Va. congressman accuses AIPAC on Iraq : "AIPAC is the most powerful lobby and has pushed this war from the beginning," U.S. Rep. Jim Moran (D-Va.) said in this month's Tikkun magazine. "Because they are so well organized, and their members are extraordinarily powerful -- most of them are quite wealthy -- they have been able to exert power."
http://www.jta.org/cgi-bin/iowa/breaking/104067.html
Coleen Rowley: Never Doubt That a Small Group of Thoughtful, Committed Neocons Can Destroy the World (If We Let Them): Neocons are conservative Jewish journalists and politicians linked to the Right-wing Israeli Likud who support United States corporate, political, cultural and military imperialism with the use of preemptive World War if necessary-- without ruling out preemptive nuclear strikes-- to rid themselves of the Muslim Menace.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/coleen-rowle...l-_b_63408.html
'Anti-Semitic' label curbs talk about Israel: Anyone who criticizes Israel's actions or argues that pro-Israel groups have a significant influence over U.S. policy stands a good chance of being labeled anti-Semitic.
http://tinyurl.com/26z62c
Doha Debate: "This House believes the pro-Israeli lobby has successfully stifled Western debate about Israel's actions " Video: Norman Finkelstein, Dr Martin Indyk, Andrew Cockburn and David Aaronovitch at the Oxford Union debating society in the UK, marking the first time the Doha Debates have been held outside Qatar.
http://tinyurl.com/25mx6b

Feast of the Wingnuts by Jonathan Chait
How economic crackpots devoured American politics.

Bang Galore by the Editors
Why our nuclear deal with India will explode in our faces.

WASHINGTON DIARIST: My Neocon Problem by Norman Ornstein

• Dems Take On Petraeus, Call For Full Withdrawal Date

• Only McCain In GOP Has Accepted Invite For Hispanic Debate
• Democrats Reject Petraeus Report: Edwards: "A Sales Job By The White House, A PR Document"...Clinton: We've Known There's "No Military Solution" For Years

Baghdad Policeman: Who Are They to Tell Us We Are Corrupt?

Delay Decision on Major Cuts, Petraeus Says
By MICHAEL R. GORDON Gen. David H. Petraeus’s recommendations will likely lead to an earlier-than-expected start to troop reductions in Iraq, while deferring decisions on a wider withdrawal.

• News Analysis: Less Talk of Victory Now
• Iranian Warning for Iraq

Military Seen as Best Able to Guide War
By STEVEN LEE MYERS and MEGAN THEE Americans trust military commanders far more than the Bush administration or Congress to bring the war in Iraq to a successful end, according to the latest New York Times/CBS News Poll.

• Complete Poll Results (pdf)

Survey of Baghdad Neighborhoods
To study the ground-level effects of the American troop buildup, Times journalists interviewed residents, Americans on patrol and Iraqi officials.

• At Street Level, Unmet Goals of Troop Buildup

From the New York Times Sunday Magazine:

• America’s Mayor Goes to America

• Conscience of a Conservative

• Can Lobbyists Stop the War?

Spotlight Shifts to Views Of U.S. Envoy to Iraq Gen. David Petraeus's testimony has been subject of speculation for months, but Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker's report may have more lasting weight.

Karen DeYoung

• Congress, White House Battle Over Assessment
• Commerce Seeks Adviser for Iraq Oil Interests
• Foreign Minister Calls for End to Meddling | Q&A

Democrats Struggle to Turn Tide Party leaders have so far failed to force a single, substantial change in U.S. policy in Iraq.

Shailagh Murray and Dan Balz

Iran: no intention to make atomic bomb
Iranian top leaders said on Sunday that the Islamic Republic had no nuclear bombs and would not produce it, but vowed to press on the disputed nuclear program.
• Special Report: Iran Nuclear Crisis
• Ahmadinejad: Today, Iran is a nuclear Iran

Flurry of diplomacy staged for Mideast peace conference
The peace conference should especially tackle issues like the final status including Jerusalem, the Palestinian borders and the refugees, Jordan's King Abdullah II said Sunday.
• Hamas downplays Blair Mideast peace mission

