is really about Adelman's interesting human resource management/leadership seminars under the title of "Movers and Shakespeares", and I've heard that Adelman's encyclopedic knowledge of Shakespeare and his love for human drama in the political world make this stuff very interesting.

But it would be interesting to know from Ken Adelman which Shakespeare characters and plays most describe the tragic situation America is in today. Who would Rumsfeld be? And is Bush more Hamlet or MacBeth? Is Cheney Richard III? What character fits Adelman himself?

Here is the last bit of Adelman's thoughts on the Bush administration and the Iraq War -- as well as his comment that America should not apply military force of its own against Iran. It's thoughtful and indicative of further fracturing in the neoconservative camp:

MORTMAN: Now I'd like to get your thoughts on other areas of your expertise. How do you think things are going in Iraq? ADELMAN: I fear that we are not doing well. I just think that we got our act together too late. I think we lost a few years in there that we should have had. Policy folks -- Secretary of Defense, National Security Adviser -- really let us down.

MORTMAN: How do we win in Iraq?

ADELMAN: I thought if we could turn it around, and give people the sense that momentum was on our side, that could turn it around. But that hasn't happened. I think with plans to withdraw, we either get out of the way and let the different factions do whatever they have to do, or let the different factions act like Iraqis. But I'm an optimist.

MORTMAN: Should we invade Iran?

ADELMAN: I would not use the military in Iran. I would squeeze the sanctions as hard as we can. I would go to the Saudis and the Persian Gulf countries, and have them pressure the Europeans, saying they just have to crack down. I don't think the Bush Administration has done anything with the Saudis that's worthwhile.

MORTMAN: Your thoughts on the presidential race?

ADELMAN: I've been disappointed. It seems that there are no new ideas coming out of the presidential race. 1980 we had the Reagan Doctrine, supply side economics, SDI -- all these were ideas, they were new ideas. I haven’t heard anything new from either side. I’m disappointed.

MORTMAN: Your thoughts on the Bush legacy?

ADELMAN: Bush is a person who had good ideas but could not implement them. The first MBA president was the worst administrative leader, the most un-MBA-ish president. He didn't set goals, he didn't hold people accountable. He just engaged in happy talk. He thought words were all people needed, instead of a realistic approach. A failed presidency based on that.

I disagree with Adelman that the invasion of Iraq was a good idea when we should have been focused on bin Laden and stamping out the embers of his operation -- but that said, it is useful to have someone of Adelman's stature and proximity to other leading neocons speak out against a repeat of the mistakes we made in the Iraq War.

-- Steve Clemons

04:26 PM | Permalink

US-Iran Policy Dynamics By Noam Chomskey IN CRUDE and brutal societies, the Party Line is publicly proclaimed, and it must be obeyed, or else. What you believe is your own business, of lesser concern. In societies where the state has lost the capacity to control by force, the Party Line is not proclaimed. Rather, it is presupposed, and then vigorous debate is encouraged within the limits imposed by unstated doctrinal orthodoxy.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article18235.htm

How to Survive at the Pentagon on $2 Billion a Day The Warfare State is Part of Us By Norman Solomon While the Bush-Cheney administration is the most dangerous of our lifetimes -- and ousting Republicans from the White House is imperative -- such truths are apt to smooth the way for progressive evasions. We hear that "the people must take back the government," but how can "the people" take back what they never really had? And when rhetoric calls for "returning to a foreign policy based on human rights and democracy," we're encouraged to be nostalgic for good old days that never existed.
http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article18234.htm

US attacks Iran over nuclear pact: Iran has been accused by the US of trying to manipulate the International Atomic Energy Agency following the signing of a nuclear pact.
http://tinyurl.com/3dht3l
US criticism of IAEA-Iran deal unhelpful, diplomats say: IAEA Deputy Director General Olli Heinonen had judged Tuesday's agreement with Iran a 'milestone,' one diplomat said, so it was 'disingenuous to discourage it, partly before even knowing the details of what it contains.'
http://tinyurl.com/36xskt

Fighting the Vietnam War in Iraq [b]By Ron Fullwood So, the nation's most prominent draft dodger wants to tell Americans how much of a mistake it was to pull our soldiers out of Vietnam. Bush would reopen those wounds, just to further his political agenda to escape a verdict of defeat for his failed Iraq misadventure.[/b]