The Mystery of al-Qaeda: Justin Raimondo


9/11, Six Years Later: David R. Henderson


Launching Brand Petraeus: Tom Engelhardt


A Month of Malarkey: Charley Reese


The Myth of al-Qaeda in Iraq: Andrew Tilghman

Despite Harsh New Rules, Troop Blogs Show Increasing

David Petraeus: General Surge

Bin Laden Benefits From US Focus on Iraq

Congress, Bush Battle Over Iraq Report

Envoys Seen Opposing Iraq Policy Shift

Numbers Cloud Debate as Congress Awaits Iraq Commander

Iran rejects 'impossible' nuclear suspension
Tehran (AFP) Sept 9, 2007 - Iran's top nuclear negotiator on Sunday said it was "impossible" Tehran would yield to the key Western demand over its nuclear programme, even if the UN Security Council imposed further sanctions. The reaffirmation by Ali Larijani of Iran's refusal to suspend uranium enrichment activities comes a day ahead of a crucial meeting in Vienna of the UN atomic energy agency on the Iranian nuclear ... more

Analysis: Iran looks to Africa
Washington (UPI) Sep 6, 2007 - Iran's growing ties with Africa may reflect economic necessity under pressure of international sanctions, but it also may signal an attempt to secure uranium supplies and spread its own brand of Islam. Iran has long paid attention to Africa. In an address to this week's meeting in Tehran of the Non-Aligned Movement, which includes almost every African nation, Iranian President Mahmoud ... more

Looking to Anbar for Iraq's future
By Tina Susman
The province's newfound stability is often cited as justification for U.S.
strategy. But some see perils in trying to replicate that model elsewhere.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBX...Io30G2B0Iu810EC

Caught in a bureaucratic black hole
By Anna Gorman
Applicants seeking U.S. citizenship languish for years as the FBI conducts
cumbersome records checks. Lawsuits are a result.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBX...Io30G2B0Iu820ED

No surprises expected in Petraeus' Iraq report
By Doyle Mcmanus and Julian E. Barnes
Though long-awaited, the assessment has been widely anticipated with the general
expected to back the troop buildup and warn against a major withdrawal.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBX...Io30G2B0IvAH0Ej

Israel arrests alleged neo-Nazis
By Richard Boudreaux
The nation is shocked over the news of youths accused of desecrating synagogues
and beating Jews and others.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBX...Io30G2B0IvAJ0El

Pope calls Catholics to charity work
By Tracy Wilkinson
Concluding his Austrian visit, he also tells a Vienna crowd that Sundays should
be reserved for God.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBX...Io30G2B0IvAK0Em

Is military justice broken?
By Gary Solis
After several bad cases in Iraq, the system is showing signs that it works well.
http://email.latimes.com/cgi-bin1/DM/y/eBX...Io30G2B0IvAR0Et

China's Quest for Overseas Oil
September 2007

by Erica Downs

In recent years it has been in vogue for some American policy makers and pundits to criticize the overseas expansion of China's national oil companies (NOCs) as mercantilist. Even the Bush administration has joined the chorus, taking the Chinese government to task for attempting to "follow a mercantilism borrowed from a discredited era" through its efforts to "somehow 'lock up' energy supplies around the world."

This rhetoric conjures up an image of a zero-sum competition for oil among the world's major powers—ranging from a New Great Game in Central Asia to a New Scramble for Africa—in which one country's gain is another's loss. But it mischaracterizes the Chinese NOCs' global search for oil and their impact on the world oil market, exaggerates the differences between Chinese and American oil policies and runs the risk of heightening Sino-American tensions over oil.

Mercantilism has become a word that serves as a catch-all for a variety of Chinese oil-motivated actions inimical to United States' interests. Some proponents of the myth of Chinese energy mercantilism use the term to narrowly describe Chinese policies, charging that Beijing, in emulation of the European colonial powers, is directing its NOCs to acquire oil assets abroad to exclusively supply China. The U.S. and other Western powers, they maintain, long ago abandoned such pernicious practices in favor of reliance on the world oil market for supply security. They also contend that the NOCs are overpaying for assets to assuage Beijing's energy insecurity. Others apply the term more broadly to lambaste Beijing for any measures taken to help China's NOCs expand overseas that run counter to U.S. foreign-policy objectives. All three usages are problematic.

Central to the myth of Chinese energy mercantilism is the misperception that China's NOCs are engaged in a centrally-directed quest to "lock up" oil around the globe for the sole purpose of supplying Chinese consumers. Reality, however, is quite different. Not only are corporate interests distinct from national ones, but Chinese officials generally have neither the time nor the inclination to become intimately involved in the assessment and acquisition of oil assets.

First, although many narratives in the international media about the overseas expansion of China's NOCs have focused on the Chinese government's energy insecurity as the main motivation, it is in fact the companies' quest for reserves and profits that are the primary drivers. While some Chinese officials are undoubtedly uncomfortable with China's increasing dependence on imported oil, China's NOCs, like all other oil companies, need to continuously acquire new reserves to replace what they produce and the opportunities for them to do so within China appear rather limited.

Additionally, exploration and production historically have been the most profitable part of the oil business. This is especially true for China's NOCs which have suffered heavy losses in their refining and marketing operations in recent years because of higher crude oil costs and state-controlled prices for diesel and gasoline. Consequently, China's NOCs, like the major international oil companies (IOCs), seek income from exploration and production assets acquired abroad.

Second, contrary to popular opinion, the overseas expansion of China's NOCs is not driven from the "top-down" but rather from the "bottom-up." The liberalization and decentralization of China's energy sector over the past two decades has resulted in a shift of power and resources away from the central government toward the state-owned energy companies and a substantial reduction in the ability of the government to monitor these firms. When it comes to deciding which overseas assets to acquire, the NOCs are in the driver's seat and the Chinese government is often just along for the ride with little idea of the final destination. While the international media has made much of the omission of Sudan from the Chinese government's recently published catalog of countries in which Chinese companies are encouraged to invest, this document has not stopped China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) from expanding its assets in Sudan. Additionally, the Chinese government is not the only backseat driver; a variety of other actors, including the companies' minority shareholders, international banks and the governments of oil-producing states also seek to influence the investment decisions of China's NOCs.

Third, the reputation that China's NOCs have acquired for prioritizing the accumulation of physical barrels of oil over the growth of profits in their acquisition of overseas exploration and production assets is not entirely warranted. It is true that the Chinese NOCs are able to settle for lower rates of return than the IOCs because, as state-owned companies, they have access to subsidized capital (although the majority of their projects in 2006 were done on balance sheet). They also do not pay dividends to their primary shareholder, the Chinese government (although this may be changing). However, declarations that the Chinese NOCs have overpaid for assets, in many cases, are premature because the rates of return on the companies' investments depend in large part on the future price of oil. Indeed, the sustained increase in oil prices since late 2002 has made many Chinese purchases previously written off as foolish now look rather smart. The British consultancy Wood Mackenzie recently concluded that "there is little evidence that the Asian NOCs have completely discarded financial returns in order to acquire oil output at any price."

Fuzzy thinking about the world oil market has led to further allegations that China's NOCs, in shipping much of their overseas production to China, have reduced global supplies and put upward pressure on world oil prices. In fact, the opposite is true.

China's NOCs, whose foreign production sharing contracts are not fundamentally different from those signed by the IOCs, pumped a combined total of 685,000 barrels per day of oil abroad in 2006—less than 1% of world oil production—and appear to have sold at least two-thirds of it on the international market. If China's NOCs were to send home all of their overseas production, oil imports from other exporters such as Saudi Arabia and Angola would be reduced by the same amount. China's NOCs are actually expanding, rather than contracting, the amount oil available to other consumers by pumping oil abroad, especially at oil fields in which other companies are unable or unwilling to invest.

Another myth of Chinese energy mercantilism concerns its dealings with oil-exporting states whose policies run counter to American interests. China's oil ties to Sudan are usually the poster child for such discussions. CNPC is the largest foreign investor in the Sudanese oil patch and its operations transformed Sudan from a net oil importer to a net oil exporter in 1999, enabling both CNPC and Khartoum to reap windfall profits from the sustained rise in world oil prices. The company's substantial and lucrative investments in Sudan—its second largest source of foreign oil production after Kazakhstan—have been a factor behind China's obstructionist behavior in the United Nations Security Council in recent years. However repugnant Beijing's willingness to allow CNPC's oil interests to influence its response to the killing and dislocation of civilians in Darfur, it does not a mercantilist make. While the very use of the term mercantilist may further the cause of those who want to paint China as a menacing and retrograde power, it does not accurately capture China's policy toward Sudan. There are better words—such as amoral and short-sighted—to describe China's attempt to separate business from politics in Sudan.

The third myth of Chinese energy mercantilism is that its approach to securing oil supplies is radically different from that of the U.S. To cite one prominent example, in its 2005 report to Congress, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission states that "[t]he United States secures its supplies via open international markets while China wants to own oil at the wellhead." Upon closer inspection, this is a false dichotomy. Both Chinese reliance on the world oil market and U.S. interventions in that market are greater than the commission maintains.

Contrary to popular perceptions, most of China's imported oil is procured in the same way as the U.S.'s. Both Chinese and U.S. buyers purchase oil on the spot market and through long-term contracts (typically no more than 12 months) which are based on spot prices. The oil that China's NOCs produce abroad—regardless of whether it is sold locally or sent to China—is likely to be valued by the host country at the world price for the purpose of calculating royalty and tax payments.