<h3 class="entry-header">Memo to the MB</h3> My article "Memo to the MB: How to talk to America" in the September/October issue of the magazine Foreign Policy is available - to subscribers only - online as of today. The article is one of Foreign Policy's series of memos to influential policymakers in international affairs (the most recent example available free online is addressed to the Chief Executive of Hong Kong). The memo, addressed to Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohammed Mehdi Akef, offers advice on what the Brotherhood should do if it really wants to engage with Western audiences. The article does not advocate on behalf of the Brotherhood. It does begin from the premise that a serious dialogue with the Brotherhood would be valuable, particularly if it can produce common understandings on the value of democracy and the need to combat extremism, but it poses more questions and challenges than answers. It begins like this:

When you took over the reins as head of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2004, promising to put freedom at the top of your agenda, you probably couldn’t have imagined where your organization would be today. Although still technically banned, the Brotherhood has emerged as the leading opposition group in Egypt, with 88 seats in parliament. Your calls for governmental transparency and accountability represent an entirely new battle in Egyptian politics—and you’ve got the scars to prove it.

Since contesting parliamentary elections, you’ve seen the Egyptian regime aggressively tamper with the ballot box, launch a massive campaign of arrests of Brotherhood members, and alter the Constitution to prevent your participation in the political process. Many in the West are concerned about the way you’ve been treated by the Egyptian government. But your continued ambiguity about the Brotherhood’s core political commitments, your ambivalence toward Hamas’s attacks on Israel, and questions about your connections with Islamic extremism have left even your backers doubting your true intentions.

The memo urges the Brotherhood to engage the "Great Muslim Brotherhood Debate" in US foreign policy circles while it is hot (Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke's Foreign Affairs piece really kicked it off, triggering lots of conservative rebuttals, while Shadi Hamid has more recently carried the torch). It acknowledges that these are very difficult times for the Brotherhood in Egypt, but that this offers an opportunity as well as a challenge: "Your Western critics want nothing more than for you to abandon democracy in the face of adversity... How you react to the tough moments tell us more about you than how you behave when things are going well." (a prize if you can identify the Buffy reference).

It warns against "double talk", pointing out that Americans will likely pay more attention to what is said in Arabic than in English since that is more likely to reflect real view. This oft-aired critique is vastly overstated, by the way: in a policy paper that will be published next month, I demonstrate that the Egyptian Brotherhood's rhetoric in Arabic is highly consistent with its rhetoric in English. Whether this rhetoric reflects their 'real' convictions remains a highly pertinent question, which can not likely be resolved in the absence of an opportunity for them to put the words into action. But at the level of rhetoric, the forthcoming article documents dozens of recent Brotherhood statements, interviews, speeches and documents (all in Arabic) which attest to consistency rather than double talk. But at any rate, with a hat tip to Dan Drezner I warn Akef that "all politics is global". If you can't persuade your fellow citizens (whether Copts or secularists) of your sincerity, I point out, how can you expect to persuade Americans?

I warn Akef against reading too much or too little into the support for the Brotherhood expressed by Western human rights organizations, academics, and political analysts. On the one hand, their defense of Brotherhood members based on principled commitments to political freedoms and human rights should challenge any undifferentiated view of a uniformly hostile West. At the same time, such support should not be misunderstood as support for the organization itself. Most of these voices are simultaneously skeptical of the Brotherhood and deeply worried about its intentions. It is these pragmatic Westerners, who are open to persuasion but are far from persuaded, that the Brotherhood needs to convince through deeds as well as words.

I recommend two specific courses of action here: first, a strong public condemnation of the practice of takfir (declaring a Muslim to be an apostate), both in principle and in practice the next time such a controversy arises in Egypt; and second, allowing the recent emergence of Muslim Brotherhood bloggers to flourish without censorship as a window into the debates, thoughts, and aspirations of the organization's members. The third area where I push the Brotherhood is on extremism. As I've argued elsewhere, the Brotherhood could be either a "firewall" against extremism, holding its members within a moderate doctrine, or a "transmission belt" recruiting people into an Islamist worldview and making them more open to radicalization. They claim to be the former, most critics see them as the latter. So what are they actually doing to resolve that debate in their favor, and prove that they are really the firewall they claim to be?