Additionally, many of the concerns expressed by American policy makers and pundits about what China is doing to meet its oil requirements are things that the U.S. itself has done. Yes, China's growing demand for oil and the international expansion of China's NOCs have contributed to China's deepening engagement with regimes that commit egregious human-rights violations (Sudan), harbor nuclear ambitions and sponsor terrorism (Iran) and are rife with corruption (Angola). Yet, China is not alone in subjugating its foreign policy to its oil interests. The U.S. has fought wars for oil (Iraq), rolled out the red carpet for visiting heads of state from oil-producing countries with poor human-rights records (Equatorial Guinea) and wide-spread corruption (Kazakhstan) and overthrown governments to further U.S. oil interests (Iran).

Both Beijing and Washington—not to mention the governments of other major oil-importing states—have also lobbied officials in oil-exporting nations to advance their oil interests. Beijing's efforts to persuade Moscow to prioritize the construction of an oil export pipeline from East Siberia to China, rather than one to the Pacific Coast championed by Japan, are broadly reminiscent of Washington's ultimately successful diplomatic pressure on Central Asian governments to support the routing of an export pipeline from the city of Baku in Azerbaijan, through Georgia, to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, rather than an alternate route through Iran.

The Cnooc Debacle

Perhaps more than any other example, the unsolicited bid made by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (Cnooc) for the U.S. firm Unocal in 2005, and the protectionist outcry it triggered in Washington, turns the conventional wisdom about Chinese and American oil policies on its head. Contrary to popular opinion, Cnooc's attempt to purchase Unocal was not motivated by a Chinese government dictate, backed by the full resources of the Chinese state, to secure oil and natural gas assets for the motherland. Lacking strong political support from Beijing, Cnooc sought to acquire Unocal not only for its reserves but also to facilitate its transformation into a truly multinational energy company. The furor that erupted in the U.S. in response to Cnooc's bid revealed that some U.S. policy makers and pundits misunderstood how oil markets work and adhered to the very mercantilist ideas which they ascribed to the Chinese. These include the assumption that the nationality of an oil company matters because firms, especially state-owned ones, prioritize national over corporate interests and the notion that the acquisition of oil assets is the best way to enhance supply security.

The fact that China and the U.S. intervene in the world oil market is hardly surprising. After all, the world oil market is not free; the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries sets production quotas for member countries—which in turn influence prices—based in large part on the economic and political needs of those countries. Similarly, oil consumers also attempt to influence the market to serve their interests.

The myth of Chinese energy mercantilism may exacerbate the increased bilateral frictions that both Beijing and Washington seek to avoid. First, the use of the adjective mercantilist to describe the foreign investments of China's NOCs conflates commercial competition with geopolitical competition and may lead some observers to see Chinese challenges to U.S. interests where they don't exist. To be sure, China's NOCs—like companies around the world—rely on their government for diplomatic support of foreign acquisitions. The state-ownership of China's NOCs certainly blurs the line between national and corporate interests, but more often than not, a bid by a Chinese oil company for an overseas asset is simply a bid to grow reserves and profits and not to advance Chinese global or regional influence. Furthermore, while an oil asset may be a source of zero-sum or mixed-sum competition between companies; this is not necessarily the case for their home countries. As long as the oil continues to flow, all consumers benefit.

Second, treating China like a mercantilist state may prompt it to behave like one. Case in point: the U.S. outcry over Cnooc's bid for Unocal. If the objective of the deal's opponents was to convince China's oil companies and policy makers that the U.S. views oil as a source of zero-sum competition between nations and that national ownership of energy assets matters, then they succeeded admirably. Opposition to the deal prompted China's NOCs to view investment opportunities in other countries, including some deemed "rogue" by the United States, more favorably.

Third, the assumption that corporate interests are synonymous with national interests can result in policy prescriptions that fail to cure the "disease" they are intended to treat. For example, some analysts—under the assumption that the foreign investments of China's NOCs, especially in states at odds with the U.S., are primarily driven by the Chinese leadership's energy insecurity—have argued that the U.S. should encourage China to join the International Energy Agency and to use oil more efficiently. While both of these recommendations should be pursued to enhance global energy security, they are unlikely to deter China's NOCs from investing overseas for the same reason that they have not prevented U.S., Japanese or French oil companies from acquiring oil assets abroad. Even if the national "energy security" motivation disappears, the corporate need to increase reserves and profits remains.

The challenge, then, for Washington and other capital cities seeking to influence China's policies toward states such as Sudan is not to attempt to convince Beijing to smother the corporate ambitions of China's NOCs but instead to persuade Beijing to use whatever influence it has over Khartoum to help shape policy outcomes.

Ms. Downs is a fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution.

The Battle for Iraq is About Oil and Democracy, Not Religion!