There's a lot more packed in to the short essay; if the full text becomes available I'll add a link. In between the time I wrote it and its publication, two significant developments have taken place. The first is the publication of the draft political party platform, followed by reports of internal debates about key aspects of the draft. Both the move to draft such a political platform and the airing of debates about its contents would have followed the tenor of my recommendations, had the article come out first. The second is the arrest of Essam el-Erian (head of the political bureau and a key drafter of the platform) and 15 other Brotherhood leaders in what is widely seen as a direct response to the publication of the draft law and Mohamed Habib's al-Jazeera interview about it. It's not easy to be democrats in an Egypt where the regime seems determined to crush any manifestation of credible political opposition, and which rewards every sign of moderation with greater repression. One has to wonder how long the younger, less patient members of the Brotherhood will be able to forebear in the face of provocation (as I'm investigating in yet another article due to come out later this fall). No doubt the regime is waiting eagerly for the first sign of a turn to more violent means of expression on their part which can be used to retroactively justify its crackdown. I hope to see the Brotherhood stick with its public commitments in the face of this adversity (releasing the political party platform, contesting elections where possible, refraining from violence): paying a high price for its convictions sends a powerful message to those willing to listen that these really are its convictions and not just a convenient facade.

Let the Great Muslim Brotherhood Debate continue!

http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/

Let's hear from someone besides the neoconservatives about Iran
COMMENTARY
Reporters should be seeking out experts who actually understand the Middle East -- because the vast majority of them think that attacking Iran would be a huge mistake. Here's an annotated list of some excellent possible sources.

A reporter speaks out about the Iraq war and news coverage
COMMENTARY
Sig Christenson of the San Antonio Express-News ridicules comments by politicians, laments the lack of reporters covering the war, and cites ground rules that are crippling for photojournalists. He says the media aren’t pressing for answers to vital and obvious questions, such as what plans the Pentagon has for an exit strategy.

The Surge Straddle
By: Jacob Laksin
Democrats concede we’re winning in Iraq -- and claim we can’t win. More>

Is Russia's claim exceptional? List of most Valuable Disputed Territories
FP lists the top most valuable disputed turfs that might just be worth a fight. The world was astonished by Russia’s recent claim to the arctic shelf, with potential for billions of dollars worth of oil and gas reserves. But looking globally, many other strategic and mineral rich territories are just as highly contested between several countries. Japan vs. China, Venezuela against major US oil companies, Iran against the UAE and the struggle over the entire Gulf of Guinea are just a few of the other examples.

Foreign Policy, August, 2007

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/22/washingt...amp;oref=slogin


Transcript of President Bush’s Speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention

Few Choices for US Beyond Iraqi Leader

[b]Bill Moyers:
Farewell to Karl Rove
08.18.07 [/b]

[b]Leahy: Bush Administration
"In Contempt" of Congress
08.20.07 [/b]

NOW:
Soldiers Against the War

Scott Ritter:
Why Cheney Really Is That Bad

August 22, 2007 | Sen. Carl Levin (D-Michigan), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called for a "less sectarian and more unifying prime minister and government" in Iraq. Levin's statement comes as some two dozen lawmakers travel to Iraq to glean firsthand assessments.
(Photo: Alex Wong / Getty Images)

God’s Harvard: The New Grooming Ground of the Evangelical Movement

Hanna Rosin, Harcourt

A small Christian school outside the nation’s capital is dispatching the next round of evangelicals to the front lines of science and politics, where they will battle for control of the nation.

Are Bush & Co. Gearing Up to Attack Iran?

Ray McGovern, AlterNet

MediaCulture: A former CIA analyst estimates the chances of an attack on Iran and shows that the mainstream media is already cheering it on.

Dems Blast Bush's 'Irresponsible' Vietnam Comparisons

How To Stop Terrorism Before It Starts
Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt of NYPD intelligence argue that homegrown terrorism in the West develops differently than policy makers expect. Enforcement agencies must focus more on the roots of terrorism, when people with “unremarkable lives” enter the process of radicalization. Read Article

Why America Wants to Iraqize Afghanistan
Thomas Speckmann challenges Iraq’s label as a “second Vietnam” for the United States. Recent changes to US military strategy on terrorism— building infrastructure, winning hearts and minds—come straight out of the Bundeswehr handbook, and they’re working. So why not take them to Kabul?Read Article

Take That, Suckers Jim Hightower explains, in terms simple enough for all of us economic illiterates to grasp, the exact operations of the subprime mortgage swindles that are presently evicting and beggaring thousands of working class Americans. And yes, we do have a working class. And yes, a class war has been raging in our country without serious interruption since the Reagan years. And yes, Bush’s class has won every important battle.

Bigtime.





Posted by Jerome Doolittle at 7:20 PM | Permalink | Comments (2)
The Coming Crash

bitterlemons-international.org Middle East Roundtable

Edition 33 Volume 5 - August 23, 2007



War in Lebanon: one year later • An Israeli perspective - Yehuda Ben Meir

Next time, Nasrallah won't be able to claim he never imagined Israel would respond so violently. • Still no easy fix - Ferry Biederman

The internal Lebanese crisis cannot be seen in isolation from the regional situation. • UNIFIL II - A year after - Timur Goksel

UNIFIL, for all its impressive weaponry, will not get involved in any military confrontation with Hizballah. • What Syria learned from the war - Murhaf Jouejati

The ramifications for Syrian-Israeli relations are rather ominous.



An Israeli perspective
Yehuda Ben Meir

One year has passed since the end of the Second Lebanon War. It is far too early to determine the long range effects and consequences of this war on Israel. Nevertheless, one year does give us a perspective from which we can derive some initial observations regarding the results of the war from the Israeli standpoint, both objectively and subjectively.

Any analysis of the war, as far as Israel is concerned, must indeed differentiate between the objective and subjective point of view. The subjective result of the war, i.e., the way Israelis view the war, is relatively easy to determine. As with beauty, victory or defeat is to a large degree in the eyes of the beholder and perceptions have a reality of their own. As will be demonstrated below, Israelis by and large were unhappy with the results of the war, although as time goes by this picture may be changing slightly.

At the same time, there is a need to assess the results of the war from an objective perspective. Such an assessment is far more difficult and will inevitably be a subject of contention and controversy. Although the conflict was clearly triggered by Hizballah, it was Israel that decided to respond with a major military operation. It is therefore essential to understand what Israel's goals were in initiating such a major military action.

Israel's war goals are a subject of great controversy and debate in Israel. Many claim that Israel's political leadership never properly defined the political and military goals of the Second Lebanon War. Indeed, this conclusion is one of the most serious accusations made by the Winograd commission of inquiry. Others claim that the major failure of the Israeli government was that it formulated and presented to the Israeli public totally unrealistic goals for the war, such as the return of the kidnapped soldiers or the destruction of Hizballah.

An examination of some of the statements made by Israel's leaders, and specifically those made by the prime minister and minister of defense, give credence to the latter claim. Indeed, PM Ehud Olmert, in his testimony before the Winograd commission, said that sometimes a leader must publicly espouse certain goals even though they are unattainable.

Be that as it may, what were the realistic goals for Israel's military action and to what degree were these goals achieved? In retrospect, one can identify two clearly defined goals, the achievement of which was the raison d'etre from Israel's standpoint for the Second Lebanon War. The first goal was to restore Israel's deterrent--a capability seriously eroded as a result of Israel's ineffectual response to Hizballah's provocations over the years as well as to the abduction, a few weeks earlier, of an Israeli soldier by Hamas near the Gaza border. While it would be almost impossible to retrieve the kidnapped soldiers by purely military means, the aim of Israel's military action was to prevent further abductions of Israeli soldiers by Hizballah. The second and essentially major goal was to bring about a basic change in the situation in southern Lebanon through implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 and the removal of Hizballah's provocative and threatening armed presence on Israel's northern border.

Based on the events of the past year and looking at the situation on the ground as of now, one can conclude objectively that these goals were to a large degree achieved. The very fact that Israel initiated large scale hostilities and in effect went to war in response to Hizballah's provocation in and of itself went a long way toward restoring Israel's deterrence capability. At the same time, the far from conclusive result of the war and the Israeli public's widespread dissatisfaction and disappointment with its outcome impaired Israel's deterrent. Nevertheless, the grave Syrian concern about a possible Israeli attack and the fact that Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah emphasizes repeatedly that he has no intention of causing a renewal of hostilities with Israel do seem to indicate that Israel projects a renewed deterrence posture.