Joshua Holland, Raed Jarrar, AlterNet

War on Iraq: As Gen. Petraeus takes the D.C. stage, he and the media are only giving half of the story. Shockingly, the United States, Iran and al Qaeda have the same goals in Iraq.

The GOP's '08 Candidates Can't Keep Dodging Iraq Much Longer

Matt Taibbi, RollingStone.com

War on Iraq: First Republicans screwed up on Iraq, sending thousands of Americans to their deaths. Then they refused to apologize. And now they're going to pay for it in the 2008 elections.


Shutting Down Transparent Government, Bush-Style

Ruth Rosen, Tomdispatch.com

Rights and Liberties: How the Bush government is now trying to prevent you from being able to use the Freedom of Information Act.

• Pentagon Planning Base Near Iraq-Iran Border

• Withdraw, Withdraw, Withdraw

• Homo Politicus: Brain Function Of Liberals, Conservatives Differs

Moyers: Justice Dept. Official On "The Most Amazing Scene I've Ever Witnessed" [VIDEO]

Post by Adam Howard
Video: Jack Goldsmith tells Bill Moyers what happened when Gonzales and Andy Card confronted a seriously ill Ashcroft about wiretapping. More »

Two US carrier-strike groups are bound for Persian Gulf region, bringing number back to three at the end of September: Ready to confront Iran

'US needs face-to-face talks with Iran': Former NATO supreme allied commander and 2004 Democratic Party presidential candidate Wesley Clark

Prelude To War? World is worried - US planning a 3-day blitz against Iran? "according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, there's no evidence that Iran has weaponized its nuclear program"

Former PM Sharif deported immediately after return to Pakistan

President Bush's rhetorical blunders at APEC meeting in Sydney reinforces view from Asian leaders that he does not take them seriously

Opra Winfrey turns it on for Obama

President Putin's visit to the UAE is a milestone

Taleban says “ready for talks”

General Petraeus Reportsby Jed BabbinPetraeus’ testimony will set the course for the rest of the Bush Presidency.

Osama’s Ideological Challengeby Robert Spencer"I invite you to embrace Islam," says Osama bin Laden in his latest videotape. Most analysts take this as pious window-dressing, but it is actually the most revealing aspect of bin Laden’s statement

Conservatives Mobilize Against Law of the Sea Treaty by Cliff KincaidAngering conservatives on the critical issue of national sovereignty, the Bush Administration …

The man with the dyed beard returns
The reappearance, after an interlude of more than two years, of Osama bin Laden will be chewed over endlessly by pundits who will mostly miss the point. It isn't bin Laden and his dyed beard that should be flashing on our TV screens but the disgraced faces of those who exploited the tragedy of a stricken nation to inflict tragedies on others. - Ramzy Baroud (Sep 10, '07)

Following is a note by David Kilcullen on the "surge" in Anbar province. He is an Australian counter-insurgency expert attached to Petraeus' staff.

Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt
Posted by Dave Kilcullen on August 29, 2007 2:52 AM | Permalink| Print
Some aspects of the war in Iraq are hard to fit into “classical” models of insurgency. One of these is the growing tribal uprising against al Qa’ida, which could transform the war in ways not factored into neat “benchmarks” developed many months ago and thousands of miles away. I spent time out on the ground during May and June working with coalition units, tribal leaders and fighters engaged in the uprising, so I felt a few field observations might be of interest to the Small Wars community. I apologize in advance for the epic length of this post, but it's a complex issue, so I hope people will forgive my long-windedness. Like much else, it’s too early to know how this new development will play out. But surprisingly (surprising to me, anyway), indications so far are relatively positive.
To understand what follows, you need to realize that Iraqi tribes are not somehow separate, out in the desert, or remote: rather, they are powerful interest groups that permeate Iraqi society. More than 85% of Iraqis claim some form of tribal affiliation; tribal identity is a parallel, informal but powerful sphere of influence in the community. Iraqi tribal leaders represent a competing power center, and the tribes themselves are a parallel hierarchy that overlaps with formal government structures and political allegiances. Most Iraqis wear their tribal selves beside other strands of identity (religious, ethnic, regional, socio-economic) that interact in complex ways, rendering meaningless the facile division into Sunni, Shi’a and Kurdish groups that distant observers sometimes perceive. The reality of Iraqi national character is much more complex than that, and tribal identity plays an extremely important part in it, even for urbanized Iraqis. Thus the tribal revolt is not some remote riot on a reservation: it’s a major social movement that could significantly influence most Iraqis where they live.
Birth of the revolt
The uprising began last year, far out in western Anbar province, but is now affecting about 40% of the country. It has spread to Ninewa, Diyala, Babil, Salah-ad-Din, Baghdad and – intriguingly – is filtering into Shi’a communities in the South. The Iraqi government was in on it from the start; our Iraqi intelligence colleagues predicted, well before we realized it, that Anbar was going to “flip”, with tribal leaders turning toward the government and away from extremists.
Some tribal leaders told me that the split started over women. This is not as odd as it sounds. One of AQ’s standard techniques, which I have seen them apply in places as diverse as Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia, is to marry leaders and key operatives to women from prominent tribal families. The strategy works by creating a bond with the community, exploiting kinship-based alliances, and so “embedding” the AQ network into the society. Over time, this makes AQ part of the social landscape, allows them to manipulate local people and makes it harder for outsiders to pry the network apart from the population. (Last year, while working in the tribal agencies along Pakistan’s North-West Frontier, a Khyber Rifles officer told me “we Punjabis are the foreigners here: al Qa’ida have been here 25 years and have married into the Pashtun hill-tribes to the point where it’s hard to tell the terrorists from everyone else.”) Well, indeed.
But this time, the tactic seems to have backfired. We often short-hand the enemy as “al Qa’ida” but in Iraq we primarily face tanzim qaidat al-jihad fil bilad al-Rafidayn (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organization, which swore allegiance to bin Laden in 2004, is now taking strategic direction and support from Al Qa’ida central, and whose archaic name literally means “the qai’da organization for jihad in the land of the two rivers”, i.e. Al Qa’ida in Iraq, AQI). This group’s foot-soldiers are 95% Iraqi, but its leadership is overwhelmingly foreign. The top leaders and several key players are Egyptians and there are Turks, Syrians, Saudis, Chechens, Afghans and others in the leadership cadre. Moreover, the group is heavily urbanized, and town-dwellers – even urban Iraqis – may as well be foreigners as far as some tribal leaders are concerned. So there is a cultural barrier, and a natural difference in outlook, between the tribes and the terrorists.
These differences need not have been fatal – indeed, for years the tribes treated the terrorists as “useful idiots”, while AQI in turn exploited them for cover and support. One person told me that AQI’s pitch to the tribes was “we are Sunni, you are Sunni. The Americans and Iranians are helping the Shi’a – let’s fight them together”. But this alliance of convenience and mutual exploitation broke down when AQI began to apply the standard AQ method of cementing alliances through marriage. In Iraqi tribal society, custom (aadat) is at least as important as religion (deen) and its dictates, often pre-Islamic in origin, frequently differ from those of Islam. Indeed, as one tribal Iraqi put it to me, “if you ask a Shammari what religion he is, he will say ‘I am a Shammari’ ” – the Shammari being a confederation which, like many Iraqi tribes, has both Sunni and Shi’a branches.
Islam, of course, is a key identity marker when dealing with non-Muslim outsiders, but when all involved are Muslim, kinship trumps religion. And in fact, most tribal Iraqis I have spoken with consider AQ’s brand of “Islam” utterly foreign to their traditional and syncretic version of the faith. One key difference is marriage custom, the tribes only giving their women within the tribe or (on rare occasions to cement a bond or resolve a grievance, as part of a process known as sulha) to other tribes or clans in their confederation (qabila). Marrying women to strangers, let alone foreigners, is just not done. AQ, with their hyper-reductionist version of “Islam” stripped of cultural content, discounted the tribes’ view as ignorant, stupid and sinful.
This led to violence, as these things do: AQI killed a sheikh over his refusal to give daughters of his tribe to them in marriage, which created a revenge obligation (tha’r) on his people, who attacked AQI. The terrorists retaliated with immense brutality, killing the children of a prominent sheikh in a particularly gruesome manner, witnesses told us. This was the last straw, they said, and the tribes rose up. Neighboring clans joined the fight, which escalated as AQI (who had generally worn out their welcome through high-handedness) tried to crush the revolt through more atrocities. Soon the uprising took off, spreading along kinship lines through Anbar and into neighboring provinces.