Accordingly, the probability of another attempt by Hizballah to abduct Israeli soldiers or, indeed, of any incursion into sovereign Israeli territory in the near future is close to zero. Next time, Nasrallah won't be able to claim he never imagined Israel would respond so violently.

The major achievement of the war from Israel's point of view is no doubt the dramatic change in the situation on the ground in southern Lebanon and along Israel's northern border. For the first time in over 30 years, the Lebanese army has been deployed in southern Lebanon and has taken up positions along Israel's northern border. The introduction of thousands of armed UNIFIL troops, including sizable contingents from western European countries--France, Italy and Spain--does seem to be making a difference. Armed Hizballah soldiers are nowhere to be seen along Israel's border. The quiet and tranquility, concomitant with the increased sense of security and the tourist boom this summer throughout the Galilee, attest to this dramatic change and can be seen as a positive result of the war.

From the subjective point of view, the story is quite different and far less positive. In a study performed by INSS in March 2007, the Jewish public expressed mixed feelings regarding the results of the Second Lebanon War. Fifty-one percent believed that neither side won the war; the remainder was evenly divided, with 23 percent saying that Israel won and 26 percent that Hizballah won. At the same time, it should be noted that close to 70 percent justified the government's decision to go to war, although the vast majority believed that Israel should have continued the war until either Hizballah was destroyed or the abducted soldiers recovered.

Faith in the political leadership was seriously diminished as a result of the outcome of the war. However, confidence in the Israel Defense Forces remained high, with 83 percent saying that they can depend on the IDF to defend the country.

Only time will tell to what extent the objective and subjective points of view converge.- Published 23/8/2007 © bitterlemons- international.org

Dr. Yehuda Ben Meir, a former deputy foreign minister of Israel, is currently a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv.

Still no easy fix
Ferry BiedermanThe Shi'ites of South Lebanon and the Israelis should seek joint therapy for their unhealthy relationship. Their mutual resentment, distrust and geopolitics lead to new disasters every time. Hizballah is currently celebrating what it considers its victory in the war with Israel last year at an exhibition in Beirut's southern suburbs. Families with little kids stroll around the grounds, taking in displays that mingle gore, glitter and above all glory. The mood is elated but also determined because it seems as if every last woman, man and child expects a new war, much in the same way as so many Israelis are convinced that there will be a "next round".

Not that either the Israelis or the Lebanese are looking forward to a new period of bloodletting, destabilization, economic hardship and all the other consequences of conflict. But once again, Lebanon in particular seems to be caught up in a web of domestic, regional and international circumstances that is dragging the country inexorably toward a new abyss. Even if it is not be tipped into the void, just the incessant sense of crisis, which started well before last year's war, may well grind the country down to such an extent that serious questions about its sustainability will emerge again, as they did during the civil war.

The internal Lebanese crisis cannot and could never before be seen in isolation from the regional situation. Last year's war is being used by the various Lebanese factions to justify their domestic political positions. Hizballah has since the war been emphasizing that the US supports both Israel and the Lebanese government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The Shi'ite movement has to all effects and purposes accused the ruling anti-Syrian majority of treason, of having engineered or extended the war and of being an American puppet. Now that both sides are gearing up for the immensely important and controversial vote in Parliament to choose a new president later this fall, Hizballah has upped the rhetoric another notch. "We will not allow the American scheme, which we buried last July, to come into being again through the upcoming presidential elections," said Nabil Kawook, Hizballah's commander in the south. Obviously, the tone is polarizing and the majority, which encompasses a large part of the Sunni Muslim community, bristles at being cast as pro- Israeli American puppets. And despite many claims to the contrary, resentment against Hizballah for starting last year's war and then paralyzing the country politically and Beirut's downtown commercially is running high among the movement's opponents.

Both sides would have had different sticks anyway to beat each other with if last year's war had not taken place. The international tribunal for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri remains a hot topic as does the extent of desirable Syrian influence in the country as well as Hizballah's weapons. A "national dialogue" among the parties before last year's war did not go anywhere. In fact, it's more than likely that Lebanon's internal disagreements were a major contributing factor in the outbreak of last year's war. Not only in the sense that the country's internal divisions and its weakness lay it open to foreign intervention or to militant groups using its territory to launch attacks. This time the lingering feeling among many is that they are facing a choice between two unpalatable extremes: either perpetual war and tension with Israel if Hizballah gets its way or American dependency with all the concomitant tensions that internal and regional resistance to such a state idea will bring.