Other tribesmen told me women weren’t the only issue. The tribes run smuggling, import/export and construction businesses which AQI shut down, took over, or disrupted through violent disturbances that were “bad for business”. Another factor was the belief, widespread among the tribes (and with at least some basis in fact) that AQI has links to, and has received funding and support from, Iran. In their view, women were simply the spark – AQI already “had it coming”. (Out in the wild western desert, things often tend to play out like The Sopranos… except that AQI changed the rules of the game by adding roadside bombs, beheadings, murder of children and death by torture. Eventually, enough was enough for the locals.)
Current Situation
Several major tribes are now “up” against AQ, across all of Anbar, Diyala, Salah-ad-din, parts of Babil and Baghdad (both city and province). Some in Anbar and Diyala have formed “Salvation Councils”, looking to well-known leadership figures like Sheikh Sittar ar Rishawi, or to community leaders. In other provinces things tend to be quite informal, based on local elders. In Anbar the movement has acquired the name “the awakening”.
The uprising against AQI has dramatically improved security. In Ramadi, Hit, Tikrit, Fallujah and other centers the rate of civilian deaths has dropped precipitously, and overall attacks are down far below historic trends, to almost nothing in some places. For anyone familiar with these places from earlier in the war, it can be quite disorienting to watch Iraqis walking safely and openly in streets which, a year ago, would have required a major operation just to traverse. This change seems to have passed some observers by, but it is one of the truly significant developments in Iraq this year. For example, a recent Washington Post article begins with a Staff Sergeant who was not expecting combat, “after many uneventful months in Iraq's Anbar province, as he jostled over the rough terrain of brush, fields and irrigation ditches in the lead Humvee of a routine patrol on the night of June 30”. Many uneventful months in Anbar? Not expecting combat? A routine patrol – at night? This is not the Anbar we think we know, a media byword for constant pointless violence.
Other provinces are experiencing similar patterns: in one farming district south of Baghdad, a treaty between an enterprising company commander and community elders has dramatically reduced bombings: by late May, one road that was attacked twice a day last year had not seen a single IED attack since the agreement was established in March. The locals have formed a neighborhood watch, are policing their own community, and are enrolling in the Iraqi police under government control and cooperating with local Iraqi Army units. And recently Shi’a tribes in the south have approached us, looking to cooperate with the government against Shi’a extremists.
Of course, this is motivated primarily by self-interest. Tribal leaders realize the extremists were leading them on a path to destruction, and have seized the opportunity to dump the terrorists and come in from the cold. They are also, naturally, looking forward to the day when coalition forces are no longer in their districts, and want to ensure that they, nor AQI, are in charge once we leave. And many of the tribal leaders have realized for themselves what our Army, Marines and Special Forces commanders have been telling them for years: “If you don’t like having us around, and you want us to get off your backs, the solution is staring you in the face: just get rid of the extremists, reduce the violence and cooperate with the government to stabilize your area, and we’re out of here”.
Internal tribal dynamics also play a part. Many older leaders, who consider themselves the true heads of clans or tribes, fled Iraq in 2003 because they were implicated in dealings with Saddam, and are now in exile in Syria or Jordan. The on-the-ground leaders are a younger generation, concerned to cement their positions vis-à-vis the old men in Damascus, who may one day want to return. By joining forces with the government, these leaders have acquired a source of patronage which they can re-direct to their people, cementing themselves in power and bolstering their personal positions.
Again, this is utterly standard behavior for tribal leaders pretty much anywhere in the Arab world: you can trust a tribal leader 100% – to follow his tribe’s and his own interests. And that’s OK. Call me cynical, but I tend to trust self-interest, group identity and revenge as reliable motivations – more so than protestations of aspirational democracy, anyway. In Iraq these motivations have proven very robust, especially when reinforced by bonds forged in fighting a common enemy alongside our forces and the government. Provided they are under Iraqi government control (a non-trivial proviso), “neighborhood watch” groups motivated by community loyalty and enlightened self-interest are not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, since the uprising has so far resulted in a significant drop in violence and a substantial increase (on the order of 30,000 people) in the number of Iraqis actively lining up with the government and the coalition to defend communities against extremists, it may turn out be a very good thing indeed.
The Baghdad Variant
An interesting variation on the general theme has arisen in Baghdad city. Baghdad, of course, is not tribal as such. But urbanization in Iraq is a relatively recent phenomenon, occurring mainly over the past 20 years or so – for example, around half the people living in Baghdad today belong to families that came to the city since the 1980s. This means many urban Iraqis still have close kinship relationships with rural tribes, and still have relatives living in their ancestral villages with whom they keep in touch. In several districts, community leaders (often the Sunni imams of local mosques) have turned against AQI in their areas. In these districts, which include Ameriya, Ghazaliya, Abu Ghraib and others, communities have formed neighborhood watch organizations, established access controls to prevent people from outside the district coming in without proper authorization and driven out terrorist cells. They are now providing information to the Iraqi and Coalition security forces, protecting their own families and conducting joint patrols and operations alongside the Iraqi army and police, both by day and night. This has happened most often in Sunni-majority districts, and locals have partnered with Shi’a dominated security forces in most cases (somewhat giving the lie to assertions that Sunni populations won’t ever work with Shia-dominated security forces: they often will, but the conditions – primarily some kind of honest broker, a relationship of trust between key individuals, or formal safeguards – have to be right). Coalition forces have provided support to the community and to Iraqi forces operating in the area, and hence tend to play the role of honest broker.