There is no easy fix to this dilemma, especially since a middle ground barely exists and Lebanon's political system is particularly ill equipped to deal with existential political questions that go beyond how to divide the loot. A good first step would be for Hizballah to accept that it can remain relevant even if it does not provoke wars and even if it does not build up one of the largest strategic weapons arsenals in the region. For that to happen it would be essential that the other groups and the government take concrete steps to make it very clear that the Shi'ites and other relatively disadvantaged sectors of Lebanese society can get a fair shake in the country, politically and financially--something that still requires a lot of work- Published 23/8/2007 © bitterlemons- international.org

Ferry Biederman is a reporter for the Financial Times based in Beirut.

UNIFIL II - A year after
Timur GokselThe United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was set up in 1978 after Israel's invasion of South Lebanon in response to a Palestinian bus hijacking in Israel that ended with more than 30 civilian deaths. The US realized the occupation of South Lebanon by the Israeli army was threatening to unravel the momentum for peace created by the visit of late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem. Yet Washington ignored the objections of experienced UN staff against placing a peacekeeping force in a country without central authority and wrecked by a raging civil war as well as armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and pushed for the creation of UNIFIL.

UNIFIL, a lightly armed peacekeeping force with no enforcement powers and an unrealistic and ambiguous mandate, was thus thrown into the conflict without a properly defined area of operations, sandwiched between heavily armed, undisciplined militias and Israel.

Over the years, it became a habit to refer to UNIFIL as a toothless and ineffective symbol of UN peacekeeping. But UNIFIL turned out to be a resilient force that held its ground despite suffering more than 100 fatalities.

In the aftermath of the July 2006 Israel-Hizballah war, some western leaders took their cues from Israel and naively called for UNIFIL to be replaced by a fighting multinational force that would go in and teach Hizballah a lesson. Both Hizballah and the Lebanese government announced they would not allow the deployment of a quasi-occupation force that could set off a new round of civil war. In any case, no country came forward to seriously discuss such a force. Thus the idea of a robust UNIFIL II, not under enforcement stipulations of Chapter VII of the UN Charter but under peacekeeping rules of Chapter VI, emerged.

Actually, nothing has changed except that UNIFIL now has better armed units that still won't use their guns unless they are attacked. UNIFIL, for all its impressive weaponry, will not get involved in any military confrontation with Hizballah because it cannot sustain a prolonged clash. Moreover, in today's South Lebanon with its militant villagers loyal to Hizballah, UNIFIL cannot last if it starts killing civilians. The talk of robust peacekeeping quickly subsided and UNIFIL, much to Israel's chagrin, began to operate as a classic peacekeeping force in support of the national army.

The outstanding feature of the new UNIFIL was to mobilize leading European countries as its key components. With self-sufficient, well-trained and well-equipped infantry troops from France, Italy and Spain and with the addition of Germany as a naval unit and participation of other European nations, UNIFIL acquired political clout the UN could never claim by itself.

In all fairness, the new UNIFIL caught on quickly that it was meant to be a conflict management tool with emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of the population and that good relations with the people would also be key to force protection because useful intelligence information would come from them.

The mood in South Lebanon began to change and the people began to rely more and more on UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army for their needs. South Lebanon is now experiencing a period of calm and peace it has not known in decades. But, unless a permanent peace is put in place, the conflict will re-erupt.

There are UN resolutions that call for the disarming of militias, including Hizballah, and stopping the flow of weapons across the Lebanese borders. Some think the UN should do it. But the Lebanese government says that disarming cannot be done by foreign armies as that would lead to internal conflict, and that the Lebanese will do it their way. Countries contributing troops to UNIFIL are not willing to change their peacekeeping mandate no matter how hard Israel wants them to.

UNIFIL is now at a crossroads. After the car-bomb attack that killed six Spanish peacekeepers, UN personnel were confined to bases and could only move in heavily guarded, armored convoys. A vital link to the people that could provide warnings against similar attacks was severed. The UNIFIL command is aware of the problem, but to achieve consensus among the 30 countries making up the force is a formidable task. A multinational force of 30 countries is not the right structure in southern Lebanon. Differences in national interests, training, doctrine, officer quality, communications and other capabilities make a mockery of any claims to unified and effective command and control structure.