In Baghdad the revolt is based on informal district power structures that evolved through the intense period of sectarian cleansing that so damaged the city and its people in 2006. Having said that, we often find leaders who are acting in a community capacity but also have family ties or other links to the tribes who have rebelled against AQI. In one district Sunni imams were constantly being targeted for intimidation and violence by AQ – there was a spate of mosque bombings in May and June, for example, targeting imams deemed too moderate by the takfiri terrorists. These imams, working with local elders, banded together to drive out AQ. But to do so, they brought in a military advisor from another district, known to one of them through his tribal connections, who was also connected to one of the main tribes currently fighting AQI outside Baghdad. So while the surface level of activity in Baghdad is not so obviously tribal, clan connections, kinship links and the alliances they foster still play a key underlying role.
For its part, the Government of Iraq has chosen to work closely with these groups as a means to secure key districts and build partnerships with communities. This took a great deal of political courage, since many of those now fighting AQI are former adversaries of the government, or even current political opponents of the Da’wa Party and the Maliki cabinet. Part of the government’s motivation was almost certainly a desire to take credit for security progress, and there is still a degree of suspicion among some Iraqi political leaders (for good reasons discussed below). But in practical terms, on the ground, the Government’s policies have resulted in fewer civilian casualties, a drop in numbers of attacks, a much less permissive operating environment for terrorists, and the freeing up of Iraqi army and police units who would otherwise have been tied down in static guard duties. So on balance, the results are positive so far in my view.
Prospects
Having said all that, it is clear that the tribal revolt could still go either way.
The strategic logic, from our point of view, is relatively straightforward. Our dilemma in Iraq is, and always has been, finding a way to create a sustainable security architecture that does not require the “coalition-in-the-loop”, thereby allowing Iraq to stabilize and the coalition to disengage in favorable strategic circumstances. But taking the coalition out of the loop and into “overwatch” requires balancing competing armed interest groups, at the national and local level. These are currently not in balance, due in part to the sectarian bias of certain players and institutions of the new Iraqi state, which promotes a belief by Sunnis that they will be permanent victims in the new Iraq. This belief creates space for terrorist groups including AQI, and these groups in turn drive a cycle of sectarian violence that keeps Iraq unstable and prevents us disengaging. (There are several other drivers of violence, of course, but this one of the most significant ones).
AQI’s “pitch” to the Sunni community is based on the argument that only al Qa’ida stands between the Sunnis and a Shi’a-led genocide. The presence of local Sunni security forces – which protect their own communities but do not attack the Shi’a – gives the lie to this claim, undercuts AQI’s appeal, and reassures Sunni leaders that they will not be permanently victimized in a future Iraq. It may thus make such leaders more willing to engage in the political process, functioning as an informal confidence-building measure, and it may help marginalize al Qa’ida. This might represent a step toward an intra-communal “balance of power” that could potentially be quite stable over time. On the Shi’a side, AQI represents a bogey-man that extremist groups like Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM, Muqtada al-Sadr’s group) exploit to gain public acquiescence: their pitch is “we are all that stands between you and AQI”. By reducing the AQI threat, the tribal uprising also therefore undercuts JAM’s appeal. And as mentioned, Shi’a tribes have recently begun to turn against JAM and other Shi’a extremists also, with the potential to further reduce the level of intra-communal violence and bring non-sectarian Shi’a into the political process, marginalizing extremists and Iranian agents.
All this means that correctly handled, with appropriate safeguards, and in partnership with the Iraqi government, the current social “wave” of Sunni communities turning against AQI could provide one element in the self-sustaining security architecture we have been seeking. And if the recent spread of the uprising into the Shi’a community continues, we might end up with a revolt of the center against both extremes, which would be a truly major development. On the positive side of the ledger, some benefits of the tribal uprising are that it:
• Relieves coalition and Iraqi forces of garrison and local security requirements, freeing up forces for maneuver against insurgents and terrorists, and thus redresses to a significant extent our lack of coalition force troop numbers in Iraq;
• May help create a self-regulating security architecture, making population groups “self-securing” and thus providing a stable platform for redeployment of coalition forces out of these districts with less risk that insurgents might re-infiltrate into them once we leave;
• Provides the Sunni population with a security guarantee that helps marginalize AQI, while deterring Shi’a extremist groups that may seek to attack Sunni districts; and
• Taps into traditional approaches based on social and political structures that many Iraqis are comfortable with – it goes with, rather than against the grain of Iraqi society.