In this part of the world, if you are designated as a target no amount of body armor and machineguns on your vehicles will protect you. Only advance intelligence warning will, and the most reliable and maybe the only way to receive such information is for the peacekeepers to stay in touch with the population. That population, if treated with compassion and respect, will in turn protect the troops- Published 23/8/2007 © bitterlemons- international.org

Timur Goksel served first as the official spokesman and than as the senior advisor of UNIFIL between 1979-2003. He now consults on conflict and peacekeeping and teaches the same at American University of Beirut.

<a name="792">What Syria learned from the war
Murhaf JouejatiIf Syrians ever had any doubt about Hizballah's military prowess, they were pleasantly surprised by its remarkable performance during its confrontation with Israel last summer. By holding out for more than a month against Israel, the most powerful military in the Middle East, Hizballah showed itself to be a powerhouse. Over and above the tremendous psychological boost this gave the embattled Syrian regime (worn down by continuous US pressures), Hizballah held its own for 34 days despite the punishing blows of Israel's massive air strikes and Hizballah fighters were able to launch an average of 150 Katyusha rockets per day into northern Israel, defeating the Israel Air Force in the process and forcing one fourth of Israel's civilian population from their homes into shelters.

Most Syrians scoff at suggestions that Hizballah's victory is debatable. Despite Israel's overwhelming American-backed power, the Jewish state, even when egged on by Washington, failed to achieve its stated objectives of releasing its two captured servicemen and eliminating Hizballah's arsenal. The mere fact that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was obliged to convene a commission of inquiry into "what went wrong" provides Syrians the evidence they need to distinguish victor from vanquished.

To be sure, the cost of Israel's retribution following Hizballah's July 12 cross-border attack was high for Lebanon. The conflict killed more than one thousand civilians, severely damaged Lebanon's infrastructure and displaced close to a million Lebanese, one quarter of whom fled to Syria. High too was the cost to Syria, at least at the strategic level. In the aftermath of the conflict, Hizballah forces dug in behind the Litani River rather than at the international border where they were massed prior to the confrontation. As a result, Hizballah's freedom of maneuver is now more restricted, reducing Syria's capacity to exert indirect pressure on Israel.

That said, Hizballah's ability to disrupt US-Israeli efforts to dislodge the Shi'ite group from the south of Lebanon and to eradicate Syrian influence in Lebanon emboldened the Syrian regime: Damascus perceived Hizballah's victory against Israel as a victory for the Syrian-Iranian alliance and a defeat of the US-Israel-moderate Arab axis. Moreover, the post-conflict security regime that ensued did not significantly alter Hizballah's strategic posture. Although it was forced to surrender its monopoly of force in the south of Lebanon in favor of the US-equipped Lebanese army and an expanded UNIFIL, neither the Lebanese army nor UNIFIL had the will or the mandate, respectively, to disarm Hizballah. Finally, despite Hizballah's loss of the border strip, its rockets can still reach deep into Israel, providing Syria and its Iranian ally with continued leverage.

In hindsight, the one regret Damascus has is not having exploited the opportunity for a Syrian land grab in the Golan. Indeed, as Hizballah fighters skillfully tied the Israeli army down, Syrian land forces were in an ideal position to storm Israel's Golan defenses. A successful Syrian thrust into the Golan would have boosted Syria's chances of resuming peace talks with Israel later, this time on Syria's own terms.

Thus, one lesson Syria learned from the "July War" is that caution does not always pay. Another has to do with doctrine: Hizballah's success demonstrated that guerrilla warfare, at least in this instance, yielded better results than conventional power. During the fighting, Hizballah fighters trained in anti-tank warfare shuttled from village to village on scooters to launch attacks. Many took cover in underground tunnels. In addition to Hizballah's discipline and motivation, these tactics were instrumental in robbing Israel of victory.

Within this context, the ramifications for the region in general and for Syrian-Israeli relations in particular are rather ominous. The absence of a peaceful resolution to the Syrian-Israeli conflict combined with the broader tensions in the US-Iranian relationship might tempt Damascus to apply the lessons it learned from the "July War".- Published 23/8/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Murhaf Jouejati is professor of political science and international relations at George Washington University in Washington, DC.





Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East reg